



Routledge Handbook of Media, Conflict and Security

Edited by Piers Robinson, Philip Seib and
Romy Fröhlich

ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF MEDIA, CONFLICT AND SECURITY

This handbook links the growing body of media and conflict research with the field of security studies.

The academic sub-field of media and conflict has developed and expanded greatly over the past two decades. Operating across a diverse range of academic disciplines, academics are studying the impact the media has on governments pursuing war, responses to humanitarian crises and violent political struggles, and the role of the media as a facilitator of, and a threat to, both peace building and conflict prevention. This handbook seeks to consolidate existing knowledge by linking the body of conflict and media studies with work in security studies. The handbook is arranged into five parts:

- Theory and principles
- Media, the state and war
- Media and human security
- Media and policymaking within the security state
- New issues in security and conflict and future directions.

For scholars of security studies, this handbook will provide a key point of reference for state-of-the-art scholarship concerning the media–security nexus; for scholars of communication and media studies, the handbook will provide a comprehensive mapping of the media–conflict field.

Piers Robinson is Professor of Politics, Society and Political Journalism at the University of Sheffield, UK.

Philip Seib is Professor of Journalism and Public Diplomacy and Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California, USA.

Romy Fröhlich is Professor of Communication Science and Media Research at Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich, Germany.

This page intentionally left blank

ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF MEDIA, CONFLICT AND SECURITY

*Edited by Piers Robinson,
Philip Seib and Romy Fröhlich*

First published 2017
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2017 selection and editorial material, Piers Robinson, Philip Seib
and Romy Fröhlich; individual chapters, the contributors

The right of the editors to be identified as the authors of the editorial
material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been
asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical,
or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including
photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or
retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks
or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and
explanation without intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Robinson, Piers, 1970- editor. | Seib, Philip M., 1949-
editor. | Fröhlich, Romy, editor.

Title: Routledge handbook of media, conflict and security / edited by
Piers Robinson, Philip Seib and Romy Fröhlich.

Other titles: Handbook of media, conflict and security.

Description: New York, NY : Routledge, 2016. | Includes
bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2016020491 | ISBN 9780415712910 (hardback) |
ISBN 9781315850979 (ebook)

Subjects: LCSH: Mass media and world politics. | Mass media and
war. | Mass media and peace. | Human rights in mass media. | Mass
media--Moral and ethical aspects.

Classification: LCC P96.W62 R68 2016 | DDC 302.23--dc23

LC record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2016020491>

ISBN: 978-0-415-71291-0 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-315-85097-9 (ebk)

Typeset in Bembo

by HWA Text and Data Management, London

CONTENTS

<i>List of illustrations</i>	<i>viii</i>
<i>List of contributors</i>	<i>ix</i>
<i>List of abbreviations and acronyms</i>	<i>xvii</i>
Introduction: media, conflict and security <i>Piers Robinson, Philip Seib and Romy Fröhlich</i>	1
PART I	
Theory and principles	7
1 Secrets and lies: on the ethics of conflict coverage <i>Richard Lance Keeble</i>	9
2 Gender, media and security <i>Romy Fröhlich</i>	22
3 Investigating the culture–media–security nexus <i>Holger Pötzsch</i>	36
4 The media–security nexus: researching ritualized cycles of insecurity <i>Marie Gillespie and Ben O’Loughlin</i>	51
5 Critical perspectives on media and conflict <i>Des Freedman</i>	68
6 Theorising media/state relations and power <i>Philip Hammond</i>	80

PART II	
Media, the state and war	91
7 Visualising war: photojournalism under fire <i>Stuart Allan and Chindu Sreedharan</i>	93
8 Media, war, and public opinion <i>Sean Aday</i>	106
9 Theorizing state–media relations during war and crisis <i>Steven Livingston</i>	118
10 Media, dissent, and anti-war movements <i>Andrew Rojecki</i>	130
11 Public diplomacy: managing narratives versus building relations <i>Craig Hayden</i>	142
12 Mapping a century in media coverage of war and conflict <i>Katy Parry and Peter Goddard</i>	156
PART III	
Media and human security	169
13 Citizen voice in war and conflict reporting <i>Lilie Chouliaraki</i>	171
14 The CNN effect and humanitarian action <i>Piers Robinson</i>	186
15 News coverage, peacemaking and peacebuilding <i>Jake Lynch</i>	197
16 Continuing post-conflict coverage <i>Marie-Soleil Frère</i>	210
17 Media and human rights <i>Ekaterina Balabanova</i>	230
PART IV	
Media and policymaking within the security state	241
18 News media and the intelligence community <i>Vian Bakir</i>	243

19	Covering acts of terrorism <i>Heather Davis Epkins</i>	255
20	Cyber-security and the media <i>Myriam Dunn Cavelty</i>	270
21	Social media, revolution, and the rise of the political bot <i>Samuel C. Woolley and Philip N. Howard</i>	282
PART V		
	New issues in security and conflict and future directions	293
22	Media, the environment, and global security: the case of climate change <i>Neil T. Gavin</i>	295
23	Propaganda and persuasion in contemporary conflict <i>David Miller, Piers Robinson and Vian Bakir</i>	308
24	Communications, human insecurity and the responsibility to protect <i>Simon Cottle</i>	321
25	Conclusion: looking ahead <i>Piers Robinson, Philip Seib and Romy Fröhlich</i>	334
	<i>Index</i>	341

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figures

4.1	The media-security nexus	57
4.2	The media ecology of terror	61
9.1	Cascading activation model	124
10.1	Great deal of confidence in people who run the military	137
16.1	Reporters Without Borders (RSF): scoring from 2002 to 2014	220

Tables

16.1	Reporters Without Borders (RSF) scoring 2002 to 2014	220
16.2	GDP per capita from 1990 to 2014	221
16.3	Variables impacting the media landscape in post-conflict Burundi and DRC	224
21.1	Social media, bots, and political conflict	289
22.1	TV coverage of the 2009 Copenhagen conference. Sunday 6 December–Monday 21 December	299
22.2	TV coverage around the first UN IPCC report. Friday 20 September–Friday 4 October 2013	299
22.3	TV coverage around the second and third UN IPCC reports. Monday 24 March–Sunday 20 April 2014	300

CONTRIBUTORS

Editors

Piers Robinson is Professor of Politics, Society and Political Journalism, Department of Journalism Studies, School of Social Sciences, University of Sheffield. (Previous appointments: Senior Lecturer in International Politics, University of Manchester (2005–2016) and Lecturer in Political Communication, University of Liverpool (1999–2005).) His current research focuses on organised persuasive communication (OPC) and contemporary propaganda. Along with Professor David Miller, Professor Vian Bakir and Professor Christopher Simpson (American University, Washington, DC), he is in the planning stages of setting up an International Institute on OPC and Propaganda. Previous research includes work on media coverage of war (Economic and Social Research Council large grant Principal Investigator) which included the co-authored book *Pockets of Resistance: British News Media, Theory and the 2003 Invasion of Iraq* (Manchester University Press, 2010) and the relationship between news media, foreign policy and humanitarian intervention which included the book *The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention* (Routledge, 2002). His research has been published in journals such as *Political Science Quarterly*, *Journal of Communication*, *American Behavioural Scientist*, *Review of International Studies*, *Journal of Peace Research*, *European Journal of Communication*, *Political Studies*, *Media, War and Conflict* and *Media, Culture and Society*. He served as an editor of the journal *Critical Studies on Terrorism* (2008–2011) and is currently on the editorial boards of *Critical Studies on Terrorism* and *Media, War and Conflict*. He is a member of the ESRC Peer Review College.

Philip Seib is Professor of Journalism and Public Diplomacy and Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California. From 2009 until 2013, he was director of USC's Center on Public Diplomacy. He is author or editor of numerous books, including *The Al Jazeera Effect*; *Global Terrorism and New Media*; *Al Jazeera English*; *Real-Time Diplomacy*; *Religion and Public Diplomacy*; and *The Future of Diplomacy*. He writes frequently for *Huffington Post* and is editor/co-editor of two academic book series and founding co-editor of the journal *Media, War, and Conflict*.

Romy Fröhlich is Professor of Communication Science and Media Research at Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Munich. Her research interests centre on news theory/research, gender studies, persuasive communication/public relations (PR), conflict and media, and content analysis. She was a Visiting Scholar at Ohio State University (USA), University of Newcastle (Australia) and University of Melbourne (Australia). Her areas of expertise include the influence of PR on journalism; representation of women in media and PR (she co-edited *Women Journalists in the Western World*); and research on war, gender and media. She is co-PI of the only longitudinal content analysis of media coverage on war (cf. EJC, 2010) and is currently coordinating a European Union project on media in violent conflicts (INFOCORE). From 1998 to 2006, she was vice president/president of the German Communication Association (DGPUK). She is member of the editorial board of *Communication, Culture & Critique*, on the international advisory board of *Journalism & Mass Communication Editor*, and on the review boards of *Corporate Communication* and *Studies in Communication Sciences*.

Contributors

Sean Aday is an Associate Professor of Media and Public Affairs and International Affairs at The George Washington (GW) University. He received his PhD and conducted a post-doctoral fellowship at the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania. His work focuses on the intersection of the press, politics and public opinion, especially in relation to war and foreign policy. He has published widely on subjects ranging from the effects of watching local television news to coverage of American politics to media coverage of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. He has been involved in media and government capacity training projects globally, including in Iraq and Afghanistan. He serves as the director of GW's Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication and directs the Global Communication Master's Program. He is currently part of a research team at GW, funded by the US Institute of Peace, studying the role of new media in protest politics and democracy movements globally. He has been a frequent commentator in the press on news coverage of elections, crime and war. He did his undergraduate work at Northwestern University's Medill School of Journalism and worked at several newspapers before entering academia.

Stuart Allan is Professor of Journalism and Communication, as well as Head of the School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies (JOMEC) at Cardiff University, UK. Stuart's publications include the authored book *Citizen Witnessing: Revisioning Journalism in Times of Crisis* (Polity Press, 2013), as well as journal articles and book chapters on different aspects of war, conflict and crisis imagery. He is particularly interested in the evolving relationship between professional and amateur or citizen news photographers, ranging from the mid-nineteenth century to the digital photo-reportage of today. He is currently writing a book on this topic, as well as conducting research on mobile technologies and civic engagement.

Vian Bakir is Professor in Political Communication and Journalism at Bangor University, Wales, UK. Her research interests lie at the intersections of journalism, risk and political communication within digital media ecologies. She is author of *Torture, Intelligence and Sousveillance in the War on Terror: Agenda-Building Struggles* (Routledge, 2013) and *Sousveillance, Media and Strategic Political Communication: Iraq, USA, UK* (Continuum, 2010). She is guest editor of *International Journal of Press/Politics* (2015) Special Issue on News, Agenda-Building

& Intelligence Agencies, and co-editor of *Communication in the Age of Suspicion: Trust and the Media* (2007). She is Principal Investigator on Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Seminar Series (2014-16), *DATA - PSST! Debating and Assessing Transparency Arrangements: Privacy, Security, Surveillance, Trust* (see <http://data-psst.bangor.ac.uk/>). She is also Principal Investigator on ESRC Impact Project Grant (2016-17), *Political-Intelligence Elites: Towards Better Public Accountability through a Co-created Benchmark for Civil Society*.

Ekaterina Balabanova is Senior Lecturer in Political Communication at the University of Liverpool, UK. Her research interests lie at the intersection of international politics and international communication. Her work has a particular focus on the relationship between news media and politics, the media's role in humanitarian crises and war, and the communication of conflict and she has published extensively on these topics. Her most recent work has broadened to incorporate the interplay between media and human rights, and the impact of non-governmental organizations on public debates, the policy agenda and public understanding of human rights issues. Her latest book, *The Media and Human Rights: The Cosmopolitan Promise*, was published in 2014 by Routledge. She is currently working on a manuscript which relates to ongoing research interests in media coverage of migration and free movement across Europe.

Lilie Chouliaraki is Professor of Media and Communication at the London School of Economics and Political Science. She has written extensively on discourse theory and analysis, media ethics (particularly the problem of mediated suffering), digital journalism and human rights/humanitarian communication. She is the author or editor of seven books, including *Discourse in Late Modernity. Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis* (Edinburgh University Press, 1999), *The Spectatorship of Suffering* (Sage, 2006/2011) and *The Ironic Spectator. Solidarity in the Age of Post-humanitarianism* (Polity, 2013; Outstanding Book Award 2015, International Communication Association).

Simon Cottle is former Head of School, School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies (JOMEC) at Cardiff University (2013–2015) and Head of the Media and Communications program, University of Melbourne. He is the author of many books on media, globalization and the communication conflicts, crises and catastrophes. Most recently these include *Mediatized Conflicts* (Open University Press, 2006), *Global Crisis Reporting* (2009), *Transnational Protests and the Media* (ed. with L. Lester; Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 2011), *Disasters and the Media* (with M. Pantti and K. Wahl-Jorgensen, Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 2012), *Humanitarianism, Communications and Change* (ed. with G. Cooper; Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 2015) and *Reporting Dangerously: Journalist Killings, Intimidation and Security* (with R. Sambrook and N. Mosdell; Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). He is Series Editor for the Global Crises and Media Series for the publisher Peter Lang. He is currently thinking about the history of violence and communications and the possible leverage that communications can help to secure in the globalizing present and in contexts of human insecurity and imminent atrocity.

Heather Davis Epkins, PhD, is the current Director of Communication and Media Relations for the Office of the State's Attorney in Anne Arundel County, Maryland, USA. She serves as a frequent source for the press on various public safety issues. Prior to this role, Heather was a Visiting Assistant Professor in the Communication Department at the University of Maryland, College Park, with a research focus on media coverage of terrorism and the influence of

government public relations on terrorism media coverage. She also served as a Lecturer for both Johns Hopkins University (Media Theory/Media Effects) and Towson University (Public Communication). She is a former journalist and Capitol Hill Press Secretary. With more than twenty years of high-visibility positions in media and public relations, Heather has personally interviewed most of the national security journalists from major media outlets in Washington, D.C., for her ongoing research. Heather was invited to submit her research for a special edition of *Media, War, & Conflict*, edited by Dr. Maura Conway of Dublin City University, entitled “Working the ‘front lines’ in Washington, D.C.: Digital age terrorism reporting by national security prestige press.” Heather is a former Fellow, Lecturer, and curriculum developer for the START Center (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism) – a Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence – and has presented her research internationally. She recently co-authored a book chapter (Palgrave MacMillan) on the long-term impact of 9/11 on national security and travel into the United States, and worked on a successful campaign to pass U.S. federal legislation regarding national border security. Her fields of interest include political communication, public relations, journalism/crisis reporting, representation of women in media and PR, and media theory – particularly the intersection of media and acts of terrorism. Heather is based near Washington, D.C. and can be found on the Twitter handle @heatherepkins.

Myriam Dunn Cavelty is Senior Lecturer for Security Studies and Deputy Head of Research and Teaching at the Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich. She has been a guest lecturer at the School of Public Policy, Central European University, Budapest and the Austrian Federal Security Academy, Vienna and leader of a research project at stiftung neue verantwortung, Berlin. Her research focuses on the politics of risk and uncertainty in security politics and changing conceptions of international security due to cyber issues – cyber-security, cyber-war and critical infrastructure protection in particular. In addition to her teaching, research and publishing activities, she advises governments, international institutions and companies in the areas of cyber-security, cyber-warfare, critical infrastructure protection, risk analysis and strategic foresight.

Des Freedman is Professor of Media and Communications at Goldsmiths, University of London. He is the author of *The Contradictions of Media Power* (Bloomsbury Academic, 2014) and *The Politics of Media Policy* (2008) and co-author (with James Curran and Natalie Fenton) of *Misunderstanding the Internet* (Routledge, 2016, 2nd edition). He is co-editor (with Daya Thussu) of *Media and Terrorism: Global Perspectives* (SAGE Publications, 2011) and *War and the Media: Reporting Conflict 24/7* (SAGE Publications, 2003). He has published widely on media policy and politics and is an editor of the SAGE journal, *Global Media and Communication*, as well as the former chair of the Media Reform Coalition.

Marie-Soleil Frère is Senior Researcher at the National Fund for Scientific Research in Belgium and teaches at the Department of Information and Communication Sciences at the University of Brussels (ULB). Since 2009, she has been the director of the Research Centre in Information and Communication (ReSIC) at ULB. Her research focuses on the role played by the media in democratic processes, conflicts, elections and social change in Francophone sub-Saharan Africa. Her background and experience has always combined an academic career with the management of media development projects, mainly in Burkina Faso and in the African Great Lakes. Her recent books include *Elections and the Media in Post-conflict Africa: Votes and Voices for Peace* (Zed Books, 2011) and *The Media and Conflicts in Central Africa* (Lynne Rienner, 2007).

Neil T. Gavin is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Liverpool, UK. His research interests straddle public opinion modelling, methodology and media coverage of the economy and Europe. His area of research expertise is the mediation of climate change, with emphasis on the web, television and the press. He is currently in receipt of funding to establish a machine-readable archive of broadcast news transcripts. He is co-founder and co-chair of the Media, Communication and Cultural Studies Association's 'Climate Change, Environment and Sustainability' network of scholars. For several years now he has been on the international editorial boards of *Journalism: Theory, Practice and Criticism* and *Environmental Communication*.

Marie Gillespie is Professor of Sociology at The Open University and Co-Director of the Centre for Research on Socio-Cultural Change. Her research interests include: globalisation and culture; media, migration and transnationalism; and South Asian and Middle Eastern diasporas. She is an ethnographer interested in methodological design and innovation. Her book *Diasporas and Diplomacy: Cosmopolitan Contact Zones at the BBC World Service 1932-2012* is based on historical and comparative AHRC-funded research on international broadcasting (<http://www.open.ac.uk/researchprojects/diasporas/>). Other research projects include *Shifting Securities: News Cultures Before and After the Iraq War 2002* (www.mediatingsecurity.com) and a national survey on the changing face of British humour with the BBC (<http://www.open2.net/lennysbritain/index.html>). Marie was awarded an AHRC Translating Cultures Fellowship to research the Art of Intercultural Dialogue and further AHRC funding for a project on methods for assessing cultural value. Current research projects include: Refugee Journeys, Smart Phones and Social Media Networks with France Medias Monde and Deutsche Welle, and a comparative study of UK and German soft power with the British Council and Goethe Institute. Her publications can be found at http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/main/staff/people-profile.php?name=marie_gillespie.

Peter Goddard is Senior Lecturer in Media and Communication in the Department of Communication and Media, University of Liverpool. His current research interests include broadcasting history, journalism and documentary, with a particular focus on television current affairs programming and the representation of historical subjects in film and television documentary. His work has been published widely and he is co-author of *Pockets of Resistance: British News Media, War and Theory in the 2003 Invasion of Iraq* (Manchester University Press, 2010) and of *Public Issue Television: World in Action 1963-98* (Manchester University Press, 2007), as well as editor of *Popular Television in Authoritarian Europe* (Manchester University Press, 2013).

Philip Hammond is Professor of Media and Communications at London South Bank University, where he is Director of Research for the School of Arts and Creative Industries. His books include *Degraded Capability: The Media and the Kosovo Crisis* (co-edited with Edward Herman; Pluto Press, 2000), *Media, War and Postmodernity* (Routledge, 2007), *Framing Post-Cold War Conflicts* (Manchester University Press, 2007) and the edited volume *Screens of Terror* (Abramis, 2011). He is currently working on a co-authored study of how campaigning around the issue of climate change reveals the new dynamics of post-political communication, and is co-convenor of the European Wargame research group.

Craig Hayden is Senior Professorial Lecturer at the American University School of International Service, and scholar of media technology, diplomacy and international communication. Craig's research focuses on public diplomacy and strategic communication,

soft power and media technology in foreign policy. Craig was a Research Fellow at the University of Southern California Center on Public Diplomacy (2012–2014) and the co-founder of the International Studies Association Working Group on Public Diplomacy. His current project, *Diplomatic Convergence: Technology, Public Diplomacy, and the Mediation of Influence* (under contract with Oxford University Press) explores the transformative potential of digital media on public diplomacy. He is the author of *The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public Diplomacy in Global Contexts* (Lexington Books, 2011). Craig Hayden holds a PhD in Communication from the USC Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism, and an MA in International Relations from the USC School of International Relations.

Philip N. Howard is a professor and writer. He has written numerous empirical research articles, published in a number of disciplines, on the use of digital media for social control in both democracies and authoritarian regimes. He holds faculty appointments at the University of Washington and Oxford University, and is a fellow at Columbia University's Tow Center for Digital Journalism. From 2013 to 2015 he worked at Central European University in Budapest, where he helped found a new School of Public Policy and was Director of the Center for Media, Data and Society. He is the recipient of a European Research Council Consolidator award for his study of algorithms and public life. He investigates the impact of digital media on political life around the world, and he is a frequent commentator on global media and political affairs. He has published eight books and over 100 academic articles, book chapters, conference papers and commentary essays. He is the author, most recently, of *Pax Technica: How the Internet of Things May Set Us Free or Lock Us Up* (Yale University Press, 2015). His BA is in political science from Innis College at the University of Toronto, his MSc is in economics from the London School of Economics, and his PhD is in sociology from Northwestern University. He has held senior academic posts at Stanford, Princeton and Columbia universities. His website is philhoward.org, and he tweets from @pnhoward.

Richard Lance Keeble has been Professor of Journalism at the University of Lincoln since 2003. Before that he was the Executive Editor of the *Teacher*, the weekly newspaper of the National Union of Teachers and he lectured at City University London for nineteen years. He has written and edited 35 publications on a wide range of subjects including peace journalism, literary journalism, communication ethics, practical reporting skills, George Orwell, the coverage of US/UK militarism and the links between the intelligence services and Fleet Street. He is also joint editor of *Ethical Space: The International Journal of Communication Ethics* and the winner of a National Teacher Fellowship in 2011 – the highest prize for teachers in higher education. He is chair of the Orwell Society. In June 2014, he was given a Lifetime Achievement Award by the Association for Journalism Education, the body that links university journalism teachers in the UK.

Steven Livingston is Professor of Media and Public Affairs and International Affairs with appointments in the School of Media and Public Affairs (SMPA) and the Elliott School of International Affairs (ESIA) at The George Washington University. His research and teaching focus on information and communication technology, security, development and governance. Among other publications, Livingston has written *The Terrorism Spectacle* (Westview Press, 1994); and *When the Press Fails: Political Power and the News Media from Iraq to Katrina* (W. Lance Bennett and Regina Lawrence, co-authors; University of Chicago Press, 2007). With Gregor Walter-Drop he edited *Bits and Atoms: Information and Communication Technology in Areas of Limited Statehood* (Oxford University Press, 2014), *Africa's Evolving Infosystems: A Pathway to Security and*

Stability (NDU Press, 2011), *Africa's Information Revolution: Implications for Crime, Policing, and Citizen Security* (NDU Press, 2013) and *Bits and Atoms: Information and Communication Technology in Areas of Limited Statehood*, with Gregor Walter-Drop, (Oxford University Press, 2014).

Jake Lynch is an Associate Professor and Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Sydney, and a Senior Research Fellow at the School of Communication at the University of Johannesburg. He has also held Visiting Fellowships at Bristol University, and the School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies at Cardiff University. Prior to taking up an academic post, Jake enjoyed a near twenty-year career in journalism, with roles as a Political Correspondent for Sky News, at Westminster, as the Sydney Correspondent for the *Independent* newspaper and an on-air presenter for BBC World Television News. Jake is the most published and most cited author in the field of peace journalism. He has also devised and led training courses for editors and reporters, for the past seventeen years, in countries including Indonesia, the Philippines, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, for clients including many major development agencies. He won an Australian Research Council Linkage grant, in partnership with the International Federation of Journalists and the aid agency, Act for Peace, to investigate a global standard for reporting conflict, showing differential audience responses to war journalism and peace journalism versions of familiar television news stories of conflict, in four countries. For two years to 2012 he served as Secretary General of the International Peace Research Association, whose biennial global conference he hosted and organized in Sydney in 2010.

David Miller is Professor of Sociology in the Department of Social & Policy Sciences at the University of Bath. From 2013 to 2016 he was RCUK Global Uncertainties Leadership Fellow leading a project on understanding and explaining terrorism expertise in practice. David is interested in understanding power: who has it, how it is exercised and how it can be democratized. He is mostly interested in studying the powerful and is interested in a wide range of methods for doing so, including via investigative research, which he pursues with a range of collaborators. Recent publications include: *Impact of Market Forces on Addictive Substances and Behaviours: The Web of Influence of Addictive Industries* (co-author, Oxford University Press, 2016); *The Israel Lobby and the European Union* (co-author, Public Interest Investigations, 2016); *Stretching the Sociological Imagination: Essays in Honour of John Eldridge* (co-editor, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); *How Israel Attempts to Mislead the United Nations: Deconstructing Israel's Campaign against the Palestinian Return Centre* (co-author, Public Interest Investigations, 2015); and *The Henry Jackson Society and the Degeneration of British Neoconservatism* (co-author, Public Interest Investigations, 2015).

Ben O'Loughlin is Professor of International Relations and Co-Director of the New Political Communication Unit at Royal Holloway, University of London. He is co-editor of the SAGE journal, *Media, War & Conflict*. His latest book is *Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order* (Routledge, 2013). He was Specialist Advisor to the UK Parliament's Committee on Soft Power, producing the report *Power and Persuasion in the Modern World*. He has received grants to research media and conflict from the European Commission, UK Economic and Social Research Council, Technology Strategy Board, Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure and the British Council.

Katy Parry is Lecturer in Media and Communication at the University of Leeds. Her work focuses on visual politics and how 'frames of war' circulate in public culture. She is a

co-author of *Pockets of Resistance* (Manchester University Press, 2010) with Piers Robinson, Peter Goddard, Craig Murray and Philip Taylor, and *Political Culture and Media Genre: Beyond the News* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) with Kay Richardson and John Corner. Along with Stephen Coleman and Giles Moss, she has co-edited a Festschrift for Jay G. Blumler, *Can the Media Serve Democracy?* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

Holger Pötzsch is Associate Professor in Media and Documentation Science at UiT Tromsø, Norway. He holds an MA in Peace and Conflict Studies and a PhD in Media and Documentation Science. His main research interests are 1) audio-visual war culture (in particular war films and games), 2) contemporary technologies of bordering, 3) the interrelation between cultural expressions and collective memory, as well as 4) new materialist approaches to media studies. Pötzsch has been involved as a researcher in the Border Aesthetics project funded by the Norwegian Research Council (2010–12) and in the FP7 project EUBORDERSCAPES funded by the European Commission (2013–16). He currently leads the development of the international research project WAR/GAME and coordinates the ENCODE-research group at UiT Tromsø.

Andrew Rojecki is Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Illinois at Chicago. He studies political communication in three contexts: political movements, racial politics and globalization. He is the author of *Silencing the Opposition* (University of Illinois Press, 1999) and co-author (with Robert Entman) of *The Black Image in the White Mind* (University of Chicago Press, 2000). *The Black Image* won the Goldsmith Book Prize awarded by the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University (2002) and the American Political Science Association Robert E. Lane Award for the best book in political psychology (2001). His most recent book, *America and the Politics of Insecurity* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016), analyses the impact of the disruptions of globalization on American politics. Professor Rojecki has published in *Critical Studies in Communication; Media, Culture, and Society; New Media and Society*; and *Political Communication*.

Chindu Sreedharan is a Senior Lecturer in Journalism and Communication, and the programme leader for MA Media and Communication at the School of Journalism, English and Communication, Bournemouth University, UK. A former journalist, his research interests include crisis reporting, literary journalism and social media. He is the author of *Epic Retold*, an experimental novel written for Twitter.

Samuel C. Woolley is a PhD researcher in the Department of Communication at the University of Washington (UW). His work focuses on the intersection of politics, digital culture and automation. His current project explores the global usage of political bots – software programs used to mimic human social media users in attempts to manipulate public opinion. Sam is the project manager of ComProp at the Oxford Internet Institute, the Political Bots Project at the University of Washington, and COSEED at the Pacific Social Architecting Corporation. He is a graduate fellow at UW Law's Tech Policy Center and a former fellow at the Center for Media, Data and Society at Central European University. He is a researcher on the Digital Activism Research Project, the New Pathways to Data Science Project and at the Center for Communication and Civic Engagement. His work has been featured in several academic publications as well as commentary venues like Motherboard, Slate, Tech Insider and The Week. Sam is based in Seattle and tweets from @samuelwoolley.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ABC	Crispin Aubrey, Dave Berry and Duncan Campbell
AI	Amnesty International
AP	Associated Press
API	application programming interface
ARPANET	Advanced Research Projects Agency Network
ARM	Audience Research and Measurement (USA)
BIF	Burundian Franc
BSC	Broadcasting Standards Commission
CENTCOM	United States Central Command
CEO	chief executive officer
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIIP	critical information infrastructure protection
CIO	chief information officer
CNC	National Communication Council (Burundi)
CO ₂	carbon dioxide
CONAFED	National Committee for Women and Development (DRC)
CPJ	Committee to Protect Journalists
CSAC	Higher Council for Communication and Broadcasting (DRC)
DARPA	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DoD	Department of Defense (USA)
DORA	Defence of the Realm Act (UK)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECA	Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs (USA)
ESRC	Economic and Social Research Council
EU	European Union
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GCHQ	Government Communications Headquarters
GDP	gross domestic product
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GHA	Global Humanitarian Assistance

List of abbreviations and acronyms

HAM	High Authority of the Media (DRC)
HMG	Her Majesty's Government (UK)
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICHRP	International Council on Human Rights Policy
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICT	information and communication technology
IIP	International Information Programs bureau (USA)
INGO	international non-governmental organization
IPCC	Independent Panel on Climate Change
IS	Islamic State
ISIS	Islamic State/Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham
IT	information technology
JED	Journaliste en Danger (DRC)
MI5	The Security Service (UK)
MI6	Secret Intelligence Service (UK)
MIME-NET	military-industrial-media-entertainment network
MoI	Ministry of Information (UK)
MOMO	Monitoring center of the Organization on the Media in Central Africa
MOOC	Massive Open Online Course
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEFA	Nine/Eleven Finding Answers
NGO	non-governmental organization
NPR	National Public Radio (USA)
NSA	National Security Agency
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OMEC	Observatory of the Congolese Media
OPB	Observatoire des Médias Burundais
OPC	organised persuasive communication
OSP	Office of Special Plans (USA)
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PM	propaganda model
PR	public relations
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RCK	Radio Communautaire du Katanga (DRC)
RFI	Radio France Internationale
RT	Russia Today
RTL	Radio Mille Collines (Rwanda)
RTNB	Radio Télévision Nationale du Burundi
RTNC	Radio Télévision Nationale Congolaise
RWB	Reporters Without Borders
SDS	Students for a Democratic Society
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SIS	Secret Intelligence Service (UK)
SMS	Short Message Service
TTIP	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
UCTF	Ukraine Communication Task Force

List of abbreviations and acronyms

UDHR	Universal Declaration on Human Rights
UN	United Nations
UNCHR	United Nations Commission on Human Rights
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNPC	National Union of the Congolese Press
UNSC	United Nations Security
UPC	Union of the Congolese Press
USD	US dollar
USIA	United States Information Agency
WMD	weapons of mass destruction
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

This page intentionally left blank

INTRODUCTION

Media, conflict and security

Piers Robinson, Philip Seib and Romy Fröhlich

The academic sub-field of media and conflict has developed and expanded at a phenomenal rate over the past two decades. Operating across an unusually diverse range of academic fields, including political science, communications, journalism and media studies, cultural studies, international relations, sociology and psychology, scholars have engaged with a wide variety of issues concerning media and violent conflict. In no particular order of importance, academics have studied the ways in which news media has both enabled and constrained governments pursuing war, the role of the media as a catalyst for attempts to respond to humanitarian crises, the ways in which actors involved in violent political struggle and terrorism have exploited communication tools to further their aims, and the role of media as a facilitator of, and a threat to, both peace building and conflict prevention. Underpinning this diverse and eclectic body of research is the recognition of the centrality of media and communications to our understanding of security and conflict.

Whilst the intellectual diversity of this field is an undoubted strength, there is also a pressing need to begin a process of facilitating both the consolidation of existing knowledge and the sketching out of the parameters of the sub-field that can provide a location for the array of academics working on media and conflict. The journal *Media, War & Conflict*, launched in 2008, served as an important first step in providing a point of reference for scholars working in this field. This handbook takes the process a step further by linking the body of conflict and media/communication research with the field of security studies. Security studies is a well-established, major sub-field linking political science and international relations scholarship and serves as an intellectual reservoir for concepts, theories and empirical research that covers the full range of scholarly inquiry into matters of conflict and peace. As a discipline, security studies has historically been located as a sub-discipline of international relations (or world politics) and has traditionally focused upon matters of war and conflict. Over time, the field has expanded to include topics such as human security, environmental security and cybersecurity. We make no grand claims with regard to theoretical synthesis, and the chapters in this handbook are primarily concerned with mapping key research areas within existing issue fields. It should also be understood at the outset that this handbook does not attempt to map the entire field of media, communications and conflict with the entirety of security studies: security studies as a whole is about more than just violent conflict. Rather, our focus

is on drawing links between media and conflict scholarship with the field of security studies which, inevitably, means that much of this handbook is about the role of communications and media in relation to *violent* conflict. However, by drawing together the array of topics and issues studies by scholars of media, communications and conflict under the umbrella of 'Media, Conflict and Security' we hope to achieve two goals: one, the provision of security studies with a go-to resource for research on media, communications and conflict and, two, facilitate greater intellectual coherence within the field of media, communication and conflict studies. We shall discuss each in turn.

First, for scholars of security studies this volume serves as an introduction to the array of issue areas that have received substantive intellectual engagement from scholars of media, communication and conflict. This is a valuable exercise in its own right, given that the majority of work in security studies often proceeds with little awareness of the highly relevant and detailed research in communication and media studies which is currently available. For example, a major and longstanding area of inquiry within security studies pertains to the democratic peace thesis and the idea that liberal democracies do not, in general terms, go to war with one another partly because of the ability of domestic media and publics to hold their governments in check. For some of this literature, a critical assumption is that both media and public opinion are sufficiently autonomous so as to allow them to hold governments to account (Maoz and Russett, 1996). Here, however, scholars of media and conflict studies would be quick to point out the frequently subservient position of public and media to elite, or official, positions when it comes to matters of war and conflict, thus problematising at least some of the assumptions underpinning the liberal peace. Indeed, journalism and communication studies have shown that the autonomy of journalists and newsroom work is usually overestimated. It is affected by a variety of partly very different internal and external determinants (cf. for instance Shoemaker and Reese, 1996; Gans, 2003; Preston and Metykova, 2009; Reich and Hanitzsch, 2013). It also varies heavily across time and media organisations/systems (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Moreover, coverage of war and conflict is also shaped by the particularities of the conflict itself and the region of the world where it happens: as Hanitzsch and Hoxha (2014: 12–16) explicate, we need to consider the nature of a conflict (such as the parties involved, issues of dispute, intensity of conflict) as well as the salience of conflict (social and individual involvement, geographical proximity) and conditions for access to the conflict (reporter security, activities of strategic communication actors). In short, scholars of the liberal peace would do well to absorb the theoretically and empirically rich body of research on wartime media–state relations as well as research about influences on news production and on war correspondents in particular.

Again, a similar shortcoming affects poststructuralist-inspired scholarship that occupies the critical security studies fiefdom and which has focused upon the importance of discourse, language and, most recently, visuals in processes of securitisation. As can be seen in a recent history of the field of security studies by Buzan and Hansen (2010: 220–246), discussion of media and communication is integral to this sub-field of security studies, and yet existing media and conflict studies is rarely paid attention to and this failure to read and understand it can lead to serious errors. For example, one strand of the poststructuralist thinking tends to emphasise the uncontrolled and free-flowing nature of information in the Internet era but without paying sufficient attention to the ways in which powerful political and economic actors continue to command and shape information flows. Greater awareness of the literature on media, communication and conflict which highlights the impact of powerful actors on communication processes, the so-called elite-driven paradigm (Robinson et al., 2010), as well as the media, communications and conflict literature which explores the dynamics of

the new media environment (Hoskins and O'Loughlin, 2010), would be of great use in terms of informing this particular critical security studies literature. At the same time it is also the case that media, communication and conflict studies provide rich insights and analyses regarding the role and contribution of 'alternative' journalism that traditionally tries to elude the threats of institutional and/or political information control as well as hierarchical forms of organisation. Alternative journalism has been experiencing an unexpected renaissance via Web 2.0 as 'public' or 'citizen journalism' for instance (cf. Atton and Hamilton, 2008; Atton, 2009). Although the actual influence of those new participatory forms of journalism still remains an open question (Seib, 2012), the new phenomenon potentially challenges our traditional understanding of news values and objectivity and of seemingly immutable arrangements and distributions of communicative power – especially during times of violent conflict and security threats (see also Gilboa, Jumbert, Miklian and Robinson, 2016). In short, media, communications and conflict studies provides a resource rich in terms of analysis and insights which would benefit many scholars of security studies who have, all too often, been unaware of its existence.

With regard to our second goal, the organisational structure of this handbook groups the existing media, communications and conflict literature according to major sub-fields that have emerged across the field of security studies. In doing so, we aim to offer both intellectual coherence to the literature on media, communication and conflict and suggest potential synergies and linkages between it and the field of security studies. So, for example, the chapters in Part II 'Media, the State and War' focus upon war and conflict, whereby war is understood in relatively traditional terms of inter-state violence and large-scale mobilisation of military forces. The chapters here, dealing with subjects such as the relationship between media, public opinion and war (Sean Aday), public diplomacy (Hayden), visuals/photo journalism and war (Allan and Sreedharan), media–state relations in wartime (Steven Livingston plus Katy Parry and Peter Goddard) and anti-war protest (Andrew Rojecki), variously focus upon the ways in which the state is constrained or enabled by media during what are, largely speaking, traditional forms of inter-state conflict and reflect the classic realist focus of security studies which is upon the state and violent conflict. Part III, conversely, reflects the development in security studies toward analysis of human security, as opposed to state security, and here the chapters deal with topics such as citizen voices in conflict (Lilie Chouliaraki), the CNN effect and humanitarian action (Piers Robinson), as well as media and human rights (Ekaterina Balabanova). Of course, it is certainly the case that human security and state security are logically intertwined. However, what is distinctive about these chapters, and the human security agenda within security studies, is the concern with those who are the weakest and most vulnerable during conflict. This section also reflects the less realist-orientated and more progressive liberal strand of security studies concerned with conflict avoidance and conflict resolution, and here we also have chapters on the role of media as a potential peacemaker, peace journalism (Jake Lynch) and the role of media in relation to attempts to resolve long-running conflicts (Marie-Soleil Frère).

Of course, not all security studies pertains to the purely international realm and, reflecting the attention paid by some security scholars to sub-state or intra-state security issues, Part IV contains a number of chapters that capture those issue areas explored by media, communication and conflict scholars which are primarily, or at least largely, concerned with security within the state. Here, chapters on the intelligence services and the media (Vian Bakir), cybersecurity (Myriam Dunn Cavelty), terrorism and the media (Heather Epkins) and the role of social media in generating internal revolutions (Philip Howard and Samuel Woolley) capture a range of critical media dynamics with respect to the security of

the state. Finally, Part V introduces a range of critical new areas of inquiry that rightfully capture significant recent developments relevant to our focus on media, conflict and security, including chapters on media and global environmental crisis (Neil Gavin), contemporary propaganda (David Miller, Piers Robinson and Vian Bakir) and the responsibility to protect doctrine (R2P) (Simon Cottle).

A further contribution to developing intellectual coherence is our 'Theory and principles' section (Part I) which provides a solid understanding of the broad theoretical and conceptual approaches that underpin much of the literature on media, communication and conflict. The chapters here explore normative and ethical issues pertaining to the role of journalism in conflict (Richard Keeble), gender (Romy Fröhlich), both elite and pluralist approaches to understanding media-political dynamics (respectively, Des Freedman's chapter on 'Critical perspectives' and the 'Media-security nexus' by Marie Gillespie and Ben O'Loughlin) as well as cultural studies and popular entertainment approaches (too often ignored by the traditional focus on traditional news media and conflict) (Holger Pötzsch) and postmodern perspectives on the question of media, political actors and power (Phil Hammond). In addition, a concluding chapter, authored by the editors, takes stock of the existing knowledge on media, communications and conflict and identifies key areas that we believe to be in need of further exploration, in particular those areas that existing scholarship has been relatively silent on.

Overall, then, the chapters and their arrangement should serve to organise the currently disparate literature on media, communications and conflict and make clearer its links to the field of security studies. As well as helping scholars of media, communications and conflict to locate their work in relation to security studies, and providing a go-to resource for scholars of security studies who need to know about media and communications research on conflict, the presentation here, we hope, can lead to further self-reflection amongst researchers and greater interdisciplinary cross-fertilisation: security studies has much to learn from the body of work on media and conflict whilst scholars of media, communications and conflict can deepen and widen the reach of their work by engaging more explicitly with security studies scholars. The chapters in this volume privilege no particular epistemological or theoretical vantage point and reflect the full diversity of structuralist, poststructuralist, critical and mainstream research agendas. This volume is a first step in consolidating the field and offering a route to greater intellectual coherence; it will undoubtedly not be the last. We hope that it is of some use.

References

- Atton, C. (2009). Alternative and citizen journalism. In K. Wahl-Jorgensen and T. Hanitzsch (eds), *The Handbook of Journalism Studies* (pp. 265–278). New York: Routledge.
- Atton, C. and Hamilton, J. F. (2008). *Alternative Journalism*. London: Sage.
- Buzan, B. and Hansen, L. (2010). *The Evolution of International Security Studies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gans, H. J. (2003). *Democracy and the News*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gilboa, E., Jumbert, M. G., Miklian, J. and Robinson, P. (2016). Moving media and conflict studies beyond the CNN effect. *Review of International Studies*, 24(4), 654–672. DOI: 10.1017/S026021051600005X. Available online: <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=10215099&fileId=S026021051600005X>
- Hallin, D. C. and Mancini, P. (2004). *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hanitzsch, T. and Hoxha, A. (2014). *News Production: Theory and Conceptual Framework. Generic and conflict influences on the news production process*. Online available: http://www.infocore.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Theoretical-Framing_WP1_News-Productions.pdf, accessed on 20.09.2016.
- Hoskins, A. and O'Loughlin, B. (2010). *War and Media: The emergence of diffused war*. Cambridge: Polity.

- Maoz, Z. and Russett, B. (1996). Normative and structural causes of democratic peace. *American Political Science Review*, 87(3), 625.
- Preston, P. and Metykova, M. (2009). From news to house rules: Organisational contexts. In P. Preston (ed.), *Making the News: Journalism and News Cultures in Europe* (pp. 72–91). London and New York: Routledge.
- Reich, Z. and Hanitzsch, T. (2013). Determinants of journalists' professional autonomy: Individual and national level factors matter more than organizational ones. *Mass Communication and Society*, 16, 133–156. DOI: 10.1080/15205436.2012.669002.
- Robinson, P., Goddard, P., Parry, K., Murray, C. and Taylor, P. (2010). *Pockets of Resistance: British news media and the 2003 invasion of Iraq*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Seib, P. (2012). *Real-Time Diplomacy: Politics and power in the social media era*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Shoemaker, P. J. and Reese, S. D. (1996). *Mediating the Message: Theories of influence on mass media content* (2nd edition). White Plains, NY: Longman.

This page intentionally left blank

PART I

Theory and principles

This page intentionally left blank

1

SECRETS AND LIES

On the ethics of conflict coverage

Richard Lance Keeble

Introduction

This chapter will explore a wide range of ethical issues involved in the reporting of conflict. It will argue that too much of the debate over the ethics of conflict coverage is based (either implicitly or explicitly) on conventional notions of professionalism which leads to a prioritising of issues relating to the mainstream media. Drawing from radical critiques of professionalism, it will aim to relocate the debate within the activist, alternative sphere. It will also explore the studies of and theories relating to the national security state to examine the crucial roles of both the alternative/peace media – defined by Atton and Hamilton (2008) as ‘journalism outside mainstream institutions and networks’ – in bringing to light the warfare activities of the secret state and that of ‘the necessary mavericks’ within the corporate, mass media.

Professionalism – and its problematics

It is not without significance that William Howard Russell became one of the founders of modern, professional war correspondence – ‘the miserable parent of a luckless tribe’, as he described himself (Knightley 2000: 2) – in his reporting for *The Times* of the Crimean War of 1854–1856 at a critical moment in the history of the British press. In 1855, the last of the Stamp Acts (which had placed an extra charge on newspapers which effectively served to limit their readership to a wealthy elite) was repealed (Curran and Seaton 1994: 31). And this allowed for the emergence of a mass-selling newspaper industry based largely on advertising. In the process, the unstamped (and hence illegal) trade union-based, republican, revolutionary and highly partisan press – which had previously been far more popular than the elite press – was marginalised. The market had effectively ‘censored’ the radical, activist media (Curran and Seaton 1994: 32–48).

Russell’s reporting on the failures of the British military in the Crimean maelstrom was said to have led to the fall of the government of the Earl of Aberdeen in January 1855 – thus adding ‘ammunition’ at this critical moment to the emerging myth of the corporate press as the ‘Fourth Estate’ separate from and critical of the state. Yet *The Times* played only a minor role: a significant section of the British elite were determined on Aberdeen’s fall,

irrespective of any views expressed in the newspaper (Keeble 1997: 193). Moreover, Phillip Knightley argues that while Russell exposed the incompetence of the army in the Crimea he failed to expose and understand the causes (2000: 16). Though he criticised the lot of the ordinary soldier he never attacked the officers 'to whose social class he belonged himself'. And Knightley adds (ibid.): 'Above all, Russell made the mistake, common to many a war correspondent, of considering himself part of the military establishment.'

The latter half of the nineteenth century in both the US and UK also saw the emergence of professionalism – with apolitical corporate journalism (along with other professions such as teaching, law, medicine) and its associated ideologies of objectivity and press freedom being closely integrated into the operations of the bourgeois state (McChesney 2000: 49). Yet Parkin (1979) and Collins (1990) stress the notion of social closure according to which occupations seek to regulate market conditions in their favour by restricting access to a limited group of eligible, mainly middle class professionals. The notion of closure is useful in helping to explain how the ideologies of professionalism – not just in the US and UK but in the 18-nation survey conducted by Thomas Hanitzsch and his colleagues (2011) – serve to exclude alternative, activist, politically partisan media from even the definition of 'journalism' (see also Weaver and Willnat 2012). While a number of commentators today see the growing power of non-professional media as a threat to standards (see Eldridge 2000), Althusser (1969) saw professions as part of the ideological state apparatus – crucial to the formation of bourgeois hegemony – while Ivan Illich (1973) described professions as a 'form of imperialism' operating in modern societies as repressive mechanisms undermining democracy. This ideology is certainly still so pervasive that it provides the frame around which most of the debate over media ethics in times of conflict operate today (for instance, see Owen and Purdey 2009).

The cynical approach

Within the broader context of the ideology of professionalism, some corporate journalists in the mainstream media still adopt a cynical, amoral approach to the reporting of conflict (Keeble 2009: 5). This was summed up by a national newspaper editor, invited to a London journalism school to give a talk on ethics. 'Efficks – wot's that?' he asked bemused. And so he simply proceeded to tell the gathered throng of students about his life and (highly successful) times in the industry. It is an attitude based on the conviction that ethical issues have little relevance for corporate journalists. There is not enough time for them and journalists have little power to influence them anyway. Profits are at the root of all journalism, so why bother with idealistic fancies such as ethics.

Such cynicism can be linked to a philosophical, existential position propounded by the 19th century German Max Stirner (1806–1856) which regards all human experience as essentially amoral. Ethical egotism takes a cynical view of the altruism behind moral conduct, suggesting that all actions (however much they are clothed in the rhetoric of morality) are essentially motivated by self-interest (see Paterson 1971). A variant on this appeared in the thinking of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) who described himself as an 'immoralist', arguing in *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886) that there were no moral facts and that evil made no sense (see Sanders 2003: 23). Also linked to this cynicism are theories relating to the 'realist' approach to global affairs according to which elites operate either in accordance with international law or not – depending on the perceived 'interests of the state'. Drawing on the work of Niccolo Machiavelli (1469–1527) and Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), realists argue that states are best seen as self-interested and primarily concerned with survival. Journalists'

role, then, in the reporting of foreign affairs and conflict, is to understand these dynamics and avoid the empty rhetoric of morality in their reporting.

The patriotic imperative

A completely opposite approach is promoted by journalists who argue that at times of conflict their essential responsibility as professionals is to support the actions of the state – perceived not as ‘immoral’ but ‘good’. Indeed, this patriotic imperative lies at the heart of British journalists’ culture (Norton-Taylor 1991). As Max Hastings, former editor of the London *Evening Standard* but most famous for being the first journalist to march into Port Stanley at the end of the Falklands War in 1982, commented:

I felt my function was simply to identify totally with the interests and feelings of that force [the task force] ... when one was writing one’s copy one thought: beyond telling everybody what the men around me were doing, what can one say that is likely to be most helpful in winning the war?

(Williams 1992: 156–157)

Indeed, the system of pooling (or embedding) reporters with frontline troops (widely adopted by Western militaries since the Vietnam War) has served to reinforce the corporate media’s essential role as propagandists for the state at times of conflict. As *The Times* media commentator Brian MacArthur reported: ‘Embeds essentially became adjuncts to the forces’ (2003). And predictably, during all the recent, major overt conflicts (Iraq 1991 and 2003, Kosovo 1999, Afghanistan 2001, Libya 2011) the vast bulk of editors, safe in their Fleet Street bunkers, have fervently banged the patriotic drum (Keeble 1997; Chomsky 1999; Hammond 2007a and 2007b; Forte 2012).

The war correspondent as ‘eye witness’ hero

A popular rhetorical strategy of mainstream war correspondents is to highlight their professional responsibilities to record accurately what they see. They do not take political stances – they are merely eyewitnesses to historic events. This approach neatly ties into dominant notions about ‘objectivity’, ‘media freedom’, ‘the public interest’ – and the ‘Fourth Estate’ which stresses the watchdog role of the professional media providing checks and balances on abuses of power by both government and other professions. Celebrations of the journalist as intrepid battler for truth appear prominently when they are killed, injured or taken hostage while engaged in the often highly dangerous business of reporting from the frontlines. In this spirit, Peter Beaumont and John Sweeney (2000) wrote in their *Observer* tribute to two colleagues killed covering the fighting in Sierra Leone: ‘The best stories are those that afflict the comfortable and comfort the afflicted, the ones that the people of power do not want told.’

Similarly, after *The Times* correspondent Anthony Loyd and photographer Jack Hill were attacked while reporting the Syrian civil war in May 2014, the newspaper captured many elements of the dominant ideology (with its stress on separating ‘fact’ from ‘propaganda’) when it editorialised:

War reporters are not omniscient. Their information is inevitably partial. Yet they are honour-bound to describe the world as they see it and not according to a set

of ideological presuppositions.... *The Times* is not neutral in its editorial views. Informed by the testimony of our reporters, we have no doubt that Assad bears prime responsibility for Syria's torment. Our reporting takes no side, however, but accuracy. ... The ability to distinguish fact from propaganda is what our readers expect. It is through the bravery and professionalism of Loyd, Hill and others that we seek to fulfil that obligation.

(*The Times* 2014)

The journalism of attachment

During the Balkans crisis of the 1990s, Martin Bell, the white-suited BBC war correspondent (and later Independent MP) advocated the 'journalism of attachment'. This, he defined, as 'a journalism that cares as well as knows ... that will not stand neutrally between good and evil, right and wrong, the victim and the oppressor' (Bell 1998: 16). In the case of the Balkans this meant representing Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic, as essentially 'evil' and Serbia's enemies (for instance, the Kosovo Albanians) as 'good' and 'worthy victims'.

Thus, in many respects, Bell's stance mirrored that of the elite. Moreover, the apparent challenge to the stress on 'objectivity' could be accommodated since the political economy of the dominant media (which underpins the ideology of professionalism) rested untouched by the critique. Bell, significantly, never challenged the underlying economic structures that essentially determine the nature of media output and journalistic standards (Fengler and Russ-Mohl 2008). Greg McLaughlin suggests that the journalism of attachment leads to unacceptable moralising and self-righteousness (2002). While veteran investigative journalist and war reporter John Pilger, in responding to Bell, warns against framing the argument within traditional assumptions about 'objectivity' and 'subjectivity', he agrees that Bell was right about the 'illusion of objectivity', rejecting it as 'often a mask for established consensus and bias' (see Wilson 2007: 126–127).

The role of the 'necessary mavericks'

The closeness of the corporate media to dominant economic, cultural and ideological forces means that the mainstream largely functions to promote the interests of the military/industrial/political/entertainment complex (Herman and Chomsky 1994; Der Derian 2001). Yet within advanced capitalist economies, many of them currently suffering acute downturns following the 2008 crisis – which, to a large extent, stemmed from the over-resourcing of US/UK military and imperial adventurism (see Johnson 2010) – the contradictions within corporate media have provided certain spaces for progressive journalism.

Chris Atton (2004: 10) warns against presenting a polarised vision of the mainstream and alternative spheres, positing a 'hegemonic approach' that 'suggests a complexity of relationships between radical and mainstream that previous binary models have been unable to identify'. Robert Hackett (2007) suggests that it is the ethical responsibility of journalists to reform the mainstream from within. Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model (1994: 2) stresses the role of the corporate media in forming a single propaganda system where 'money and power are able to filter out the news fit to print, marginalise dissent and allow the government and dominant private interests to get their message across to the public'. But for Hackett, this model is too deterministic. It thus fails to 'identify the scope and conditions under which newswriters could exercise the kind of choices called for' by a more peace-oriented journalism and to acknowledge that individual journalists are 'active and creative

agents' able to combine an involvement in the corporate media with regular contributions to alternative, partisan, campaigning media (Hackett 2007: 93).

Hackett also draws on the 'hierarchy of influences' model of Shoemaker and Reese (1996) and Bourdieu's notion of the media as a relatively autonomous institutional sphere (1998) to further theorise the activities of progressive newswriters within the corporate media to promote the interests of the peace movement. Arguing that both models suggest some degree of agency for newswriters, Hackett stresses: 'There is, indeed, a necessary role for dedicated journalists to take the lead' (2007: 93). Progressive journalists of this important hybrid group today might include Tom Bower, Ian Cobain, Barbara Ehrenreich, Susan George, Stephen Grey, Robert Fisk, Seymour Hersh, Phillip Knightley, Paul Lashmar, Richard Norton-Taylor, John Pilger, Arundhati Roy and Jonathan Steele.

At the same time, Hackett acknowledges the severe constraints on progressive journalists operating within the mainstream: 'Ultimately it seems probable that in Western corporate media at least, journalists have neither sufficient incentives nor autonomy vis-à-vis their employers to transform the way news is done without support from powerful external allies' (ibid.). Oliver Boyd-Barrett (2010) also highlights the propaganda model's failure to acknowledge journalists' individual agency, though his focus is more on the penetration of corporate media by covert intelligence and their sympathisers (see Keeble 2015).

Mockery, critique and the limits of acceptable debate

How to further explain and theorise this progressive, ethical 'space' within the corporate media? Is it useful to understand it as operating within a sort of modern-day court? During the Middle Ages, one of the most important roles at courts throughout Europe (and in India, Persia and China) was occupied by the jester. Often known as 'licensed fools' their crucial function was to mock and critique their employer. Queen Elizabeth the First (who ruled between 1558 and 1603) was said to have even rebuked one of her fools for not being severe enough in his mockery of her. Fools, clowns and jesters all appear in Shakespeare's plays: Feste, the jester in *Twelfth Night*, is even described as 'wise enough to play the fool' (Otto 2001).

All this tells us a lot about the importance of radical critique, humour and mockery in societies. Rulers know they will always be attacked – but clever are those rulers who control the attacks! The court system did just that. Today, intriguingly, a modern version of the court system operates, and while there is no formal licensing, a subtler – and hence more powerful – unwritten system helps to define the limits of acceptable debate and provides a crucial legitimising function for the 'democratic' state.

Daniel Hallin, in his seminal analysis of US media coverage of the Vietnam War (1986), identified the various ideological spheres: there is the sphere of consensus around topics on which there is, in general, elite agreement; then there's the sphere of legitimate controversy, around topics on which there are significant elite disagreements; and finally there's the sphere of deviance inhabited by issues either marginalised or eliminated from the dominant debate (ibid.: 116–118). In this context, it's useful to see the work of progressive journalists within the mainstream as falling within the sphere of 'legitimate controversy'.

Significantly, Hallin argues that ideology determines the structuring of the spheres – thus the notion that the US was conducting a criminal invasion of South Vietnam constituted the 'deviant view' excluded from the dominant media. Yet Hallin may have exaggerated the importance of ideology in the formation of the various spheres. The consensual formation process may be even more complex and intriguing than Hallin envisaged – one built more about the individual's position in relation to the 'court' rather than their ideology. For 'court'

members – such as the *Washington Post*'s Rajiv Chandrasekaran (2006), author of an award-winning book that overtly mocks the incompetence of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq following the 2003 invasion (see Keeble 2014), can mock and criticise the elite, even leak embarrassing information which might expose lying and corruption; but if someone outside the 'court' makes the same attack they can be harassed by the state and even jailed for treason.

Let's take the example of Peter van Buren. Basing his account on his time leading a Provincial Reconstruction Team, he exposed abysmal US failures in post-2003 Iraq in his *We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People* (2011) – but because he was considered by the US elite outside the 'court' he was removed from his job in the US State Department Foreign Services following his whistleblowing act.

Secret state: secret warfare – and the ethical challenges for journalists

Alongside the 'democratic' state in Britain, there exists a secret state occupied by the massively resourced intelligence and security services (the Security Service (MI5), Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the Cheltenham-based signals spying centre and the armed forces special intelligence sections),¹ secret armies, undercover police units and a vast array of private intelligence operations. As Anthony Sampson stresses, the government's operations are only part of a much wider intelligence community (2004: 151): 'This includes private companies, often employing ex-MI6 officers, which have their own interests in cultivating mystery and which rapidly expanded in the 1980s and 1990s, benefiting from the global marketplace.'

While it might be difficult to identify precisely the impact of the spooks (variously represented in the press as 'intelligence', 'security sources', 'Whitehall' or 'Home Office') on mainstream politics, diplomacy and military strategies, from the limited evidence available it looks to be enormous. As Roy Greenslade, media blogger at *The Guardian*, and editor of the *Mirror* at the time of the Gulf crisis in 1991, commented: 'Most tabloid newspapers – or even newspapers in general – are playthings of MI5' (Milne 1994: 262). Journalist, former MI6 officer and Soviet spy Kim Philby once said that MI6 had penetrated the 'English mass media on a wide scale' running agents in the *Daily Telegraph*, *The Sunday Times*, *Daily Mirror*, *Financial Times* and *The Observer* (Davies 2008: 235). Spy novelist John le Carré, who worked for MI6 between 1960 and 1964, has even claimed that the British secret service then controlled large parts of the press – just as they may well do today (Dorrit 1993: 281). Moreover, the deployment of secret armies, targeted assassinations and covertly planned coups in 'enemy' states have been crucial features of Western military strategies since 1945 (Keeble 1997: 15). Is it not remarkable, then, that the debate over the ethics of conflict coverage has hardly ever acknowledged the existence of the secret state?

The crucial ethical question arises: how should journalists respond to the secret state? Investigative journalist David Leigh (2000), in a rare exploration of the ethical challenges for journalists in dealing with the secret state, identifies three ways in which the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) manipulates journalists:

- They attempt to recruit journalists to spy on other people or attempt themselves to go under journalistic 'cover'.
- They allow intelligence officers to pose as journalists 'to write tendentious articles under false names'.
- And 'the most malicious form': they plant intelligence agency propaganda stories on willing journalists who disguise their origin from readers.

Leigh's solution:

I think the cause of honest journalism is best served by candour. We all ought to come clean about these approaches and devise some ethics to deal with them. In our vanity we imagine that we control these sources. But the truth is that they are very deliberately seeking to control us.

(Ibid.)

Phillip Knightley also argues that journalists have a responsibility to be more aware about the activities of the secret services:

What's the difference between a spy and a journalist? Not much. Both are in the information business. Both go out into the world and try to find out what's really going on. They look, listen and ask people questions. They assess the reliability of what they are told. They try to decide what is likely to happen next. Then they write a report for their bosses. Only now do their paths diverge. The journalist sends his or her report off expecting it will be published for the world to read. The spy sends his report off knowing it will not be published but instead will be used for political advantage. My point is that intelligence services are well aware of the similarities between journalism and spying and take full advantage of them. But journalists are not so aware.

(Knightley 2006)

Splits in the intelligence community: the ethical implications for journalists

Yet it is wrong to see the intelligence community as unified with one single ambition. As the intelligence community has grown so vast so have the competing factions within it. The corporate media, then, become the theatre in which these various factions play out their games for supremacy. Some journalists side with the dominant factions; others take a principled stand reproducing the views of those critical of policies such as over torture, 'extraordinary rendition', secret/black prisons, and the secret deployment of drones in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen and elsewhere.

Let us take a few examples: in the late 1990s factions emerged which managed to marginalise traditional elements within both MI6 and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In the UK, the Rockingham Cell, determined to promote the Iraq invasion, emerged triumphant (Meacher 2003); in the United States it was the Office of Special Plans (OSP), set up by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in 2002. As Julian Borger explained (2003), the OSP was created to 'second-guess CIA information' while it operated under the patronage of hardline conservatives in the top rungs of the administration, the Pentagon and at the White House, including Vice President Dick Cheney. 'The ideologically driven network functioned like a shadow government, much of it off the official payroll and beyond Congressional oversight. But it proved powerful enough to prevail in a struggle with the State Department and the CIA by establishing a justification for war.' Accompanying the formation of the OSP was the new regime of harsh torture techniques, backed by Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, directed at prisoners at Guantanamo Bay with the intention to extract confessions about links between the Iraqi regime and al-Qaeda. Indeed, statements about the existence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were extracted through torture (see Chomsky 2009).

Norman Baker (2007: 293) explains the crucial intelligence splits in the UK this way: 'In London, it was the Foreign Office, MI6 and the Defence Intelligence Service that were cold-shouldered. In America, it was the State Department, the CIA and the DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency]. In both countries, the great reservoirs of knowledge were disregarded because they provided an analysis that was unwanted.' Baker adds, somewhat murkily (ibid.: 294): 'Naturally this bred resentment, and some I have spoken to have suggested that one consequence was actually a deliberate collusion between the CIA and MI6 not to find any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq so as to embarrass or even destabilise the White House and Downing Street respectively.' A lot of the media coverage of the secret state emerges, then, as a consequence of splits such as these amongst the intelligence community, with each faction fighting through their trusted journo for media prominence.

Journalists, whistle-blowers and the need for constant scepticism

Many defence correspondents loyally promote the Official Line (as on weapons of mass destruction before the Iraq invasion of 2003); after 30 years have passed, top level, highly classified documents are regularly released (though suitably redacted) from the National Archives. But the Official Line is deliberately broken when whistle-blowers (who are distinctly non-courtiers) speak out. Bradley/Chelsea Manning (jailed for 35 years for leaking cables and videos to Julian Assange's WikiLeaks exposing American war crimes in Iraq and Afghanistan; see Madar 2012) and Edward Snowden (who took refuge in Russia after revealing the global surveillance activities of the National Security Agency (NSA)) are only the latest in a long line of men and women who have risked so much in speaking out against the secret state (Greenwald 2014). They include:

- 1971: Daniel Ellsberg who, in the *Pentagon Papers*, as reported in the *New York Times*, reveals the secret bombing of Cambodia and Laos (Greenberg 2012: 11–46).
- 1975: Philip Agee exposes the activities of the CIA in his book *The Company* (see Campbell 2011).
- 1976: the secret signals spy base, GCHQ, revealed for the first time in *Time Out*, leading to the trial and acquittal of Crispin Aubrey, Dave Berry and Duncan Campbell (ABC).
- 1983: Sarah Tisdall jailed after releasing information on cruise missile deployment to *The Guardian*.
- 1985: senior civil servant at the Ministry of Defence Clive Ponting claims 'public interest' and so the jury acquits him after he revealed secrets about the sinking of the Argentinian warship (with the loss of 323 lives) during the Falklands War of 1982 (Norton-Taylor 1985).
- 1986: Mordechai Vanunu reveals Israel's secret nuclear weapons programme in *The Sunday Times* (Quinn 2011)
- 1988: former M15 officer Peter (*Spycatcher*) Wright: reveals plot to oust Prime Minister Harold Wilson in 1968.
- 1997: David Shayler exposes British attempt to assassinate Col Gaddafi, President of Libya, in 1996; later jailed for six months in 2002.
- 2003: Katherine Gun, translator for GCHQ, discloses US intimidation of states before United Nations (UN) discussions over attack on Iraq.

Yet the case of 'Deep Throat', the whistle-blower at the heart of the Watergate scandal, proves how important it is for both reporters and media consumers to remain sceptical about

all matters relating to secret warfare and the secret state. The source for the series of reports by the *Washington Post* duo Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein that helped topple the US President in 1974 – and the subject of the book (1974) and Hollywood blockbuster, *All the President's Men*, featuring Robert Redford and Dustin Hoffman as the intrepid sleuths – was not a high-minded public servant appalled at White House corruption and the lies over the secret bombing of Cambodia. Rather, it was Mark Felt, the deputy director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), angry that he had been overlooked for promotion by Richard Nixon with the top job going to L. Patrick Gray (see Holland 2012 and Ricketson 2014: 46–47). Yet mystery surrounds Felt's revelations. Why was *Vanity Fair* chosen as the outlet in which Felt revealed all? Why were the 'Woodstein' duo not informed before publication? Was it not strange that the revelation had to be written by Felt's lawyer (Felt was seriously ill and died soon afterwards). And could there not, in fact, have been a number of 'Deep Throats' – as investigative reporter Russ Baker argues (2008).

The crucial role of alternative media: broadening the definitions of journalism

Conventional studies of the ethics of conflict reporting have tended to marginalise or ignore altogether the non-corporate media. This should not come as a surprise: the essential ideological function of the dominant political and cultural spheres is to silence the voices of progressive and revolutionary social movements (Keeble 1997). Yet the role of the alternative media both historically and today (of which the peace movement media is a part) in the formation of a counter or oppositional public sphere is considerable both in the UK and internationally (see, for example, Downing 1984; Sparks 1985; Nelson 1989; Rodriguez 2001; Couldry and Curran 2003; Harcup 2003 and 2013; Waltz 2005; Atton and Hamilton 2008; Keeble 2010; Forde 2011).

Moreover, peace movement media, like other non-corporate outlets, have tended to rely on the work of non-professional journalists: citizens and community/political activists. As in Chris Atton's definition of alternative media (2002: 25): 'They typically go beyond simply providing a platform for radical or alternative points of view: they emphasise the organisation of media to enable wider social participation in their creation, production and dissemination than is possible in the mass media.' Thus, these well-established working arrangements long pre-dated recent discussions about the nature of journalism – provoked by the emergence of the internet and its many communicative forms. Stuart Allan, for instance, celebrates the bloggers and the 'extraordinary contribution made by ordinary citizens offering their first-hand reports, digital photographs, camcorder video footage, mobile telephone snapshots or audio clips' (2006: 7). John Hartley (2008: 42) even draws on Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to proclaim the radical, utopian-liberal ideal that everyone has the right not only to seek and receive but also to 'impart' (in other words, communicate) information and ideas.

This broadened definition of journalism certainly helps to incorporate a wide range of media and political activists into the discussion on the ethics of conflict coverage. For instance, it could include radical, progressive journalists and their associated media such as, in the United States, *Democracy Now!* — an alternative broadcast station (with allied website) run by the award-winning Amy Goodman, which is overtly committed to peace journalism. As its website stresses:

Democracy Now!'s War and Peace Report provides our audience with access to people and perspectives rarely heard in the US corporate-sponsored media, including

independent and international journalists, ordinary people from around the world who are directly affected by US foreign policy, grassroots leaders and peace activists, artists, academics and independent analysts. In addition, *Democracy Now!* hosts real debates – debates between people who substantially disagree, such as between the White House or the Pentagon spokespeople on the one hand, and grassroots activists on the other.

(www.democracynow.org)

Other peace-oriented, progressive journals include *Middle East Report* (www.merip.org), *Nation* (www.thenation.com), *Mother Jones* (www.motherjones.com), *Z Magazine* (www.zcommunications.org/zmag) and *In These Times* (www.inthesetimes.com). In Chennai, India, there is *Frontline* (www.frontline.in) while in London there is the investigative website *Corporate Watch* (www.corporatewatch.org). Media such as these often draw inspiration from the critique by Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky (1994) of the corporate myths of ‘balance’ and ‘objectivity’ and emphasise instead their explicitly partisan character. Moreover, they seek to ‘invert the hierarchy of access’ to the news by explicitly foregrounding the viewpoints of ‘ordinary’ people (activists, protestors, local residents), citizens whose visibility in the mainstream media tends to be obscured by the presence of elite groups and individuals (Atton 2002: 20).

Indeed, given the centrality of the secret state to the operations of Western militarism, one of the most important functions of journalism is to highlight where possible its operations – and this is most consistently done in a range of alternative media (normally completely ignored in the debate over the ethics of conflict coverage). These include: www.lobster-magazine.co.uk; intelnews.org; tomdispatch.com; <http://nsarchive.wordpress.com/>; www.cryptome.org/; www.boilingfrogspost.com/; <http://whowhatwhy.com/>; wsws.org; www.bigbrotherwatch.org.uk; www.counterpunch.org; www.coldtype.net/.

Conclusion

In Britain, a predictable media panic erupted in 2011 after Fleet Street journalists were discovered hacking into the phones of celebrities, top politicians, royals and the occasional ‘ordinary’ person, such as missing schoolgirl Milly Dowler (see Keeble and Mair 2012). An expensive inquiry was then launched into the ethics of the corporate press. Not surprisingly, the alternative sector was entirely ignored. Yet, as this chapter has attempted to show, the importance of the alternative media both historically and today as a site for ethically responsible reporting of conflict cannot be underestimated. Tony Downmunt draws attention to the term ‘alternative media’, noting that it might be thought of as denoting activities of secondary importance to the mainstream. Yet this not need be the case: ‘In that they provide resistance, opposition and counterexamples to tired and reactionary mainstream uses of media, they are of primary social, cultural and political importance. Nevertheless they remain, by definition, significantly less powerful and privileged than the mainstream’ (Downmunt 2007: 10).

There are, though, as I hope this chapter has shown, reasons for optimism. Beyond the gaze of the elite, a global counter-public sphere (though full of tensions) is bursting with people constantly challenging the lies and mystifications of the powerful and their propaganda media, bravely protesting (through the alternative media and in so many other imaginative ways) against the warmongers – and for peace.

Note

- 1 Paul Todd and Jonathan Bloch (2003: 106) calculate that, following leaks from the National Audit Office about overspends – from £140 to £250 million (MI6) and £85 to £227 million (MI5) – on high-profile city offices and a range of other scandals involving IT contract overruns, an unofficial estimate of £2.5 billion to be close to the mark for the cost of the UK intelligence services. Todd and Bloch suggest that the cost of the intelligence services is Britain's 'greatest secret'.

References

- Allan, S. (2006) *Online News: Journalism and the Internet*, Maidenhead: Open University Press.
- Althusser, L. (1969) *For Marx*, London: Penguin.
- Atton, C. (2002) *Alternative Media*, London: Sage.
- Atton, C. (2004) *An Alternative Internet: Radical Media, Politics and Creativity*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Atton, C. and Hamilton, J. F. (2008) *Alternative Journalism*, London: Sage.
- Baker, N. (2007) *The Strange Death of David Kelly*, London: Methuen.
- Baker, R. (2008) *Family of Secrets*, London: Bloomsbury.
- Beaumont, P. and Sweeney, J. (2000) 'The price of telling the awful truth', *The Observer*, 28 May
- Bell, M. (1998) 'The journalism of attachment', in: Kieran, M. (ed.) *Media Ethics*, London: Routledge, pp. 15–22.
- Borger, J. (2003) 'The spies who pushed for war', *The Guardian*, 17 July. Available online at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/jul/17/iraq.usa>. Download on 6 June 2014.
- Bourdieu, P. (1998) *On Television*, London: Pluto Press.
- Boyd-Barrett, O. (2010) 'Recovering agency for the propaganda model: The implications for reporting war and peace', in: Keeble, R. L., Tulloch, J. and Zollmann, F. (eds) *Peace Journalism, War and Conflict Resolution*, New York: Peter Lang, pp 31–48.
- Campbell, D. (2011) 'Whistleblowing: From Xerox machine to WikiLeaks via Ellsberg, Agee and Vanunu', in: Mair, J. and Keeble, R. L. (eds) *Investigative Journalism: Dead or Alive?* Bury St Edmunds: Abramis, pp. 223–229.
- Chandrasekaran, R. (2006) *Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Baghdad's Green Zone*, London: Bloomsbury.
- Chomsky, N. (1999) *The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo*, London: Pluto Press.
- Chomsky, N. (2009) The torture memos, *Z Magazine*, 9 June. Available online at <http://www.zmag.org/zmag/viewArticle/21609>. Downloaded on 4 June 2009.
- Collins, R. (1990) 'Market closure and the conflict theory of professions', in: Burrage, M. and Torstendahl, R. (eds) *Professions in Theory and History: Rethinking the Study of Professions*, London, Newbury Park and New Delhi: Sage, pp. 24–42.
- Couldry, N. and Curran, J. (eds) (2003) *Contesting Media Power: Alternative Media in a Networked World*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Curran, J. and Seaton, J. (1994) *Power without Responsibility: The Press, Broadcasting and New Media in Britain*, London: Routledge, seventh edition.
- Davies, N. (2008) *Flat Earth News*, London: Chatto and Windus.
- Der Derian, J. (2001) *Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network*, New York: Basic Books.
- Dorrl, S. (1993) *The Silent Conspiracy: Inside the Intelligence Services in the 1990s*, London: Heinemann.
- Downing, J. (1984) *Radical Media: The Political Experience of Alternative Communication*, Boston, MA: South End Press.
- Downmunt, T. (2007) 'Introduction', in: Coyer, K., Downmunt, T. and Fountain, A. (eds) *The Alternative Media Handbook*, Abingdon and New York: Routledge, pp. 1–12.
- Eldridge, S. (2000) 'Perceiving professional threats: Journalism's discursive reaction to the rise of new media', *Journal of Applied Journalism and Media Studies* 2(2): 281–299.
- Fengler, S. and Russ-Mohl, S. (2008) 'Journalists and the information-attention markets: Towards and economic theory of journalism', *Journalism* 9(6): 667–690.
- Forde, S. (2011) *Challenging the News: The Journalism of Alternative and Community Media*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Forté, M. (2012) *Slouching towards Sirte: NATO's War on Libya and Africa*, Montreal: Baraka Books.

- Greenberg, A. (2012) *This Machine Kills Secrets: How WikiLeaks, Hactivists and Cypherpunks Aim to Free the World's Information*, London: Virgin Books.
- Greenwald, G. (2014) *No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA and the Surveillance State*, London: Hamish Hamilton.
- Hackett, R. A. (2007) 'Is peace journalism possible?', in: Shinar, D. and Kempf, W. (eds) *Peace Journalism: The State of the Art*, Berlin: Regener, pp. 75–94.
- Hallin, D. (1986) *The 'Uncensored' War*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Hammond, P. (2007a) *Media, War and Postmodernity*, London: Routledge.
- Hammond, P. (2007b) *Framing Post-Cold War Conflicts: The Media and International Intervention*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Hanitzsch, T. et al. (2011) 'Mapping journalism cultures across nation', *Journalism Studies* 12(3): 273–293.
- Harcup, T. (2003) 'The unspoken – said: The journalism of the alternative media', *Journalism* 4(3): 356–376.
- Harcup, T. (2013) *Alternative Journalism: Alternative Voices*, London: Routledge.
- Hartley, J. (2008) 'Journalism as a human right: The cultural approach to journalism', in: Loffelholz, M. and Weaver, D. (eds) *Global Journalism Research: Theories, Methods, Findings, Future*, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 39–51.
- Herman, E. S. and Chomsky, N. (1994) *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*, London: Vintage (originally published 1988, New York: Pantheon Books).
- Holland, M. (2012) *Leak: Why Mark Felt Became Deep Throat*, Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press.
- Illich, I. (1973) 'The professions as a form of imperialism', *New Society*, 13 September.
- Johnson, C. (2010) *Dismantling the Empire: America's Last Best Hope*, New York: Metropolitan Books.
- Keeble, R. (1997) *Secret State, Silent Press: New Militarism, the Gulf and the Modern Image of Warfare*, Luton: John Libbey.
- Keeble, R. (2009) *Ethics for Journalists*, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, second edition.
- Keeble, R. L. (2010) 'Peace journalism as political practice: A radical new look at the theory', in: Keeble, R. L., Tulloch, J. and Zollmann, F. (eds) *Peace Journalism, War and Conflict Resolution*, New York: Peter Lang, pp. 49–67.
- Keeble, R. L. (2014) 'Rajiv Chandrasekaran's Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Beyond the Court Jester?', in: Keeble, R. L. and Tulloch, J. (eds) *Global Literary Journalism: Exploring the Journalistic Imagination*, Vol. 2, New York: Peter Lang, pp. 139–154.
- Keeble, R. L. (2015) 'Giving peace journalism a chance', in: Atton, C. (ed.) *The Routledge Companion to Alternative and Community Media*, London: Routledge, pp. 335–346.
- Keeble, R. L. and Mair, J. (eds) (2012) *The Phone Hacking Scandal: Journalism on Trial*, Bury St Edmunds: Abramis.
- Knightley, P. (2000) *The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth Maker*, London: Prion Books.
- Knightley, P. (2006) 'Why spies and scribes have a lot in common', *Khaleej Times*, 11 August. Available online at http://www.khaleejtimes.ae/DisplayArticleNew.asp?section=opinion&xfile=data/opinion/2006/august/opinion_august31.xml. Download on 6 June 2014.
- Leigh, D. (2000) 'Tinker, tailor, soldier, journalist', *The Guardian*, 12 June.
- MacArthur, B. (2003) 'Changing pace of war', *The Times*, 27 June.
- Madar, C. (2012) *The Passion of Bradley Manning*, New York: Or Books.
- McChesney, R. W. (2000) *Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Politics in Dubious Times*, New York: New Press.
- McLaughlin, G. (2002) *The War Correspondent*, London: Pluto Press.
- Meacher, M. (2003) 'A very secret service', *The Guardian*, 21 November. Available online at <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/nov/21/davidkelly.media>. Download on 6 June 2014.
- Milne, S. (1994) *The Enemy Within: The Secret War Against the Miners*, London: Pan Books.
- Nelson, E. (1989) *The British Counter-Culture, 1966–73: A Study of the Underground Press*, London: Macmillan.
- Norton-Taylor, R. (1985) *The Ponting Affair*, London: Cecil Woolf.
- Norton-Taylor, R. (1991) 'Pressure behind the scenes', *Index on Censorship* 4/5: 14.
- Otto, B. (2001) *Fools are Everywhere*, Chicago, IL and London: University of Chicago Press.
- Owen, J. and Purdey, H. (2009) *International News Reporting: Frontlines and Deadlines*, Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley and Sons.
- Parkin, F. (1979) *Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique*, London: Tavistock Publications.

- Paterson, R. (1971) *The Nihilistic Egoist: Max Stirner*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Quinn, A. (2011) 'All roads lead to Assange: WikiLeaks and journalism's duty of care', in: Mair, J. and Keeble, R. L. (eds) *Investigative Journalism: Dead or Alive?* Bury St Edmunds: Abramis, pp. 230–243.
- Ricketson, M. (2014) *Telling True Stories: Navigating the Challenges of Writing Narrative Non-Fiction*, Sydney, Melbourne and London: Allen & Unwin.
- Rodriguez, C. (2001) *Fissures in the Mediascape: An International Study of Citizen's Media*, Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.
- Sampson, A. (2004) *Who Runs this Place? The Anatomy of Britain in the 21st Century*, London: John Murray.
- Sanders, K. (2003) *Ethics & Journalism*, London: Sage.
- Shoemaker, P. J. and Reese, S. D. (1996) *Mediating the Message: Theories of Influences on Mass Media Content*, New York: Longman.
- Sparks, C. (1985) 'The working-class press: Radical and revolutionary alternatives', *Media, Culture and Society* 7: 133–146.
- The Times* (2014) 'Editorial: The first casualty', 16 May p. 20.
- Todd, P. and Bloch, J. (2003) *Global Intelligence: The World's Secret Services Today*, London: Zed Books.
- van Buren, P. (2011) *We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People*, New York: Metropolitan Books.
- Waltz, M. (2005) *Alternative and Activist Media*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Weaver, D. H. and Willnat, L. (2012) *The Global Journalist in the 21st Century*, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.
- Williams, K. (1992) 'Something more important than truth: Ethical issues in war reporting', in: Belsey, A. and Chadwick, R. (eds) *Ethical Issues in Journalism and the Media*, London: Routledge, pp. 154–170.
- Wilson, D. (2007) 'An unscathed tourist of wars: The journalism of Martha Gellhorn', in: Keeble, R. and Wheeler, S. (eds) *The Journalistic Imagination: Literary Journalists from Defoe to Capote and Carter*, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, pp. 116–129.
- Woodward, B. and Bernstein, C. (1974) *All the President's Men*, London: Quartet Books.

2

GENDER, MEDIA AND SECURITY

Romy Fröhlich

Introduction

More than 20 years ago (1995), at the Beijing Platform for Action during the United Nations' Fourth World Conference on Women, Article 13 of the "Action for Equality, ..." stated: "The media have a great potential to promote the advancement of women and the equality of women and men by portraying women and men in a non-stereotypical, diverse and balanced manner, and by respecting the dignity and worth of the human person" and "stereotyping of women and inequality in women's access to and participation in all communication systems, especially in the media" was designated as one of the 12 most "critical areas of concern" (United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women 1995). Five years later, in October 2000, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325, in which, for the first time in its history, the Council dealt specifically with the consequences of armed conflicts for women. The resolution determines that women's contribution to conflict prevention, peacebuilding and peacekeeping is undervalued and calls for the active and unlimited global involvement of women in peace and security measures on an equal footing.

Resolution 1325 marked a turning point in the Security Council's handling of this issue, as they subsequently dealt with it three more times.¹ In their entirety, these resolutions describe the problems and develop clear ideas concerning how they should be handled, both politically and socially. Still, it is striking that the resolutions primarily refer to the role and participation of, and threat towards, "women" and "girls", that is, the *female* gender only, in wars and conflicts. The prevailing scientific understanding of gender is generally broader, although in science, too, the variable "women" is prevalent, even if there is also talk of "gender" (e.g. in the titles of academic works). Within a particular research context, however, we theoretically and empirically should understand gender as an analytical category (see the section on 'Gender') and not merely as a demographic variable.

Over the course of the last few decades, numerous scientific disciplines have discovered the gender issue within the topic of war, violent conflicts and security for themselves. Boyd (2005: 115) calls it "one of the most pressing problems of our time". However, the interdisciplinary character and the wide variety of different approaches in this field of research represent a special challenge. The interdisciplinary character the research topic "Gender, Media, War/Conflict and Security" has is actually located at the junction of various

scientific disciplines within the domain of the humanities and social sciences. These range from “international relations/studies”, and here, in particular, the field of “(critical) feminist security studies” (both specialist fields of political science), to communication research, media and/or journalism studies, to sociology, cultural anthropology, gender studies, philosophy or cultural studies – to name but a few. In a narrow sense, however, this research topic is not really dealt with in an *interdisciplinary* way. Instead, the separate disciplinary approaches to the issue exist rather independently from one another. Only very seldom do the respective scientific works refer to each other across disciplines. Hence, to understand the many insights research has provided on this issue, it is essential to determine the specific disciplinary context from which a given research project originated.

The various disciplines approach the issue from very different theoretical starting points, with different paradigms and different sets of methodological instruments. It would go beyond the scope of this contribution to systematically introduce and compare them. For example, while security studies focus on political, social, economic, or even ecological dimensions of human security, and also include questions of security *technology* in the core area of their disciplinary interest (Sylvester 2010: 24), the interest of communication science and media studies, for instance, lies exclusively in the political and social dimensions of the research topic. Failure to take this into account from the outset can quickly result in a tangled mess of theoretical approaches and models, empirical analyses and findings which cannot be compared to each other and/or even seem to be contradictory. Given the enormous (interdisciplinary) variety and complexity of the research topic, this article will deal with selected theoretical assumptions and empirical findings of gender-sensitive research in the field of communication science/media studies, and in the field of security studies.²

As a scholar of communication science, my selection and brief description of certain approaches from the field of feminist security studies³ might appear questionable – it is certainly fragmentary and incomplete. However, my aim is not to provide a broad and complete overview of the relevant studies in either field but to offer an overview of the most influential and promising achievements of gender-sensitive research on media, war and security. In doing so, I focus deliberately on those works that expressly take into account the role and function of the media, theoretically and/or empirically.⁴ This is naturally always the case when it comes to communication studies. As for security studies, their emphasis is generally on international (political) relations and not on the mass media. Therefore, only a few gender-specific studies within security studies generate significant amounts of empirical data concerning the role of the media. Most studies here are qualitative works on selected (largely prominent) media coverage cases.

This contribution might stimulate readers’ gender-sensitive lens for the following chapters of this volume and serve as a solid starting basis for students and researchers who are not yet familiar with the topic. Furthermore, I aim to identify possible linkages that might harbor potential for the development of future (truly) interdisciplinary research at the junction of these two disciplines which I will talk about in the last section of my contribution. I also conclude with new developments to be considered for further research. At the beginning, however, I want to briefly introduce the definitions of “security” and “gender” upon which my contribution relies.

Definitions

Security

International security studies – above all, the gender-sensitive studies or feminist security studies – interpret the term “security” to mean “*human security*”. For this interpretation it is important to consider the definition used by the United Nations Development Programme (1994), which defined the term “human security” for the first time in 1994 in its “Human Development Report”, thereby bringing about a paradigm shift that continues to considerably influence this scientific discipline to this day:

The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust. ... Human security is not a concern with weapons – it is a concern with human life and dignity. ... Human security is people-centered. It is concerned with how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their many choices, how much access they have to market and social opportunities – and whether they live in conflict or in peace.

(pp. 22–3)

The report identified seven “main categories” which represent threats to human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security (pp. 24–5). These categories continue to represent the areas of research within scientific security studies today – including gender-sensitive ones.

How “security” is interpreted is often closely linked with the conviction that establishing and achieving security is conditional upon providing protection and/or shelter.⁵ This notion is criticized, particularly in feminist security studies, as being a masculine, authoritarian idea, since the appeal for protection and/or shelter often serves as a political and/or humanitarian justification for military intervention and war (cf. Tickner 1992, 2001). Thereby, those purportedly in need of protection (primarily women and children) are automatically degraded to being weak, dependently acting objects that are subjected, in turn, to additional violence. In this sense, Stiehm (1982) or Young (2003) (among others) interpret protection as a means of masculinizing the notion of security. Take, for example, the remarkable security events and legal changes⁶ in the US after the 9/11 attacks as an instance of security policy, which is based on the logic of masculinist concepts of protection (Young 2003: 2). In this connection, Jonathan Wadley (2010: 52) speaks of protection as “a bad arrangement for the protected. Protection is, therefore, less about what is provided than it is about the effects of the performances undertaken in its name.”⁷ As a consequence, I would go as far as to constitute any masculinizing interpretation of security to be, in this sense, a “bad arrangement” for those searching for security, and so the vicious circle caused by a typical masculinizing interpretation of protection and security becomes apparent: at the extreme, such an interpretation leads to war and/or other forms of violent conflict, which once again may well lead to security problems – now potentially even more problematic than before. This vicious circle is only one of many examples, which shows that Enloe’s (2000a [1989]) realization in her classic late 1980s work “Bananas, Beaches and Bases” that “the conduct of international politics has depended on men’s control of women’s lives” (p. 4) simply cannot be denied.

In addition, with reference to the seven categories named above, feminist security studies debunk another myth: that peace, understood as the opposite of war, automatically means *security*. This simplification is also criticized as a gendered perspective (if not more explicitly as a *masculine* perspective), because it ignores how, especially in pacified post-conflict situations, social and political life are frequently still in a state of lawlessness and chaos. In this state, security generally achieves, at best, a purely formal quality.

Gender

Following Peterson's (1992) classic definition, I specify gender as "a socially imposed and internalized lens through which individuals perceive and respond to the world". On this basis, "the pervasiveness of gendered meanings shapes concepts, practice and institutions in identifiable gendered ways" (p. 194). Sjöberg (2010: 3) puts it slightly differently, albeit with largely the same meaning: "gender is a system of symbolic meaning that creates social hierarchies based on perceived associations with masculine and feminine characteristics". This includes the notion that organizations and even states, too, can become gendered (Sjöberg 2011: 110). Thus, I conclude that media organizations (radio and broadcasting stations, editorial departments etc.) are *gendered* entities – all the more, as "[g]ender is a socially constructed category which produces asymmetries and differences and which determines the distribution of power between men and women" (Fröhlich 2010: 1). This is what is meant when we talk about gender as an analytical category.

For centuries the asymmetric distribution of power between men and women has been observable in media organizations (cf. for example Gallagher 1995; Chambers et al. 2013). This is bad news, because many scholars have long assumed that the media play a significant part in the construction of gender roles (cf. Enloe 1994, 2000a, 2000b; Fröhlich 2010; Rabinovitz 1994; Wiegman 1994), and therefore it is assumed that gender balance in the media contributes to a more balanced/realistic media content. The logic of the media, however, strongly reduces the complexity of "real" reality (including the complexity of gender reality). Professional journalistic norms and rules are part of this particular media logic and determine the selection of events and the production of media content. These norms abolish possible influences of particular gender perspectives in journalism and thus contribute to the reduction of complexity.⁸ This process of complexity reduction also necessarily underlies the media coverage of war, violent conflicts and security.⁹

Gender, war and media: selected theoretical and empirical findings

It is not until the media begins reporting on a war that it becomes a topic of public discussion and, therefore, a relevant problem in communities not involved in the conflict. Thereby, the media also report on matters of security and defense policy and, in doing so, create a public forum for debates on how politics and society should react to the changes brought about by new violent conflicts and wars. The political scientist Piers Robinson (1999) was one of the first researchers to investigate the question as to whether news media can drive foreign policy. And John Shattuck (1996), United States Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor from 1993 to 1998 under President Bill Clinton, provided a clear example of this notion: "The media got us into Somalia and then got us out." In view of this, Berkowitz (2003) coherently defines military power differently than before, namely as the ability to collect, evaluate and process *information*, and then *communicate strategically*. Today, Berkowitz considers this communicative ability – Miskimmon et al. (2013) speak of "strategic

narratives” – to be even more decisive than military strength as measured by arms, troops or the quality of their weapons and military intelligence. The accuracy of this assumption can be illustrated with reference to the “information war” in the current Ukraine–Russia conflict (cf. Pikulicka-Wilczewska and Sakwa 2015). With respect to the power of the combatants’ state and/or media generated communication/propaganda, Giles (2015: 1) speaks of “Russia’s hybrid warfare” and Dyczok (2015: 198) of the “initial effectiveness of Russia’s information machine”. Hutchings and Szostek (2015: 184) claim that “[t]he conflict in Ukraine has thus become an “information war” as much as a conventional one”.

Even though the mass media’s presentation of war, violent conflict and security (policy) is of utmost importance in the field of communication science and media studies, the numerous international empirical studies on this topic have a noticeable blind spot: there are only very few empirical *gender*-sensitive studies on the topic. There is, however, a vast body of theoretical work from neighboring disciplines. The overwhelming majority of these theoretical works originates from the context of political science security studies, within which feminist security studies constitute a special area. Here, empirical analyses in a narrow sense are very rare. The underlying thesis, which proceeds fundamentally and consistently on the basis of one-sided and stereotypical thematization and representation of women and men, both in coverage of war and conflict, and in political and military public relations, is to an extensive degree substantiated in theoretical terms and supported largely by narrative single-case analysis. And indeed, our dominant model of womanhood comprises neither technological competence nor courage or physical strength. No wonder then that violence, conflict, war and security are topics that make it especially difficult to perceive women as *acting subjects* (cf. Elshtain 1987; Elshtain and Tobias 1990). And no wonder then that women hardly seem present in public consciousness as significant *actors* in war and conflict, defense and security policy.¹⁰

Furthermore, and in accordance with traditional social perceptions of gender, men are constructed almost naturally as active participants in war and conflict – as fighters, aggressors and offenders on the one hand, and as active defenders and warrantors of security on the other; moreover, men (in particular, the military) are even considered as promoters of war (Fröhlich 2010). In contrast to this, women are perceived (not only by the media) as a “pacifying influence” (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007: 2), as beings who almost naturally oppose war and/or (warlike) violent conflicts, who are peace-loving and resistant to violence, who suffer from violence and so on. Elshtain (1987: 4) refers to these stereotypes as “Just Warriors” and “Beautiful Souls”. Several empirical studies – mainly qualitative ones – found evidence that media coverage of war and conflict assigns the subordinate role of the peaceful, passive victim, the vulnerable and powerless dependent and survivor, and the sexual object all to women – all in need of security, protection and relief (cf. Cloud 1994; del Zotto 2002; Elshtain 1982, 1987; Enloe 1994; Fröhlich 2013; Rabinovitz 1994; Stables 2003; Wiegman 1994). In doing so, the media simply “reinforce and reproduce the existing social order” between men and women (Lemish and Barzel 2000: 150). As Stabile and Kumar (2005: 765) accurately explain, “[f]ighting brutality against women and children is not the expression of a specific culture; it is the acceptance of our common humanity – a commitment shared by people of good will on every continent”.

This “commitment of common humanity” also applies with regard to female soldiers. If they are taken as prisoners of war, they transform from acting security promising subjects into passive, protection-seeking objects. This was made most clear in the prominent case of Jessica Lynch, imprisoned and liberated during the Iraq war in 2003 (cf. Froula 2006; Howard and Prividera 2004; Kumar 2004) as well as in similar but less well-known situations (see also Nantais and Lee 1999).

Zur and Morrison (1989: 532) refute assumptions about the peaceful and powerless female victim as a sort of myth:

The belief that war is a male institution which has no appeal to women is important because it implies that it is man's responsibility to prevent wars from occurring. The myth which views women as peaceful but powerless, and men as warlike and powerful does not acknowledge the interdependent relationship of men and women in the making of war. ... wars do not simply exist through male advocacy, they also stem from the influence of a complex cultural system.

Sylvester (1987, 2010) and Sjöberg and Gentry (2007) also strongly question the myth of the peaceful and innocent female victim and, therefore, advocate a model of security policy that recognizes the violence of women as deviation as well as the gendered nature of violence (and security) in general. Nevertheless, it is the media's preferred point of view when reporting on wars and violent conflict (cf. e.g. Fröhlich 2010; Lahav 2010; Tuchman 1979). Why is it that we only very rarely find news stories in our media on the many women who during wars and barbarous conflicts perform acts of tremendous violence and aggression – types of violence and aggression that we, as Sylvester (2010: 31) puts it, “associate with aberrant militarism and sadistic politics”?¹¹

Some authors conclude that the media are used to a great extent to promote war and to obtain public support for military interventions (to restore security) – in particular, by conveying stereotypical pleas for military intervention to protect and/or free innocent women and children and to re-establish security (e.g. Cloud 2004; Klaus and Kassel 2005; Orford 1999; Stabile and Kumar 2005). Young (2003: 2), for instance, argues “that an exposition of the gendered logic of the masculine role of protector in relation to women and children illuminates the meaning and effective appeal of a security state that wages war abroad and expects obedience and loyalty at home”. Brownmiller (1994: 38) argues that the transformation of women's bodies by national actors into a symbolic battlefield of virtual conflicts is a crucial prerequisite for such a process.¹²

Other authors, however, argue that especially during armed conflicts or other violent crises and conflicts, female acting subjects leave the public (media) stage – a place where they are underrepresented even under normal circumstances. They are “pushed to the margin and perceived as peripheral to the events” (Kumar 2004; Lahav 2010: 263; see also, e.g. Lachover 2009; Turpin and Lorenzen 1998). Although there are hardly any quantitative studies with a broad scope on this question, the few that do exist (Fröhlich 2010, 2013; Harp et al. 2011) all come to the same conclusion, which, in the most recent of these studies, Harp et al. (2011: 211) summarize as follows: “the exclusion of women's experiences [in and by war coverage] is the norm instead of the exception”.

The very few cases where women do become significant actors in war, conflict and security coverage are cases that represent deviance from the usual gender-stereotypical expectations, one example being female suicide bombers.¹³ But since, as Sjöberg (2006: 195) writes, “current gender stereotypes are incompatible with these women's behavior ... their stories are marginalized [in the US media] and their realities are buried even deeper”. Such processes of marginalization play an important role for military communications, since the narrative of weak women who need security and thus need to be protected, defended and liberated by male heroes (as the above-mentioned case of Jessica Lynch illustrates) only works if female brutality is ignored by the media and does not enter the public perception (cf. Froula 2006; Prividera and Howard 2006; Virchow 2005).

Thus, even deviance from the expected “normality”, which usually results in high newsworthiness, does nothing to change the consistent marginalization of the reality of women in wars and violent conflicts. In the case of deviance from the usual “female” normality, a suitable and different gender stereotype was quickly found: that of the “fallen woman”.¹⁴ The use of this stereotype reduces the issue’s complexity. The reduction of complexity, in turn, is an important function of the mass media, which is why, undoubtedly, journalists willingly pick up the military’s interpretation of such events as a case of a “fallen woman”. This example clearly shows how amplification effects occur in war reporting (almost unconsciously): due to journalistic war reporting’s dominant alignment with military elite sources, in combination with the power of culturally effective gender stereotypes. Journalists have great difficulty shedding the latter, and shrewd military PR knows how to exploit this.

Taken together, it seems plausible to assume that gender-stereotypical media reports become particularly recognizable in media coverage of war, conflict, defense policy and security. Feminist security studies provide interesting theoretical explanations, which I find very useful for studying the reasons for gender-stereotypical war reports. For example, during armed conflicts or other violent crises and conflicts, female (acting) subjects do not simply “leave” the public [and media] stage or “disappear” because their particular problems would not be of any interest for the media. In actual fact, rather the opposite is the case, as feminist security scholars point out when providing an explanation, which they do not explicitly link to the deficits of media coverage but which one can easily apply to the specific annihilation of female issues in media coverage on war and hostile conflicts: taking the case of rape during wartime as a very plausible example, security studies scholar Lene Hansen (2000: 295) describes silence and denial explicitly as “security strategies” of raped women or female victims of other physical and sexual assault. Sylvester (2010: 30) explains that this often is “the only way they [the victims] can create some security”. With respect to media coverage of war and hostile conflicts, this strategy leads, of course, to the annihilation of women and their experience with violence and (lack of) security.

On the other hand, rape during wartime and hostile conflicts is an example of the persistent “symbolic annihilation” (Tuchman 1978) of female issues by means of media coverage, even if women openly speak about it.¹⁵ Peter Sartorius (1996: 15), a leading editor of the German quality newspaper *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and the newspapers’ war correspondent in the Balkans for more than four years, describes his experiences during his travels to the warring regions of Bosnia and Croatia, where he, like most of his colleagues, quite frequently met women who told him of the martyrdom they and others had gone through,

But could we, were we allowed to believe that? Where was, asked almost cynically, the proof of evidence? ... Was the flow of information controlled by propagandists ...? ... One undergoes a process of learning during a war, a process in which it is constantly hammered home that no one can be believed and that even tears do not have any powers as evidence. ... Later, when after intensive research primarily done by the female German journalist Alexandra Stiglmayer and the American Roy Gutman the presumptions were confirmed, I regretted that I did not denounce the crimes when I first heard of them.

(Sartorius 1996: 15)

This demonstrates the whole dilemma: regardless of whether women use silence and denial as security strategies during times of war and violent/hostile conflict, or whether they speak

openly about the life-threatening security issues they are experiencing, the media ignore their stories anyway.

The media's skillful ignorance of women's various experiences is further enhanced by the fact that they usually portray victims of war and hostile conflicts as an anonymous mass (refugee trails, for example; cf. Fröhlich 2010). "Individualization ... has to be banned from the context of war reporting, since the major objective is to demonstrate that larger groups of people, the entire population, or whole ethnic communities, and not individuals are involved ..." (Fröhlich 2013: 161). The dire consequence may be that women's particular security issues in times of war and hostile conflicts (in contrast to those of men) remain unknown, even within the system of political decision-making.

The appeal of women for (more, better, stable etc.) security is further trivialized in media coverage by the reduction of women's experiences to an "emotionalizing function" as a victim that is supposed to give war coverage an "affective kick" (Fröhlich 2013: 163). As the extract from Sartorius' field report (see above) shows, such emphasis on their supposed emotionality reduces their credibility and rationality. Against this background, another vicious circle becomes complete: besides the security argument, it is probably also the argument "women are too emotional" that determines the decisions of media organizations not to send too many female journalists as reporters into war and conflict regions. Although female war correspondents have become more commonplace nowadays, they still represent a small minority (cf. Fröhlich 2013: 160–4).

It is all the more surprising, since there are numerous examples for how female war correspondents often accomplish the extraordinary in their work. BBC correspondent Lyse Doucet offers one possible explanation for the fact that female war reporters constantly deliver stories that are considerably different from those of their male colleagues: it is her experience that in many war zones western female journalists are considered to be a kind of "third gender", which differs not only from men but also from the local women of the area in question. Therefore, they do not fit the mold of the usual gender-stereotypical behaviors and that is why they are secure and treated differently. "We aren't treated like the women of the place. We aren't treated like the men. But in traditional societies, where hospitality trumps ideology, we are almost always accorded the special privileges afforded to guests. In conservative societies, that also includes a belief that women need to be protected" (Doucet 2012: 151).

In various discussions about this phenomenon, several female war correspondents gave me another explanation for the differences seen in their journalistic work: since women are often denied the usual access – for instance, because access to certain elite events and sources (military and political) is reserved for the mostly male chief correspondents – they are forced to turn to supposedly less elite sources for their stories. Accordingly, for reasons of status, the professional role of female war correspondents would be much less shaped by the "intense pro-military bias", i.e. predictable patterns of reporting and editorializing (Entman 2013: 204), than is the case for their male colleagues. In this way, other stories come to light, "stories about people, not frontlines" (Maria von Welser, cited in Gernhuber 1996: 21). Hence, female war correspondents are possibly better placed to shed the media's general militaristic bias and to break out of the vicious spiral of elite silence.

Deficits of current research and challenges for the future

The niche status of gender-sensitive research on media coverage of war, conflict and security (policy) is certainly partly to blame for a theoretical deficiency within communication science. This research could benefit enormously by taking into account the critical understanding

and approaches of gender-sensitive security studies. A first step would be to acknowledge, that men and women differ in their perception and relevance of violence, that they have different notions of and requirements for security, and different notions and expectations concerning the specific establishment and guarantee of security.

I also consider those approaches of security studies to be particularly valuable, which help to broaden the classical focus of conflict-communication studies on “military”, “war activities” or “diplomacy” toward *social* and *societal* aspects of threat and security. For instance: presenting ecological destruction (cf. Detraz 2009) within war coverage as a social/societal aspect of threat, security and consequence of war (for example as German media did during the early phase of the escalation of the violent conflict in Syria) should gain a particular qualitative relevance of its own, and thus could be scientifically evaluated as a specific criterion regarding the quality of media coverage. The same applies to coverage on social changes as a consequence of war (cf. United Nations 2002): how do media report on social changes which affect security or perceived security in war or crisis zones (for instance: people trafficking, sexual slavery and domestic violence; unemployment and the growth of exploitative informal economies; laying of mines and the decreasing possibilities for agricultural production and trading; the transformation of civilian roles during war); how do media report on civil society’s involvement in peace and reconciliation processes in post-conflict situations (for instance: civil grass-roots attempts and their engagement for peace as an opportunity to become organized); and so forth. None of these aspects explicitly represents gender reference. However, the various theoretical approaches of feminist security studies do show the ways in which gender-relevant links can be established – for example the rising risk of domestic violence in post-conflict phases (cf. Tickner 1992), the observable increase in patriarchal values during times of rising nationalism, the transformation of civilian *gender* roles during war and reversed changes in post-conflict contexts (cf. Theidon 2007; Wood 2008).

In doing so, communication studies should also review the prevailing (masculine) news factors and news values and their application in the journalistic selection process, which are considered a sign of professionalism. In the long-term, a reassessment of such professional norms and values, and the reassessment of existing notions of the ideal-type media discourse, could lead to a shift in media coverage of war and security policy. The work of feminist security studies makes a valuable contribution in this context (cf. Brownmiller 1994; Cloud 2004; Froula 2006; Hansen 2000; Kumar 2004; Lemish and Barzel 2000; Moser and Clark 2001; Prividera and Howard 2006; Sjoberg 2006; Sjoberg and Gentry 2007; Stabile and Kumar 2005; Sylvester 2010; Tickner, 2001; Young 2003). However, empirical communication science has yet to develop more complex quantitative methodological approaches which analyze the actual gendered character of relevant media discourses more in-depth and with a broad scope (longitudinal studies, complete inventory counts, less single case studies). With respect to this, complex frame/framing analyses (Entman, 1993; Goffman, 1975), for instance, seem to be better for investigating the actual *discursive* as well as the *strategic* structure of media texts (including culturally determined contexts) than ordinary content analyses which merely focus on single topics, actors and/or evaluations.

The fact that communication science has so far overlooked previous research in gender-sensitive security studies smacks of ignorance – of which, incidentally, I am also guilty. On the other hand, the fact that gender-sensitive security studies deal with media questions on an almost exclusively theoretical basis and, with respect to the empirical dimension of their arguments concerning the media, rely heavily upon single qualitative case studies, is a question of the specific methodological approach and of the corresponding traditions of

this discipline. Still, it is somewhat confusing to me when, for example, Christine Sylvester (2010: 33) writes that women who are charged with (monstrous) aggressiveness and violence in wars “have been paraded in the press in gender particularistic ways”. There is neither empirical evidence nor a scientific reference for such a claim, which lacks intersubjective verifiability. If one then considers that there are currently less than a handful of empirical studies which, with a broad scope, provide valid empirical data on the gendered character of media coverage on war and security, it becomes clear generalizing statements like this are impossible. A “joint venture” between feminist security studies and gender-sensitive quantitative communication research would be a perfect match to solve these problems.

And there are further challenges to be considered: first, the public perception of gender in times of war and violent conflict meanwhile is determined not only by professional journalists but (increasingly) by non-professional ones (e.g. citizen journalists; e.g. the Arab Spring). Furthermore, the public perception of gender, to a greater degree than previously, is increasingly determined by professionalizing military/combatants’ communication. On top of that, in the military area there is more and more unofficial communication by various members of the military, who are involved in relevant public discourses on social media (e.g. video clips from cell phones on YouTube, blogs etc.). Research has not yet sufficiently dealt with this “differentiation of media actors” (Virchow 2012: 213)¹⁶ – and certainly not in the specific context of gender-relevant questions.

Second, in view of the increasing importance of communication as a strategic weapon (cf. Berkowitz 2003), future research should also address the question as to which (dominant) gender representations are depicted in military’s/combatants PR and propaganda, in politics or by non-governmental organizations (NGOs; see also Chambers 2003; Kumar 2006). As yet, this has not been examined in any scientific discipline to any extent. Third, future gender-sensitive research in the field of media, war and security must anticipate the effects of globalization as well as the growing significance of supranational political and economic organizations (cf. Limor and Nossek 2006; Seib 2005). Crucial intervening variables result from these developments, both for the theoretical foundation of relevant studies and for the interpretation of the data they gather. The same is true for the currently increasing economic competition in the media system around the globe, and the casualization tendencies in journalism associated with this, including unmistakable de-professionalization tendencies. There is much to be done – let’s get started.

Notes

- 1 2008: Resolution 1820; September 2009: Resolution 1888; October 2009: Resolution 1889.
- 2 This contribution does not include the topic ‘domestic violence and security’ (cf. e.g. Tickner 1992). Due to the limited scope of this article, I must also exclude environmental security as an issue of gendered violence and conflict (cf. also Detraz 2009).
- 3 For a good overview of feminist security studies in general, see also Blanchard (2003) and, more recently, Sjöberg (2010).
- 4 The focus is on English-language articles although there have been quite a number of German-language studies on this topic in the last ten years.
- 5 For the interdependences between ‘violence’ and ‘security’ see Shepherd (2007), who illustrates the potential of a feminist reconceptualization of (international) security and (gender) violence.
- 6 For example, the ‘USA Patriot Act’ (Pub. L. No. 107–56) of 2001 which covers inter alia the enhancement of domestic security against terrorism, surveillance procedures and border security; the ‘Aviation and Transportation Security Act’ of 2001 (Pub. L. No. 107–71); the ‘Homeland Security Act’ (Pub. L. No. 107–296) of 2002 which re-adjusted US immigration law and policy; the ‘Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act’ (Pub. L. No. 108–458) of 2004 and so on. For more detailed information on more than 130 legislation acts (including

- legislation with floor action) all related to the 9/11 attack in 2001 see <http://thomas.loc.gov/home/terrorleg.htm> (accessed 24 June 2015).
- 7 For more information on the gendered nature of armed conflict and political violence, see also Moser and Clark (2001).
- 8 Some authors see a solution for this problem in 'peace journalism' (cf. Keeble et al. 2010; see also the article in this compendium 'News coverage, peacemaking and peacebuilding' by Jake Lynch in Part III), or rather in the specific concept of 'gendered peace journalism' (Jacobson 2010).
- 9 For the discussion about the hypothetical potential (more) gender-sensitive media coverage would have for the prevention of violent conflicts or for peace and security building activities – including the potential for early warning – see, for example, Schirch (2004) or Lloyd and Howard (2005).
- 10 Since Resolution 1325 of the UN Security Council in 2000, the number of female UN spokespersons for the organization and special correspondents has only slightly increased (e.g. Linda Chavez and Pam O'Tool).
- 11 For example, Sylvester (2010: 31) points out that more than 3,000 Rwandan women have been tried, and many sentenced – some of whom in international trials – for their contributions to genocidal acts.
- 12 See also Faludi (1999: 36–7).
- 13 For an overview of research on female suicide bombers in the media, see Naaman (2007).
- 14 For more on narratives of violent women, see also Sjöberg and Gentry (2008). Another example is the case of the former US Army reserve soldier Lynndie England and the abuses of (male) Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in 2004.
- 15 For a comprehensive examination of news coverage of rape, see also Meyers (1997); for more information on rape as a war crime, see Tetreault (2001).
- 16 As a rare example see Busch (2012).

References

- Berkowitz, B. (2003) *The New Face of War: How war will be fought in the 21st century*, New York: Free Press.
- Blanchard, E. M. (2003) 'Gender, international relations, and the development of feminist security theory', *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 28(4): 1289–312. DOI: 10.1086/368328
- Boyd, R. (2005) 'Gender and human security issues: Building a programme of action-research', *Development in Practice*, 15(1): 115–21. DOI: 10.1080/0961452052000321668
- Brownmiller, S. (1994) 'Making female bodies the battlefield', in A. Stiglmayer (ed.) *Mass Rape: The war against women in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, Lincoln, NE and London: University of Nebraska Press.
- Busch, P. (2012) 'The future of war reporting', *RUSI Journal*, 157(3): 60–7. DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2012.695183
- Chambers, D., Steiner, L. and Fleming, C. (2013) *Women and Journalism*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Chambers, R. (2003) 'The war of the words. The rhetoric of "Operation Iraqi Freedom" An informal survey', *Culture, Theory & Critique*, 44(2): 171–81. DOI: 10.1080/1473578032000151030
- Cloud, D. (1994) 'Operation desert comfort', in S. Jeffords and L. Rabinovitz (eds) *Seeing through the Media: The Persian Gulf War*, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Cloud, D. (2004) "'To Veil the Threat of Terror": Afghan women and the "Clash of Civilizations" in the imagery of the U.S. war on terrorism', *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 90(3): 285–306. DOI: 10.1080/0033563042000270726
- del Zotto, A. C. (2002) 'Weeping women, wringing hands: How the mainstream media stereotyped women's experiences in Kosovo', *Journal of Gender Studies*, 11(2): 141–50. DOI: 10.1080/09589230220139773
- Detraz, N. (2009) 'Environmental security and gender: Necessary shifts in an evolving debate', *Security Studies*, 18(2): 345–69. DOI: 10.1080/09636410902899933
- Doucet, L. (2012) 'No man's land. Reflection on a working life as a third gender', in H. Storm and H. Williams (eds) *No Woman's Land: On the frontlines with female reporters*, London: International News Safety Institute.
- Dyczok, M. (2015) 'The Ukraine story in Western media', in A. Pikulicka-Wilczewska and R. Sakwa (eds) *Ukraine and Russia: People, politics, propaganda and perspectives*, Bristol: E-International Relations.
- Elshtain, J. B. (1982) 'On beautiful souls, just warriors and feminist consciousness', *Women's Studies International Forum*, 5(3/4): 341–48. DOI: 10.1080/09589230220139773

- Elshtain, J. B. (1987) *Women and War*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Elshtain, J. B. and Tobias, S. (eds) (1990) *Women, Militarism, and War: Essays in History, Politics, and Social Theory*, Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Enloe, C. (1994) 'The gendered Gulf', in S. Jeffords and L. Rabinovitz (eds) *Seeing through the Media: The Persian Gulf War*, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Enloe, C. (2000a [1989]) *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making feminist sense of international politics* (updated edn; 1st edn 1989), Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Enloe, C. (2000b) *Maneuvers: The international politics of militarizing women's lives*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Entman, R. E. (1993) 'Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm', *Journal of Communication*, 43(4): 51–8.
- Entman, R. M. (2013) 'Surging beyond realism. How the US media promote war again and again', in J. Seethaler, M. Karmasin, G. Melischek and R. Wöhlert (eds) *Selling War. The role of the mass media in hostile conflicts from World War I to the 'War on Terror'*, Bristol and Chicago, IL: Intellect.
- Faludi, S. (1999) *Stiffed: The betrayal of the American man*, New York: HarperCollins.
- Fröhlich, R. (2010) 'The coverage of war: Do women matter? A longitudinal content analysis of broadsheets in Germany', *European Journal of Communication*, 25(1): 1–10. DOI: 10.1177/0267323109354226
- Fröhlich, R. (2013) 'Women, the media and war: The representation of women in German broadsheets between 1980 and 2000', in J. Seethaler, M. Karmasin, G. Melischek and R. Wöhlert (eds) *Selling War: The role of the mass media in hostile conflicts from World War I to the 'War on Terror'*, Bristol and Chicago, IL: Intellect.
- Froula, A. (2006) 'Lynch N' England. Figuring females as the U.S. at war', *Global Media Journal*, 5(9): 1–12.
- Gallagher, M. (in cooperation with My von Euler) (1995) 'An unfinished story: Gender patterns in media employment', *Reports and Papers on Mass Communication 110*, Paris: UNESCO Publishing. Online. Available HTTP: <<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0010/001016/101613eb.pdf>> (accessed 20 September 2016).
- Gernhuber, S. (1996) 'Weibliche Sichtweisen' ['Female perspectives'], *Journalist*, 47(1): 20–1.
- Giles, K. (2015) *Russia's Hybrid Warfare: A success in propaganda*, Working paper No. 1 of the German Federal Academy of Security Policy. Online. Available HTTP: <https://www.baks.bund.de/de/aktuelles/working-paper-russias-hybrid-warfare-a-success-in-propaganda> (accessed 20 September 2016).
- Goffman, E. (1975) *Frame Analysis: An essay on the organization of experience*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hansen, L. (2000) 'The Little Mermaid's silent security dilemma and the absence of gender in the Copenhagen School', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 29(2): 285–306. DOI: 10.1177/03058298000290020501
- Harp, D., Loke, J. and Bachmann, I. (2011) 'More of the same old story? Women, war, and news in Time Magazine', *Women's Studies in Communication*, 34(2): 202–17. DOI: 10.1080/07491409.2011.619470
- Howard, J. W. III and Prividera, L. C. (2004) 'Rescuing patriarchy or saving "Jessica Lynch": The rhetorical construction of the American woman soldier', *Women and Language*, 27(2): 89–97.
- Hutchings, S. and Szostek, J. (2015) 'Dominant narratives in Russian political and media discourse during the Ukraine crisis', in A. Pikulicka-Wilczewska and R. Sakwa (eds) *Ukraine and Russia: People, politics, propaganda and perspectives*, Bristol: E-International Relations. Online. Available HTTP: <<http://www.e-ir.info/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Ukraine-and-Russia-E-IR.pdf>> (accessed 20 September 2016).
- Jacobson, A. S. (2010) 'When peace journalism and feminist theory join forces: A Swedish case study', in R. L. Keeble, J. Tulloch and F. Zollmann (eds) *Peace Journalism, War and Conflict Resolution*, New York: Lang.
- Keeble, R. L., Tulloch, J. and Zollmann, F. (eds) (2010) *Peace Journalism, War and Conflict Resolution*, New York: Lang.
- Klaus, E. and Kassel, S. (2005) 'The veil as a means of legitimization: An analysis of the interconnectedness', *Journalism*, 6(3): 335–55. DOI: 10.1177/1464884905054064
- Kumar, D. (2004) 'War propaganda and the (ab)uses of women: Media constructions of the Jessica Lynch Story', *Feminist Media Studies*, 4(3): 297–313. DOI: 10.1080/1468077042000309955
- Kumar, D. (2006) 'Media, war, and propaganda: Strategies of information management during the 2003 Iraq War', *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies*, 3(1): 48–69. DOI: 10.1080/14791420500505650
- Lachover, E. (2009) 'Women in the Six Day War through the eye of the media', *Journal of Israeli History: Politics, Society, Culture*, 28(2): 117–35. DOI: 10.1080/13531040903169685

- Lahav, H. (2010) 'The giver of life and the griever of death: Women in the Israeli TV coverage of the second Lebanon war', *Communication, Culture & Critique*, 3(2): 242–69. DOI: 10.1111/j.1753-9137.2010.01069.x
- Lemish, D. and Barzel, I. (2000) 'Four mothers: The womb in the public sphere', *European Journal of Communication*, 15(2): 147–69. DOI: 10.1177/0267323100015002001
- Limor, Y. and Nossek, H. (2006) 'The military and the media in the twenty-first century: Towards a new model of relations', *Israel Affairs*, 12(3): 484–510. DOI: 10.1080/13537120600745054
- Lloyd, F. and Howard, R. (2005) *Gender, Conflict and Journalism: A handbook for South Asia*, Paris: UNESCO Communication and Information Sector. Online. Available HTTP: <<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001439/143925e.pdf>> (accessed 20 September 2016).
- Meyers, M. (1997) *News Coverage of Violence against Women: Engendering blame*, Newberry Park, CA: Sage.
- Miskimmon, A., O'Loughlin, B. and Roselle, L. (2013) *Strategic Narratives: Communication power and the new world order*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Moser, C. and Clark, F. (eds) (2001) *Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gender, armed conflict and political violence*, London: Zed Books.
- Naaman, D. (2007) 'Brides of Palestine/angels of death: Media, gender, and performance in the case of the Palestinian female suicide bombers', *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 32(4): 933–55. DOI: 10.1086/512624
- Nantais, C. and Lee, M. E. (1999) 'Women in the United States military: Protectors or protected? The case of prisoner of war Melissa Rathnun-Nealy', *Journal of Gender Studies*, 8(2): 181–91.
- Orford, A. (1999) 'Muscular humanitarianism: Reading the narratives of the new interventionism', *European Journal of International Law*, 10(4): 679–711.
- Peterson, V.S. (1992) 'Transgressing boundaries: Theories of knowledge. Gender and international relations', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 21(2): 183–206. DOI: 10.1177/03058298920210020401
- Pikulicka-Wilczewska, A. and Sakwa, R. (eds) (2015) *Ukraine and Russia: People, politics, propaganda and perspectives*, Bristol: E-International Relations. Online. Available HTTP: <<http://www.e-ir.info/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Ukraine-and-Russia-E-IR.pdf>> (accessed 20 September 2016).
- Prividera, L. C. and Howard, J. W. III (2006) 'Masculinity, whiteness, and the warrior hero: Perpetuating the strategic rhetoric of US nationalism and the marginalization of women', *Women and Language*, 29(2): 29–37.
- Rabinovitz, L. (1994) 'Soap opera woes: Genre, gender and the Persian Gulf War', in S. Jeffords and L. Rabinovitz (eds) *Seeing through the Media: The Persian Gulf War*, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Robinson, P. (1999) 'The CNN effect: Can the news media drive foreign policy?', *Review of International Studies*, 25(2): 301–9.
- Sartorius, P. (1996) 'Grenzen der Profession' ['Limitations of the profession'], *Journalist*, No. 1/January, 15–16.
- Schirch, L. (2004) *Women in Peacebuilding: Resource and training manual*. Harrisonburg, VA: Eastern Mennonite University.
- Seib, P. (2005) 'Hegemonic no more: Western media, the rise of Al-Jazeera, and the influence of diverse voices', *International Studies Review*, 7(4): 601–15. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2486.2005.00535.x
- Shattuck, J. (1996) 'Human rights and humanitarian crises: Policy-making and the media', in R. I. Rotberg and T. G. Weiss (eds) *From Massacres to Genocide: The media, public policy and humanitarian crises*, Washington, DC: Brookings.
- Shepherd, L. J. (2007) "'Victims, perpetrators and actors" revisited: Exploring the potential for a feminist reconceptualisation of (international) security and (gender) violence', *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, 9(2): 239–56. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-856X.2007.00281.x
- Sjoberg, L. (2006) *Gender, Justice, and the Wars in Iraq: A feminist reformulation of just war theory*, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Sjoberg, L. (ed.) (2010) *Gender and International Security: Feminist perspectives*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Sjoberg, L. (2011) 'Gender, the state and war redux: Feminist international relations across the levels of analysis', *International Relations*, 25(1): 108–34. DOI: 10.1177/0047117810396990
- Sjoberg, L. and Gentry, C. E. (2007) *Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women's violence in global politics*, London: Zed Books.
- Sjoberg, L. and Gentry, C. E. (2008) 'Reduced to bad sex: Narratives of violent women from the Bible to the war on terror', *International Relations*, 22(1): 5–23. DOI: 10.1177/0047117807087240

- Stabile, C. A. and Kumar, D. (2005) 'Unveiling imperialism: Media, gender and the war on Afghanistan', *Media, Culture & Society*, 27(5): 765–82. DOI: 10.1177/0163443705055734
- Stables, G. (2003) 'Justifying Kosovo: Representations of gendered violence and U.S. military intervention', *Critical Studies in Mass Communication*, 20(1): 92–115. DOI: 10.1080/0739318032000067047
- Stiehm, J. H. (1982) 'The protected, the protector, the defender', *Women's Studies International Forum*, 5(3–4): 367–76. DOI: 10.1080/0739318032000067047
- Sylvester, C. (1987) 'Some dangers in merging feminist and peace projects', *Alternatives*, 12(4): 493–509. DOI: 10.1177/030437548701200404
- Sylvester, C. (2010) 'War, sense, and security', in L. Sjöberg (ed.) *Gender and International Security: Feminist perspectives*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Tetreault, M.A. (2001) 'Accountability or justice? Rape as a war crime', in L. Richardson, V. Taylor and N. Whittier (eds) *Feminist Frontiers* (5th edn), Boston, MA: McGraw Hill.
- Theidon, K. (2007) 'Gender in transition: Common sense, women and war', *Journal of Human Rights*, 6: 1–27.
- Tickner, J. A. (1992) *Gender in International Relations: Feminist perspectives on achieving international security*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Tickner, J. A. (2001) *Gendering World Politics: Issues and approaches in the post-cold war era*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Tuchman, G. (1978) 'The symbolic annihilation of women by the mass media', in G. Tuchman, A. K. Daniels and J. Benet (eds) *Hearth and Home: Images of women in the mass media*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Tuchman, G. (1979) 'Women's depiction by the mass media', *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 4(3): 528–42.
- Turpin, J. and Lorentzen, L. A. (eds) (1998) *The Women and War Reader*, New York: New York University Press.
- United Nations (2002) *Women, Peace and Security: Study submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1325 (2000)*, New York: United Nations. Online. Available HTTP: <<http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/eWPS.pdf>> (accessed 20 September 2016).
- United Nations Development Programme (1994) 'Human Development Report 1994', New York: United Nations Development Programme.
- United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (1995) The United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women. Platform for action. Online. Available HTTP: <<http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/plat1.htm>> (accessed 20 September 2016).
- Virchow, F. (2005) 'Militär und Medien', in M. Apelt (ed) *Forschungsthema: Militär Militärische Organisationen im Spannungsfeld von Krieg, Gesellschaft und soldatischen Subjekten*, Wiesbaden: Springer.
- Virchow, F. (2012) 'Militär und Medien' ['Military and media'], in N. Leonhard and I.-J. Werkner (eds) *Militärsoziologie. Eine Einführung [Military sociology. An introduction]*, (2nd edn), Wiesbaden: VS.
- Wadley, J. D. (2010) 'Gendering the state: Performativity and protection in international security', in L. Sjöberg (ed.) *Gender and International Security. Feminist perspectives*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Wiegman, R. (1994) 'Missiles and melodrama (masculinity and the televisual war)', in S. Jeffords and L. Rabinovitz (eds) *Seeing through the Media: The Persian Gulf War*, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Wood, E. J. (2008) 'The social processes of civil war: The wartime transformation of social networks', *The Annual Review of Political Science*, 11: 539–61. DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.082103.104832
- Young, I. M. (2003) 'The logic of masculinist protection: Reflections on the current security state', *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 29(1): 1–25. DOI: 10.1086/375708
- Zur, O. and Morrison, A. (1989) 'Gender and war – Re-examining attitudes', *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 59(4): 528–33. DOI: 10.1111/j.1939-0025.1989.tb02742.x

3

INVESTIGATING THE CULTURE–MEDIA– SECURITY NEXUS

Holger Pötzsch

Introduction

Drawing upon the observation that every conflict with necessity includes a cultural dimension, the present chapter outlines key conceptual and analytical tools that enable an understanding of how technologically mediated cultural expressions such as films or computer games interfere with and impact upon processes of conflict formation and transformation. In doing so the chapter outlines ways of understanding the potential impacts of media, art, and popular culture on politics and society.

The chapter introduces the cultural sphere as a crucial security sector and investigates the roles of art, popular entertainment, and media technologies in processes of de/securitization. Firstly, I direct attention to issues of meaning and representation, before I move on to a conceptualization of potential effects based on emotion and affect, technology, and performances. Key themes to be elaborated include, yet are not limited to, neo-formalist analysis, procedural rhetoric, affective design, technological affordances, and performance effects. Initially, however, I provide a brief overview of established conceptualizations of the interrelation between a cultural sphere, politics, and security.

The culture–media–security nexus

Since the 1990s, the cultural sphere has emerged as a crucial sector for conflict and security studies. An initial extension of focus included attention to the economy, the environment, society, and politics besides traditional issues of military and state security (Buzan et al. 1998), before a second extension widened the frame towards issues of culture and identity. As such, for instance, Williams (2007) asserts the necessity ‘to develop more ... sophisticated theories of security that place questions of culture and identity at the centre of their analyses’ (Williams 2007: 1). On the basis of Bourdieu’s thought, Williams suggests a “cultural field of security” that privileges *cultural and symbolic forms of power*’ (Williams 2007: 2; emphasis in original). Similarly, and arguing from the vantage point of conflict theory, Väyrynen (2001) has pointed to the increasing saliency of ‘language, culture, and identity in international conflict resolution’ (Väyrynen 2001: 5). She criticizes the framework of, for instance, John

Burton (1990; 1997) for treating issues of narrative, attitudes, meaning, affect, and belief as secondary to quantifiable strategic interests based on a human needs scale as determinate of conflict conceptualizations and behaviors.

The move of scholarly attention away from hard power, the state, military, and grand strategy towards soft power, culture, identity, attitudes, and values was facilitated by a *cultural turn* (Bachmann-Medick 2006) involving the increasing importance of post-structuralist and constructivist approaches to issues of conflict and security (Hammond 2007). The notion of securitization¹ as an inherently political process of risk and threat formation and negotiation (Wæver 1995; Hansen 2006; Balzacq 2011), multi-actor and critical approaches to security (Fierke 2007; Hoogensen-Gjörv 2012), and processual understandings of politics,² as well as of societal conflicts and antagonisms (Väyrynen 2001; Laclau and Mouffe 2001; Mouffe 2005) are all based on a growing sensibility for the ultimate contingency and malleability of identities and socio-cultural frames, and their implications for political performances and positions.

When perceived from the vantage point of these developments, attempts to properly understand the formation and negotiation of security issues, the legitimacy of securitizing actors, or the relative importance of referent objects³ for securitization moves have to extend into the field of cultural analysis, critical theory, as well as the general humanities. Likewise, conflicts cannot be effectively managed or transformed without due attention to the socio-culturally constituted mindscapes (Zerubavel 1997) and affective structures of engagement that inform discursive positions and influence attitudes, beliefs, norm systems, and ultimately the individual and collective performances of involved actors.

In all the cases mentioned above, cultural expressions play a significant role and their various *modi operandi* and functions in different individual and collective contexts have to be carefully addressed. Proceeding from formal analysis of textual structures and frames, via questions of attention management and affective design, to technological affordances and performance effects, the present chapter aims at sketching out four frameworks that enable such a productive analytical engagement with the role of a cultural sphere in the (international) politics of security and conflict.

Aesthetics beyond the arts

An improved understanding of the ways through which a cultural sphere impacts upon processes of de/securitization and conflict formation and transformation necessitates a reconceptualization of aesthetics beyond a focus on high art. Welsch (1997: 8), for instance, introduces a widened understanding of aesthetics that takes seriously the concept's in-built 'semantic ambiguity'. He argues that the term aesthetics refers to both a Hegelian notion of 'a philosophy of ... fine art' (quoted in Welsch 1997: 8) and to Baumgarten's (1983) understanding of the term as the 'science of sensitive cognition' in general (quoted in Welsch 1997: 8). According to Welsch, Baumgarten's extension of aesthetics into a branch of general epistemology implies that studies of aesthetics do not only involve questions concerning art, but also enable attention to how knowledge is formed and negotiated, or how certain design features and formal properties of cultural expressions impact upon individuals and socio-political processes on a day-to-day basis.

On the basis of such considerations, Bleiker (2001: 510) has argued for a distinction between mimetic and aesthetic forms of representation. While the former works on the pretense to be able to capture a phenomenon as it really is, the latter retains awareness of an ultimate contingency of any articulation about the world and recognizes that 'the inevitable

difference between the represented and its representation is the very location of politics'. In relation to studies of world politics, Bleiker (2001: 510) asserts that this 'aesthetic turn' enables new insights 'including those that emerge from ... literature, visual art, music, cinema and other sources that extend beyond "high art" into popular culture'. In this view, state responses to issues of security, war, and conflict are not only based on rational assessments of a given situation, but are equally predisposed by a cultural sphere that through representation influences attitudes and beliefs of decision makers and the general public, and that implicitly provides plausibility and relevance to certain measures while tacitly undermining possible alternatives. Bleiker's thought, as such, points to key aspects of an emerging culture-media-politics nexus.

Bleiker's notion of a productive gap between representation and represented as the locus of politics is mirrored in Welsch's (1997: 25) aesthetically motivated recommendation to develop a 'blind-spot culture' in scientific conduct that constantly attends to the dynamics between 'heeding and excluding' that predispose findings in contingent terrain. In both cases, the cultural sphere acquires a key function in assigning value to and objectifying particular articulations while undermining others. This happens, for instance, through the tacit stereotyping of particular individuals or groups, or through the selective de/emphasizing of certain past incidents in film, television shows, or games. Popular cultural representations can tacitly normalize or challenge established power relations, and inhere the potential to either reinforce or question certain attitudes or beliefs. How exactly one can approach and cautiously predict such potential effects and impacts will be investigated throughout the remainder of this chapter.

The (international) politics of (popular) culture

The varying relations between cultural expressions⁴ and politics referred to in the section above have been addressed earlier. One strain of studies has taken an instrumental stance and examined a perceived shift from military and economic hard power politics to culture-, media-, and communication-based strategies that are termed soft or smart power (Nye 2008; Rugh 2009; Rosendorf 2009). Often in the context of specific national policies, these approaches deal with the applicability and effectiveness of particular advances in public diplomacy (Hayden 2012), information operations (Munoz 2012), political communication (Bakir 2010), specific military cultures (Hajjar 2014), or the deployment of strategic narrative to advance state agendas (Roselle et al. 2014). Alternatively, research in these fields can address intended or unintended consequences of media interventions by state and non-state actors such as propagandistic uses of mainstream media or the use of social media channels by insurgent or terrorist groups (Murray et al. 2008; Hoskins and O'Loughlin 2009; Robinson et al. 2010; Hansen 2011). Besides these studies into the conscious instrumentalization of cultural expressions for particular political ends, a second strain of research has directed attention to possible implicit effects of an apparently neutral entertainment sector.

From Kracauer's (1947) notion of popular film as reflective of deep-seated collective beliefs and attitudes to Galtung's (1996) focus on cultural dimensions of violence and conflict, many scholars have addressed the potential impacts of cultural expressions on political practice, the formation of subjectivities, and the negotiation of discursive positions (Weldes 2003; Nexon and Neumann 2006; Hammond 2007; Stahl 2010). What unites these studies is the idea that popular culture can frame public debate and normalize particular power relations or forms of conduct by establishing a 'background of meanings' (Weldes 2003: 6) that tacitly renders plausibility to certain articulations and practices, while undermining others.

To provide a brief example, consistently presenting women in popular cultural expressions as passive victims who have to be protected by male protagonists might, in this line of reasoning, establish a certain implied normality that systematically pushes political discourses and practices in a particular direction. Presenting them as active self-sustained individuals, on the other hand, might naturalize an opposing role model. The audience would not be determined to perceive all women in the implied fashion. However, the assigning of certain roles to women across a wide variety of cultural representations might, in the long run, establish a mediated normality that supports certain forms of conduct and makes others more difficult to sustain. Nexon and Neumann (2006: 17–20) refer to such processes as a ‘constitutive impact’ of popular cultural expressions on politics.

Several scholars have attempted to connect certain political and/or economic interests to how, for instance, acts of violence, conflict, and war are culturally framed. From analysis of the involvement of the US military in the production of military-themed films or computer games for the sake of increased recruitment and tacit propaganda (Der Derian 2009; Kellner 2009; Stahl 2010; Alford 2010; Mantello 2012) to critical assessment of possible hidden agendas behind global news coverage of particular wars or conflicts (Kellner 2005; DiMaggio 2009), these studies often posit global mass media and entertainment industries as purveyors of hegemonic ideological positions that, for instance, serve to sustain domestic support for Western military interventionism and clandestine military operations.

Even though all the studies mentioned above agree upon a certain significance of a cultural sphere for politics and society, few of them highlight concrete methods that enable an assessment of the specific textual means through which such expressions and representations invite certain responses in the audience and predispose the production of certain dominant paradigms of meaning. In the following, I will supply these valuable approaches with methodological considerations that allow for a more accurate tracing of the formal, textual properties and technological frames through which certain audience responses are systematically invited.

To reach this aim, I will introduce four analytical frameworks that allow for a more nuanced understanding of the role of technologically mediated cultural expressions in politics. Particular attention will be directed to aspects of 1) textual properties and meaning, 2) affect and the body, 3) new media technology, and 4) performance effects of art and popular culture. Throughout, I will illustrate the applicability of the presented methods with brief references to studies of films, computer games, and artworks that have productively applied these methods and conceptual frames.

Text, context, meaning

How does meaning emerge from images or texts? To approach this question scholars have long drawn upon a semiotic tradition inspired by Saussure’s (1983 [1916]) structural linguistics that perceives of signification as the result of conventionalized, yet arbitrary, relations between signifiers and signifieds. This line of thought argues that there is no necessary connection between the word ‘tree’ (signifier) and the mental image of a perennial plant with a large trunk and leafed branches (signified) this word evokes. The relation between the two is arbitrary and merely the result of convention. Scholars such as Barthes (1967; 1987) and Eco (1976) have since shown that processes of signification pervade cultures and societies and cannot be limited to linguistic or textual phenomena. They apply an extended understanding of text and argue that objects, images, or gestures also convey meanings and can accordingly be subjected to textual analysis.

In the process of opening up signification and perceiving it in wider socio-cultural and historical contexts, additional layers of meaning production were explored. Barthes (1967; 1987), for instance, distinguishes between denotative and connotative levels of signification. While an image of an eagle at a denotative layer merely points to the particular bird of prey depicted, at a connotative layer various forms of context become relevant that fill the denotative sign with additional meanings. According to Barthes, myths play a key role in stabilizing contingent connotative processes of signification over time that connect, for instance, the image of a bird of prey with notions of courage, vigor, or strength.

Such a widened understanding of signification has since inspired various scholars interested in the interrelation between structures of meaning and contextual factors. Textual features are seen as contingent frames that predispose, yet do not determine, processes of interpretation and understanding by situated audiences. As such, struggles over meaning, oppositional forms of reading, or multiple socio-political functions and effects of particular cultural expressions move within the purview of these approaches.

To provide an example, in her study of the role of novels and films in the formation of collective and cultural war memories, Erll (2010; 2011) introduces a useful methodological distinction between three different, yet related, levels of analysis. She differentiates between an 'intra-medial' level that consists of formal textual properties and devices, an 'inter-medial' level that is comprised of inter-textual references entailing an 'interplay with earlier and later representations' (Erll 2010: 390), and a 'pluri-medial' level, that is, the institutional, technological, and socio-cultural constellations within which a particular expression or artifact operates and is received. According to Erll (2011: 137–138) the first two levels of analysis can merely point to certain, textually and aesthetically motivated potentials for politically relevant memory effects. Only the third, contextual level, however, can give indications to how these meaning potentials are received, activated, and negotiated in concrete technological, socio-political, and institutional settings.

As such, Zack Snyder's film *300* (2006) or Activision's first-person shooter *Call of Duty: Black Ops* (2010) might refer to actual historical incidents – the Greek–Persian war and the cold war respectively – but this does not imply that audiences will make that connection and understand the works accordingly. To understand how a particular cultural expression is read, attention has to be directed toward the 'pluri-medial constellations' (Erll 2011: 137) that guide and predispose processes of reception. Close textual analysis can identify the specific textual tropes and devices that systematically invite particular responses and, this way, predispose the negotiation processes taking place at a pluri-medial level.

Erll's way of combining meaning potentials identified through close textual analysis with contextual factors is inspired by formalism – an approach to literary criticism developed by Russian literary scholar Victor Shklovsky (1965). Similar to Erll, Thompson (1988) also adapts this method for an analysis of textually motivated meaning potentials inherent in aesthetic objects and practices. In contrast to Erll, however, Thompson connects these potentials to cognitive and perceptual schemata to understand possible socio-political impacts.

According to Thompson, art – including film art – is defined by its capacity to de-habitualize accustomed ways of seeing, thinking, and acting. Through various forms of attuned transgression – the carefully devised, deliberate breaking of established rules or conventions, argues Thompson (1988) – works of art can de-familiarize naturalized frames for cognition and perception, and endow cultural expressions with a subversive political potential. As such, an art film might deliberately challenge generic conventions to achieve an unsettling effect and this way frustrate audience expectations and received templates for reception. This frustration will, according to Thompson, lead to increased reflection and a questioning of received knowledge.

To provide a brief example, Pötzsch (2012) has shown how Nick Broomfield's film *The Battle for Haditha* (2007) challenges several conventions of the war genre and this way induces critical reflection and contemplation, and enables a reconceptualization of the nature of war, conflict, and enemy. This is achieved through a form of 'triple focalization' (Pötzsch 2012: 181) where camera and microphone constantly invite the audience to adopt the perspective of US soldiers, Iraqi civilians, as well as Iraqi insurgents and this way enforce a constant negotiation of apparently contradictory frames of reference and subject positions. As a result, clear-cut notions of war as a struggle of good against evil with a clear objective and predictable outcomes are undermined. Rather, the viewer is invited to perceive war as a complex and multidimensional political economy where various rational actors compete and strive for their particular interests. As such, Broomfield provides a systemic perspective on evil in war and exposes an engrained logic of violence that reduces options for agency for all involved groups until only 'wrong' decision can be taken.

What is analytically valid for studies of film is also useful with respect to other forms of cultural expression. The popular war game *Spec Ops: The Line* (Yager Development 2012), for instance, creatively re-appropriates the conventions of the military shooter genre to make a similar point about the nature of war and the counterproductive logics of violence. Here, violent actions by the player are constantly problematized with reference to unintended blowbacks, civilian casualties, and an increasing impossibility to establish clear objectives. According to Pötzsch (2015c), *Spec Ops: The Line* uses a carefully devised narrative to raise awareness for the procedural logics of the shooter genre that implicitly posit violence as the only way to achieve in-game progress.

To provide a final example, Schimanski and Wolfe (2013) have shown how Morten Traavik's work *Borderlines* (2011) – that consists of re-located border posts from the Norwegian Russian border – intervenes in, and potentially de-habitualizes, established regimes of in/exclusion connected to state borders and the particular perceptions and performances these invite. The authors argue that Traavik's re-location of markers of division into the centers of the towns of Oslo and Kirkenes enables a new attentiveness to these structures and invites for critical reflection over everyday regimes and practices of in- and exclusion.⁵

The analytical tools for an assessment of textually generated meaning potentials of given cultural expressions are based on the idea of a constraining function of form that predisposes, yet does not determine, audiences. Consequently, a neo-formalist approach treats textual structures as contingent and remains open for re-readings in different contexts or by specific audiences that might challenge and even subvert the identified dominant message. Neo-formalist analysis as such aligns to a post-structuralist framework that asserts the contingency of objects in relation to changing socio-political, cultural, and historical positions and frames. The reader does not freely impose meaning on a given text, but neither does the text unambiguously tie down responses to only one possible reading. Meaning emerges in the contingent and continuous exchange between the two.

All the studies mentioned above treat textual structures as empirically observable sets of data that can be analyzed to predict probable dominant responses. However, as the next section will show, such inherently rational, meaning-based forms of analysis are not the only way through which textual structures and devices assert influence upon audiences.

The 'textual' amplification of affect and emotive engagement

The following section introduces analytical frameworks that investigate the means through which cultural expressions address the spectator at an embodied⁶ level and elicit certain pre-

rational affects and emotions. The body as a locus of immediate forms of reception has long been in the focus of film studies (Williams 1991; Sobchack 2004). Here, I will direct attention to the design of digital applications and how they invite embodied responses by audiences.

The design of digital technologies elicits affects and other embodied responses in a variety of ways. These include, yet are not limited to, the tacit management of human attention (Hayles 2012), the modulation and amplification of affective engagements (Ash 2012; 2013), and the tacit predisposition of interactive performances along ideological trajectories through software-based procedures and protocols (Bogost 2006; 2007). In all these cases, focus on the meaning potentials inherent in explicit, textually framed messages and narratives is accompanied by analysis of the textual features that invite specific embodied experiences through sub- and unconscious forms of address.

Ash (2012; 2013), for example, has shown how the design and mechanics of first-person shooter computer games enable instant affective gratifications for violent actions through the use of pleasant colors, sounds, and rewards, thus modulating and managing the player's positive attention and active engagement. Similarly, Stahl (2010) has addressed the ways through which the interactive design of first-person war games and military training simulations affords new forms of involvement that play on emotion and reduce the capacity for critical thought and contemplation, thus creating a more sophisticated and immersive regime of social control than what he terms a preceding spectacle-based sports-militarism hybrid.

McSorley (2012), on the other hand, details how ubiquitously networked digital recording technologies such as helmet cams afford the emergence of more detailed, more visceral, and therefore more affective images from war zones and battlefields. These technologies convey 'lo-fi, intimate, multi-sensory' (p. 47) war experiences from a first-person perspective that elicit strong emotions and make a conscious distancing from the realities of war more difficult. As such, McSorley argues, these technologies might afford a re-enchantment of warfare in the sense of Coker (2004), but could also lead to increased awareness of the embodied risks and visceral consequences of violent conduct, thus potentially undermining propagandistic efforts that aim at presenting a sanitized image of warfare and that tend to de-emphasize costs and unintended consequences of military interventions.

Taking underlying software-based procedures and operations as his point of departure, Bogost (2006: 103) opens a different, code-based venue into an extended textual approach to cultural representations of war and conflict. He criticizes the 'black box nature' of contemporary simulations that keep the rules governing user activities and systemic responses inaccessible and invisible. However, argues Bogost, these rules tacitly and non-consciously pre-structure users' performative involvement in games along ideological paths and thereby influence subjects' performances through what he terms procedural rhetoric. Providing the example of the terror-event response-planning and training simulation *BioChemFX*, Bogost (2006: 104) shows how the unit operations of the simulation exclude such variables as 'the relative worth of the population' in economic terms. However, Bogost claims that in reality such variables might factor heavily into political decisions about where scarce resources are deployed in a crisis situation, and where not. Therefore, the implicit exclusion of these factors at the level of the simulation's encoded procedures constitutes a rhetorical act that frames state practices as more inclusive and socio-economically neutral than they in reality are, and that leads players to enact these ideological frames by tacitly removing these aspects from simulated decision-making processes.

The specific design features and underlying technological protocols and procedures identified above point to the fact that the culture-media-security nexus is about more

than consciously deployed messages and rational audience responses. Emotions, affect, and performances are equally salient arenas where the cultural sphere, subjects, and politics interact and mutually predispose one another.

Approaches such as those introduced in the present section focus on embodied and affective responses to mediated cultural expressions. As such, they are part of a recent turn in media and communication studies that moves attention away from content-based analysis and argues for the significance of material structures and situated performances for an assessment of potential media effect and impacts. Besides renewed attention to the human body, this material turn also opens up interesting questions regarding the role of technology in these processes.

Assessing affordances of new media technologies

Ever since McLuhan's (1964) famous assertion that 'the medium is the message', a growing number of scholars have argued for the importance of technology and infrastructure for processes of mediation and cultural representation (Kittler 1999; Packer and Crofts Wiley 2012). This movement entailed a turn away from questions of media messages and content and enabled attention to, among other things, the affordances of technological objects (Norman 2011; 2013), technological infrastructure (Hoskins and O'Loughlin 2010; Pötsch 2015a), or software protocols (Galloway 2004).

Avoiding initial tendencies toward technological determinism connected to the early thought of, for instance, McLuhan (1964) or Kittler (1999), most scholars today agree that the specific affordances of information and communication technologies predispose, yet do not determine, individual and collective responses. As such, messages still matter, but their content cannot alone account for their potential impacts. This general statement retains its validity when focusing on medial frames for perceptions and practices relating to issues of security and conflict. Consequently, the specific nature of media technological affordances merits continued scholarly attention.

Following Norman (2011; 2013), affordance is here understood as sets of properties of an object that invite particular practices, while constraining others. The design of technological objects frames possible forms of use without, however, determining in the last instance what can and cannot be done with it. Affordances, as such, constitute horizons of possibility that limit the autonomy of users. Similar to the mere potentials for meaning in cultural expressions identified through, for instance, neo-formalist analysis, focus on technological affordances only opens for the identification of possible or probable impacts of technical devices.

To provide an example, the affordances of social media are politically speaking ambiguous. These technologies at once open up potentials for governmental, commercial, and peer-to-peer surveillance, yet at the same time afford improved communication between users and enhance possibilities for political mobilization at a grass root level. What technologies do depends on both the designed form of the technical object and the specific individual, socio-economic, and cultural contexts within which it operates. The term affordance captures these inherent ambiguities and this way guards science and technology studies against reiterating a form of technological determinism or uncritically assuming a complete autonomy of the individual user.

Connecting the affordances of media and communication technologies to issues of security, war, and conflict often leads to an institutional perspective that critically addresses the relation between certain socio-technological developments and the specific conditions for the

representation, dissemination, and negotiation of narratives and images about military conduct and other forms of violence. Arguing from this vantage point, various thinkers have cautioned against a growing influence of military interests on broadcast era media and entertainment industries, coining terms such as militainment, military-entertainment-complex, or military-industrial-media-entertainment network (MIME-NET) (Der Derian 2009; Alford 2010; Stahl 2010), while others balance such accounts with reference to the interactive and participatory nature of new media ecologies (Hoskins and O'Loughlin 2010; Pötzsch 2015a).

Der Derian (2009), for instance, posits a technologically facilitated transition in the United States from a military-industrial complex to a contemporary MIME-NET with the capacity 'to seamlessly merge the production, representation, and execution of war' (p. xxxvi).⁷ Rapid technological and institutional developments, he claims, have provided increasing salience to the mass media and culture industries in de/securitization practices and in attempts to justify military interventions or growing military expenditures. According to him, MIME-NET representations 'clean up the political discourse as well as the battlefield' (p. xxxi) and attempt to frame Western warfare as virtuous in its intentions, as furthering universal values, and as leaving virtually no undeserved damage. Coker (2004) has argued that these developments lead to a possible re-enchantment of war, and therefore to greater legitimacy of Western military interventionism.⁸

Technological innovations during the 1990s such as global 24/7 live television coverage of conflicts and crises entailed new socio-cultural dynamics that afforded unprecedented opportunities for terror, propaganda, and tacit persuasion. As war turns into 'infowar' and global insurgencies revert to 'infoterror', argues Virilio (2000: 134), the relentless and uninterrupted gaze of global media channels not only facilitates the propagandistic framing of issues and debates on behalf of governments or large corporations, but also constitutes a veritable 'information bomb' that force-multiplies the destructive capacities of factual explosives and projectiles by constantly replaying their effects across the various channels of a globalized media sphere. Der Derian (2009) points to the accurately timed lag between the first and second passenger plane hitting the World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001 as a prime example for a carefully devised media tactic that employs these logics and dynamics to increase the impact and effects of a terrorist act.

Hoskins and O'Loughlin (2010) and Pötzsch (2015a) further develop this line of argument in relation to latest media technological advances. Based on Hjarvard's (2008) concept, Hoskins and O'Loughlin (2010: 10, 16–17) argue for a 'second phase of mediatization' where key actors not only perceive themselves as constantly exposed to media attention adjusting their appearances and policies accordingly, but where the whole of 'everyday life is increasingly embedded in the mediascape'. This 'shift to a post-broadcast, participatory media ecology', they assert, entails decisive changes in the ways the mass media and culture industries can be appropriated for particular propagandistic purposes. The authors show that ubiquitous participatory digital technologies afford a blurring of cause and effect relationships and this way create greater uncertainties for decision makers and audiences. As a result, issues of security, conflict, war, and peace become diffused and even meticulously planned propagandistic interventions can backfire and be re-appropriated or turned against their initial purposes.

Even though Hoskins and O'Loughlin (2015) recently developed the term arrested war to understand the ways through which traditional big media players adapt to, and effectively re-appropriate, the technological affordances of new media ecologies for the purpose of reinstituting their gatekeeping functions, diffused war still retains considerable explanatory power. Doubtlessly, new technologies of surveillance, tracking, and predictive analytics open

up potentials for the political instrumentalization of network technologies and wearable devices for the purpose of improved management and control of populations. However, this trend merely constitutes one aspect of the complex and multidimensional affordances of new media ecologies.

Coining the term iWar, Pötzsch (2015a) suggests a concept for an understanding of precisely such complexities and ambiguities in the relation between new media and war. He argues that emergent network technologies not only diffuse images and narratives of war and conflict, but also serve to facilitate an increasing individualization of practices and perceptions of warfare and other forms of violence. He points, among other things, to the epistemological impacts of page and edge rank algorithms that tacitly customize the information on wars made available through digital networks. According to Pötzsch (2015a) this might lead to the formation of isolated echo chambers where users are predominantly exposed to beliefs and attitudes they already hold. Besides this tailoring of war images and experiences, iWar also enables a better understanding of the unprecedented capacity of individuals to effectuate network-based cyber-attacks, highlights the consequences of decreased deliberation time for decision makers due to ubiquitously networked wearable recording devices, and critically investigates the algorithmic assessments behind security-related pattern of life analysis and signature strikes in drone warfare.

In sum, concepts such as virtuous war, diffused war, arrested war, and iWar highlight different, yet equally salient, aspects of the current relationship between technologies of mediation and perceptions and practices of warfare. As such, rather than postulating radical breaks between distinct phases of a mediatization of war, critical approaches should both highlight apparent historical continuities and direct attention to the unprecedented affordances of new technologies. This way, attentiveness to important new developments can be productively combined with an awareness for the necessary historicity of every apparently new trend.

Culture effects between attitude and position

The approaches introduced so far enable critical attention to the potential impacts of a mediated cultural sphere on matters of security and politics. So far, this chapter has suggested approaches to such impacts on the basis of conveyed content and meanings, affective design, and the multiple affordances of dissemination technologies. However, the cultural sphere can also exert influence on security issues and conflicts at the direct performative level of socio-economic and political practice.

In their study of the relation between contemporary art and politics, Paglen and Gach (2003) introduce the distinction between works with an attitude and positioned works to account for the crucial difference between content-based and performative impacts of cultural expressions. According to them, what an artwork *says*, and how it is read and interpreted, is often less important than what it *does* in specific socio-economic contexts. As such, they state, ‘for artists desiring to achieve material political effects, the goal of creating dialogue or raising consciousness frequently misses the mark’. The positioned cultural expression, they argue, incorporates an awareness of its own political and economic situatedness into the work. It does not only articulate opposition but enacts resistance and actively contributes to improvements and change. As such, Paglen and Gach’s distinction is reminiscent of Bhabha’s (1994) differentiation between pedagogical and performative functions of literature in the formation and negotiation of the modern nation, yet extends the latter’s focus on literature to the visual and the field of arts in general.

To provide an example, in his attempts to map the black world of clandestine US surveillance and warfare, photographer Trevor Paglen (2010; 2014) repeatedly blurs the line between art as positioned, performative intervention and conveyer of critical messages. Gustafsson (2013) argues that Paglen's practice resembles 'a hybrid of empirical science, investigative journalism, political activism and high end art' (Gustafsson 2013: 150) in that the photographer's work entails direct political impacts at various levels from increasing the knowledge base for human rights advocacy, via making visible the material infrastructure of apparently elusive digital surveillance, to unveiling previously unknown secret US government facilities, organizations, and operations.

For works of popular culture, Paglen and Gach's considerations also retain their significance. The Hollywood action movie *Avatar* (James Cameron 2009), for instance, has been commended by various reviewers for its broad articulation of a critical message placing the genocide committed against Native Americans on the public agenda and metaphorically rearticulating a criticism pointing to veiled economic interests behind the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (see for instance Pulver 2009). The discursive impact of the film on political practice, however, has been minimal. Therefore, it can be argued that the intended political message of the work, its attitude, remains without measurable impact. The material performance effect of Cameron's film, on the other hand, appears to have served a quite different political agenda. As Clark (2010) shows, the profit made with Cameron's allegedly critical work served to significantly boost the financial standing and stock market pricing of the owners of its production company – Rupert Murdoch's News International, including the neo-conservative mouthpiece Fox News. The example shows that textually generated meaning potentials at the level of conveyed messages do not necessarily translate into corresponding socio-political and economic performance effects.

Conclusion

In his essay 'Encoding, Decoding', Stuart Hall (1973) has shown that reception is an active process of appropriation rather than a passive form of persuasion and ideological positioning. Readers, viewers, or players are not slavishly bound to reproduce the ideological frames and subject positions inherent in a given novel, film, artwork, or technology, but actively play with and potentially subvert the dominant frames of meaning and practice they are exposed to. This happens in and through situated forms of reception that selectively activate some and suppress other features of a given work.

However, in spite of an active role of audiences, a certain constraining function of aesthetic form has to be acknowledged. How a particular cultural expression is formally structured and disseminated predisposes what can be done to and with it in various contexts of reception. The present chapter introduced four methodological and theoretical frameworks that allow for a description of such structural constraints at the levels of text and technology, and that enable a cautious assessment of potential political implications of dominant forms of reading invited by these frames. Rather than describing clear-cut effects, this chapter introduced frameworks for an assessment of meaning potentials inherent in given cultural expressions, and connected these to probable socio-political impacts and effects in relation to conflict, war, and security. This way it aims at contributing to a better understanding of a culture–media–security nexus from an extended textual and critical media technological vantage point.

Notes

- 1 Securitization in international relations theory describes the process by which state actors transform certain issue areas into matters of security that demand exceptional measures to be contained. Securitization, as such, emerges as an extreme form of politics with the inherent potential to undermine established democratic practices and procedures.
- 2 A processual notion of politics assumes the irreconcilability of conflicts and societal antagonisms. In this perspective, an all-inclusive society that ends all conflicts and opposition is impossible as any order will always be based on one or another form of often implicit exclusion. Rather, the aim of a democratic politics must be to channel inherently necessary struggles within societies into non-violent directions.
- 3 In securitization theory ‘referent object’ refers to the societal entity at which securitization moves by state actors are directed.
- 4 I use cultural expression as an overarching term that covers both works of high art and popular culture.
- 5 For an approach inspired by neo-formalism that outlines the ambivalent functions and impacts of art biennials in the Barents Euro-Arctic region see Pötzsch (2015b).
- 6 Cultural research has long assumed a predominant role of rational responses to media content that was focused on meaning-making structures and practices. Embodiment here relates to approaches to potential roles of cultural expressions based on pre-rational, affective responses.
- 7 The term military-industrial complex was coined by President Eisenhower in his 1961 farewell address to the American people. There, he issued an explicit warning against ‘the rise of misplaced power’ and the ‘acquisition of unwarranted influence’ by military and economic interests on US foreign and domestic policies. Eisenhower’s speech is available at: http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Eisenhower%27s_farewell_address_%28audio_transcript%29
- 8 For an investigation of the close connection between discourses of humanitarianism and military interventionism see Chapter 14 by Piers Robinson in the present volume.

References

- Alford, M. (2010) *Reel Power: Hollywood Cinema and American Supremacy*, London: Pluto Press.
- Ash, J. (2012) ‘Attention, Videogames and the Retentional Economies of Affective Amplification’, *Theory, Culture & Society*, 29(6): 3–26.
- Ash, J. (2013) ‘Technologies of Captivation: Videogames and the Attunement of Affect’, *Body & Society*, 19(1): 27–51.
- Bachmann-Medick, D. (2006) *Cultural Turns. Neuorientierungen in den Kulturwissenschaften* [Cultural Turns: New Orientations in Cultural Research], Hamburg: Rowohlt Verlag.
- Bakir, V. (2010) *Sousveillance, Media, and Strategic Political Communication: Iraq, USA, UK*, London: Continuum.
- Balzacq, T. (2011) ‘A Theory of Securitization: Origins, Core Assumptions, and Variants’ in Thierry Balzacq (ed.), *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, London: Routledge, 1–30.
- Barthes, R. (1967) *Elements of Semiology*, London: Jonathan Cape.
- Barthes, R. (1987) *Mythologies*, New York: Hill & Wang.
- Baumgarten, A.G. (1983 [1750]) *Texte zur Grundlegung der Ästhetik* [Texts Concerning a Foundation of Aesthetics], Hamburg: Meiner Verlag.
- Bhabha, H.K. (1994) ‘DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Modern Nation’ in Homi K. Bhabha (ed.), *The Location of Culture*, London: Routledge, 199–244.
- Bleiker, R. (2001) ‘The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory’, *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, 30: 509–533.
- Bogost, I. (2006) *Unit Operations: An Approach to Video Game Criticism*, Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Bogost, I. (2007) *Persuasive Games. The Expressive Power of Videogames*, Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Burton, J. (1990) *Conflict: Human Needs Theory*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Burton, J. (1997) *Violence Explained*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Buzan, B., Wæver, O. and de Wilde, J. (1998) *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

- Clark, A. (2010) 'Avatar helps Rupert Murdoch's News Corp boost quarterly profits to £554m', *The Guardian*, 5 May 2010. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/media/2010/may/05/news-corp-boosts-quarterly-profits>
- Coker, C. (2004) *The Future of War. The Re-Enchantment of War in the Twenty-First Century*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Der Derian, J. (2009) *Virtuous War. Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network* (Second Edition), London: Routledge.
- DiMaggio, A. (2009) *When Media Goes to War. Hegemonic Discourse, Public Opinion, and the Limits of Dissent*, New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Eco, U. (1976) *A Theory of Semiotics*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Erll, A. (2010) 'Literature, Film, and the Mediality of Cultural Memory' in Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning (eds), *A Companion to Cultural Memory Studies*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 389–398.
- Erll, A. (2011) *Memory in Culture*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Fierke, K.M. (2007) *Critical Approaches to International Security*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Galtung, J. (1996) *Peace by Peaceful Means*, London: Sage.
- Galloway, A. (2004) *Protocol. How Control Exists After Decentralization*, Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Gustafsson, H. (2013) 'Foresight, Hindsight and State Secrecy in the American West: The Geopolitical Aesthetics of Trevor Paglen', *Journal of Visual Culture*, 12(1): 148–164.
- Hajjar, R.M. (2014) 'Emergent Postmodern US Military Culture', *Armed Forces & Society*, 40(1): 118–145.
- Hall, S. (1973 [2007]) 'Encoding, Decoding' in Simon During (ed.) *The Cultural Studies Reader*, London: Routledge, 90–103.
- Hammond, P. (2007) *Media, War, and Postmodernity*, London: Routledge.
- Hansen, L. (2006) *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*, London: Routledge.
- Hansen, L. (2011) 'Theorizing the Image for Security Studies: Visual Securitization and the Muhammad Cartoon Crisis', *European Journal of International Relations*, 17(1): 51–74.
- Hayden, C. (2012) *The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public Diplomacy in Global Context*, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Hayles, K.N. (2012) *How We Think: Digital Media and Contemporary Technogenesis*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Hjarvard, S. (2008) 'The Mediatization of Society. A Theory of Media as Agents of Social and Cultural Change', *Nordicom Review*, 29(2): 105–134.
- Hoogensen-Gjørø, G. (2012) 'Security by Any Other Name: Negative Security, Positive Security, and a Multi-Actor Security Approach', *Review of International Studies*, 38(4): 835–859.
- Hoskins, A. and O'Loughlin, B. (2009) *Television and Terror: Conflicting Times and the Crisis of News Discourse*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hoskins, A. and O'Loughlin, B. (2010) *War and Media. The Emergence of Diffused War*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Hoskins, A. and O'Loughlin, B. (2015) 'Arrested War: After Diffused War', *Global Policy Blog*, <http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/14/01/2015/arrested-war-after-diffused-war>
- Kellner, D. (2005) *Media Spectacle and the Crisis of Democracy*, London: Paradigm Publishers.
- Kellner, D. (2009) *Cinema Wars. Hollywood Film and Politics in the Bush-Cheney Era*, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Kittler, F. (1999) *Gramophone, Film, Typewriter*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Kracauer, S. (1947) *From Caligari to Hitler: A Psychological History of the German Film*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (2001) *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, London: Verso.
- Mantello, P. (2012) 'Playing Discreet War in the US: Negotiating Subjecthood and Sovereignty through Special Forces Video Games', *Media, War & Conflict*, 5(3): 269–283.
- McLuhan, M. (1964) *Understanding Media: The Extension of Man*, New York: McGraw-Hill.
- McSorley, K. (2012) 'Helmetcams, Militarized Sensation, and "Somatic War"', *Journal of War and Cultural Studies*, 5(1): 47–58.
- Mouffe, C. (2005) *The Democratic Paradox*, London: Verso.
- Munoz, A. (2012) *US Military Information Operations in Afghanistan: Effectiveness of Psychological Operations 2001–2010*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Cooperation.

- Murray, C., Parry, K., Robinson, P. and Goddard, P. (2008) 'Reporting Dissent in Wartime: British Press, the Anti-War Movement and the 2003 Iraq War', *European Journal of Communication*, 23(1): 7–27.
- Nexon, D.H. and Neumann, I.B. (2006) 'Introduction: Harry Potter and the Study of World Politics' in Daniel H. Nexon and Iver B. Neumann (eds), *Harry Potter and International Relations*, New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1–23.
- Norman, D.A. (2011) *Living With Complexity*, Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Norman, D.A. (2013) *The Design of Everyday Things: Revised and Expanded Edition*, Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Nye, J.S. Jr. (2008) *The Power to Lead: Soft, Hard, and Smart Power*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Packer, J. and Crofts Wiley, S.B. (2012) 'Introduction: The Materiality of Communication' in Jeremy Packer and Stephen B. Crofts Wiley (eds), *Communication Matters: Materialist Approaches to Media, Mobility, and Networks*, London: Routledge, 3–16.
- Paglen, T. (2010) *Blank Spots on the Map: The Dark Geography of the Pentagon's Secret World*, New York: New American Library.
- Paglen, T. (2014) 'New Photos of the NSA and Other Top Intelligence Agencies Revealed for the First Time', *The Intercept*, 10 February 2014, <https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/10/new-photos-of-nsa-and-others/>
- Paglen, T. and Gach, A. (2003) 'Tactics without Tears', *The Journal of Aesthetics & Protest*, 1(2), online article, <http://www.joaap.org/1/TacticsWithout/index.html>
- Pöttsch, H. (2012) 'Imag(in)ing Painful Pasts: Mimetic and Poetic Style in War Films' in Asbjørn Grønstad and Henrik Gustafsson (eds), *Ethics and Images of Pain*, London: Routledge, 173–192.
- Pöttsch, H. (2015a) 'The Emergence of iWar: Changing Practices and Perceptions of Military Engagement in a Digital Era', *New Media & Society*, 17(1): 78–95.
- Pöttsch, H. (2015b) 'Art across Borders: Dislocating Artistic and Curatorial Practices in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region', *Journal of Borderlands Studies*, 30(1): 111–125, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08865655.2015.1036099#>
- Pöttsch, H. (2015c) 'Selective Realism: Filtering Experiences of War in the First- and Third-Person Shooter', *Games and Culture* <http://gac.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/05/29/1555412015587802.abstract>
- Pulver, A. (2009) 'Avatar Review: James Cameron Just Got Slack', *The Guardian*, 11 December 2009, <http://www.theguardian.com/film/2009/dec/11/avatar-james-cameron-film-review>
- Robinson, P., Goddard, P., Parry, K., Murray, C. and Taylor, P.M. (2010) *Pockets of Resistance: British News Media, War and Theory in the 2003 Invasion of Iraq*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Roselle, L., Miskimmon, A. and O'Loughlin, B. (2014) 'Strategic Narrative: A New Means to Understand Soft Power', *Media, War & Conflict*, 7(1): 70–84.
- Rosendorf, N.M. (2009) 'The Cultural Public Diplomacy Strategy' in Philip Seib (ed.), *Toward a New Public Diplomacy: Redirecting U.S. Foreign Policy*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 173–194.
- Rugh, W.A. (2009) 'The Case of Soft Power' in Philip Seib (ed.), *Toward a New Public Diplomacy: Redirecting U.S. Foreign Policy*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 3–22.
- Saussure, F. de (1983 [1916]) *Course in General Linguistics*, London: Duckworth.
- Schimanski, J. and Wolfe, S. (2013) 'The Aesthetics of Borders' in Kjerstin Aukrust (ed.), *Assigning Cultural Values*, Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 235–250.
- Shklovsky, V. (1965) 'Art as Technique' in L.T. Lemon and M.J. Reis (eds), *Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays*, Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 3–24.
- Sobchack, V. (2004) *Carnal Thoughts. Embodiment and Moving Image Culture*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Stahl, R. (2010) *Militainment Inc.: War, Media, and Popular Culture*, London: Routledge.
- Thompson, K. (1988) *Breaking the Glass Armor. Neoformalist Film Analysis*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Väyrynen, T. (2001) *Culture and International Conflict Resolution: A Critical Analysis of the Work of John Burton*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Virilio, P. (2000) *The Information Bomb*, London: Verso.
- Wæver, O. (1995) 'Securitization and desecuritization' in Ronnie D. Lippschutz (ed.), *On Security*, New York: Columbia University Press, 46–86.
- Weldes, J. (2003) 'Popular Culture, Science Fiction, and World Politics: Exploring Intertextual Relations' in J. Weldes (ed.), *To Seek Out New Worlds: Exploring Links Between Science Fiction and World Politics*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1–27.

- Welsch, W. (1997) *Undoing Aesthetics*, London: Sage.
- Williams, L. (1991) 'Film Bodies: Gender, Genre, and Excesses', *Film Quarterly*, 44(4): 2–13.
- Williams, M.C. (2007) *Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security*, London: Routledge.
- Zerubavel, E. (1997) *Social Mindscales. An Invitation to Cognitive Sociology*, Harvard: Harvard University Press.

4

THE MEDIA- SECURITY NEXUS

Researching ritualized cycles of insecurity

Marie Gillespie and Ben O'Loughlin

Introduction

The media–security nexus refers to the ways in which media furnish the conditions that shape how security is conceived and experienced in the interactions between security actors, media producers and audiences. It is not simply that the media are the main delivery mechanism for public knowledge about security. Rather, the precise nature of security threats, and the human and policy responses to those threats, are also produced and reproduced in and through these relationships. This apparently simple observation has important implications for research into security, media and citizenship.

The concept of the media–security nexus was initially developed by Gillespie (2007a) to refer to an interdisciplinary theoretical and methodological approach that was developed in order to investigate the relationship between media and security in Britain during the early years of the ‘War on Terror’ and in the shadow of widespread concerns about climate change, economic anxiety, local crime, immigration and other social insecurities. It was premised on the assumption that ‘new security challenges are *constituted* in the intersecting relationships between political and military actors, news producers, news representations and discourses, and news audiences’ (2007a: 275). News audiences, citizens and publics were understood not as discrete categories but as coterminous.

The approach drew on prior research on transnational television cultures which foregrounded the complex, cross-cultural negotiations of identities that take place around security events among diaspora audiences (Gillespie 1995). In particular, it documented the often painful ‘ambivalent positionings’ that had to be negotiated by young British Muslims when faced with the Iraq War of 1991 and its mediations. Ethnographic audience research proved to be a useful, culturally sensitive way of understanding citizen perspectives. It foreshadowed what was to become a profound disjuncture between state, citizens and news media in multicultural societies around security issues (O’Loughlin and Gillespie 2012).

Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, the growing interest in media and migrant transnationalism coincided with the work of leading scholars in politics and international relations on cultures of security (Croft 2012; Katzenstein 1996; Weldes et al. 1999). Security research had long sidelined or simply ignored questions of culture and media. Hypodermic models of media effects, prevalent in security research and policy thinking, were based on

unexamined assumptions about the power of the media over audiences. Audiences were seen as having little agency to interpret media in ways other than that intended by media 'messengers'. The need for more complex and holistic approaches to culture and media became an urgent priority in the post-Cold War period characterized by a proliferation of national news media channels and new interactive technologies of communication. In the UK, the interdisciplinary research programme New Security Challenges broke new ground in its emphasis on culture and communication and examined how contestations over the meanings of security played into decision-making.¹

Our core argument is that the media-security nexus approach is necessary to understand and explain why, how, where and for whom security issues emerge and intensify at specific moments, only to fade away and re-emerge. It enables us to understand the uneven temporalities and shifting locations of security dilemmas and to recognize patterns of similarity and difference in how media producers, publics and policymakers debate and negotiate, legitimize and contest security policy. It forces us to conceive of security actors, whether states or non-state protagonists, not as independent agents acting and impacting on society, exerting *power over* media and audiences, but as an integral part of our shared and mediated social worlds. It requires us to think of how *power* works *through* large news media organizations such as the BBC, CNN and Al Jazeera, and of audiences as active agents in processes of meaning-making with the *power to* shape the media-security nexus.

Our media worlds are marked by contradictory tendencies: they are increasingly global and local, diversified and homogenized, interconnected and fragmented. Journalists, citizens, and security actors and practitioners are unavoidably caught up in complex relationships, making it very difficult for researchers to capture the fluctuating yet perpetual presence of critical security events and dilemmas. 'New' security challenges precipitated by life-changing 'critical events' (Das 1995) are not anterior to these relations, but produced through them. Hence security threats are not obvious or given. Scientific evidence, political claims, public opinion polls and shocking media reports may all contribute to the creation of a security concern. But the power of media or states to set security agendas has to be explained by exploring the unfolding of the media-security nexus over time.

The study of a media-security nexus depends on three theoretical claims about communication. The first claim is that while communication is usually conceptualized through a transport metaphor – news 'travels' fast, the president must 'get her message across' – communication of news is more accurately conceived through a ritual model (Carey 1989). A news story or image may occasionally seem arresting, but what is more important, in terms of power and social order, are the everyday rituals whereby audiences consume news in multi-layered serial narrative forms. Ritual processes of consuming and interpreting serial news narratives are an integral focus of the media and security nexus (Gillespie 1995). Seriality matters because media rituals create standardized frames for representing security news and shape patterned audience and policy responses to it and in so doing these processes contribute to the cyclical reproduction of insecurity.

Second, that nexus involves not just analysis of a few mainstream media outlets but of media cultures, in the holistic anthropological sense, or as media ecologies (Hoskins and O'Loughlin 2010). The term 'media' includes environments, actors and technologies together. Media are understood as akin to organic life forms existing in a complex set of interrelationships within a system that strive for balance but are constantly changing and evolving (McLuhan 1994; Postman 1970). As technology changes and new actors gain power, these interrelationships alter. Since the emergence of mass internet access and mobile telephony in the 1990s and 2000s, more social relations and security events are recorded, disseminated and debated,

potentially on near-instantaneous and de-territorialized scales. Actors are forced to adapt. Journalists, security actors and publics inhabit participatory, multi-modal and multilingual media ecologies made up of overlapping local, national and transnational circulations of competing narratives, varying visibilities, and evolving repertoires of response and behaviour (Deuze 2012; Miskimmon et al. 2013). Media–security nexus research seeks to capture this cultural and political complexity. It treats each new security event as a discrete focus of analysis but situates it in the wider context of prior salient events that have been subjected to the same analytical approach. The media–security nexus framework enables comparisons of events over time and place via the application of a systematic, robust methodology that produces a more comprehensive analysis of how processes of ritualization and securitization go hand in hand, and points to interventions that can break these vicious circles.²

The ideas of communication as ritualistic and media cultures as ecological lead us to a third theoretical claim about communication: the diffuse and indeterminate nature of media power. The *power to* set agendas and define the meaning of security issues does not lie exclusively with elites. The mechanics of communication operate through ongoing but evolving rituals, which are disrupted and reinvented by the internet and social media. While certain actors may learn to game the rituals to their benefit in order to transport the ‘right’ message to intended audiences, audiences interpret news media in often unforeseen and unforeseeable ways in specific cultural and political contexts. As media systems evolve, they have to cope with the co-existence of broadcast (one-to-many) and networked (many-to-many) models of communication – hybrid systems in which increasing numbers can individualize mass communication – self-broadcasting and interact directly in real time with officials, journalists and conflict protagonists (Castells 2007; Chadwick 2013).

Dissent and contestation operate not only among citizens and through citizen media but also among elites (Hallin 1989). Policymakers struggle to define the security issues on which they are legislating and frequently fail (Dillon 2013). The lines of power and influence through which the meanings of security issues are constructed and contested must therefore be treated as, to varying degrees, open and provisional – comprising different forms, modalities and strengths of power: power *over*, power *to* and power *through* (Gillespie 2005). There are notable occasions when political leaders have successfully mobilized power over public opinion to support a security policy, but there are equally notable occasions when they have not. This indeterminacy indicates why the media–security nexus is therefore to be explored and explained.

Constructing methodologies to gain analytical purchase on the media–security nexus in this context requires an approach that understands methods not as culturally neutral tools but as active agents in shaping the fluid social and political realities under study. Any study of the media and security nexus needs to deploy mixed and mobile methods (ethnographies of media organizations and audience, discourse and social media analyses alongside big data and other forms of quantitative research) in order to be responsive to the emergence of new technologies, applications and actors and how these interact with those already existing. It must track shifting discursive repertoires as well as visual and auditory regimes of representing security (e.g. the recent representation of the migration policy crisis as a security crisis). Lines of causation will often be multi-directional and fuzzy at interactions across times and places, exhibiting both continuity and change (Hoskins and O’Loughlin 2010). Methods used to study security dilemmas in one election are outdated by the next election as media systems feature different dynamics and audiences-cum-citizens communicate with each other and with media and political organizations in new ways (Karpf 2012), so our methods must be responsive, agile, iterative and reflexive.

The value of the media–security nexus as a conceptual tool and systematic methodological framework is that one can investigate different events and locations of security over time and thereby find which if any have primacy or, more likely, how power and meaning are organized across different sites via ritualized processes. While deductive theorizing can be done by testing existing theories of, say, agenda-setting or public engagement, the value of the media–security nexus approach is that it allows for inductive theorizing because innovative mixes of methods that produce rich and robust empirical data can challenge epochal theories of change and policy-led definitions of security. The need to identify sites and dynamics of communication, and to discern the often very different security dilemmas that preoccupy different social groups and security actors, can lead to new propositions about power and influence that can, in turn, lead to new theories of media, power and security. Analysing these shifting dynamics through a media–security nexus lens can allow transnational collaborative comparative research projects to develop, and can foster vibrant international networks that connect academics, journalists and policymakers, practitioners and publics (for details, see the authors' websites at The Open University's Centre for Research on Socio-Cultural Change and Royal Holloway's New Political Communications Unit).

Our mode of theorizing goes with the grain of thinking about security since the Cold War ended. While nuclear arms races and proxy wars are far from over, the concept of 'security' has necessarily come to be treated as multifaceted. Traditional security studies focused on defence at home and the use of kinetic force abroad. But the categories of 'home' and 'abroad' are blurred, requiring us to embrace forms of methodological transnationalism in our thinking and practice. National security concerns must also be understood in relative terms and tied to global and local threats. Whether in stable or pre/post-conflict societies, politicians and publics alike worry about economic and social insecurity, and about the consequences of individuals and groups feeling alienated; do they lack 'resilience' to act as responsible productive citizens and might they be 'radicalized' to act in violence against society? Researching the media–security nexus comparatively, transnationally using a shared analytical framework with common points of reference, has allowed our research teams to identify what counts as a 'security' issue and hence what counts as security at different moments and in different places and yet to connect and trace patterns as well as divergences across apparently disparate events.

In sum, a whole set of actors shape the meanings and experiences of security and conflict and we must explain how those meanings and experiences feed back into actions and policies. This analytical challenge is daunting but unavoidable if security studies are to make a substantial contribution to enlightened security policy and its ability to effect conflict resolution, diplomacy and peace. Having provided an overview of the media–security nexus approach, the remainder of this chapter explores how some scholars and practitioners have researched the media–security nexus in the UK over the last fifteen years. It presents the methods used and the findings generated. It concludes by setting out some questions of enduring significance and potential new directions for research.

After 11 September 2001: television news and transnational audiences

Al-Qaeda's attacks on the East Coast of the US on 11 September 2001 acted as the trigger for a body of research on the media–security nexus that scholars observed unfolding. US President Bush declared a war on terror. World affairs – and news reporting – became intently focused on a concept of security as counter-terrorism. The politics of identity and

multiculturalism in the UK became entwined with the politics of risk, threat and danger posed by Islamist migrant and diasporic groups. News media were inescapably implicated in these processes. A series of projects that we undertook in the UK (outlined below) sought to combine methods and disciplinary approaches to explain how understandings of security were generated in the interactions of policymakers, journalists and publics.

The first of these, *After September 11*³ aimed to understand how transnational television news covered the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the ensuing Western intervention in Afghanistan and how diaspora and British audiences responded to this coverage (Broadcasting Standards Commission 2002). A collaborative audience ethnography was carried out involving over a dozen bilingual researchers who investigated news-viewing in multilingual families and households in the UK on and after 11 September 2001 (Gillespie 2006). The attacks understandably triggered deep emotional responses in viewers. Many people experienced a sense of trauma that lasted for weeks and months.

In thinking through the causes, meanings and consequences of these events, diaspora viewers offered memories of their own ‘ground zeros’ – Halabja, Palestine and the Iraq War of 1991 among many others. In the process of casting and structuring of blame, innocence and guilt became relativized. If viewers were cynical about political leaders past and present, they were also deeply distrustful of all news media, regardless of language or source. Audiences became ‘sceptical zappers’, avidly comparing and contrasting coverage on a range of channels from BBC to Al-Jazeera to CNN and a host of other language media, actively seeking alternative news sources because of perceived bias in Western media reporting.

To complement this collaborative ethnography, research into the competing news agendas of UK and US news media was carried out. There were some striking examples of acknowledgement of the Palestinian cause on UK news bulletins, as the programmes attempted to provide a frame and context for the 11 September 2001 attacks. Findings from textual and discourse analysis of these news bulletins ran counter to the perceptions of audiences who took part in this project, who felt that TV news coverage of the Middle East and Palestine was minimal and biased towards Israel. The articulation of audience ethnography and discourse analysis served to open up pressing questions about dissonances and disjunctures between what is seen and heard on TV and how it is interpreted (Gow and Michalski 2008).

News media had long been charged with amplifying fear among audiences by sensationalizing events in a way that creates ‘moral panics’ (Cohen 1972; Hall et al. 1978; Poynting et al. 2004). Equally, however, the *After September 11* team found that security-oriented news in mainstream British news could contain insecurity by packaging potentially alarming or catastrophic events in familiar, sanitized (e.g. concealing the moment of death by blank screens) and reassuring formats (e.g. the personalization of news via uses of melodramatic conventions). This was not the case among Arabic, Turkish, Farsi or Kurdish news providers where cultural conventions of the portrayal of violence and death differ markedly. This cultural dissonance generated questions in subsequent research about how news producers and audiences managed the dynamics of involvement and attachment when faced with traumatic and upsetting news. The ‘modulation of terror’ was then studied in ways that began to tie in much more closely the iterative analysis of news audiences and discourses (Gillespie 2007a: 286; Hoskins and O’Loughlin 2007: 14). This work enabled us to get a clearer picture of how audiences juggle imperatives to stay informed – the presumed duty of good citizens – with the need for ontological security – the need to keep anxieties at a safe distance so as to carry on with everyday life. But, of course, the task of understanding the media–security nexus must go beyond the study of the intersections of news discourses

and audience reception. It must also pay focused attention to how governments and security policymakers relate to news organizations and seek to legitimate their policies to publics.

Shifting securities: TV news cultures before and after the Iraq War 2003

In the context of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the political, legal, moral and operational frameworks for using armed force required systematic analysis. The calculus of risk and threat changed when Western governments undertook 'pre-emptive' action without public consent and with information not made public. The tensions between the duty of the state to inform its citizens and the realities of secrecy, censorship and propaganda had rarely been greater than around the decision to intervene in Iraq in 2003, foregrounding the vital role of news media in legitimizing security policy (Gillespie 2007b; Gow and Michalski 2008).

Shifting Securities⁴ took the 2003 Iraq War as a trigger to explore discourses and perceptions of security among diaspora and national publics, news producers and policymakers in Britain. The study consisted of three interacting strands: (i) collaborative audience ethnography; (ii) discourse and content analysis of news media texts; and (iii) semi-structured interviews with security policymakers and journalists. All three strands were brought into dialogue together in a special journal issue *News Cultures, Multicultural Society and Legitimacy* (Gillespie et al. 2010a).

Analysing these interactions allowed the Shifting Securities researchers to explain the sense of loss, alienation and insecurity many citizens, particularly racialized religious minorities including British Muslims, felt after the 2003 Iraq War. For example, policies that aimed to increase the security of the British population involved the government asking Muslims to carry out surveillance of their communities and to report any threats of 'radicalization' among 'vulnerable' youth. Such policies aimed to harness the eyes and ears of ordinary people in their everyday interactions. But these strategies, alongside stereotypical news media representations, had the effect of criminalizing south Asian and Middle Eastern diasporic groups in general. 'Muslim communities' became distrusted for harbouring and even producing 'home-grown terrorists'.

A cyclical intensification of insecurity unleashed a chain reaction in the media–security nexus that bore some striking similarities but also important differences to prior critical media events. In particular, it was reminiscent of the 'ambivalent positionings' adopted by British Muslim youth during and after the Iraq War in 1991 mentioned earlier but occurring in a very different media and political conjuncture. Nevertheless, it was quite clear that these prior political experiences were profoundly shaping how the Iraq War 2003 was seen. Again, our collaborative audience ethnography was prescient in warning that: (i) the ritualized interactions between policymakers, journalists and news audiences (addressed as national citizens in a transnational news milieu) constituted the media–security nexus as a 'battlespace' of mutual disrespect and suspicion; (ii) this exacerbated the marginalization and racialization of many ethnic minority groups but in particular British Muslims, who faced declining prospects for multicultural citizenship; and (iii) security policymakers struggled to find public legitimacy in view of the growing scepticism and hostility of national and diasporic news media and audiences (Gillespie 2007a: 293).

Policymakers' perceptions of security matters and those of citizens diverged greatly, and government seemed unable to engage in the kind of open, give-and-take debate through which popular legitimacy might be generated. The legitimacy of security policies was also undermined as audiences were exposed to images of death and destruction, torture and




Figure 4.1 The media–security nexus

abuse. Such images contradicted government narratives justifying military action. Overall, this media–security nexus – depicted in Figure 4.1 – was marked by structural conflict between media, policymakers and publics (Gillespie et al. 2010a). Citizens complained they were caught up in the crossfire of media and political ‘wars’ and could not find credible, impartial information.

If After September 11 showed a fragmenting media landscape, *Shifting Securities* explored this further and investigated the consequences for intercultural dialogue and democratic debate as a result of news audiences consuming news in diverse languages, from radically different perspectives and through different cultural/political prisms and experiences. If people consumed news from beyond national borders and had multiple overlapping identifications that did not map onto national communities, how could a deliberative model of democratic communication and accountability tied to national policymaking operate?

Diasporas and diplomacy

Shifting Securities found mainstream national news media, especially BBC News, provided the staple news diet for the majority of those interviewed, regardless of social and cultural background. This finding challenged the widespread idea in the mid-2000s that increasing media diversity (technologies, platforms, languages and sources) had reduced the significance of mainstream news. There was recourse to ‘new’ media, particularly at moments of crisis, but public service television channels remain the primary source of news, particularly for security issues, for the majority. This also challenged the idea that minority ethnic groups forge insular diasporic media ghettos that impede social integration or promote anti-Western, anti-democratic ideologies. The ethnically diverse respondents aspired to have full access to resources for citizenship and to participate fully in national debate.

BBC World Service proved to be particularly important for refugee diasporas – for Afghans, Iraqis, Iranians and Somalis who, in their homelands, had relied on the BBC’s foreign language services as reliable and trusted news sources. Fleeing war, political conflict, economic hardship, and persecution, these refugee diasporic groups that we interviewed tuned into or logged on to the BBC World Service’s Pashto, Arabic, Somali channels to find out what was going on back home. We observed groups of Somalis huddled round computer screens in internet cafes in London listening to the latest news bulletin on the Somali service. We noted the online debates that occurred on the BBC Arabic’s online spaces that brought audiences in the Middle East and the Arabic diaspora into dialogue via the mediation of the World Service. And, among Afghan refugees, we observed the huge importance of the BBC

World Service's radio soap opera, *New Home New World* (or 'The Afghan Archers' as some BBC staff called it) where a cocktail of entertaining drama, news and information, security policy and public diplomacy converged to shape understandings and responses to war and security issues (Skuse et al. 2010).

These insights led to a new research project *Tuning In: Diasporic Contact Zones* at the BBC World Service (2007–10).⁵ It investigated the media–security nexus through the prism of a multidisciplinary study of the BBC World Service's diasporas (Gillespie and Webb 2012). Combining an organizational ethnography with historical research, it examined the relationship between audiences and the BBC's diaspora producers (based in Bush House in London who gave voice to BBC broadcasts across the globe for eight decades), in the context of funding by the UK's Foreign and Commonwealth Office as one of the UK's major public diplomacy partners. It explored new configurations of audiences, especially the digital diasporas brought into being by new technologies and new patterns of communication and the ways in which critical security events were negotiated online, such as the Mumbai bombings (Gillespie et al. 2010c).

This study documented and analysed the role of the World Service as an essential part of the UK's diplomatic infrastructure and the role of diasporic staff as diplomatic intermediaries – mediating the relations between the UK government, the BBC and overseas publics not only at moments of intense crisis in the past and present, but also in the daily affirmation and communication of British security interests and policies abroad via the serialization of news and drama and its ritualistic consumption. Our case studies of the media–security nexus ranged from Suez and the Hungarian Uprisings (Webb 2014) and the birth of Bangladesh (Crawley 2010) and the Mumbai Attacks (Gillespie, Herbert and Andersson 2010c) to the ongoing Israel–Palestinian conflict and the Arab Spring (Gillespie 2013).

Each case study created its own tailor-made methods but within a shared analytical framework. For example, we worked closely with BBC audience researchers and their 'big data' sets derived from social media to analyse digital diasporas and new audience configurations, including the meaning of engagement. We found that before and during the Arab Spring, it was not the content of news and debate but rather the forms of debate fostered by the BBC Arabic's online spaces where the public diplomacy value, from a UK government perspective, could be located (Gillespie 2013). This study of the media–security nexus over decades and in very diverse locations proved the potential for flexible adaptation but also for cumulative and comparative analysis.

Shifting Securities inspired several other important lines of enquiry as various research teams tried to explore different aspects of this media–security nexus. For example, following the 7/7 London bombings of July 2005 a study of the 'interactional trajectories' through which memories of the bombings formed in the aftermath proved very fruitful (Brown and Hoskins 2010; Hoskins 2011; Lorenzo-Dus and Bryan 2011).⁶ Survivors and victims' families were interviewed, and the personal and public memorials that emerged on the internet and in public spaces were investigated, tracing how the terrorist attacks were treated in the legal inquest in the years that followed (Hoskins 2011). These studies also continued the line of multi-modal television analysis of security events from the After September 11 and *Shifting Securities* projects. This project was another benchmark in the qualitative study of the media–security nexus because the constant comparison of the experiences of 7/7 participants and those of the legal investigators opened up uncertainties and indeterminacies that constitute the experience of living through such deeply traumatic events. The project offered a 'phenomenology of the event', illuminating how aspects of a security event – in this case a terrorist attack – can be stretched, warped, and in some cases erased, through experiences extended through times, spaces and specific places (O'Loughlin 2011).

Legitimising the discourses of radicalization

By the end of 2007 ‘radicalization’ had become a key term in this nexus, indicating government concern that ‘home-grown’ Muslims were turning to political and religious violence against the states they inhabited or travelling to fight for Islamic militant organizations overseas. News media devoted attention to the 7/7 bombers and the process through which apparently peaceful individuals could be radicalized and blow up their fellow citizens. If *Shifting Securities* showed that the ritualized interactions of policymakers, journalists and citizen audiences constituted a ‘battlespace’ of mutual disrespect and suspicion, then it was likely that policymakers would face difficulties introducing further counter-terrorist policies. In this context, Hoskins led a further project, *Legitimising the Discourses of Radicalisation*⁷ which asked: (i) how do ‘radicalizing’ discourses circulate and persuade those ‘vulnerable’ to radicalization? (ii) How did *the very fact of having to debate radicalization* feed into the existing ‘battlespace’ of mutual suspicion, given that British Muslims already felt over-scrutinized, journalists were uncertain of the government’s motives and government was not entirely sure how the risk of radicalization could be calculated?

The Legitimising Radicalisation team extended the multi-method approach of *Shifting Securities* by analysing the Jihadist online environment, mainstream English and Arabic media coverage of radicalization and audience ethnography in three countries. They identified how different sections of societies engaged with the issue of radicalization (Awan et al. 2011). This enabled them to see how the apparently threatening radicalizing agents of al-Qaeda connected to social groups through their own web presence but also journalists’ remediation of al-Qaeda videos and statements. The researchers could track how citizens engaged with this ghostly but threatening presence in their daily news rituals, and how this shaped their attitude towards government security policy.

The findings were somewhat surprising. First, researchers found that even jihadist sympathizers felt detached from the al-Qaeda core. The jihadist media culture was made up of core websites featuring members who were committed without deviation or question to the jihadist campaign. Outside the core was a ‘grey zone’ of individuals who potentially had sympathy for the campaign but questioned the legitimacy of some violent acts, particularly violence that killed Muslims or civilians. The core members offered little guidance or recognition to potential sympathizers, who had to turn to mainstream media such as BBC or Al-Jazeera to find out what core al-Qaeda had been doing. This meant that BBC and Al-Jazeera were in effect the primary mediators of al-Qaeda and contributed to any ‘radicalizing’ effect by sustaining al-Qaeda’s presence and credibility.

Secondly, the team also found that journalists and the security experts that they interviewed were uncertain about the nature of ‘radicalization’. There was little pattern to who was radicalized – it could be people of different ages, religions, levels of education and socio-economic class, making prediction difficult. Mainstream news media, which must find facts to report, struggled when few facts were available and security services were slow to release information. The result was news coverage that ‘clustered’ different signs of radicalization, often taken from eyewitnesses who may be unreliable: ‘he suddenly grew a beard’, ‘she became much more religious’, ‘they always met after Friday prayers’. Since these ‘signs’ applied to large numbers of people, mainstream news coverage may have inadvertently contributed to stereotyping, particularly of British Muslims.

Finally, the ethnographic audience research demonstrated that ordinary citizens did not trust news about ‘radicalization’. Government and media discourses of radicalization were not credible or trustworthy to many ordinary citizens. UK news publics were uneasy with

the concept of radicalization in their everyday engagement with the domains of politics and religion. So, if de-radicalization played a role in counter-terrorism policy in the UK and citizens were not convinced what radicalization might mean in the first place, this had consequences for the legitimacy of UK security policy. News reporting of issues related to 'radicalization' had not helped to clarify its meaning or its legitimacy in the public understanding of government strategy on terrorism.

An objective of the Legitimising project was to arrive at a model of how radicalizing discourses *and* news about radicalization circulated in a global media ecology. Triangulated, iterative methods brought to light pivotal actors in the circulation of jihadist messages which had yet to be researched, for instance translation agencies and 'grey zones' such as Al-Jazeera Talk which host both mainstream and jihadist materials side by side. Fully mapping this media ecology illuminated how particular experiences, rituals and discourses were present among particular groups, and the role of different media outlets, technologies and infrastructures in enabling this (Figure 4.2).

Typical of inductive research, this approach threw up insights not expected when the project began. The team was able to identify the gatekeepers of jihadist materials and, more importantly, contribute to debates about the changing forms of gatekeeping emerging in a digital media ecology in which audiences themselves now shared, or re-broadcast, a large proportion of news themselves across social media. The role of translation agencies such as Nine/Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA) suddenly fell into place as it became clear that many news organizations lack Arabic journalists or translators. As these new issues and processes came to light, the media–security nexus took on a more complex appearance: a multiplicity of intersecting rituals and interdependencies.

Nevertheless, the core concerns of media, policymakers and publics continued to receive attention. Shifting Securities inspired further research on 'everyday' security and how citizens lived with security events. Lee Jarvis and Michael Lister (2013a; 2013b) carried out sustained focus group research to understand whether people in the UK felt more secure as a result of counter-terrorism policy.⁸ They found participants held a range of views on what security means, from simple human survival to contentment, hospitality, equality and freedom. This range was reflected in the variation of how people thought about security. Those who equated security with survival presumed others held the same narrow view as them; it was just common sense. Others held more complex and multi-layered ways of understanding security, especially those individuals who could hold several understandings of security together at once. They were more inclined to consider how others might reflect on different forms of security too. In addition, a person's conception of security shaped their evaluation of recent counter-terrorism policy. Hence, there is policy value as well as scholarly interest in addressing not just what but *how* people think about security.

Stevens and Vaughan-Williams extended this research with a large survey study of UK public understandings of threat and security.⁹ Alongside these studies of the policy–public dyad, Robinson et al. (2010: 25) set out to explore 'wartime media-state relations, and the media-foreign policy nexus in general' by asking whether government elites were able to achieve positive news coverage of the invasion of Iraq in 2003.¹⁰ Their systematic content analysis of UK news coverage of the war, as well as interviews with national press and TV journalists, demonstrated that government still retained significant scope to set the agenda and framing of news reporting. Were journalists 'mouthpieces for government officials' (ibid.: 50)? They were found to be largely due to journalists' patriotism and their ideological commitment to humanitarian intervention. These findings reinforced the importance of




Figure 4.2 The media ecology of terror (from Awan et al. 2011)

multi-modal analysis of news, since visual content – particularly a few key photographs – played an important role in anchoring certain pro-war narratives.

More recently, researchers of the media–security nexus have developed methodologies to capture the digital dimensions of dynamics between media, policymakers and publics. The challenge remains: finding methods that capture ‘how new security challenges are *constituted* in the intersecting relationships between political and military actors, news producers, news representations and discourses, and news audiences’ (Gillespie 2007a: 275). Recent security challenges include cybercrime and cyberwarfare, pandemics and water shortages, alongside the continued series of military and humanitarian crises and terrorist attacks. It is now necessary to build in social media analytics to capture digital communications by media, policymakers and publics *alongside* the traditional methods of mainstream media

analysis, elite interviews and audience ethnography used by *Shifting Securities*.¹¹ Data has never been so abundant. However, systematicity and synthesis are needed to build coherent frameworks to capture Gillespie's cycles of mistrust or Hoskins' interactional trajectories in hybrid media systems. Analytical frameworks must capture how actors concerned with security engage simultaneously with traditional media logics of immediacy, visibility and simplicity, *and* social media logics in which what circulates is that which can be shared and reprogrammed (Chadwick 2013; van Dijck and Poell 2013). The nexus is under perpetual qualitative transformation. We conclude this chapter by pointing to enduring questions and some strategies for future research.

Questions for media–security nexus research

Researching the media–security nexus allows us to address a number of questions of academic and political importance. Here we focus on power and effects, temporality and identity.

Power and effects

The *Shifting Securities*, *Tuning In*, and *Legitimising Radicalisation* projects indicated the enduring significance of mainstream media for public consumption of news about security. Robinson et al.'s news management project *Media Wars* suggested that government succeeded in setting the terms of reporting the 2003 Iraq War. It would seem a reasonable hypothesis, then, that mainstream media are vehicles for government to exert some degree of *power over* the security agenda and to legitimate and garner support among the general public for war and security policies. However, the research findings are more complex and ambivalent about government and media power. The evidence from media–security nexus research is that we need to consider power, like security, in relational terms. We need to consider manifestations of government power *over* security agendas in relation to producers and audiences' *power to* contest and reframe these agendas. We need to understand how power works *through* large legacy broadcasters like the BBC World Service over time and globally as well as through citizen media in the short term. Despite the rhetoric of transformation, it remains to be seen if citizen media will have enduring political consequences. Audiences are both loyal and fickle but at moments of crisis they turn to mainstream news when high quality journalism that can be trusted is crucial. But news sources and platforms are proliferating at a phenomenal rate and audiences consume national news channels *and* news of their linguistic or political affiliation – making attention scarce and the job of government communication of policy difficult. Government can call for military intervention overseas and be defeated in Parliament if public opinion is not convinced, as Prime Minister Cameron realized when pushing for action in Syria in the summer of 2013. The public are a force to be reckoned with as a collective political actor. In addition, journalists and policymakers have uncertain knowledge about many security concerns, including radicalization, cybersecurity, climate change and the global economy. There is not necessarily a coherent narrative for government to project and sceptical audiences can see through spin much of the time.

Longstanding questions remain, then, about control and chaos, power and authority, legitimacy and credibility. However, researchers must find ways to grasp the degree of uncertainty and ambivalence present in the positions of media, policy and publics. It is through the media–security nexus that we see these positions being produced and contested. Security research too often and too easily brackets off discrete areas of enquiry and fails to analyse constitutive relationships as components of the bigger picture. It remains necessary for at least

some researchers to find holistic, anthropological and ecological approaches that are alive to how power and influence operate in unexpected places or in unforeseen directions.

There are of course fairly entrenched and opposing perspectives on where media power lies, which have been the subject of debate over decades. Power lies either with the producer of a text and/or with the text (and there is debate over whether the image is more powerful than the word), or it lies in the interpretative abilities of audiences at the site of reception and/or beyond into the social networks of audiences. Alternatively, if power is understood as relational – existing in the relations between people and/or texts/objects – then power is found in the modes, rituals and circuits of production, circulation, regulation and interpretation (Appadurai 1986; Awan et al. 2011; Gillespie 1995). This leads to our second area of questions: media and security in time.

Temporalities

A central finding of *Shifting Securities* and *Tuning In* is that legitimacy, authority, trust and credibility are temporal phenomena – they may be hard earned but quickly lost. Their generation depends on media, policymakers and publics being able to negotiate and respond to the rhythms of events and circumstances in an appropriate manner: there are crisis moments when new policy can be pushed through, calmer periods when ideas can be ‘floated’ and deliberation can occur, and there are cyclical intensifications of anxiety and insecurity about certain events, issues, institutions or leaders. While snapshot analysis of a media–security nexus at a certain moment can help to illuminate some relationships, it will miss the temporal rhythms through which legitimacy and authority, trust and credibility operate together over time. Our research on the World Service offers important insights into these longer-term processes. Understanding the shifting temporalities of security has political and methodological implications.

Politically, citizens do not respond simply to policymakers; rather, they often have a sense of a mediated political world from which statements and images about security threats emerge, linger, fade, recur and create a low-level but ever-present sense of threat and insecurity. This is most evident from the ways in which citizens find tactics to cope with and manage their proximity and distance to ubiquitous media and its anxieties. Further research is needed to identify more productive ways for citizens’ concerns to reach public debate, as many of the projects discussed point to a democratic deficit around security matters. Audience ethnography has proved to be a useful thermometer for flagging early warning signs of dissent and discontent – and policymakers would be wise to recognize this value. It is much more time-consuming and expensive than focus groups, however. Policymakers want executive summaries and actionable results so researchers too need to develop more fruitful ways of communicating their results.

Following security issues over time through multi-sited ethnographies where researchers follow the people, the story, the sounds and images can be very productive (Appadurai 1986). The projects discussed here began to do this. *Shifting Securities* took one news clip about US forces committing abuse in Iraq and showed it to audiences and military practitioners in the UK. They also tracked how the news migrated across English and Arabic-language media spheres. This opened up the specificity of those groups and those spheres and how meaning was generated in each. Legitimising Radicalisation continued this exploration of ‘remediation’ by asking how a securitizing statement by a policymaker or an al-Qaeda leader can be picked up by media, repackaged, debated, contested and adapted by other actors. In a review of the *Shifting Securities* project, Croft wrote that, ‘Remediation means that the intersubjective

context is always in motion' (2010: 260). Audiences will hear a leader's statement via media and then discuss it among families in their own social networks, rather than in the abstract or in the policy/problem-oriented context of the original statement. For audiences, 'it is not that "the government said the threat level is high", but, "there is the government saying the threat is high. Why are they doing that, and are they correct?"' (Gillespie et al. 2010b: 270). Following media stories and images across diverse contexts as they travel opens up these contexts and helps understand how the meaning of security is produced. Online media provide new ways of tracing and tracking stories and images across contexts.

Identities and identifications

What subject positions are offered to individuals and groups within a media–security nexus, and how do they navigate these? During the war on terror, in many Western states government and mainstream media portrayed Muslims as either 'moderate' or 'extreme' or 'radical', but many self-identifying Muslims found these categories bizarre or unhelpful. How do media enable differing axes of identification and how do these intersect with vernacular and state categories? How do media enable or prevent audiences from forming identifications with distant others via personalization and contextualization or by reducing a story to graphics and numbers? How are identifications made or unmade in the intensity of drone targeting or the patient cataloguing of mass graves?

The Shifting Securities project demonstrated how certain identifications were activated or inhibited in different social situations. Through repeated interviews with the same citizens, over time, researchers identified how specific identifications were made and broken *in situ*. Interviews offered a sense of 'push and pull' factors – the dynamics of how certain experiences and events, not always isolated but often cumulative, shift attachments. As the media–security nexus keeps changing amid broader changes in global politics, economy and technology, how do push and pull factors evolve?

Conclusion

Media–security nexus research is a form of conjunctural analysis in which the articulation of research around significant actors and their relationships is orchestrated in order to integrate analysis of the diverse components of a project into a larger relational whole. Shifting Securities and Legitimizing Radicalisation shed light on the media–security nexus in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The media–security nexus also needs to be researched comparatively and historically in different kinds of societies and across time. The Tuning In research examined the nexus over eight decades and was a first step in this direction, but only through the lens of one organization. One next step would be to compare and contrast how different international broadcasters, in their relationships with their governments and audiences, negotiate and legitimate security dilemmas over a similar time span. Further steps might involve researchers choosing different foci – events, generational conflicts – and starting at different sites in the media–security nexus, whether with audiences, elites or media texts. What is fundamental is that the interplay of media, policymakers and publics is researched as an interactive process over time and place using iterative methodologies that can adapt to whatever media technology or security issue are salient to explaining the phenomenon of interest. In this way, it is hoped that interdisciplinary security studies can make significant interventions in both academia and the policy fields. For with better understanding comes better diplomacy and a better chance of securing peace.

Notes

- 1 Croft, S. (2003–08) New Security Challenges, Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). Details at <http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/newsecurity/>
- 2 For a recent example of the application of the framework following the Paris attacks see http://www.cresc.ac.uk/medialibrary/research/REPORT%20Paris%20Attacks%20and%20Eyewitness%20Media%203004%2015_1.pdf
- 3 The After September 11 research project was based on an articulated approach to discourse analysis and audience ethnography. It sought to identify patterns of response among a very diverse group of transnational and multilingual households and examined their news viewing on and in the weeks following the attacks. It was led by Marie Gillespie at The Open University and James Gow at Kings College London and was jointly funded by the Broadcasting Standards Commission (BSC), the British Film Institute and The Open University. The research report was published by the BSC and is available on their website – see references).
- 4 Marie Gillespie et al., *Shifting Securities: News cultures before and beyond the Iraq crisis 2003: Full Research Report, ESRC End of Award Report, RES-223-25-0063* (Swindon: ESRC, 2007).
- 5 Gillespie, M. (2007–10) *Tuning In: Diasporic contact zones at the BBC World Service*. AHRC Diasporas, Migration and Identities Research Programme. Ref AH/E58693/1. See project website for full details of projects and publications at <http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/diasporas/>
- 6 Hoskins, A. (2008–10) *Conflicts of Memory: Mediating and commemorating the 2005 London bombings*, Arts and Humanities Research Council, Award No. AH/E002579/1.
- 7 Hoskins, A. (2007–09) *Legitimising the Discourses of Radicalisation: Political violence in the new media ecology*, Award Number: RES-181-25-0041.
- 8 Lister, M. (2009–11) *Anti-terrorism, Citizenship and Security in the UK*, Economic and Social Research Council, Award ref: RES-000-22-3765.
- 9 Stevens, D. (2012–13) *Public Perceptions of Threat in Britain: Security in an age of austerity*, Economic and Social Research Council, Award ref: ES/J004596/1.
- 10 Robinson, P. (2004–06) *Media Wars: News media performance and media management during the 2003 Iraq war*, Economic and Social Research Council, Grant ref: RES-000-23-0551
- 11 Gillespie and O’Loughlin have each led projects seeking to develop such methodologies. Gillespie’s research has included an exploration of how broadcasters enrol audiences as participants during periods of social change and conflict such as the Arab Spring; Gillespie led a three-year AHRC funded project ‘Tuning In: Diasporic contact zones at BBCWS’, Arts and Humanities Research Council, award Ref: AH/ES58693/1. O’Loughlin has studied the formation, projection and reception of states’ strategic narratives through digital environments as competing actors seek to define the meaning of conflict and change in international relations (Miskimmon et al. 2013).

References

- Appadurai, A. (1986) *The Social Life of Things: Commodities in cultural perspective*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Awan, A. N., Hoskins, A. and O’Loughlin, B. (2011) *Radicalisation and Media: Connectivity and terrorism in the new media ecology*, London: Routledge.
- Broadcasting Standards Commission (2002) ‘After September 11: TV news and transnational audiences’. Online. Available <http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/bsc/pdfs/research/911.pdf> (accessed 14.4.2015).
- Brown, S. D. and Hoskins, A. (2010) ‘Terrorism in the new memory ecology: Mediating and remembering the 2005 London bombings’, *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, 2(2): 87–107.
- Carey, J. (1989) *Communications as Culture: Essays on media and society*, Winchester: Unwin Hyman.
- Castells, M. (2007) ‘Communication, power and counter-power in the network society’, *International Journal of Communication*, 1(1): 238–66.
- Chadwick, A. (2013) *The Hybrid Media System: Politics and power*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cohen S. (1972) *Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The creation of the mods and rockers*, London: MacGibbon & Kee.

- Crawley, W. (2010) 'Bangladesh, 1971, and the BBC South Asian language services: Perceptions of a conflict', *South Asian Diaspora*, 2(1): 3–23.
- Croft, S. (2010) 'Does "shifting securities" shift securitization theory?', *Ethnopolitics*, 9(2): 259–62.
- Croft, S. (2012) *Securitizing Islam: Identity and the search for security*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Das, V. (1995) *Critical Events: Anthropological approaches to contemporary India*, London and New Delhi: Routledge.
- Deuze, M. (2012) *Media Life*, Cambridge: Polity.
- Dillon, M. (2013) *Deconstructing International Politics*, London: Routledge.
- Gillespie, M. (1995) *Television, Ethnicity and Cultural Change*, London: Routledge.
- Gillespie, M. (2005) 'Television drama and audience ethnography', in Gillespie, M. (ed.) *Media Audiences*, Maidenhead: Open University Press, 137–183.
- Gillespie, M. (2006) 'Transnational television audiences after September 11', in After September 11: Television news and transnational audiences. Guest Editor. Special Issue, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 32(6): 903–23.
- Gillespie, M. (2007a) 'Security, media and multicultural citizenship: A collaborative ethnography', Introduction to special issue. Guest Editor, *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, 10(3): 275–93.
- Gillespie, M. (2007b) 'Security, media, legitimacy: Multi-ethnic media publics and the Iraq War 2003', *International Relations*, 20(4): 453–67.
- Gillespie, M. (2013) 'BBC Arabic, social media and citizen production: An experiment in digital democracy before the Arab Spring', *Theory, Culture and Society*, 29(3): 92–131.
- Gillespie, M. and Webb, A. (eds) (2012) *Diasporas and Diplomacy: Cosmopolitan contact zones at the BBC World Service*, London and New York: Routledge (CRESC Series).
- Gillespie, M., Gow, J., Hoskins, A., O'Loughlin, B. and Žveržhanovski, I. (2010a) 'Shifting securities: News cultures, multicultural society and legitimacy', *Ethnopolitics*, 9(2): 239–53.
- Gillespie, M., Gow, J., Hoskins, A., O'Loughlin, B. and Žveržhanovski, I. (2010b) 'Shifting securities: Theory, practice and methodology: A response to Powers, Croft and Noble', *Ethnopolitics*, 9(2): 269–74.
- Gillespie, M., Herbert, D. and Andersson, M. (2010c) 'The Mumbai attacks and diasporic nationalism: BBC World Service online forums as conflict, contact and comfort zones', *South Asian Diaspora*, 2(1): 109–29.
- Gow, J. and Michalski, M. (2008) *War, Image and Legitimacy: Viewing contemporary conflict*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jefferson, T., Clarke, C. and Roberts, B. (1978) *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and law and order*, London: Macmillan.
- Hallin, D. C. (1989) *The Uncensored War: The media and Vietnam*, Berkeley, CA and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.
- Hoskins, A. (2011) '7/7 and connective memory: Interactional trajectories of remembering in post-scarcity culture', *Memory Studies*, 4(3): 269–80.
- Hoskins, A. and O'Loughlin, B. (2007) *Television and Terror: Conflicting times and the crisis of news discourse*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hoskins, A. and O'Loughlin, B. (2010) *War and Media: The emergence of diffused war*, Cambridge: Polity.
- Jarvis, L. and Lister, M. (2013a) 'Disconnected citizenship? The impacts of anti terrorism policy on citizenship in the UK', *Political Studies*, 61(3): 656–75.
- Jarvis, L. and Lister, M. (2013b) 'Vernacular securities and their study: A qualitative analysis and research agenda', *International Relations*, 27(2): 158–79.
- Karpf, D. (2012) 'Social science research methods in internet time', *Information, Communication & Society*, 15(5): 639–61.
- Katzenstein, P. J. (ed.) (1996) *The Culture of National Security: Norms and identity in world politics*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Lorenzo-Dus, N. and Bryan, A. (2011) 'Re-contextualizing participatory journalists' mobile media in British television news: A case study of the live coverage and commemorations of the 2005 London bombings', *Discourse & Communication*, 5(1): 23–40.
- McLuhan, M. (1994) *Understanding Media: The extensions of man*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Miskimmon, A., O'Loughlin, B. and Roselle, L. (2013) *Strategic Narratives: Communication power and the new world order*, New York: Routledge.
- O'Loughlin, B. (2011) 'Commentary: The phenomenology of the event: Remembering the 2005 London bombings', *Memory Studies*, 4(3): 328–31.

- O'Loughlin, B. and Gillespie, M. (2012) 'Dissenting citizenship? Young people and political participation in the media-security nexus'. Special Issue. Guest Editor: J. Sloam. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 65(1): 115–37.
- Postman, N. (1970) 'The Reformed English Curriculum', in Alvin C. Eurich (ed.) *The Shape of the Future in American Secondary Education*, New York: Pitman Publishing Corporation, 160–8.
- Poynting, S., Noble, G., Tabar, P. and Collins, J. (2004) *Bin Laden in the Suburbs: Criminalising the Arab other*, Sydney: Sydney Institute of Criminology.
- Robinson, P., Goddard, P., Parry, K., Murray, C. and Taylor, P. M. (2010) *Pockets of Resistance: British news media, war and theory in the 2003 invasion of Iraq*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Skuse, A., Gillespie, M. and Power, G. (2010) *Drama for Development: Cultural translation and social change*, New Delhi: Sage India.
- van Dijck, J. and Poell, T. (2013) 'Understanding social media logic', *Media and Communication*, 1(1): 2–14.
- Webb, A. (2014) *London Calling: Britain, the BBC World Service and the Cold War*, London: Bloomsbury.
- Weldes, J., Laffey, M., Gustersom, H. and Duvall, R (eds) (1999) *Cultures of Insecurity: States, communities, and the production of danger*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

5

CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON MEDIA AND CONFLICT

Des Freedman

Introduction: contextualizing the debate

When the British broadcaster Jon Snow, the presenter of Channel 4 News, returned from Gaza in July 2014, he committed the cardinal sin of professional journalism: he appeared to take sides in a conflict. In a video posted on the Channel 4 website, he spoke of his ‘distress’ in witnessing the horrors inflicted on Palestinian children by Israeli bombs and urged viewers to take action: ‘We cannot let it go on. If our reporting is worth anything, if your preparedness to listen and watch and read is anything to go by, together we can make a difference’ (Snow 2014). His emotional appeal was immediately condemned by the chief executive officer (CEO) of the Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre – a pro-Israel monitoring organization – as just another example of Snow’s ‘extremely partial and one-sided reports from Gaza’ (Kehoe 2014). Pro-Palestinian campaigners, on the other hand, challenged Snow (and Channel 4 News coverage more generally) for ‘failing to pose the more far-reaching and complex question as regards *why* Israel is conducting this intense bombing campaign’ (Schlosberg 2014), an absence of context that appeared to fuel a simplistic premise that ‘ Hamas attacks; Israel defends’.

However, Snow’s video was also criticized by fellow journalists including the chief executive of ITN News, John Hardie, who described it as the kind of ‘sentimental expression’ that was out of kilter with the responsibilities of broadcast news. The deputy head of BBC News, Fran Unsworth, went further in arguing that it was not appropriate even as a private blog: ‘If one of our presenters had done something like that...I’d have had to have said, this isn’t really appropriate in terms of our public role as an impartial presenter of BBC news programmes’ (quoted in Frost 2014). David Loyn, the BBC’s Afghanistan correspondent, weighed in by insisting that Snow’s video flouted the impartiality rules that govern broadcast news media in the UK: ‘This is a dangerous path. Emotion is the stuff of propaganda, and news is against propaganda’ (Loyn 2014). This counterposing of ‘news’ to ‘propaganda’ is central to the dominant narrative of the professional journalist in reporting conflict: that the reporter is on a ‘truth-telling’ mission and not engaged in public relations or ‘taking sides’. As Charlie Beckett commented, in his response to Snow’s video: ‘The classic idea of “objective” reporting on conflict and suffering is that the job of the journalist is to witness, analyse and leave the judgements and campaigns to others’ (Beckett 2014).

A 'critical' perspective aims to evaluate these 'classic' narratives – described by James Curran (2002: 218) as a 'liberal watchdog' perspective – and to scrutinize journalists' aspirations towards objectivity, impartiality and truth-telling in their coverage of specific conflicts. So, for example, how did a commitment to dispassionate 'truth-telling' play out in the coverage of the Israeli assault on Gaza in the summer of 2014? Numerous critics alleged that, far from impartially representing the claims and experiences of all participants, news reports all too often were seen to be favouring Israeli voices over Palestinian ones, naming Israeli casualties but not Palestinian ones, privileging Israel's security concerns above the justification for Israel's blockade of Gaza and, crucially, failing to provide proper context for the conflict. 'The Palestinian perspective', according to Greg Philo of the Glasgow University Media Group, 'is just not there. The Israelis are on twice as much. The issue is the roots of the conflict. The problem with the coverage is that it doesn't refer to the history of it, that the Palestinians are a displaced people' (quoted in Plunkett 2014). This assessment is not unique to the events in 2014 but symptomatic of a more general problem in the coverage of the Israel/Palestine conflict. The official report on BBC news coverage of Israel/Palestine that was commissioned by the Corporation's governors in 2006, while not finding evidence of deliberate bias, noted nevertheless both 'how little history or context is routinely offered' (Thomas 2006: 3) as well as 'the failure to convey adequately the disparity in the Israeli and Palestinian experience, reflecting the fact that one side is in control and the other lives under occupation' (Thomas 2006: 7).

'Impartial' media coverage of the conflict has long been further undermined by a series of other factors including the impact of the Israeli government's PR machine (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007) and the associated reluctance on the part of journalists to challenge the Israeli government and military – a senior BBC news editor told Philo and Berry (2011: 2) that, following any critical report, 'we wait in fear for the phone call from the Israelis'. This is accompanied by a systematic favouring of Israeli sources over Palestinian ones – for example, Israeli officials outnumbered Palestinian officials by four to one on CNN in the first few weeks of the 2014 conflict (Qiu and Sanders 2014) – and even the routine news values that favour 'dramatic' pictures that distort and stereotype the participants. A world news editor for *The Guardian* admitted, when faced with reader complaints, that there has been 'a seemingly disproportionate use of images of Palestinians throwing rocks...this is likely to be a combination of subeditors feeling they need to use "action" images and the fact that the images provided by the agencies are dominated by such photos' (quoted in Elliott 2014).

So while there are multiple reasons preventing even the best-intentioned journalist from 'objectively' covering the assault on Gaza, there is perhaps a more fundamental objection to the way in which 'objectivity' is itself used as a journalistic device to describe a world in which the equal representation of all sides will somehow capture the truth of the situation. Far from constituting an unproblematic professional norm, objectivity should instead be seen as a defence mechanism: a 'strategic ritual' that is designed to protect journalists against accusations of bias (Tuchman 1972). Given the asymmetric nature of the conflict, objectivity, far from being a tool to illuminate the situation, may be seen instead as a strategy to paint a picture of two equal sides battling it out for regional hegemony. Chris Hedges, the former *New York Times* foreign correspondent, reflecting on the coverage in which he was involved of the 2008–2009 Israeli occupation of Gaza, argues that objectivity serves a highly ideological purpose:

We retreated, as usual, into the moral void of American journalism, the void of balance and objectivity. The ridiculous notion of being unbiased, outside of

the flow of human existence, impervious to grief or pain or anger or injustice, allows reporters to coolly give truth and lies equal space and airtime. Balance and objectivity are the antidote to facing unpleasant truths, a way of avoidance, a way to placate the powerful. We record the fury of a Palestinian who has lost his child in an Israeli airstrike in Gaza but make sure to mention Israel's 'security needs,' include statements by Israeli officials who insist there was firing from the home or the mosque or the school and of course note Israel's right to defend itself.

(Hedges 2009)

This chapter seeks to highlight a critical tradition of analysis that challenges liberal narratives of journalism and argues instead that mainstream media have tended to fall short of their self-proclaimed 'watchdog' role. Due to a range of structural factors that are rooted in contemporary geographies of power – including patterns of corporate ownership, a prevailing consensus on foreign policy objectives and a deep-rooted connection between journalistic and political elites – news media have repeatedly failed to provide a contextualized, independent and robust account of conflict. I am aware that there is a major problem when speaking about a 'critical' framework: that simply by repeating the mantra that you are being 'critical' does not, of course, guarantee the 'truthfulness' or value of your arguments. 'Being critical' is neither a descriptive project nor a kind of safety net but a form of enquiry that seeks to challenge the world as it is so often presented – as an ultimately consensual and democratic place *even* in times of war and conflict – and instead to highlight the unequal power relations that shape dominant media representations, institutions and practices. Critical approaches to the relationship between media and war situate themselves consciously as a direct response to conceptions of professional journalists as vanguards of the truth, sword-bearers of objectivity and, not least, watchdogs of the powerful precisely in order to illuminate, and then challenge, the real dynamics of mediated conflict.

The liberal narrative: media as impartial observer

As I have just suggested, the traditional liberal account of the news media as a 'Fourth Estate' – an independent arbiter, detached observer and objective witness to the unravelling of historical events – retains some influence. A well-resourced and professionalized cadre of reporters and bloggers perform a vital service to liberal democracies. This is all the more important in times of war and crisis when journalists are said to play a central role in monitoring power, acting as a medium between citizenry and elites and, where necessary, mobilizing in order to secure change. It is a narrative that is particularly nurtured by stories of brave war reporters who are willing and able to shrug off political, organizational and ideological restrictions to keep a watchful eye on the activities of military combatants and to challenge, where necessary, the arguments of politicians and generals during wartime. The man credited with founding the tradition of the independent war reporter is William Howard Russell who covered the Crimean War in the 1850s for *The Times*. He was the first civilian to report from the front and vigorously condemned poor military planning and the terrible conditions that the troops had to suffer. His reports were widely publicized and indeed led to the resignation of the general in charge and the collapse of the government. However, while Russell may have had serious reservations about the conduct of the war, '[t]he one thing he never doubted or criticised was the institution of war itself' (Knightley 2004: 16).

The most famous example of the 'adversarial' conception of the journalist's role concerns US coverage of the Vietnam War where it has been argued both that the uncensored portrayal

of American casualties undermined public support and effectively ‘lost the war’ for the US (Elegant 1979) and that the tenacity of journalists in holding generals and politicians to account represented a highpoint of American journalism (Halberstam 1979). One of the key turning points of the war was the transmission of a special report by the most famous American news anchor of the time, CBS’ Walter Cronkite. Having just returned from a visit to Vietnam, he argued that the war was a ‘bloody stalemate’ and that outright military victory was basically impossible. On watching this, President Johnson is alleged to have turned to an aide and said that ‘it’s all over’ (quoted in Hallin 1986: 108).

This ‘adversarial’ model suggests that the determination and critical instincts of committed journalists require governments to be more open in their justifications for war and more transparent in how they actually fight wars themselves. According to this logic, the recent expansion in the number of media outlets, the emergence of a 24/7 news cycle and the explosion of social media have all fuelled this ‘watchdog’ role. Fierce competition and the increased availability of a diverse range of sources force reporters to go beyond official handouts and briefings – to move beyond primary definers – and to ‘bear witness’ in a more robust way than previously. Indeed, this is especially important given the natural instinct of governments to suppress security-related information and to distinguish between the public’s ‘right to know’ and their ‘need to know’ – something that is far more limited in times of war and crisis. In the face of visible news management techniques and the rise of military public affairs (Rid 2007) as well as more covert forms of surveillance and control – everything from the ‘D Notice’ system in the UK that inhibits journalists from reporting on military matters (Wilkinson 2009) to the aggressive prosecution of whistle-blowers in the US (Downie 2013) – a brash and raucous news media that is committed to uncovering the truth is fundamental for modern democracies.

Critical approaches: the reproduction of authority

The rather reassuring and romantic narrative of the war reporter as an independent check on power has been critiqued by a heterogeneous group of theorists who argue that the media in general are more likely to publicize and reinforce official sources and pro-war narratives than they are to challenge them. Far from supplying independent information or counter-frameworks, the media – for a host of organizational and ideological reasons – disseminate a distorted and decontextualized picture of conflict. In the remainder of this chapter, I want to outline some of the main explanatory frameworks in relation to mainstream media coverage and to argue that, while there is no smooth consensus amongst some of the leading critics, their accounts of the ‘everyday’ performance of the news media are more convincing than those voices who insist that the media continue to play a decisive and democratic watchdog role, particularly in relation to war and conflict.

News as propaganda

The propaganda model (PM), as developed initially by Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky (Herman and Chomsky 1988) is perhaps the most well-known rebuttal of the ‘watchdog’ account of news media performance. For Herman and Chomsky, the corporate media are a crucial tool for legitimizing the ideas of the most powerful social actors and, borrowing from Walter Lippmann, for ‘manufacturing consent’ for their actions in both domestic and foreign contexts. They identify five ‘filters’ working on the media that ensure a systematic bias in favour of dominant frames. First, the main media

organizations are large corporations with an orientation on profit and, as such, are ‘closely interlocked, and have important common interests, with other major corporations, banks, and government’ (Herman and Chomsky 1988: 14). Second, these media corporations often depend on advertising as a key source of revenue – a pressure that tends to skew their coverage towards the interests of more ‘desirable’ (i.e. privileged) audiences and to militate against ‘controversial’ content that may alienate the most powerful advertisers. Third, news organizations are dependent on elite sources, both because they are ‘reliable’ purveyors of information but also because they lower the costs of newsgathering. Coverage is dominated, therefore, not simply by established politicians and business leaders but by unaccountable ‘experts’ and well-resourced think tanks, all of which help to subsidize the cost of newsgathering. The fourth filter concerns what Herman and Chomsky call ‘flak’, the systematic rebuttal of material that challenges these sources – for example the coordinated response to unsympathetic coverage of Israel to which we have already referred and which help to discipline those journalists who may wish to highlight more critical agendas. The final filter consists of the construction of an ‘enemy’ around which populations (and media agendas) can unite. While anti-Communism initially fulfilled this role, today the enemy is more likely to be that of fundamentalist Islam. In passing through and interacting with these filters, the mainstream media environment is therefore structured in such a way as to control dissent and to secure public support for the actions of ruling elites. ‘They fix the premises of discourse and interpretation and the definition of what is newsworthy in the first place’ (Herman and Chomsky 1988: 2).

Through detailed empirical analysis of ‘elite media’ coverage of US interventions in Central America and South-East Asia, Herman and Chomsky discover a ‘conformism’ between media agendas and the *broad* aims of US foreign policy and conclude that ‘the “societal purpose” of the media is to inculcate and defend the economic, social, and political agenda of privileged groups that dominate the domestic society and the state’ (Herman and Chomsky 1988: 298). While there is the capacity for limited and tactical disagreement inside the media, coherent oppositional frameworks are largely marginalized and dissenting viewpoints remain highly bounded. This is an approach that has been adopted by many others including DiMaggio (2008), Edwards and Cromwell (2006, 2009), Philo and Berry (2011) and Pilger (1998) whose analyses coalesce around a shared view that, for all the valuable contributions of individual journalists, mainstream media function as ‘weapons of mass deception’ (Rampton and Stauber 2003) rather than public enlightenment.

Far from the PM operating on conspiratorial grounds – in other words that editors sit down privately with politicians and generals to plan the contours of media coverage – Herman and Chomsky claim quite the opposite: that media performance is the result of the everyday operation of market forces. The filters are triggered so ‘naturally’ that journalists are able ‘to convince themselves that they choose and interpret the news “objectively” and on the basis of professional news values’ (Herman and Chomsky 1988: 2). Journalists are, therefore, *formally* free to follow their own hunches and to pursue their own investigations but they do this within a heavily constrained and hierarchical news system that limits their choices and defines the contours of what is likely to be accepted as news in the first place.

Of course, in times of conflict and war, even this ‘formal’ autonomy is undermined by national security considerations that restrict the free movement of reporters in the battlefield and subject them to surveillance and harassment should they reveal ‘uncomfortable’ truths about government activities (see, for example, Greenwald 2014). Following the claim that television coverage had contributed to the military defeat of the US in Vietnam, there was a swift reaction on the part of the US and UK governments: the media would have to be

controlled even more tightly. According to the British broadcaster Robin Day: 'one wonders if in future a democracy which has uninhibited television coverage in every home will be able to fight a war, however just...blood looks very red on the colour television screen' (quoted in Knightley 2004: 452). As we shall see, Daniel Hallin (1986) has challenged the idea that there was indeed 'uninhibited' TV coverage of the Vietnam War but Day's words reflect a commitment that has guided Western governments from the Falklands War in 1984 to the Gulf War in 1991 and to the more recent occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan in this century. This has involved the drawing up of 'ground rules' designed to stifle the opportunity for critical coverage that include the creation of news pools, threats to 'unilateral' reporters, the embedding of journalists and a far more comprehensive and sophisticated system of military public relations (Pilger 1998; Schechter 2004). Indeed the reporter's ability to explain and investigate contemporary terrorism has been undermined by, for example, anti-terror legislation in the UK that criminalizes the 'glorification' of terrorism, and forbids journalists from going to 'terrorist training camps' for legitimate news purposes (Article 19 2006) and by increased surveillance of journalists by recent US governments that is 'harming journalism, law and American democracy' (Human Rights Watch 2014).

Yet propaganda is still needed to overcome the cynicism, if not the outright opposition, to military interventions that is regularly demonstrated by publics. In the face of significant anti-war public opinion in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, for example, a sustained public relations campaign was launched in order to 'sell' the war to the US and UK publics in which highly targeted information 'flows to the media and the public through a limited number of well-trained messengers, including seemingly independent third parties' (Miller et al. 2004: 44; see also Herring and Robinson 2014). Chomsky notes a reluctance on the part of US citizens to get involved in the affairs of other countries, particularly after the defeat in Vietnam, and quotes conservative commentator Norman Podhoretz's despair about 'the sickly inhibitions against the use of military force' (Chomsky 1991: 9). In this situation, propaganda is required for two reasons: 'to whip up the population in support of foreign adventures' (Chomsky 1991: 8) and to attempt to rewrite history in order to justify future interventions and to pre-empt opposition.

One of the best studies of wartime propaganda that illustrates many of these pressures and techniques is Philip Knightley's *The First Casualty* (Knightley 2004). He describes how, in World War One, leading correspondents were dressed in officers' uniforms, were given honorary status as captains and were provided with food, housing, transport and, not least, with military censors (Knightley 2004: 101). They were perhaps the first examples of 'embedded reporters', a tactic that was used very effectively in Iraq in 2003 in order to encourage an affinity between journalists and troops (Schechter 2003). Correspondents would draw lots as to who would go out and cover particular areas of the battlefield; material was then pooled and sent to the censor. Only two photographers were allowed by the British Army onto the field, both of them army officers: anyone else found taking photos faced the firing squad (Knightley 2004: 105).

Fed by a constant supply of stories from official sources and aware of the need to package news in dramatic form wherever possible, one of the most common journalistic narratives has long been to 'demonize' enemies as a means of justifying intervention. From anti-German propaganda in World War One, to the story of Iraqi soldiers ransacking a hospital ward in Kuwait in 1991 and throwing babies out of their incubators – a story that was unfounded but nevertheless significant in securing US support for military action against Saddam Hussein (Macarthur 2004: 68) – to contemporary reports equating the Russian leader Vladimir Putin to Adolf Hitler (Schechter 2014) in order to legitimize North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) expansion, news outlets have consistently demonstrated their willingness to reproduce public relations material as bona fide journalism.

These are pretty extreme examples of ‘misinformation’ and exaggeration that relate to an understanding of propaganda as mere lies and distortion that then fosters a rather one-dimensional (and incorrect) image of journalists as simple liars and public relations (PR) operatives. A more productive way of conceptualizing propaganda is as a communicative practice that furthers the objectives of its protagonists – a process that can include bombings and beheadings as well as TV bulletins and feature films. Indeed, as Miller and Sabir argue persuasively (2012: 79), propaganda is ‘not simply a matter of discourse but a matter of concrete material action by particular institutional interests’. The media – due to their ideological proximity to and dependence on established sources – are a vital link in the propaganda chain but far from the sole instigators of limited frames and hegemonic perspectives.

So when mainstream media use language that appears to reproduce dominant definitions of conflict – for example that ‘terrorism’ is what others do to us in contrast to ‘self-defence’ which is what we do to others – in order to mobilize popular consent for military action against ‘rogue states’, this is not a vocabulary designed exclusively in the newsroom but one that reflects the power interests of the environment in which it is located. Philo and Berry, in their study of news coverage of Israel and Palestine, argue that while quantitative studies of sources and discourse analyses of news are of course very important in evaluating questions of ‘objectivity’ and ‘bias’, ‘the use of words and phrasing is itself a function of the much broader explanatory themes and assumptions which underpin news accounts. These relate to the reasons why events are assumed to occur and to the legitimacy given to the motives and actions of different sides’ (Philo and Berry 2011: 5–6). Given the crucial role that Israel continues to play for the West in the geopolitics of the Middle East, mainstream reporting is, therefore, bound to be affected by the fact that Palestinians and Israelis are not equipped with equal political, military *or* definitional power. Indeed Philo and Berry conclude the book with a firm statement of the link between propaganda and political action: ‘The effect of presenting propaganda is in the end to prolong the violence, but a proper understanding of its causes, is a major step in the move towards peace’ (Philo and Berry 2011: 398).

Indexing and framing: constraints on reporting conflict

The PM has not won universal acceptance from all those who, otherwise, share its view that the corporate media are unable to perform a watchdog role and to hold administrations and elites to account, especially in times of conflict. Some, for example Sparks (2007) and Freedman (2009), claim that proponents of the PM are absolutely correct to pinpoint the ideological affiliations between modern states and the vast majority of media organizations and to focus on the ways in which they present a distorted view of the world. However, they also claim that the PM underplays the possibility of alternative frames that may be generated by tensions between capitalist elites as well as through popular resistance to their actions. Others attribute an instrumentalism and functionalism to the PM in that it sees media systems as ‘solid, permanent and immovable’ (Golding and Murdock 2000: 74) and retains an emphasis on manipulation and mass gullibility that renders it ‘a little too simplistic’ (Davis 2010: 136) to explain how media influence really operates. Hallin (1994: 13) argues that the PM sees mainstream media as ‘perfectly unidimensional’ and is thus unable to account for other roles that they may perform, such as providing a space for elite debate, and for the occasional differences (as opposed to routine similarities) in journalistic output. The PM, therefore, may be effective in explaining the general pro-war orientation of a pro-

market media but it may be less useful in uncovering precisely how journalistic practices are shaped by news environments and how the professional ideology of journalists – including a commitment to ‘objectivity’ and ‘truth-telling’ – intersects with their wider surroundings.

According to Lance Bennett, journalists’ pursuit of and reliance on official sources is conditioned by the degree of consensus that operates inside the most powerful and official communities at any one time. To the extent that there is general agreement on the aims and objectives of, for example, foreign policy, journalists are likely to find it difficult to challenge this consensus and to highlight dissenting voices. Bennett develops a theory of press–state relations in which he argues that journalists ‘tend to “index” the range of voices and viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a single topic’ (Bennett 1990: 106). While corporate ownership is certainly a significant factor on their output, ‘indexing’ explains why journalists ‘naturally’ orientate themselves on a limited range of ‘official’ perspectives. It links together economic factors, newsroom cultures and individual political leanings into an explanation for the narrowness of the ‘journalistic gate’ (Bennett 1990: 107). He also insists that indexing is not predictable or standard across all types of reporting and that it is strongest in those areas – like trade and military decisions – which are ‘of great importance not only to corporate economic interests but to the advancement of state power as well’ (Bennett 1990: 122). Here, the pressure to take a lead from elite sources and to minimize voices that challenge these sources will be most intense.

This unacknowledged orientation on a very restricted range of frameworks and institutions produces a default position that favours established interests and undermines the ability of journalists directly to confront these interests and to pursue alternative agendas. News, for Bennett is ‘elite driven’ (Bennett 1994: 24), subject to official sanctions and government pressure, and therefore also sensitive to the impact of schisms within these elites: divisions that are especially intense in times of war and conflict which may provide journalists with access to ‘*reportable* opposition voices and viewpoints’ (Bennett 1994: 24 – my emphasis). This does not mean that the journalistic gate is thrust wide open (let alone that it is demolished) but simply that it may be possible to include a wider diversity of voices than is typically possible given what is generally seen as ‘reportable’ or not.

The best example of how elite dissensus found its expression in the mainstream media is to be found in contrasting narratives of media coverage of the Vietnam War. As we have already seen, foreign policy ‘hawks’ argued that uncensored TV coverage prevented the US from adequately prosecuting the war while advocates of the ‘Fourth Estate’ claimed that a professional commitment to ‘objectivity’ had illuminated the more unsavoury aspects of the conflict. Critics of this approach argue that a patriotic media largely accepted military assumptions about the aims of the war and covered US intervention in the mid-60s in favourable terms, privileging government sources and marginalizing oppositional ones. Sympathetic coverage of the aims of the war helped to prolong and not to curtail the conflict. Indeed, the media’s dependence on government sources and US soldiers in the field never diminished – it was just that ‘these sources became more and more divided’ (Hallin 1986: 10).

The trigger for this shift was the military disaster that was the Tet Offensive in early 1968 when political consensus on the war started to break down. Divisions in the senior ranks of government and mass opposition to the war inside the US helped to change the emphasis of the coverage. According to Hallin, increased political division and poor internal communication meant that ‘the media became a forum for airing political differences rather than a tool of policy’ (Hallin 1986: 187). A media consensus started to crack in line with the breakdown of

the political consensus that had, until that point, been guiding it. Shots of body bags and corpses which had initially been shown on television mostly for their dramatic appeal to viewers now had a political resonance which contributed to the growing anti-war sentiment. Even by the end of the war when US society was effectively divided over the question of Vietnam, Hallin argues that 'for the most part television was a follower rather than a leader: it was not until the collapse of consensus was well under way that television's coverage began to turn around; and when it did turn, it only turned so far' (Hallin 1986: 163).

The degree of elite consensus is not sufficient, however, fully to explain media performance both when there *is* journalistic dissent (Schlosberg 2013: 205) and, more frequently, where there is not. In order to make sense of the frequent distortions and omissions in the coverage of conflict and the ways in which ideological commitments to professional values are undermined without a direct or overt 'command' from editors and proprietors, Todd Gitlin turns to Erving Goffman's account of frame analysis (Goffmann 1974) and argues that frames are crucial ways for journalists to make sense of and to order public life that are based on 'principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters' (Gitlin 1980: 6).

The latter phrase is particularly crucial: framing is a process that is an essential part of the journalist's work in helping to assemble a coherent narrative but the ability to decide 'what matters', and therefore what does not, is clearly unequally distributed throughout society. This ability for journalists to discriminate between frames – whether on the basis of indexing or a more profound ideological sympathy to elite interests – leads to a persistent favouring of pro-war voices and the marginalizing of oppositional viewpoints. Gitlin (1980) examines the media's long-standing neglect of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the 1960s while Entman and Page found that, in the lead up to the 1991 Gulf War, out of 118 opinion pieces in *The New York Times*, many of which contained limited criticisms of the administration, not a single one actually argued against US involvement in the war (Entman and Page 1994: 96). Criticism, they argue, was 'procedural' rather than 'substantive', accentuated by a routine dependence on official sources and the 'beat' system that 'encourages the over-representation of administration views' (Entman and Page 1994: 96). This is a pattern of coverage that was particularly evident during the 2003 Iraq War. Despite substantial public opposition in early 2003, researchers found evidence in UK broadcast news coverage of a 'subtle but clear bias towards...pro-war assumptions' (Lewis et al. 2006: 126) while, according to Robinson et al. (2010: 104), 'British news coverage of the Iraq invasion conformed to the prediction of the elite-driven model. Press and television news relied heavily on coalition sources and supportive battle coverage prevailed even among newspapers that had opted to oppose the war.'

Entman argues that in a less polarized, post-Cold War world, framing – or what he describes as 'highlighting some facets of events or issues...so as to produce a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution' (Entman 2004: 5) – is the most effective tool with which to explain the elite-dominated nature of media coverage of conflict than what he sees as the ideologically fixed notions of the PM or indexing. Reporting of conflict 'does not always fall into the iron grip of hegemonic elite control, nor does it always provide a straightforward index of elite discussion' (Entman 2004: 147) even though the most powerful actors continue to be better equipped to transmit their frameworks and interpretations through the media and on to publics in what he calls a 'cascading activation' model. While this allows for more journalistic autonomy than other 'critical' models, the news process is still dominated by vested interests to produce, particularly in matters of foreign policy, an "elite" spiral of silence' together with only very limited contestability (Entman 2004: 73), a point also made by Schlosberg (2013) in his analysis of the reporting of corruption scandals in the UK.

Framing is certainly a useful way of capturing the dynamics of journalistic practice as they relate to the fraught circumstances of war reporting but it has a tendency to privilege the internal mechanisms of newsroom culture more than the broader contexts within which journalists operate. Entman himself acknowledges that he is 'more concerned with media interventions in the day-to-day contests to control government power *within* the snug ideological confines of American politics' (Entman 2007: 170) than he is to investigate how these ideological parameters condition the frames and routines of journalists themselves. Perhaps the most fruitful lesson we can learn from the different critical perspectives on media and conflict is to integrate the various approaches: to combine the PM's emphasis on the structural constraints on independent journalism in a market society with indexing's focus on elite power and framing's emphasis on the interpretative work done by journalists that favours dominant narratives at the expense of 'counter' narratives.

Conclusion

Despite the allure of the liberal 'watchdog' perspective on the coverage of conflict in which, as the BBC's David Loyn puts it, 'our job as reporters is only to be witnesses to the truth' (Loyn 2003), this chapter has argued that a number of factors work together to undermine this noble objective. Political controls, organizational constraints, shared ideological frameworks, economic pressures and professional aspirations towards 'objectivity' and 'balance' tend to skew coverage towards dominant frameworks and to constrain the promotion of critical perspectives. In particular, we have seen how the reporting of war has been marked by elite sources, pro-war agendas, militaristic frames and limited contestability but how it has also been destabilized by elite division and even popular resistance.

While there have been and continue to be many moments of tension between media outlets and government authorities in the reporting of war and terrorism, their interests are all too often not fundamentally opposed. Governments actually want supportive media frames to legitimize and sustain conflict while, with very few and very honourable exceptions, editors and journalists share many of their government's ideological assumptions about the 'national interest'. Faced with real obstacles concerning censorship and access, many in the media have accepted the agendas and the briefings of politicians and generals. Reporters have criticized particular aspects of military or counter-terrorist operations but have regularly failed to attack the underlying assumptions behind these objectives. For every truly 'unilateral' reporter, there have been many more all too comfortable to identify with the military, to bed themselves down in regiments and platoons, to reproduce the statements of generals and politicians and to circulate and further naturalize the idea that conflict is an inevitable, acceptable or necessary part of modern life.

References

- Article 19 (2006) 'The Impact of UK Anti-Terror Laws on Freedom of Expression', London: Article 19.
- Beckett, C. (2014) 'Should news get personal? Emotion and objectivity in the face of suffering', *Polis*, 30 July. Online. Available HTTP: <<http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/polis/2014/07/30/should-news-get-personal-emotion-and-objectivity-in-the-face-of-suffering/>> (accessed 4 September 2014).
- Bennett, W. L. (1990) 'Towards a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States', *Journal of Communication* 40(2), 103–125.
- Bennett, W. Lance (1994) 'The News about Foreign Policy', in W. L. Bennett and D. Paletz (eds), *Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 12–42.

- Chomsky, N. (1991) *Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda*. Westfield, NJ: Open Magazine.
- Curran, J. (2002) *Media and Power*. London: Routledge.
- Davis, A. (2010) *Political Communication and Social Theory*. London: Routledge.
- DiMaggio, A. (2008) *Mass Media, Mass Propaganda: Examining American News in the 'War on Terror'*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Downie, L. (2013) 'The Obama administration and the press', Committee to Project Journalists, 10 October. Online. Available HTTP: <<http://cpj.org/reports/2013/10/obama-and-the-press-us-leaks-surveillance-post-911.php>> (accessed 4 September 2014).
- Edwards, D. and Cromwell, D. (2006) *Guardians of Power: The Myth of the Liberal Media*. London: Pluto.
- Edwards, D. and Cromwell, D. (2009) *Newspeak in the 21st Century*. London: Pluto.
- Elegant, R. (1979) *How to Lose a War: The Press and Vietnam*. Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center.
- Elliott, C. (2014) 'The readers' editor on...language in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict', *The Guardian*, 14 July, 27.
- Entman, R. (2004) *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Entman, R. (2007) 'Framing Bias: Media in the Distribution of Power', *Journal of Communication* 57, 163–173.
- Entman, R. and Page, B. (1994) 'The News Before the Storm', in W. L. Bennett and D. Paletz (eds), *Taken By Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 82–101.
- Freedman, D. (2009) "'Smooth Operator'? The Propaganda Model and Moments of Crisis', *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture* 6(2), 59–72.
- Frost, C. (2014) 'BBC News Chief Fran Unsworth Says Jon Snow's emotional video about Gaza children would have failed BBC impartiality', *Huffington Post*, 9 September. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/09/09/jon-snow-gaza-video-channel4-bbc-news-sky-rts_n_5791204.html> (accessed 12 September 2014).
- Gitlin, T. (1980) *The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Goffmann, E. (1974) *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Golding, P. and Murdock, G. (2000) 'Culture, Communications and Political Economy', in J. Curran and M. Gurevitch (eds), *Mass Media and Society*, third edition. London: Arnold, 70–92.
- Greenwald, G. (2014) *No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the BSA and the U.S. Surveillance State*. New York: Macmillan.
- Halberstam, D. (1979) *The Powers That Be*. New York: Dell.
- Hallin, D. (1986) *The Uncensored War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hallin, D. (1994) *We Keep America on Top of the World: Television Journalism and the Public Sphere*. London: Routledge.
- Hedges, C. (2009) 'With Gaza, journalists fail again', *truthdig*, 26 January. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/20090126_with_gaza_journalists_fail_again> (accessed 5 September 2009).
- Herman, E. and Chomsky, N. (1988) *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*. New York: Pantheon.
- Herring, E. and Robinson, P. (2014) 'Report X Marks the Spot: The British Government's Deceptive Dossier on Iraq and WMD', *Political Science Quarterly* 129(4), 551–583.
- Human Rights Watch (2014) 'With liberty to monitor all: How large-scale US surveillance is harming journalism, law and American democracy'. Human Rights Watch/ACLU. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usnsa0714_ForUpload_0.pdf> (accessed 6 September 2014).
- Kehoe, D. (2014) 'Representing Israel to the UK media during the Gaza conflict', *PR Week*, 19 August. Online. Available HTTP: <<http://www.prweek.com/article/1308281/representing-israel-uk-media-during-gaza-conflict>> (accessed 4 September 2014).
- Knightley, P. (2004) *The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-Maker from the Crimea to Iraq*, third edition. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press.
- Lewis, J., Brookes, R., Mosdell, N. and Threadgold, T. (2006) *Shoot First and Ask Questions Later: Media Coverage of the 2003 Iraq War*. New York: Peter Lang.

- Loyn, D. (2003) 'Witnessing the truth', openDemocracy, 20 February. Online. Available HTTP: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/media-journalismwar/article_993.jsp> (accessed 5 September 2014).
- Loyn, D. (2014) 'Jon Snow's Gaza appeal risks reducing reporting to propaganda', *The Guardian*, 3 August. Online. Available HTTP: <<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/aug/03/jon-snow-gaza-appeal-reporting>> (accessed 5 September 2014).
- Macarthur, J. (2004) *Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the 1991 Gulf War*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Mearsheimer, J. and Walt, S. (2007) *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*. New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux.
- Miller, D. and Sabir, R. (2012) 'Propaganda and Terrorism', in D. Freedman and D. Thussu (eds), *Media and Terrorism: Global Perspectives*. London: Sage, 77–94.
- Miller, L., Stauber, J. and Rampton, S. (2004) 'War is Sell', in D. Miller (ed.), *Tell Me Lies: Propaganda and Media Distortion on the Attack on Iraq*. London: Pluto, 41–51.
- Philo, G. and Berry, M. (2011) *More Bad News from Israel*. London: Pluto.
- Pilger, J. (1998) *Hidden Agendas*. London: Vintage.
- Plunkett, J. (2014) 'BBC defends coverage of Israeli air strikes in Gaza after bias accusations', *The Guardian*, 16 July. Online. Available HTTP: <<http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/jul/16/bbc-defends-coverage-israeli-airstrikes-gaza-palestinian>> (accessed 5 September 2015).
- Qiu, L. and Sanders, K. (2014) 'Fact-checking Rula Jebreal's claim that CNN interviewed 17 Israeli officials vs. 1 Palestinian', PunditFact, 24 July. Online. Available HTTP: <<http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2014/jul/24/rula-jebreal/fact-checking-rula-jebreal-claim-cnn-had-17-israel/>> (accessed 4 September 2014).
- Rampton, S. and Stauber, J. (2003) *Weapons of Mass Deception: The Uses of Propaganda in Bush's War in Iraq*. New York: Tarcher/Penguin.
- Rid, T. (2007) *War and Media Operations: The US Military and the Press from Vietnam to Iraq*. London: Routledge.
- Robinson, P., Goddard, P., Parry, K., Murray, C. and Taylor, P.M. (2010) *Pockets of Resistance: British News Media, War and Theory in the 2003 Invasion of Iraq*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Schechter, D. (2003) *Embedded: Weapons of Mass Deception*. Amherst, NY: Prometheus.
- Schechter, D. (2004) 'Selling the Iraq War: The Media Management Strategies We Never Saw', in Y. Kamalipour and N. Snow (eds), *War, Media and Propaganda: A Global Perspective*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 25–32.
- Schechter, D. (2014) 'The Hitler slur and making new enemies', www.consortiumnews.com, 4 September. Online. Available HTTP: <<http://consortiumnews.com/2014/09/04/the-hitler-slur-and-making-new-enemies/>> (accessed 5 September 2014).
- Schlosberg, J. (2013) *Power Beyond Scrutiny: Media, Justice and Accountability*. London: Pluto.
- Schlosberg, J. (2014) 'Media wars over Gaza: why British broadcasters are still failing in their scrutiny of Israeli officials', openDemocracy, 31 July. Online. Available HTTP: <<https://opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/justin-schlosberg/media-wars-over-gaza-why-british-broadcasters-are-still-failing-in-thei>> (accessed 31 August 2014).
- Snow, J. (2014) 'The children of Gaza', video, 27 July. Online. Available HTTP: <<http://www.channel4.com/news/the-children-of-gaza-jon-snow-video>> (5 September 2014).
- Sparks, C. (2007) 'Extending and Refining the Propaganda Model', *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture* 4(2), 68–84.
- Thomas, Q. (2006) 'Report of the Independent Panel for the BBC Governors on impartiality of BBC coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict'. London: BBC. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/our_work/govs/panel_report_final.pdf> (accessed 4 September 2014).
- Tuchman, G. (1972) 'Objectivity as Strategic Ritual: An Examination of Newsmen's Notions of Objectivity', *American Journal of Sociology* 77(4), 660–679.
- Wilkinson, N. (2009) *Secrecy and the Media: The Official History of the UK's D-notice System*. London: Routledge.

6

THEORISING MEDIA/ STATE RELATIONS AND POWER

Philip Hammond

The media are often understood to be simply an extension of state power in non-democratic, non-Western countries. They are therefore sometimes viewed as implicated in war crimes – such as in Rwanda, where three media executives were convicted by the United Nations' (UN's) international criminal tribunal for having incited genocide in 1994. The media can also be treated as legitimate military targets – as during the 1999 Kosovo conflict, when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombed the main television building in central Belgrade, killing the civilian employees inside. In both of these cases, the assumption was that the role of the media in conflict is to act as an instrument of power, whether they are state-run (as in the Serbian case) or privately owned (as in Rwanda). In Western democracies, in contrast, the assumption is that the media (including national broadcasters such as the BBC) are independent: able to act as a watchdog on the powerful rather than simply being an arm of official authority.

Yet there is a long tradition of critical scholarship which questions this view. Analysts have argued that the range of opinions available in the free Western media is constricted, 'indexed' to the views of elite sources (Bennett 1990); that debate is limited to a narrow sphere of 'legitimate controversy' (Hallin 1989); and that the news media – especially in coverage of foreign policy and war – produce propaganda rather than independent journalism (Herman and Chomsky 2002). For many critics, these problems are not contingent – a product of war fever or patriotism, say – but are systemic, and derive from the fundamental characteristics of the media in capitalist democracies.

This chapter will review the key claims of this radical tradition, but the main aim in what follows is to assess how far it remains useful for understanding news coverage of contemporary conflicts. Perhaps the most obvious reason its relevance has been doubted in recent years is that new online communications seem to call into question the importance of theorising how and why the news media serve the interests of power. If activists in repressive states can circumvent or challenge state propaganda, as in Egypt or Libya during the 2011 'Arab Spring', we might expect even greater freedom in democratic societies. Recent work on how the conduct of war has been transformed by a 'new media ecology characterized by connectivity, emergence and contingency' (Hoskins and O'Loughlin 2010: 168), suggests to

some analysts that the goal of demonstrating how mainstream print and broadcast media are subservient to power is much less important.

The radical critique

It is slightly misleading to write of ‘the’ critical or radical tradition, but there is not space here for a detailed exposition of differences of approach and emphasis. Instead, this section will attempt to draw out some common themes in relation to three key issues for understanding the media/state relationship: official constraint and manipulation of the media; patterns of media ownership and commercialisation; and the professional practices and routines of journalism itself. The best illustration of the overall approach is Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky’s propaganda model, because of both its comprehensive scope and its frequent citation in studies of war reporting.

Of these three issues, the first might be thought to be the most significant in war coverage, and indeed there is no shortage of studies detailing the long and sorry history of efforts by Western governments, militaries and intelligence services to manipulate, censor and control the news in wartime (see Knightley 2003 for an historical overview). The potential scope of coercive state power over the media should not be underestimated. In the 1980s the British government commandeered a BBC transmitter on Ascension Island to broadcast black propaganda to Argentine troops during the Falklands conflict (Harris 1983: 119), for example, and at home it banned the broadcasting of statements by Irish Republican political leaders (Miller 1995). In legal provisions for ‘defence and emergency arrangements’, the British government has the power to require the BBC to broadcast any material it chooses, or to prevent it from broadcasting any material. It can also require the BBC to act as an ‘agent of the Crown’ in monitoring and reporting on others’ media output; and, while the BBC’s domestic services are funded by licence-fee payers, the Corporation receives direct government funding for the World Service and is answerable to the Foreign Office for its overseas programming.¹

However, the radical tradition starts from the fact that in Western democracies direct state censorship and control of the news media is the exception rather than the rule. This is not because Western states are seen as benign – to the contrary, critics such as Herman and Chomsky are centrally concerned with how the media work as a propaganda system to legitimise the nefarious activities of the US and other Western governments. Rather, the point is to explain how the media generally do this spontaneously with relatively little direct state control. As Ralph Miliband wrote in 1969: ‘In no field do the claims of democratic diversity and free political competition which are made on behalf of the “open societies” of advanced capitalism appear to be more valid than in the field of communications.’ Nevertheless, he went on to observe, the media are ‘a crucial element in the legitimization of capitalist society’, supporting ‘the prevailing system of power and privilege’ and fostering a ‘climate of conformity’ (Miliband 2013). Explaining this apparent paradox is at the heart of the radical critique.

Herman and Chomsky identify five ‘news filters’ which ‘allow the government and dominant private interests to get their messages across to the public’ (2002: 2). Notably, the first two of these – ‘size, ownership and profit orientation’, and ‘the advertising licence to do business’ – concern the nature of the news media as private businesses. In other words, it is simply the character of media themselves as capitalist enterprises, and their enmeshing with other private businesses, which does most to explain how they tend to work routinely in ways which support the socio-economic status quo. As in other sectors, the media industry

has seen a trend toward increased concentration of ownership and large-scale investment by other major companies and banks, but unlike most other sectors of the economy, in the case of news media this has potentially far-reaching effects on the public sphere in terms of the quality of information and range of opinion available to citizens. The importance of attracting advertising revenue also means that the media are less likely to carry content which might alienate either their sponsors or their more affluent readers and viewers.

In foregrounding the importance of the media's business interests, Herman and Chomsky are squarely in the tradition of 'political economy' analysts, such as Herbert Schiller (1976) in the US or Graham Murdock and Peter Golding (1974) in the UK. Although they are addressing a US context, it is worth noting that Herman and Chomsky draw extensively on British press history (as told in James Curran and Jean Seaton's (2010) *Power without Responsibility*) to illustrate their argument. Indeed, one of the most striking examples of how interlocking interests can shape the media's relationship with power is the behaviour of Rupert Murdoch's News International in the UK during the 1980s. In the bitter year-long Wapping dispute, when more than 5,000 print workers were sacked in a bid to end trades-union influence, there was a clear convergence between the commercial interests of News International and the aggressively anti-trades-union programme of Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government. The editorial support for the Conservatives offered by Murdoch's papers throughout the decade was reciprocated by government (and police) support for News International against its employees.

Herman and Chomsky (2002: 18–19) also suggest that economic considerations are one of the factors underpinning the media's reliance on a narrow range of official sources (their third 'filter'), since the public relations bureaucracies of state and corporate sources offer a ready supply of authoritative news. An over-reliance on official sources is a well-established feature of routine journalism, but is particularly pronounced in coverage of war and conflict, when the range of opinions and views aired in the media tend to be even more closely 'indexed' to those of the political mainstream (Mermin 1999). Herman and Chomsky (2002: 19) note that this is in part a result of the established professional conventions of 'objective' journalism, used strategically by reporters to protect themselves and their employers from charges of bias (Tuchman 1972). As Daniel Hallin (1989: 25) observes in his study of coverage of Vietnam, 'The effect of "objectivity" was not to free the news of political influence, but to open wide the channel through which official influence flowed.'

Although a (mistaken) perception of media disloyalty led to greater official efforts to control and censor news in post-Vietnam conflicts, a more cooperative relationship began to develop in the 1990s. Government and military attempts to manage the media have, in more recent years, tended to work more through informal and indirect methods of influence, such as choosing which correspondents to accredit, embedding reporters with military units, offering formal and informal briefings, and generally attempting to co-opt the media rather than simply repress them. As their fourth filter, Herman and Chomsky include both direct and indirect 'flak' from powerful voices seeking to bring the media into line if they stray off message. While overt censorship is relatively rare even in wartime, flak is standard operating procedure: UK political leaders sharply criticised BBC journalists for treating Argentine and British claims too even-handedly in the Falklands (Harris 1983: 75), for becoming the 'Baghdad Broadcasting Corporation' in the 1991 Gulf war (Keeble 1997: 168), and for acting as a 'mouthpiece' for the Serbian authorities in the Kosovo conflict (Hammond 2000: 126), for example.

The point of such criticisms is to define the scope of acceptable debate; the bounds within which journalistic 'balance' can operate. Ideas or views which fall outside the range of what

Hallin (1989: 117) calls 'legitimate controversy', are excluded or marginalised as 'deviant'. This is also the key to understanding Herman and Chomsky's final filter, 'anti-communism'. Since the Cold War ended soon after the first publication of Herman and Chomsky's *Manufacturing Consent* in 1988, this has long been seen as needing to be updated, and various alternative enemies (particularly radical Islamism) have been suggested as substitutes for the Soviets. Herman (2000: 109) himself, however, has argued that in a world 'where non-market solutions seem utopian', journalists have internalised the belief that 'markets are... benevolent and non-market mechanisms are suspect'. The original proposition was less to do with unity against enemy hate-figures, important though this is in wartime propaganda, and more to do with underlying shared beliefs. As Hallin (1989: 117) suggests, 'the journalist's role is to serve as an advocate and celebrant of consensus values' (see also Hall 1973: 88).

Herman and Chomsky devote most of their book to empirical evidence supporting and illustrating the model, focusing on the reporting of war, conflict and international affairs. Their approach typically involves examining paired examples to show how news coverage of conflict generally follows the interests of Western governments in either highlighting suffering and atrocities or looking the other way and excusing them, as appropriate – for instance in the different treatment of conflict in Libya in 2011 compared with Sri Lanka in 2008–9 (Herman and Peterson 2011: xiv–xvii). Yet despite naming it a 'propaganda model', it was not intended as narrowly applicable only to the behaviour of the media in wartime, which is perhaps what we mostly associate with the term propaganda. Rather, the point was to challenge the assumed contrast, much like that pointed up at the start of this chapter, between the propaganda systems of authoritarian states and the free, independent media of the democratic West (Herman and Chomsky 2002: lvix).

The challenge of complexity

Before going on to assess the radical critique, it is important to clarify the arguments which question its relevance for today's digital, online world. We can broadly distinguish two ways of conceptualising how new media challenge the claims of the radical tradition. The first is to argue that the pluralism claimed in liberal understandings of the media (a 'free market of ideas') can now finally be realised, since new media have the potential to liberate us from the distortions of monopoly ownership and the shackles of state control. The second approach draws on complexity theory to argue that the new media ecology which we now inhabit problematises previous understandings of media and power, and that neither the radical critique nor traditional liberal ideas are adequate to explain our new situation. This section will deal with each of these in turn, but the second argument, elaborated specifically in relation to war reporting by Andrew Hoskins and Ben O'Loughlin (2010), will be the main focus, since it presents the more fundamental challenge to theorising media/state relations and power.

The claim that the 'transformative impact of new media technologies' has produced a 'radically pluralised information sphere' has been tested by Piers Robinson et al. (2010: 79) in their systematic analysis of coverage of the 2003 Iraq war. As one would expect both from the radical critique and from previous empirical studies of war reporting, they found that 'official sources and actors dominated television and press coverage and ensured that the story of the invasion was narrated largely through the voice of the coalition' (Robinson et al. 2010: 80). This elite dominance of 'old' media remains significant, particularly in the case of television, which is still the main source of news for most people.² 'Old' media organisations, moreover, are hardly at a disadvantage in the online world: of the ten news

websites with the highest monthly traffic in the US, eight are linked to established news providers such as *The New York Times* or CNN (Pew Research Center 2013). The picture is similar in the UK, where the BBC dominates online news consumption (Newman and Levy 2013). As with older media, online news provision seems to be following a similar pattern of concentration in the hands of a few large players. Similarly, elite efforts to influence media messages in wartime have long extended to online as well as print and broadcast media, whether through official efforts such as the US State Department's Digital Outreach Team and the Defense Department's Bloggers Roundtable, indirectly through non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as the Cyber Century Forum's 'Spirit of America' project, or covertly through funding and supplying politically friendly bloggers in targeted countries. As Donald Matheson and Stuart Allan (2009: 125) observe, 'governments are aware of the advantages to be gained in using citizen media to further their military and political aims, especially where they can cloak such efforts in the mantle of independent media'. None of this is to say that the rise of new media is not highly significant, and overall it is indeed much more difficult for elites to control media messages in wartime. But there are strong empirical grounds for doubting that we are now in such a pluralistic media environment that business and state influence over the news is no longer a concern.

Nevertheless, this does not settle the matter, since one could argue that we are seeing only the beginning of trends that are likely to develop much further, and that the potential for genuine plurality could be realised in future. Moreover, while it is true that Hoskins and O'Loughlin (2010) put the idea of a 'new media ecology' at the centre of their argument, their approach involves more than simply a set of empirically based claims which can be tested by gathering further evidence. Robinson et al. (2010: 169) tackle claims about the impact of new technologies as part of what they call the 'media empowerment thesis', and link this both to a 'wider cultural obsession with computer technology' and to older debates such as that surrounding the 'CNN effect'. The notion of the 'CNN effect' implies a reversal of the state/media relationship, whereby the media become the active partner, driving the policy agenda rather than being subservient to the political elite. What Hoskins and O'Loughlin (2010: 85) are proposing, however, is not a reversal of power relationships, but the breakdown of 'linear cause-and-effect models' of communication in a world characterised by unpredictability and diffuseness. Notwithstanding their emphasis on new technologies, what is really novel in the 'new media ecology' they describe is not so much the extent of new media use (which may be exaggerated), but the reconceptualisation of the media as a whole as an 'ecology' which can be understood in terms of complexity theory, as 'characterized by connectivity, emergence and contingency' (2010: 168).

Complexity theory is now widely taken up across the social sciences (see Byrne and Callaghan 2014 for an overview). Complexity approaches are not making an epistemological claim, about our inability to know and predict patterns of cause and effect which are nevertheless understood to operate deterministically, but an ontological one: that the world itself consists of overlapping complex systems or processes in which we are embedded and which produce unpredictable effects and outcomes. The assemblages of complex life are not simply chaotic or disordered, but neither are they knowable according to any linear cause-and-effect models. Rather, order is an emergent property of self-organising complex systems, and is knowable only after the fact. Although Hoskins and O'Loughlin (2010: 17) are a little unusual in dating the rise of complexity to the start of the twenty-first century and explaining its appearance as an effect of new communications technologies, their work is clearly part of this larger intellectual shift. Others have discussed how complexity theory helps us to understand developments in Western foreign policy and military strategy (Lawson 2014;

O'Kane 2006; Roderick 2007), often with the suggestion that Western states might learn from terrorist organisations who are more at home in a complex world (Bousquet 2012). Hoskins and O'Loughlin (2010: 8–9, 12) make a similar suggestion, and argue that states and 'Big Media' organizations need to adapt to a world of complexity rather than hanging on to outmoded linear ideas about managing communications (2010: 85). This latter point is drawn out well by Steven Corman et al., who note the ineffectiveness of America's strategic communications efforts in the war on terror, and diagnose the problem as a 1950s-vintage 'message influence model'. Their advice is that the US and its allies should 'deemphasize control and embrace complexity' (Corman et al. 2007: 15).

For our purposes, the key implication here is that media researchers also need to recognise that their models and paradigms no longer work. According to Hoskins and O'Loughlin (2010: 185–6) all established concepts, theories and methodologies in the study of war and media have 'imploded' because 'there is no stable object around which a research paradigm could cohere'. Instead, insight can come only via 'an openness to new and emergent phenomena rather than a reification of existing institutions and structures' (2010: 190). Tellingly, their book ends with a chapter on 'Methods': unlike in the traditional social-science model, where the methods section outlines how the research question will be addressed, the aim is not so much to find answers as to enrich our ability for self-reflection on how we can learn from the processes and practices of complex life. As David Chandler (2014: 221) observes in his study of complexity approaches to governance, from a complexity perspective 'critique can no longer operate on the basis of revealing "unifying principles" such as the inner-workings of power or the supposed structures of domination', since this would only 'reinforce reified categories of thought'. Instead, complexity means that both researchers and political actors must adopt a very different orientation to the world: not as sovereign subjects confronting an object to be investigated or acted upon, but as reflexive subjects 'always and already relationally-embedded in processes of emergent causality' (2014: 222).

If we understand Hoskins and O'Loughlin as offering a particularly media-centric version of a more general intellectual vogue for complexity, this raises the question of what, if not new media, might be prompting that broader trend. A useful point of comparison here is Brian McNair's (2005: 151) somewhat similar argument that we should abandon the idea that the media are 'instruments of control concentrated in the hands of dominant elites', and instead recognise that they are 'autonomous and increasingly unruly agencies...over which those elites, including even the proprietors of big media capital, have relatively little control'. McNair makes his case in terms of the (related but different) concept of chaos, rather than complexity, but the more interesting contrast is that he recognises the importance of political factors in the changes he highlights. After 9/11 and in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq war, when one might have expected the 'control paradigm' to have been very much in evidence, elite attempts to 'set the terms of the debate' were, McNair argues, 'singularly unsuccessful', with an abundance of highly critical news coverage (2005: 156). Yet rather than seeing this as simply a media phenomenon, McNair suggests that in a 'political environment of substantially greater volatility and uncertainty', in which the 'ideological dividing lines' of the Cold War era have collapsed, elites 'find it difficult to act as unified blocs or to exercise effective power over the media' (McNair 2005: 157, 159, 155). While the challenge to the radical tradition's emphasis on media subservience to the elite is similar, this is a useful corrective to media-centrism. So while for Hoskins and O'Loughlin (2010: 188–9) the 'emergence' of the meaning of 9/11 from everyday practices rather than from official narratives stands as an example of how 'life is mediatized', McNair's broader perspective suggests that if elite narratives lack coherence or authority this might have more to do with

the larger political context of the post-Cold War era, rather than simply being caused by new media or being a symptom of complexity.

While the further growth and development of online media will continue to be important, then, it does not really make sense to treat this in isolation and take it as the starting point of explanation: rather, its significance is shaped by broader contextual factors. Something similar might be said of the theoretical perspectives considered in this chapter: although these have been discussed in terms of paradigms and models, attempts to theorise and critique the media are also developed in specific historical contexts and take shape in response to particular conditions. As we now move on to assess the radical tradition and contemporary challenges to it, we need to consider how the meaning of critique is altered by changing circumstances.

The changing context of critique

Most of what the radical tradition said about the media – regarding their capitalist interests, dependence on advertising, reliance on official sources and vulnerability to flak – still holds true of print and broadcast media, and applies equally well to significant parts of the online world. However, the final ‘filter’, which identifies shared political values and beliefs, works at best inconsistently and intermittently today. It is true that Margaret Thatcher’s dictum that ‘there is no alternative’ to the market is now taken for granted, but this narrow and diminished view of the future is more like a passive background resignation than a positive celebration of common convictions. This may seem like a minor point, or perhaps even as an encouraging sign for proponents of the radical critique. But the collapse of Left/Right politics at the end of the 1980s has had far-reaching consequences, equally disorientating both for Western elites and their critics.

With the breakdown of the broader political framework of meaning through which modern societies made sense of change, public life has become hollow and unappealing, leaving Western elites increasingly isolated and, notwithstanding their incessant talk of ‘shared values’, unable to connect with and give direction to their societies. As Alexander Gourevitch (2007: 64) argues, when domestic political contestation is negligible, the ‘national interest’ becomes much harder to define, since it is ‘only when the fundamental organizing intuitions of society are challenged that the question of the national interest poses itself in a consistent way’. Since the end of the Cold War, Western governments have indeed found it ‘exceedingly difficult to define [their] “national interest”’, in the words of Condoleezza Rice (2000), producing a confusion which goes well beyond the ‘elite dissensus’ allowed for in the radical critique. Western governments have repeatedly looked to the international stage – from the announcement of a ‘New World Order’, through the elaboration of a doctrine of ‘humanitarian military intervention’, to the declaration of ‘war on terror’ – as the most promising sphere to try and work up a sense of purpose or mission. Yet this narcissistic turn in foreign affairs has led only to incoherent, opportunistic and inept policy-making. Even supposed successes like Kosovo or Bosnia are hardly beacons of democratic peace and stability; while more recent interventions, in Afghanistan, Iraq or Libya, have produced appalling chaos with no obvious benefit for the intervening powers.

This is an equally confusing situation for radical critics who have tended to assume the existence of reasonably coherent elite interests, which compliant media then serve. In the peculiar circumstances of the present, there is some truth in the claim that the media continue to follow elite agendas, and in the apparently contradictory claim that there are unprecedented levels of media criticism and unruliness. It is surely the case, for example,

that as Robinson et al. demonstrate, most mainstream coverage of Iraq slavishly reproduced the perspective of official Western sources. Yet it is also true that the sort of unruly or chaotic media behaviour described by McNair was much in evidence, including in the mainstream, although what he identifies as critical reporting would be better characterised as a cynical self-consciousness. The same impulse which has repeatedly led politicians to seek meaning and purpose in international affairs has at the same time made the conduct of war acutely image-conscious, encouraging an ironic, distanced style of coverage (see further Hammond 2007). More genuinely critical perspectives were of course available, notably online. Yet as Jodi Dean (2005: 52) observes, 'despite the terabytes of [online] commentary and information, there wasn't exactly a debate over the [Iraq] war'. Equally, despite the subservience of much of the mainstream, there wasn't exactly a consensus either. The idea of a 'non-linear' and 'diffuse' world of 'emergence' captures something of how things appear from the perspective of a confused and disconnected elite who have trouble coming up with a coherent message, who cannot rely on media or audiences to react in predictable ways, and who are necessarily less able than in the past to control today's global, multi-perspectival information environment. Yet if there has been a conceptual 'implosion' in the way Hoskins and O'Loughlin describe, it is better understood in terms of politics rather than technology. The radical critique has limited traction now because we are no longer living in a universe of Left and Right where coherent political worldviews confront one another.

The influence of the radical critique has varied depending on circumstances and the fortunes of the wider political Left. In Britain, as Curran (2002: 39, 141) recounts, following the 'high-water mark of this tradition' in the 1970s, its 'self-immolation' in the 1980s paralleled the decline and defeat of the labour movement and the Left during that decade. He has in mind the sorts of theoretical debates described by Greg Philo and David Miller (2001) as the 'dead ends of media/cultural studies', which largely revolved around the question of the public, dividing between those who foregrounded the ability of audiences to contest dominant meanings versus those who emphasised the ideological influence of the media. The unfortunate implication was that to be radical was to insist on people's vulnerability to potent media messages; a position which also provided an alibi for the Left's declining influence. Around the same time, government antipathy toward the BBC led many to turn a critique of private ownership into a defence of state regulation (Curran 2002: 124). Curran seems confident that the radical tradition continues and can be renewed, but although contemporary analyses of the media sometimes seem to echo the radical critique of the past, the political content is usually quite different. Today, ritualistic denunciations of neoliberalism may sound radical, but are often accompanied by enthusiastic support for ever-greater state control of the media (Garland and Harper 2012); and in regard to questions of war and conflict a sense of political disorientation is even more evident as self-styled leftists and radicals are often the most fervent advocates of Western intervention (Herman and Peterson 2011: xviii).

In its earlier formulations, the radical tradition always assumed the possibility of large-scale social transformation and implicitly addressed a political subject who could carry such change through. With the collapse of established Left/Right politics, though, that assumption can no longer be made. It would be difficult to overstate the implications of the political changes that have happened since the end of the Cold War, a historic shift which represented the end of modernist politics. When Walter Lippmann and others initially wrote of the 'manufacture' or 'engineering' of consent in the aftermath of the First World War, they were voicing elite fears about the threat to capitalist order posed by a politically active public (Carey 1997). Often expressed in terms of worries about popular passions and irrational forces which needed to be controlled, elite concerns were prompted by the tumultuous entry of

the masses into public life in an era of war, revolution and economic upheaval. When radical critics in the late 1960s and 1970s set out to challenge the ideological role of the media, they did so in the context of a lively Left political culture and robust working-class organisation. Today, by contrast, the concerns of Western elites centre on public disengagement from politics and the difficulty of finding points of connection with electorates. Now when thinkers such as Lippmann are invoked it is because they address the question of how to understand the formation of publics in (what would now be called) a complex, globalised world, in which previous frameworks of political representation and identification appear hollow and unappealing (Marres 2005). In such circumstances, much 'radical' critique often seems either to echo elitist assumptions about the vulnerability of media audiences or to reinforce popular disengagement from politics.

Complexity approaches are certainly sensitive to change, but offer no alternative, since from this perspective 'power relations can easily evaporate into complex processes of indirect interconnection' (Chandler 2014: 123). Political and military power have hardly become any less of a problem just because we live in a 'globalised' or interconnected world. Indeed, the arbitrary and incoherent exercise of power by today's purposeless elites is arguably even more destructive and dangerous than the imperialism of old. Furthermore, critics who interpret today's 'chaotic' media culture as critical and democratic are obliged to ignore the extent to which journalists have frequently joined with great enthusiasm in the pursuit of narcissistic foreign policy, urging greater projection of Western military power in the Balkans, Africa and the Middle East. The assumption that the free Western media play the democratic role of holding power to account looks just as questionable as it always did, even though we need to refine how we understand the problem and respond to it.

What was good about the radical tradition at its best was that it abstracted from the particular to draw out the underlying dynamics of media performance in capitalist democracies, with a clear sense that this was fundamentally shaped by wider socio-economic arrangements. Its most problematic legacy is that a critique of private ownership has morphed into advocacy of ever more state regulation, as if the problem all along was too much media freedom (Hume 2012). Having begun from the premise, highlighted at start of this chapter, that the key thing to explain was how the free media of democratic societies act as agents of power despite relatively little direct state interference, today the aim of much media criticism seems to be to encourage greater official regulation (Media Reform Coalition 2012). Such an approach seems more likely to encourage a climate of conformity than to disrupt it. The presumption used to be that by identifying structures of power these could be resisted and overturned, but such is our contemporary failure of political imagination that perhaps it not so surprising if, set against the apparent fluidity of the networked world, to many observers this approach now looks more like 'reifying' power structures than challenging them.

Notes

- 1 Broadcasting Agreement, 2006 (CM6872), paragraphs 81, 88, 64, http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/about/how_we_govern/agreement.pdf (accessed 17 May 2016).
- 2 According to the Pew Research Center, even in a highly 'wired' nation such as the US, most people still turn to TV as their main source of news; while of the 38 per cent who go online for news, even the heaviest users spend on average only four minutes per day on online news sites (Olmstead et al. 2013). The two most popular social networking sites, Facebook and YouTube, are used as a source of news by 30 per cent and 10 per cent of the US population respectively (Holcomb et al. 2013). According to Ofcom (2013), in the UK 78 per cent of people view TV news and 32 per cent use the Internet for news, with over half of the latter using the BBC website.

References

- Bennett, W. Lance (1990) 'Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States', *Journal of Communication*, 40(2): 103–25.
- Bousquet, Antoine (2012) 'Complexity Theory and the War on Terror', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 15: 345–69.
- Byrne, David and Gill Callaghan (2014) *Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Carey, Alex (1997) *Taking the Risk out of Democracy*. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Chandler, David (2014) *Resilience: The Governance of Complexity*. London: Routledge.
- Corman, Steven R., Angela Trethewey and Bud Goodall (2007) 'A 21st Century Model for Communication in the Global War of Ideas' (Report #0701), Consortium for Strategic Communication, Arizona State University, <http://csc.asu.edu/wp-content/uploads/pdf/114.pdf> (accessed 9 May 2014).
- Curran, James (2002) *Media and Power*. London: Routledge.
- Curran, James and Jean Seaton (2010) *Power without Responsibility* (seventh edition). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Dean, Jodi (2005) 'Communicative Capitalism', *Cultural Politics*, 1(1): 51–74.
- Garland, Christian and Stephen Harper (2012) 'Did Somebody Say Neoliberalism? On the Uses and Limitations of a Critical Concept in Media and Communication Studies', *TripleC*, 10(2): 413–24.
- Gourevitch, Alexander (2007) 'National Insecurities: The New Politics of the American National Interest', in Christopher J. Bickerton, Philip Cunliffe and Alexander Gourevitch (eds) *Politics without Sovereignty: A Critique of Contemporary International Relations*. Abingdon: University College London Press, pp. 58–76.
- Hall, Stuart (1973) 'A World at One with Itself', in Stanley Cohen and Jock Young (eds) *The Manufacture of News*. London: Constable, pp. 85–94.
- Hallin, Daniel C. (1989) *The 'Uncensored War': The Media and Vietnam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hammond, Philip (2000) 'Third Way War: New Labour, the British Media and Kosovo', in Philip Hammond and Edward S. Herman (eds) *Degraded Capability: The Media and the Kosovo Crisis*. London: Pluto Press, pp. 123–131.
- Hammond, Philip (2007) *Media, War and Postmodernity*. London: Routledge.
- Harris, Robert (1983) *Gotcha! The Media, the Government and the Falklands Crisis*. London: Faber.
- Herman, Edward S. (2000) 'The Propaganda Model: A Retrospective', *Journalism Studies*, 1(1): 101–12.
- Herman, Edward S. and Noam Chomsky (2002) *Manufacturing Consent* (second edition). New York: Pantheon.
- Herman, Edward S. and David Peterson (2011) *The Politics of Genocide* (second edition). New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Holcomb, Jesse, Jeffrey Gottfried and Amy Mitchell (2013) 'News Use across Social Media Platforms', *Pew Research*, 14 November, www.journalism.org/2013/11/14/news-use-across-social-media-platforms/ (accessed 9 May 2014).
- Hoskins, Andrew and Ben O'Loughlin (2010) *War and Media*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Hume, Mick (2012) *There is No Such Thing as a Free Press*. London: Imprint Academic.
- Keeble, Richard (1997) *Secret State, Silent Press: New Militarism, the Gulf and the Modern Image of Warfare*. Luton: John Libbey.
- Knightley, Phillip (2003) *The First Casualty* (third edition). London: Andre Deutsch.
- Lawson, Sean (2014) 'Drone Strikes and the Lessons of Nonlinear Science', *Forbes*, 30 January, www.forbes.com/sites/seanlawson/2014/01/30/drone-strikes-and-the-lessons-of-nonlinear-science/ (accessed 9 May 2014).
- Marres, Noortje (2005) 'Issues Spark a Public into Being: A Key but Often Forgotten Point of the Lippmann-Dewey Debate', in Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel (eds) *Making Things Public*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 208–217.
- Matheson, Donald and Stuart Allan (2009) *Digital War Reporting*. Cambridge: Polity.
- McNair, Brian (2005) 'The Emerging Chaos of Global News Culture', in Stuart Allan (ed.) *Journalism: Critical Issues*. Maidenhead: Open University Press, pp. 151–163.
- Media Reform Coalition (2012) *The Leveson Report: Recommendations for Media Plurality*, www.mediareform.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/The-Leveson-Report-Recommendations-for-Media-Plurality.pdf (accessed 9 May 2014).
- Mermin, Jonathan (1999) *Debating War and Peace*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Miliband, Ralph (2013) 'Communications in Capitalist Society', *Monthly Review*, 65(3), <http://monthlyreview.org/2013/07/01/communications-in-capitalist-society> (accessed 9 May 2014). (Excerpted from Ralph Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society*. London: Merlin, 2009 [1969], pp. 159–173).
- Miller, David (1995) 'The Media and Northern Ireland', in Greg Philo (ed.) *Glasgow Media Group Reader, Volume II*. London: Routledge, pp. 45–75.
- Murdock, Graham and Peter Golding (1974) 'For a Political Economy of Mass Communications', in Ralph Miliband and John Saville (eds) *The Socialist Register 1973*. London: Merlin, pp. 205–234, available at http://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/view/5355/2256#.Uw5hg_2yfwl (accessed 9 May 2014).
- Newman, Nic and David A.L. Levy, eds (2013) 'Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2013: Tracking the Future of News', https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/documents/Publications/Working_Papers/Digital_News_Report_2013.pdf (accessed 9 May 2014).
- O'Kane, Ryan (2006) 'Co-opting Chaos: The Role of Complexity Discourse in the War on Terror', *49th Parallel*, 18, www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue18/OKane_CooptingChaos.pdf (accessed 9 May 2014).
- Ofcom (2013) 'News Consumption in the UK: 2013 Report', 25 September, http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/tv-research/news/News_Report_2013.pdf (accessed 9 May 2014).
- Olmstead, Kenneth, Mark Jurkowitz, Amy Mitchell and Jodi Enda (2013) 'How Americans Get TV News at Home', *Pew Research*, 11 October, www.journalism.org/2013/10/11/how-americans-get-tv-news-at-home/ (accessed 9 May 2014).
- Pew Research Center (2013) 'The State of the News Media 2013', <http://stateofthemedias.org/2013/digital-as-mobile-grows-rapidly-the-p pressures-on-news-intensify/21-top-sites-2012-nielsen/> (accessed 9 May 2014).
- Philo, Greg and David Miller (2001) 'Cultural Compliance', in Greg Philo and David Miller (eds) *Market Killing*. Harlow: Longman, pp. 3–96.
- Rice, Condoleezza (2000) 'Promoting the National Interest', *Foreign Affairs*, January/February, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/55630/condoleezza-rice/campaign-2000-promoting-the-national-interest (accessed 13 August 2014).
- Robinson, Piers, Peter Goddard, Katy Parry and Craig Murray with Philip M. Taylor (2010) *Pockets of Resistance*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Roderick, Ian (2007) '(Out of) Control Demons: Software Agents, Complexity Theory and the Revolution in Military Affairs', *Theory & Event*, 10(2), www.press.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/ (accessed 9 May 2014).
- Schiller, Herbert I. (1976) *Communication and Cultural Domination*. White Plains, NY: International Arts and Sciences Press.
- Tuchman, Gaye (1972) 'Objectivity as Strategic Ritual', *American Journal of Sociology*, 77(4): 660–79.

PART II

Media, the state and war

This page intentionally left blank

7

VISUALISING WAR

Photojournalism under fire

Stuart Allan and Chindu Sreedharan

Introduction

'After the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001', David Carr (2011) of *The New York Times* observed, 'the business of war picked up and the bloody consequences have landed hard on people who bring cameras, rather than guns, to a firefight.' Against a backdrop of news organisations retrenching, with overseas bureaus closing down, he noted how steadfast photographers have remained in their commitment to bearing witness to human suffering. In his words:

Even as warfare has changed – becoming in some cases more remote and more distant – the job of covering war has not. Missiles can be guided from great distances and drone aircraft can be commanded by a joystick, but journalists still have to go and see where the bombs landed.

Information has sprouted from all manner of new tools, including Facebook, Twitter and cellphone video. But no one has perfected the journalist drone.

(Carr, 2011)

Carr neatly pinpoints the moral imperative of human witnessing for photo-reportage, its intrinsic value firmly inscribed in professional ideals set into sharp relief by the shifting contingencies of digital media ecologies. Time and again, war photographers stress the vital necessity of being there, on the ground, to interpret people's experiences. 'The amount of war photojournalism being published by news organisations has shrunk dramatically over the years', photojournalist Sean Smith (2011) contends, 'but we should remember that we stop being news organisations when we stop going to the frontline.' Recognising that 'other forms of journalism are important', he nevertheless insists that 'without someone actually going and talking to and taking pictures of people in these situations, our take on the world becomes more and more distorted.'

The importance of bearing witness to what is transpiring in harrowing circumstances is a time-honoured lynchpin of war and conflict reporting (Allan, 2013; Azoulay, 2012; Batchen et al., 2012; Griffin, 2010; Hoskins and O'Loughlin, 2010; Kennedy and Patrick, 2014; Linfield, 2010; Matheson and Allan, 2009; Parry, 2010, 2011; Stallabrass, 2013; Zelizer,

2010). Risk-taking is perceived to be ‘part of the job’, routinely accepted as being inescapable when the demands of image-making require closer proximity than reason dictates (Robert Capa’s well-known maxim, ‘If your picture isn’t good enough, you’re not close enough’, is recurrently upheld as a professional ideal). In striving to render problematic ‘our camera-mediated knowledge of war’ (Sontag, 2003), this chapter explores a number of pressing questions confronting news photographers – both professionals of the craft and bystanders’ offering improvised contributions to newsmaking – committed to relaying what they see unfolding before them, however harrowing it may be. More specifically, the discussion examines a set of issues concerning war photography in relation to the Iraqi, Libyan and Syrian conflicts. This mode of enquiry strives to provide a basis to further elucidate the ethical imperative to bear witness as an epistemic conviction of war photography, particularly with regard to how it is being recast by citizens who find themselves compelled to generate their own embodied forms of visual documentation in war zones. In so doing, this chapter will endeavour to illuminate how war photography is evolving under pressure to rewrite the relationship between professionals and their citizen counterparts.

Camera as weapon of truth in Iraq

Recurrently working under intense stress, photojournalists in conflict zones are compelled to negotiate a range of formidable challenges. Longstanding professional ideals are certain to prove conditional upon the ad hoc negotiation of conflicting demands, not least where the perceived benefits of rolling deadlines, processing speed and heightened immediacy effectively streamline decision-making processes. Many of the photojournalists frustrated in their efforts to cover the conflict in Afghanistan (Allan, 2011; Kozol, 2014; Verschueren, 2012) insisted on being ‘embedded’ with US or British troops in Iraq (Kamber, 2011; Matheson and Allan, 2009; Ritchin, 2013; Robinson et al., 2010). They welcomed the mobility afforded by portable digital technologies, with the capacity to relay images while travelling being a critical consideration when personal safety is threatened. Nevertheless, what the ‘embed’ gained by way of access to the war zone was often countered, in turn, by a corresponding loss of journalistic independence, not least when photographs were perceived to have contravened the tacit rules of professionalism – or sanitisation in the eyes of critics – enforced by military minders (see also Mortensen, 2015; Zarzycka, 2013). Even the ‘unilateral’ photographer working without the benefits of military access or protection was likely to test these limits, with relative freedoms at risk on the basis of their images’ possible impact on public support for the war.

For photojournalists striving to extend their craft in alignment with a moral commitment to social responsibility, tensions often arose with their personal adherence to the ideals of dispassionate, impartial reportage. Such tensions, under certain circumstances, could invite insidious forms of self-censorship in accordance with wider discourses of ‘the national interest’, ‘patriotism’, or ‘support for our troops’. Compounding matters was the extent to which major news organisations were withdrawing their photojournalists from the field altogether, typically citing safety concerns as the principal concern. Too many photographers – professionals as well as ordinary citizens pressed into service to document horrors unfolding around them – have found themselves deliberately targeted by armed forces determined to stop them from bearing witness, either there and then, or later when making formal testimony before commissions and courts. There is little doubt that documenting events is often extraordinarily dangerous, which is why on the case of photo-reportage of the Iraq war, local citizens were being increasingly relied upon at the front lines, many of whom were

routinely risking their lives to document the human devastation left in the wake of military attacks. Several were killed, while others endured arbitrary arrest and imprisonment by US and Iraqi military authorities.

The experience of Bilal Hussein is telling in this regard, raising as it does a complex set of issues regarding how an ordinary Iraqi citizen found himself encouraged to join the thinning ranks of professionals as the situation continued to deteriorate. Born in the Al-Anbar Province, he had worked in several jobs over the years before he became involved with the Associated Press (AP), initially as a guide for its journalists and helper with interviews in Fallujah. A keen amateur photographer, he received training and equipment from AP's Baghdad bureau – initially being paid US\$50 a photograph on a trial basis as a local stringer – before being sent to Ramadi to work as a contract photographer (see also Arango, 2007; Lang, 2007b; Layton, 2007). Carrying out a range of assignments he sharpened his new craft, taking a number of impressive photographs, not least one of insurgent fighters in Fallujah in November 2004 included in an AP collection awarded a Pulitzer Prize the following year.

Hussein's life was dramatically altered when he was held – without formal charge – on 12 April 2006 for 'imperative reasons of security', with no opportunity to hear the evidence against him. He was subjected to intense interrogation, which included spells of solitary confinement and being blindfolded for nine days, in a facility in Ramadi, before being transferred to Abu Ghraib and then on to a detention facility at Camp Cropper. A 46-page report later prepared by Hussein's attorney alleges that US military interrogators initially sought to recruit the photographer as an informant working within AP, which he refused because of his ethical and professional commitments. AP worked quietly behind the scenes to secure his release, but, after more than five months without success, went public. 'We want the rule of law to prevail', Tom Curley, AP's president and chief executive officer stated in September of that year. 'He either needs to be charged or released. Indefinite detention is not acceptable. We've come to the conclusion that this is unacceptable under Iraqi law, or Geneva Conventions, or any military procedure' (cited in AP, 2006). In a letter to *The New York Times*, Curley (2006) pointed out that no evidence had been provided by the military to support their claim – no formal charges having been filed – that Bilal had improper ties to insurgents, which left him incapable of mounting a defence. 'All we are asking is that Bilal have appropriate access to justice: charge him or let him go', Curley wrote. 'Likewise, due process should apply to the thousands of others [estimated by AP to be as many as 14,000 people] being held in the United States military vacuum.'

Pentagon insistence that Bilal Hussein was a 'terrorist media operative' who infiltrated AP was based on 'convincing and irrefutable evidence' that officials refused to disclose. Calls for his release, including from organisations such as the Committee to Protect Journalists, were ignored. As time wore on, several AP editors became increasingly convinced that Bilal's arrest was in retaliation for photographs he had taken. Executive editor Kathleen Carroll (2007) stated in an interview with Photo District News Online:

We have said for some time that we feel that the reason he was held in custody was that he was taking pictures that were unwelcome to the US military in Anbar province, which has been difficult for them to control ... the images from a tough place to control have been largely shut down except through the embed process.

(Carroll, 2007)

She continued, explaining that every single photograph taken by Hussein, including outtakes, had been examined by AP with a view to determining whether he may have

somehow known about events before they took place. No such evidence was found; his images were consistently taken in order to document the aftermath of violence. Moreover, besides Hussein's own fate, she pointed out, the integrity of news reporting was at stake:

Of course it's not just about one man. It's about our ability to operate as journalists in a war zone. It is the most important conflict on the planet today. This is about any journalist's ability to do their jobs without fear of open-ended imprisonment without charges. This is not treatment that would happen in the United States.

(Carroll, 2007)

This latter point was further underscored by one of the lawyers working on the case for AP. 'I am absolutely convinced', Scott Horton stated,

that the ton of bricks fell on these two guys – Bilal Hussein and Abdul Ameer Hussein [CBS cameraman arrested and imprisoned in Abu Ghraib for one year before being acquitted by an Iraqi court] – because they were working as professional journalists. They were the eyes of the world, covering things that the Pentagon doesn't want people in America to see.

(cited in Herbert, 2006)

Intense pressure to avoid using this type of imagery has also been brought to bear on news organisations by a number of staunchly conservative, pro-war bloggers in the US. Several condemned Bilal Hussein and other photographers for producing propaganda for the insurgency, engaging in what Eric Boehlert (2008) aptly described as 'mob rule-style pseudo-journalism' to advance their accusations. Blogger Michelle Malkin was arguably Hussein's fiercest critic, but other war bloggers weighing in included 'The Belmont Club', 'Captain's Quarters', 'Federal Way Conservative', 'Flopping Aces', 'Infidels are Cool', 'Jawa Report', 'Little Green Footballs', 'PowerLine' and 'Wizbang', amongst others. Charles Layton (2007), writing about the controversy in the *American Journalism Review*, pointed out that the 'first word of Bilal Hussein's arrest seems to have come from the blog of Michelle Malkin, Hussein's long-time critic', which cited an anonymous military source maintaining that he had been 'captured' by US forces in a building in Ramadi 'with a cache of weapons'. The perception lingered that the military had fed the story to Malkin because of her past histrionic criticism of Hussein's imagery, which appeared consistent with a broader strategy articulated by the Pentagon and the Bush administration.

Photojournalism risks being regarded as serving the enemy's interests, by this logic, effectively complicit in extending the aims of those – in then President George Bush's (2006) words – 'trying to divide America and break our will'. For Hussein, this meant two years of imprisonment before the accusations (formal charges were never filed) against him were finally dismissed in April 2008. 'I think the case is more than Bilal Hussein', his lawyer said at the time of his release. 'He was part of a much larger issue, which is who is going to control the flow of information from the battlefield.' He then added, 'I think he was someone who got caught up in the debate, and it will be a continuing debate and struggle between the media and the military' (cited in Lang, 2007a, 2008). These words have proven apt, not surprisingly given the recurrently contentious – and politically fraught – relationship between photojournalists and their military minders, even without the emotionally charged vicissitudes of the blogosphere being brought to bear.

Libya through a fractured lens

In what was widely acknowledged as one of the darkest days in the history of photojournalism, the price paid by two photojournalists – Liverpool-born Tim Hetherington and his American colleague Chris Hondros – underscored the constant dangers negotiated by those striving to document the cruel realities of warfare. Both were killed on the afternoon of 20 March 2011 in the besieged Libyan city of Misrata, victims of deliberately targeted shelling by Gaddafi forces. Tributes to their professionalism under fire featured prominently in the ensuing news and editorial coverage, with particular attention given to the sacrifice made by Hetherington and Hondros in the service of their craft. ‘Suddenly’, David A. Graham (2011) of *The Atlantic* observed, ‘two of the leading photojournalists of their generation were gone.’ Intense feelings of loss found expression in a range of comments made by other photographers, several sharing personal recollections of experiences working together in treacherous conditions. Virtually all of the related news media praised the crucial role war photographers of all descriptions were playing in the Arab Spring upheavals (see also Allan, 2014).

Here it is worth noting that a high proportion of the journalists and photographers able to enter Libya were freelancers, a large share of whom were witnessing conflict for the first time in their lives. Hannah Storm of the International News Safety Institute remarked:

You can understand why new journalists or journalists inexperienced in covering conflict were drawn to Libya. It was on the doorstep and there was a sense of being part of history. But it was so dangerous because it was not like a traditional war – it was fluid and unpredictable, with the anti-Gaddafi fighters often not very familiar with the weapons they were using.

(Storm cited in Beaumont, 2011)

In addition, she argued, a certain ‘blurring of what it means to be a journalist’, brought about by ‘the rise of citizen journalism and journalist-activists’, meant that the lure of this type of opportunity was difficult to resist, despite the dangers. Some of those involved struggled to cope without the benefit of training or adequate logistical support, commonly relying on ‘fixers’ to report what was happening, as individuals living in the area prepared to assist them were called.¹ Suliman Ali Zway, otherwise employed as a construction worker, explained:

I realised that without help the journalists weren’t going to get the story out.

It happened before in 2006. We had a revolution in Benghazi and it was controlled after 10 days because nobody could report it, nobody could get word out.

I knew it would be important to help the journalists keep on top of things and to do everything it took to help them report the truth. ... When you go to a frontline and it’s just an army of volunteers with AK-47s fighting against a regular army, it’s dangerous.

(Zway cited in Gunter, 2011)

Meanwhile some 130 foreign journalists in Tripoli were told by their official minders to remain in their hotel for their own safety when it was readily apparent the real reason was to stop them covering the demonstrations and the authorities’ repressive responses to them. Shortly thereafter, according to one *New York Times* reporter, ‘the government informed the journalists that it planned to fly them away from potential Friday protests to

a Gaddafi stronghold in the south'. When the journalists objected, refusing to co-operate, 'the government temporarily locked them in their hotel, before arranging a bus trip to a central square that is a hub for pro-Gaddafi rallies' (Kirkpatrick, 2011; see also Coker and Dagher, 2011).

It was against this contested terrain that the significance of reportorial contributions made by ordinary Libyans came to the fore. 'When protests first began in Libya', Al Jazeera (2011) reported, 'the media presence there was scarce so the story filtered out via social media thanks to courageous citizen journalists.' Diverse forms of citizen reporting ('guerrilla journalism', as one professional called it) emerged via Twitter and Facebook, efforts to block them circumvented by using proxy servers, amongst other strategies. 'The citizen journalists provide an alternative to the official media in their portrayal of the protests and the turmoil across the country', BBC Monitoring (2011) observed. The sheer volume of such diverse forms of citizen imagery defied straightforward categorisation. 'Without a doubt', journalist James Foley (2011) observed, 'home videos have played a huge role in the Libyan revolution', whether shot from 'clunky early '90s TV cameras' to newer handycams, or the ubiquitous cell or mobile telephones. Ranging 'from early videos of unarmed protestors being attacked in Benghazi, to shocking videos taken from captured Gaddafi troops filming their own atrocities', these images have 'sowed the righteous anger of thousands as they spread like wildfire on Facebook and YouTube'.

Struggling to keep abreast of unfolding developments, news organisations found themselves relying on materials ostensibly shared by eyewitnesses, all too aware that independent verification was near-impossible at times. Noteworthy in this regard was the use of qualified language in captions – 'this amateur image purportedly depicts' or 'this footage is said to show' – employed to express this uncertainty. Telltale words such as 'purportedly', or phrases such as 'could be a pool of blood', signal the absence of independent verification, the unspoken acknowledgement that sometimes cameras – or, more to the point, the people holding them – do not always relay the truth. In so doing, the challenge for journalists endeavouring to cover a conflict they could not witness first-hand is implicitly acknowledged. At the same time, truth-claims hedged in such terms invited a nuanced relationship with readers, effectively crediting them with the interpretive skills necessary to differentiate subtle gradations in journalistic authority over contested evidence.

In the main, eyewitness reports from Libya were provided by citizen witnesses on an ad hoc, impromptu basis, frequently without the protection of anonymity. Amongst them were the rebels themselves, capturing imagery of jubilant celebration, as well as combat destruction and the human misery left in its wake. Likened to 'battlefield tourists' by some, those risking their lives to overthrow the Gaddafi regime recognised the value of both cameras and Kalashnikovs in waging war. For news organisations intent on processing this type of imagery, however, thorny problems of mediation emerged, both in terms of logistics as well as with respect to certain ethical implications. Differing views over what constituted appropriate, responsible and non-judgemental treatment, particularly where it risked being perceived as overly graphic or upsetting for distant audiences, simmered throughout the ensuing coverage.

These tensions boiled over when photographs and video clips of captured former leader Muammar Gaddafi, wearing heavily blood-stained clothing whilst surrounded by ecstatic rebel fighters near the town of Sirte, surfaced on 20 October 2011. Grainy, blurry images of what appeared to be his slumped body were soon followed by shaky, staccato flashes of mobile telephone footage of him being dragged down the street. A further clip showed him splayed on the bonnet of a pickup truck, much of his face covered in blood, violently jostled

by jeering rebels (the sound of euphoric gunfire in the background), while another revealed him staggering to the ground where he was repeatedly kicked, evidently alive but clearly struggling to endure. Video imagery shot by rebel fighters of the capture of Gaddafi may not be regarded by most as deserving of the label citizen journalism, but it was nonetheless a form of soldier witnessing with its own distinctive precedents of photographic form and practice (the gradual consolidation of which having been underway long before the digital age emerged: see Perlmutter, 1999; Seib, 2006).

This instance of the re-purposing of soldier imagery within journalistic conventions signalled the uneven, evolving ecology of reportorial truth-telling, the ethical implications prompting sustained discussion and debate for news organisations under pressure to ascertain the acceptable limits of graphic carnage (see Hanusch, 2010; Stallabrass, 2013; Zelizer, 2010). Questions revolving around this setting of limits recurrently elude satisfactory answer, being the subject of constant scrutiny and self-reflexive critique by news organisations striving to uphold normative editorial justifications consistent with their conceptions of 'public acceptability'. Mäenpää (2014) profiles how the work environment of photojournalists has undergone drastic change, necessitating a renegotiation of the core ideals of photojournalism in light of the technological innovations the field has experienced, including the speedier digital photo-editing and transmission possibilities available to journalists (including via social media), not to mention the torrent of citizen content, which – as we saw above – news organisations are increasingly willing to use. This acknowledgement of their 'worth' by professional editors, coupled with the praise amateur news photographs have received elsewhere for adding realism and a sense of 'being there', can be seen to have enriched the coverage of the Libyan uprising, serving well the contemporary news consumer who seeks information 'grazing across a wide variety of professional- and citizen-produced news content' (Holton et al., 2013: 723). In the process, however, the news coverage also evolved into a fluid, perilous and extraordinarily challenging enterprise, which exhibited several noteworthy characteristics – a profusion of inexperienced freelance photojournalists in the conflict zone; substantial involvement from the Libyan citizenry, either as 'fixers' or 'citizen camera-witnesses'; and state repression and intimidation of an extraordinary level specifically aimed at journalists.

Syria under siege

By the time the Free Syrian Army was formed in July 2011, and efforts to bring down President Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria changed from popular protests to an armed movement, citizen journalists were being heavily relied on by mainstream media organisations (Kamal, 2014). Echoing the crisis in Libya, the conflict in Syria also saw the regime resorting to 'tactics of terror' against protestors and revolutionists, killing more than 5,000 people by the end of 2011 (Oweis, 2011). The death toll of media personnel in Syria continues to mount, with at least 79 journalists having been killed in the country since fighting began in 2011 (AP, 2014).

The deaths of French photojournalist Remi Ochlik and *Sunday Times* correspondent Marie Colvin in February 2012 were tragic cases in point. Ochlik and Colvin died when a rocket hit the house in which they had taken refuge during an onslaught of shelling in the Baba Amr neighbourhood of Homs. Colvin had been the only journalist from a British newspaper in the besieged city, having surreptitiously slipped over the border from Lebanon on a smuggler's route used to transport food and medical supplies. Ochlik, a 28-year-old, experienced, award-winning photojournalist, had similarly crossed the border and arrived in Homs on 21 February.

There they sheltered in a house in Baba Amr, a suburban neighbourhood, shared by activists and journalists seeking refuge from Syrian tank and artillery fire. 'I just arrived in Homs, it's dark', Ochlik wrote in an email to Alfred de Montesquiou of *Paris Match*. 'The situation seems very tense and desperate. The Syrian army is sending in reinforcements now and the situation is going to get worse—from what the rebels tell us.' He then added, 'Tomorrow, I'm going to start doing pictures' (cited in Mroue and Murphy, 2012). At 6.30 am the next morning, the shelling recommenced, and the shelter used by the journalists was decimated at approximately 10 am. Amongst those surviving the carnage was Javier Espinosa, a Spanish journalist, who later recalled the moment of the mortar blast. 'When the smoke cleared the picture was shocking', he said. 'Several bodies were intermingled with the debris, computers and cameras of the reporters' (cited in Booth, 2012). Both Ochlik and Colvin had died instantly.

Evidence continues to mount that Ochlik, Colvin and the other journalists in the same building, which had been serving as a makeshift press centre, were deliberately targeted by President al-Assad's regime to prevent their reporting of the atrocities perpetrated on civilians. Nicolas Sarkozy, the then French President, contended the two journalists were 'assassinated'. Within France, press attention focused directly on Ochlik, but elsewhere it was among those writing about photojournalism that his passing drew the most sustained comment. 'I am persuaded that he did not take unnecessary risks', Olivier Laban-Mattei, a photojournalist for Neus Agency who had worked with him, was quoted as saying. 'He was caught in between bad luck and ballistic reality. That's it ... He was doing his job and he did it well' (cited in Keaton, 2012). For Jonathan Jones (2012) writing in *The Guardian*, Ochlik was 'a profound and original observer of the most dramatic events of our time', someone committed to 'humane truth-telling'. Photojournalism is an 'art for the brave', and Ochlik had made photographs 'that deserve to be looked at for as long as war and revolution stir fascination and fear and compassion'. Time and again, references to the importance of bearing witness were highlighted, Ochlik's name being added to a lengthening list of photojournalists killed or wounded in service. 'His being there allowed the world to witness horrifying atrocities', Nate Rawlings (2012) of *Time* commented, 'but it ended the life of a gifted storyteller when his own adventure had barely begun.'

While the deaths of Ochlik and Colvin made news headlines around the world, the sacrifices made by ordinary Syrians to take the place of international journalists prohibited from entering the country by Bashar al-Assad's regime were more typically overlooked (DCMF, 2012). One exception was the video blogger Rami al-Sayed (a.k.a. Syria Pioneer), who succumbed to wounds suffered during a rocket attack in the Bab Amr district of Homs. 'Early this morning the bombardment of Homs was streamed live to the web by a citizen journalist', Ahmed Al Omran (2012) of NPR reported. 'But as the forces loyal to Bashar Assad continued their attack on the restive city, the stream went quiet and never came back again.' Together with this video stream, al-Sayed had posted more than 800 videos to his YouTube channel chronicling the assault on Homs over the previous eight months, many of which had been taken up and used by Western news organisations desperate to secure footage documenting the violence and its aftermath. Reading his messages to friends, it is apparent he believed he was witnessing genocide. 'Rami was killed because he was broadcasting real footage from Bab Amr', Dr Mohammad al-Mohammad states in a YouTube video accompanying Omran's report, revealing to the camera the young man's wounds. 'Rami was killed because he was recording the truth.' It was this commitment to citizen witnessing that made his inclusion with professional correspondents poignantly appropriate in the news coverage to follow. 'Deaths of journalists are not special', an editorial leader published by the *Sydney Morning Herald* (2012) intoned following its reporting of the demise of Colvin,

Ochlik and al-Sayed days before; 'All deaths in war are equally terrible, equally pitiable. But in bearing witness to the suffering of victims and the crimes of their oppressors, the message journalists send to the outside world is the one most feared by the powerful.' This is the reason why, the leader continued, 'increasingly they are targeting journalists and bloggers, the witnesses, the recorders and communicators of evidence of their inhumanity. Each death makes it only clearer why their work is of the first importance.'

Ordinary Syrians remain determined to make a critical difference, helping the rest of the world to understand what is happening on the ground. News organisations continue to rely on their eyewitness reportage relayed via social media sites. 'Citizen-journalists pay dearly for trying to be as independent as possible in their reporting', a Reporters Without Borders (RWB, 2013) study of the Syrian coverage pointed out, typically working to 'fill the void often left by the professional journalists' (RWB, 2013: 3). Facebook and YouTube have proven to be the main platforms for imagery generated by individuals with markedly different motivations. Some combatants work simultaneously as 'media activists' inside one of the military groups to document its operations, the aim being 'not only to report on the conflict, but also to attract funds from potential international sponsors, particularly in the Gulf' (RWB, 2013: 25). Others choosing to accompany armed groups have retained their status as civilians by refusing to take part in the fighting, concentrating instead on reporting as best they can under the circumstances. Still others self-identify as citizen journalists, purposely striving to emulate professional standards in their practice, and not restricting themselves to any one armed group (RWB, 2013: 27). Not surprisingly, these personal motivations inform the ensuing coverage to varying degrees, yet together their contributions provide insights otherwise impossible to secure.

Here it is important to note how mainstream news organisations are embedding such citizen reportage into their coverage. Content produced by 'Raqqā is Being Slaughtered Silently', an activist journalism network, is a good case in point. In September 2014, it published a video of daily life from Raqqā that several news organisations drew upon to extend their coverage. Filmed secretly by a Syrian woman, the footage chronicles what ordinary citizens witnessed in Raqqā after the Islamic State 'liberated' it from the Assad regime. Among other scenes, the video shows armed men patrolling the city, a woman carrying an AK-47 into a playground, and a man scolding the activist for not wearing her face veil properly (Zen, 2014; see also Chivers, 2013; Mortensen, 2014; Patrick and Allan, 2013). Though they seem to be more open to publishing non-professional photographs than they were about making use of text content on blogs in the early days of citizen journalism, there are indications that the usage is judicious if not reluctant and comparatively sparse. Even in stories where the main news source is a Raqqā activist, editors preferred to source related professional photographs where possible, using images supplied by the network lower down in the article and mostly only the ones vetted and released by a professional wire service. But still evident in this news production is an increasing media-activist interdependency, and a shift from 'conventional elite-sourcing routine towards more source diversity and non-elite source practices' (Kamal, 2014: 238). After studying the way *The New York Times* Lede Blog has incorporated citizen videos from Syria, Melissa Wall and Sahar El Zahed (2014) make a similar point, speaking of the creation of a new journalistic element, a Collaborative News Clip. Such visuals are created through 'joint framing and shared gatekeeping by a tier of citizen-activists with a professional news organisation' (Wall and El Zahed, 2014: 1) and provide a new collaborative space for amateurs to create their own version of news, which is often amplified by professionals (see also Greenwood and Jenkins, 2013; Harkin et al., 2012; Mast and Hanegreefs, 2015).

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to examine certain features of the changing landscape of war photojournalism, devoting particular attention to the increasing involvement of ordinary citizens in chronicling conflict. As we have seen, the situations in Iraq, Libya and Syria are posing new challenges to photojournalism at several levels. The level of physical risks journalists face has gone up considerably – often, they are deliberate targets of those who want to close ‘the eyes of the world’. Further, accessibility, always an issue amidst the chaos of violence, has become even more of a problem, owing to a strategy of ‘lock out or lock down’ imposed on journalists by state and military authorities. This situation can be seen to have made some significant changes to the way news organisations pursue visual war and conflict coverage (see Chouliaraki, 2012; Cottle, 2006; Keeble et al., 2010; Lynch, 2008; Seib, 2006; Sreedharan, 2013; Zelizer, 2004).

In the face of the heightened risks involved, many editors have pulled their professional staff out of harm’s way, increasingly relying on local freelancers and, when necessary, ordinary citizens pressed into service. Though in a judicious – even reluctant – manner, news organisations are forging impromptu relationships with these citizens, creating new spaces for shared collaboration in war zones (see also Alper, 2014; Wall and El Zahed, 2014). This growing interdependency between professional and non-professional journalists points to the future of war photojournalism. Riyaad Minty, head of social media for Al Jazeera, signalled this realignment when he spoke of citizen journalism as the primary lens through which people came to know about the situation simultaneously unfolding in Libya, Yemen and Syria. ‘Now our main stories are driven by images captured by citizens on the street’, he maintained, ‘it’s no longer just a supporting image. In most cases citizens capture the breaking news moments first’ (cited in Batty, 2011). As noted above, many of them possess the language skills, local knowledge and access that ‘proper’ photojournalists ‘parachuting’ from elsewhere lack, performing a vital role despite the absence of logistical support, or the ‘protection’ of belonging to a known news organisation. Whether ‘accidental photojournalists’ who happen to be on the scene, purposeful citizen witnesses intent on bearing witness or civilians trained (and paid) to be embedded in situ to replace their professional counterparts, their contributions are critical to furthering a wider understanding of what is happening on the ground. Precisely what we – as members of distant publics – do with this understanding is a question of moral responsibility, one that each of us must answer in the knowledge of the heavy price paid by those bearing witness on our behalf.

Note

- 1 Fixers are local personnel employed by news organisations to help their correspondents with newsgathering. Mostly non-journalists, fixers help professional journalists operate in a foreign culture, often serving as their interpreter, guide, technical assistant and so forth (see Palmer and Fontan, 2007; Paterson et al., 2011).

References

- Al Jazeera (2011) ‘Libya: The propaganda war’, Al Jazeera Listening post. 12 March.
- Al Omran, A. (2012) ‘Rami Al-Sayed, Syrian citizen journalist, is killed during attacks on Homs’, National Public Radio, 21 February.
- Allan, S. (2011) ‘Documenting war, visualising peace: Towards peace photography’, in I. Shaw, R. Hackett and J. Lynch (eds) *Expanding Peace Journalism*. Sydney: University of Sydney Press, 147–167.

- Allan, S. (2013) *Citizen Witnessing: Revisioning Journalism in Times of Crisis*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Allan, S. (2014) 'Photo-reportage of the Libyan conflict', in L. Kennedy and C. Patrick (eds) *The Violence of the Image: Photography and International Conflict*. London and New York: I.B. Taurus, 167–192.
- Alper, M. (2014) 'War on Instagram: Framing conflict photojournalism with mobile photography apps', *New Media & Society*, 16(8), 1233–1248.
- AP (2006) 'US Holds Photographer in Iraq', *The New York Times*, 18 September.
- AP (2014) 'Dangerous year for journalists as 2014 death toll reaches 60', *The Guardian*, 23 December.
- Arango, T. (2007) 'Case lays bare the media's reliance on Iraqi journalists', *The New York Times*, 17 December.
- Azoulay A (2012) *Civil Imagination: A Political Ontology of Photography*. London: Verso.
- Batchen, G., Gidley, M., Miller, N.K. and Prosser, J. (2012) (eds) *Picturing Atrocity: Photography in Crisis*. London: Reaktion.
- Batty, D. (2011) 'Arab Spring leads surge in events captured on cameraphones', *The Guardian*, 29 December.
- BBC Monitoring (2011) 'New media emerge in "liberated" Libya'. 25 February.
- Beaumont, P. (2011) 'Reporting Libya: Freelance coverage, full-time dangers', *The Guardian*, 13 November.
- Boehlert, E. (2008) 'Michelle Malkin and the warbloggers get everything wrong – again', MediaMatters.org, 23 April.
- Booth, J. (2012) 'Witness describes Marie Colvin's last moments', *The Times*, 23 February.
- Bush, G. (2006) 'President's Radio Address', Transcript, the White House, 21 October.
- Carr, D. (2011) 'War, in life and death', *The New York Times*, 24 April.
- Carroll, K. (2007) 'Q&A: The case of Bilal Hussein', David Walker interview with Kathleen Carroll, PDNonline.com, 2 July.
- Chivers, C. J. (2013) 'Brutality of Syrian rebels posing dilemma in West', *The New York Times*, 5 September.
- Chouliaraki L (2012) *The Ironic Spectator: Solidarity in the Age of Post-humanitarianism*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Coker, M. and Dagher, S. (2011) 'Gadhafi forces seek to widen grip', *The Wall Street Journal*, 5 March.
- Cottle, S. (2006) *Mediatized Conflict: Developments in Media and Conflict Studies*. Maidenhead and New York: Open University Press.
- Curley, T. (2006) 'Charge our man, or let him go', *The New York Times*, 22 September.
- DCMF (Doha Centre for Media Freedom) (2012) Journalists' death toll in Syrian revolution, <http://www.dc4mf.org/en/content/journalists-death-toll-syrian-revolution> (accessed 29 April 2015).
- Foley, J. (2011) 'Like battlefield tourists, Libyan rebels film the fight', *GlobalPost*, 5 October.
- Graham, D.A. (2011) 'Libya war photographers' final hours', *The Daily Beast*, 21 April.
- Greenwood, K. and Jenkins, J. (2013) 'Visual framing of the Syrian conflict in news and public affairs magazines', *Journalism Studies*, 16(2), online first.
- Griffin, M. (2010) 'Media images of war', *Media, War & Conflict*, 3(1), 7–41.
- Gunter, J. (2011) "'Wherever there was news, we went": Libya's "A-Team" fixers on getting the story out', *Journalism.co.uk*, 17 November.
- Hanusch, F. (2010) *Representing Death in the News*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Harkin, J., Anderson, K., Morgan, L. and Smith, B. (2012) 'Deciphering user-generated content in transitional societies: A Syria coverage case study', Center for Global Communication Studies, Annenberg School for Communication, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania.
- Herbert, B. (2006) 'Due process, bulldozed', *The New York Times*, 25 September.
- Holton, A.E., Coddington, M. and Gil de Zuniga, H. (2013) 'Whose news? Whose values?: Citizen journalism and journalistic values through the lens of content creators and consumers', *Journalism Practice*, 7(6), 720–737.
- Hoskins, A. and O'Loughlin, B. (2010) *War and Media: The Emergence of Diffused War*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Jones, J. (2012) 'Rémi Ochlik's great photograph tells truth about the Arab Spring', *The Guardian*, 24 February.
- Kamal, Y. (2014) 'Reporting a revolution and its aftermath: When activists drive the news coverage', in E. Thorsen and S. Allan (eds) *Citizen Journalism: Global Perspectives*, Volume 2. New York: Peter Lang, 227–241.
- Kamber, M. (2011) 'A group of conflict photographers runs out of luck', *The New York Times*, 23 April.

- Keaton, J. (2012) 'Remi Ochlik dead: French photographer killed in Syria', *The Huffington Post*, 22 February.
- Keeble, R.L., Tulloch, J. and Zollmann, F. (eds) (2010) *Peace Journalism, War and Conflict Resolution*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Kennedy, L. and Patrick, C. (eds) (2014) *The Violence of the Image: Photography and International Conflict*. London and New York: I.B. Taurus.
- Kirkpatrick, D.D. (2011) 'Qaddafi brutalizes foes, armed or defenceless', *The New York Times*, 4 March.
- Kozol, W. (2014) *Distant Wars Visible*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Lang, D. (2007a) 'Interrogators told Bilal Hussein his photos were a threat, report says', PDNOnline.com, 26 November.
- Lang, D. (2007b) 'The man from Fallujah', PDNOnline.com, 28 November.
- Lang, D. (2008) 'An Iraqi photographer's long wait for justice', PDNOnline.com, 3 January.
- Layton, C. (2007) 'Behind bars', *American Journalism Review*, December 2006/January 2007.
- Linfield, S. (2010) *The Cruel Radiance: Photography and Political Violence*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Lynch, J. (2008) *Debates in Peace Journalism*. Sydney: Sydney University Press.
- Mäenpää, J. (2014) 'Rethinking photojournalism: The changing work practices and professionalism of photojournalists in the digital age', *Nordicom Review*, 35(2), 91–104.
- Mast, J. and Hanegreefs, S. (2015) 'When news media turn to citizen-generated images of war', *Digital Journalism*, 3(4), online first.
- Matheson, D. and Allan, S. (2009) *Digital War Reporting*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Mortensen, T.M. (2014) 'Blurry and centered or clear and balanced? Citizen photojournalists and professional photojournalists' understanding of each other's visual values', *Journalism Practice*, 8(6), 704–725.
- Mortensen, M. (2015) *Journalism and Eyewitness Images*. London: Routledge.
- Mroue, B. and Murphy, B. (2012) 'Intense government shelling in rebellious Syrian city kills 2 Western journalists', *Global News*, 22 February.
- Oweis, K.Y. (2011) 'Syria death toll hits 5,000 as insurgency spreads', *Reuters.com*, 13 December.
- Palmer, J. and Fontan, V. (2007) "'Our ears and our eyes": Journalists and fixers in Iraq', *Journalism*, 8(1), 5–24.
- Parry, K. (2010) 'Media visualisation of conflict: Studying news imagery in 21st century wars', *Sociology Compass*, 4(7), 417–429.
- Parry, K. (2011) 'Images of liberation? Visual framing, humanitarianism and British press photography during the 2003 Iraq invasion', *Media, Culture & Society*, 33(8), 1185–1201.
- Paterson, C., Andresen, K. and Hoxha, A. (2011) 'The manufacture of an international news event: The day Kosovo was born', *Journalism*, 13(1), 103–120.
- Patrick, C. and Allan, S. (2013) "'Humane truth telling": Photojournalism and the Syrian uprising', in A. Moschovi, C. McKay and A. Plouviez (eds) *The Versatile Image: Photography, Digital Technologies and the Internet*. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 107–126.
- Perlmutter, D.D. (1999) *Visions of War: Picturing Warfare from the Stone Age to the Cyber Age*. New York: St Martin's Griffin.
- Rawlings, N. (2012) 'In memoriam: Rémi Ochlik, 1983–2012', *Time LightBox*, 22 February.
- Ritchin, F. (2013) *Bending the Frame: Photojournalism, Documentary, and the Citizen*. New York: Aperture.
- Robinson, P., Goddard, P., Parry, K., Murray, C. and Taylor, P.M. (2010) *Pockets of Resistance: British News Media, War and Theory in the 2003 Invasion of Iraq*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- RWB (2013) 'Journalism in Syria: Impossible job?', *Reporters Without Borders*, November.
- Seib, P. (2006) *Beyond the Front Lines: How the News Media Cover a World Shaped by War*. London: Macmillan.
- Smith, S. (2011) 'War photographers are not addicted to danger', *The Guardian*, 22 April.
- Sontag, S. (2003) *Regarding the Pain of Others*. London: Hamish Hamilton.
- Sreedharan, C. (2013) 'War and peace journalism', in K Fowler-Watt and S. Allan (eds) *Journalism: New Challenges*. Bournemouth: CJCR, 457–475.
- Stallabrass J (2013) *Memory of Fire: Images of War and the War of Images*. Brighton: Photoworks.
- Sydney Morning Herald* (2012) 'Editorial: The death of a witness', 24 February, p.12.
- Verschueren, P. (2012) *Picturing Afghanistan: The Photography of Foreign Conflict*. New York: Hampton Press.
- Wall, M. and El Zahed, S. (2014) 'Embedding content from Syrian citizen journalists: The rise of the collaborative news clip', *Journalism*, online first.

- Zarzycka, M. (ed) (2013) *Carnal Aesthetics: Transgressive Imagery and Feminist Politics*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Zelizer, B. (2004) 'When war is reduced to a photograph', in S. Allan and B. Zelizer (eds) *Reporting War: Journalism in Wartime*. London and New York: Routledge, 115–135.
- Zelizer, B. (2010) *About to Die: How News Images Move the Public*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Zen, E. (2014) French report: Syrian woman secretly filmed life in Raqqa under ISIL, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TkuAIKoI28> (accessed 29 April 2015).

8

MEDIA, WAR, AND PUBLIC OPINION

Sean Aday

War has dominated the political communication research about media and foreign policy. The complex and evolving media–military relationship – and its implications for influencing public opinion about war – serves as a backdrop for this research. Through Vietnam, journalists were allowed on the front lines with U.S. forces but, especially in the 20th century, their copy was censored by the military, ostensibly for operational security reasons but in fact for more propagandistic aims (Fussell 1989). Most notably, images of dead U.S. GIs were almost entirely forbidden in American media in the first two world wars out of fear that such images would turn public opinion against America’s involvement in those conflicts. This era of “post-censorship” was replaced beginning with the invasion of Grenada in 1983 with one of “pre-censorship.” Following the lead of British media management in the Falklands/Malvinas War a year earlier, and spurred by an institutional belief amongst many in the military and the Republican-controlled White House that the press had played a role in losing Vietnam (Wilson 2001), reporters were kept away from the battle and left on boats to cover the invasion via press conferences. Although this media management strategy raised hackles amongst the press and many critics, it also allowed the military to control the message environment and resulted in uncritical coverage of conflicts ranging from Grenada to Panama to the Persian Gulf War (Sharkey 2001).

This policy changed, however, with the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, when the Pentagon switched to a modified version of the post-censorship model called embedding. The decision to attach journalists to specific units stemmed in large part from a belief that in the 21st century global media environment, information wars were important components of an intervention’s success (Katovsky & Carlson 2003). Scholarly studies of embedded coverage shows mixed results regarding whether the coverage was indeed more slanted than would be expected. Some found evidence of pro-American bias in embedded reportage (Pfau et al. 2004; Robinson et al. 2010). Using different measures of tone, Aday et al. (2005b) didn’t find significant differences in the level of patriotic coverage, but did find that unembedded (or “unilateral”) reporters showed more casualty images in broadcast news.

Ultimately the question raised by these and many other studies of media and war is: what role do media play in generating or depressing public support for war? After all, a key reason for various wartime media management policies is the perceived effects of coverage

on public support for war. Much of the literature in this area has been focused on three key areas: casualty coverage, questions of media (in)dependence, and public opinion rallies. The work of John Mueller (1973) is foundational in this regard. Mueller used data from the Vietnam and Korean wars to argue that publics will rally behind presidents who go to war, but that these rallies will eventually fade, and support for intervention will evaporate, as home country casualties mount over time, something known as the casualty aversion hypothesis. Mueller's thesis gained traction toward the end and following the Vietnam War, especially in the United States, where many military and political elites came to believe America lost that conflict in large part because of what they perceived as casualty-ridden, overly critical broadcast coverage that turned the public against the war.

Mueller's casualty aversion hypothesis has been fleshed out and contextualized by recent work challenging or modifying its propositions (Gartner 2004; Gartner et al. 2004). Some of that research, for instance, has shown that not all casualties are created equal in terms of their effects on public support for war: recent deaths are more salient to public opinion than reporting of cumulative casualties (Althaus et al. 2012), and people are more sensitive to casualty rates that are rising than those that are falling (Gartner 2008). Many studies have found, contra Mueller, that casualties per se are not the most important determinant of public opinion about military intervention, but rather are usually contextualized through the prism of various other variables (Burk 1999; Eichenberg 2005; Klarevas 2002). These include the nature of the conflict and severity of the threat (Jentleson & Britton 1998), partisan predispositions and elite consensus or dissensus (Berinsky 2009; Berinsky & Druckman 2007; Larson 1996), a kind of rational cost-benefit analysis (Lacquement 2004), and whether the intervention is seen by the public as being likely to succeed and as righteous (Gelpi et al. 2005/2006; Sidman & Norpoth 2012).

The vast majority of these studies either ignore or dismiss the role of news media in shaping the public's attitudes about war and intervention. They often treat their independent variables—for example, casualties, elite opinion, nature of the conflict or threat, and a conflict's chances of success and “rightness”—as objectively defined. In fact, however, in almost every case we might think of these variables as being subject to, or influenced by, media and elite framing. Framing refers to the selection and highlighting of certain information in a news story or elite narrative at the expense of other information in a way that influences audience perception (Entman 1993). Despite being largely absent from the major work on casualty sensitivity and support for intervention discussed thus far, framing plays a key role in the dynamics each describe.

For instance, how people contextualize casualties and assess threats and crises is largely an outgrowth of elite and media framing. The Iraq War provides an excellent example. The war was originally framed by its proponents in the White House and elsewhere as necessary to combat an existential threat, winnable, and the “right thing to do.” Later, events showed this threat to be exaggerated, victory became a contested construct, and Americans quickly became divided about its justification. Ultimately strong majorities supported the withdrawal of U.S. troops, a policy promise that helped propel Barack Obama to the White House in 2008.

Indeed research suggests that media coverage itself might influence opinion about war and intervention in a variety of ways, for instance as an intervening variable between elite cues and public opinion (Boettcher & Cobb 2006). Jordan and Page (1992), found that favorable messages in television news from elite sources had a significant effect on changing public attitudes. Baker and Oneal (2001) and Aday (2010) find that media coverage and the framing of war news is associated with the occurrence and the magnitude of rally effects.

Others argue that episodic and tactically-oriented war stories that ignore more thematic and geo-strategic implications of war and foreign policy create “accountability gaps” that prevent presidents and other elites from being held fully responsible when those policies fail or backfire (Aday et al. 2010; Entman et al. 2009).

Coverage of conflict has also been found to be dominated by a “war” frame that tends to be one-sided (i.e., in favor of the home country or its allies), employs militaristic language, focuses on “action” such as battles and bombings, and wraps that all up in a superficial, context-free narrative (Lee & Maslog 2005). This has led to calls for news organizations to adopt a more advocacy-oriented “peace journalism” (Galtung 1986) that uses an alternative frame that avoids demonization, is non-partisan, has a multi-party orientation, and emphasizes peaceful and diplomatic solutions and contextualized reporting. Studies show, however, the persistence of the traditional war framed journalism, in part because of the reliance on news routines that privilege official sources and their frames (Fahmy & Neumann 2011).

Casualty coverage and the CNN Effect

In the 1990s, the casualty aversion hypothesis formed the theoretical basis of the “CNN Effect,” a strand of communication research that investigated whether in an era of 24 hour broadcast news, some vivid images might spur support for intervention (e.g., images of a famine), while others, notably casualties, might make the public risk averse. Yet the preponderance of CNN Effect studies has found little evidence of direct effects on the public in line with the CNN Effect hypothesis (Gilboa 2005; Robinson 1999; though Hawkins [2011] argues importantly that *lack* of media coverage of global conflicts can keep them off the policy agenda, and that this may lead to increased civilian fatalities). Significantly, however, policymakers’ *perception* of the media’s power to turn the public against an intervention by showing American casualties has been shown to lead them to adopt policies that avoid or limit American risks. This, it has been argued, has taken the form of preferring air campaigns over committing ground troops (e.g., the Balkans, Libya, Syria), and avoiding or abandoning potentially costly humanitarian interventions such as Rwanda in 1994 (Gilboa 2005; Robinson 2002).

Indeed, the question of whether critical media coverage, or casualty coverage specifically, can turn people against an intervention is far more complex than the casualty aversion hypothesis and its spawn, the CNN Effect, would suggest. Interestingly, despite their prominence in normative discussions of media coverage of war, the specific effects of exposure to casualty images, especially vivid ones, remain largely unaddressed empirically.

Recently, scholars have begun to investigate experimentally the influence of mediated casualty coverage, especially images, on audience attitudes. Several of these studies have found that casualty images can have a more pronounced effect on attitudes, at least under certain circumstances, than narrative discussions of them (Gartner 2011; Pfau et al. 2006, 2008). But these effects seem to be filtered through prior attitudes and predispositions and emotions. Aday (2010), for instance, found evidence that news audiences reframe graphic images of dead American soldiers through the prism of their partisan predispositions, with Republican-leaning study participants seeing photos of dead American soldiers in Iraq in the middle of that war as a noble sacrifice, whereas Democratic-leaning subjects saw them as tragic wastes. Gartner (2008, 2011) found that “conventionalized” casualty images such as flag-draped coffins (as opposed to “unconventional” images such as battle pictures) have a greater tendency to shift a person from supporting to opposing a war, but he also found effects to be filtered through partisan predispositions. And Althaus and Coe (2011)

show that the evidence from the past 60 years of major military conflicts shows that public support for war in the United States tends to increase as coverage of the war increases – and decreases as coverage decreases – regardless of casualty coverage or other variables. They draw on social identity theory to argue this is because news about an external threat primes citizens’ latent patriotism.

Also contrary to conventional wisdom, there does not appear to be any evidence that media coverage explains the very slow (and much exaggerated) turn of American public opinion against the Vietnam War. Hallin (1986) showed that media coverage of Vietnam was largely *uncritical* of the war and tended to reflect the perspectives of the military and White House until prominent members of Congress began questioning the war’s progress in 1967 and the Tet Offensive in early 1968. Furthermore, despite the image of a living-room war, Hallin showed that casualty images were few and far between until after Tet.

In fact, Vietnam is far from an outlier. Rather, the trend Hallin found of coverage adopting a largely uncritical stance toward the war has been shown to exist in press coverage of the early stages of most conflicts, at least in the American case (see: Campbell [2000] and Nasaw [2000] regarding the Spanish–American War; Bennett [1990] on Nicaragua; Dickson [1995] about the invasion of Panama; Kellner [1992] and Mermin [1999] regarding the Persian Gulf War; and Aday et al. [2005b] and Katovsky & Carlson [2003] regarding the Iraq and Afghanistan wars). In addition, coverage of casualties generally and of American casualties (especially those killed in action) specifically, is almost entirely absent from coverage of war (Aday 2005; Althaus et al. 2014).

Elite-driven news

Why do we see these trends? One persistent answer offered by scholars has been because journalism in general, and especially in foreign policy coverage, tends to be source-driven and reflects the biases and policy goals of elites. Much of this territory is covered in another chapter in this volume, but suffice to say scholars consistently find that political elites – especially presidents in the U.S. system – dominate the agenda setting and framing environment during foreign policy crises and wars, especially when they are in consensus about the threat’s causes and remedies (see, for example, Bennett 1990; Entman 2004; Robinson et al. 2010).

Baum and Groeling’s (2010) “strategic bias” theory of media–elite–public interaction argues that the natural news bias in favor of conflict leads the journalists to cover foreign policy crises in a way that may distort the facts by overemphasizing controversy and dissent at the expense of nuance and consensus, something they refer to as “opinion indexing.” They argue this leads audiences to fall back on partisan cues in making judgments about policy, rather than a more considered examination of the diverse array of facts and opinions available.

Baum and Groeling’s work is based in a voluminous amount of research showing the power of elites to shape not only media coverage of foreign policy but also the public’s foreign policy beliefs (Brody 1991; Zaller 1992). This is due in no small part to the well-established fact that most citizens, especially in the United States, know very little about foreign affairs (Delli Carpini & Keeter 1997). Interestingly, however, Baum and Groeling also argue that the determinants of public support for war, and of elites’ ability to influence public opinion, is not static. Rather, presidents’ rhetorical power – as well as that of their opponents – vary based on the stage of the crisis, events on the ground, and other factors. Baum and Groeling refer to this as the “elasticity of reality,” a dynamic that parallels an argument made by Aday

(2008) that presidents have “framing windows” during the course of a military intervention that are “bigger” (i.e., their frames influence a wider range of the public) and can overwhelm partisan predispositions during the establishing phase and early stages of a crisis (e.g., the large number of Democrats who supported President Bush after 9/11), but shrink as events and elite dissensus – transmitted through the media – combine with partisanship to play a bigger role in shaping public opinion.

For example, Aday et al. (2005a) found that pre-war rhetoric from White House and other political elites suggesting coalition forces would be welcomed as liberators led U.S. media to adopt a victory frame immediately following the fall of Saddam Hussein’s statue in Firdos Square on April 9, 2003, as if it represented the triumphant end of the Iraq War. In addition, the authors found that in the week following the statue’s fall, combat coverage declined dramatically on all U.S. broadcast networks. Aday et al. (2005a) also found that journalists tended to explicitly tie the toppling of the Saddam statue to iconic images of the fall of the Berlin Wall and various Lenin statues around the world after the Soviet Union collapsed.

This points to the importance of culturally significant historical events in shaping both elite and media framing of war and foreign policy crises, consistent with Entman’s (2004) cascade model and its emphasis on the power of culturally resonant frames. Scholars have found that policymakers, for instance, use – and often misuse – historical analogies – especially World War II – both to frame contemporary international crises (usually in a way that justifies a course of action they already support) and to persuade the public to support the desired policy response (Jervis 1976; Record 2002). World War II analogies also receive a prominent airing in the press (Dorman & Livingston 1994). World War II frames appear to be especially effective at eliciting support for intervention, whereas wars with more complex or less favorable outcomes, such as Vietnam, have not been found to have the opposite effect of diminishing support for war (Aday & Kim 2008; Gilovich 1981). It will be interesting to see how the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, with their lack of clearly defined victory or defeat, evolve into cultural-historic signifiers for future policymakers, journalists, and publics.

Elite influence over media coverage of war and public attitudes about intervention can have other ramifications, as well. Factual inaccuracies endorsed by elites and broadcast through the media are not only likely to be accepted by the public, but to persist even after their debunking (Kull et al. 2003). In addition, because the range of elite foreign policy opinion is limited and often consensus-driven during international crises (Bennett 1990; Mueller 1973), media coverage can accentuate and contribute to public opinion rallies in support of White House policies by transmitting these consensus cues (Althaus & Coe 2011; Zaller 1992). One implication of this can be that during major foreign policy crises, public trust in political and media institutions is heightened (Brewer et al. 2003, 2004; Gross et al. 2004), which may make the messages and frames they convey all the more persuasive.

New media, war and conflict

More recently, the role of digital and social media in shaping coverage and public opinion about war and conflict has received increasing scholarly attention. Much of this research has focused on how these new media technologies might alter the power dynamics between the public, the media, and political elites discussed above. For instance, initial euphoria over social media’s impact on major movements for democratic change such as Iran’s Green Revolution in 2009 or the Arab Spring protests of early 2011 could be found in several prominent scholarly articles and books from the time (e.g., Howard 2010; Hussain &

Howard 2013). Yet the ephemeral successes of these movements, coupled with their more troubling legacies, have led to more sober analyses of late (Lynch 2007; Shirky 2011). Indeed, the very phrase “Arab Spring revolutions” now seems exaggerated, given that only Tunisia has managed to maintain a semblance of democratic momentum.

That said, new media and other technological innovations are leading scholars to rethink old paradigms in political communication regarding media, foreign affairs, and the public’s role in foreign policy. In particular, the press–state dynamic described earlier – in which the foreign policy press is largely dependent on and reflective of political elites in a nation state system – is being challenged. Global media and satellite-based technologies have empowered networked communities to gain access to publics and media (and therefore an even wider public) and challenge official framing and message dominance (Aday & Livingston 2008; Castells 2009; Keck & Sikkink 1998). Portable satellite video technology and smartphones are allowing reporters – professional and amateur – the ability, in theory at least, to circumvent official media management strategies and potentially include a wider array of sources that can now be efficiently engaged via the internet (Livingston & Asmolov 2010). These new technologies may in fact force us to rethink the ways in which media influence foreign and military affairs, something Livingston (2003) has referred to as the “CNN Effect Plus.” Some have found that the news agenda on social media is different in many ways than that in traditional media, especially in its greater focus on foreign policy (Neuman et al. 2014). At the same time, we need to be careful not to exaggerate these evolutions: coverage of foreign policy crises still typically reflects elite framing and agendas (Bennett & Livingston 2003), and traditional news norms and routines still play a significant role in how all journalists report and write the news (Livingston & Van Belle 2005).

The question thus becomes, what can we say of social media’s evolving role in coverage of conflicts and public opinion about them? For instance, some have found evidence that the high degree of regional media and social media integration helped to create the conditions for the international diffusion of revolutionary protest, culminating in a regime change cascade (Hale 2013; Hussain & Howard 2013; Patel et al. 2014). This is known as a “scale shift,” in which disparate local protest movements are linked together into one meta-protest frame (McAdam et al. 2001). This allows individual protests to be applied to otherwise unique contexts, potentially broadening their sources of support and increasing the perceived efficacy of individual movements and their participants.

Other scholars have investigated whether new media are changing the gatekeeping dynamics found for decades in research on traditional media (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991). This might result from the fact that the task of filtering new media falls in large part to the public, who select information to pass on to their friends and followers, rather than professional journalists, something Bruns (2003, 2005) calls *gatewatching* (see also Hermida 2010; Meraz 2009; Williams & Delli Carpini 2004). At the same time, gatewatching doesn’t imply that all users are equal. Some users are more important than others in deciding which content is disseminated and which is not (Lawrence et al. 2010).

Finally, other scholars have suggested that new media may facilitate political participation and activism in ways that can lead to the kinds of revolutions and political upheaval witnessed during and since the Arab Spring (Howard 2010). Several studies, for instance, have concluded that digital media were useful to some degree to protestors on the ground in the early part of the Arab Spring protests (Eltantawy & Wiest 2011; Rinke & Röder 2011; van Niekerk et al. 2011; but see Hassanpour 2011; Newsom et al. 2011). Others have argued that new media were important platforms for sharing knowledge about the ongoing events (Howard et al. 2011; Russell 2011; Wall & El Zahed 2011).

If true, this could mean that digital information and communication technologies (ICTs) might play important roles in shaping and marshaling public opinion in repressive societies, circumventing not only regimes but state-run media. Whether this leads to largely peaceful revolutions or to civil war depends more on the contextual variables other than communication platforms, however, as events in the Middle East have demonstrated since 2011.

For instance, in one survey of Tahrir Square protestors, only 13 percent named Twitter as a medium used in protest activities (Wilson & Dunn 2011). In fact, social media were cited less frequently than “old media” such as television (92 percent) and firsthand communication via live conversation (93 percent).

It’s possible, however, that digital media amplify attention to protest movements such as those seen in the early stages of the Arab Spring outside the region, among international publics not directly affected by the consequences (Aday et al. 2013; Bruns et al. 2013; Lotan et al., 2011; Lynch, 2011). This potential “boomerang effect” (Keck & Sikkink 1998) could have important ramifications for protesters, for instance by increasing international pressure on regimes to not engage in violent crackdowns, and to negotiate peaceful settlements. Initial research on the Arab Spring, for instance, showed that traditional media networks, particularly Al Jazeera, were central to conveying protestors’ grievances to a global audience (Khondker, 2011; Rinke & Röder, 2011; Russell, 2011).

That said, one of the important things to realize about the impact of digital media is that our understanding of it must continue to evolve alongside the media themselves. Research from the Syrian civil war, for instance, finds fascinating evidence of multiple “twitterverses” that might modify our understanding of war coverage. Lynch et al. (2014, in press) found that there was very little overlap between Arabic twitterverses and that occupied by Western journalists. Because the framing and agenda of issues discussed in the Arabic tweets versus the English tweets were very different, this implies that Western journalists and their audiences – including policymakers – were missing a significant aspect of the story. This has profound implications for understanding how these potential alternate realities influence public and policymaker opinion differently depending on language and cultural contexts.

Conclusion

Media serve as perhaps the most important intermediary between government and citizens, and that relationship is especially important in times of war and international crises. Similar to the findings of decades of media effects research generally, the influence of media coverage of war on shaping public opinion and policy are complex, often limited, rarely as powerful as many assume (or hope), yet far from inconsequential. Perhaps the most important thing we know about media and foreign affairs is that, even more than in domestic coverage, journalists appear to generally be inclined to taking their lead from policy elites in what they cover and how they cover it. This is significant. Among other things, it means that elites, especially leaders (e.g., presidents), have a significant advantage in framing crises, their parameters and the range of options to be entertained to address them. Other views, frames, and even facts, are less likely to be discussed, covered, and thus considered by publics.

Other questions about media coverage are more complex. One of the most important, and still less understood, is the role of casualties and casualty coverage in shaping public support for intervention. At this point, the evidence suggests that casualties are highly contextualized by citizens and media audiences, and filtered through the prism of their prior beliefs and attitudes. Still, it’s important to not ignore the fact that many if not all of the “contextualizing” variables (e.g., the nature of the threat and conflict, the intervention’s

moral rightness and chances of success, etc.) are themselves framed by elites, and filtered through the media's own news norms and cultural biases. Furthermore, these biases are by definition shared between policymakers and mainstream media professionals, despite their traditionally adversarial relationship.

There has been a tendency in some of the punditry, and even some of the research, on new media to assume these technologies represent paradigmatic shifts in how we understand media, policy, and public opinion. While it's true that each new medium brings with it new modes of reporting and, perhaps, cognitive processing on the part of audiences, the growing body of research in this area suggests caution in getting ahead of ourselves. Social media, for instance, do not appear to be replacing traditional news in informing people about war and international crises. If anything they appear to be merging in important ways that may even enhance and improve foreign affairs reporting. At the same time, many of old news routines – especially a heavy reliance on official sources and traditional news norms – appear to apply to “new” media.

That said, there are many unresolved questions and potential challenges as we move further into the 21st century. It appears, for instance, that social media may simultaneously expand the reach of non-state actors and citizen “journalists” alike, while creating hemophilic sub-networks where like-minded people have their prior beliefs reinforced. This can be functional or dysfunctional, or both. It also appears from research on the twitterverse surrounding the Syrian civil war that Western journalists may be operating in an English-only social media world far removed from that of other key regional and sectarian constituencies. If future research finds something similar, this could have profound implications for understanding the limits of traditional journalism as well as what impact it might have on public opinion and policy based on this limited, perhaps distorted, worldview.

References

- Aday, S. (2005). The Real War Will Never Get on Television: An Analysis of Casualty Imagery in American Television Coverage of the Iraq war. In Phil Seib (Ed.), *Media and Conflict in the 21st Century* (pp. 141–156). Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Aday, S. (2008). On the Opening and Closing of Framing Windows: The relative power of elites and events to shape public opinion on use of force. Paper presented to the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, CA, March 2008.
- Aday, S. (2010). Leading the Charge: Media, Elite Cues, and Emotion in Public Support for War. *Journal of Communication*, 60(3), 440–465.
- Aday, S., Cluverius, J., & Livingston, S. (2005a). As Goes the Statue, So Goes the War: The Emergence of the Victory Frame in Television Coverage of the Iraq War. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, 3, 314–331.
- Aday, S., Entman, R.M., & Livingston, S.L. (2010). Media, Power, and U.S. Foreign Policy. In Holli Semetko and Maggie Scammell (Eds.), *Sage Handbook of Political Communication* (pp. 327–341). Los Angeles, CA: Sage.
- Aday, S., Farrell, H., Lynch, M., Sides, J., & Freelon, D. (2013). Watching From Afar: Media Consumption Patterns Around the Arab Spring. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 57(7), 899–919.
- Aday, S., & Kim, J. (2008). Framing Matters: A multi-methodological test of the use and effects of World War II and Vietnam frames by elites. Paper presented to the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, March 2008.
- Aday, S., & Livingston, S. (2008). Taking the State out of State-Media Relations Theory: How Transnational Advocacy Networks are Rewriting (Some) of the Rules about What We Think We Know about News and Politics. *Media, War, and Conflict*, 1(1), 99–107.
- Aday S., Livingston, S., & Hebert, M. (2005b). Embedding the Truth: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of Objectivity and Television Coverage of the Iraq War. *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*, 10(1), 3–21.

- Althaus, S.L., & Coe, K. (2011). Social Identity Processes and the Dynamics of Public Support for War. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 75(1), 65–88.
- Althaus, S. L., Bramlett, B. H., & Gimpel, J. G. (2012). When War Hits Home: The Geography of Military Losses and Support for War in Time and Space. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 56(3), 382–412.
- Althaus, S.L., Swigger, N., Chernykh, S., Hendry, D.J., Wals, S.C., & Tiwald, C. (2014). Uplifting Manhood to Wonderful Heights? News Coverage of the Human Costs of Military Conflict from World War I to Gulf War II. *Political Communication*, 31, 193–217.
- Baker, W.D., & Oneal, J.R. (2001). Patriotism or Opinion Leadership? The Nature and Origins of the “Rally ‘Round the Flag” Effect. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45(5), 661–687.
- Baum, M.A., & Groeling, T. (2010). *War Stories: How Strategic Journalists, Citizens, and Politicians Shape the News about War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bennett, W.L. (1990). Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations. *Journal of Communication*, 40(2), 103–125.
- Bennett, W.L., & Livingston, S. (2003). A semi-independent press: Government control and journalistic autonomy in the political construction of news. *Political Communication*, 20, 359–362.
- Berinsky, A. (2009). *In Time of War: Understanding American Public Opinion from World War II to Iraq*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Berinsky, A., & Druckman, J. (2007). Public Opinion Research and Support for the Iraq War. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 71, 126–141.
- Boettcher, W., & Cobb, M. (2006). Echoes of Vietnam?: Casualty Framing and Public Perceptions of Success and Failure in Iraq. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1, 831–854.
- Brewer, P., Aday, S., & Gross, K. (2003). Rallies All Around: The Dynamics of System Support. In Pippa Norris, Montague Kern and Marion Just (Eds.), *Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the Government and the Public* (pp. 3–23). New York: Routledge.
- Brewer, P.R., Gross, K., & Aday, S. (2004). International Trust and Public Opinion about World Affairs. *American Journal of Political Science*, 48(1), 93–109.
- Brody, R.A. (1991). *Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and Public Support*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Bruns, A. (2003). Gatewatching, Not Gatekeeping: Collaborative Online News. *Media International Australia incorporating culture and policy: Quarterly journal of media research and resources*, 107, 31–44.
- Bruns, A. (2005). *Gatewatching: Collaborative Online News Production*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Bruns, A., Highfield, T., & Burgess, J. (2013). The Arab Spring and Social Media Audiences: English and Arabic Twitter Users and Their Networks. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 57(7), 871–898.
- Burk, J. (1999). Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Casualties Hypothesis. *Political Science Quarterly*, 114(1), 53–78.
- Campbell, W.J. (2000). *Yellow Journalism: The Life of William Randolph Hearst*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
- Castells, M. (2009). *Communication Power*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Delli Carpini, M.X., & Keeter, S. (1997). *What Americans Know About Politics and Why it Matters*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Dickson, S.H. (1995). Understanding Media Bias: The Press and the U.S. Invasion of Panama. *Journalism Quarterly*, 4, 809–819.
- Dorman, W.A., & Livingston, S. (1994). News and Historical Context: The Establishment Phase of the Persian Gulf Policy Debate. In W.L. Bennett & D.L. Paletz (Eds.), *Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War* (pp. 63–81). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Eichenberg, R.C. (2005). Victory has Many Friends: U.S. Public Opinion and the Use of Military Force, 1981–2005. *International Security*, 30(1), 140–177.
- Eltantawy, N., & Wiest, J.B. (2011). Social Media in the Egyptian Revolution: Reconsidering Resource Mobilization Theory. *International Journal of Communication*, 5(5), 1375–1405.
- Entman, R.M. (1993). Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm. *Journal of Communication*, 43(4), 51–58.
- Entman, R.M. (2004). *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Entman, R.M., Livingston, S., & Kim, J. (2009). Doomed to Repeat: Iraq News, 2002–2007. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 52, 689–708.
- Fahmy, S., & Neumann, R. (2011). Shooting War or Peace Photographs? An Examination of Newswires’ Coverage of the Conflict in Gaza (2008–2009). *American Behavioral Scientist*, 56(2), NP1–NP26.
- Fussell, P. (1989). *Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Galtung, J. (1986). On the Role of the Media in Worldwide Security and Peace. In T. Varis (Ed.), *Peace and Communication* (pp. 249–266). San Jose, Costa Rica: Universidad para La Paz.
- Gartner, S.S. (2004). Making the International Local: The Terrorist Attack on the USS Cole, Local Casualties, and Media Coverage. *Political Communication*, 21(2), 139–159.
- Gartner, S.S. (2008). The Multiple Effects of Casualties on Public Support for War: An Experimental Approach. *American Political Science Review*, 102(1), 95–106.
- Gartner, S.S. (2011). On Behalf of a Grateful Nation: Conventionalized Images of Loss and Individual Opinion Change in War. *International Studies Quarterly*, 55, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00655.x
- Gartner, S.S., Segura, G.M., & Barratt, B. (2004). Casualties, Positions, and Senate Elections in the Vietnam War. *Political Research Quarterly*, 3, 467–477.
- Gelpi, C., Feaver, P., & Reifler, J. (2005/2006). Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq. *International Security*, 30(3), 7–46.
- Gilboa, E. (2005). Global Television News and Foreign Policy: Debating the CNN Effect. *International Studies Perspectives*, 3, 325–341.
- Gilovich, T. (1981). Seeing the Past in the Present: The Effect of Associations to Familiar Events on Judgments and Decisions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 40(5), 797–808.
- Gross, K., Aday, S., & Brewer, P. (2004). A Panel Study of Media Effects on Political and Social Trust After September 11th. *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*, 9(4), 49–74.
- Hale, H.E. (2013). Regime Change Cascades: What We Have Learned from the 1848 Revolutions to the 2011 Arab Uprisings. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 16, 331–353.
- Hallin, D. (1986). *The “Uncensored” War*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hassanpour, N. (2011). Media Disruption Exacerbates Revolutionary Unrest: Evidence from Mubarak’s Natural Experiment. APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper. Available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1903351>
- Hawkins, V. (2011). Media Selectivity and the Other Side of the CNN Effect: The Consequences of Not Paying Attention to Conflict. *Media, War & Conflict*, 4(1), 55–69.
- Hermida, A. (2010). Twittering the News. *Journalism Practice*, 4(3), 297–308.
- Howard, P. (2010). *The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and Political Islam*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Howard, P.N., Duffy, A., Freelon, D., Hussain, M., Mari, W., & Mazaid, M. (2011). *Opening Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of Social Media during the Arab Spring?* Project on Information Technology & Political Islam.
- Hussain, M.M., & Howard, P.N. (2013). What Best Explains Successful Protest Cascades? ICT and the Fuzzy Causes of the Arab Spring. *International Studies Review*, 15, 48–66.
- Jentleson, B.W., & Britton, R.L. (1998). Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(4), 395–417.
- Jervis, R. (1976). *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Jordan, D.L. and Page, B.I. (1992). Shaping Foreign Policy Opinions: The Role of TV News. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 36(2), 227–241.
- Katovsky, B., & Carlson, T. (2003). *Embedded: The Media at War in Iraq*. Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press.
- Keck, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press.
- Kellner, D. (1992). *The Persian Gulf TV War*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Khondker, H.H. (2011). Role of the New Media in the Arab Spring. *Globalizations*, 8(5), 675–679.
- Klarevas, L. (2002). The “Essential Domino” of Military Operations: American Public Opinion and the Use of Force. *International Studies Perspectives*, 3, 417–437.
- Kull, S., Ramsey, C., & Lewis, E. (2003). Misperceptions, the Media, and the Iraq War. *Political Science Quarterly*, 118, 569–598.
- Lacquement, R.A. (2004). The Casualty-Aversion Myth. *Naval War College Review*. LVII (1), 38–57.
- Larson, E. (1996). *Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.
- Lawrence, E., Sides, J., & Farrell, H. (2010). Self-segregation or Deliberation? Blog Readership, Participation, and Polarization in American Politics. *Perspectives on Politics*, 8(1), 141–157.
- Lee, S.T., & Maslog, C.C. (2005). War or Peace Journalism? Asian Newspaper Coverage of Conflicts. *Journal of Communication*, 55(2), 311–329.
- Livingston, S. (2003). Diplomacy in the New Information Environment. *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, 4, 111–117.

- Livingston, S., & Asmolev, G. (2010). Networks and the Future of Foreign Affairs Reporting. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, 11(5), 745–760.
- Livingston, S., & Van Belle, D. (2005). The Effects of Satellite Technology on Newsgathering from Remote Locations. *Political Communication*, 22(1), 45–62.
- Lotan, G., Graeff, E., Ananny, M., Gaffney, D., Pearce, I., & boyd, d. (2011). The Revolutions Were Tweeted: Information Flows during the 2011 Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions. *International Journal of Communication*, 5, <http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/1246/643>
- Lynch, M. (2007). Blogging the New Arab Public. *Arab Media & Society*, 1(Spring), <http://www.arabmediasociety.com/?article=10>
- Lynch, M. (2011). After Egypt: The Limits and Promise of Online Challenges to the Authoritarian Arab State. *Perspectives on Politics*, 9(2), 301–310.
- Lynch, M., Freelon, D., & Aday, S. (2014) *Syria's Socially Mediated Civil War*. Peaceworks 91. Washington, DC: USIP.
- McAdam, D., Tarrow, S., & Tilly, C. (2001). *Dynamics of Contention*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Meraz, S. (2009). Is There an Elite Hold? Traditional Media to Social Media Agenda Setting Influence in Blog Networks. *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, 14(3), 682–707.
- Mermin, J. (1999). *Debating War and Peace: Media Coverage of U.S. Intervention in the Post-Vietnam Era*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Mueller, J. (1973). *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Nasaw, D. (2000). *The Chief: The Life of William Randolph Hearst*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
- Neuman, W.R., Guggenheim, L., Jang, S.M., & Bae, S.Y. (2014). The Dynamics of Public Attention: Agenda Setting Meets Big Data. *Journal of Communication*, 64, 193–214.
- Newsom, V.A., Lengel, L., & Cassara, C. (2011). Local Knowledge and the Revolutions: A Framework for Social Media Information Flow. *International Journal of Communication*, 5, 1303–1312.
- Patel, D., Bunce, V., & Wolchick, S. (2014) Diffusion and Demonstration. In M. Lynch (Ed.), *The Arab Uprisings Explained: New Contentious Politics in the Middle East* (pp. 57–74). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Pfau, M., Haigh, M.M., Fifrick, A., Holl, D., Tedesco, A., & Nunnally, D. (2006). The Effects of Print News Photographs of the Casualties of War. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, 83, 150–168.
- Pfau, M., Haigh, M.M., Gettle, M., Donnelly, M., Scott, G., & Warr, D. (2004). Embedding Journalists in Military Combat Units: Impact on Newspaper Story Frames and Tone. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, 81, 74–88.
- Pfau, M., Haigh, M.M., Shannon, T., Tones, T., Mercurio, D., & Williams, R. (2008). The Influence of Television News Depictions of the Images of War on Viewers. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, 52, 303–322.
- Record, J. (2002). *Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Rinke, E.M., & Röder, M. (2011). Media Ecologies, Communication Culture, and Temporal-Spatial Unfolding: Three Components in a Communication Model of the Egyptian Regime Change. *International Journal of Communication*, 5, 1273–1285.
- Robinson, P. (1999). The CNN Effect: Can the News Media Drive Foreign Policy? *Political Communication*, 25, 301–309.
- Robinson, P. (2002). *The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy, and Intervention*. London: Routledge.
- Robinson, P., Goddard, P., Parry, K., & Murray, C. with Taylor, P. (2010). *Pockets of Resistance*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Russell, A. (2011). Extra-National Information Flows, Social Media, and the 2011 Egyptian Uprising. *International Journal of Communication*, 5, 1238–1247.
- Sharkey, J. (2001). War, Censorship and the First Amendment. *Media Studies Journal*, 15(1), 20–25.
- Shirky, C. (2011). The Political Power of Social Media. *Foreign Affairs*, 90(1) http://www.shirky.com/writings/powerlaw_weblog.html.
- Shoemaker, P.J., & Reese, S.D. (1991). *Mediating the Message*. White Plains, NY: Longman.
- Sidman, A.H., & Norpoth, H. (2012). Fighting to Win: Wartime Morale in the American Public. *Electoral Studies*, 31, 330–341.
- van Niekerk, B., Pillay, K., & Maharaj, M. (2011). Analyzing the Role of ICTs in the Tunisian and Egyptian Unrest from an Information Warfare Perspective. *International Journal of Communication*, 5, 1406–1416

- Wall, M., & El Zahed, S. (2011). "I'll be Waiting for You Guys": A YouTube Call to Action in the Egyptian Revolution. *International Journal of Communication*, 5, 1333–1343.
- Williams, B. A., & Delli Carpini, M. X. D. (2004). Monica and Bill All the Time and Everywhere. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 47(9), 1208–1230.
- Wilson, G.C. (2001). Media-Military Relations: No Worse, No Better. *Media Studies Journal*, 15(1), 26–31.
- Wilson, C., & Dunn, A. (2011). Digital Media in the Egyptian Revolution: Descriptive Analysis from the Tahrir Data Sets. *International Journal of Communication*, 5, 1248–1272.
- Zaller, J.R. (1992). *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

9

THEORIZING STATE-MEDIA RELATIONS DURING WAR AND CRISIS

Steven Livingston

This chapter considers government news management during times of political conflict and crisis. We begin by reviewing various interpretations of state-media relations and the expectations concerning issue management that accompanies each. We then consider two underlying assumptions found in the research literature. The first concerns the existence of a relatively independent (from the state), economically viable, professional news media. Many of the key studies in the field analyze content from the same handful of newspapers and television channels. All of them are powerful, professional news organizations that, while experiencing economic pressures, still command the attention of millions of viewers, buy ink by the barrel and newsprint by the ton, and maintain massive amounts of data on thousands of servers. News organizations of this size and power are the global exception rather than the rule. Instead, across the Global South, and in some cases in the Global North, news organizations are underfunded and reporters are poorly trained and underpaid. Many news organizations are the mouthpieces for the state, political parties, and other elements of the economic and political elite.

Second, the research literature assumes an administratively competent, formally liberal – or at least non-authoritarian – consolidated state. The state may be cunning, manipulative, sometimes intimidating of news organizations and journalists, but not ruthlessly despotic. Media content is negotiated, not dictated.

State-media relations

Disagreement on the degree of meaningful editorial autonomy available to news organizations distinguishes one state-media-relations model from another. Some see (or imply) practically no independence from at least the general contours of state preferences (Herman and Chomsky 2002), while others see media independence vary according to the dynamics of elite disputes within the state (Bennett 1990), while still others see a greater degree of media independence, especially after the Cold War (Entman 2004). Archetti, for example, finds considerable transnational variance in the news media's willingness to reproduce the official themes and agendas. She cites a variety of possible reasons for this, including differences in political culture and systems of government, and the effects associated with a changing

geopolitical landscape (Archetti 2008). There is also an underlying normative debate found in the literature. For some, news media have an obligation to offer the broadest possible range of debate while keeping a vigilant eye on state conduct. For others, such a high standard is idealistic and unreasonable (Schudson 1998; Zaller 2003; Bennett 2003; Prior 2014).

Yet despite the differences, most models of state-media relations understand news media to operate in a political space that is relatively free of *direct* political intrusions by state authorities.¹ Rather than the product of state diktats, reinforced by threats and sanctions, media content is understood to be the result of a complex mix of exogenous (from the state) political, technological, sociological, cultural and economic variables. Much of the debate found in the state-media-relations research literature involves disagreement over the relative importance of various *exogenous* explanatory variables.

In the space available here we cannot review all of the variables that are possibly at play in shaping news content. Instead, we will focus on ideological or norms-based variables that play a central role in almost all of the models. Press management and control understood in this way involves the mobilization of political, social and cultural norms through symbols and language (Edelman 1988). Others have spoken of the same or similar ideas in terms of cultural congruence (Entman 2004), ideological hegemony (Gramsci and Buttigieg 1992; Hall et al. 2013) and the third dimension of power (Lukes 1974; Gaventa 1982).

Daniel C. Hallin maps the bounded conceptual space in which American news media operate by positing three spheres of controversy found in media coverage of issues and events. Press objectivity and professional standards operate according to the implicit normative rules that demarcate the three spheres of controversy. He represents this by drawing three concentric circles. At the center is the Sphere of Consensus. It contains those topics characterized by wide political and cultural agreement. In an American idiom, these are “mom and apple pie” issues – things that almost everyone within the country can agree are good, right, proper and just. For topics in this sphere “journalists do not feel compelled to present an opposing view point or to remain disinterested observers” (Hallin 1989). America’s benevolent superpower role in world affairs, as understood by many Americans, offers one possible example. America’s “liberation of Kuwait” in 1991 or the “bringing of democracy” to Iraq in 2003 offers illustrations (Dorman and Livingston 1994; Bennett, Lawrence and Livingston 2007; Aday, Cluverius and Livingston 2005).

Next is the Sphere of Legitimate Controversy. It involves issues and events that are perceived to involve reasonably disputed preferences, goals, objectives and relevant facts. Journalists are obliged to emphasize disinterestedness and evenhandedness, relying on balance between two presumably representative perspectives, rather than advocating for or against a particular view. News formulas assume there are two sides to every story and that objectivity, or at least impartiality, calls for every claim to be balanced by a counterclaim. The chief objective of issue management campaigns is to keep issues in the relatively unfixed, problematized and even ambiguous Sphere of Legitimate Controversy. A few examples illustrate the principle.

Despite the near universal scientific consensus that global warming is real and the result of human activities, the American news media’s practice of balance creates the appearance of debate and controversy where none exists (Brüggemann and Engesser 2014). Furthermore, American conservative politicians, the petrochemical industry, and other industries that are dependent on fossil fuels and other forms of unsustainable consumption have created lobbying groups and “think tanks” devoted to obfuscating the scientific consensus and attacking the integrity of individual scientists (Schwartz 2009; Goldenberg and Rushe 2012). For years, the American Tobacco Institute lobbied against regulation of tobacco by commissioning “studies” that obfuscated the link between smoking and cancer (Brandt 2007; Oreskes and Conway

2010). These tactics are intended to prevent the link between cancer and smoking or global warming and the burning of fossil fuels from slipping into the Sphere of Consensus, one that would imply radical economic, political, economic and cultural realignments.

Next is the Sphere of Deviance. It consists of topics that are rejected by journalists as being unworthy of general consideration. Such views are implicitly understood to be either unfounded, taboo, lacking in good taste, or of such minor consequence as to be un-newsworthy. In a sense, the Sphere of Deviance is antipodal to the Sphere of Consensus. A couple of examples can illustrate Hallin's model.

The idea that the American government pursued a deliberate policy of torturing prisoners, for example, struck many editors and journalists as inconceivable or unworthy of serious consideration, even after the release of photos of American soldiers torturing Iraqi prisoners in 2003 (Bennett, Lawrence and Livingston, 2006). The topic was broached in softer language; the United States used "enhanced interrogation techniques," which was the Pentagon and White House preferred terminology. For example, when referring to U.S. interrogation techniques, National Public Radio (NPR), among other American news organizations, refrained from using the term torture. Alicia C. Shepard, the NPR ombudsman, reasoned that "the word torture is loaded with political and social implications for several reasons, including the fact that torture is illegal under U.S. law and international treaties the United States has signed." Therefore, according to Shepard's logic, American practices must not constitute torture. "I recognize, that it's frustrating for some listeners to have NPR not use the word torture to describe certain practices that seem barbaric." She continued,

But the role of a news organization is *not to choose sides in this or any debate*. People have different definitions of torture and different feelings about what constitutes torture. NPR's job is to give listeners all perspectives, and present the news as detailed as possible and put it in context.

(Shepard 2009. *Emphasis added*)

What is most telling about her reasoning is the placement of political neutrality in the official version of reality. According to the Shepard's logic, by using the word *torture* NPR would be taking sides in the debate; yet to rely on the White House's "enhanced interrogation techniques" was to preserve its evenhandedness and neutrality. Press management involves efforts to use language and emotive symbolic content to mobilize cognitive and emotive responses that are in alignment with versions of reality that are supportive of the objectives of powerful political actors (Bennett, Lawrence and Livingston 2006 and 2007; Entman 2006, p. 216; Wallach 2007; Jones and Sheets 2009; Desai, Pineda, Runquist, and Fusunyan 2010).

American press coverage of domestic surveillance by the National Security Agency (NSA) offers another illustration. In 2004, *New York Times* reporter James Risen received tips that the NSA was conducting domestic surveillance without warrants and on a massive scale. "We heard, basically, that the president had authorized a warrantless wiretapping program. It was believed by the people we were talking to be in violation of the FISA and of the Constitution" (PBS 2014).

Once the White House realized that Risen was about to reveal its mass surveillance program it demanded a meeting with him and his editors at the *Times*. In the meeting, the White House characterized the surveillance program as being both effective and entirely legal. What White House officials did not reveal was that the acting attorney general and other high-ranking Justice Department officials, including the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), had threatened to resign because of their concerns over the constitutionality of the

program. The administration then invited executive editor Bill Keller, and other top *Times* editors, to meet with Condoleezza Rice, Michael Hayden, Alberto Gonzales and other officials. Following the meeting, the *Times*, in a decision led by then-Washington Bureau Chief Philip Taubman and then-Executive Editor Bill Keller, quashed the story. In doing so they ignored the objection of Risen, his colleague Eric Lichtblau and their editor Rebecca Corbett. Keller and Taubman said that the balance between perceived newsworthiness and the dangers involved in publishing the story led to their decision (Folkenflik 2014).

Over the course of the next year the NSA surveillance program grew dramatically while Risen's story remained shelved. Exasperated, Risen decided to go around the *Times* and publish his story in a book. According to Risen, in taking these steps the *Times* editors regarded him as insubordinate. Yet as Lichtblau pointed out, Risen "had a gun to their (the *Times* editor's) head. They're really being forced to reconsider" (PBS 2014).

In December, Keller, publisher Arthur Sulzberger, and other *Times* executives were called to the White House for another meeting that included the president and his top national security advisors. Eventually, Bush told them *The New York Times* would be responsible for the next terrorist attack if they published the story (PBS 2014). Yet with Risen threatening to publish it anyway, the *Times* decided to run the story, 14 months after its originally scheduled publication date and after the re-election of George Bush as president.

At this point the administration went into full damage-control mode. It began with Bush's carefully limited acknowledgement of the program. "This is a highly classified program that is crucial to our national security. Its purpose is to detect and prevent terrorist attacks against the United States, our friends and allies." These are consensus phrases involving the White House efforts to fight terrorism. He continued, "I authorized the National Security Agency, consistent with U.S. law and the Constitution, to intercept the international communications of *people with known links to al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations*" (PBS 2014. Emphasis added). Protecting Americans and their allies from terrorist attacks is firmly positioned in the Sphere of Consensus.

Bush made no reference to the massive gathering of domestic communications data. Later, Barton Gellman of the *Washington Post* said that Bush's "characterization of the facts was simply wrong, and it was wrong from the beginning." He continued, "The program wasn't to surveil known suspects, known conspirators. You could easily get a warrant for that. The program was to sift big data, was to trawl through enormous volumes, literally trillions of telephone calls, trillions of e-mails, and to look for unknown conspirators." The administration framed the issue differently. It wanted to hold it in the Sphere of Consensus where everyone could agree that keeping a wary eye on *terrorists* was a great idea.

In a separate press conference, Hayden also misrepresented the facts. "This is targeted. This is focused. This is about al Qaeda. One end of any call targeted under this program is always outside the United States" (PBS 2014) There was no mention that the NSA was also tracking telephone calls and e-mails *inside* the United States. And Hayden even dismissed the idea that there had been any internal NSA dissent about the program, when in fact senior NSA administrators had retired rather than be a part of the program.

Torture and mass surveillance stories are in some ways exceptional. They do not constitute the day-to-day drumbeat of news. Nor do they illustrate news processes and management practices outside of crisis situations. We must also consider the more mundane qualities of news and the state. At the heart of much of state-media-relations research is the question of the role state institutions and their representatives in newsgathering. How often do (and should) official voices be a part of the news? Who, where, and when do alternative voices come into the news?

Leon V. Sigal looked at *New York Times* and *Washington Post* page-one articles between 1949 and 1969 and found that officials had a dominant presence in almost all of the news published over that time. Press releases, press conferences, planned media events, what Sigal calls Routine news, constituted almost 60 percent of the news content. Nearly one half of routine channels were U.S. officials (92 percent of whom were executive branch officials).

Just under another 16 percent of the news was provided by officials giving background briefings and leaks. Leaks are both controlled by central administration authorities, that is deliberate and intended to shape the discussion of an issue without officials taking direct responsibility for the content of the leak, and uncontrolled (such as the Snowden leaks). Only 25 percent of the news, according to Sigal's finding, involved reporter initiatives independent on the state's apparatus for feeding the production of news. In total, over 90 percent of the news in *The New York Times* and *Washington Post* came from official sources.

The state and formally independent news organizations are bound together in a mostly stable symbiotic relationship. The state needs an independent news media – or at least what appears to be an independent media – while the news media require state institutions and officials for broad ideological guidance for the anchoring of “objectivity” and as counterparts in a highly synchronized exchange process. A key point of differentiation among competing models of press–state relations concerns the latitude news organizations have to offer news content that is at odds with official preferences, cultural norms, or ideological constraints.

Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky's “propaganda model” – also called the hegemony model – views the private media as primarily businesses interested in the sale of a product – readers and audiences – to other businesses (advertisers). The theory postulates five general “filters” that shape news selection and presentation. These five classes are:

- 1 Corporate ownership of the news media
- 2 Media's reliance on advertising from other corporations
- 3 The heavily dependency on official sources when deciding the news
- 4 An aversion to “flak,” the criticism directed at those who drift too far from acceptable corporate/state norms
- 5 Anticommunism and fear ideology

Following the 9/11 attacks on the United States in 2001, Chomsky and Herman amended the fifth to refer to the “War on Terrorism.”

The causal mechanisms in Herman and Chomsky's model are vaguely delineated. Media management involves reporters who are socialized into a compliant media environment that is motivated by commercial interests (rather than the public interest) and held in check by “flak” from media watchdog groups and other opinion media. Implicitly, it describes a closed media system, one without much variance to explain. Instead, it describes a state/media system that is authoritarian in all but name. Is all media content so tightly controlled? If not, how does the propaganda model explain variance?

The Indexing hypothesis, first formulated by W. Lance Bennett, posits that the range of debate about any given issue in the American press is indexed to the range of debate present in mainstream government discourse about that issue. “Mass media professionals, from the boardroom to the beat, tend to ‘index’ the range of voices and viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a given topic” (Bennett 1990, p. 106). Bennett's original study looked at the interplay of White House and congressional debate concerning U.S. policy in Nicaragua. As Democrats in Congress fell silent in their dissent of Reagan administration policy – following a Red

baiting campaign – the news media also fell silent, despite broad public opposition to the policies as well. Later, Bennett, Regina G. Lawrence and Steven Livingston (2007) found similarly indexed content regarding the Iraq War.

Stated in its simplest form, Indexing claims that the level of expressed disagreement among policy elites drives media content. A null hypothesis would claim just the opposite: that media content drives elite discourse. The political elites are responsive to what they read in newspapers, see on television and see in public opinion polling. Something like this is found in the CNN effect (see also Chapter 8). Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and several technological developments leading to 24-hour cable news, commentators began to see what they thought was evidence that the United States was responding to the latest crisis covered by CNN and other 24-hour news channels, rather than pursuing a foreign policy guided by foreign policy professions' insights into the national interest. A primary case for this argument was the American intervention in Somalia in 1992. The only explanation for the decision, according to critics, was the emotional content seen on television (Kennan 1993).

Livingston and Eachus (1995), however, found little empirical evidence supporting this claim. The vast majority of news content regarding the crisis in Somalia in 1991–1992 followed the decision by the George H. W. Bush administration to intervene. Simple logic of causation undermines the claims of such a robust CNN effect. Later, Livingston identifies three distinct aspects that fall under the broad term of the CNN effect. The media may function alternately or simultaneously as (1) a *policy agenda-setting agent*, (2) an *impediment* to the achievement of desired policy goals, and (3) an *accelerant* to policy decision-making (Livingston 1996). Also, in one of the more careful and comprehensive studies of the CNN effect, Piers Robinson found that policy effects are more likely when official policy positions and priorities are underdeveloped (Robinson 2002). Babak Bahador argues that in the case of the Kosovo intervention by NATO and the United States in 1999, Kosovar separatists manipulated media coverage of atrocities in a way to invite intervention (Bahador 2007). If the CNN effect literature is understood as an extension to the Indexing research literature, we can see evidence in the work of Robinson and Bahador, respectively, for an argument that media are, *at times*, capable of greater independent influence on policy than was previously thought.

The cascading activation model, first formulated by Robert Entman, picks up on the same point. It explains how interpretive frames (descriptive elements in news stories) activate and spread from the top level of a stratified system (the White House) to the network of non-administration elites, and on to news organizations, their texts, and the public – and how interpretations feed back from lower to higher levels (Entman 2004). As index theorists would suggest, elite disagreement is a necessary condition for politically influential frame challenges. The cascade model tries to explain why elite dissensus arises (or not) in the first place, and how journalists can hinder or advance it. Metaphorically, Entman refers to the flow of frames from the White House to the public through the news media and other officials as a cascade or waterfall (Figure 9.1).

As he describes it,

Elites heavily influence media, which in turn significantly shape public opinion—that is why the public occupies the bottom level of the cascade, after all. But this model also offers insight into the significant potential influence of perceived and anticipated public reactions on what leaders say and do. And here again, it turns out to be crucial that the information about public opinion that moves back up the cascade to leaders travels in the form of frames.

(Entman 2003)




Figure 9.1 Cascading activation model

While most news frames flow down the cascade, elites are cognizant of public opinion. This means that feedback loops exist that affect elite decision-making.

The propaganda or hegemony model, the indexing and cascade models, and the CNN effect literature try to explain the processes involving issue placement and potential migration from one sphere of controversy to another. They all assume powerful institutional actors in a struggle for dominance. In light of the emergence of digital technologies and what some see as a crisis of the state, we should probe these core assumptions a little further.

Discussion

According to Max Weber, “a state is any human community that (successfully) claims a monopoly of the *legitimate* use of physical *force* within a given territory that is used for the enforcement of binding rule” (Weber 1919 p. 4, emphasis added). Legitimation and force are interrelated core elements of statehood. State consolidation requires the actual or threatened use of *legitimate* force. Successful appeals to public opinion and sentiment distinguish legitimate from illegitimate uses of force by the state (Barker 1990). *Therefore*,

statehood also presupposes an administrative capacity for crafting public symbolic appeals that legitimize the state. To varying degrees, the models reviewed above seem to underscore this central component of statehood. Media systems, in large measure, serve to legitimize state institutions, actors and policy objectives. The success of the effort remains an open question.

The *public's* identity in relationship to the state is also symbolically constructed. With the formation of the modern state and the industrialization of warfare, we see both combatants and home-front populations mobilized around emotive symbols (Lippmann 1922; Dower 1986; Keen 1985; Fussell 1989). As Benedict Anderson puts it, a nation “is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson 1983, p. 224). Ultimately, says Anderson, imagined communities “make [...] it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings” (Anderson 1983, p. 224).

As literacy spread, nascent national identities took root around common languages (Anderson 1983). An inter-subjective sense of self in relation to the state, what one might call citizenship, emerged (Ruggie 1998a; Ruggie 1998b). Humans live in a world of constructed significances, ideas and associations that have no direct material reality. This includes attachments to the state as a social fact.

This capacity gives rise to a class of facts that do not exist in the physical object world: social facts, or facts that, in the words of the linguistic philosopher John Searle, depends on human agreement that they exist and *typically require human institutions for their existence*. Social facts include money, property rights, sovereignty, marriage, football, and Valentine’s Day, in contrast to such brute observational facts as rivers, mountains, population size, bombs, bullets, and gravity, which exist whether or not there is agreement that they do.

(Ruggie 1998b, p. 856. *Emphasis added*)

Here information management is not as much administrative in character – a set of administrative techniques or manipulative schemes – as it is ideational. Socialization processes that lead to the adoption of *some* social facts but not others shape the contours of subjective identities, and in the process the cognitive accessibility of social facts (Lodge and Taber 2013). This cognitive dynamic is in play with all of the major theories of state–media relations, though conceptualized and labeled in different ways.

Who we see ourselves to be, our identities, influences what we see as real, important, relevant, pacifying, enraging, calming, inspiring or revolting. They constitute the demarcation lines in Hallin’s news content heuristic. Recent research on motivated reasoning underscores how identities and beliefs shape the human engagement with facts (Slothuus and de Vreese 2010). To a degree, the facts of the world do not shape identities, but rather identities shape the social facts of the world. In their more decisive forms, social facts distinguish norms and behaviors that are said to be representative of *us* as opposed to those that are said to be representative of *them*. They create boundaries between people, groups and tribes (Lippmann 1922, especially Chapter 1). These boundaries are both constitutive of statehood while also serving as points of leverage used by political elites to encourage compliant media content, as we see in the case of the *Times* shelving of Risen’s NSA surveillance story for 14 months. Keller didn’t make that decision as the managing editor of *The New York Times*; he made it according to his identity as an American.

Finally, information management is not only essential to the legitimation of the state and the shaping of citizenship; it is also the central administrative process of statehood. Collecting and managing information about populations and about features of its territorial domain is what states *do*. The inspiration for this part of the argument is found in James Scott's work on statehood and what he calls *legibility* – the processes by which states “see” their territory and citizens. Insecurity and war served as the principal catalysts to the formation of the modern state. As populations expanded, competition for scarce land and natural resources grew more acute.² The insecurities of this competitive climate eventually gave rise to standing armies, which in turn catalyzed state consolidation. “The *premodern* state was, in many crucial respects, partially blind; it knew precious little about its subjects, their wealth, their landholdings and yields, their location, their very identity” (Scott 1999, p. 2. Emphasis added). State consolidation therefore involved the development of administrative processes for the collection and management of information. Because standing armies are expensive to maintain, more thorough and efficient methods of taxation of the subject populations are needed. To support armies, states look for ways to “see” the peoples and territory within their domain. The state's need for more efficient systems of taxation, social control and conscription in the face of war called for more sophisticated taxonomic forms and information collection methodologies. In addition to actual or threatened use of force, as Max Weber emphasized, shaping and controlling information became core functions of modern statehood. In this respect, state–media–relations theory is picking up on one facet of a larger project of statehood: controlling information.

From the start of the modern era, war, information and the state were entwined in a tightly coiled recursive relationship. State–media relations during conflict and political stress involves more than administrative mechanisms of management, control and manipulation, though that, too, is a part of it. Information management systems are constitutive of the state itself. Likewise, war fueled the processes leading to consolidated statehood. War, media and the state are in this sense mutually constitutive. And herein rests an interesting question for the future.

Formalized bureaucratic states have existed for only about 200 years, and even now as much as 80 percent of the world's population experiences or is exposed to areas of limited statehood (Risse 2011, p. 6). As Thomas Risse notes, “if the modern, developed, and sovereign nation-state turns out to be a historical exception,” there are serious consequences for how we think about statehood, war, peace and even media. “Yet the world today, as an internationalized community of states, is largely based on the fiction that it is populated by fully consolidated states” (Risse 2011, p. 8). What is more, Manuel Castells has argued that the Western state is suffering a deep crisis of legitimacy. Major state institutions across Europe and the United States are seen as corrupt and ineffectual (Castells 2009). To the degree the consolidated statehood is in crisis, as Castells implies, state–media theory and notions of news management face a similar crisis.

And what about the traditional news media? In 2014, the freest press was found in Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Luxembourg, Andorra, Liechtenstein, Denmark, Iceland, New Zealand and Sweden. Indeed, the top 14 countries in press freedom were found in Europe. Press freedom in the United States, on the other hand, was in 46th place (Reporters Without Borders 2014, p. 30). Barack Obama, who came to office promising a new era of transparency, instead used arcane provisions of a century old law to pursue whistleblowers and journalists at a rate higher than all of his predecessors combined (Kiriakou 2013).

There are other signs of concern. One of the chief assumptions of most state–media–relations theory is a financially sound and sufficiently secure news media. Yet too often

journalists around the world are underpaid, forcing them to practice “brown envelope journalism,” a phrase referring to the practice of accepting cash payments for favorable articles. Even in the United States, the future of journalism looks dire. When the American Society of News Editors released its annual newsroom census in 2013 it revealed a stark acceleration of job losses. Roughly 2,600 full-time professional editorial jobs at newspapers disappeared in 2012, a 6.4 percent decline compared to 2011’s total, leaving industry news employment at 38,000. From 2000, the number of reporters, editors and other journalists was down almost one-third, and down 30.9 percent since 2006 (Edmonds 2013). In 2010, it was learned that membership of the Investigative Reporters and Editors association fell more than 30 percent, from 5,391 in 2003, to a 10-year low of 3,695 in 2009 (Walton 2010).

What to make of all of this? A pessimistic reading would suggest that state-media-relations theory is on the verge of a paradigm shift. States and traditional media alike are facing serious challenges. With extreme inequality growing worse and governments unable to take corrective actions, the legitimacy of the state in some parts of Europe and North America is in decline. Add to that the inability (so far) of states to take far-reaching steps to remedy climate change, or in the United States to even agree that it is real and caused by human activities, adds to the burden.

A less dire reading suggests that the weakening of the state, combined with a changed media environment, should lead to a reevaluation of *some* of what we think we know about media-political relations. The state may be weakening, but it isn’t going away altogether anytime soon. Likewise, while the traditional news media are experiencing strain in the face of technological and economic challenges, they may well adapt, taking on the characteristics of what Chadwick has called hybrid media. Hybrid media reflect the media logics of newer digital media and older traditional news media (Chadwick 2013). At the moment, it is impossible to say which of these readings is most accurate.

Notes

- 1 Of course, that being said, it is important to remember that direct censorship of the press by the government occurred during the First and Second World War and during the Korean War (Sweeny 2001).
- 2 Jeffery Herbst (2000) has argued that state consolidation in Africa has been impeded by the absence of this pressure. Other state origin stories would include Fukuyama (2011) and North, Wallis and Weingast (2009).

References

- Aday, S., Cluverius, J. and Livingston, S. (2005) “As Goes the Statue, So Goes the War: The Emergence of the Victory Frame in Television Coverage of the Iraq War,” *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, 49(3), 314–331.
- Anderson, B. (1983) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso.
- Archetti, C. (2008) “News Coverage of 9/11 and the Demise of the Media Flows, Globalization and Localization Hypotheses,” *International Communication Gazette*, 70(6), 463–486.
- Bahador, B. (2007) *The CNN Effect in Action: How the News Media Pushed the West Toward War in Kosovo*, New York: Palgrave.
- Barker, R. (1990) *Political Legitimacy and the State*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bennett, W. L. (1990). “Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations,” *Journal of Communication*, 40(2), 103–125.
- Bennett, W.L. (2003) “The Burglar Alarm That Just Keeps Ringing: A Response to Zaller,” *Political Communication*, 20(1), 31–138.

- Bennett, W.L., Lawrence, R. and Livingston, S. (2006) "None Dare Call It Torture: Indexing and the Limits of Press Independence in the Abu Ghraib Scandal," *Journal of Communication*, 56(3), 467–485.
- Bennett, W.L., Lawrence, R. and Livingston, S. (2007) *When the Press Fails: Political Power and the News Media from Iraq to Katrina*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago.
- Brandt, A.M. (2007) *The Cigarette Century: The Rise, Fall and Deadly Persistence of the Product That Defined America*, New York: Basic Books.
- Brüggemann, M. and Engesser, S. (2014) "Between Consensus and Denial: Climate Journalists as Interpretive Community," *Science Communication*, 36(4), 399–427.
- Castells, M. (2009) *Communication Power*, New York, Oxford University Press.
- Chadwick, A. (2013) *The Hybrid Media System: Power and Politics*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Desai, N., Pineda, A., Runquist, M. and Fusunyan, M. (2010) "Torture at Times: Waterboarding in the Media," Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy, Harvard Student Paper, April, http://www.hks.harvard.edu/presspol/publications/papers/torture_a_t_times_hks_students.pdf.
- Dorman, W. and Livingston, S. (1994) "Historical Content in the News: Policy Consequences for the 1990–91 Persian Gulf Crisis," in W. Lance Bennett and David L. Paletz, (eds.), *Taken By Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, pp. 63–81.
- Dower, J.W. (1986) *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War*, New York: Pantheon Publishers.
- Edelman, M. (1988) *Constructing the Political Spectacle*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Edmonds, R. (2013) "ASNE Census Finds 2,600 Newsroom Jobs Were Lost in 2012," Poynter, June 25, <http://www.poynter.org/latest-news/business-news/the-biz-blog/216617/asne-census-finds-2600-newsroom-jobs-were-lost-in-2012/>
- Entman, R.M. (2003) "Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House's Frame After 9/11", *Political Communication*, 20:4, 415–432. Available at: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10584600390244176?needAccess=true>
- Entman, R.M. (2004) *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Entman, R.M. (2006) "Punctuating the Homogeneity of Institutionalized News: Abusing Prisoners at Abu Ghraib versus Killing Civilians at Fallujah," *Political Communication*, 23, 215–224.
- Folkenflik, D. (2014) "'New York Times' Editor: Losing Snowden Scoop 'Really Painful'," NPR, June 5, <http://www.npr.org/2014/06/05/319233332/new-york-times-editor-losing-snowden-scoop-really-painful>.
- Fukuyama, F. (2011) *The Origins of Political Order*, London: Profile Books.
- Fussell, P. (1989) *Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gaventa, J. (1982) *Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley*, Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Goldenberg, S. and Rushe, D. (2012) "Climate Science Attack Machine took Donations from Major Corporations," *The Guardian*, February 16, <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/feb/15/heartland-institute-microsoft-gm-money?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487>.
- Gramsci, A. and Buttigieg, J.A. (eds.) (1992) *Prison Notebooks*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jefferson, T., Clarke, J.N. and Roberts, B. (2013) *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hallin, D.C. (1989) *The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Herbst, J. (2000) *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Herman, E. and Chomsky, N. (2002) *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*, New York: Pantheon.
- Jones, T. and Sheets, P. (2009) "Torture in the Eye of the Beholder: Social Identity, News Coverage, and Abu Ghraib," *Political Communication*, 26, 278–295.
- Keen, S. (1985) *Faces of the Enemy: Reflections of the Hostile Imagination*, San Francisco: Harper & Row.
- Kennan, G.F. (1993) "Somalia, Through a Glass Darkly," *The New York Times*, September 30.
- Kiriakou, J. (2013) "Obama's Abuse of the Espionage Act is Modern-day McCarthyism," *The Guardian*, August 6, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/06/obama-abuse-espionage-act-mccarthyism>
- Lippmann, W. (1922) *Public Opinion*, https://openlibrary.org/books/OL659993M/Public_opinion.

- Livingston, S. (1996) *Beyond the CNN Effect: An Examination of Media Effects According to Type of Intervention*, Cambridge, MA: The Shorenstein Center on Press, Politics and Public Policy, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
- Livingston, S. and Eachus, T. (1995) "Humanitarian Crises and U.S. Foreign Policy: Somalia and the CNN Effect Reconsidered," *Political Communication*, 12(4), 413–429.
- Lodge, M. and Taber, C. (2013) *The Rationalizing Voter*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Lukes, S. (1974) *Power: A Radical View*, New York: Macmillan.
- North, D., Wallis, J.J. and Weingast, B.R. (2009) *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Oreskes, N. and Conway, E.M. (2010) *Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming*, New York: Bloomsbury Press.
- PBS (2014) "United States of Secrets," Frontline. Available at: <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/united-states-of-secrets/transcript/>
- Prior, M. (2014) "Conditions for Political Accountability in a High-Choice Media Environment," in Kate Kenski and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Communication*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Reporters Without Borders (2014) World Press Freedom Index
- Risse, T. (ed.) (2011) *Governance without a State? Policies and Politics in Areas of Limited Statehood*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Robinson, P. (2002) *The CNN Effect: The Myth of News Media, Foreign Policy and Intervention*, London: Routledge.
- Ruggie, J. (1998a) *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization*, New York: Routledge.
- Ruggie, J. (1998b) "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivists Challenge," *International Organizations*, 52, 855–885.
- Schudson, M. (1998). *The Good Citizen: A History of American Civic Life*, New York: The Free Press
- Schwartz, A. (2009) "American Petroleum Institute Demonstrates How to Screw Up a Grassroots Event," *Fast Company*, August 21.
- Scott, J. (1999) *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to the Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Shepard, A.C. (2009) "Harsh Interrogation Techniques or Torture?," *NPR Ombudsman*, June 21, 2009. Available at: http://www.npr.org/sections/ombudsman/2009/06/harsh_interrogation_techniques.html
- Slothuus, R and de Vreese, C.H. (2010) "Political Parties, Motivated Reasoning, and Issue Framing Effects," *Journal of Politics*, 72(3), 630–645.
- Sweeny, M.S. (2001) *Secrets of Victory: The Office of Censorship and the American Press and Radio in World War II*, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- Wallach, E. (2007) "Waterboarding Used to be a Crime," *Washington Post*, November 4, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/02/AR2007110201170.html>.
- Walton, M. (2010) Investigative Shortfall, *AJR*, September, <http://ajrarchive.org/article.asp?id=4904>
- Weber, M. (1919) "Politics as a Vocation," <http://anthropos-lab.net/wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Weber-Politics-as-a-Vocation.pdf>.
- Zaller, J. (2003) "A New Standard of News Quality: Burglar Alarms for the Monitorial Citizen," *Political Communication*, 20, 109–130.

10

MEDIA, DISSENT, AND ANTI-WAR MOVEMENTS

Andrew Rojecki

Much of our understanding of anti-war movements and their mediated influence on public opinion relies on scholarship developed at a time when the nature of war, the means of information transmission, and the world picture differed radically from the present. The research produced during the Cold War shaped the military and information strategies of elites as well as protest movements, an example of what Giddens (1987) calls the 'double hermeneutic,' the influence of scholarly discourse on practice. In light of this research, movements became 'reflexively conditioned by their pursuit of media attention ... to get their message across and mobilize wide support' (Cottle 2008). Similarly, elite formulation of military strategy was influenced by the Vietnam Syndrome debate. Historical change, however, needs to be taken into account before we fall back on explanations which are perhaps no longer relevant to the current era politics of protest and dissent.

To illustrate one of the major changes, prior to the Internet revolution of the mid-1990s, the mass media were the principal carriers of information and opinion to mass audiences. To draw adherents and increase the scope of contagion (Schattschneider 1960), movement leaders needed to draw the attention of the mass media. Today the mass media join a host of information sources including the World Wide Web to form a much more complex information environment that alters the relationship between anti-war movements and public opinion.

Three bodies of scholarship that bear on political communication theory have emerged to explain the political success of movements: (1) resource mobilization (Jenkins 1983), (2) political opportunity structure (Eisinger 1973; Kitschelt 1986; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996), and (3) movement framing strategies (Snow and Benford 1988). The latter body of theory regards movement success as more than a function of structural change or resources, but also of ideas that may resonate with the beliefs of potential participants and sympathizers and draw them into the movement.

In this chapter I review our understanding of the relationships between anti-war movements and the structure of the information environment that mediates their communication strategies. To do this requires identifying the changes in the system of relations among the political actors and the information environment that have taken place since much of the theory was developed. The primary issue addressed in this chapter is the extent to which the

news media enable and constrain anti-war movements in their quest to limit the state's use of military force and whether changes in the nature of war, the information system, and the power balance since the end of the Cold War have altered that relationship.

The Cold War

Daniel Hallin (1992) termed pre-Vietnam US foreign policy as the period of 'High Modernism.' Characterized by an assumption among professionals and intellectuals that it was possible to 'produce knowledge of universal validity,' the period was also marked by an ideological consensus among political and media elites on the dangers of communism. Taken together these assumptions yielded the paradoxical notion that it was possible to be both committed to an ideological worldview and to regard one's self as objective despite that commitment.

In retrospect, the consequences of this paradox for anti-war movements were clear: citizens who demonstrated against the use of military force could expect to be marginalized by the press. From the standpoint of political opportunity structure, the Cold War consensus restricted the scope of dissent. Savvy movement participants, aware of the chilling effects of the 'paranoid style' of McCarthyism (Hofstadter 1964), anticipated such marginalization and presented a face of conservative respectability at public demonstrations in the 1960s against nuclear weapons (Rojecki 1999). From the standpoint of resource mobilization theory, however, the anti-war movement could draw on the morally charged purpose of participants motivated by a keen dread of the looming threat of nuclear war. Because the dominant conception of war at that historical moment was total—including the possibility of nuclear annihilation in World War III—dissent was charged with high moral purpose and attracted committed participants (many from church-based groups) as well as media attention, some of it unwelcome, from what was then a much more contained information system.

With the outbreak and escalation of the Vietnam War, the base of anti-war dissent widened as a theoretical threat became much more immediate as those subject to the draft became more engaged in issues of war and peace. Gitlin's account of the New Left (1980) traces the intertwining of the issues that broadened movement politics in the 1960s, an example of the cyclical nature of movements (Tarrow 1991). American defeat to Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces in early 1968 during the Tet offensive, and the subsequent withdrawal of Lyndon Johnson from a run at a second term, led to an erosion of the Cold War consensus that up to that point had contributed to uncritical media coverage of the war.

For some political communication scholars the Cold War consensus represented a form of consciousness explained by a Marxist-inspired analysis of the role of capital in naturalizing the subordination of the oppressed to the perspective of the dominant. Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model (1988) cited the role of concentrated wealth and class interest in marginalizing dissent in such a way as to make the status quo appear to be natural and inevitable. The authors used an Althusserian conception of the news media as coterminous with an 'ideological state apparatus' that reproduced and naturalized social states of knowledge (cf. Lang and Lang 2004).

Adopting a less instrumental, Gramscian perspective, Gitlin's analysis (1980) of the New Left focused on the role of ideology in limiting the success of movements, especially when they violated 'core' hegemonic values. Short of direct interventions by political and economic elites in news coverage of dissent when such values came into serious question, journalistic routines would be sufficient to maintain (but not guarantee) hegemonic containment. Despite their wariness of the potential negative influences of the mass media, Gitlin cited the peace

movement's search for attention to satisfy their need 'to matter,' to validate their significance to political elites (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993). In the end, a synergy between media attraction to sensation and conflict and new participants drawn by those attractions hollowed out the intellectual core of the movement and led to its radicalization and collapse. Gitlin argued that new protestors did not have the rigorous training of early Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) participants who had participated in the systematic crafting of a formal statement of principles that disciplined their actions. Movement leaders also needed the mass media to draw support from the larger population that would influence public opinion (Snow and Benford 1988). The mass media offered the means to reach a broader base of support, but their attention risked the distortions of institutional practice and the reliance of reporters on official sources.

In his model of the limits of permissible dissent for media gatekeepers, Daniel Hallin (1986) cited the institutional dependence of reporters on access to news sources. The significance of that dependence drew upon a body of sociological research that identified the institutional constraints on journalistic autonomy. These included authoritative sources (Sigal 1973), routines (Tuchman 1978), and the influence of powerful figures (Gans 1979). Accordingly, dependency on the media shifted the burden to movements for crafting a persuasive message, maintaining discipline, and shaping their approach in line with the professional needs of reporters. Accordingly, elite conflict signaled an increased tolerance of dissent to reporters who perceived they had normative leave to promote the ideas and messages of anti-war activists from the sphere of deviance to the sphere of legitimate controversy (Zaller 1992).

Bennett's indexing hypothesis (1990) built on Hallin's model to provide an empirically testable model of the openness of the media to anti-war dissent cued by conflict among political elites. The indexing hypothesis stimulated a broad program of research that sought to specify its limits and applicability (e.g., Entman and Page 1994; Zaller and Chiu 1996; Mermin 1999; Althaus 2003; Domke et al. 2006). Application of the indexing hypothesis beyond US borders found mixed support (e.g. Jones and Sheets 2009; Robinson et al. 2009), though it is not clear whether it was the nature of the US political and media system (Hallin and Mancini 2004) or the changes that followed the collapse of the Soviet empire and then the Soviet Union that accounted for the differences.

Post-Cold War complication

After the Cold War ended, the absence of a ready template for understanding the relevance of a foreign conflict for domestic interests led to increased uncertainty among policy elites for formulating clear policy and defending it with a stock of culturally resonant public appeals (Rojecki 2016). The options were limited to a passive endorsement of free market capitalism and liberal democracy or to a neoconservative vision of US hegemony supported by the forceful application of military power legitimated by the tenets of American exceptionalism. Under these changed and contested conditions the indexing model's denial of media influence on policymaking proved less plausible.

Extending the work of Wolfsfeld (1997) on the political dimensions of the relationship between policymakers and media, Robinson (2001) argued that under conditions of policy uncertainty in the executive, more likely in the absence of a clear and comprehensive ideological framework, the media could play a direct role in influencing the course of foreign policy (Entman 2004). Vivid images of victims of famine and genocide, for example, led to US interventions in Somalia and Serbia precisely because of ambivalence within the George Bush and Bill Clinton administrations, respectively, on proper courses of action.

The erosion of the Cold War consensus also reconfigured the grounds for the influence of anti-war movements. The most favorable change was elimination of the ideological power of the communist threat as a potent rhetorical smear against dissenters. In a discursive field no longer dominated by anti-communist fervor, political opportunity theory predicted increased activity among movement participants: absence of a unifying ideological field would lead to increased dissent among political elites and greater media independence. Taken together these structural changes provided a more favorable political environment for the dissemination of bottom-up counter-frames (Entman 2003).

Also in favor of anti-war dissent was the rise of a broader and deeper information network that provided a horizontal communication alternative to traditional media for reaching target audiences. Meanwhile fragmentation of cable television along partisan lines made it possible for a news source to assist and even sponsor a movement, as was the case for Fox News in its coverage and support of the Tea Party movement (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). In the UK a similar trend is taking place as increased competition among media outlets leads to ‘consumer-driven politics’ in which news media promote single-issue causes and campaigns (Cottle 2008).

From the standpoint of resource mobilization theory—a rational actor model of social movements—the Web offered a highly leveraged means of spreading a message directly through existing networks of potential participants. This avoided the costs of crafting an appeal that would withstand the twin distortions of news values (e.g., conflict and deviance) and dependence on the kindness of elites.

In short, the twin forces—elite consensus and a comparatively restricted information system—that held anti-war movements at bay during the Cold War had been disrupted. Yet even as these positive developments were taking place, a number of countermanding influences also came into play. These included elite countermeasures to what became known as the Vietnam Syndrome, the patriotism and nationalism unleashed by the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and the increased militarism among the US population. We begin by reviewing representative research on changes in the information system.

The changing information environment

The rise of the Internet and World Wide Web provided an alternative to the one-to-many, non-interactive model provided by the mass media. The new information environment permitted a horizontal exchange of information between individuals and groups and eliminated divisions between interpersonal and mass communication (Yzer and Southwell 2008). A cornucopia of information and opinion became available to those who mistrusted traditional media sources and were motivated to seek a richer supply of information and opinion. Those who found mainstream media coverage of the Iraq War to be discrepant with their views turned to the Internet for alternative sources of information. They in turn were more likely to discuss their anti-war views and participate in some form of opposition to the war (Hwang et al. 2006).

Scholars theorized that new information and communication technologies (ICTs) enabled ‘new modes of communication, forms of collective identity and solidarity, and grassroots mobilization.’ They offered the promise of resisting elite domination and overcoming the ‘colonization’ of the public sphere and public opinion (Carty 2010: 169). ICTs provided a platform for mutual-reinforcing interaction between online and offline political participation. Studying moveon.org, Carty declared that the website supplied ‘flexible and contingent forms of (wired) collective identity, the blurring of the public and private spheres, and the possibility for expanded forms of communicative action.’ (162) Opposition, articulated

and strengthened in horizontal communication networks, could stand up to corporate-dominated media and other institutions that attempted to ignore or block it. It might also attract media attention to spread movement messages beyond the perimeters of the choir, a reminder that ICTs do not obviate movement needs to reach mass audiences (Cottle 2008).

Theorists also argued that the ICTs could solve the free-rider problem inherent in the production of public goods. Collective action requires identifying people with relevant, potential interests in the public good, a way of transmitting messages among them, and a means for integrating and synchronizing their actions. Bimber et al. (2005) cited examples of citizens voluntarily posting information in online forums and crafting strategies for collective action without the presence of a formal organization, violations of the rational actor model of collective action (Olson 1965).

The incubation of ideas and strategy in ICTs has not only lowered the costs of mobilization, it has also yielded novel forms of dissent. Liberation from time and space provided by the present information environment has led to novel conceptions of collective action based on the philosophical concept of emergence. The concept refers to high-level processes and phenomena that develop from those at a lower level but are unique and distinct from those from which they arose. One example is the inability to predict the outcome of a chess game from the rules that govern the movement of individual pieces. A more positive example is how the Google algorithm emerged from patterns of page links at the individual web-page level. In psychology the concept has been used to explicate the phenomenon of gestalt and in systems theory to account for a property of a system that cannot be reduced to any of its parts, individually or collectively.

Harcourt and Escobar (2002) used emergence to develop their concept of ‘meshworks’ to describe the self-organizing dynamics of a movement embedded (and constituted) in a communication network. Nonhierarchical and self-organizing, meshworks interweave heterogeneous individuals and groups who share complementary or common experiences. The seemingly spontaneous organization of recent movements such as Global Justice, the Tea Party, and Occupy Wall Street arises from the linkage of existing networks of individuals and organizations readily mobilized by the nearly cost-free transactions afforded by ICTs (see, e.g., Fisher et al. 2005; Bennett et al. 2008). Flexibility and resilience are notable features of contemporary movements, although it is yet unclear whether the weak ties that propel them are adequate substitutes for the strong ties that underlay earlier movements (e.g., church membership). They also mark the strategies of elites mindful of increased public resistance to the use of military force, at one time called the Vietnam Syndrome.

The Vietnam Syndrome and risk transfer war

The Vietnam Syndrome refers to the reluctance among US political and military elites to repeat the tragic and costly experience of a failed ‘limited’ war that nevertheless claimed 58 thousand American lives, in excess of 2 million Vietnamese, 273 thousand Cambodians, and 62 thousand Laotians (Rummel 1998). It also undermined the confidence of the American population in government and the military. Political and military elites perceived that the mass media had played a significant role in weakening their standing in public opinion. Thereafter military force would be used only if the objectives were ‘compelling and attainable, and sufficient force [was] employed to assure a swift victory with a minimum of casualties’ (McCracken 2003). Formulated by Ronald Reagan’s Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, the criteria came to be known as the Powell Doctrine, named after General Colin Powell who directed the course of the Gulf War in 1991.

The Vietnam War exemplified the concept of limited war, which had replaced the total concept of war represented by the societal mobilizations required to support World Wars I and II and the shadow threat of nuclear annihilation in a third (Shaw 2005). A more tempered model followed, represented by the Falklands/Malvinas War, the Gulf War of 1991, Kosovo (1999), and the Wars on Terror fought by the US in Afghanistan and Iraq. The end of conscription, reduced tolerance for casualties, and a more conscious effort among political and military for gaining public support led to a model that Shaw (2005) terms 'risk-transfer' war. Its features included the reduction of troop exposure to hazardous combat, the strategic placement of journalists with combat personnel, and the use of precision weaponry.

Intended to limit casualties, the use of computer-guided weapons also became part of an effort to win back the hearts and minds of the public. Monochromatic aerial footage of silent ground explosions of buildings and vehicles created an impression of a videogame that gave rise to such concepts as 'virtual war,' 'spectacle war,' and 'theatrical micro-militarism' (cited in Shaw 2005: 37–38). The tactic joined the practice of embedding US troops with reporters, a public relations innovation of the Thatcher government during the Falklands/Malvinas War. The aim was to reduce surveillance of casualties in an effort to sustain popular support for military action and to restore the credibility of the military. The Gulf War enhanced the status of the military for a time, but 9/11 and following events significantly raised its standing among the US public.

Terror, political culture, and militarism

The research on anti-war movements since the onset of the War on Terror indicates a rebalancing of power between anti-war movements and the state. Scholars differ on the party holding the advantage depending on what element of the process or structure they study. After 9/11 the spectacle of terrorism stimulated a surge of nationalism fervor. The George W. Bush administration used both to support a National Security Strategy for preventive war, which not only cured the Vietnam Syndrome but also overtook the Cold War policy of deterrence in its ambition.

Unlike the geographically fixed image of the Kremlin and the metaphor of the Iron Curtain that had been symbolic anchors for the Cold War, the War on Terror had no fixed geographic symbols. It could not because the war was not aimed at a particular nation state but a politically motivated method for instilling fear. In turn, the Bush administration leveraged the public's fear to gain popular support for ground invasions against two nation states, though the push for the invasion of Iraq was more difficult and stimulated widespread demonstrations (Maney et al. 2009). Images and video footage of the airliner collisions with the Twin Towers and their collapse reminded the populace that it was the US that had been attacked and reinforced the belief that following military action would be defensive in nature, even if it meant a preemptive attack.

In terms of Snow and Benford's framing model, the anti-war movement needed to craft a compelling argument that could overcome the resonance of an appeal to respond forcefully to a surprise attack waged by a ruthless and remorseless enemy. The swift takedown of critics (e.g., Bill Maher, Susan Sontag) who questioned the assertions that the 9/11 attackers were cowards—which raised questions of motive as related to US foreign policy—demonstrated the resonance of the Pearl Harbor analogy as a cultural force multiplier for the War on Terror. After 9/11 the peace movement pragmatically adopted a nationalist identity that condemned the terrorists and honored their victims, restricting the scope of anti-war frames

to the abrogation of civil liberties and democratic participation. In the words of a group of researchers, 'post-9/11 activism for peace became patriotic' (Maney et al. 2005).

In the early stages of the Iraq War, media coverage was predictably patriotic and stifled dissent despite the size of the demonstrations (about 10 million people demonstrated in at least 600 cities throughout the world), the largest in the history of anti-war movements (Epstein 2003). In London nearly one million protestors marched on the eve of the war. Despite the numbers of dissenters and the controversies surrounding the war, a study of seven national papers in the UK found that coverage marginalized or ignored the anti-war movement. The authors concluded, 'With respect to mainstream media, protest and opposition during war remains a marginal and difficult task' (Murray et al. 2008).

In the US, media also marginalized the demonstrators during the active phase of the war (prior to President Bush's declaration of the end of 'major combat operations' aboard an aircraft carrier on May 1, 2003), despite the patriotic alignment of anti-war frames. Coverage sanitized the war by ignoring Iraqi casualties and the outrage among the population and in the region, a feature of the war amply covered by Al Jazeera (Byerly 2005; Luther and Miller 2005; Aday 2005). As the war continued, demonstrations became more frequent, but it was not clear whether it was their message or the stream of bad news—failure to find the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and sectarian violence—that followed Bush's premature declaration of victory that turned public opinion against the war. An alternative explanation from prospect theory is that as the rationale for the Iraq invasion changed from avoidance of a risk (attack on the US with WMD) to regime change, public opinion turned against the war. Prospect theory predicts that support increases when the public perceives policies to be predicated on the prevention of a loss and decreases when those policies are intended to achieve a gain (see Perla 2011).

As predicted by the indexing hypothesis, when elites (including some that had been in the Bush administration) became critical of the war, media coverage also turned critical. What is interesting in these studies is increasing evidence of deference to the military that tapped a deeper militarism that had been growing in US political culture. Echoing the study by Maney and his colleagues (2005) of the prominence of patriotism in post-9/11 anti-war coverage, Klein et al. (2009) found that veterans of the Iraq War were the third most quoted sources in media coverage during the 2006 mid-terms by which time public opinion had turned against the war.

A later study of coverage in *Time* magazine (Harp et al. 2010) found that US military officials were among the most quoted critics of the war, especially after the insurgency grew in Iraq. The broader context for the increased presence of military voices in movement discourse is what one scholar termed 'the long shadow of Vietnam,' the perception, not fully documented, that the anti-war movement was hostile to returning soldiers and the use of loyalty to the troops by the Bush administration to beef up patriotic support for the invasion of Iraq (Leitz 2011). That rhetorical stratagem was also used during the Gulf War as citizens tied yellow ribbons around trees and affixed yellow ribbon magnets to the trunks of their cars to show they supported the troops. Leitz references the gap between popular perceptions of participants in the anti-war movement from the majority of those serving in the armed forces:

Not only are [military peace] activists respected because of their experiences, these experiences make them appear more similar to the 'average American' than stereotypical peace activists. Similarly, during the Persian Gulf War in the 1990s, the leader of a military family peace organization claimed his organization could

reach ‘ordinary’ or ‘mainstream’ America in ways that the ‘odd folk’ in other peace movement organizations could not ... During both wars military families believed that this mainstream identity presentation helped inspire credibility and thus enhanced their antiwar framing,

(Leitz 2011: 249)

The drawback of adapting anti-war arguments to a ‘support our troops’ frame is that it tacitly accepts the legitimacy of the institution that advances US military primacy and limits a more ambitious critique of the legitimacy of US foreign policy in general.

Popular support for a continual War on Terror depends on increased admiration among the US population for the military. Figure 10.1 depicts the percentage of Americans who had a ‘great deal of confidence in people who run the military’ in the forty-year period between 1973 and 2013.

The ebb of confidence can be seen in the years following the end of the Vietnam War when support averaged in the mid-30s. The wars in the Middle East—first the Gulf War of 1991 and then the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003—marked a dramatic rise in the public’s support of the military. While the Gulf War’s influence was temporary, the rise in support since 9/11 was sustained for over a decade. To provide some contrasting context for the public’s confidence, while President Obama’s level of support hovered in the upper 40s toward the end of his term in office and confidence in Congress and the mass media could be measured in the high single digits, confidence in the military averaged in the mid to high 50s.




Figure 10.1 Great deal of confidence in people who run the military

Data source: General Social Survey

The reasons for the rise in the public's confidence are many, but most notable is the end of conscription and the demise of the citizen-soldier. As historian Andrew Bacevich (2013) pointed out, middle-class Americans profess deep regard and admiration for the military, from a safe distance. The distance also applies to the demographic makeup of the enlisted forces as contrasted with the nonmilitary population. He cited statistics that show that, in 2000, minorities made up 42 percent of the Army's enlisted force and that less than 7 percent of the enlisted ranks had any college education compared to 46 percent of the civilian population. The rupture between military service and citizenship has led to a yellow ribbon, 'thank you for your service' amalgam of guilt and admiration that has, insensibly, become part of the political culture. Bacevich pointed out that with the exception of the Korean War, before the end of conscription there was no 'requirement to conjure up reassuring explanations of what the armed forces were doing and why. The rotation of citizen-soldiers through the ranks and the leavening presence of veterans throughout American society obviated the need for myths, indeed made it all but impossible to idealize war or military service' (98).

After Richard Nixon replaced the draft with an all-volunteer army, the military became a tool of foreign policy unencumbered by the close emotional attachments of the larger population to sons and daughters who served in its ranks. In the present political culture the idealization of the military has ironically contributed to a labile public opinion regarding the use of military force and thereby a drag on the fortunes of anti-war movements.

The War on Terror endures, the result of the agile relocation and reconstitution of the terror networks in places where governments are weak: Somalia, Yemen, central Iraq and western Syria, and border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Meanwhile the ideological appeals of a war against heretics to a conservative branch of Islam continued to draw young supporters from across the Middle East and even Western Europe, Canada, and the US. The horrific spectacle of beheadings and victims burned alive—widely available on social media—continued to amplify the fear and anger that led the Obama administration to seek Congressional approval for the potential of redeploying US ground troops in Iraq. Polls indicated rising support for such an invasion, from 37 percent in June 2014 (CBS/NYT 2014), to 57 percent in February 2015 (CBS/NYT 2015). Despite record-breaking anti-war demonstrations since 9/11, popular support for war remains strong and poses a formidable challenge to the peace movement.

Conclusion

In their essay on the relation between the structure of society and communication theory, Bennett and Iyengar (2008) cautioned of the lag between social changes and the conceptual and theoretical frameworks used to study political communication. In their words, 'we are concerned with the growing disjuncture between the prevailing research strategies and the socio-technological context of political communication.' They pointed out that scholars continue to cite research papers that represent monuments in the progress of the field rather than those that identify and theorize inflection points. Thus a top-down conception of the agenda-setting hypothesis continues to drive research projects despite the participatory, market-driven nature of the communication system today. Political movements are no less influenced by this particular change, but they must also respond to the tides of history and the cultural changes that accompany them.

A review of the research on anti-war movements shows a similar lag in the models and theories used to explain their origins, development, and influence on the decision strategies of military and political elites. Although a dominant interpretation of Cold War

movements, especially the movement against the Vietnam War, is laced with descriptors such as 'delegitimize,' 'marginalize,' and 'trivialize,' the concept of the Vietnam Syndrome presumes a decisive influence. It has also played a part in reconfiguring present-day military strategies, from embedding reporters with troops to minimizing casualties by using precision computer-guided weapons such as drones.

Also needing consideration are the layers of interests intent on undoing the work of the Cold War anti-war movements. Working independently under the rubric of the neoconservative movement, they include military elites, right-wing intellectuals associated with publications such as *Commentary* and the *Weekly Standard*, the Christian Right, opportunistic politicians, and purveyors of pop culture such the producers of *Rambo*, *Top Gun*, *Hunt for Red October*, and, most recently, *Zero Dark Thirty* and *American Sniper* (Bacevich 2013). Their success is evidenced by the rise in admiration of the military in American public opinion and the reflexive support of the president in terror-related foreign policy. The media-driven strategies of ever-splintering terror networks are mindful of US military policy and its role in increasing the prestige necessary for attracting 'foreign fighters' to their ranks. Thus far the anti-war movement, weighed down by its allegiance to a volunteer army and their sacrifice, has been unable to mount a successful campaign against the War on Terror. In this respect movement framing strategies (Snow and Benford 1988) have been unable to withstand the force field of the patriotism and nationalism stimulated by 9/11.

Political opportunity structure theory predicts the success of political movements based on large-scale political features such as the openness of a political system to demands from interest groups, high in the US, low in a nation with a weak legislature and strong executive such as France (Kitschelt 1986). Most relevant for media reception is elite consensus as posited in the indexing model, yet the fragmentation of the news media along partisan lines and a wealth of information and opinion available on the Web provides alternative sources for influencing public opinion. As these trends continue, the indexing model will need to be modified to address the increasing likelihood of selective exposure in a richer information environment.

A richer information environment also provides movements with additional resources to mobilize participants, perhaps overcoming the free-rider problem identified by rational actor models. The record-breaking, world-wide demonstrations on the eve of the Iraq War suggest that mobilization and coordination no longer impose significant costs to peace movements. New concepts that model the dynamics of movements in this information ecosystem (e.g., Harcourt and Escobar 2002; Bennett et al. 2008; Bennett and Segerberg 2013) are still in their infancy and need further theorization and empirical testing before we can assess their significance.

References

- Aday, S. (2005) The real war will never get on television: An analysis of casualty imagery in American television coverage of the Iraq war. In Phil Seib (ed.), *Media and Conflict in the 21st Century* (pp. 141–156). Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Althaus, S. L. (2003) When news norms collide, follow the lead: New evidence for press independence. *Political Communication*, 20: 381–414.
- Bacevich, A. J. (2013) *The new American militarism: How Americans are seduced by war*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bennett, W. L. (1990) Toward a theory of press-state relations in the United States. *Journal of Communication*, 40: 103–125.
- Bennett, W. L. and Iyengar, S. (2008) A new era of minimal effects? The changing foundations of political communication. *Journal of Communication*, 58: 707–731.

- Bennett, W. L. and Segerberg, A. (2013) *The logic of connective action: Digital media and the personalization of contentious politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Bennett, W. L., Breunig, C. and Givens, T. (2008) Communication and political mobilization: Digital media and the organization of anti-Iraq war demonstrations in the U.S. *Political Communication*, 25: 269–289.
- Bimber, B., Flanagan, A. and Stohl, C. (2005) Re-conceptualizing collective action in the contemporary media environment. *Communication Theory*, 15: 365–388.
- Byerly, C. M. (2005) After September 11: The formation of an oppositional discourse. *Feminist Media Studies*, 5: 281–296.
- Carty, V. (2010) New information communication technologies and grassroots organization. *Information, Communication and Society*, 13: 155–173.
- CBS News / *The New York Times* (2014) Poll. Retrieved from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
- CBS News / *The New York Times* (2015) Poll. Retrieved from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
- Cottle, S. (2008) Reporting demonstrations: The changing media politics of dissent. *Media, Culture and Society*, 30: 853–872.
- Domke, D., Graham, E. S., Coe, K., John, S. L. and Coopman, T. (2006) Going public as political strategy: The Bush administration, an echoing press, and passage of the Patriot Act. *Political Communication*, 23: 291–312.
- Eisinger, P. (1973) The conditions of protest behavior in American cities. *The American Political Science Review*, 67: 11–28.
- Entman, R. M. (2003) Cascading activation: Contesting the White House's frame after 9/11. *Political Communication*, 20: 415–432.
- Entman, R. M. (2004) *Projections of power: Framing news, public opinion, and US foreign policy*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Entman, R. M. and Page, B. I. (1994) The news before the storm: The Iraq War debate and the limits to media independence. In W. Lance Bennett and David L. Paletz (eds), *Taken by storm: The media, public opinion, and U.S. foreign policy in the Gulf War* (pp. 82–104). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Epstein, B. (2003) Notes on the antiwar movement. *Monthly Review*, 55: 109–116.
- Fisher, D., Stanley, K., Berman, D. and Neff, G. (2005) How do organizations matter? Mobilization and support for participants at five globalization protests. *Social Problems*, 52: 102–121.
- Gamson, W. A. and Wolfsfeld, G. (1993) Movements and media as interacting systems. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 528: 114–125.
- Gans, H. J. (1979) *Deciding what's news: A study of CBS evening news, NBC nightly news, Newsweek, and Time*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Giddens, A. (1987) *Social theory and modern sociology*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Gitlin, T. (1980) *The whole world is watching: Mass media in the making and unmaking of the New Left*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Hallin, D. (1992) The passing of the 'high modernism' of American journalism. *Journal of Communication*, 42: 14–25.
- Hallin, D. C. (1986) *The 'uncensored war': The media and Vietnam*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hallin, D. C. and Mancini, P. (2004) *Comparing media systems: Three models of media and politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Harcourt, W. and Escobar, A. (2002) Women and the politics of place. *Development*, 45: 7–14.
- Harp, D., Loke, J. and Bachmann, I. (2010) Voices of dissent in the Iraq war: Moving from deviance to legitimacy? *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, 87: 467–483.
- Herman, E. S. and Chomsky, N. (1988) *Manufacturing consent: The political economy of the mass media*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Hofstadter, R. (1964) The paranoid style in American politics. *Harper's Magazine*, November, pp. 77–86.
- Hwang, H., Schmierbach, M., Paek, H., Zuniga, H. G. and Shah, D. (2006) Media dissociation, internet use, and antiwar political participation: A case study of political dissent and action against the war in Iraq. *Mass Communication and Society*, 9: 461–483.
- Jenkins, J. C. (1983) Resource mobilization theory and the study of social movements. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 9: 527–553.
- Jones, T. M. and Sheets, P. (2009) Torture in the eye of the beholder social identity, news coverage, and Abu Ghraib. *Political Communication*, 26: 278–295.

- Kitschelt, H. P. (1986) Political opportunity structures and political protest: Anti-nuclear movements in four democracies. *British Journal of Political Science*, 16: 57–85.
- Klein, A. G., Byerly, C. M. and McEachern, T. M. (2009) Counterframing public dissent: An analysis of antiwar coverage in the U.S. media. *Critical Studies in Media Communication*, 26: 331–350.
- Lang, G. E. and Lang, K. (2004) Noam Chomsky and the manufacture of consent for American foreign policy. *Political Communication*, 21: 93–101.
- Leitz, L. (2011) Oppositional identities: The military peace movement's challenge to pro-Iraq War frames. *Social Problems*, 58: 235–256.
- Luther, C. A. and Miller, M. M. (2005) Framing of the 2003 U.S.-Iraq War demonstrations: An analysis of news and partisan texts. *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, 82: 78–96.
- Maney, G. M., Woehrl, L. M. and Coy, P. G. (2005) Harnessing and challenging hegemony: The U.S. peace movement after 9/11. *Sociological Perspectives*, 48: 357–381.
- Maney, G. M., Woehrl, L. M. and Coy, P. G. (2009) Ideological consistency and contextual adaptation: U.S. peace movement emotional work before and after 9/11. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 53: 114–132.
- McCracken, T. B. (2003) *American exceptionalism and the legacy of Vietnam: US foreign policy since 1974*. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mermin, J. (1999) *Debating war and peace: Media coverage of U.S. intervention in the post-Vietnam era*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Meyer, D. S. and Staggenborg, S. (1996) Movements, countermovements, and the structure of political opportunity. *American Journal of Sociology*, 101: 1628–1660.
- Murray, C., Parry, K., Robinson, P. and Goddard, P. (2008) Reporting dissent in wartime: British press, the anti-war movement and the 2003 Iraq War. *European Journal of Communication*, 23: 7–27.
- Olson, M. (1965) *The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Perla, H. (2011) Explaining public support for the use of military force: The impact of reference point framing and prospective decision making. *International Organization*, 65: 139–167.
- Robinson, P. (2001) Theorizing the influence of media on world politics: Models of media influence on foreign policy. *European Journal of Communication*, 16: 523–544.
- Robinson, P., Goddard, P., Parry, K. and Murray, C. (2009) Testing models of media performance in wartime: U.K. TV news and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. *Journal of Communication*, 59: 534–563.
- Rojecki, A. (1999) *Silencing the opposition: Anti-nuclear movements and the media in the Cold War*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Rojecki, A. (2016) *America and the politics of insecurity*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Rummel, R. J. (1998) *Statistics of democide: Genocide and mass murder since 1900*. Münster: LIT.
- Schattschneider, E. E. (1960) *The semi sovereign people: A realist's view of democracy in America*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Shaw, M. (2005) *The new western way of war: Risk-transfer war and its crisis in Iraq*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Sigal, L. V. (1973) *Reporters and officials: The organization and politics of newsmaking*. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath.
- Skocpol, T. and Williamson, V. (2012) *The Tea Party and the remaking of Republican conservatism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Snow, D. A. and Benford, R. D. (1988) Ideology, frame resonance, and participant mobilization. In Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow (eds), *From Structure to Action: Social Movement Participation Across Cultures* (pp. 197–217). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- Tarrow, S. G. (1991) *Struggle, politics, and reform: Collective action, social movements and cycles of protest*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Tuchman, G. (1978) *Making news: A study in the construction of reality*. New York: Free Press.
- Wolfsfeld, G. (1997) *Media and political conflict: News from the Middle East*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Yzer, M. C. and Southwell, B. G. (2008) New communication technologies, old questions. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 52: 8–20.
- Zaller, J. and Chiu, D. (1996) Government's little helper: U.S. press coverage of foreign policy crises, 1945–1991. *Political Communication*, 13: 385–405.
- Zaller, J. R. (1992) *The nature and origins of mass opinion*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

11

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Managing narratives versus building relations

Craig Hayden

The public diplomacy concept reflects an increasingly salient aspect of diplomatic practice. It encompasses a range of communication interventions intended to facilitate influence, understanding, and relation-building between states and foreign publics. The spread of new and social media technologies has also prompted new attention to the potential of publics as crucial and politically effective agents necessary to achieve policy ends. Public diplomacy is thus increasingly *mediated* through technological platforms. Public diplomacy's role in managing conflicts and in conducting mediated war, however, suggests further attention to how such media platforms (from broadcasting to social media) shape its purpose and relation to concepts such as strategic communication and information operations. In practice, public diplomacy programs reflect a balance of competing imperatives, to advocate as much as to build relations of understanding. What sort of constitutive role does media technology play in reconciling or perpetuating this inherent conceptual tension in the changing strategies and practices of public diplomacy?

This chapter provides an introduction to the concept of “public diplomacy” as a range of activities employed by states to communicate with foreign publics in ways that support their strategic objectives, and describes how states deploy a variety of programs to manage perceptions, persuade, and establish credibility in the service of statecraft. Public diplomacy is considered in this chapter as a field of practice aimed primarily at shaping the symbolic and relational context within which publics constrain or enable state goals. The differing forms of public diplomacy (international broadcasting, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy) are argued here as challenged by *mediatization* in ways that illuminate new norms and purpose for public diplomacy within the field of media and conflict. Mediatization is offered here as a perspective to assess how communication platforms (technologies and their attendant practices) impact public diplomacy strategy and programs (Pamment 2014). The term does not suggest a deterministic account of media technology-driven change, but rather focuses attention on how the practices associated with a technology constrain and enable thinking about their strategic significance in the service of public diplomacy.

The chapter begins with an overview of the public diplomacy concept, and surveys the typologies and categories of practice that have informed contemporary understanding of the concept. The second section describes the constitutive impact of mediatization on

public diplomacy, drawing on perspectives in media and technology studies to elaborate how “logics” associated with media technologies have transformed its strategy, practice, and measurement. The third section presents the mediated conflict between the United States and Russia over territorial disputes in the Ukraine in order to demonstrate how technology reveals persistent unresolved tensions in the linkages between public diplomacy and other institutions of foreign policy.

Public diplomacy: definitions and conceptual ambiguity

Gyorgy Szondi observes that the origins of public diplomacy lay primarily in the managing and prevention of conflict (Szondi 2008). Indeed, public diplomacy represents a potentially vital role in the management of conflict, given its specific mandate to manage international relations through communications with foreign publics (Cull 2009a). The *term* public diplomacy is largely acknowledged as American in origin, and is attributed to Edmund Guillion, who sought an alternative to “propaganda” in describing US international broadcasting, cultural relations, and educational exchange programs (Scott-Smith 2011). Yet the term “public diplomacy” has grown from its origins as a neologism to describe the organization of US activities, to a more inclusive concept that encompasses a variety of institutional arrangements states employ to communicate with publics and non-state actors to advance foreign policy objectives and national interests.

Public diplomacy has attracted widespread attention from international actors seeking to leverage communication platforms in the service of statecraft. China, for example, invests considerably in its international broadcasting capacity as well as its cultural and educational exchange presence abroad through its Confucius Institutes (Rawnsley 2012). China has also built up its research on public diplomacy, in order to facilitate better practices and to extend China’s strategic ambitions toward the amplification of its soft power (Hayden 2011). South Korea and Japan have likewise invested in a variety of programs to promote their cultural industries, both as a means of economic growth as well as a vehicle for cultural diplomacy (Akaha 2010, Otmazgin 2007, Kim 2011). Russia, as this chapter later explores, has turned to international broadcasting and programming online, to expand an audience for its counter-Western news frames as a soft balancing media strategy. Comparative studies have only begun to account for how public diplomacy has become popularized as a component of diplomatic institutions around the world (Hayden 2011, Pamment 2012a, Sun 2012).

The problem with public diplomacy as an *analytical* term, however, is that it incorporates a wide array of state-based activity. It encompasses a variety of communication methods, normative and ethical considerations, and timeframes of action. Public diplomacy also involves a diverse range of practitioners: journalists, cultural relations experts, educators, students, press officers, and technologists working under a very broad mandate to communicate with foreign publics. As John Brown has noted, the label public diplomacy covers kinds of activities that are potentially at cross-purposes, where the objectives of persuasion and the fostering of understanding potentially work against each other (Brown 2009). The scope of programs aimed at the promotion of culture, the provision of news, and facilitation of educational experience distinguishes public diplomacy from connotations of propaganda, and can be distilled to two primary imperatives for practice. Specifically, public diplomacy fulfills two (at times competing) roles for foreign policy institutions: to *advocate* messages or ideas and to *cultivate relations* of mutual understanding.

The inherent tension within the practice of public diplomacy is therefore not surprising, given the range of activities that increasingly fall under the term public diplomacy. Scholars

have attempted to refine the term based on upon its institutional legacies and ideal-types. For example, Robin Brown's four part typology breaks down the term into four dimensions for "mapping arguments about public diplomacy," and includes (a) public diplomacy as an *extension of diplomacy*, (b) public diplomacy as a matter of *national projection* (or branding), (c) external communication for *cultural relations*, and (d) external communication as *political warfare*. Each of these ideal-type categories describe different kinds of politics via international communication, giving the term public diplomacy a wide conceptual footprint (Brown 2012).

Nicholas Cull's oft-cited typology derives from both historical practices as well as normative imperatives, including advocacy, cultural diplomacy, educational exchange, listening, and international broadcasting (Cull 2008). Cull's terms to describe public diplomacy combine strategic arguments for doing public diplomacy, with the institutional practices that have emerged historically among ministries of foreign affairs.

Other diplomacy scholars, however, have noted the increasing convergence of public diplomacy tools with the evolving institutional burdens of traditional diplomacy. A comprehensive report on diplomatic transformation by Brian Hocking, Jan Melissen, Shaun Riordan, and Paul Sharp argues that public diplomacy has become a significant aspect of diplomacy and diplomatic institutions, because much of diplomacy involves the management and cultivation of multi-stakeholder arrangements to address transnational issues (Hocking et al. 2012). The *politics* of this kind of "polylateral" diplomacy requires open and transparent action to build coalitions and cultivate support among increasingly organized and informed publics, bringing public diplomacy into the fold of "traditional" diplomacy (Wiseman 2010). They describe how diplomatic ministries are increasingly required to embrace public diplomacy methods and instruments in order to carry out "*engagement*" to mobilize or inform around particular issues, "*shaping strategies*" to prompt diplomatic action by reframing the terms of an issue, "*disruptive strategies*" to address a foreign public opinion consensus, and finally "*destructive strategies*" of subversion through communication.

The fusion of diplomatic institutions and public diplomacy is warranted, in part, by arguments detailing the rise of the so-called "new public diplomacy," which describe the growth of non-state actors as pivotal to international relations, along with the diffusion of new and social media technologies empowering such actors, as requiring new thinking about public diplomacy. Rather than serving as a euphemism for messaging campaigns and the monological promotion of culture or ideas, the "new public diplomacy" reflects the political agency of non-state actors, and the changing requirements for influence as a result of communication technology (Seib 2009). The "new public diplomacy" is not simply a description of the status quo as it is a prescription: a normative template for adapting public diplomacy to new conditions and political actors (Melissen 2011).

Similarly, Ole Sending, Vincent Pouliot, and Iver Neumann argue that the historical mandate of diplomatic representation is now matched by the salience of *governance*, where diplomacy must manage distributed forms of oversight, coordinating the shared interests of state and non-state actors over issues that transcend the boundaries of the nation-state (Sending et al. 2011). Put simply, diplomats and foreign affairs practitioners must adapt their institutions to account for the larger social consequences of global communication flows that necessitate qualitatively distinct new roles for diplomats in the field of international politics, such as the coordination and management of multiple non-state stakeholders invested in the transnational governance of issues such as human rights and climate change, where communication is central to sustaining networks that support diplomatic objectives. Taken together, emergent observations among diplomacy scholars suggest that the business

of “traditional” diplomacy is both increasingly mediated and distributed in ways that blur distinctions with public diplomacy.

Given these observations about the definition and context of public diplomacy, what does public diplomacy increasingly signify for *how* states turn to communication practices in the service of their interests and indeed, in how public diplomacy conveys strategic interest? What is clear, based on definitional treatments of public diplomacy, is that public diplomacy involves *both* short-term concerns with messaging and advocacy, and longer term horizons of symbolic inducement, where relation-building practices and acts of communication work to establish social capital and identification between the “sending” actor and the “target” audience. Public diplomacy can be both directly interventionist in shaping the opinions or considerations of its audience or it can be *performative*, such as when states cultivate legitimacy by the symbolic value of communicating, where governments demonstrate their credibility by “listening,” “facilitating,” and otherwise participating in how publics communicate. For example, the Department of State’s “Share America” social media platform is arguably not designed to push US perspectives on the news, but to cultivate online communities through the act of sharing stories online (Scola 2014).

In addition to well-known efforts to leverage news media to spread messages or establish exchange programs to cultivate long-term interest, public diplomacy can also be about empowering audiences through the provision of resources. This facilitative stance is exemplified in the US Young African Leadership Initiative. This program provides opportunities for entrepreneurs and civic leaders to attend educational events in the United States. However, the broader impact of the program may be manifest in the social networks of applicants, developed and sustained by the State Department’s Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) to foster more robust civil society and economic development.

Where the typologies of public diplomacy converge, intentionally or not, is on public diplomacy’s purpose. Public diplomacy is primarily concerned with communication-derived *influence*, and is predicated on the capacity of international actors to leverage communication platforms (broadcasting media, interpersonal communication, social media, cultural consumption, etc.) to otherwise transform audience beliefs and dispositions, as well as to provoke or demobilize action (Fisher 2010). Public diplomacy is thus (potentially) more than a narrowly conceived strategy of propaganda, where publics are addressed to move opinion, but is more broadly about shaping the communication environment among populations or in regions that directly impact the goals of the country. For example, this could be bolstering the communicative activities of other actors to demobilize the recruitment strategies of extremist organizations, or providing political communication resources to support democratic institutions. In this regard, public diplomacy should not be narrowly conceived as a repertoire of message promotion or cultural relations, but about *intervening* in the communication infrastructure of a given region, population, or nation-state.

The history of information operations and propaganda suggest that the two defining aspects of this broad vision of public diplomacy, advocacy and relation-building, are certainly not *new* (Cull 2009b). Yet what public diplomacy looks like in practice is often very much contingent on how international actors perceive its worth as a tool to facilitate policy objectives, and how actors perceive the exigency of the situation they confront. Thus, while some countries tend to deploy a version of public diplomacy that is largely defined by maintaining and cultivating cultural relations, others conceive public diplomacy as instrumental to goals of national power projection (Hayden 2011, Zaharna et al. 2013). How states interpret the mandate and ideal practice of public diplomacy, in other words, suggests in practice how the term is evolving in step with other institutions of international relations and foreign policy.

The case of the United States is particularly instructive. As Bruce Gregory notes, the prioritization of public diplomacy in the United States is driven primarily by crisis or some form of political exigency, rather than a deep institutional commitment to the concept (Gregory 2011). In the decade after the September 11, 2001 attacks, considerable attention was paid to revamping the instruments of public diplomacy, given that the United States Information Agency was merged with the Department of State in 1999, effectively “dismantling” the official US organization responsible for managing its public diplomacy capacity (Fitzpatrick 2010). Dozens of reports emerged from think tanks, academics, and government institutions to consider ways to reform or rehabilitate the US ability to communicate to foreign publics deemed crucial to US foreign policy interests (Lord 2008).

R.S. Zaharna argued that to revamp its public diplomacy, the US needed to move away from broadcast-oriented models of public diplomacy thinking, and embrace the relational potential of public diplomacy to defuse conflict and to cultivate mutual understanding across cultural divides (Zaharna 2009). In particular, media platforms were no longer available as easy routes to the cultivation of opinion or messaging. Middle East audiences for the US perspective could choose from a variety of new satellite news outlets, and had little incentive to select US-based information outlets (such as the Al-Hurra satellite news channel established in 2004) in order to gain the US view on its foreign policies and actions. There were diminished opportunities to leverage a purely broadcasting-based approach to achieving the influence goals of public diplomacy, because the field of potential media framing was already dominated by well-established and trusted news sources, such as Al Jazeera (Entman 2008).

By 2008, the US attitudes toward public diplomacy shifted toward a *facilitative* stance, where the emphasis was no longer on burnishing the image of the United States, but on the provision of communication outlets to potential audiences for the US message, and towards achieving the goals of *foreign policy* over specific audience-centric objectives. James Glassman’s 2008 speech on the rise of “public diplomacy 2.0” embodied this strategic shift. Citing the impact of social media on political organization, Glassman touted new efforts at public diplomacy that leveraged the affordances of the medium, such as the “Democracy Video Challenge,” a contest to invite contributors to submit their own vision of democracy via video, and the Alliance for Youth Summit, an event co-sponsored with US technology partners to bring together youth civil society change agents from around the world (Glassman 2008).

During the Obama administration, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton’s notion “21st century statecraft” further effaced the distinction between public diplomacy and diplomacy, by articulating the need for a new form of diplomacy that embraced transparency and outreach to new, critical demographics for US diplomacy efforts, including youth, women, and Muslim constituencies around the world (Clinton 2010). The master trope of this strategic turn is perhaps best embodied in the term “engagement,” featured prominently in the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. *Engagement* signified efforts to connect with the audience for diplomatic communication, in ways that invite response or participation. To *engage* meant, at least theoretically, more than simply “pushing a press release” through new media channels, but to leverage communication platforms to build more robust relationships with publics – to counter misinformation, improving understanding of US policies, and build up social capital among populations that would impact US foreign policy objectives (Hayden 2013).

US public diplomacy’s turn to technology embodied much of this emerging ethos. The Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs (ECA) of the Department of State launched

the department's first social media platform, *Exchanges Connect*, in 2008. By 2013, ECA had expanded its portfolio on exchange and cultural promotion to include supporting Massive Open Online Course (MOOC) platforms for English language instruction, and the development of a video game distributed online. Under the authority of IIP, the Office of Innovative Engagement used social media and Short Message Service (SMS) text-based applications to promote US presidential visits to Ghana in 2008 and Brazil in 2011. These efforts extended the traditional reach of the US embassy in building connections to populations not normally visible to traditional practices of public diplomacy, and invited feedback to US presidential communications. By 2011, social media properties managed by US embassies, and coordinated by IIP had become commonplace. The United States was lauded for its ambitious embrace of social media platforms in the service of public diplomacy, and with building what Fergus Hanson described as a "global media empire," based on the number of Facebook pages, Twitter accounts, and other region-specific platforms for "engagement" (Hanson 2012, Paris 2013).

Yet the rhetoric of such new initiatives did not necessarily mirror the prescriptive implications of the "new public diplomacy" scholarship, which claims the necessity for a *relational* public diplomacy focused on the cultivation of networks and relations in order to facilitate foreign policy objectives (Zaharna et al. 2013). While US public diplomacy, broadly speaking, remained committed to the long-term relation-building efforts of cultural and exchange-based diplomacy, its strategic discourse and practices to utilize new and social media platforms convey a more direct concern with the capacity of communication platforms to secure routes to persuasion and advocacy. Official US strategic communication doctrine, for example, says little about "understanding," and strongly emphasizes the "synchronization" of messaging across government outlets. In practice, new initiatives taking advantage of media technologies are concerned primarily with the reach of communication to promote US perspectives, and less with the deliberative qualities of the communication to *inform* US policy (*Update to Congress on National Framework for Strategic Communication* 2012).

For example, in 2013, IIP was criticized by the Office of the Inspector General for "buying likes" on Facebook, a practice of building followers via social media through advertising (*Inspection of the Bureau of International Information Programs* 2013). How this kind of emphasis on building social media followers translated into substantive engagement involving the exchange of opinion and viewpoints on US foreign policy remained less obvious. In US strategic discourse, the term "engagement" was deployed less as a means to describe a new form of public diplomacy, than as a way to reframe traditional approaches to message and communication control. Engagement, in other words, became a catch-all term to describe contact between the State Department's communication and its touchpoints. This is evident in internal measurement and evaluation methodologies. Since the advent of a new "strategic template" for public diplomacy strategy in 2010, the emphasis on "shaping the narrative" and influencing "conversations" remains prominent (McHall 2013). Despite the rise of "relational" public diplomacy concepts then, much of US public diplomacy remains committed to securing attention and managing communication flows. While some scholars argue as much in critical treatments of public diplomacy, this also suggests a consequence of public diplomacy moving more solidly into the orbit of traditional diplomacy and its mandate to sustain and achieve foreign policy objectives (Comor and Bean 2012).

Public diplomacy scholar James Pamment observes in his comparative study of public diplomacy that upon close scrutiny, much of contemporary public diplomacy practice remains grounded in more narrowly construed conceptualization of influence. Rather than encouraging a more robust international public sphere or promoting substantive dialogue

between and among international audiences, Pamment argues that 21st century public diplomacy reflects “propaganda in the age of strategic communication,” rather than an idealized form of dialogue or collaboration driven communicative action (Pamment 2012a).

What explains Pamment’s observations? Despite the widespread recognition among policy-makers that new communication environments can transform the practice of public diplomacy towards more inclusive and collaborative environs for relation-building, the tension between advocacy and mutual understanding remains tilted towards the management and control of narratives and media frames that sustain perspectives about a country’s foreign policy and actions. Public diplomacy’s move toward the “mainstream” of diplomatic institutional thinking certainly provides one explanation for this shift, in that we would expect to find public diplomacy programs now more directly concerned with practices that effect changes among audiences that impact foreign policy. Yet there may be less obvious impacts derived from perceptions about the media used in the service of public diplomacy. Manuel Castells argues that politics in general is not merely increasingly reliant on media, it is primarily carried out on and through media (Castells 2007, p. 242–6). This broad claim invites consideration of the sort of consequences media technologies might have on conceptual thinking and practice related to public diplomacy, and provides an opportunity to draw upon theoretical concepts in media and technology studies in order to understand how public diplomacy is evolving from strategic logics to practice.

Mediatization, media logics, and public diplomacy

The growth of conceptual and typological assessments of public diplomacy readily acknowledges the context of media technologies as significant to the “new” public diplomacy or “relational” approaches to public diplomacy practice (Kelley 2010). The impact of media technology is visible in the diffusion of political agency of foreign publics, non-state actors, and transnational advocacy networks – and how nation-states accommodate these developments in their respective public diplomacy programs.

Yet it is unclear *how* the ubiquity of media technology among public diplomacy’s traditional stakeholders and constituents has left its imprint on the conceptualization of public diplomacy, including its normative and strategic dimensions. While much of the rhetoric surrounding the rise of networked publics and newly empowered non-state actors has sparked more attention to the strategic significance of public diplomacy, it is less certain whether this represents a serious rethinking of the *purpose* of public diplomacy, the fundamental assumptions about its role as a tool of statecraft, or how public diplomacy offers opportunities for the extension of other aspects of diplomatic institutions. Do arguments for a “new” public diplomacy propose something qualitatively distinct from previous episodes, a shift in the “art of the possible” for public diplomacy as a field of practice?

As diplomacy scholars continue to grapple with the question of institutional transformation, emerging perspectives among media and technology studies may offer insight into the constitutive effects of media and communication technology that address the “materiality” of public diplomacy. Insights from these fields speak directly to how perceptions of technological affordance shape, transform, or reaffirm the practices of public diplomacy across international contexts. The notion of affordance is crucial: it accounts for how certain activities and meanings reflect the properties of the media technology in question (Siles and Boczkowski 2012). Affordance signifies “the physical properties or features of objects and settings that ‘invite’ actors to use them in particular ways” (Lievrouw 2014, p. 23). Following Latour, affordances are both the “permission and the promise” of a thing (Latour

2002, p. 250). So what does the irrevocable context of media technology promise for public diplomacy?

To be clear, this question does not prompt a deterministic response – media technologies are not necessarily the “cause” of any transformation in the normative and strategic conceptualization of public diplomacy. Rather, thinking about the constitutive impact of technology invites the straightforward question of what has changed, particularly in how practitioners and policy-makers seize upon the perceived affordances of the media technology available. Public diplomacy is an expansive term that accounts for a variety of differing practices, yet are there implications that can be specifically located in media technology’s growth among public diplomacy practice and programs: from cultural relations to information operations?

One way to approach this question is through the concept of *mediatization*. The mediatization concept is well-established in media and communication studies, and offers a way to articulate media’s impact on public diplomacy by focusing on the ideas and practices associated with media outside the context of diplomacy (Couldry and Hepp 2013). In particular, mediatization focuses attention on how the *logics* associated with media use have impacted institutional perspectives. Indeed, the notion of a “media logic,” an early approach to the study of mediatization, described and critiqued how political actors changed their communication practices to accommodate the “the selection, organization, and production of issues according to criteria of competitiveness” (Landerer 2013). “Media logic” therefore describes how the practice of political communication is increasingly distorted by the imperatives that drive corporate media’s attention to audience share, speed, and message composition to meet such needs. *Mediatization*, likewise, describes the encroachment of media logic into fields of practice not traditionally governed by commercial media or private journalism. The “mediatization of politics refers to the ‘predominance of audience-oriented market logic’ over normative logic in political actors’ behavior,” which describes how a competitive disposition associated with the commercial media is transposed into other fields, displacing norms of practice and purpose (Landerer 2013, p. 240).

Attention to mediatization is not simply a focus on technology, but on how *attitudes* towards a media technology are imported from other institutions in ways that reconfigure the norms and strategy of communication. Mediatization may not provide a totalizing diagnosis of what has changed in the context of public diplomacy, as public diplomacy is already a field defined by competing logics and imperatives, where perspectives of media professionals, cultural affairs experts, and public relations officials are situated within the demands of states seeking to cultivate influence and the inertia of older institutional cultures of diplomacy. Rather, mediatization is offered here as a way to consider how the practices of public diplomacy reflect emergent or enduring frameworks.

Some scholars have already noted the intrusion of such media-derived logics into the strategic discourse of a broadly construed public diplomacy. James Pamment argues that the measurement and evaluation imperatives that now frame much of government attention to public diplomacy has irrevocable consequences for the kind of public diplomacy programs eventually developed (Pamment 2012b). Thinking about public diplomacy, in other words, is constrained by how it can be measured and demonstrated as providing concrete effects. Similarly, Rasmussen and Merckelsen (2012) describe the rise of marketing approaches to branding as narrowing the way in which public diplomacy has been incorporated into strategic thinking. They cite the Danish response to the Jyllands-Posten cartoon crisis in the 2009 as emblematic of a shift toward “reputation management” and the minimization of risk as the primary purpose of public diplomacy within a national security framework.

Locating strategic reasoning within the affordances of media is also plainly evident in US policy-making discourse. In 2011, Secretary Clinton argued before the US Senate on the necessity of increased resources for public diplomacy and international broadcasting. The language frames the strategic necessity of media in stark terms:

We are in an information war and we are losing that war. Al Jazeera is winning, the Chinese have opened a global multi-language television network, the Russians have opened up an English-language network. I've seen it in a few countries, and it is quite instructive.

(Cited in Lubin 2011)

Clinton presented US public diplomacy in securitized rhetoric, made necessary in comparison to the media instruments of other countries. Strategic necessity is inferred from the possession of broadcasting capabilities, serving as a marker of information dominance under a presumed condition of mediated “war.”

Public diplomacy reflects *mediatization* in that governments seize upon the competitive, zero-sum logics associated with media fields outside of the context of diplomacy. Mediatization has *constitutive* effects when strategic thinking about public diplomacy tends toward competition over narratives and attention, despite recognition that the technological context for public diplomacy affords new opportunities for relation-building and mutual understanding. The following section explores the mediatization of public diplomacy by examining how the US deployed a social media counter-narrative strategy in the Ukraine in 2014. In this case, the affordances of the medium present opportunities that function as strategic goals in themselves.

Public diplomacy as policy tool: the Ukraine Communications Task Force

On February 22, 2014, the embattled president of Ukraine Viktor Yanukoyvich was overthrown after an extended period of protests in Majdan Square of the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv/Kiev. The protests, which had gained considerable momentum through online organization via social media platforms, had also drawn sharp criticism from the Russian government. Shortly after the overthrow, Russia refused to recognize the interim government, citing the work of fascist elements in the ouster of Yanukoyvich and responding to concerns of ethnic Russians in the eastern regions of Ukraine where the former president drew most of his support.

In late February of 2014, Russian military forces arrived in the Crimean peninsula of Ukraine, seizing the territory and surrounding the Ukrainian military garrison (Walker et al. 2014). After securing the Crimean parliament, the Russian-influenced legislators dismissed the previous legislative body and called for a referendum to succeed from Ukraine. On March 13, 2014, the newly declared Republic of Crimea declared its independence and was subsequently incorporated into the Russian Federation.

The Russian annexation of Crimea was roundly criticized in the international community for violations of Ukrainian sovereignty, despite Russia's own narrative of the annexation as justified by popular referendum in the disputed territory. The UN General Assembly approved a resolution on March 27, 2014 declaring the referendum invalid. The US response to the Crimean crisis was swift. Shortly before the referendum, the Ukraine Communications Task Force (UCTF) was set up up to directly counter Russian efforts to control the narrative

of the referendum and the eventual annexation. This became increasingly important, as the Russian Federation became involved in a growing proxy conflict between the Ukrainian government and separatist ethnic Russian territories in Eastern Ukraine, threatening to widen the scope of the conflict.

The UCTF represents an important example of the operative logics underscoring the contemporary practice of public diplomacy, particularly in crisis and conflict scenarios. It also reflects an episode during which public diplomacy was given a leading role in coordinating the foreign policy response of the US government. And unlike much of the growing literature on relational approaches to public diplomacy, the strategy and practice embodied in the UCTF represents something different than the more inclusive and participatory models of public diplomacy found in prescriptive scholarship. Instead, it reflects a fixated effort at managing the narratives surrounding Russian involvement in Ukraine.

The mission of the UCTF was to erode support for Russian media outlets' depiction of events on the ground in the Ukraine, both within Ukraine and other international actors. It was designed to portray Russian actions as violating international law and the territorial sovereignty of Ukraine, while legitimating support for the newly established post-revolution government in Kiev/Kyiv. The UCTF represents a whole-of-government approach to the advocacy function of public diplomacy, and involved support from the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and other federal departments.

The UCTF's efforts involved a number of activities aimed at countering the Russian narrative. It produced a YouTube video, "Sanctions on Russia – How did We Get Here," that explained the US rationale for imposing sanctions. It also set up the UKRProgress social media presence across a number of social media properties, including Twitter, LiveJournal, YouTube, and Facebook (via its "Straight Talk" page). These platforms were established as broadcasting outlets, as well as opportunities to track and recalibrate messaging strategies, which were subject to measurement and impact metrics (e.g. retweets, new follower tracking, aggregate demographic data, and usage of URL shorteners). The UCTF also set up a coordinated summary of US official communication called the "Diplomatic Playbook" to provide embassies, journalists, and analysts with policy-maker statements, news articles, and US social media content multiple times per week.

Yet the US efforts to counter the Russian narrative faced considerable resistance from the Russian international broadcasting and strategic communication apparatus. While the US has claimed some success in shaping the "conversation" on Twitter and other social media platforms regarding Russian involvement in Ukraine, it is unclear whether this effort has impacted the gains made by Russia's coordinated information operations capability.

William Stevens, the director the UCTF, stated that Russia has spent "twenty years building up" its strategic communications organizations, which constitutes a vertically integrated communication system strongly centralized with the Russian government (Powell 2014). The Russian infrastructure for its communications operations included media dominance within the Russian-speaking media in Eastern Ukraine, as well as near total control over the press within Russia itself. Outside of Russia, the international broadcaster Russia Today (or RT) leveraged its considerable online audience to amplify Russia's foreign policy legitimacy (Richter 2014).

Russia's communication strategy was both multi-platform and targeted to multiple audiences. Within Russian speaking audiences, the media framing strategies emphasized the rights of ethnic minorities within Ukraine, and aggressively took advantage of photo-manipulation techniques to portray acts of the Ukrainian government in a negative light. Social media platforms such as Twitter were flooded with both in-person and automated

accounts set up to defend Russian actions and react to posts that portrayed Russia in a negative light (Seddon 2014).

In contrast to the Russian efforts, the US public diplomacy strategy was more dispersed across embassies and federal agencies – a flexible if less coordinated approach to cultivating support for the US position on Ukraine. The State Department’s efforts were not without controversy. The hashtag “#UnitedforUkraine” drew criticism from domestic political commentators, after the office of the spokesperson argued that Russia would have to recognize the “power of the hashtag” in legitimating its foreign policy. The Russian foreign ministry began to use the State Department hashtag in its own Twitter posts, potentially diluting the ambition to build wider coalitions of support for action against Russia (Al Jazeera: The Stream 2014). When confronted with questions over whether US public diplomacy was working against such extensive Russian efforts, Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Richard Stengel demurred, claiming that despite Russia’s efforts to promote its message, the US still retained the advantage of “credibility” in the face of propaganda (Amanpour 2014).

How does the UCTF represent the impact of *mediatization* on public diplomacy? The answer is not derived from the tools used to conduct its counter-propaganda efforts, so much as in the connection between such tools and the strategic intent of public diplomacy in this instance. The measurement and evaluation efforts, in particular, offer insight into this relationship. The UCTF was supported by extensive monitoring from analytical units within the State Department, such as the Audience Research and Measurement team (ARM) within IIP. The State Department’s measurement focused on the “engagements” observed – the extent to which US sponsored communication was shared or “favorited” as well as grew in followers.

Yet it is less clear whether such *engagements* represent the countering or de-legitimation of the Russian narrative about its actions in Ukraine. More importantly, it is not obvious whether counter-narrative efforts function as strategic ends in themselves, or serve as a means to service other goals, such as to consolidate support among nation-states for stricter international sanctions against Russia, or to encourage opposition within Russian-speaking publics. In the absence of a clear policy agenda to facilitate or promote via public diplomacy, the purpose of public diplomacy defaults to a strategy derived from the material affordances of the technology itself – in this case, the measurable outcomes of retweets, likes, and followers.

UCTF, considered as a kind of public diplomacy strategy within a conflict scenario, appears driven less by an overarching strategy of influence, and more so by perceptions of how social media behavior among crucial demographics *stands in* for political credibility and leverage. Which is to say, by examining the practices of counter-narrative engagement, the implicit strategic logic rests on the expected (and unarticulated) returns of being “present” in a turbulent social media space, without a significant elaboration of how its various audiences could serve as crucial publics with the political agency to help facilitate US policy objectives in the region. *Mediatization* becomes apparent in narrowing the scope of the conflict to the contest of narrative framing in social media, which both amplifies an inherent competitive logic of communicative engagement while diminishing or downplaying both the “understanding” imperative of public diplomacy and how such a campaign could translate counter-narratives into tangible policy outcomes.

Conclusion

The US efforts to intervene in the competition of media frames over Russian involvement in the Ukraine is presented here to illustrate the persistence of advocacy-oriented logics to define the way public diplomacy is rationalized as a tool of statecraft. It is *also* offered to suggest that emergent strategic approaches to public diplomacy are in part derived by perceptions of what the technology offers in the service of influence, rather than a more elaborate vision of public diplomacy operating within a complex, networked politics. Put another way, the perceived affordances of the technology to enable users to share information in support of a particular media frame or narrative becomes the de facto strategy of public diplomacy in their own right. The mediatization embodied in the UCTF public diplomacy tactics, in other words, obscures a more robust logic of engagement that could elaborate how communicative action works to link the US foreign policy objectives in the Ukraine to the capacity of media audiences to consume or act upon social media counter-narrative efforts. Importantly, the UCTF's activity does not suggest that *advocacy* is the predominant aspect of public diplomacy either in the US or elsewhere – other “relational” approaches to public diplomacy are supported by the US and other countries with active cultural and exchange-oriented public diplomacy programs around the world. However, in the wake of the events unfolding after the Ukrainian revolution, the US did not turn to its well-established cultural and exchange-based programs in the region. Indeed, these kinds of programs were curtailed as the potential for conflict grew.

The US-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission, one of the most extensive recent US public diplomacy efforts with Russia, was suspended after the crisis began. Pressure among US legislatures also grew to force US international broadcasting outlets such as the Voice of America (VOA) to more directly promote US policy perspectives and directly combat Russian propaganda efforts, threatening the VOA's enduring institutional commitment to journalistic integrity (Hattem 2014). Despite overtures toward facilitative and relational approaches to public diplomacy, the default strategic position veers toward the enduring imperative of control and the management of policy legitimacy. More entrepreneurial diplomacy advocates such as former technology advisor Alec Ross argue that the need to “control” information environments, such as through official press statements and advocacy through international broadcasting, is both difficult to achieve and unrealistic given the diffusion of political agency among the potential stakeholders for a country's foreign policy (Ross 2012). Despite such claims, international actors continue to see public diplomacy and its attendant terms such as *engagement* in terms that both anticipate the ability of states to effectively shape the political impact of conversations across mediated networks, and, importantly, that the affordances of such networks offer readily available evidence that competitive struggles over such conversations can be managed. While there are indeed exceptions, instead of promoting more inclusive and collaborative politics, the mediatization of public diplomacy has worked to sustain the enduring characteristics of political warfare through communication as much as to promote new venues for mutual understanding and relation-building, while at the same time deferring strategic logic to the affordances of the technology itself.

References

- Akaha, T. (2010) ‘Japan’s Soft Power-Hard Power Balancing Act’, in S. Arase and T. Akaha, eds. *The US-Japan Alliance: Balancing Soft and Hard Power in East Asia*. New York: Routledge, 58–80.
- Al Jazeera: The Stream (2014) ‘Russia Trolls US in Ukraine Twitter Spat’.
- Amanpour, C. (2014) ‘Selling America to the World’, CNN.com Blogs.

- Brown, John, (2009) "The Purposes and Cross-Purposes of American Public Diplomacy" *American Diplomacy* August Available at: http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2002_07-09/brown_pubdipl/brown_pubdipl.html. Accessed on July 2, 2014.
- Brown, R. (2012) 'The Four Paradigms of Public Diplomacy: Building a Framework for Comparative Government External Communications Research', Presented at the International Studies Association, San Diego, CA: 1–19.
- Castells, M. (2007) 'Communication, Power, and Counter-Power in the Network Society', *International Journal of Communication*, 1: 238–266.
- Clinton, H. (2010) 'Leading Through Civilian Power: Redefining American Diplomacy and Development', *Foreign Affairs*, 89(6): 13–24.
- Comor, E. and Bean, H. (2012) 'America's "Engagement" Delusion Critiquing a Public Diplomacy Consensus', *International Communication Gazette*, 74 (3): 203–220.
- Couldry, N. and Hepp, A. (2013) 'Conceptualizing Mediatization: Contexts, Traditions, Arguments', *Communication Theory*, 23(3): 191–202.
- Cull, N.J. (2008) 'Public Diplomacy: Seven Lessons for its future from its past', in J. Welsh and D. Fearn, eds. *Engagement: Public Diplomacy in a Globalized World*. London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 16–29.
- Cull, N.J. (2009a) *Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past*. Los Angeles, CA: Figueroa Press.
- Cull, N.J. (2009b) *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Entman, R.M. (2008) 'Theorizing Mediated Public Diplomacy: The U.S. Case', *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 13(2): 87–102.
- Fisher, A. (2010) 'Looking at the Man in the Mirror: Understanding of Power and Influence in Public Diplomacy', in S. Lucas and A. Fisher, eds. *Trials of Engagement: The Future of US Public Diplomacy*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 271–296.
- Fitzpatrick, K. (2010) *The Future of U.S. Public Diplomacy: An Uncertain Fate*. Leiden: Brill.
- Glassman, J.K. (2008) 'Public Diplomacy 2.0: A New Approach to Global Engagement' remarks by James K. Glassman, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, New America Foundation, Washington, DC December 1, 2008. Available at: <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/us/2008/112605.htm>. Accessed July 3, 2014
- Gregory, B. (2011) 'American Public Diplomacy: Enduring Characteristics, Elusive Transformation', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 6(3–4): 351–372.
- Hanson, F. (2012) Baked in and Wired: eDiplomacy@State. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, Policy Paper No. 30.
- Hattem, J. (2014) 'VOA Reform Push Sparks Propaganda Fears', *The Hill*. Available: <http://thehill.com/policy/technology/205097-voice-of-america-reform-push-sparks-propaganda-fears>.
- Hayden, C. (2011) *The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public Diplomacy in Global Contexts*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Hayden, C. (2013) 'Logics of Narrative and Networks in US Public Diplomacy: Communication Power and US Strategic Engagement', *Journal of International Communication*, 19(2): 196–218.
- Hocking, B., Melissen, J., Riordan, S., and Sharp, P. (2012) *Futures for Diplomacy: Integrative Diplomacy in the 21st Century*, Report No. 1, The Hague: Clingendael, Netherlands Institute of International Relations.
- Inspection of the Bureau of International Information Programs (2013) Washington, DC: United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General, No. ISP-I-13-28. Available at: <https://oig.state.gov/system/files/211193.pdf>
- Kelley, J.R. (2010) 'The New Diplomacy: Evolution of a Revolution', *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 21(2): 286.
- Kim, R. (2011) 'South Korean Cultural Diplomacy and Efforts to Promote the ROK's Brand Image in the United States and Around the World', *Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs*, 11(1): 124–134.
- Landerer, N. (2013) 'Rethinking the Logics: A Conceptual Framework for the Mediatization of Politics', *Communication Theory*, 23(3): 239–258.
- Latour, B. (2002) 'Morality and Technology. The End of the Means', *Theory, Culture, and Society*, 19(5–6): 247–260.
- Lord, K.M. (2008) 'Voices of America: U.S. Public Diplomacy for the 21st Century – Brookings Institution'. Brookings Institution. Available: http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/11_public_diplomacy_lord.aspx.
- Lubin, G. (2011) 'Hillary Clinton Says Al Jazeera is Putting American Media to Shame', *Business Insider*. Available: <http://www.businessinsider.com/hillary-clinton-al-jazeera-2011-3>.

- McHall, D. (2013) Presentation to the Public Diplomacy Council. American Foreign Service Association, Washington, DC.
- Melissen, J. (2011) *Beyond the New Public Diplomacy*. Clingendael Paper No. 3. The Hague: Clingendael, Netherlands Institute of International Relations.
- Otmazgin, N.K (2007) 'Contesting Soft Power: Japanese Popular Culture in East and Southeast Asia', *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 8(1): 73–101.
- Pamment, J. (2012a) *New Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century: A Comparative Study of Policy and Practice*. New York: Routledge.
- Pamment, J. (2012b) 'What Became of the New Public Diplomacy? Recent Developments in British, US and Swedish Public Diplomacy Policy and Evaluation Methods', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 7(3): 313–336.
- Pamment, J. (2014) 'The Mediatization of Diplomacy', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 9(3): 253–280.
- Paris, R. (2013) 'The Digital Diplomacy Revolution', OpenCanada.org, Canadian International Council. Available: <http://opencanada.org/features/the-think-tank/essays/the-digital-diplomacy-revolution/>.
- Powell, A. (2014) 'Is the US Losing the Propaganda War with Russia?', USC Annenberg Center on Communication Leadership and Policy. Available at: <https://communicationleadership.usc.edu/news/is-the-us-losing-the-propaganda-war-with-russia/>. Accessed June 30, 2014.
- Rasmussen, R.K. and Merkelsen, H. (2012) 'The New PR of States: How Nation Branding Practices Affect the Security Function of Public Diplomacy', *Public Relations Review*, 38(5): 810–818.
- Rawnsley, G. (2012) 'Approaches to Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in China and Taiwan', *Journal of International Communication*, 18(2): 121–135.
- Richter, P. (2014) 'White House Accuses Russia of Anti-U.S. Propaganda War in Ukraine', *Los Angeles Times*, 20 May.
- Ross, A. (2012) Remarks at Digital Diplomacy: A New Era of Advancing Policy, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC. Available at <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/05/17/digital-diplomacy-new-era-of-advancing-policy/apnu>
- Scola, N. (2014) 'Meet Share America, the U.S. State Department's Upworthy Clone', *The Washington Post*. Available: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/09/30/meet-share-america-the-u-s-state-departments-upworthy-clone/>.
- Scott-Smith, G. (2011) 'The Heineken Factor? Using Exchanges to Extend the Reach of U.S. Soft Power', American Diplomacy. Available: http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2011/0104/comm/scottsmith_heineken.html#_ednref3.
- Seddon, M. (2014) 'Documents Show How Russia's Troll Army Hit America' Buzzfeed. https://www.buzzfeed.com/maxseddon/documents-show-how-russias-troll-army-hit-america?utm_term=.mtNrZOvov#.qjaM4IQxQ
- Seib, P. (2009) *Toward a New Public Diplomacy: Redirecting U.S. Foreign Policy*. Palgrave New York: Macmillan.
- Sending, O.J., Pouliot, V., and Neumann, I.B. (2011) 'The Future of Diplomacy: Changing Practices, Evolving Relationships', *International Journal*, 66(3): 527–542.
- Siles, I. and Boczkowski, P. (2012) 'At the Intersection of Content and Materiality: A Texto-Material Perspective on the Use of Media Technologies', *Communication Theory*, 22(3): 227–249.
- Sun, J. (2012) *Japan and China as Charm Rivals*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Szondi, G. (2008) 'Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual Similarities and Differences', Discussion Papers in Diplomacy. The Hague: Clingendael, Netherlands Institute of International Relations.
- Update to Congress on National Framework for Strategic Communication (2012). Washington DC: United States National Security Council.
- Walker, S., Salem, H., and MacAskill, E. (2014) 'Russian "Invasion" of Crimea Fuels Fear of Ukraine Conflict', *The Guardian*, 28 February.
- Wiseman, G. (2010) 'Polylaternalism: Diplomacy's Third Dimension', *Public Diplomacy Magazine*, Summer: 24–39.
- Zaharna, R.S. (2009) *Battles to Bridges: U.S. Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy after 9/11*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Zaharna, R.S., Arsenault, A., and Fisher, A. (2013) *Relational, Networked, and Collaborative Approaches to Public Diplomacy: The Connective Mindshift*. New York: Routledge.

12

MAPPING A CENTURY IN MEDIA COVERAGE OF WAR AND CONFLICT

Katy Parry and Peter Goddard

How can anyone hope to offer a fair picture of the possibility of peace when the press, the only real medium for the masses, is both strictly censored and in the hands of propagandists, warmongers and ideologues? Corday finds no great comfort in the thought that a succeeding generation will be able to make sense of the tangle of emotional storms, *idées fixes*, exaggerations, half-truths, illusions, linguistic games, lies and deceptions which this war has produced.

(Englund 2011: 325–326)

Michael Corday was a forty-five-year-old civil servant in the French Ministry of Commerce and Post, relocated from Paris to Bordeaux in 1917, one voice in the twenty ‘average individuals’ whose letters and diaries form Peter Englund’s ‘mosaic’ of experience from soldiers’ and civilians’ experiences from both sides of the First World War, and which contribute to his ‘intimate’ history to the war. The quotation above is striking for its expression of sentiments which might equally be applied to coverage of conflicts such as the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Nowadays, these sentiments are familiar, even if it is surprising to find them expressed nearly 100 years ago. Perhaps it is surprising, too, because Corday is merely an ‘average individual’, and the shift to emphasising the voices of ordinary people in the historical narrative is something that we associate with a more recent approach to history in the twenty-first century. Corday’s concern is for future generations and how they might make sense of the tangle of lies, exaggerations and illusions offered by the press coverage. This is the first matter this chapter takes up, charting how media coverage has evolved through a century of war. Later, we return to the shift in focus to ‘ordinary people’, from representation to self-representation, as emergent digital technologies combine with more traditional forms of media to offer an ever-broadening variety of perspectives on the experiences and meanings of wars and conflicts.

In writing this chapter, as British authors in 2014, it appeared especially pertinent to take the First World War as the starting point through which to explore a ‘century of war’. As the United Kingdom and other countries mark the anniversary with various commemoration events, and scholars similarly attract funding to provide new reinterpretations of the causes and consequences of the ‘war that will end war’ (H.G. Wells, cited in Knightley 2003: 87),

we look back to the debates on media coverage of war and conflict. We argue that while the language might have altered over this period – from propaganda and censorship, to ‘information warfare’ and ‘embedded reporting’ – many of the underlying fault lines have remained the same. If the First World War acts as the opening frame for the chapter, the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 provides the closing frame. Britain’s century of unbroken warfare appeared set to end, as recently illustrated in *The Guardian*’s interactive timeline (Cobain et al. 2014). But with regular US-led airstrikes against Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria taking place at the end of 2014, the hope that 2015 could offer the first ‘year of peace’ for British forces since 1914 is looking increasingly unlikely.

This chapter deals primarily with conflicts involving UK and/or US forces, and wars of ‘national interest’ rather than humanitarian crises. In examining these, we take a loosely chronological approach, charting the key debates in media–military relationships and how the resulting coverage is shaped by the journalistic routines, ideological pressures and material constraints of the time. We then turn to recent developments in the twenty-first century and how debates around digital technologies, amateur images and citizen journalism have provided new discussion points, especially in the degree to which they might herald a shift from mass media representation to forms of self-representation (e.g. military blogging, soldier photography). Nevertheless, despite the significance of present-day discussions about convergence culture, social media connectivity and audience fragmentation, we argue that attention to the mainstream media practices and content which continue to provide the dominant interpretations of war and its consequences remains crucial.

While the chapter heading refers to ‘media’, news media represent our primary concern, of course. But this comes with the recognition that news media represent an evolving but still recognisable component within a recipe of media forms and genres which together inform and shape our collective knowledge, emotional involvement and public memories of wars. Feature films, documentaries, TV drama, comedy and, indeed, museum artefacts and political artwork, have long contributed to this broader media landscape of intersecting narratives and images, and newer digital technologies continue to add to it, with blogging, citizen journalism and amateur images becoming increasingly familiar as part of our mediated experiences of twenty-first century war.

Thinking about how conflicts are reported

In examining coverage of media and war, especially in wars in which the nation itself is a participant, it is important to recognise three separate stakeholders, each with different needs and perspectives. In simplified terms, news audiences are seeking accurate information about the progress of the war and reassurance about the prospects of victory, with particular concern for loved ones and other national combatants. Government and military elites are seeking supportive and patriotic coverage: an ideal formula might involve ‘our boys’ as mighty and merciful, fighting an unfathomable or morally inferior enemy, with potentially damaging news of setbacks or images of casualties appearing rarely or explained in terms of the enemy’s propaganda strategy. News organisations which fail to offer such supportive coverage may receive flak from dissatisfied elites, as happened in Britain during the Falklands/Malvinas and Iraq conflicts (Barnett 2011; Robinson et al. 2010). The third stakeholder is the news organisations themselves, and here journalistic obligations may partly be in tension with commercial imperatives. War correspondents often self-identify as tenacious seekers of truth, challenging censorship and revealing the circumstances of war without fear or favour,

but profitability is more likely to lie in giving the public what they want – revelations of the hidden truths of war certainly, but also patriotically themed, domestically oriented coverage.

These conflicting imperatives inform our survey of the ‘century of war’ and have, not surprisingly, given rise to a variety of approaches to coverage. Technological advances – especially the rise of radio, television and, latterly, the Internet – have all led to developments in the form and content of coverage. Nevertheless, it is possible to see all of these conflicts as embodying a clash between openness and strategies for elite control of the news narrative. Understandably, government and military elites have sought to control the content of reporting – crudely through censorship or more subtly by creating the conditions for favourable coverage – but, as we explore in this chapter, too much control risks undermining public confidence or encourages reporters to seek alternative approaches to coverage, while too little risks undermining the objectives of the military campaign. So it is not surprising that scholars have worked tirelessly to measure and debate the nature and orientation of wartime reporting and the circumstances in which supportive, negotiated and oppositional coverage might occur (see Robinson et al. 2010: Chapter 3, for an overview).

Consequently, the research context for this chapter is a plentiful literature on the coverage of war, including historical accounts (Carruthers 2011; Knightley 2003; Taylor 2003), edited collections (Allan and Zelizer 2004; Maltby and Keeble 2007) and key texts on particular wars such as Vietnam (Hallin 1989), Falklands (GUMG 1985; Morrison and Tumber 1988), the 1991 Gulf War (Bennett and Paletz 1994; Morrison 1992) or the 2003 Iraq War (Lewis et al. 2006; Robinson et al. 2010; Tumber and Palmer 2004). Other useful contributions to the field give attention to certain dimensions, such as the role of images (Michalski and Gow 2007; Perlmutter 1998; Roger 2013), trauma and collective memory (Zelizer 1998) and military–media relationships (Maltby 2013). Finally, the ways in which militaries, politicians, journalists and publics adapt to rapidly evolving digital technologies are considered in texts on conflict coverage in the new century (Bennett 2013; Cottle 2006; Hoskins and O’Loughlin 2010; Matheson and Allan 2009). This selective review cannot do justice to the full range of literature and scholarly interest in this area but it serves as a good starting point for our discussion that follows.

Openness versus control: covering twentieth century wars

Across Europe in 1914, domestic and imperial concerns presented crises which seemed more immediate than the impending war, with ‘widespread labor unrest, strikes, suffragist protests and ... swelling radicalism in autocratic Germany and Russia’ (Carruthers 2011: 45). Nevertheless, the outbreak of the First World War saw an upsurge in patriotic feeling and, in Britain, more than a million volunteered to fight in the early months. For publics throughout Europe, news from the front became all-important. The all-encompassing nature of an industrialised war would require the support of all citizens – for the maintenance of morale, but also because the survival of nations depended upon it. In Britain, the emphasis was on censorship and control. Within days of the announcement of war with Germany, the 1910 Official Secrets Act was bolstered with the institution of the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) and the Press Bureau, both with wide-ranging powers to control information about the war and to monitor all telegraph traffic (Carruthers 2011; Taylor 2003). War correspondents were initially banned altogether from travelling to Belgium and France and threatened with arrest and expulsion by Lord Kitchener (Knightley 2003: 93). But as Susan Carruthers writes, the danger with excessive control of reporting was that ‘the press would fill the vacuum of official silence with rumor, speculation and embellishment’ (2011: 53).

As we shall see, the next 100 years have seen numerous attempts to engender supportive coverage of war whilst managing this balance between control and openness.

A letter from former US president Theodore Roosevelt to the British Foreign Secretary in January 1915 also pointed out another flaw in Britain's hostility towards war correspondents:

If you think [American] public opinion should be taken into account, then it is worth your while considering whether much of your censorship work and much of your refusal to allow correspondents at the front has not been a danger to your cause from the standpoint of the effect on public opinion without any corresponding military gains.

(cited in Knightley 2003: 100)

Roosevelt's distance across the Atlantic allowed him to contrast the British approach with that of the German authorities, who were showering 'lavish attention' on the neutral American war correspondents (*ibid.*). His warning opens up a number of key considerations in the relationship between militaries and the media which resonate throughout the century: allowing war correspondents alongside soldiers might have some risks, but they are likely to also provide benefits in propaganda terms and are generally keen to raise morale for their home nation by supplying gripping stories of courage and moral conduct in battle. The harshest criticism tends to be expressed *after* the war, with the 1914–1918 war correspondents' doubts, anger and shame at their own distorted reporting and self-censorship emerging largely once the fighting was over. In his 1923 memoir, the *Daily Chronicle*'s Philip Gibbs summed up their patriotic acquiescence: 'There was no need of censorship in our despatches. We were our own censors' (cited in Moorcroft and Taylor 2008: 42).

Increasingly, the press had become the platform for a simultaneous propaganda war between nations, and Roosevelt's letter also points out the importance of providing persuasive and compelling copy to affect public opinion abroad, especially in the case of a country yet to be persuaded to join the war effort. Alongside popular writers such as H.G. Wells, Rudyard Kipling and Arthur Conan Doyle, the press could perform a 'rallying function', offering its particular talents for mass appeal: 'Their skill lay in knowing how to get the war over to the man in the street, how to exploit his vocabulary, prejudices, and enthusiasms' (Knightley 2003: 89). The cooperation (and indeed co-option) of the press into the propaganda machine in 1914–1918 served the UK authorities well, but it is important to note that the strategic embrace of popular media acted in concert with powerful state controls and a growing intolerance for criticism and conscientious objection (Carruthers 2011: 65).

In addition to this rallying function, the press on both sides of the war also attempted to protect civilians from the true terror of war by playing down the horrors of mechanised warfare and the unimaginable number of casualties. This was even the case in the USA where, despite Roosevelt's concerns, American war correspondents were closely controlled after they joined the war in 1917. For Germany this was to have particularly troubling consequences: based on the partial information that the German public had access to, their surrender and military defeat came as a huge shock. As recalled by First World War correspondent Philip Gibbs, this gave rise to a persistent myth exploited most famously by exiled German military leader General Erich Ludendorff and which galvanised a resolute sense of betrayal: 'It was a stab in the back which betrayed them. Revolution from behind by Communists and Jews' (cited in Knightley 2003: 144). Presenting a one-sided, partial and romanticised view of the home nation's military endeavours not only generates mythologies which belie the tortuous reality of warfare, it can also foment deeply troubling prejudices ripe for exploitation.

If news gained in public importance at the outbreak of the First World War, mass mobilisation at the start of the Second World War gave rise to an almost insatiable thirst for it, with press coverage now supplemented by newsreel and, in particular, the immediacy of radio. In Britain, conscription had already started and a Ministry of Information (MoI) had existed in embryo since 1936 (Knightley 2003: 238). But Germany's mobilization of military and cultural forces was all-embracing by comparison: a 'spiritual mobilization' of German life according to Nazi propaganda chief Josef Goebbels (see Carruthers 2011: 66). Apparently admiring of British propaganda in the First World War and pursuing the myth that Germany had lost the war through manipulation and betrayal, the Nazi administration set about controlling the media. Again, all sides in the war strove to find a balance between satisfying the public thirst for news and maintaining tight control over information which could prove damaging or embarrassing, or expose earlier obfuscation and lies. As well as reports from the front, the media proved to be a vital tool, in Britain in particular, for maintaining morale, promoting a sense of national community and countering the misinformation from the enemy side.

For all its pre-war planning, initially there was confusion in Britain about the role of the MoI and the government's attitude to censorship. In the early months of the war, newspapers and the BBC reiterated the same heavily censored stories, while Lord Haw Haw's German propaganda broadcasts attracted over 30 per cent of British listeners seeking a refuge from the monotony (Curran and Seaton 2010: 122, 124). This reflected MoI attempts at control ('for the purpose of war activities the BBC is to be regarded as a government department', wrote one MoI official (Curran and Seaton 2010: 134)), but the BBC knew better. It announced that it would 'tell the truth and nothing but the truth, even if the news was horrid' (quoted in Curran and Seaton 2010: 139), increased radio news bulletins to eight per day and doubled its staff, recognising a public demand for instantaneous news with which the press could scarcely compete (Curran and Seaton 2010: 123, 135). Perception of the BBC as a source of truthful reporting was crucial to the war effort in both Britain and across Europe, where listening to one of its many foreign language services often represented an act of resistance in its own right. For those living with the oppressive restrictions of German state-controlled media, the BBC's reputation for impartiality and independence only enhanced its authority, seeming to represent the voice not only of Britain but of democracy.

In practice, the BBC and the British press shared many of the government's wartime values and objectives, so rigid censorship could be forfeited for an approach which Carruthers describes as 'patriotic security-consciousness' (2011: 78; and see Barnett 2011: 30). Paradoxically then, the British government's decision not to control the BBC directly was a propaganda triumph, and the BBC's perceived independence made it 'almost certainly the most important instrument of domestic propaganda during the war' and 'both a symbol and an agent of the victory' (Curran and Seaton 2010: 120).

If the immediacy of radio made it the dominant news medium in the Second World War, it was through television that the public came to witness the Vietnam War (1955–1975). In the nostalgic montage vision we now have of the Vietnam War, the fate of service personnel was played out nightly in family rooms via vibrant colour television pictures, alongside images of protesting hippies, neglected veterans and graphic casualties. But this condensed and enduring mythology of Vietnam is also misleading. With US forces aiding French troops in the early 1950s and slowly becoming embroiled in a proxy war in its Cold War fight against Communism, the mobilisation of the media also built slowly, only really becoming invested in the 1960s – with the 20-odd stationed reporters in 1964 becoming 464 during the Tet offensive in 1968 (Carruthers 2011: 104). According to Daniel Hallin's respected

study, reporters may have enjoyed freedom from direct governmental censorship, but they still relied heavily on official sources and produced largely patriotic coverage in which the Americans were the 'good guys', at least until political will for the war crumbled: 'day-to-day coverage was closely tied to official information and dominant assumptions about the war, and critical coverage didn't become widespread until consensus broke down among political elites and the wider society' (Hallin 1989: x).

The political dissensus noted above and fractures between US authorities and wider society in the latter years of the war led to an enduring perception that a critical news media and resulting public malaise had thwarted political and military objectives in Vietnam – a diagnosis famously referred to as the 'Vietnam syndrome' by Ronald Reagan in a speech given to veterans in 1980 (Reagan 1980). This analysis favoured by political and military elites was based, as Carruthers points out, on two significant simplifications: that media coverage was hostile to the war; and that graphic television imagery fuelled public opposition, the second of which assumes a homogenous reaction to certain images rather than acknowledging the role of the varied existing prejudices and personal experiences, not to mention the levels of attention, of those encountering such images (Carruthers 2011: 111–112; also see Hoskins 2004: 15). This intense suspicion and anxiety directed at televised coverage in particular – its 'reputation for power' (Hallin 1989: 123) – betrays assumptions both about the specific qualities of the medium (personalised, emotionally driven, entertaining, dramatic) and the audience's experiences as passive spectators. Ironically, and possibly disingenuously, political and military leaders' oft-repeated assertions on the power of television only bolstered its reputation further. This continued after Vietnam, whether in relation to the 'CNN Effect' and foreign policymaking decisions (Robinson 2002; also see Robinson in this volume), the perils of fighting a war in the age of twenty-four-hour news (Allan and Zelizer 2004; Taylor 2003) or the emergence of non-Western transnational satellite networks (Seib 2008).

Whether or not the news media truly deserved their reputation for 'losing the war' scarcely matters. A war-weariness infected most layers of US society after defeat in Vietnam, and reporters believed that the gulf between their own experiences of the war and the official, anodyne version of events certainly justified the coverage that the war received after 1968. In practice, this reflected a broader 'credibility gap' between generations in the wider political and cultural domains, during an era of mobilisation for civil rights, women's movements and other individual and collective freedoms. For the authorities, however, anxiety over the 'Vietnam syndrome' and a failure to deal with an enthusiastic yet non-deferential press pack represented another lesson in the ongoing contest between openness and control in wartime. The mythologies surrounding Vietnam, perpetuated in varied guises both by political authorities and in popular culture forms, encouraged the formalisation of 'media management' strategies in which the media were to be recast as a weapon in the 'information' wars of the late twentieth century (Michalski and Gow 2007; Taylor 2003).

The effectiveness of this approach was cemented in the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas war. Its island location, inaccessible by any independent means, presented propitious conditions for military control of information and of 'the representational field'. Only twenty-nine journalists (all British) were allowed to travel with the task force, shadowed at all times by military minders, and their copy 'reviewed' for operational security purposes (Carruthers 2011: 120–125). Taking the view that 'late news is no news for the media, which in turn is good news for the military', film reports for television could take three weeks to reach home (Taylor 2003: 278), although positive 'good news' pictures, such as the famous image of a Marine drinking a cup of tea with locals, somehow arrived home in less time than potentially damaging imagery (Carruthers 2011: 123). The military's apparent comfort in deceiving the

media and employing them in a public relations role attracted censure after the war, but the constraining circumstances of the conflict also demonstrated the benefits of close bonding between journalists and soldiers when the media are dependent on the military for their safety and their satellite communications. Patriotic coverage in the British press helped to satisfy the British public that such restrictions were justified in the name of military victory, while the BBC suffered criticism for attempting to be more even-handed (Barnett 2011: 84).

The US administration and its coalition partners were determined to replicate this sense of control over the information environment during the 1991 Gulf War, especially with large numbers of journalists flocking to cover the war from an array of international media. The 'pool' system implemented for a small number of journalists attached to military units and media outlets' reliance on the military for air war images ensured that repetitive footage of soldiers preparing for battle, and of missiles apparently hitting their targets, filled the airtime, along with military experts in the studio providing speculation and reaffirmation of military prowess (Willcox 2005). The Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein attracted particularly personalised coverage in the popular press in Britain (Morrison 1992: 83), even demonised as the new Hitler in the US press (Dorman and Livingston 1994); Iraqi soldiers were represented either as diehards who set fire to oil fields, or reluctant conscripts, soon surrendering to coalition forces.

Reporting war into the twenty-first century

Such control of a supportive master-narrative becomes more difficult to maintain as initial media-friendly military operations turn into protracted and ill-defined wars involving a more complex array of actors and ever-shifting objectives. Moving into the twenty-first century, we have seen two long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, started under the 'war on terror' rubric, slip from the intended short sharp invasions by militarily superior forces, into nascent civil wars and counter-insurgency operations.

The Afghanistan and Iraq wars, starting respectively in 2001 and 2003, initially followed the broad patterns outlined above. The nature of the initial invasion in Afghanistan (with a targeted air war and special forces fighting the Taliban alongside the Northern Alliance) meant that media access was limited and a pool system employed once again. The difficult and dangerous terrain caused problems for independent journalists attempting to circumvent the restrictions on the media, meaning that early coverage largely provided the symbolic images of military and moral superiority desired by the authorities. In their studies of US news magazines' photographic coverage, Dana Cloud's (2004) rhetorical analysis points to the paternalistic picturing of Afghan women unveiled and smiling, while Michael Griffin's (2004) comparative content analysis shows the recurrence of familiar, narrow themes in pictorial coverage of both wars – of soldiers preparing for combat and gleaming military hardware.

The lengthier build-up to the Iraq war in 2003 allowed for a new and well-planned media strategy to be introduced: the 'embedding' of over 700 journalists with military units and hostility towards 'independent' journalists who preferred not to be bound by such restrictions. Embedding proved to be a successful strategy, providing a large amount of the kind of reporting it had been designed to encourage: close-up-and-personal coverage of 'our boys' in action or delivering humanitarian aid (Lewis et al. 2006; Robinson et al. 2010; Tumber and Palmer 2004). Saddam Hussein was quickly removed and Baghdad captured amid carefully staged symbols of victory which culminated in President George W. Bush's 'Mission Accomplished' photo-opportunity aboard a US aircraft carrier. But

already Iraq was facing a chaotic and precarious situation, as many suffered insecurity, lack of basic services such as water or electricity, and sectarian violence which killed thousands and displaced millions. Once the Western embedded reporters had largely returned home, the conflict became increasingly dangerous for both local and international reporters as Iraq descended into civil war. Such unsafe conditions, including targeted assassinations according to Reporters Without Borders (2010), meant that Iraq slipped from Western media attention. Over the decade that followed, mainstream media coverage of Iraq was largely limited to the reporting of soldier deaths, their families' concerns over equipment or anniversary occasions. Meanwhile, public support for the war, so carefully engendered and managed at the outset, gradually ebbed away on both sides of the Atlantic. The costs of reporting – human as well as material – meant that the personal consequences of war in Iraq and Afghanistan remained agonisingly disregarded in mainstream public discourse.

Reporting war and the 'new media ecology'

News media are nowadays treated as one element in the broader 'new media ecology' (Cottle 2006: 51; Hoskins and O'Loughlin 2010). In posting blogs, videos or articles online, citizens can themselves become publishers of news rather than simply recipients of it while bypassing the traditional media. This development signals web-based technologies as a democratising force with potential to destabilise elite attempts to control the 'information environment'. But the embrace of the Internet as a 'bottom-up' vernacular space fails to acknowledge the corporate and ideological interests of the dominant media platforms which largely replicate their centrality in digital forms. There is not the space here to discuss the multifaceted and paradoxical tendencies of something as complex and disruptive as the World Wide Web, but we cannot deny the importance of the latest information and communication technologies in terms of how journalists gather and disseminate conflict news (for further information, see Bennett 2013; Matheson and Allan 2009). The development of radio and television has already shown how journalistic practices adapt with emergent technologies. Digital technologies extend this process further, but certain principles and patterns of coverage remain resilient, as well as the political and economic imperatives behind such coverage.

It is perhaps in the spaces opening up for citizens and other social actors to express their voice and visibility that we note the most disruption to traditional roles. Digital technologies have provided the tools and connective environments through which campaigners, social movements or, indeed, terrorist groups are able to mobilise opinion and action against powerful states. The technology-centric optimism expressed in the Western media's depiction of the 2011 Arab uprisings as 'Facebook revolutions' has been replaced with some recognition of the limited role of social media as a causal factor, and we would follow the appeal of Wolfsfeld et al. to consider each political context seriously: 'The nature of the political environment affects both the *ability* of citizens to gain access to social media and on their *motivation* to take to the streets' (2013: 117, emphasis in original). Public interest motivations to expose abuses of power have also been harnessed by organisations born of the digital information age. The interventions of information activists such as WikiLeaks have provided damning evidence on the higher-than-claimed casualty numbers in Iraq and Afghanistan, yet their huge catalogues of data arguably require traditional journalistic skills and resources to register in the public consciousness.

Possibly in line with the more collaborative and conversational relationships enabled by digital media technologies, the treatment of war has seen a notable shift in focus to 'military experience' and the nature of contemporary soldiering, whether expressed through poetry,

memoirs or blogging and social media (Christensen 2008; Jenkins and Woodward 2014). This turn towards self-representation, where people represent themselves rather than being represented by others (Thumim 2012), arguably encourages new social identities and relationships through media texts, in this case with armed forces given new opportunities to tell their stories about everyday life and military experience. It is not only the combat experience which is of interest here, but also the tensions in returning to civilian life, sometimes in celebratory forms such as ‘surprise homecoming’ videos (Silvestri 2013), but also problematised through an emphasis on mental health issues (post-traumatic stress), criminality, domestic violence and suicide rates. Soldiers’ own images of warfare, which have long existed but tended to be shared in a limited fashion if at all (Struk 2011), now circulate in news media and often portray the most controversial aspects of war. Most infamously we recall the Abu Ghraib prison torture photographs, but also more recently the marine’s helmet-cam footage in Afghanistan which provided the damning evidence in the case of the first British soldier, Alexander Blackman, to be found guilty of murder in the battlefield since the Second World War (Farmer 2013). Amateur imagery, whether from soldiers or citizens, has increased the visual recipes available in the repertoire of news coverage, whether adding an unsettling and less familiar visualisation of war, or embedded seamlessly into the more recognisable journalistic narratives and templates (Andén-Papadopoulos and Pantti 2011).

Conclusions

This brief mapping of war coverage through the past century has attempted to summarise some of the key thematic patterns and problematics encountered during wartime reporting. We note an ongoing contest for control of the message between elites and media, continually to be re-fought in the face of new circumstances, new technologies and new military control strategies. In sum, we conclude with some key points.

- Once underway, short successful wars tend to receive supportive coverage from the national media, which is also when coverage is most intense: drawn-out conflicts may attract less positive coverage as they mutate into counter-insurgency operations, ‘nation-building’ and civil wars, but they also slip down or off the mainstream news agenda.
- Numerous strategies for control of the information environment in wartime have been developed, but strict censorship or exclusion of journalists has gradually (if erratically) given way to more cooperative relationships which aim to create the conditions for supportive coverage. In part, this reflects realisations that an information vacuum is liable to be filled with speculation, and that reporters largely bring complementary values and a tendency to share the perceived national interests with fighting forces, in addition to the ability to create compelling stories with soldiers as the central protagonists.
- The dichotomies between openness (flow of information) and control (strategies of censorship and regulation) are becoming re-articulated in the age of fast-evolving digital media technologies, and media management strategies have also had to adapt alongside journalistic practices. The traditional give-and-take relationship of accredited correspondents given privileged access to Western or coalition forces breaks down in the era of information sharing via global networks. For example, new media players such as *Vice Media*, who currently host the fastest-growing news channel on YouTube, have brought their counter-cultural ethos to conflict journalism, with reporter Medyan Dairieh producing a full-length documentary after spending three weeks ‘embedded’

with ISIS in 2014. Made ‘by young people for young people’ *Vice* flouts the accepted rules and harnesses an alternative form of credibility recognised by a generation who have grown up with the Internet: ‘Trust is not the battleground, authenticity is the battleground’ (Al Brown of *Vice News*, cited in Martinson 2015: 9). In adjusting to the disconcerting developments beyond the formalised structures of established military–media relations, militaries now recognise the strategic role of social media and are apparently attempting to understand the psychological impact of video-sharing sites such as YouTube (Quinn 2014).

Although the conflicting wartime needs of authorities, the public and the media have been the main focus of this chapter, we contend that each of them tend to produce self-interested and incomplete coverage which threatens to mask a full understanding. Our own position is that the public interest is best served by coverage that scrutinises policy and conduct, looks beyond elite perspectives, and draws attention to elite attempts to control the information flow. We also note that a long-standing preoccupation with battlefield access for journalists – emanating from militaries, media and possibly media scholars – perpetuates the crowding-out of other factors, such as the consequences for civilian populations, space to understand the trauma that continues after the so-called ‘end’ to the war, and dissenting voices who struggle to gain legitimacy in the mainstream arena.

Intertwined within the above debates are the various technological developments in communications, as militaries and governments attempt to harness the potentially disruptive forces of emergent media forms and genres whilst alleviating the political, cultural and social anxieties about the overarching rationales and conduct of wars. When wars are fought in distant lands, media organisations negotiate their roles as a public forum for the expression of such opinions, a key player in the selective processes of representation, and as a political actor with its own set of interests, whether openly partisan or as a (trans)national, institutional collective voice. In these roles, the news media often act as arbiters for legitimate voices and for standards of taste and decency, and in so doing may reveal as much about our own political cultures as they do about the theatre of battle. And for the vast majority of Western audiences, recent wars have been conducted ‘over there’ so that the violence, insecurity and other consequences of conflict continue to be encountered only through the intermediaries visible on screen or in print.

References

- Allan, S. and Zelizer, B. (2004) *Reporting War: Journalism in Wartime*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Andén-Papadopoulos, K. and Pantti, M. (2011) *Amateur Images and Global News*, Bristol: Intellect.
- Barnett, S. (2011) *The Rise and Fall of Television Journalism: Just Wires and Lights in a Box?* London: Bloomsbury.
- Bennett, D. (2013) *Digital Media and Reporting Conflict: Blogging and the BBC's Coverage of War and Terrorism*, New York: Routledge.
- Bennett, W.L. and Paletz, D.L. (eds) (1994) *Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy in the Gulf War*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago.
- Carruthers, S. (2011) *The Media at War*, 2nd edn, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Christensen, C. (2008) ‘Uploading dissonance: YouTube and the US occupation of Iraq Media’, *Media, War & Conflict*, 1(2), 155–175.
- Cloud, D. (2004) ‘“To veil the threat of terror”: Afghan women and the “clash of civilizations” in the imagery of the U.S. War on Terrorism’, *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 90(3), 285–306.
- Cobain, I., MacAskill, E. and Stoddard, K. (2014) ‘Britain’s 100 years of conflict’, *The Guardian*. Available HTTP: <<http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/ng-interactive/2014/feb/11/britain-100-years-of-conflict>> (accessed 8 March 2014).

- Cottle, S. (2006) *Mediatized Conflict*, Maidenhead: Open University Press
- Curran, J. and Seaton, J. (2010) *Power without Responsibility: The Press, Broadcasting and the Internet in Britain*, 7th edn, Abingdon: Routledge.
- Dorman, W.A. and Livingston, S. (1994) 'News and historical content: The establishing phase of the Persian Gulf policy debate', in W.L. Bennett and D.L. Paletz (eds) *Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy in the Gulf War*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago.
- Englund, P. (2011) *The Beauty and the Sorrow: An Intimate History of the First World War*, London: Profile.
- Farmer, B. (2013) 'Royal Marine faces life in jail for captive execution', *The Telegraph*, 8 November. Available HTTP: <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/10436149/Royal-Marine-faces-life-in-jail-for-captive-execution.html>> (accessed 18 April 2014).
- GUMG (Glasgow University Media Group) (1985) *War and Peace News*, Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
- Griffin, M. (2004) 'Picturing America's "war on terrorism" in Afghanistan and Iraq: Photographic motifs as news frames', *Journalism*, 5(4), 381–402.
- Hallin, D.C. (1989) *The 'Uncensored War': The Media and Vietnam*, Paperback edn, Berkeley, CA: University of California.
- Hoskins, A. (2004) *Televising War: From Vietnam to Iraq*, London: Continuum.
- Hoskins, A. and O'Loughlin, B. (2010) *War and Media: The Emergence of Diffused War*, Cambridge: Polity.
- Jenkins, K.N. and Woodward, R. (2014) 'Communicating war through the contemporary British military memoir: The censorships of genre, state, and self', *Journal of War and Culture Studies*, 7(1), 5–17.
- Knightley, P. (2003) *The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist and Myth-maker from the Crimea to Iraq*, London: André Deutsch.
- Lewis, J., Brookes, R., Mosdell, N. and Threadgold, T. (2006) *Shoot First and Ask Questions Later: Media Coverage of the 2003 Iraq War*, New York: Peter Lang.
- Maltby, S. (2013) *Military Media Management: Negotiating the 'Front' Line in Mediatized War*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Maltby, S. and Keeble, R. (eds) (2007) *Communicating War: Memory, Military and Media*, Bury St Edmunds: Arima Publishing.
- Martinson, J. (2015) 'The virtues of Vice: How punk magazine became a worldwide media giant', *The Guardian*, 2 January, pp. 8–9.
- Matheson, D. and Allan, S. (2009) *Digital War Reporting*, Cambridge: Polity.
- Michalski, M. and Gow, J. (2007) *War, Image and Legitimacy: Viewing Contemporary Conflict*, London: Routledge.
- Moorcroft, D. and Taylor, P.M. (2008) *Shooting the Messenger: The Political Impact of War Reporting*, Washington, DC: Potomac Books.
- Morrison, D. (1992) *Television and the Gulf War*, London: John Libbey.
- Morrison, D. and Tumber, H. (1988) *Journalists at War*, London: Sage.
- Perlmutter, D.D. (1998) *Photojournalism and Foreign Policy: Icons of Outrage in International Crises*, Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Quinn, B. (2014) 'Revealed: The MoD's secret cyberwarfare programme', *The Guardian*, 14 March. Available HTTP: <<http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/mar/16/mod-secret-cyberwarfare-programme>> (accessed 18 April 2014).
- Reagan, R. (1980) 'Peace: Restoring the margin of safety', Speech to Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention, Chicago, 18 August. Available HTTP: <<http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/reference/8.18.80.html>> (accessed 18 May 2014).
- Reporters Without Borders (2010) *The Iraq War: A Heavy Death Toll for the Media, 2003–2010*. Available HTTP: <http://en.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/rapport_irak_2003-2010_gb.pdf> (accessed 2 January 2015).
- Robinson, P. (2002) *The CNN effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention*, New York: Routledge.
- Robinson, P., Goddard, P., Parry, K., Murray, C. and Taylor, P. (2010) *Pockets of Resistance: British News Media and the 2003 Invasion of Iraq*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Roger, N. (2013) *Image Warfare in the War on Terror*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Seib, P.M. (2008) *The Al Jazeera Effect: How the New Global Media are Reshaping World Politics*, Washington, DC: Potomac Books.
- Silvestri, L. (2013) 'Surprise homecomings and vicarious sacrifices', *Media, War & Conflict*, 6(2), 101–115.

- Struk, J. (2011) *Private Pictures: Soldiers' Inside View of War*, London: I.B. Tauris.
- Taylor, P.M. (2003) *Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Day*, 3rd edn. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Thumim, N. (2012) *Self-representation and Digital Culture*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Tumber, H. and Palmer, J. (2004) *Media at War: The Iraq Crisis*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Willcox, D. (2005) *Propaganda, the Press and Conflict: The Gulf War and Kosovo*, London: Routledge.
- Wolfsfeld, G., Segev, E. and Sheaffer, T. (2013) 'Social media and the Arab Spring: Politics comes first', *International Journal of Press/Politics*, 18(2), 115–137.
- Zelizer, B. (1998) *Remembering to Forget: Holocaust Memory Through the Camera's Eye*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago.

This page intentionally left blank

PART III

Media and human security

This page intentionally left blank

13

CITIZEN VOICE IN WAR AND CONFLICT REPORTING

Lilie Chouliaraki

Introduction

Ibn Omar tweets: 'Roads from #tripoli to #azZawiya are filled with military and tanks, the west of the city (sourman area) is under control by Khweldi'.

(BBC liveblog on Libya, 26 February 2011)

Citizen voice is today a crucial part of contemporary war and conflict reporting. As this quote from the Libya conflict demonstrates, the power of citizen voice stems from its capacity to witness conflict from the perspective of civilians and, potentially, to raise the demand for responsibility or even action in their name. Whilst civilian testimony has been part of the repertoire of war reporting since the First World War (Goode 2009), the new visibility of citizen voice fully resonates with the contemporary ethos of 'humanitarian' wars, which now places this voice at the heart of the United Nations (UN) doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P): 'the responsibility to protect implies an evaluation of the issues *from the point of view of those seeking or needing support*, rather than those who may be considering intervention' (emphasis added).¹ The moral emphasis on listening to 'those seeking or needing support' marks, from this perspective, an emerging 'institutionalisation of empathy and altruism' in the management of contemporary conflicts – a process inherently linked to the historical shift from traditional warfare, based on a conception of 'sovereignty as control' over territories or groups, towards wars that today rely on 'sovereignty as responsibility for human rights and individual security' (Marlier and Crawford 2013: 406).

Even if the institutionalisation of empathy in the UN offers a new legitimacy to citizen voice, it is the rise of new media that amplifies and echoes this voice in the global media landscape. Digital platforms, such as Twitter, mobile phones and email, have been hailed not only as a new chapter in war and conflict reporting but also as a turning point in the power relations of news production, in that they enable ordinary people to claim some control over the news' agenda and so to 'deeply affect the news, in which the margins grow in power to shape the center' (Russell 2011: 1238). In the post-Arab Spring conflicts, in particular, where the exclusion or persecution of professional journalists were pervasive (Salama 2012), citizen testimonies became a necessary dimension of Western conflict reporting so that, as

Wollenberg and Pack argue, 'even the NATO decision to intervene on humanitarian grounds [in Libya] was influenced by this powerful new mechanism made up of the alliance of social media and pan-Arab channels' (2013: 197).

Questions, however, arise: to what extent is citizen voice incorporated in Western news platforms and how is it articulated with journalistic witnessing? Is witnessing the only contribution of citizen voice in war and conflict reporting? How does citizen witnessing portray civilian suffering and how, in so doing, does it contribute to the transnational institutionalisation of empathy? In other words, which forms of responsibility and action does citizen voice make available towards the suffering of civilians? It is these questions I explore in this paper. I begin by theorising citizen voice as a constitutive dimension of war and conflict reporting and then proceed to provide a novel conceptualisation of citizen voice in terms of the 'securitisation' of news – a discursive practice of digital journalism that, in the context of 'humanitarian' wars, prioritises the suffering of conflict as a cause for concern and possibly action for the West. I subsequently employ this conceptualisation in a comparative analysis of the BBC's convergent news on two post-Arab Spring conflicts, Libya and Syria, so as to show how differences in the incorporation of citizen voice in its digital news platforms produce variations in the securitisation of news across contexts. These variations, I conclude, bear important implications on the discourses of responsibility and action that each piece of news articulates, throwing into relief the hierarchies of place and human life that continue to govern the flow of global news.²

Citizen voice in war and conflict reporting: the theoretical context

Even though digital media have played a major role in disseminating the civilian voice, it is the radical changes in the conduct of warfare that have, in fact, elevated civilian testimonies to a necessary component of war and conflict reporting today. This is because suicide bombings, city skirmishes and drone attacks have moved warfare into urban spaces and, in so doing, rendered civilians both the main victims and the primary eyewitnesses of conflict: 'the proportion of all war casualties that are civilian' as Spiegel and Salama claim, 'has increased from about 14 per cent in the First World War to 67 per cent the Second World War, and to 90 per cent in the 1990s' (2000: 2204). As a result, citizen voice has become instrumental not only in contributing to what I have earlier referred to as, the institutionalisation of altruism, but also in introducing a new authenticity in war and conflict reporting.

This claim to journalistic authenticity has prompted major news institutions to appropriate citizen voice in their own renewed vision of journalism as a collaborative project. At the BBC, for instance, the lesson drawn from disaster and terror reporting, such as the tsunami (2004) and the London attacks (2005), is that 'when major events occur, the public can offer us as much new information as we are able to broadcast to them. From now on, news coverage is a partnership' (Sambrook 2009). It is, in turn, this 'partnership' between people's voice and mainstream digital platforms that Deuze defines as convergent journalism – the online presentation of a 'news story package' that incorporates more than one media format, including 'the spoken and written word, music, moving and still image, graphic animations, including interactive and hypertextual elements' (2004: 140). Driven by techno-commercial as well as professional interests, the rise of convergent journalism is nonetheless primarily invested in an ethico-political discourse, that of 'giving voice' to the public (Beckett 2008). For it is these convergent platforms, of the BBC, CNN or Al Jazeera, that ultimately mediate citizen voice into mainstream broadcasting and thus enable this voice to become global, to

participate, that is, in the 'global network structure and enter the battle over the minds by intervening in the global communication process' (Castells 2007: 244).

Yet, whilst everyone agrees that citizen voice is today a constitutive aspect of convergent war and conflict reporting, there is disagreement as to its political and moral implications: to what extent does citizen voice contribute to the institutionalisation of altruism? Which discourses of responsibility and, potentially, action towards victims of the conflict does such institutionalisation put forward for media publics? And how, if at all, can citizen voice challenge the geo-political relations of power, as they are reflected in Western conflict reporting? Two antithetical positions dominate the debate over these questions – the optimistic one and the pessimistic one.

The optimistic position draws on the democratisation of journalism argument in order to theorise citizen voice as the catalyst for a new visibility of suffering in the news (Allan 2013). Citizen voice, the argument has it, breaks with the dominant pattern of war and conflict reporting, the state-driven propaganda that closely regulated the representation of war violence in the name of national interest (Herman and Chomsky 1988), by introducing the perspective of suffering people themselves, as they experience the war zone. This perspective relies on the testimonial ethos of the ordinary eyewitness, who produces heart-rending narratives, 'designed', as Cottle puts it, 'to humanize, sense-size and bring home the plight of distant others' (2013: 244). An exemplary manifestation of the power of the eyewitness is the clandestine footage from the Burma protests (2007) and the Iran election riots (2009), which, in instantly disseminating visual testimonies of violence in Rangoon and Tehran, inspired a global activism of solidarity with local populations (Mortensen 2011). More recently, the eye-witnessing of civilian suffering has played a key role in the reporting of post-Arab Spring conflicts, whereby Twitter, Facebook and mobile phone footage acted as the people's 'partisan advocates' (Wollenberg and Pack 2013), bypassing state propaganda and capturing the global imagination: 'what national and international audiences see', as Kampf and Liebes put it, 'are pictures of the suffering of innocent people ... which means that viewers' spontaneous demand is to stop the suffering straight away' (2013: 9).

If this 'spontaneous demand' to act lies at the heart of the positive argument, the pessimistic position is sceptical of such optimism. Rather than celebrating the moralising potential of citizen voice, the pessimistic view links the rise of this voice to the expansion of corporate media and their need to re-legitimise journalism in the face of a declining consumption of news (Scott 2005). The rise of citizen voice constitutes, in this context, a 'demotic', rather than a 'democratic', turn in convergent journalism, in that, trading professional validity for personal authenticity prioritises the immediacy of experience over fact-checking and expert analysis (Turner 2010). There are two aspects to the pessimistic diagnosis. On the one hand, whilst claiming to reflect a new plurality of information and opinion, convergent journalism recreates the traditional hierarchy of journalism by carefully distinguishing professional contributions from amateur ones. For instance, drawing on an analysis of CNN's iReporting platform covering the violence of the Iranian elections in 2009, Palmer shows how the citizen's 'unpaid labor simultaneously bolsters the power of the CNN brand while also illuminating the social hierarchies long associated with traditional journalism' (2013: 368). On the other hand, as citizen voice is co-opted by major news corporations for market purposes, convergent journalism compromises the expertise of a retreating foreign correspondence service and privileges instead sensationalist snapshots that 'sell': 'convergence in journalism', as Scott puts it, is not about the democratization of information but about 'a new strategy in the economic management of information production and distribution', whose 'raison d'être is profit' (2005: 101). War and conflict reporting is an inevitable victim

of such commercialisation, in that, as Kampf and Liebes (2013) show in their analysis of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, citizen voice from the battlefield provides just that ordinary ‘feel’ that can turn facts into sentimental entertainment; in place of old actors with relevant expertise, such as generals or politicians, they argue, ‘new actors occupy centre-stage and tell of their own personal experiences in melodramatic and heartrending language’ (2013: 12). The consequence is that journalism no longer offers an overview of events nor provides the resources for judgment necessary to understand the war: ‘armed conflict’, they conclude, ‘is increasingly covered in ways that stress the micro-level individual experience rather than the macro-issues of the collective social good’ (2013: 12).

Suspended between these two positions, either celebrating the moralising potential of convergent journalism or regretting the demise of the news into a ‘journalism of emotion’, the argument on citizen voice remains unresolved. As a consequence, it also fails to address the key empirical question of how the reporting of different conflicts may itself vary across contexts, depending on the ways in which such voice is remediated in mainstream Western platforms. Following Robinson’s claim that ‘research into the impact of media and communication processes needs to be done with due attention to the multiplicity of non-media processes that shape political actions and outcomes’ (2011: 6), I therefore propose a comparative approach on the role of citizen voice, which views the convergent news on post-Arab Spring conflicts as primarily a political process dependent not only on the use of digital media but also on the different geo-political interests of the West and other international stakeholders. Before the case study on each conflict, however, let me first introduce a conceptual framework for the analysis of citizen voice in convergent news based on ‘securitisation’.

War and conflict reporting as securitisation: the analytical context

Citizen voice as a politics of pity

The reporting of contemporary wars in terms of the humanitarian ethos of protecting civilians entails, let us recall, a news structure that relies on the representation of suffering as a cause of responsibility and potentially action. This thematisation of suffering in the reporting of war and conflict enacts, in this sense, what we may call, a *politics of pity*: a politics of news representation that aims at gaining public legitimacy by construing the conflict as a scene of action between sufferers, their persecutors and their saviours (Chouliaraki 2006). In centring upon the human toll of a conflict, pity foregrounds questions of death, victimhood, injury, displacement and torture whilst it backgrounds or even conceals questions of interest, alliance, rivalry and domination. The term ‘politics’ of pity refers, in this sense, to the representational work of the news to strategically construe the victim of a conflict within specific regimes of meaning, as deserving security or not, and, in so doing, to reproduce specific relationships of power between those who need and those who offer protection. For, in placing the responsibility for securing human life consistently on certain states rather than others, as Duffield says, ‘human security is embodying a distinction between effective and ineffective states’ (2007: 122), distinguishing, thus, between effective states of the West, with a right to intervene, and ineffective, non-Western ones, as candidates of intervention.

This discursive work of pity in construing a conflict as a humanitarian emergency can be defined as a ‘securitisation’ of news – a process ‘aimed at convincing a target audience to accept, based on what it knows about the world, the claim that a specific development

is threatening enough to deserve an immediate policy to alleviate it' (Balzacq 2005: 173). The news becomes, then, a site of securitisation, insofar as the proposal to act (or not) in the name of civilian security depends upon the systematic use of discursive resources of the news to invest the conflict in moral meaning and hence confront its publics with the demand for action. Rather than assuming, therefore, that journalism simply reports on pre-existing events, the politics of pity suggests instead that journalism bears a *performative* force upon these events, construing them from particular points of view, at the moment that it claims to simply represent them (Chouliaraki 2013). By the same token, journalism also bears a performative effect on the publics it addresses, insofar as these publics are, time and again, invited to engage with the news' politics of pity and to take a stance towards the proposals for altruism that the discourse of the responsibility to protect puts forward for them. In focusing on Western journalism, therefore, my question becomes how BBC news securitises Libya and Syria as humanitarian conflicts and, in so doing, what forms of responsibility it proposes to the publics it addresses.

Witnessing and deliberation

My starting point is that the securitisation of the news depends on the act of witnessing, on reporting on what has been seen and felt by those present in the scene of action. For it is, as Oliver (2001) puts it, the eye-witnessing of a conflict as a spectacle of human suffering that, in turn, makes it possible for Western publics to bear witness to the conflict and engage with it in morally acceptable and politically legitimate ways. In the First World War, for instance, the British justification of the war strategically moved from the German violation of the international law of neutrality, in the invasion of Belgium, to the German atrocities against Belgian women and children, which rallied people around a humanitarian cause. This '*representation of German atrocities*', as Gullace argues, 'provided British propagandists with a vivid and evocative set of images that could be used to explain the arcane language of international law to a democratic public increasingly empowered to support or reject its enforcement' (1997: 716).

Its power to move and moralise granted, however, witnessing can only legitimise efficacious modes of action when it is further authorised by international stakeholders that not only deem suffering civilians as worth acting upon but also judge the conditions of the suffering to be possible and desirable to act upon. This is because the question of security is not a fixed moral 'truth' but, as Hansen (2006) argues, it is always entangled with the power relations of the international order and, therefore, becomes an object of deliberation among interested parties, as they seek to negotiate altruistic versus other, more self-interested forms of responsibility. The securitisation of news, it follows, depends as much on testimonials of suffering as on authoritative voices that assign particular discourses of responsibility to the stakes of a conflict, be these the voices of the UN, International non-governmental organizations (INGOs) or national governments (Watson 2011). In the war of Yugoslavia, for instance, this was a deliberation between the responsibility to protect civilians and the responsibility to defend Western interests, as national and international actors sought to both respond to 'the media reports of Serbian atrocities' and simultaneously 'legitimize the deployment of a large peacekeeping force working under rather dangerous conditions' (Hansen 2006: 125). Unlike, then, the First World War, where suffering civilians were used as mere news propaganda for British interests, the politics of pity in Yugoslavia, the first 'humanitarian' war (Roberts 1999), renders security an inherent part of the very construal of the conflict itself and the driving force behind its

course of action – airborne intervention. How, then, do the discursive acts of witnessing and deliberation come together to construe the two post-Arab Spring conflicts? Which politics of pity does each piece of conflict reporting enact?

To address these questions, I next focus on a comparison of the Libya and Syria news in BBC's convergent reporting. The choice of the BBC reflects my interest in identifying the ways in which a major Western broadcaster securitises conflict reporting. Libya and Syria are chosen because they were both protagonists in the surge of civilian uprisings against the authoritarian regimes of North Africa and the Middle East in early 2011, and were, subsequently, subjected to state violence, mass atrocities and crimes against humanity. They differ, however, in terms of the response of the West vis-à-vis these crimes. Already in March 2011, Libya saw Western intervention – a response that, in the UN Secretary General's words, reflected 'clearly and unequivocally, the international community's determination to fulfil its responsibility to protect civilians from violence perpetrated upon them by their own government' (Ban 2011). Yet, despite its ten-fold higher casualty rates than Libya to date, Syria did not see Western intervention – the strongest Western reaction so far being the UN-supervised destruction of its chemical weapons (following a terrible case of chemical warfare, in August 2013). In light of such significant variation in the West's application of the R2P doctrine, I ask how the BBC used citizen voice, and its discourses of responsibility and action, so as to reproduce or challenge this variation of responses in its convergent reporting. I begin with BBC's Libya report on Saturday, 26 February 2011, and continue with that of Syria, on 10 June 2011.³

Libya and Syria: the empirical context

The BBC's convergent reporting offers daily live online updates of the Libya and Syria conflicts, by using a hybrid news structure made up of various media platforms, including Twitter and email messages, 'eye-witness' links with footage and 'have your say' links that invite people's testimonials and views. This hybrid structure de-homogenises the news story, as sources, rather than woven through narrative, are now connected through the temporal logic of what-comes-first, whilst simultaneously allowing for multiple modes of user engagement: reading, clicking and navigating, skimming through images (Chouliaraki 2010). How does each piece of news on Libya and Syria manage this hybridity into a particular politics of pity around each conflict?

Libya

The Libyan narrative is tighter and denser than the Syrian one, reflecting an easier flow of information on the ground. Consequently, it also offers more detailed updates, which, however, remain open-ended, as events are randomly reported and never reach closure.

Witnessing

There are 113 instances of eye-witnessing in the 148 update entries of the Libyan online broadcast. These can be categorised in two classes, civilian and professional eye-witnessing. Civilian witnessing refers to Twitter messages or mobile phone footage sent by civilians or civil organisations, as they report on what they see or hear on the ground – for instance:

16.39: Ibn Omar tweets: 'Roads from #tripoli to #azZawiya are filled with military and tanks, the west of the city (sourman area) is under control by Khweldi'.

Professional witnessing refers to Twitter messages or reports sent by journalists on the ground, as they either quote civilians' experience of the conflict, what we may call indirect professional testimonies, as in:

18.41: John Griffin in Benghazi writes: 'Locals here in Benghazi are complaining of increasingly limited access to fresh food, medical equipment and, in particular, drinking water'

or report on their own experience, what we may call direct professional testimonies, as in:

08.06: Sky News correspondent Alex Crawford says that in the last few minutes, the rebels have repelled the attack by government force.

Out of the 113 entries of eye-witnessing, the majority (54) are indirect professional testimonies, that is, journalistic reports on civilian experiences, followed by direct testimonies of journalists (51) and by the ordinary witnessing of civilian tweets (6). The BBC, thus, reverses the Al Jazeera practice of conflict reporting as civilian witnessing (Wollenberg and Pack 2013) to prioritise instead the professionalisation of testimonies through indirect witnessing – journalists reporting on civilian accounts. Whilst, practically speaking, this emphasis reflects the large number of journalists on mission in Libya, it simultaneously resonates with the epistemological shift in online news reporting from, what I earlier referred to as, a conception of truth as journalistic objectivity towards a multi-vocal conception of truth that relies on personal experience, re-mediated and validated as this is by professionals (Allan 2013).

Through this shift towards multi-vocal news, BBC's online footage on Libya managed to articulate a powerful politics of pity, which consistently used the figures of victim, perpetrator and benefactor so as to propose a strong discourse of responsibility as the protection of Libyan civilians. This is the case in civilian testimonies, for instance:

09.44: Libyan Youth Movement tweets 'Tanks were used this morning and fired at residential buildings on the city of Zawia but yet again Gaddafi fails to control #Libya #Feb17'

which uses the distinction between people and army to establish the two sides of the conflict in terms of an unequal and immoral battle – Gaddafi's 'tanks' 'fire' at 'residential buildings' – and, simultaneously to reinforce the identity of the Libyan Youth Movement as a force of resistance, in 'yet again Gaddafi fails to control #Libya'. A similar distinction is articulated in indirect professional testimonies as in

07.44: 'I am watching neighbours dying unarmed in front of their homes'

another resident of Zawiya tells *The New York Times*. The resident says the militias are using tanks and heavy artillery, attacking from the east and west gates of the city. 'I don't know how many are being killed but I know my neighbourhood is being killed.' The benefactor is here absent, though evoked in subsequent entries, but the juxtaposition between victim/

civilians and perpetrator/army is repeated in a starker form, in 'neighbours dying unarmed' and 'neighbourhood ... being killed' versus 'militias ... using tanks and heavy artillery'. The following example of a direct professional testimony follows the same pattern of pity:

15.08: Sky News correspondent Alex Crawford, at Zawiya hospital, says that within the last 10 or 15 minutes government tanks loaded with soldiers have been rolling in ... She says there was heavy artillery bombardment lasting about 10 minutes. Since then, the sound of gunfire has died down. Casualties have started arriving at the hospital with serious injuries, including a young boy of about 10 whose body was peppered with bullets, she adds. There are also reports that government forces have been taking away bodies on the streets to minimise the numbers of known casualties.

The juxtaposition between 'government tanks' or 'forces' and 'casualties ... including a young boy of about 10' reinforces, here, the distinction between perpetrator and victim, by singling out the case of the child casualty, whilst the reference to the removal of 'bodies on the streets', suggesting that the government knowingly commits crimes against its citizens, further strips the regime from moral and political legitimacy.

In summary, the Libya conflict in BBC's online live news is mediated by a range of witnessing claims – civilian witnessing, professional direct and professional indirect witnessing. All these types of witnessing gravitate towards the sharp distinction between perpetrator, the Gaddafi forces, and victim, Libyan civilians, with the category 'rebels' figuring as the benefactor. In so doing, the testimonies of suffering in BBC news securitise the Libyan conflict through a discourse of denunciation – a discourse that, according to Boltanski, presupposes a 'redirection of attention away from the depressing consideration of the unfortunate and his sufferings and in search of a persecutor on whom to focus' (1999: 57).

Deliberating

For witnessing to operate as a politically efficacious act, however, the accusation against the persecutor needs to be combined with deliberation – with arguments that legitimise intervention in the name of the international community. Which kinds of deliberation are included in the BBC news on Libya? In line with the ordinary/professional distinction employed in journalistic witnessing, deliberation, too, can be defined in terms of its source status, with popular deliberation referring to comments or appeals by citizens in and beyond Libya and professional deliberation referring to commentary by international organisations, such as the UN or national governments. The total of deliberative entries is 30.

Popular deliberation (10 entries) is about moral argument through people's dramatic appeals for international action in Libya:

2054: Kobby in Denver, writes: 'It saddens me that the world looks helplessly as Gaddafi slaughters his own people. I wish we could send anti-tank and aircraft bombs to the rebels. The world should not wait until people are slaughtered in Libya as it happened in Rwanda before acting. Freedom must reign!'

The use of emotional language ('It *saddens* me that the world looks *helplessly*', 'people are *slaughtered*'), the expression of desire ('I *wish* we could send ...') and the proliferation of

categorical imperatives ('The world *should not* wait', 'Freedom *must* reign!') are some of the linguistic features that build on the discourse of denunciation, already established through witnessing, so as to promote a humanitarian argument for intervention. A similar politics of pity is enacted in:

2045: Samira Kavar in London writes: 'The international community should come to the aid of the brave people of Benghazi in every way possible. Governments and NGOs [non-governmental organisations], including voluntary organisations, should send food and medical supplies. That is the least that Libyans trying to overthrow their tyrant of a leader deserve.'

Convergent journalism's claim to give voice to ordinary people is exemplified in this statement, which explicitly addresses the 'international community' as a potential benefactor of the Libyan people, whilst, at the same time, it enacts a familiar politics of pity by activating the figures of perpetrator, in the 'tyrant ... leader', and the (dignified) sufferer, in 'the brave people of Benghazi' in need of 'food and medical supplies'.

Professional deliberation principally includes UN statements about the status of refugees in Libya (20 entries):

1348: African workers trapped in Libya are the most vulnerable of the foreigners scrambling to flee the country, the UN refugee chief has said. 'There are hundreds of thousands of African workers in Libya, and very few have shown up at the borders', Antonio Guterres told Al Jazeera in an interview. 'We have received phone calls from people in a desperate situation, afraid of leaving their homes.'

Similarly to popular deliberation, such statements also moralise the news, this time by expanding the domain of possible suffering civilians to non-Libyan citizens ('African workers ... the most vulnerable of the foreigners'; 'desperate situation', 'afraid ...').

In summary, the BBC's convergent journalism on Libya combines a discourse of denunciation, through witnessing, with appeals to humanitarian intervention, through deliberation. Whilst popular deliberation raises the question of international action, professional deliberation expands the scope of sufferers to encompass non-Libyan refugees. The securitisation of BBC's convergent news lies, then, in its capacity to both narrate the Libya conflict from the perspective of civilians under threat and to invest this perspective with moral argument as to why it is important to act on their suffering. In this manner, it effectively promotes the responsibility to protect discourse and contributes to legitimising an international military operation, in the name of saving lives.

Syria

The Syria news extract also combines professional with citizen voice but consists of fewer updates than the Libya one. Its articulation of witnessing with deliberation claims, consequently, plays out a different politics of pity and activates a different process of securitisation.

Witnessing

As with the Libya news, BBC's Syria online broadcast is also made up of instances of civilian and professional eye-witnessing (78 entries in total). Such testimonies, however, consist principally of indirect, rather than direct, witnessing (36), due to the Syrian government's banning of Western professionals from entering the country. This difficulty of reporting on the ground is a major difference between two pieces of news, resulting in the Syria news being more heavily dependent than the Libya news on citizen reports from Damascus but also on Syrian state TV and other Arab media.

Civilian witnessing (13 entries) reports on violence against civilians in the course of massive protests:

13.59: Yousif in Hama writes: 'Last Friday major massacres were committed in Hama that claimed the lives of 70 and wounded tens of citizens. At first the media have denied the massacre and spoke of a limited number of deaths according to public sources. It also spoke of the presence of gangs who committed vandalism. All citizens of Hama know that the demonstrations were totally peaceful. Protesters were carrying roses when protesting. There has been no vandalism at all.'

The principal distinction in this entry is, like in the Libya news, between civil activism and state violence, casting civilians as the victim and state army as the persecutor – established through the juxtaposition of, on the one hand, a vocabulary of violence, in 'massacres', '70' lives claimed, 'tens of citizens' wounded and, on the other, a vocabulary of civil protest, 'demonstrations were totally peaceful', 'protesters were carrying roses'. This familiar politics of pity articulates a discourse of denunciation that, similarly to that of Libya, vilifies the state and victimises protesting citizens – with the contrast between state propaganda, in 'denied the massacre', and defiant resistance, in 'protesters were carrying roses', further consolidating the moral superiority of the latter over the former.

Indirect professional witnessing partly echoes this discourse, in a small number of entries (3), as in:

13.47: Reports now say Syrian security forces have shot dead two demonstrators in the southern village of Bosra al-Harir. Anti-government activists say a third protester was shot dead in the capital, Damascus.

However, by majority (33), indirect professional witnessing also reports from a multiplicity of other sources, which modify the discourse of denunciation by offering alternative interpretations of the conflict:

13.04: Reuters reports that Syrian forces have shot dead two protesters in the southern village of Busra al-Hariri, near Deraa. Syrian TV says a member of the security forces was shot dead by gunmen in the village; residents say no troops died.

10.20: Human rights groups say more than 1,100 people have been killed since protests against President Assad's rule began in March, and it now appears several hundred security forces may also have died.

Established through a series of contrasts, such as ‘Reuters reports ... Syrian TV says ... residents say’, ‘human rights groups say... it now appears ... security forces may have also died’, the overall mood of these testimonies is one of ambivalence: if there are ‘massacres’ or ‘vandalisms’ on one side of the conflict, so there are on the other. The absence of direct professional witnessing, where journalists would be able to better check facts for themselves, may be responsible for this testimonial pluralism. The outcome nonetheless is that, in presenting the two sides of the conflict, this politics of pity effectively destabilises the figure of the persecutor, shifting the discourse of denunciation into undecidability – the presentation of the views held by all parties involved without taking a stance.

In summary, witnessing in the Syrian news differs from witnessing in the Libyan one in that civilian witnessing only partially sustains a discourse of denunciation, whilst professional witnessing introduces into the news a pluralism of testimonials that marginalises denunciation in favour of impartiality.

Deliberating

Similarly to the Libya news, this piece also consists of popular and official deliberation entries (27). Popular deliberation (9) expresses the voices of citizens in Syria and the world. Some clearly articulate anti-regime sentiments, as in:

10.11: Adolf Agbormbai in the UK writes: ‘It is high time the international community takes decisive action against Syria. The Syrian government cannot be allowed to continue massacring demonstrators while the world sits and watches. This is irresponsible ...’

Even though these claims sustain our familiar distinctions among the state as persecutor (‘massacring’ people), civilians as victims (‘demonstrators’) and the international community as potential benefactor (urged to ‘take decisive action’ to not be ‘irresponsible’), other claims blur these distinctions:

13.59: Ziad A. Fadel from Michigan, US writes: ‘We have family in a town called Hallouz just west of Jisr-al-Shugour in the mountains. The village looks over the city. They told us that people are being evacuated from the city in anticipation of a much-awaited and welcomed Syrian army attack on fanatics holed up there. Mr Erdogan statements, if true, are irresponsible. He ought to know better about what these fanatics can do. Especially since the Turks have fought a much longer and bloodier war against their native Kurds.’

In direct contrast to the claim above, this one construes the Syrian army as ‘much awaited’ and ‘welcomed’, whilst turning demonstrators into ‘fanatics’ and the international community, in the face of Turkish president Erdogan, as ‘irresponsible’ for seeking to intervene.

Taken together, these instances of popular deliberation unsettle the politics of pity, as we have known it in the Libyan extract. Rather than establishing a stable stage of suffering populated by actors with fixed attributes and relationships, Syrian news continuously alternate these actors, thereby blurring the moral boundaries they are supposed to maintain. There is, consequently, no pure figure of evil or misfortune, in the Syrian news, nor is there a clear imperative for the international community to exercise its ‘responsibility to protect’.

This blurring of divisions becomes even more explicit in further entries that directly address just this instability of positions:

13.04: Antoun from Aleppo in Syria writes: 'Protests in Syria began peacefully and there are still large segments of the peaceful protesters, but also there is a major segment that uses violence, weapons and vandalism. The biggest mistake the protesters may commit is to harbour this segment. Describing the protests in Syria as sectarian is more accurate than labelling it as popular. So far the regime remains the strongest link and a large faction of the society still holds to it. We welcome reforms with the regime at the top of it.'

If deliberative argument may provide legitimacy to intervention, then, unlike Libya, the popular deliberation of the Syrian news complexifies such legitimacy in that it projects the state as both evil and supported by civilians whilst it construes civilians both as peaceful and violent. In encompassing a range of voices, from anti-or pro-regime to moderate reformist ones, popular deliberation in the Syrian news offers no dominant discourse of responsibility through which the conflict can be understood and reinforces instead a position of undecidability vis-à-vis the conflict.

Professional deliberation (18) includes claims from international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), principally the Red Cross, and foreign governments. The Red Cross emphasises the humanitarian aspect of the conflict:

11.12. The International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] has called on the Syrian authorities to allow urgent and unimpeded access to all areas affected by the unrest within Syria. 'It's extremely alarming that our numerous requests for access to affected areas or detained people have not been granted by the Syrian authorities', says the ICRC's Hicham Hassan ...

Choices like 'urgent and unimpeded' and 'extremely alarming' point to the emergency of the situation whilst the direct quote from an authoritative figure ('It is extremely alarming ...') not only adds force to the humanitarian appeal but firmly positions the government on the side of the perpetrator ('called on the Syrian authorities', 'have not been granted by the Syrian authorities'). Foreign governments partially echo this politics of pity, also construing the conflict as an emergency through the choice of direct quotes, in 'massacre of innocents':

10.33: US Defence Secretary Robert Gates says Mr Assad's legitimacy has now been called into question by what he calls the 'massacre of innocents' in Syria.

Others, however, reflect either dissent between traditional and emerging global players, as in:

09.40: The unrest in Syria has prompted a split within the UN Security Council, where France and Britain have proposed a resolution to condemn the government's actions. But other nations on the council, including Brazil, China and Russia, say such a resolution – which does not propose concrete action – could further inflame tensions in an already volatile region

or explicitly articulate geo-political concerns regarding the conflict's spill-over into neighbouring countries:

11.34: Jonathan Head BBC News, Istanbul: 'Turkey has a 900-km border with Syria and, in recent years, has heavily promoted trade with its neighbour. Its officials say they fear chaos if Mr Assad is toppled – but they have quietly started helping the opposition, allowing a meeting to take place here earlier this month in which the disparate dissident figures tried to form a more coherent movement. One of Turkey's greatest concerns is that the unrest will destabilise Kurdish areas of Syria ...'

In both these entries, the politics of pity has given way to a more complex representation of the conflict, with humanitarian urgency qualified by divisions in the international community between Western and emerging powers ('a split within the UN Security Council ...') or by specific geo-political considerations ('could further inflame tensions in an already volatile region'; 'Turkey has a 900-km border with Syria ... the unrest will destabilise Kurdish areas of Syria'). Despite, therefore, the discourse of denunciation, evident in the casting of Syria as an evil persecutor, the professional deliberation of the Syrian news fails to articulate a clear politics of pity that, as in Libya, would activate indignation against the perpetrator/state and empathy for suffering civilians. Instead, it construes a morally unstable discursive landscape, which enables a conception of responsibility as *realpolitik* to voice and thematise the geo-political concerns of international stakeholders.

Overall, the Syria news in BBC's convergent journalism is similar to the Libya one in that it combines a discourse of denunciation, established through its witnessing claims, with humanitarian concerns for civilians, articulated through its deliberation claims. Where the two differ, however, is that, in Syria, both witnessing and deliberation rely on a more complex representation of the conflict than the politics of pity would allow. Whilst witnessing is now characterised by pluralistic testimonials, simultaneously denouncing and justifying civilian deaths, deliberation is split between appeals for action and concerns about the interests of international stakeholders. In this way, the securitisation of BBC's convergent journalism galvanises the question of action through a multiplicity of ethico-political positions, which marginalise the discourse of responsibility to protect civilians and stand reluctant towards the option of intervention in the name of human security.

Citizen voice and the hierarchies of place and human life

The responsibility to protect has been hailed, let us recall, as a discourse of global governance that institutionalises altruism, by expanding the 'circle of empathy' beyond 'our own' people towards all vulnerable others in the international community, towards 'every person, everywhere ... demanding taking risks to protect them' (Marlier and Crawford 2013: 416). Whilst, as the authors continue, this institutionalisation, by coding altruism into a legal doctrine, evacuates emotions of empathy and care from the sphere of international politics (2013: 410), my focus on convergent journalism demonstrates how the digital testimonies of civilians, in emphasising the authentic experience of civilian suffering, return emotions into the global stage and attempt to moralise the West's relationship to those civilians in terms of providing protection to those who need it.

Approaching, thus, war and conflict reporting as a securitisation of news, that is as discursive practice through which citizen voice construes conflict as a humanitarian emergency, in line with contemporary conceptions of Western warfare, I analysed BBC's convergent reporting on two post-Arab Spring conflicts – Libya and Syria. In both cases, we saw that the securitisation of conflict news involves a multi-vocal digital structure of communication, where the acts of witnessing, in civilian and professional testimonies, and deliberation, in popular and elite appeals,

position the conflicts within specific regimes of pity – that is within different configurations of the relationship between sufferers, persecutors and benefactors. It is, however, the journalistic voice that ultimately dominates convergent news, as professional witnessing is an overwhelming majority in Libya (54 direct, 51 indirect vis-à-vis 6 civilian) and a clear majority in Syria, where indirect professional witnessing (36) is more than double to civilian (13); deliberative claims are similarly biased towards elite sources in both contexts with double the number of popular ones in both Libya (20 to 10) and Syria (18 to 9). Confirming, thus, Palmer's research on CNN's 'iReporting' that convergent platforms reproduce the power relations of traditional journalism (2013), the hierarchy of voice in these BBC news texts suggests that professional authority and expertise is privileged over ordinary testimony and opinion.

This hierarchy of voice has, inevitably, implications on the politics of pity in each piece of news: a politics of denunciation in Libya and undecidability in Syria. Even though both pieces, let us recall, share a discourse of denunciation in their professional and ordinary witnessing accounts, the Libya news reinforces this discourse with popular and elite appeals that ask for international support, whilst the Syria news qualifies the discourse of denunciation through civilian testimonials that blur the divide between perpetrator and victim and through popular deliberation that holds equally split views on the desirability of intervention. As a consequence, the securitisation of the two pieces of also differs. Whilst the Libya news unequivocally articulates the responsibility to protect civilians, thereby acting as a prototype case of the institutionalisation of altruism in contemporary wars of the West, the Syria one privileges a form of responsibility as *realpolitik*, oriented towards the national and multi-lateral interests of global players.⁴

To conclude, in parallel to the hierarchy of citizen voice in convergent news, a different and more important hierarchy seems to be emerging – a hierarchy of place and human life. What this hierarchy suggests is that the deep asymmetries of the contemporary geopolitical order continue to classify the world between those who deserve and those who do not deserve protection, selectively distributing the potential for pity towards civilians across different conflict zones. Ultimately, it appears indeed that the celebrated institutionalisation of altruism cannot but only be 'imperfect and incomplete'. For, as Marlier and Crawford put it, 'it is often the case that where the great powers have little material incentive to intervene themselves, those seeking protection cannot rely on empathy' (2013: 399).

Notes

- 1 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa, IDRC, 2001) para. 2.29.
- 2 Even though this piece focuses on the unequal distribution of the 'responsibility to protect' discourse in digital war and conflict reporting, it is important to note that there are conflicts that do not at all fall within the range of digital mediation and, consequently, remain for ever invisible to global publics. My analysis of a digital hierarchy of place and human life, therefore, presupposes (and conceals) a more fundamental hierarchy between visible and invisible civilian suffering, which corresponding to, what Herman and Chomsky (1988) refer to as, 'worthy' and 'unworthy' victims – the former exemplified in various categories of Western civilians intensely mourned and commemorated, such as the 11 September dead, whilst the latter exemplified in the anonymous masses of Iraqi or Afghani dead, in the 'War on Terror', 2003–2014.
- 3 These are available online at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/9416095.stm> (Libya) and <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13724765> (Syria). Last accessed in September 2016.
- 4 In Libya, following Gaddafi's aerial raids against his own rebelling population, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorised a military intervention on humanitarian grounds (UNSC Mandate, 1 March 2011; <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm>). In Syria, in contrast, the almost undecipherable political landscape of the rebel forces, combined with the positioning of the country in the international arena and the risks for a spill-over of unrest across the Middle East, rendered the option of intervention so far untenable (Thakur 2013).

References

- Allan S. (2013) *Citizen Witnessing* Cambridge: Polity.
- Balzacq T. (2005) The three faces of securitization: Political agency, audience and context *European Journal of International Relations* 11(2): 171–4.
- Ban Ki-moon (2011) Statement by the Secretary-General on Libya. Available at: <<http://www.un.org/sg/STATEMENTS/index.asp?nid=5145>> (accessed 14 June 2016).
- Beckett C. (2008) *Supermedia* London: Blackwell.
- Boltanski L. (1999) *Distant Suffering. Politics, Morality and the Media* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Castells M. (2007) Communication, power and counter-power in the network society *International Journal of Communication* 1(1): 238–66.
- Chouliaraki L. (2006) *The Spectatorship of Suffering* London: Sage.
- Chouliaraki, L. (2010) Ordinary witnessing in post-television news: Towards a new moral imagination In L. Chouliaraki (ed) 'Self-mediation: Citizenship and New Media', special issue *Critical Discourse Studies* 7(3): 305–19.
- Chouliaraki L. (2013) Re-mediation, inter-mediation, trans-mediation: The cosmopolitan trajectories of convergent journalism *Journalism Studies* 14(2): 267–83.
- Cottle S. (2013) Journalists witnessing disasters: From the calculus of death to the injunction to care *Journalism Studies* 14(2): 232–48.
- Deuze M. (2004) What is multimedia journalism? *Journalism studies* 5(2): 139–52..
- Duffield M. (2007) *Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples* Cambridge: Polity.
- Goode L. (2009) Social news, citizen voice and democracy *New Media and Society* (11)8: 1287–305.
- Gullace N. (1997) Sexual violence and family honor: British propaganda and international law during the First World War *The American Historical Review* 102(3): 714–44.
- Hansen L. (2006) *Security as Practice* London: Routledge.
- Herman S. and Chomsky N. (1988) *Manufacturing Consent. The Political Economy of the Mass Media* Pantheon Books.
- Kampf Z. and Liebes T. (2013) *Transforming Media Coverage of Violent Conflict. The New Face of War* London: Palgrave.
- Marlier G. and Crawford N. (2013) Incomplete and imperfect institutionalisation of empathy and altruism in the 'Responsibility to Protect' doctrine *Global Responsibility to Protect* 5: 397–422.
- Mortensen M (2011) When citizen photojournalism sets the news agenda: Neda Agha Soltan as a Web 2.0 icon of post-election unrest in Iran *Global Media and Communication* 7(1): 4–16.
- Oliver K. (2001) *Witnessing: Beyond Recognition* Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Palmer L. (2013) 'iReporting' an uprising: CNN and citizen journalism in network culture *Television & New Media* 14(5): 367–85.
- Roberts A. (1999) NATO's 'humanitarian war' over Kosovo *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 41(3): 102–23.
- Robinson P. (2011) The CNN effect reconsidered: Mapping a research agenda for the future *Media, War & Conflict* 4(1): 3–11.
- Russell A. (2011) Extra-national information flows, social media, and the 2011 Egyptian uprising *International Journal of Communication* 5: 1238–47.
- Salama V. (2012) "Covering Syria." *International Journal of Press/Politics* 17(4): 516–526.
- Sambrook R. (2009) "Citizen journalism." International news reporting: Frontlines and deadlines' in Owen J. and Purdey H. (eds) *International News Reporting: Frontlines and Deadlines*, pp. 220–242.
- Scott B. (2005) A contemporary history of digital journalism *New Media and Society* 6(1): 89–126.
- Spiegel P.B. and Salama P. (2000) War and mortality in Kosovo, 1998–99: An epidemiological testimony *The Lancet* 355(9222): 2204–9.
- Thakur R. (2013) R2P after Libya and Syria: Engaging emerging powers *The Washington Quarterly* 36(2): 61–76.
- Turner G. (2010) *Ordinary People and the Media: The Demotic Turn* London: Sage.
- Watson S. (2011) The 'human' as referent object? Humanitarianism as securitization *Security Dialogue* 42(1): 3–20.
- Wollenberg A. and Pack J. (2013) Rebels with a pen: Observations on the newly emerging media landscape in Libya *The Journal of North African Studies* 18(2): 191–210.

14

THE CNN EFFECT AND HUMANITARIAN ACTION

*Piers Robinson*¹

Overview

During the 1990s the emergence of global news media providers such as CNN, coupled with dramatic shifts in the global political landscape and an emerging discussion over the concept of humanitarian intervention, helped to underpin a new debate about the role of media in foreign policy formulation. For many commentators, officials and academics the news media had become a pivotal actor during responses to humanitarian crises around the world, helping to generate pressure to intervene in order to alleviate suffering (Robinson 1999). Since then, although new types of media have emerged, accompanied in turn by new phrases such as the ‘Al Jazeera Effect’ (Seib 2008) and the ‘You Tube Effect’, and whilst issues such as the ‘war on terror’ have tended to deflect attention away from humanitarian intervention, interest in the power of media to shape foreign policy and instigate humanitarian responses has persisted (e.g. Cottle 2009; Hutchison, Bleiker and Campbell 2013; Livingston and Klinkworth 2010; Meier and Leaning 2009; Otto and Meyer 2012). At the time of writing, the powerful images of a dead Syrian boy, Aylan Kurdi, on a Turkish beach, who drowned along with his brother and mother whilst attempting to cross from Turkey to Greece, have appeared to play a role in forcing a more meaningful response by European countries to what has been described as the worst refugee crisis since WWII. Belief in, and the debate about, the power of images and news media to transform humanitarian responses is as pertinent today as it was during the 1990s.

This chapter reviews the CNN-effect debate, outlining both key research findings and the major shortcomings of existing research, and then evaluates the major issues facing research on media power and humanitarianism in the 21st century. The chapter starts by explaining the context in which the CNN effect first emerged, before detailing major studies and their key findings. The limitations to both early debate and research are then discussed; they include inadequate attention to pre- and post-conflict phases, the absence of attention to many of the world’s worst conflicts, and the failure to appreciate the geo-political underpinnings of both media coverage and Western responses. In the final section, the implications of the new media environment (characterised by the convergence of traditional mainstream media on to the Internet and the emergence of social media) and propaganda for the debate over media impact on humanitarianism is discussed and suggestions for future research noted.

The CNN-effect debate and 1990s interventions during humanitarian crises

The CNN-effect debate emerged during the 1990s, and, as part of the post-Cold War disciplinary shake-up amongst international relations scholars, was one of the early attempts to broaden our understanding of the importance of non-state actors as well as the potential for the kind of global political awareness predicted in Marshall McLuhan's (1962) famous 'global village' vision. Although originally associated with a number of issues and effects, the term quickly came to be associated with the emerging humanitarian-intervention debate of the 1990s and the idea that media representation of human suffering was playing a pivotal role in mobilising (Western) responses. Interventions in Northern Iraq 1991 to protect Iraqi Kurds from Saddam Hussein (Operation Provide Comfort), Somalia 1992–1994 to provide protection to food relief supplies (Operation Restore Hope), and Bosnia 1992–1995 (UNPROFOR and Operation Deliberate Force) were all associated with heavy media attention in which graphic and emotional coverage of suffering people appeared to be driving decisions to threaten or use force in order to save lives and protect human rights.

There are two reasons why these apparently media-driven interventions generated so much sustained debate. The first was that the apparent emergence of a powerful media, able to shape foreign policy responses, was very much out of step with the body of knowledge on media–state relations, the elite-driven model (Robinson et al. 2010), which highlighted the close relationship between news media and official sources (e.g. Bennett 1990; Hallin 1986; Herman and Chomsky 1988). Rather than remaining deferential toward authority, or actively working to mobilise support for elite-led foreign policy decisions, media appeared to be taking the lead and determining foreign policy, and, for many, this appeared to be a direct consequence of technological developments that were allowing journalists to report in real-time from conflict zones. Overall, it seemed that a more powerful and independent media had emerged and one that was driving and not following foreign policy decisions. The second reason why the debate gained traction was that the CNN effect was being associated with decisions to deploy force during humanitarian crises. Here, some argued that a significant transformation had occurred in the practice of international relations, one in which a new norm of humanitarian intervention was usurping the principle of non-intervention and sovereignty (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1996; Roberts 1993). In short, media pressure was being associated with a major shift in the practice of international politics. This debate reverberates today with talk over, for example, the role of Twitter, Facebook and YouTube with respect to the now largely ill-fated 'Arab Spring' revolutions (e.g. Eltantawy and Wiest 2011; Rinke and Röder 2011) and also in debate over 'humanitarian' intervention and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine in cases such as that of the 2011 Libyan intervention. However, early claims regarding the power of media to initiate armed intervention during humanitarian crises quickly gave way to a more sober assessment of media power.

State of knowledge regarding media-driven humanitarianism

An early re-evaluation came with Gowing's (1994) interviews with officials conducted during the early 1990s. He concluded that media influence upon strategic decisions to intervene during a humanitarian crisis was comparatively rare, whilst tactical and cosmetic impact was more frequent. So, for example, he found that media coverage was capable of influencing tactical decisions such as the creation of 'safe areas' during the 1992–1995 civil war in Bosnia or limited airstrikes against Bosnian Serb nationalist artillery positions. More often, he found

that a frequent response of politicians to media pressure was simply to develop cosmetic policy responses, for example airlifting small numbers of injured children out of conflict zones. For Gowing, the superficial and limited nature of these cosmetic policy responses was entirely intentional. Indeed, these policies were enacted in order to deflect media pressure for more substantive intervention.

In another early study, Livingston and Eachus (1996) highlighted the extent to which media appeared to simply reflect the policy agendas of government officials, as opposed to setting the foreign policy agenda in the way suggested by the CNN-effect thesis. Examining the case of Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992–1993, they found that US media reporting of the crisis actually followed the cues of US government officials who had been attempting to draw attention to the crisis there. They concluded that, rather than media driving the intervention, journalists were actually conforming to more traditional patterns of indexing (Bennett 1990) whereby their coverage was indexed to the viewpoints of US officials who were already persuaded of the need for intervention in Somalia. In sum, political agendas were influencing media much more than media were influencing politics.

More generally, substantive research-based conclusions regarding the CNN-effect debate pointed toward a complex matrix of media effects, conditional on the type of humanitarian response in question and the political conditions in play (Robinson 2002). First, and most importantly, media impact upon armed humanitarian responses was the least likely phenomenon to be occurring. Here, it was concluded that, at best, media pressure could trigger the use of air power intervention, for example Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia in 1995 (Robinson 2002) and Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999 (Bahador 2007), but that it fell short of being able to influence policy makers to intervene with ground troops. In short, the classic ground troop interventions in Northern Iraq in 1991 and in Somalia 1992–1993 were not the result of the CNN effect. The explanation for this limitation was that, in the context of politically risky and high-level decisions regarding the use of force, policy makers were likely to be driven by concerns other than media pressure. Moreover, any pressure to intervene with troops was always held in check by the fear of taking casualties, the so-called ‘body-bag effect’. To put this bluntly, policy makers, as much as they might feel compelled to respond to media pressure to ‘do something’ about a humanitarian crisis, were also aware that risking the lives of troops could ultimately backfire and generate negative media and public reaction when casualties were taken. Another factor militating against media influence in the context of forcible intervention decisions concerned more traditional *realpolitik* calculations that were also informing decision-making. For example, the apparently media-driven intervention in Northern Iraq in 1991 in order to protect Kurdish refugees was also at least in part, if not mainly so, motivated by geo-strategic concerns that stability in Southern Turkey was being threatened by the million or so Iraqi Kurdish refugees who were trying to escape Iraq. Here, the creation of safe havens was a tactic designed to draw the Iraqi Kurds away from the border and back into Iraq, thus helping to resolve Turkey’s security crisis (Robinson 2002: 63–71). Overall, and with respect to forcible intervention, media influence was relatively weak and, even then, limited to contexts where there existed policy uncertainty (Robinson 2000) amongst government officials.

However, when moving away from high foreign policy decisions regarding the use of force, Livingston (1997) noted that humanitarian policies involving lower political risks and costs were more likely to be influenced by media pressure. For example, the deployment of US troops in Zaire in 1994, in which US troops were deployed as part of a non-coercive ‘feeding and watering’ operation was likely to have been influenced by media pressure. Consistent with this logic, and moving away from government-led responses to humanitarian

crises, civil society responses such as that of the 1984 Ethiopian famine appear to have been significantly driven by media pressure. Finally, and with respect to foreign aid, van Belle and Potter (2009) argue that a close relationship exists between media coverage and decisions over aid allocation. In short, as we move away from policies involving the use of force, and toward non-coercive and less politically risky operations, the scale of possible media influence upon humanitarian responses becomes greater (Robinson 2002).

The flip-side to the CNN effect: selectivity, short-termism, media framing and the masking of geo-political strategy

Whilst debate has continued over the impact of media on humanitarian responses, a more critical literature has also emerged which has served to highlight significant problems with media-influenced humanitarianism. This concerns, firstly, the random and selective nature of media attention to humanitarian crises; secondly, inadequacies of the ways in which journalists frame humanitarian crises; and thirdly, the potentially destructive and inhumane dynamics that exist between political power, aid agencies, international organisations and news media. I shall deal with each in turn.

Even if media has the potential to influence humanitarian responses, an obvious shortcoming concerns the selective nature of media attention. As Hawkins (2008, 2011) has comprehensively documented, news media repeatedly fail to shine a spotlight on the world's most serious crises. Quantifying US network news coverage in 2009, Hawkins (2011: 65) demonstrated that the conflicts in Afghanistan, Israel/Palestine and Iraq overwhelmingly overshadowed the conflicts in Darfur, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). For example, whilst 18 hours of coverage was devoted to Afghanistan, only 7 minutes was accorded to the conflict in the DRC, despite it being by far the most costly and serious conflict existing in the world that year (Hawkins 2011: 58). Overall, Hawkins shows that Western media repeatedly fail to report on the world's most significant (in terms of casualties) conflicts and crises. A similar critique was advanced by Jakobsen in his 2000 *Journal of Peace Research* article. Here he noted that debate over the CNN effect obscured a more significant dynamic at work. In essence, because news values were rooted in drama and immediacy, media tended to cover crises only when there was visible and dramatic suffering that could be reported upon. The direct consequence of this, according to Jakobsen (2000), is that international resources and attention are shifted away from pre-conflict and post-conflict phases which are less 'exciting' and less newsworthy. Consequently, resources are drawn away from pre-conflict early warning and prevention and post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction. In effect, media influence is missing exactly at the points where it is needed the most, before a conflict has escalated, and when the international community is attempting to build long-term peace and security. The result is that media tend to encourage fire-fighting type responses to humanitarian crises. Overall, according to Jakobsen (2000: 141), the CNN effect was 'probably more of a hindrance than a help for Western conflict management at the general level'.

Second, even when media do cover a crisis, many communication scholars have documented serious inadequacies with respect to how journalists frame human suffering. For example, early analysis of seminal events such as the 1984 Ethiopian famine highlighted the superficiality and ethnocentrism of coverage. Van der Gaag and Nash (1987) critiqued UK coverage of famine in Africa, highlighting the innate negativity toward Africa and simplistic representations of famine which depoliticised crises and relegated all Africans to the status of powerless victims trapped in a 'dark' continent plagued by 'natural' disasters.

Similarly, Benthall (1993) described how media representation of humanitarian crises tended to be framed in terms of a simplistic morality play in which white, Western aid workers came to the rescue of weak, powerless and inferior Africans. In an influential work Susan Moeller (1999) drew upon some of these critiques and linked them with concerns over highly emotional and sensationalist coverage in order to assert the existence of a general condition of compassion fatigue, whereby Western audiences were giving up on caring for those suffering in crises and wars. As Campbell (2012) persuasively argues, however, there is little evidence to support the existence of a generalised compassion fatigue and even Moeller's own work points to significant evidence of emotional engagement from Western audiences (Campbell 2012: 15–16).

In fact, media representation of crisis and conflict has a tendency to oscillate between the extremes of 'empathy' and 'distance' (Robinson 2002: 27–30): on the one hand, for example, conflicts are often portrayed as being the consequence of some kind of primeval savagery and which is immune to any attempts to help or intervene. In their analysis of media coverage of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, Myers et al. (1996) highlight this particular dynamic in which the conflict, and the genocide itself, was presented as a 'regular round of tribal bloodletting' emanating from Africa's 'heart of darkness' (see also Robinson 2002: 110–116). Recently, Bleiker et al. (2013) documented the dehumanising visual representation of refugees arriving in Australia. Here, emotional disengagement is enabled by rarely showing images of individual refugees and, instead, frequently representing refugees with images of large numbers of people arriving on boats. Such coverage does little more than to distance audiences from those who are suffering and works against enabling a positive response. On the other hand, and comparatively infrequently, journalists adopt a more dramatic and emotive 'empathy framing' of a crisis, which demands that 'something must be done', Martin Bell's so-called journalism of attachment (Ruigrok 2006). This form of coverage 'tends to focus upon the suffering of individuals, identifying them as victims in need of "outside" help' (Robinson 2002: 28–29). But this form of coverage can often fall into ethnocentric, stereotypical and simplistic frames that appeal to the good intentions of audiences, but do so in a way which depoliticises and disempowers those caught up within crises. Ultimately, and for those journalists and humanitarian actors who seek to facilitate responses, there exists a difficult balancing act between encouraging audiences to care but also relaying the political and human issues in a way that does justice to the victims of conflict and crisis. Precisely how to get this framing 'right' is the subject of considerable ongoing intellectual thought and here the work of Chouliaraki (2006, 2013) and Hutchison, Bleiker and Campbell (2013) provide important analysis of how media represent suffering and the politics behind these representations.

The limitations of selectivity and inadequate framing all feed into an even more profound set of critiques regarding the relationship between media and suffering. At the heart of this matter lie arguments about unexplored assumptions regarding the legitimacy and benign nature of liberal 'humanitarian' interventionism, and an associated tendency to inadequately recognise the politics that lie behind both media coverage of, and responses to, crises and suffering (Belloni 2007; Benthall 1993; Edkins 2000; Kennedy 2005; van der Gaag and Nash 1987). For example, de Waal's critique of the aid business, *Famine Crimes* (1997), presents a critical alternative analysis of the relationship between media, crises and aid agency responses with respect to famine. Here, he argues that aid agencies, media and Western publics are linked together in a mutually beneficial relationship which, inadvertently, inhibits effective responses to crises. Aid agencies seek money and resources whilst news media representation of suffering people provides both a key route to these resources and newsworthy material

for journalists and editors: the more dramatic and emotive the coverage, the more resources are likely to flow from concerned publics. These resources are then directed to high-profile famine and crisis relief activities. This in turn provides further publicity and legitimacy to the aid agencies (de Waal 1997: 82–85). For de Waal, this arrangement serves to obscure the political causes of famine, some of which lie in neo-liberal international structural adjustment policies, and also replaces local-level government accountability for preventing famine by making people dependent on international aid. He concludes:

Contemporary international humanitarianism works, but not for famine-vulnerable people in Africa. High-profile ‘debased’ humanitarianism works to extend the institutional reach of relief agencies, to create an attractive narrative for the media and to provide a political alibi for Western governments.

(de Waal 1997: 217)

In de Waal’s analysis, the observation by Jakobsen (2000) discussed above, that media covered only the most dramatic and visible aspects of a crisis, is no accident. Rather it is in part the consequence of the organisational imperatives pursued by aid agencies which themselves encourage journalists to focus on particular stages of a crisis when suffering is most dramatic, newsworthy and, most importantly, lucrative in terms of attracting publicity and money. More generally, de Waal’s analysis reflects a broad critique of Western humanitarianism which emphasises the political–economic causes of suffering, whether that be due to poverty or famine, war or conflict, and the way in which charitable humanitarianism can act as a distraction from addressing these underlying and underpinning issues. Put bluntly, charitable humanitarian responses do much to provide comfort to affluent peoples of the world that all that can be done has been done, but leave the politics and economics that shape crises undisturbed (Richey and Pont 2011; Tester 2010). With respect to the forms of media representation discussed above, the key problem is the way in which emotive images and narratives of human suffering sometimes ‘pressures only for a humanitarian response’ (Philo et al. 1999; Robinson 2002: 132) and can ‘elide the political context that has given rise to the crisis’ (Campbell 2011: 16; Muller 2013). Consequently, such representations of ‘humanitarian’ crisis can work against engaging more fundamental and long-term approaches to reducing human suffering (Terry 2002).

Problems with the liberal worldview with respect to humanitarianism, media and international responses continue to occur when dealing with the hard military end of Western foreign policy. As already suggested when discussing the state of the field, media influence assessments were sometimes exaggerated because of the failure to recognise the importance of *realpolitik* which was also shaping intervention decisions. One significant trend over the last 15 years, and in particular in the context of the post-9/11 ‘war on terror’, has been the progressive integration of ‘humanitarian’ aid strategies with military operations in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. This has involved both the recognition of the role of humanitarian actors during ‘counter-insurgency operations’ and the drive toward integrating civil and military mechanisms during such operations (Barnett 2005; Counterinsurgency Operations 2009). This co-opting of humanitarian organisations with military objectives has been underpinned by a political and media narrative emphasising the humanitarian nature of contemporary Western wars (Chomsky 1999; Robinson et al. 2010). In conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan, the US and Western geo-strategic interests that have been pursued in these wars have been presented through the discourse of humanitarianism. Humanitarianism has operated as a public justification for these wars of national/security interest, whilst on the

ground military operations have been integrated with humanitarian operations as part of the struggle to win ‘hearts and minds’ of the populations in both these countries. Michael Barnett (2005: 731) points out that these developments have frequently and increasingly compromised the neutrality and independence of humanitarian organisations.

New directions and new issues

If the history of the CNN-effect debate and humanitarianism leaves us with a sometimes pessimistic perspective on the ability of communications media to facilitate positive humanitarian and political action, are there greater grounds for optimism today? In this final section, I will map out some possibilities and suggestions worthy of further research.

The power of the new media environment

On the one hand, advocates of the media-empowerment thesis (e.g. Castells 2009; Hoskins and O’Loughlin 2010) have frequently argued that the arrival of the Internet has played a significant role in pluralising media-state dynamics.² There are many reasons for this alleged pluralisation of power, ranging from a greater diversity of sources available to mainstream journalists through to the empowering potential of personal communication technology (i.e. mobile phones and cameras) which facilitate so-called *citizen journalism* (Allan 2013). For example, Allan (2013) describes how Internet-based technology and digital communication enables people within war zones to communicate with global audiences and bring quickly to light evidence of humanitarian suffering and human rights abuses. Other scholars have argued the importance of social media platforms as potential early warnings of humanitarian crisis and their role in coordinating responses (Asimakopoula and Bessis 2010; Meier and Leaning 2009) whilst some describe the growing significance of transnational advocacy networks, underpinned by digital communication and the Internet, as strengthening humanitarian actors at the national and international governmental levels (e.g. Livingston 2011; Livingston and Klinkworth 2012). Finally, some maintain that the emergence of a variety of global news media providers, such as Al Jazeera and BBC World, have complemented and expanded upon the role of CNN as deliverers of cosmopolitan global values and a sense of solidarity (Cottle 2011: 88).

At the same time, it is also the case that the existing body of research on the CNN effect and humanitarianism can be significantly expanded upon through a more focused engagement with the complex ways in which local actors (i.e. within conflict zones) seek to communicate with and influence international and global actors and how new communications technologies may facilitate more of a bottom-up process (Gilboa et al. 2016). As Gilboa et al. (2016) argue, much of the existing CNN-effect literature has focused primarily upon how Western media coverage of conflicts has at times influenced Western governments to respond to humanitarian crises whilst ignoring both local-level actors and the role of international and transnational humanitarian actors. Future work in this area needs greater theoretical engagement with an approach that comprehends the multi-level reality of media-conflict dynamics.

The new media environment and disempowerment

At the same time, it is also a possibility that the new media environment has actually had a fundamentally disempowering effect upon the ability of humanitarian actors to facilitate

substantial responses to humanitarian crises (Gilboa et al. 2016). On the one hand, whilst the above-mentioned scholars are surely correct to identify the *potential* of new communication technology to enable actors within conflict zones to communicate more readily with global media and distant audiences, it is not entirely clear how the panoply of voices and initiatives actually translates into a cohesive and politically influential message. The problem here is principally one of the possible fragmentation of public spheres, both global and national, in which innumerable voices are all calling for attention but none of which become 'loud' enough to be heard; in information technology (IT) terms, a problem of poor signal-to-noise ratio. This problem is possibly being further hampered by the kinds of pressures that are now being placed upon traditional mainstream media: here there has been a steady decline in the number of high quality foreign correspondents who possess in-depth understanding of a country or region and, as Otto and Meyer (2012) argue, this tendency undermines the ability of mainstream media to act as an early warning for impending crises. Furthermore, today's media are less well-resourced and financed than in previous eras with declining audiences and ever greater commercial pressures, whilst many people choose today to receive their news via glimpses of Facebook and Twitter.

Overall, future research needs to engage directly with trying to understand better both the empowering and the disempowering potentials of the new media environment.

The role of humanitarianism in propaganda and persuasion

Finally, the body of literature on the CNN effect, as well as the broader political communication literature on media–state relations, has rarely explored in any great depth the coordinated, highly organised and systematic approaches to influencing opinions and behaviour. Here, activities that are variously called *strategic communication*, *public diplomacy*, *public relations*, *psychological operations* and *perception management* (as well as numerous other terms) are an important part of the way in which states and other powerful actors exercise power. Historically, these activities have been referred to as propaganda and, although rarely acknowledged, frequently involve manipulation of beliefs and behaviours through both deception and also forms of incentivisation and coercion (Bakir et al. 2015; Bakir et al. 2017). So, for example, Herring and Robinson have recently demonstrated deception in the case of the 2003 Iraq invasion in which UK officials intentionally deceived both by presenting available intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as much more certain and threatening (Herring and Robinson 2014–2015), and by claiming that diplomacy at the United Nations (UN) was motivated by a desire to avoid war when in fact it was aimed at smoothing the path to war (Herring and Robinson 2014). Even in the world of the Internet and weakened mainstream media, strategic attempts to influence opinions and mobilise populations in support of particular policies remains a critical objective for states and other political actors. Indeed, a strong case can be made that the weakening of mainstream media actually increases the power and influence of both manipulative propaganda and other forms of organised persuasive communication.

This brings us to a final area that demands scholarly attention. As noted earlier, certainly since the 9/11 event there has been an increasing integration of humanitarian activities with military operations during the 'war on terror' and, many times, the discourse of humanitarianism has become one component of how the deeply unpopular and costly wars post-9/11 have come to be sold. The pressing question here is the extent to which the humanitarian agenda of the 1990s, and the extent to which it represented a genuine and progressive attempt to create a more ethical international society, has, since 9/11, become subverted by geo-strategic objectives. In doing so, the question of whether humanitarianism has become, in effect, part

of the propaganda of Western governments is the obvious question that is begged. In short, what was once a call for action driven by humanitarian concerns and pressed for by journalists may now have become a form of propaganda deployed by governments seeking to pursue militaristic foreign policy adventures. Since 9/11 we have repeatedly witnessed US-led wars being presented, at least in part, as humanitarian endeavours. For example the ‘humanitarian rationale’ for invading Iraq was a key component of official justifications during that war (Robinson et al. 2010: 170–172) whilst the war in Afghanistan has been frequently presented as being about bringing democracy and human rights to that country. Responses to both Syria and Libya have also been articulated, at times, via the humanitarian frame: indeed, initial Western intervention in Libya was conducted under the R2P doctrine. The fact that all of these wars have been enmeshed with a proclaimed ‘war on terror’ in defence of Western civilisation by Western leaders, frequently obfuscating both historical and current Western complicity in terrorism (e.g. Keenan 2009, 2013; Curtis 2010), and that these have resulted in catastrophic and massive loss of life of over a million people (Physicians for Social Responsibility 2015), should raise serious questions about any kind of association with humanitarianism. In short, there is a very real danger that the humanitarian agenda has become a sugarcoating, a form of propaganda, that has underpinned 15 years of major conflict since 9/11.

To conclude, these are uncertain times for humanitarian action and the media. New technologies may bring new possibilities for humanitarian action, or they may serve to disempower global civil society actors seeking a better world. At the same time, we must also confront more fully the role of humanitarianism as a vehicle for justifying and selling aggressive wars. Undoubtedly, these are interesting and indeed troubling times.

Notes

- 1 Parts of this chapter draw from Robinson, P. (2015) ‘News Media and Communication Technology’, in Roger Mac Ginty and Jenny Peterson (eds) *The Routledge Companion to Humanitarian Action*, London: Routledge. Reproduced with permission of the publisher.
- 2 For an overview of this debate see Robinson et al. 2010, pages 27–29.

Bibliography

- Allan, S. (2013) *Citizen Witnessing: Revisioning Journalism in Times of Crisis*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Asimakopoula, E. and Bessis, N. (eds) (2010) *Advanced ICTs for Disaster Management and Threat Detection: Collaborative and Distributed Frameworks*, Hershey, NY: IGI Global.
- Bahador, B. (2007) *The CNN Effect in Action: How the News Media Pushed the West toward War in Kosovo*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bakir, V., Herring, E., Miller, D. and Robinson, P. (2015) ‘Organised Persuasive Communication: A Conceptual Framework’. Unpublished working paper.
- Bakir, V., Herring, E., Miller, D. and Robinson, P. (2017) ‘Lying and Deception in Politics’ in J. Meibauer (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Lying*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Barnett, M.C. (2005) ‘Humanitarianism Transformed’, *Perspectives on Politics*, 3(4): 723–740.
- Belloni, R. (2007) ‘The Trouble with Humanitarianism’, *Review of International Studies*, 33(3): 451–474.
- Bennett, W.L. (1990) ‘Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States’, *Journal of Communication*, 40(2): 103–127.
- Bentham, J. (1993) *Disasters, Relief and the Media*, London: I.B. Tauris.
- Bleiker, R., Campbell, D., Hutchison, E. and Nicholson, X. (2013) ‘The Visual Dehumanisation of Refugees’, *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 48(4): 398–416.
- Campbell, D. (2011) ‘The Iconography of Famine’ in G. Batchen, M. Gidley, N. K. Miller and J. Prosser (eds) *Picturing Atrocity: Photography in Crisis*, London: Reaktion Books.
- Campbell, D. (2012) ‘The Myth of Compassion Fatigue’, www.david-campbell.org. Download date 19 September 2016.

- Castells, M. (2009) *Communication Power*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Chomsky, N. (1999) *The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo*, Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press.
- Chouliaraki, L. (2006) *The Spectatorship of Suffering*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Chouliaraki, L. (2013) *The Ironic Spectator: Solidarity in the Age of Post-Humanitarianism*, Cambridge: Polity.
- Cottle, S. (2009) *Global Crisis Reporting: Journalism in the Global Age*, Maidenhead: Open University Press.
- Cottle, S. (2011) 'Taking Global Crises in the News Seriously: Notes from the Dark Side of globalization', *Global Media and Communication*, 7(2): 77–95.
- Counter Insurgency Operations (2009) Joint Publication 3–24, 9 October, US Department of Defense. Available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_24.pdf. Download date 19 September 2016.
- Curtis, M. (2010) *Secret Affairs: Britain's Collusion with Radical Islam*, London: Profile Books.
- de Waal, A. (1997) *Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa*, Oxford: James Currey.
- Edkins, J. (2000) *Whose Hunger?: Concepts of Famine, Practices of Aid*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Eltantawy, N. and Wiest, J.B. (2011). 'Social Media in the Egyptian Revolution: Reconsidering Resource Mobilization Theory', *International Journal of Communication*, 5: 1207–1274.
- Gilboa, E., Jumper, M.J., Miklian, J. and Robinson, P. (2016) 'Moving Studies beyond the CNN Effect', *Review of International Studies*, 1–19. Available at <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=10215099&fileId=S026021051600005X>
- Gowing, N. (1994) 'Real-time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it Pressure or Distort Foreign Policy Decisions?', Harvard working paper, Cambridge, MA: The Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, Harvard University.
- Hallin, D. (1986) *The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Hawkins, V. (2008) *Stealth Conflicts: How the World's Worst Violence Is Ignored*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Hawkins, V. (2011) 'Media Selectivity and the Other Side of the CNN Effect: The Consequences of Not Paying Attention to Conflict', Special Issue on the CNN effect edited by P. Robinson, *Media, War & Conflict*, 4(1): 55–68.
- Herman, E. and Chomsky, N. (1988) *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*, New York: Pantheon.
- Herring, E. and Robinson, P. (2014) 'Deception and Britain's Road to War in Iraq', *International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies*, 8(2–3): 213–232.
- Herring, E. and Robinson, P. (2014–2015) 'Report X Marks the Spot: The British Government's Deceptive Dossier on Iraq and WMD', *Political Science Quarterly*, 129(4): 551–584.
- Hoskins, A. and O'Loughlin, B. (2010) *War and Media: The Emergence of Diffused War*, Cambridge: Polity.
- Hutchison, E., Bleiker, R. and Campbell, D. (2013) 'Imaging Catastrophe: The Politics of Representing Humanitarian Crisis', in M. Acuto (ed.) *Negotiating Relief: The Dialectics of Humanitarian Space*, London: Hurst and Co and New York: Columbia University Press.
- Jakobsen, P.V. (2000) 'Focus on the CNN Effect Misses the Point: The Real Impact of Media on Conflict Management is Invisible and Indirect', *Journal of Peace Research*, 37(2): 131–143.
- Keenan, J. (2009) *The Dark Sahara: America's War on Terror in Africa*, London: Pluto Press.
- Keenan, J. (2013) *The Dying Sahara: US Imperialism and Terror in Africa*, London: Pluto Press.
- Kennedy, D. (2005) *The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Livingston, S. (1997) 'Clarifying the CNN Effect: An Examination of Media Effects According to Type of Military Intervention', research paper R-18, June, Cambridge, MA: The Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy at Harvard University.
- Livingston, S. (2011) 'The CNN Effect Reconsidered (Again): Problematizing ICT and Global Governance in the CNN Effect Research Agenda', Special Issue on the CNN effect edited by P. Robinson, *Media, War & Conflict*, 4(1): 20–36.
- Livingston, S. and Eachus, T. (1995) 'Humanitarian Crises and US Foreign Policy', *Political Communication*, 12: 413–429.
- Livingston, S. and Klinkworth, K. (2010) 'Narrative Power Shifts: Exploring the Role of ICTs and Informational Politics in Transnational Advocacy', *The International Journal of Technology, Knowledge, and Society*, 6(5): 43–64.
- McCluhan, M. (1962) *The Gutenberg Galaxy. The Making of Typographic Man*, London: University of Toronto Press.
- Meier, P. and Leaning, J. (2009) 'Applying Technology to Crisis Mapping and Early Warning in Humanitarian Settings', Working Paper Series, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative.

- Moeller, S.D. (1999) *Compassion Fatigue: How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War and Death*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Muller, T.R. (2013) 'The Long Shadow of Band Aid Humanitarianism: Revisiting the Dynamics between Famine and Celebrity', *Third World Quarterly*, 34(3): 470–484.
- Myers, G., Klak, T. and Koehl, T. (1996) 'The Inscription of Difference: News Coverage of the Conflicts in Rwanda and Bosnia', *Political Geography*, 15(1): 21–46.
- Otto, F. and Meyer, C.O. (2012) 'Missing the Story? Changes in Foreign News Reporting and Their Implications for Conflict Prevention', *Media, War & Conflict*, 5(3): 205–221.
- Philo, G., Hilsum, L., Beattie, L. and Holliman, R. (1999) 'The Media and the Rwanda Crisis: Effects on Audiences and Public Policy', in G. Philo (ed.) *Message Received*, Harlow: Longman, pp. 214–228.
- Physicians for Social Responsibility (2015) 'Body Count: Casualty Figures after 10 Years of the "War on Terror"; Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Washington DC, Berlin, Ottawa. Available at http://www.ippnw.de/commonFiles/pdfs/Frieden/Body_Count_first_international_edition_2015_final.pdf. Download date 19 September 2016.
- Ramsbotham, O. and Woodhouse, T. (1996) *Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict*, Cambridge: Polity Press and Blackwell.
- Richey, L.A. and Pont, S. (2011) *Shopping Well to Save the World*, Minneapolis, MN University of Minneapolis.
- Rinke, E.M. and Röder, M. (2011) 'Media Ecologies, Communication Culture, and Temporal-Spatial Unfolding: Three Components in a Communication Model of the Egyptian Regime Change', *International Journal of Communication*, 5(5): 1273–1285.
- Roberts, A. (1993) 'Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights', *International Affairs*, 69(3): 429–449.
- Robinson, P. (1999) 'The CNN Effect: Can the News Media Drive Foreign Policy?', *Review of International Studies*, 25(2): 301–309.
- Robinson, P. (2000) 'The Policy-Media Interaction Model: Measuring Media Power during Humanitarian Crisis', *Journal of Peace Research*, 37(5): 613–633.
- Robinson, P. (2002) *The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Robinson, P. (2015) 'News Media and Communication Technology', in R. MacGinty and J. Peterson (eds) *The Routledge Companion to Humanitarian Action*, London: Routledge.
- Robinson, P., Goddard, P., Parry, K., Murray, C. and Taylor, P.M. (2010) *Pockets of Resistance: British News Media, War and Theory in the 2003 Invasion of Iraq*, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.
- Ruigrok, N. (2006) *Journalism of Attachment: Dutch Newspapers during the Bosnian War*, Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis.
- Seib, P. (2008) *The Al Jazeera Effect: How the New Global Media Are Reshaping World Politics*, Washington DC: Potomac Books.
- Terry, F. (2002) *Condemned to Repeat: The Paradox of Humanitarian Action*, New York: Cornell.
- Tester, K. (2010) *Humanitarianism and Modern Culture*, Philadelphia, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- van Belle, D. and Potter, D. (2009) 'News Coverage and Japanese Foreign Disaster Aid: A Comparative Example of Bureaucratic Responsiveness to the News Media', *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 9(2): 295–315.
- Van der Gaag, N. and Nash, C. (1987) *Images of Africa: The UK Report*, Oxford: Oxfam.

15

NEWS COVERAGE, PEACEMAKING AND PEACEBUILDING

Jake Lynch

In this chapter, the emergence of peacebuilding, as a concept for United Nations (UN) intervention in conflict to complement the established activities of peacekeeping and peacemaking, is recounted and briefly discussed. Peacebuilding, it is argued, broadens the field of co-requisites for peace, which is understood not merely as the absence of direct violence, but also a condition requiring structural and cultural violence to be exposed and challenged. This understanding entails attention to the symbolic context in which people respond to conflict, including the influence of media. In light of these connections, the rise of peace journalism, as both a reform proposition within and around journalism itself, and a field of scholarly research, is also recounted and discussed.

The chapter considers the main distinctions in the field, first put forward as a model by Johan Galtung (1998), as well as challenges and objections to peace journalism, and elements of future research and reform agendas, as an ongoing contribution to peace and peacebuilding. First, the wide range of meanings attached to the word ‘peace’, and the degree of clarification it has undergone in order to be used as an organising principle for such an endeavour as an approach to reporting conflict, are considered.

‘Peace is our Profession’, the slogan displayed at the entrance to Burpelson Air Force Base in Kubrick’s nuclear-age black comedy, *Dr Strangelove*, indicates one of the difficulties in using peace as an organising principle – the wide variance in accounts of what it means, and entails. The film ends with human civilisation about to be destroyed and the world plunged into a long radioactive winter, triggered by the dropping of an atomic bomb from an out-of-control B52 which had taken off from the Burpelson base some hours earlier. Generals at the Pentagon are shown calculating how they can use the situation after the ensuing nuclear war to their advantage; peace, of a sort, having been established. A doomsday scenario is seen to have eventuated simply by extending to its extreme a form of military logic that is founded on a vision of peace.

In the ancient world, the *Pax Romana* was notorious for being established by what was, essentially and translated to the weaponry of the time, the same expedient: escalating the use of force to the point of quelling any opposition. If necessary, the Romans would ‘create a desert’, according to a Celtic chieftain, Calgacus, quoted (or probably invented) by the historian, Tacitus, ‘and call it peace’. There are distinct, if distant echoes in the military

campaigns of our own time. Interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya aimed to instil a state of affairs promoted hubristically by neo-conservative commentators of the time as *Pax Americana*. The violent and chaotic socio-political milieu that is their legacy seems merely to contain the seeds of the next war.

Two out of the three interventions just mentioned took place with explicit UN mandate, albeit attended by numerous complaints that US military involvement, in particular, led to the organisation's time-honoured principle of neutrality being undermined. It is the UN that has the job of – according to its charter – ‘bring[ing] about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes’. Over four decades after its inception, the UN put forward its most comprehensive statement of what ‘peaceful means’ could entail: the Agenda for Peace under Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

Its publication in 1992, after the Cold War ended with the collapse of Soviet communism, was explicitly based on a recognition, by 15 heads of state and government, that:

The absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security. The United Nations membership as a whole, working through the appropriate bodies, needs to give the highest priority to the solution of these matters.

(in Dedring, 2008: 203)

The report therefore marked the ascendancy of a concept of peace as something that can and must be built. Previously, the UN had largely confined its role to peacemaking – brokering peace agreements between warring factions – and peacekeeping, the deployment of blue-helmeted troops to monitor a ceasefire (and occasionally intervene to maintain it). Peacebuilding proceeds from a recognition that these measures deal only with the presenting symptoms of conflict, rather than its underlying causes or the conditions of its production in the first place. Stopping the large-scale direct violence signified by the phrase, ‘military conflicts’ may be relatively simple, given the deployment of adequate armed might as a deterrent against open hostilities. But the existence of deeper and more far-reaching problems may lead to its recurrence, if not attended to. The subsequent creation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission enabled the coordination of efforts to reform the political and economic structures of societies emerging from violent conflict, to prevent a relapse into war (Lambourne and Herro, 2008).

In these ways, the trajectory of policy-making was tracking that of the conceptual development of peace and conflict studies, through some of its most prominent contributors, such as John Paul Lederach (1995), John W Burton (1990) and Johan Galtung (1969). These contributions have furnished us with key concepts of peace, conflict and violence, which have, in turn, pointed up the need to consider the role and influence of symbolic interventions in conflict, in forms of communication. In the following section, I explain how the concept of peace evolved away from the mere absence of war, or suppression of armed combat, to a far broader vision of a peaceful society. And I connect this evolving concept to Galtung's proposal for peace journalism (1998) as a contribution to peacebuilding in this wider sense.

Peace and peace journalism

Galtung authored a UN manual at the turn of the millennium, which gathered material from courses he had led for the UN Disaster Management Training Programme over the previous decade. Titled “Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means”, it sets out some of the key precepts that underpin this evolving concept of peace. Conflict is seen as a phenomenon that can be not only destructive, but also creative, depending on the responses people make to it: ‘as [both] potentially dangerous... now and in the future, because of violence, and as a golden opportunity to create something new’ (Galtung, 2000: 5).

John W Burton, an Australian former diplomat who involved himself in practical schemes to resolve conflicts through methods he called ‘interactive problem-solving’, saw conflict as intrinsic to human relationships. To resolve conflicts through negotiation, Burton argued, one must first accept that some aspects of conflict are non-negotiable. Parties enter into conflict on the basis of unfulfilled human needs. By the time they arrive at the negotiating table, however, these are often buried under mounds of conflict discourse, comprising lists of demands and positions. These can be reframed, Burton argued, and apparent incompatibilities transformed into opportunities to create new structures and new relationships. But this cannot require the parties to accept injustice, or a state of affairs in which their needs cannot be met, or it will not work.

We should not be surprised, Burton (1990) argued, if at least some members of a frustrated conflict party resort to violence: ‘It follows, that unless satisfied within the norms of society, [unfulfilled human needs]... will lead to behaviour that is outside the legal norms of the society’ (Burton, 1990: 36–37). Such an awareness had been acknowledged in other parts of the post-WWII settlement. Three years after the UN Charter came the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which declares, in its preamble, that such rights must be protected ‘if man [sic] is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression’. And something of the same sense can be inferred from an aphorism attributed to John F Kennedy: ‘If we make nonviolent revolution impossible, we make violent revolution inevitable’ (Kennedy, 1962: 223).

These are clues as to the components of, or perhaps the co-requisites for, peace in the modern world. In Galtung’s words, ‘peace is the absence of violence’, but not just in the ‘narrow’ sense of direct violence, the intentional infliction of physical harm: ‘If this were all violence is about, and peace is seen as its negation, then too little is rejected when peace is held up as an ideal. Highly unacceptable social orders would still be compatible with peace’ (1969: 168). Peace should not, Galtung was arguing, be defined in such a way as to seem to confer approval on political systems that maintain order only by virtue of keeping their citizens cowed into submission, even in the face of injustice.

Instead, peace – on this understanding – is seen not merely as the absence of war, but as requiring ‘also the establishment of positive, life-affirming and life-enhancing values and social structures’ (Barash, 2002: 3). It is not a stasis but a process, ‘a state of affairs the realization of which is not utopian (“not impossible to obtain”) yet not on the immediate political agenda (“complex and difficult”)’ (Galtung, 1969: 168). Peace, Galtung argued, had to be something to work towards, not a way for politicians in wealthy, generally orderly societies to preen, or the better-off to feel more comfortable with their advantage. There has to be room, in this concept of peace, for justice, and for the insight attributed to Frederick Douglass, a prominent voice in the campaign to abolish slavery in the United States: ‘If there is no struggle, there is no progress’ (Douglass, 1857).

For peace to be the absence of violence therefore requires violence itself to be redefined, which Galtung did: not by the form it takes, but by the effect it brings about: ‘Violence is when human beings are influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential’ (Galtung, 1969: 168).

This effect can be wrought in many ways. As well as direct violence, the deliberate infliction of physical harm, it can also be brought about by structural and cultural violence, concepts respectively covering systems of social organization, and signification, that deny or abrogate human potential. Among the most visible forms of structural violence was the panoply of race laws in apartheid South Africa, with its notorious whites-only buses, residential areas and so forth. But it is present in many other, more insidious forms, which place barriers across the fulfilment of human potential. Cultural violence is manifest in overt expressions of racism, for instance, but also in culturally constructed assumptions that are tacitly at work in everyday social relations in many societies. Such forms will always be with us, it may be argued, so a society at peace is one with abundant and effective mechanisms for exposing and challenging them, and mobilising support for positive changes – often through struggle.

Prominent among such mechanisms are the various modes of social communication. These enable the construction and circulation of what another prominent researcher, the US Mennonite peace theorist and practitioner John Paul Lederach, called ‘social meaning’ (1995: 8). It is the social meaning of events in a conflict that determines how people will respond to them – with more violence, or by seeking alternatives. And it is the social meaning attached to – for instance – inequalities produced by particular systems of political and economic relations that lead people either to accept them as an unshakeable ‘fact of life’, or to view them as unjust, and in need of reform. Therefore, ‘social conflict emerges and develops on the basis of the meaning and interpretation people involved attach to actions and events’ (Lederach, 1995: 8).

How do people attach meaning and interpretation to actions and events? Here, Lederach’s contentions intersect with those of Galtung, who published an essay in 1965 with Mari Holmboe Ruge, ‘The structure of foreign news’, urging the importance of news as an influence on responses to conflict. In it, they argue: ‘It is axiomatic that action is based on the actor’s image of reality... [and] media, [with their] regularity, ubiquity and perseverance [are] first-rate competitors for the number-one position as international image-former’ (Galtung and Ruge, 1965: 64).

Prospects for making or building peace, therefore, depend to some extent on how events in conflict are represented. ‘Peaceful transformation also presupposes a peaceful context, as provided by peace education/journalism’ (Galtung, 2000: 6). The conventions, or news values, identified in ‘The structure of foreign news’ mapped out a dominant discourse of ‘war journalism’, Galtung later declared (1998). This should be distinguished from the neutral term, current in professional journalism, of ‘war reporting’, meaning reporting – of any kind – on wars. War journalism, in Galtung’s terms, means journalism that represents conflicts in such a way as to validate direct violence as a response, by presenting a warlike image of reality. Or it may inure readers and audiences to ongoing structural and cultural violence, by producing and strengthening social meanings and interpretations that naturalise and legitimise them.

The three news values from the Galtung–Ruge essay that are most directly relevant to the present discussion are:

- Threshold;
- Frequency;
- Negativity.

A big event is more newsworthy, with the proviso that scale is in the eye of the beholder. For the *Basingstoke Gazette*, say, the threshold of newsworthiness for a particular event in Basingstoke would be lower than that of the same event occurring in Baghdad. Frequency refers to developments with a clear beginning, middle and end that all take place in the interval between editions. We buy the newspaper today – or watch this evening’s news, or go back to the Twitter feed from the reporter – to find out what’s happened since yesterday, or since the last hour. And negativity refers to the old editor’s maxim, bad news sells.

These news values give rise to the prevalent form of war journalism, which is:

- Violence-oriented, with a preference for highly visible violent events such as bombs, battles and bullets;
- Propaganda-oriented, with a tendency to report statements by conflicting parties at face value, commonly counter-posed against each other;
- Elite-oriented, ignoring other voices below leadership level;
- Victory-oriented, representing a conflict as a contest that will end only when one side wins and the other loses.

Peace journalism, therefore, as a remedial form, is:

- Conflict and peace-oriented, with space for the exploration of contexts and backgrounds – the process leading up to the events;
- Truth-oriented, with a commitment to expose hidden agendas;
- People-oriented: on the lookout for peace initiatives emanating from whatever level, no matter how small or apparently tangential;
- Solution-oriented, representing a conflict as a series of intelligible problems, leading to consequences and capable of being solved with nonviolent interventions (adapted from Galtung, 1998).

These distinctions refer to what Entman calls ‘substantive framing’. Framing is a way of describing how social meanings and interpretations are produced in texts and in our readings of them. To ‘frame’ is ‘to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation’ (Entman, 1993: 51). Later, Lee and Maslog added three further indicators of war journalism, in a study of ten newspapers from different countries in Asia, which pertain directly to the language used when writing about these different aspects of conflict. ‘The language-based criteria [in their study] focused on language that was (a) demonizing, (b) victimizing, and (c) emotive’ (Lee and Maslog, 2005: 317).

These distinctions, like those of Galtung (which Lee and Maslog call ‘approach-based criteria’), contain layers of interpretation that can be compared with insights from other research considering issues of framing in war reporting. Wolfsfeld et al. (2008) observe that media tend to foreground victim testimony and perspectives, with a high degree of emotionalism, when the victims are on what they perceive as their ‘own’ side. By contrast, they note, media reporting on victims from the ‘other’ side exhibits a ‘defensive mode of reporting’ with correspondingly lower levels of overtly emotional content.

Strong effects can be observed when emotive portrayals of protagonists in conflict are used to implement the elements of peace journalism called for in Galtung’s model, such as a focus on ‘people as peace-makers’ (Galtung, 1998). McGoldrick and Lynch, in a four-

country study gauging differential audience responses to television news stories presented as war journalism and peace journalism respectively, found that:

Many of the strongest effects came when challenges to dominant narratives, which serve to justify violence and/or perpetuate injustice, were carried by a 'character' whose personal story won attention and engagement by triggering empathy and hope. The results support the conclusion of a correlation, at least, between these emotional and cognitive responses.

(McGoldrick and Lynch, 2015: 16)

Implementation

Galtung presented his peace journalism model at a residential course at Taplow Court, a stately home in southern England that is now the UK cultural centre of a Japanese lay Buddhist organisation, the Soka Gakkai International (the Buddhist value of peace giving a connection with Galtung's work and profile). From the Taplow proceedings, a 50-page manual, 'The Peace Journalism Option' (Lynch, 1998), was produced, and began to come to the attention of professionals in aid and development work including in Indonesia. In this, it coincided with an upsurge of interest in the sector in media development as a means of resourcing societies affected by conflict to turn away from violence:

The influence of the media has caught the eye of international agencies and NGOs [non-governmental organisations] closely involved in peace-building during the last decade. Over ten years an estimated one billion dollars has been invested in interventions relating to the media in conflict-ridden societies. There is an emerging belief that the media may well be the most effective means of conflict resolution and preventing new wars.

(Howard, 2003: 147–148)

In countries directly affected by armed conflict, or living with tensions arising from an overhang of latent conflict issues, journalists have often evinced an appetite for peace journalism, including Indonesia, the Philippines, Nepal, Georgia, Armenia, Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories, Jordan, Cyprus, Turkey and many others. Worldwide pedagogical and exhortatory initiatives are documented in a biannual magazine, *The Peace Journalist*, which is produced at the Global Peace Journalism Center at Park University, Missouri. Peace journalism can legitimately be regarded as a globally distributed reform movement in civil society. It was taken up as the signature concept and approach of the World Association for Christian Communication, which counts among its members some 1,500 institutions and individuals in more than 100 countries. Peace journalism is taught at universities in the UK, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Finland, the US, South Africa, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand.

Peace journalism began to attain wider attention in the international academic community from 2002, at an Oxford conference convened and funded by the Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research. In one section of the event, communication scholars from many countries were formed into an 'Action Research Team' and tasked with considering implications in media domains of complementary processes of 'Globalisation, Regionalisation and Democratisation'. Outputs included a book, *Democratizing Global Media* (Hackett and Zhao, 2005) with a chapter on peace journalism, and a collective decision by

participants to move straight on to the next stage of collaborative work, based on elaborating and operationalising the peace journalism model.

This work was developed through subsequent Toda conferences in Vancouver (2004); Madrid (2005); Vancouver again in 2006; and Washington State (2007). *Peace Journalism*, published in 2005 by Lynch and McGoldrick, gave the emerging field a primary iterative text, and *Conflict & Communication Online*, in effect an online, open-access 'house journal'. At the same time, a Peace Journalism Commission of the International Peace Research Association was created, and convened for its biennial conferences at Calgary in 2006, Leuven (2008) and Sydney (2010). Papers presented at these and other gatherings have been collected in several edited volumes (Kempf and Shinar, 2007; Kempf, 2008; Ross and Tehranian, 2008; Keeble et al., 2010; Shaw et al., 2011; Hoffmann and Hawkins, 2015). Finally, Galtung's own expanded ideas on peace journalism appeared, in a work published jointly with the present author (Lynch and Galtung, 2010).

Objections to peace journalism

Throughout this period, then, the peace journalism movement was developing rapidly in complementary and overlapping spheres: journalism practice, training, education and academic research. It was instilled primarily as a call for the activation of journalistic agency, to be brought about through conflict sensitisation and training, but it also began to mesh with modest structural innovations and resources. It acquired a life of its own as a 'challenger paradigm' (Hackett, 2011) or insurgent form. Unsurprisingly, it also attracted its fair share of objections and criticism.

An early (2002) critical study came from Liz Fawcett, titled 'Why Peace Journalism isn't News'. She found that the rhetorical and narrative structures characteristic of newspaper journalism in Northern Ireland enabled it to engage with 'conflict frames' for sectarian events (the stories analysed were taken from coverage of an Orange Order march) but not 'conciliation frames' (2002: 213). Peace journalism would only gain a foothold, she concluded, if the 'discursive structures, as well as the power of the political and professional cultures within which journalists operate' (2002: 221) were effectively challenged.

In this, Fawcett echoed some of the findings of Gadi Wolfsfeld's 1997 study of reporting of the so-called Oslo 'peace process' involving representatives of Israel and the Palestinians. There is, Wolfsfeld argues, an inherent tension between the demands of news journalism and the requirements of peacebuilding:

A peace process is complicated; journalists demand simplicity. A peace process takes time to unfold and develop; journalists demand immediate results. Most of a peace process is marked by dull, tedious negotiations; journalists require drama. A successful peace process leads to a reduction in tensions; journalists focus on conflict. Many of the significant developments within a peace process must take place in secret behind closed doors; journalists demand information and action.

(Wolfsfeld, 1997: 67)

Then, Thomas Hanitzsch, invited by the journal, *Conflict & Communication Online*, to situate peace journalism in communications theory, argued that its advocates too readily overlooked or minimised arguments about the limitations imposed by media's structure and function, in particular configurations of political economy, leading them to adopt 'an overly individualistic and voluntaristic perspective' (2008: 75).

It might be inferred, from such observations, that peace journalism is, in practice, impossible to do. But the Fawcett article does not mention an earlier study by Kirsten Sparre, who discussed reporters' role in 'megaphone diplomacy', finding that 'media were instrumental in carrying a dialogue between the British and Irish governments and the Republican movement about the terms on which Sinn Féin could be admitted into the talks process' (2001: 94) that led ultimately to the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland.

The study by Lee and Maslog (referenced above) used the distinctions in Galtung's model, adding the three others for linguistic characteristics, to derive evaluative criteria to gauge the extent of peace journalism already underway. Their sample ($n = 1,388$), drawn from ten English-language newspapers in different Asian countries, included three – the *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, the *Philippine Star* and Indonesia's *Jakarta Post* – whose journalists, at least in some cases, were almost certainly aware of peace journalism by the time of publication of the material used as the basis for the study. The Philippines and Indonesia were two countries where the peace journalism movement gained traction among journalistic communities (Lynch, 2013) and significant numbers of editors and reporters took part in professional training modules based upon it. But the majority of articles studied were probably contributed by journalists who had never heard of peace journalism. Nevertheless, the extent of published peace journalism was found to vary widely, with newspapers from both the Philippines and Sri Lanka displaying over 50 per cent – that is, peace journalism was in a majority – and well over one third (35.7 per cent) overall.

This practice – operationalising the peace journalism model as a tool for content analysis – accounts for the largest single strand of published research on peace journalism. Its authors invariably discover that some peace journalism is present (see also Lynch, 2008; Ross and Tehranian, 2008), even if not in the majority proportions discovered in some of the newspapers studied by Lee and Maslog.

Objectivity and practicality

The instantiation and early implementation of peace journalism in milieux of professional journalism in mainstream media has mandated a broadly conceived acceptance of its remit of factual reporting. Peace journalism is, according to its most widely cited definition: 'When editors and reporters make choices, of what to report and how to report it, which create opportunities for readers and audiences to consider and value nonviolent responses to conflict' (Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005: 5).

If readers and audiences are provided with such opportunities, and prompted to consider them, only to decide they prefer violent responses, then there is nothing more journalism can do about it, while remaining journalism. Peace journalism is an advocacy project vis-à-vis journalism, but it is not trying to turn journalism into advocacy.

For Wilhelm Kempf, long-serving editor of the online journal, *Conflict & Communication Online*, and himself a major theoretical contributor to the development of peace journalism, it is essential to respect the journalist's remit of factual reporting, embedded as it is in newsroom routines and role definitions, to preserve the 'trust bonus' that peace journalism advocates should enjoy.

In so far as peace journalism is a reform agenda, therefore based on a deficit analysis and giving rise to calls for change in journalistic practice, Kempf (2003) emphasised the importance of making these realistic and achievable in respect of particular phases of conflict. Journalists operate from inside their society and generally have their own beliefs, like the rest of society. Therefore, he suggested using a two-step procedure to break down war discourse

and violence-oriented war reporting, and transform such reporting into conflict-oriented peace journalism.

Kempf's two-step model suggested the use of a de-escalation-oriented style of conflict reporting during violent phases of the conflict, when peace is to be made; and a solution-oriented style of conflict reporting only after a peace treaty or agreement is in place, when peace is to be built.

The de-escalation-oriented conflict coverage promotes neutrality and critical distance from all parties in the conflict. Journalists working in this mode must be equipped with knowledge related to conflict theory, and must use it for exploring the conflict formation with a win-win orientation and also practice fair reporting of peace initiatives and attempts at mediation (Kempf, 2003). When a peace agreement has been reached, solution-oriented conflict reporting would be applied by focusing on the people-oriented, proactive role of the journalists, the invisible effects of war and conflict, and reconciliation perspectives (Kempf, 2003).

Other writers, such as Hackett (2011), have sensed what are arguably more radical implications, within the peace journalism model and the movement for its implementation and spread, as a 'challenger paradigm' to what he has called the 'discursive regime of objectivity', which ensures that journalism in mainstream media legitimates and naturalises boundaries of debate and disagreement that coincide with the delimitations of elite discord, generally within the country where it is produced.

PJ [peace journalism] constitutes an epistemological challenge to the objectivity regime. In this view, journalism inherently involves choices; it is a matter of representation, not of reality-reflection. Notwithstanding its professed disinterestedness, conventional 'objective' journalism enshrines practices that predictably favour some outcomes and values over others – including, too often, war over peaceful conflict transformation. For example, in conflict situations, far from being passive observers, journalists are often caught in a 'feedback loop' with political players... By focusing on physical violence divorced from context, and on win-lose scenarios, conventional 'objective' news unwittingly incentivises conflict escalation and 'crackdowns,' impeding a morally and professionally justifiable incentivisation of peaceful outcomes.

(Hackett, 2011: 40)

He also remarks, however, that peace journalism defies easy categorisation in its epistemological approach, rejecting both the stance that journalism simply reports self-evident facts, and the relativist position that 'it's all spin', that there is no independent basis for separating truth from propaganda.

Robert Karl Manoff summarises the case for regarding media as a potential component of peacemaking: 'The media constitute a major human resource whose potential to help prevent and moderate social violence begs to be discussed, evaluated and, where appropriate, mobilized' (in Baumann, 1998: np).

If peace journalism is foreclosed, as remarked earlier, from straying into advocacy, then for its potential as a contribution to peacemaking to be mobilised, it must attend not merely to journalistic technique but also to audience responses. And if it is going to engage, not merely with the violent phase of shooting wars, but also on symbolic terrains that govern the fulfilment of human potential under headings of structural and cultural violence, then it must apply its key distinctions to issues of social as well as military conflict.

This is the twin-track rationale for the biggest experiment so far in gauging differential audience responses to war and peace journalism respectively. A four-country experiment (conducted in Australia, the Philippines, South Africa and Mexico) saw upwards of 500 participants watch a total of 42 television news stories. They filled in questionnaires to report changes in their emotional state; they took notes of thoughts and feelings prompted by their viewing experience; and they discussed their impressions in focus groups. The latter were convened, following Philo and Berry (2004), to reflect a range of social groups in each country.

Coding was carried out using, as headings, a five-fold summarising overview of literature in the field. When researchers discuss peace journalism, Shinar found, they mean journalism that:

- 1 Explores backgrounds and contexts of conflict formation, and presents causes and options on every side so as to portray conflict in realistic terms, transparent to the audience;
- 2 Gives voice to the views of all rival parties, not merely leaders from two antagonistic 'sides';
- 3 Airs creative ideas, from any source, for conflict resolution, development, peacemaking and peacekeeping;
- 4 Exposes lies, cover-up attempts and culprits on all sides, and reveals excesses committed by, and suffering inflicted on, peoples of all parties;
- 5 Pays attention to peace stories and post-war developments (Shinar, 2007: 200).

Beneath these five headings, distinctions salient to each story in the study were identified through a process attentive to principles of critical discourse analysis, recommended by Nohrstedt and Ottosen (2011) as an essential supplement to peace journalism because 'journalistic products are perceived to carry and contain meanings on several levels. These cannot be collapsed into a single "manifest content" level' (2011: 224–225). The overall conclusions from the study supported the view that peace journalism can and does prompt and enable audiences to consider and value nonviolent responses to conflicts of various kinds:

When audiences watch television news items created as war journalism and peace journalism respectively, their responses reflect a process of meaning-making... linking perceived causes and effects that predicate, respectively, a lesser or greater receptiveness to cooperative, nonviolent responses to conflict.

(Lynch and McGoldrick, 2013: 1056)

Moreover, it was possible to identify certain common characteristics in the stories that induced the strongest audience responses – that is, the most pronounced differentials between those viewing war and peace journalism respectively. They all brought into focus elements of background and context which prompted and equipped viewers to take issue with dominant discourses. They enabled critical scrutiny of familiar assumptions that have the effect of validating violent responses, or inuring publics to ongoing injustices of structural and/or cultural violence. 'In general, this cognitive engagement was triggered by (or at least indissociable from) emotional engagement, as the background and context issues emerged from human stories of protagonists who spoke from their own experience' (McGoldrick and Lynch, 2015: 8).

In recording these findings, the study amplified and extended earlier research by Schaefer (2006) and Kempf (2008), in which German newspaper readers proved receptive to, and interested in, versions of stories about international conflict coded to produce 'de-escalation-oriented' coverage.

Conclusion

If there were more peace journalism, then, there is at least some evidence that it could make a difference to audience responses, and thereby to the contexts in which peacemaking and peacebuilding initiatives are conceived and carried out. So could there be? More peace journalism, that is?

The feasibility of peace journalism is generally seen as being limited by the continuing salience and prevalence of the conventions identified by Galtung and Ruge as ‘news values’. To the extent that these arose out of the economic interests of news industries with a certain time-specific organisational structure, they are also now visibly waning, as rapid technological changes bring economic transformations in their wake, although – as Hackett has observed – there is no agreed-upon successor paradigm to professional, factual reporting.

Many have dreamed of finding or fashioning such a paradigm, even characterising it as a ‘Holy Grail...a revenue model that goes hand-in-hand with a commitment to allow journalists to continue to protect the public interest’ (Wilson, 2012: 3). A separate study of US journalism extrapolates present trends to visualise the media of 2020, by which time: ‘There will be more nonprofit news organizations, driven by several kinds of donation – direct cash subsidy by philanthropies and other donor organizations...user donations of cash...and in-kind donations of the time and talents of a particular community’ (Anderson et al., 2012: 107).

As journalism is increasingly called upon to negotiate its position in public spheres with other discursive endeavours – overlapping and even merging to some extent with non-professional forms of representation from social media and specialised platforms such as WikiLeaks – the structures within which it is carried out will become more plural, as will its modes of conduct and content. Prominent peace journalists are already harnessing the potentiality of this situation to parlay their ideas into varied and successful careers (Lynch, 2013).

Like the other initiatives discussed in this chapter, however, such examples of success in implementing peace journalism are piecemeal and unconnected. There has never been any but the most rudimentary infrastructure to put the take-up and spread of peace journalism on any organised or systematic footing. Over a decade ago, Tehranian (2002) made the case for a World Media Development Bank as a specialised UN agency, to fund media structures and initiatives capable of supporting peace journalism as a system of global media ethics. Nohrstedt and Ottosen (2015: 221) call for ‘a joint approach [involving] universities, colleges, training institutes, NGOs such as Reporters sans Frontières and the International Federation of Journalists’ to establish ethical standards and norms for professional journalists reporting conflicts, with peace journalism as a basis, through journalism education.

For such a joint approach to be conceived and implemented it will require peace journalism research to clarify several of the key theoretical and methodological issues raised and discussed in this chapter. Is it chiefly a reform agenda in mainstream media, or does it seek instead to engage with alternative and social media as a way round the structural constraints on the content of news, first set out in the Galtung–Ruge’s essay (1965)? Is it committed to some form of correspondence theory of representation, in support of the journalistic remit to distinguish facts from claims? Or does it, as Hackett (2011) suggests, seek instead to challenge the ‘regime of objectivity’? How far can it be implemented by editors and reporters in professional news organisations? On the answer to that question will depend judgments as to its feasibility as the basis for expectations of media representing conflicts in any given milieu.

The scholarly and practical work encompassed in the peace journalism field to date contains an archipelago of positions and perspectives on all these questions and more. But they are connected to only a limited extent. The task of future research is to prompt and enable collaborations to establish where peace journalism stands, and what it calls for, with reference to the exigencies and affordances of today's mediascapes. Only then will peace journalism be able to fulfil its potential, to become a significant contribution to symbolic environments propitious to peacemaking and peacebuilding.

References

- Anderson, CW, Emily Bell and Clay Shirky (2012) *Post-Industrial Journalism: Adapting to the Present*. New York: Columbia School of Journalism.
- Barash, David P (2002) 'The Meanings of Peace' in *Peace and Conflict Studies*. London: Sage Publications, pp. 3–27.
- Baumann, Melissa (ed.) (1998) 'Media and Conflict', *Track Two*, 7 (4). Cape Town: Centre for Conflict Resolution, http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/two/7_4/index74.html
- Burton, John W (1990) 'Human Needs Theory', in *Conflict: Resolution and Prevention*. London: Macmillan, pp. 36–48.
- Dedring, Juergen (2008) *The United Nations Security Council in the 1990s: Resurgence and Renewal*. New York: SUNY Press.
- Douglass, Frederick (1857) 'West India Emancipation', speech at Canandaigua, New York. Full text available online: <http://www.blackpast.org/1857-frederick-douglass-if-there-no-struggle-there-no-progress#sthash.nTDcbLfQ.dpuf>
- Entman, Robert M (1993) 'Framing: Towards Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm', in Wilhelm Kempf and Dov Shinar (eds) (2007) *Peace Journalism: The State of the Art*. Berlin: Regener.
- Fawcett, Liz (2002) 'Why Peace Journalism Isn't News', *Journalism Studies*, 3(2): 213–223.
- Galtung, Johan (1969) 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research', *Journal of Peace Research*, 6(3): 167–191.
- Galtung, Johan (1998) 'High Road, Low Road: Charting the Road for Peace Journalism', *Track Two*, 7(4): 7–10.
- Galtung, Johan (2000) *Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means: Participants' Manual; Trainers' Manual*. Geneva: United Nations Disaster Management Training Programme.
- Galtung, Johan and Mari Holmboe Ruge (1965) 'The Structure of Foreign News: The Presentation of the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus Crises in Four Norwegian Newspapers', *Journal of Peace Research*, 2(1): 64–90.
- Hackett, Robert A (2011) 'New Vistas for Peace Journalism: Alternative Media and Communication Rights', in Ibrahim Seaga Shaw, Jake Lynch and Robert A Hackett (eds), *Expanding Peace Journalism: Comparative and Critical Approaches*. Sydney: Sydney University Press, pp. 33–67.
- Hackett, Robert A and Yuezhi Zhao (eds) (2005) *Democratizing Global Media: One World, Many Struggles*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Hanitzsch, Thomas (2008) 'Situating Peace Journalism in Journalism Studies: A Critical Appraisal', in Wilhelm Kempf (ed.), *The Peace Journalism Controversy*. Berlin: Regener, pp. 69–80.
- Hoffmann, Julia and Virgil Hawkins (eds) (2015) 'Media in Peace and Conflict Studies', in *Communication and Peace: Mapping an Emerging Field*. New York: Routledge.
- Howard, Ross (2003) 'The Media's Role in War and Peacebuilding', in Marina Caparini (ed.), *Media in Security and Governance*. Baden-Baden: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, pp. 147–148.
- Keeble, Richard, John Tulloch and Florian Zollman (eds) (2010) *Peace Journalism, War and Conflict Resolution*. London: Peter Lang.
- Kempf, Wilhelm (2003) 'Constructive Conflict Coverage – A Social-Psychological Research and Development Program', *Conflict & Communication Online*, 2(2): 1–13.
- Kempf, Wilhelm (2008) 'Peace Journalism: A Tightrope Walk between Advocacy Journalism and Constructive Conflict Coverage', in Wilhelm Kempf (ed.), *The Peace Journalism Controversy*. Berlin: Regener, pp. 145–156.
- Kennedy, John F (1962) 'Address on the First Anniversary of the Alliance for Progress', White House reception for diplomatic corps of the Latin American republics, 13 March 1962, President John F Kennedy. Public Papers of the Presidents. Washington, DC: White House.

- Lambourne, Wendy and Annie Herro (2008) 'Peacebuilding Theory and the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission: Implications for non-UN Interventions', *Global Change, Peace and Security*, 20(3): 275–289.
- Lederach, John Paul (1995) *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation across Cultures*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Lee, Seow Ting and Crispin C Maslog (2005) 'War or Peace Journalism in Asian Newspapers', *Journal of Communication*, 55(2): 311–329.
- Lynch, Jake (1998) *The Peace Journalism Option*. Taplow: Conflict and Peace Forums.
- Lynch, Jake (2008) 'Active and passive peace journalism in reporting of the "War on Terrorism" in The Philippines', *Peace and Policy*, 13: 99–113.
- Lynch, Jake (2013) 'Is Peace Journalism Feasible? Pointers for Research and Media Development', *Ethical Space: The International Journal of Communication Ethics*, 10(2–3): 15–24.
- Lynch, Jake (2014) *A Global Standard for Reporting Conflict*. New York: Routledge.
- Lynch, Jake and Johan Galtung (2010) *Reporting Conflict: New Directions in Peace Journalism*. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press.
- Lynch, Jake and Annabel McGoldrick (2005) *Peace Journalism*. Stroud: Hawthorn Press.
- Lynch, Jake and Annabel McGoldrick (2013) 'Responses to Peace Journalism', *Journalism: Theory, Practice and Criticism*, 14(8): 1041–1058.
- McGoldrick, Annabel and Jake Lynch (2015) 'Audience Responses to Peace Journalism: Merging Results from a Four-Country Research Study', *Journalism Studies*, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1461670X.2014.992621#abstract>
- Nohrstedt, Stig-Arne and Rune Ottosen (2011) 'Peace Journalism–Critical Discourse Case Study: Media and the Plan for Swedish and Norwegian Defence Cooperation', in Ibrahim Seaga Shaw, Jake Lynch and Robert A Hackett (eds), *Expanding Peace Journalism: Comparative and Critical Approaches*. Sydney: Sydney University Press, pp. 217–238.
- Nohrstedt, Stig-Arne and Rune Ottosen (2015) 'Peace Journalism: A Proposition for Conceptual and Methodological Improvements', *Global Media and Communication*, 11(3): 219–235.
- Philo, Greg and Mike Berry (2004) *Bad News from Israel*. London: Pluto Press.
- Ross, Susan Dente and Majid Tehranian (eds) (2008) *Peace and Policy, Vol. 13: Peace Journalism in Times of War*. Tokyo: Toda Institute for Peace and Policy Research.
- Schaefer, Christoph Daniel (2006) 'The Effects of Escalation- Vs. De-escalation-orientated Conflict Coverage on the Evaluation of Military Measures', *Conflict & Communication Online*, 5(1): 1–17.
- Shaw, Ibrahim Seaga, Jake Lynch and Robert A Hackett (eds) (2011) *Expanding Peace Journalism: Comparative and Critical Approaches*. Sydney: Sydney University Press.
- Shinar, Dov (2007) 'Peace Journalism: The State of the Art', in Wilhelm Kempf and Dov Shinar (eds), *Peace Journalism: The State of the Art*. Berlin: Regener, pp. 199–210.
- Sparre, Kirsten (2001) 'Megaphone Diplomacy in the Northern Irish Peace Process: Squaring the Circle by Talking to Terrorists through Journalists', *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*, 6(1): 88–104.
- Tehranian, Majid (2002) 'Peace Journalism: Negotiating Global Media Ethics', *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*, 7(2): 58–83.
- Wilson, Amanda (2012) 'Introduction', in Penny O'Donnell, David McKnight and Jonathan Este (eds) *Journalism at the Speed of Bytes: Australian Newspapers in the 21st Century*. Sydney: Walkley Foundation, pp. 1–3.
- Wolfsfeld, Gadi (1997) *Media and the Path to Peace*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wolfsfeld, Gadi, P Frosh and MT Awabdy (2008) 'Covering Death in Conflicts: Coverage of the Second Intifada on Israeli and Palestinian Television', *Journal of Peace Research*, 45: 403–419.

16

CONTINUING POST-CONFLICT COVERAGE

Marie-Soleil Frère

Introduction

A country is usually described as “post-conflict” when hostilities have ended and transitory institutions have been established in order to organize “free and fair” elections aimed at restoring the rule of law. Nevertheless, more broadly, a “post-conflict” situation can drag on for years and even decades after these elections, in a context where the absence of war does not mean that all violence has ceased, and democratic institutions remain fragile, dysfunctional or unsustainable. In such contexts, the consolidation of the media sector is viewed as central for political stability and sustainable peace by international democracy assistance organizations, along with other areas such as institution building and the defense of human rights (de Zeeuw 2005). But in post-conflict countries, public and private media outlets face huge challenges, as they generally emerge from war poorly equipped, politically controlled (especially if they have been used as propaganda tools by the belligerents) and with little public trust (Kumar 2006).

This chapter will analyze the evolution of the media landscape in two “post-conflict” countries in Central Africa (Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo), where war officially ended in 2003 and the first democratic polls were held in 2005 and 2006, respectively. A second round of general elections was organized in 2010 and 2011, and, on the eve of a third electoral round, in January 2015, both countries had therefore been at “peace” for more than a decade. Nevertheless, the local media still faced many challenges, in areas where instability remains a central concern and democratic governance is still very weak. Some media are regularly accused of acting once again as propaganda outlets, fueling hatred and promoting violence. Building on an analytical framework developed to analyze the media’s role in conflicts in Central Africa (Frère 2007), this chapter will underline the variables which, within the media outlets or more broadly in the political and media environment, continue to have an impact on the media’s behavior in post-conflict countries, even many years after peace has been restored.

During the wars in both Burundi (1993–2003¹) and the DRC (1996–2003), some media were labeled “hate media” (Frère 2007). And such accusations are still formulated today against a few outlets. For instance, on 17 April 2014, in Burundi, the president of the

opposition party Sahwanya-Frodebu was brought to court after he addressed a letter to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in which he compared the local radio station, Rema FM, to the famous Radio Mille Collines (RTLM), which prepared and supported the execution of the genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda during 1994.²

Similarly, in January 2012, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the French international radio station Radio France Internationale (RFI) was suspended for ten days, accused by the minister in charge of the media, Lambert Mende Omalanga, of disseminating hatred and promoting violence, just as the Rwandan RTLM had done previously in the neighboring country.³

For the past twenty years, references in the African Great Lakes region to the radio that helped implement the genocide in Rwanda have been commonplace. As in the second case cited above, it can be used to threaten any station that opens its airwaves to opposition parties, rebel movements or civil society members critical of the ruling party. But, as in the case of Rema FM, it can also reflect real concerns expressed by analysts that are monitoring media content and willing to raise the alarm about a possible upsurge of inflammatory or hate discourse disseminated by local media.

Ten years after the war's end in the DRC and Burundi, the past still casts a long shadow. How has the media landscape developed? Has the former tendency of some local media to disseminate hatred been totally eradicated, or could it resurface? Have the factors that contributed to the emergence of "hate media" during the war disappeared, or do they still exist, justifying the fear that such media could operate again?

The chapter will first define "post-conflict" before showing why media outlets are viewed as major stakeholders at such times. Based on fieldwork implemented in 2014 in Burundi (before the current political crisis that started in April 2015⁴) and in 2013 in the DRC,⁵ the second section will present the state of the media in both countries⁶ and analyze the variables affecting the commitment of local journalists to maintain professional standards or their tendency to become a mouthpiece for propaganda.

Media in "post-conflict" countries

Every country that has gone through war, whether a civil war or an inter-state one, becomes "post-conflict" as soon as peace agreements are signed and the warring parties put down their weapons. Nevertheless, "post-conflict societies vary considerably, depending on criteria such as the length of conflict and the devastation brought about by it, the way the war ended, and the way relative peace was restored" (de Zeeuw & Kumar 2006: 2). In the two countries under study, a deadly war (300,000 dead in Burundi, several million in the DRC) resulted in peace agreements supported by the international community and which opened a transition period leading to free elections (Reyntjens 2009; Prunier 2009).

A shared challenge for all post-conflict countries is the highly volatile security environment. "Despite the label 'post-conflict', most societies after prolonged and devastating conflict suffer from continuing organized violence, rampant crime and widespread lawlessness" (de Zeeuw & Kumar 2006: 3), with widespread human rights violations. The society can be profoundly divided. Indeed, after more than ten years of "peace" neither the DRC nor Burundi have completely emerged from the cycle of violence. In the DRC, several Eastern provinces are still the theatre of killings, rapes, abductions, torture and economic exploitation at the hands of many different armed groups that control much of the region (UN 2015). In Burundi, killings have taken the form of individual, targeted assassinations rather than large-scale massacres, and have also

tended to be concentrated in certain provinces, and, more recently, in some neighborhoods of Bujumbura (Human Rights Watch 2012; ICG 2012).

Post-conflict situations are also characterized by a context where institutions and infrastructure (roads and transport, energy, buildings) have been destroyed (Kumar 1998). In the DRC, road transport has almost collapsed and flying (which is expensive and not always reliable) has become the only way to move around the country. In Burundi, less than 20 percent of households have access to electricity.

Progress has been made during the decade of “peace”, on both the security and infrastructure fronts, but changes are nevertheless slow, to the extent that both countries have trouble leaving the post-conflict category. Indeed, usually, “countries with ten or more years of post-conflict peace are regarded as having normalized and as such having emerged from the post-conflict phase to a development phase” (Economic and Social Council 2013). Therefore, at the time of the study, Burundi and the DRC should no longer have been labeled “post-conflict.” However, as violence is still widespread and the state is unable to ensure security across the whole territory, both countries still face the same major challenges that they encountered a decade before.

According to Paul Collier et al. (2008: 461), post-conflict societies are confronted by two distinct challenges: economic recovery and the risk of a recurring conflict, as nearly half of all civil wars are due to post-conflict relapses. Economic development is essential to ensure peace and security, but the media cannot do much about it. On the contrary, the media can definitely help reduce tensions between former warring communities and support rebuilding efforts, limiting the risk of conflict relapse. Conversely, they can also keep former animosities alive by presenting the “other party” as threatening, thereby fueling the flames and paving the way for a return to violence.

What Gadi Wolfsfeld writes (2004: 1) on media in peace processes applies equally to the post-conflict period:

They can emphasize the benefits that peace can bring, they can raise the legitimacy of groups and leaders working for peace, and they can help transform the images of the enemy. The media however can also serve as destructive agents in the process. They can emphasize the risks and dangers associated with compromise, raise the legitimacy of those opposed to concessions, and reinforce negative stereotypes of the enemy.

These scenarios are highly plausible during the post-conflict phase.

Variables shaping the role of the media during conflicts

Even at a post-conflict stage, the main question remains: why would some media outlets indeed choose to play the first role of encouraging peace, while others follow the second path, becoming propaganda tools for those advocating violence?

In previous research, focusing on nine countries in Central Africa⁷ (Frère 2007), I tried to identify variables that had an impact on the media’s behavior during the conflicts, leading journalists to remain professional or to slip into discourses of hatred and calls to violence. Three sets of interrelated variables were identified. The first was linked to the situation within each media outlet; the second to the way the political authorities interacted with the media during the conflict; the third to the position of other stakeholders in the media environment.

In the first set of variables, directly related to each media outlet, the journalists' level of training was identified as having an impact on the degree of professionalism of a media and therefore on its capacity to resist becoming a propaganda mouthpiece during the conflict. But the research showed that training was, maybe surprisingly, a secondary factor. Indeed, the links between the media outlets and the political parties or leaders, as well as the level of their financial resources (and subsequently the level of the journalists' salary) seem to play a more significant part in turning the local media into propaganda tools or help them to remain neutral and professional. Moreover, the degree of activity of journalists' professional organizations is an important factor in explaining why media can resist political pressure together (if they are united), or if atomization will make them weaker and easier to manipulate.

Regarding the second set of variables – the intervention of the public authorities in the media sector – it also appeared as having a great impact on the media's involvement in fueling hatred or in peace-building. First, the existing legal and regulatory framework, and moreover the way it is implemented, certainly has an impact on the media's behavior. Indeed, impunity can be seen as a factor that will encourage the deviant media to continue. Access to information (and the capacity of journalists to report on subjects of their choice across the country) is also an important parameter permitting complete and balanced reporting (vs. biased, one-sided views of events). The degree of freedom and pluralism enjoyed by the public broadcaster is also paramount: the more the "public" media are hijacked by the party in office and turned into propaganda outlets, the more politically committed the private media can become, as the opposition is deprived of access to "public" airwaves. The lack of order and the scattering of power in the hands of several armed groups were also identified as factors leading to the increase in attacks on press freedom and therefore the spread of self-censorship among media professionals in times of conflict.

The third set of variables relates to other social or economic stakeholders. Indeed, the economy is another key factor enabling the consolidation of an independent and professional media sector: in war-torn societies, the absence of a suitable environment drives the media into adopting political leanings (and depending on the belligerents' money). The audience also impacts the editorial line, as many media justify their political commitment or sensationalist coverage during wartime by saying that it is what the audience wants. Last but not least, foreign donor intervention in the media sector (whether through training, structural support or the creation of news media) can have a deep impact on media outlets. Major support from foreign donors obviously helps keep reliable information available for the audience in wartime.

All these factors were presented as interrelated in a dynamic model, leading to cases of journalists resisting propaganda and political pressure, for instance in Chad and Burundi, or to cases where journalists turned into warmongers, such as in Congo-Brazzaville and Rwanda.

The issue raised in the current research is as follows: How do these variables evolve in the post-conflict period? Ten years after peace was signed, do they still impact the daily work of journalists, to the extent that this can explain the continuing fear of new "hate media"? This will be examined in the second part of this chapter, based on fieldwork carried out in 2013 in the DRC and 2014 in Burundi.⁸

Media outlets after a decade of peace

Four variables internal to the media outlets were identified as impacting the way journalists operate in times of conflict: the level of training of journalists; the links between media outlets and political stakeholders; the level of financial resources of each media house; professional solidarity between journalists over and beyond the different editorial leanings. Each provides a guarantee of better resistance to pressure from the warring parties.

Training: more opportunities, but limited progress

The lack of appropriate professional training is among the factors that can contribute to bias or inflammatory coverage during conflicts. In both Burundi and the DRC, training opportunities have multiplied since peace has been restored. In Bujumbura, where there was no journalism school before the war, a Master in Journalism was established in 2008 at the National University, while three private universities have developed curricula in communication studies since the early 2000s. Despite these changes, training is still viewed as lacking by media managers. A recent study has shown that the training opportunities were “insufficient and inadequate” (Nindorera et al. 2013: 129). Most of the thirty students (per year) in the Master in Journalism are just seeking to obtain a diploma, which could help them to get a promotion (especially in the public media where the staff consists of civil servants). They do not necessarily want to change their daily routines. In the DRC, training has developed, with many new private education institutions established and a growth in the number of students in pre-existing public schools (Fierens et al. 2013). In both countries, many international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) have also provided training opportunities, through short-term workshops, many of them devoted to the promotion of “peace journalism.”⁹ While most participants in these sessions acknowledge the fact that they have improved their skills regarding information and communication technologies (ICTs), the development of training did not have an obvious impact on the quality of the media content.¹⁰

There are many reasons why the greater availability of training opportunities has not resulted in a rise in the quality of media content. Some are related to the training itself (lack of skilled trainers, poor equipment, gap between the course content and the media’s real needs), others to the situation within the media houses. According to some journalists interviewed during this fieldwork, courses on ethics and professional skills are hypocritical because they burden journalists with a responsibility which is not, in fact, theirs to bear. Trying to raise the quality of media content through the training of journalists implies that the abuses committed by the media are due to a lack of knowledge and skills, and not to working conditions. Polydor Muboyayi, the publisher of the newspaper *Le Phare* and president of the self-regulatory body in the DRC, testifies:

There has been a lot of training. But you need to know that the media have been established by political leaders with a specific aim. In that context, training cannot have any impact. The journalists know very well what they should be doing, but they do not follow professional rules of conduct because they have to follow their boss, if they do not want to have to resign... For such training to have an impact, it would be necessary to compel the bosses to give the journalists more leeway.¹¹

Close ties between the media and political leaders

During the conflicts, media outlets with a direct link to a political party or leader were the ones that completely turned into propaganda mouthpieces. This was the case of the “hate press” that circulated from 1993 to 1996 in Burundi and of some radio stations in the DRC in 1997 and 1998 (Frère 2007). Ten years later, close ties between politicians and media outlets were still predominant in the DRC. Each electoral process (2006, 2011) has triggered a mushrooming of newspapers, self-proclaimed “community” radios and even television stations, committed to supporting one or other candidate. Each of the main political candidates wants to have his own media in his stronghold during the election campaign.¹²

Therefore, in order to survive, the media are forced to publish information to please their political protectors. Asked about the improvements in the media sector over the past five years, Tshivis Tshivuadi, the general secretary of Journaliste en Danger (JED, a Congolese non-governmental organization (NGO) defending press freedom), made it clear: “The quality of information has not changed. It is ‘subsistence information,’ propaganda, aimed at survival.”¹³ JED monitored the last electoral campaign in the Congolese media and showed that all television stations were committed to serving their owner’s political career. Télé 50 gave 90 percent of its airtime to candidate Joseph Kabila, while the ten other candidates shared the remaining 10 percent. At the other end of the political spectrum, Radio Télévision Lisanga devoted 90 percent of its airtime to Etienne Tshisekedi. Digital Congo devoted all its airtime to Joseph Kabila, while Canal Futur devoted 100 percent to Vital Kamhere. JED concluded that media coverage was “partisan, eclipsing political pluralism and the variety of opinions which should be the professional motto of the media during elections” (JED 2012: 18).

Burundi, where all extremist media were suspended in 1996, did not encounter the same phenomenon of politically affiliated media during the 2005 elections. Besides the national broadcaster, Radio Télévision Nationale du Burundi (RTNB), the main media were private radio stations (Radio Publique Africaine (RPA), Radio Isanganiro, Radio Bonesha, Radio Renaissance), established with the specific aim of contributing to peace-building and democratic consolidation. Before the 2011 elections, the situation changed with the creation of new radio stations, close to the ruling CNDD-FDD party: Rema FM, Radio Star and Radio Umuco. Besides, the director of a radio station, RPA, created a political party and ran for the presidency, which led to the radio also being accused of serving a political party. From 2010 to 2015, the stations with political affiliations were the ones identified as ethically problematic.¹⁴

Financial resources (and the pay level of journalists)

In Central Africa, during the wars, the media that were independent from political stakeholders often lived on money received from foreign donors. During and shortly after the conflict, new media (mainly radio stations) were established with the support of INGOs in order to contribute to the dissemination of “neutral” information, but also to peace-building and reconciliation. These media were still operating after a decade of peace: Radio Okapi, created by the United Nations (UN) and the Swiss Foundation Hironde in the DRC, and, in Burundi, radio stations such as Radio Bonesha, RPA and Radio Isanganiro. All these media outlets survived even though sustainability remained an issue (Frère 2013). In Burundi, in 2013, up to 85 percent of the budget of the main radio stations and the main private newspaper *Iwacu* came from foreign partners (Nindorera et al. 2013). In the DRC, Radio Okapi requires a yearly budget of around 10 million euros and, if the UN

peacekeeping mission was to withdraw, the survival of the station could not be guaranteed with local resources.

If sustainability remains a major issue, the support provided by foreign donors places these media beyond the reach of pressure from political parties. It also enables these media to work in good material and technical conditions, and journalists to be paid regularly.

Nevertheless, except for Radio Okapi, the salaries of media professionals remain low and have not really improved over the past decade, whereas the cost of daily living keeps rising.¹⁵ As a result, the practice of “paid-for” reporting is widespread in the DRC and is also growing in Burundi. The journalists and media that are willing to be paid for positive coverage – or to ruin someone’s reputation – are also those that can resort more rapidly to hatred and political propaganda. Therefore, paying a sufficient salary to media personnel is a guarantee for neutral and balanced information. Nevertheless, a decade of peace has still not enabled the local media to increase their revenue and raise the salary of their staff, while most media also keep operating with their original equipment. Even though economic growth is undeniable in the DRC, the media market has not benefited from new resources. In Burundi, media budgets have been rising as a result of escalating operating costs, but salaries remain low.

Weak professional organizations

Just as civil society has difficulties getting organized and structured during a war, journalists’ organizations very seldom operate during armed conflicts. Nevertheless, when they do, they can foster professional solidarity among journalists, which will help them go beyond their political rifts and defend their joint professional interests against the warring parties. This has not been the case in the DRC, nor during the first part of the war in Burundi where most media professionals have been deeply split along political lines. Ten years after the conflict, it is worth exploring how professional organizations work and defend journalistic principles collectively, and examining whether they could raise the professional debate above the former, predominantly political, ethnic or regional sense of belonging.

As soon as the war in the DRC ended, media professionals were prompt to organize a congress in March 2004 to lay the foundations of a new organization in the media landscape.¹⁶ Since then, several organizations have been established at the national and local levels, but most face internal problems (mainly around the issue of management of financial resources). The self-regulatory body, the Observatory of the Congolese Media (OMEC), is not operating properly, and only acts when motivated by funding from a donor. In several provinces, where radio and television stations were established by political leaders, clashes between media from opposite sides regularly occur and can lead to violence.¹⁷ Atomization and the rift between journalists and media owners along political (and often ethnic) lines weaken any collective attempt to defend the profession.¹⁸

In Burundi, a smaller country with a limited number of media outlets, most of them funded by foreign donors with the aim of contributing to peace-building, it was easier to bring the media professionals together.¹⁹ During the 2005 elections, a joint coverage mechanism called Synergy was established, gathering all the major private media and the public broadcaster. The aim was to share human and technical resources in order to be able to send reporters to all the provinces to follow the voting operations and to broadcast, simultaneously, newscasts prepared jointly by the participating media (Frère 2011a). In 2010, the project was revived and around 150 journalists from fifteen different media were dispatched across the country or in the joint newsroom in Bujumbura. Nevertheless, tensions

surfaced between the major private radio stations and the national broadcaster RTNB as well as Rema FM. RTNB eventually withdrew from the Synergy for some time, while Rema FM kept broadcasting political propaganda in the time slots available before and after the joint newscasts. Nevertheless, the Synergy managed to keep both the government station and the radio stations close to rival parties together inside the project. Although a sense of commonality is not always guaranteed in Burundi (Rema FM has repeatedly insulted the president of the self-regulatory body OPB and the director of RPA), the strength provided by professional solidarity to face state pressure has been demonstrated many times. For instance, in 2012, when Hassan Ruvakuki (a journalist with Radio Bonesha) was jailed for fifteen months, accused of “terrorism” after he had met with a new rebel movement at the Tanzanian border, journalists from all media decided to demonstrate jointly every Friday in front of the law courts.

Hence, the process of having professional journalistic identity prevail on ethnic or political feelings of belonging has progressed a lot in Burundi, making the whole profession stronger and more daring, even though the recent crisis, resulting in the closure of the main independent broadcasters and the exile of dozens of journalists, is now threatening that common professional vision (Frère 2016). In the DRC, divisions (mainly on political grounds) prevent solidarity from acting as a shield to protect the profession.

The political environment

How have relations evolved between the media and the new, “democratically elected”²⁰ government over a decade of peace? In both countries, there is a clear divide between, on the one hand, the media that are close to the ruling party and supportive of its policies, and, on the other, those that are close to the opposition parties and are being harassed. Caught in between, the “neutral” media are viewed by the government as outlets serving the political opposition: indeed, any critique of the ruling party’s actions is seen as a malicious attempt to impede its constructive policies.

In the DRC, Radio Okapi has repeatedly been accused of being “too critical” of the Congolese government. “All the station is interested in is showing what is not working in the DRC. That is not good for the motivation of the Congolese people. What we need to hear is what is going well in the country.”²¹ In Burundi, the main private radio stations have also been accused by the party in office of systematically undermining the government’s actions.

Relations between the ruling party and the media are very tense, as, even after over a decade of peace, the government remains highly sensitive to any form of criticism, which can be labelled as “anti-patriotic.” In both countries, the political opposition is threatened, prevented from gathering or demonstrating, and its media (or even the ones that are just allowing it on air) are the target of unfair treatment. Therefore, the media landscape just reflects this lack of respect of the democratic rules at the political level: the media that are not aligned with the ruling party (whether they are close to the political opposition or not) act as the only watchdogs in the public space and are constantly under pressure.

During the conflicts, four variables characterized the way public authorities dealt with the media sector, and therefore relations between the media and the government: the legal and regulatory framework, access to public information, the situation of state media and of press freedom. These variables could help explain why some media either keep providing professional information or slip into propaganda. Ten years after the war’s end, they still continue to impact the media’s daily work.

A new legal and regulatory framework

When war-torn countries engage in peace and reconstruction, the institution building (or rebuilding) process is central to the restructuring of the different sectors, including the media, after a period of vacuum. Burundi adopted a new press law in 2003 and that same year the DRC established a new regulatory body (High Authority of the Media or HAM, which was later replaced by the Higher Council for Communication and Broadcasting (CSAC)). The general aim was to promote press freedom and to establish rules and institutions that would help to prevent the media from again becoming harmful weapons. Nevertheless, the attempt to organize and “sanitize” the media sector through legislation and institutional regulation was not a great success. After a short period of reasonable collaboration, relations between the local media and the public institutions in charge of the sector deteriorated rapidly.

In the DRC, the CSAC is viewed as a political instrument of the ruling party, mainly devoted to punishing the media that criticize the government, but with no sanctions against those close to the ruling party members who misbehave. In Burundi as well, the National Communication Council (CNC)²² is accused of being biased and politically manipulated. Media close to the opposition or critical of the government are summoned and sanctioned while those close to the ruling party are never called to order. Besides, a new press law was adopted in June 2013, which journalists see as restricting their freedom and giving greater repressive powers to the CNC.²³

Regarding the regulation of the media sector in those post-conflict countries, even though there is a liberal legal framework²⁴ and institutions devoted to organizing the media and promoting press freedom, two main problems remain. First, there is a huge gap between the word of the law and its interpretation by courts and judges that enjoy no independence from the ruling party. The law is therefore systematically manipulated in order to condemn overly critical media. In Burundi, in 2010–2011, Jean-Claude Kavumbagu, director of the online agency Net Press, was incarcerated for ten months after publishing a paper suggesting that the country was not ready to face a terrorist attack like those launched by the Somali group al-Shabab in Uganda. In the DRC, the Ministry of Information is using the argument of the media’s lack of compliance with certain administrative rules to close down those that are too critical. Canal Futur and Radio Television Lisanga, close to the opposition, were suspended by the CSAC in 2012 and could not resume broadcasting. Even Radio Okapi was closed for ten days in 2012, because administrative formalities had supposedly not been fulfilled. The UN station had just broadcast an interview with the spokesperson of M23, a rebel movement in Eastern DRC.

The second problem is that the media close to the ruling party that disseminate threatening political propaganda enjoy total impunity. In Burundi, Rema FM has been insulting members of the civil society without ever being penalized. Impunity encourages the escalation of the most hateful discourses, as those promoting these views feel untouchable.

Access to information still lacking

A crucial issue during the war, which prevented the media from being balanced and often restricted them to the official government statements, was the lack of access to the field of operations. After a decade of peace, the media could hope that the usual tradition of withholding information would vanish, or at least diminish, while democratic institutions were consolidating. And indeed, progress has been made, many public institutions creating “communication” departments in order to manage relations with the media. Nevertheless, these departments are often under-informed themselves and the withholding of information

remains usual for anyone with a bit of responsibility in a public service. This is why journalists have been lobbying in both countries to try to have a law passed on access to information.²⁵ So far, neither attempt has been successful.

In the DRC, journalists' organizations, grouped in the "Collective 24," have been supported by INGOs to lobby the government on that issue. It is especially important as the current 1996 press law does not protect journalistic sources.

The issue of access to information is important, as the media claim that the current restrictions have two major consequences. Firstly, the media have to rely on "rumors," as they have no access to official data that could help them verify or cross-check information. Secondly, restrictions on access to information encourage "self-censorship," as journalists will prefer to remain mute on events that could be significant for the audience, but are not based on any evidence.

Nevertheless, local journalists recognize that access to information has greatly improved in recent years, not because of peace and democratization, which would push the new administration to share more information, but thanks to the new communication tools, mainly the cell phone and the Internet.

"Public" broadcasters hijacked by the executive

During conflicts in Central Africa, the more the public broadcaster became a propaganda outlet devoted to one-sided views, the more radical the media promoting other views would become. Ten years after the war's end, it is worth considering whether the degree of independence (from the government) and of internal pluralism of the "public" broadcaster has improved. Indeed, during the first "post-conflict" elections, both national broadcasters had to open their airwaves to all candidates. The Radio Télévision Nationale Congolaise (RTNC) and the RTNB had to disseminate electoral messages from all candidates and parties that had been recorded under the supervision of the regulatory body.²⁶ In Burundi, as explained above, the RTNB even joined the Synergy, working together with all the main local media. It could have led the two media organizations to maintain a practice of giving airtime to various political leaders from different sides. Unfortunately, except for this restricted period of elections, when they are supposed to provide equal access, both media only serve the ruling party.

If there is no "shared media" in which all components of the political and social sphere can feel represented, these components will tend to establish their own outlet in order to defend their position. The more committed the "national" radio and television, the more committed the private media, which overall is not good for the balance and quality of information.

Journalists still under threat

Last but not least, the media's capacity to achieve complete and professional coverage is also tied to their ability to work in a secure environment. As Larry Diamond underlines (2006: 96), when it comes to "post-conflict" situations, the equation is simple: "no order, no democracy." We could add, "no order, no free press." In order to play their part, as both news providers and "watchdogs" of democracy, the media need a secure environment. Security (in general and specifically for the journalists) has not yet been achieved in the DRC or Burundi.

In Eastern Congo, rebel movements are still active, threatening the local population (and journalists). In Burundi, the local population is still under threat from several groups of criminals, including the youth wing of the ruling party, the Imbonerakure, which have used violence against young militants supporting opposition parties.²⁷

Table 16.1 Reporters Without Borders (RSF) scoring 2002 to 2014

	<i>Burundi</i>	<i>DRC</i>
2002	24.50	40.75
2003	26.25	38.50
2004	19.00	51.5
2005	23.00	57.33
2006	39.83	51.00
2007	43.40	50.5
2008	21.00	51.25
2009	29.00	53.5.
2010–2011	28.88	51.83
2012	57.75	67.67
2013	38.02	41.66
2014	40.50	44.64




Figure 16.1 Reporters Without Borders (RSF): scoring from 2002 to 2014

While overall security has greatly improved after the end of the wars, press freedom has not. If we look at the scores of the countries in the annual assessment of Reporters Without Borders,²⁸ we find the results as shown in Table 16.1 and Figure 16.1.

As we can see, the overall situation of press freedom (which was, until 2014, better in Burundi than in the DRC) has not improved over the past decade: in both countries, the situation is worse in 2014 than it was at the end of the war, in 2002–2003.

Journalists are still being threatened, attacked, jailed and, in the case of the DRC, even killed in the exercise of their duties. More journalists were killed in the DRC after the war's end than during the conflict: nine have been killed since 2003 and only one during the war, besides two missing (JED 2013: 10). In Burundi, five journalists have been jailed (one of them twice), all of them for several months, since 2003. And the current crisis has forced more than eighty journalists to flee the country, in fear of being arrested or killed.

In such a situation, self-censorship, which always spreads in times of insecurity, has not faded away, as might have been expected at war's end. In Bukavu (Eastern Congo), journalists now justify their own self-censorship by saying "Better a bad live journalist than a good dead one."²⁹ The director of the main community station Radio Maendeleo argues that "the situation has clearly deteriorated over the past ten years in South Kivu. The more Radio Maendeleo improves its equipment and the quality of information provided, the more the

radio is threatened by the provincial authorities that cannot stand the fact that information critical of their management is disseminated.”³⁰

The other stakeholders

Besides variables related to the media outlets themselves and others related to the relations with the political system, a third set of factors has been identified as playing an important part in the way the media position themselves during conflicts. They are linked to the general environment in which the media operate: the state of the market, the intervention of foreign donors and the audience all have an impact either on the media’s capacity to withstand pressure and maintain professionalism or, on the contrary, on their tendency to become weapons in the political struggle.

A slowly recovering economy

The spoilt economic situation during conflicts has been identified as a factor impacting the media’s behavior, as impoverished media (deprived of advertising) will tend to negotiate their support of political leaders or movements for some financial help. Therefore, it is important to identify whether, after ten years of “peace,” the economy has recovered, allowing the media to develop in a more enabling market, where they are able to consolidate their financial independence.

According to macro data (from the World Bank), some progress had been made, at the time of the study, regarding economic growth in both countries, as indicated in Table 16.2. Nevertheless, none of the countries has returned to the level of the early 1990s, before the wars.³¹

Burundi’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew around 4 percent each year between 2006 and 2013. Political stability and the end of the civil war improved aid flows, which represent 42 percent of Burundi’s national income.³² Economic activity has increased, but cannot compensate basic weaknesses: a high poverty rate, poor education, insufficient transportation network, growing corruption and low administrative capacity. Meanwhile, the purchasing power of most Burundians has decreased as wage increases have not kept up with inflation,

Table 16.2 GDP (gross domestic product) per capita (in USD) from 1990 to 2014 (World Bank data)

	<i>Burundi</i>	<i>DRC</i>
1990	1,051	816
2000	723	341
2005	692	365
2006	704	375
2007	713	387
2008	723	399
2009	723	399
2010	725	416
2011	731	433
2012	737	451
2013	750	484
2014	736	451

and 68 percent of Burundians live below the poverty line. In the DRC, growth has also been increasing since the war's end (with a peak of 8 percent in 2007–2008), but an uncertain legal framework, corruption, and a lack of transparency in government policies are preventing the development of resources from the mining sector and of the economy as a whole. The population remains among the poorest in the world, with about 70 percent living below the poverty line.

Even though both countries are witnessing some growth at the macro level, the media cannot really benefit from it. Companies established locally do not invest in advertising (a main resource for broadcasters around the world). Only telecom companies and breweries actually devote some budget to advertising through the media. But the advertising market is too limited. It is an important variable, as more financially sustainable media outlets would be less dependent on politicians or foreign aid.

Foreign support by international NGOs: media on a drip

Since the local economy does not enable the media to be sustainable, support from foreign donors is still a necessity in both countries. As indicated above, the most important media of the “post-conflict” era (Radio Okapi in the DRC or the main private radio stations in Burundi) were created, more than a decade ago, with the particular aim of helping to build peace and with foreign funding from INGOs or donors.

During the ten years of “peace,” support continued and major programs were launched, by the donor community, to promote independent media in Burundi and the DRC.³³ The European Union (EU), the UN agencies and many bilateral donors (including the UK, US, Sweden, France and Belgium), as well as specialized NGOs (Search for Common Ground, Internews, the Panos Institute, Hironde Foundation, La Benevolencija) have supported the media sector. Dozens of millions of dollars have been injected in it over the past decade. Support has focused on journalists' training, financial support to certain media outlets, and projects aimed at promoting an enabling environment through the adoption of a supportive legal framework. International assistance has deeply affected the “post-conflict” media landscape, both positively (helping to provide neutral and professionally handled information to the local audiences) and negatively (making the main “independent” media outlet completely reliant on foreign support and donors' priorities). In the DRC, the only media outlet that is actually acting as a true public service broadcaster (covering the whole territory and opening its airwaves to all political leanings) relies entirely on foreign funding and could not survive with the resources available in the local media market (Frère 2013).

The audience: in search of neutral and critical information

A last variable worth considering is the level of public trust and confidence towards the media. Support from the audience is a major factor in encouraging the media to keep working honestly and rigorously. During the conflicts, the media lost a lot of credibility and portions of the audience were even traumatized by what they had heard or read in the media. Looking at the post-conflict situation, we should examine whether the audience actually tuned into the media that are working more professionally, avoiding hate-filled discourses and unchecked information.³⁴

Audience surveys are very scarce in the Great Lakes region, but according to the available data, it appears that the most popular media are indeed those providing the most reliable and “neutral” information. In the DRC, Radio Okapi remains on or near the top of all

charts, sometimes behind a local community radio such as Radio Maendeleo in South Kivu (IMMAR 2010). In Burundi, RPA, which calls itself “the voice of the voiceless,” is the most popular station while the problematic Rema FM comes very low in the ranking (IMMAR 2013). If national media still have an audience, qualitative research shows that much of the population does not trust the “public” broadcaster, perceived as a mouthpiece for the government, but still the audience remains faithful to national radio as it provides official information that is not necessarily available elsewhere (Frère forthcoming).

In more developed countries, the media’s editorial options are often dictated by the market, in order to “sell” and rise in audience surveys. That trend sometimes drives them to publish sensationalist information, which can be particularly harmful in times of conflict. Even though Burundian and Congolese media do not suffer the tyranny of audience charts (as the latter hardly exist), forms of sensationalism do indeed exist. For instance, in Burundi, there have been several cases where the radio stations have broadcast information without actually cross-checking or verifying it.³⁵ In the DRC, audience members testify that they distrust every single broadcaster, all considered as bias, but they keep listening to several of them in order to compare and, *in fine*, make up their opinion on the basis of their own compilation.

Conclusion

After peace agreements were signed, transitional regimes were set up and “post-conflict” elections were organized in 2005 and 2006, Burundi and the DRC have been considered as “having normalized.” The aim of this chapter was to assess the evolution of the media landscape during the following decade, which was supposed to lead to democratic consolidation. We observed eleven variables which had been previously identified as decisive in explaining why, during the conflicts, local media either engaged in spreading hatred and propaganda, or remained neutral, giving peace a chance. The findings of this study, based on fieldwork carried out in the DRC in March 2013 and Burundi in July 2014, can be summed up as shown in Table 16.3.

The conclusion to be drawn from this assessment is that the media landscape has changed over the decade of peace, but maybe not as much as the journalists themselves expected. Even though we cannot rule out the re-emergence of “hate media,” we can certainly confirm that such media would not have the same impact as RTLM during the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Indeed, in both countries, the audience now has access to a wider variety of media outlets and contents (enabling the citizens to compare and choose and possibly criticize the propaganda-tinged media). Members of the audience also have been used to a kind of “public service broadcasting,” even though provided by local or international broadcasters supported by foreign assistance. Even after the main independent broadcasters were destroyed in Burundi in May 2015, audiences are still in search of any alternative source of information that can counter-balance the remaining public media (Frère 2016). Journalists have developed a strong sense of professional solidarity in Burundi and there is now a huge diversity of media outlets of different types in the DRC.

Nevertheless, the sector remains fragile and still very much impacted by the same variables that led some media outlets to play a negative role during the conflict: close connections to political parties, financial unsustainability, unequal access to national media devoted to the government’s propaganda. The reason for that situation is that, politically, Burundi and the DRC do not seem to have succeeded in emerging from the “post-conflict” category, even after ten years of peace. Therefore, their media landscape is still very much

Table 16.3 Variables impacting the media landscape in post-conflict Burundi and DRC

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Burundi</i>	<i>DRC</i>
Journalists' skills (training level)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase in training opportunities • Slight improvement of the quality of news coverage, limited by constraints inside of the newsrooms 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase in training opportunities • Quality still insufficient due to poor salaries and constraints in the newsrooms
Links to political leaders and parties	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Most media are independent (viewed by the government as pro-opposition) • A few politically affiliated outlets created recently 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Many media belong to political leaders • Independent media under constant pressure
Financial resources and salaries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rising media budgets • Journalists' wages improving slowly • Emergence of "paid-by-the-source" journalism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decreasing media budgets • Journalists' wages stagnating or decreasing • Generalization of "coupage" ("paid-by-the-source" journalism)
Professional solidarity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Good sense of collective actions • Synergies • Problems with the integration of the public media and the politically committed media in collective actions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very little solidarity possible above political divisions (except locally, in some provinces)
Media law and regulation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New press law (2013) viewed as threatening press freedom • CNC: regulatory body viewed as biased and politically manipulated • Laws and regulations applied unfairly to different media outlets (according to political affiliation) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Outdated press law (1996) viewed as insufficiently protective of journalists • CSAC: regulatory body viewed as biased and politically manipulated • Laws and regulations applied unfairly to different media outlets (according to political affiliation)
Access to information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public services still withholding information • No law on access to information • Security is sufficient to report across the country 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public services still withholding information • No law on access to information • Security has improved but some parts of the territory are still unsafe for reporting
Situation of the state media	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public broadcaster (RTNB) remaining a government mouthpiece • Public service broadcasting only opens up to the opposition during elections 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public broadcaster (RTNC) remaining a government mouthpiece • PSB only opens up to the opposition during elections

Press freedom	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Journalists still threatened (jail sentences) • Reaction: professional solidarity and collective action 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Journalists still threatened (assassination and jail sentences) • Reaction: self-censorship
General economic background	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited economic growth • Limited advertising market 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic growth, but very unequally distributed • Limited advertising market
Foreign support to media sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continuing support from INGOs and donors over the past decade • Most independent media dependent on foreign support (35% to 85% of their budget) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continuing support from INGOs and donors over the past decade • Some major independent media (including Radio Okapi) totally dependent on foreign support
Audience	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Audience turns to a diversity of media (in order to “balance” the points of view) • Independent media are the most popular • Public media are consumed but critically • Problematic media (from an ethical point of view) are not among the most followed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Audience turns to a diversity of media (in order to “balance” the points of view) • Independent media are the most popular • Public media are consumed but critically • Problematic media (from an ethical point of view) are not among the most followed

a “post-conflict” media landscape, with journalists facing problems they probably thought would have been easily overcome after the restoration of peace: physical threats, economic constraints, impunity regarding press freedom violations, political pressure, lack of access to information, repressive laws and regulations are still there. In such a context, if hate speech was to resurface, it would probably be the sign that the political leaders have lagged behind and that the progress made by the media towards “normalization” were faster than the changes of the mindset of the political elite.

Notes

- 1 The war’s end in Burundi coincided with the signature of the first peace agreements in 2000 in Arusha, but the main rebel movements only put down their weapons in 2003 (for the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie-Forces de défense de la démocratie (National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy – CNDD-FDD) and 2006 (for the Forces nationales de libération (National Liberation Forces – FNL)).
- 2 See <http://www.iwacu-burundi.org/comparution-de-leonce-ngendakumana-devant-le-parquet-de-la-republique-en-mairie-de-bujumbura/>, accessed 25 August 2014.
- 3 http://radiookapi.net/files/060112-p-f-LambertMende_Coupure-Signal-RFI.mp3, accessed 25 August 2014. It was not the first time that RFI faced such accusations. In 2006, Ghislaine Dupont, RFI’s correspondent in Kinshasa, had been expelled from the country a few months after the Minister of Information, Henri Mova Sakanyi, had accused her of behaving like RTLM and giving a voice to people that were perpetrating a genocide.
- 4 Since April 2015, Burundi has been going through a deep political crisis following the decision of President Nkurunziza to compete for a third mandate even though that was not allowed neither by the Constitution nor the Arusha Peace Agreement. After a failed coup attempt on 13 May, the media landscape has been totally transformed as the four main independent broadcasters, as well as Rema FM, have been destroyed. Dozens of journalists have fled to neighboring countries.
- 5 This chapter builds mainly on data from two reports elaborated as baseline studies for donors willing to engage in media support in the DRC (Fierens et al. 2013) and Burundi (Frère et al. 2014). Most of the interviews cited in the chapter took place during field trips organized in March 2013 (DRC) and July 2014 (Burundi).
- 6 At the time of the study, there were twenty-six radio stations, five television stations and thirty-six print media outlets in Burundi. In the DRC, the situation is unclear because the data from the provinces has not been centralized, but there are an estimated 450 radio stations, almost 200 television stations and more than 250 registered publications. The great majority of them operate locally, in a very limited perimeter.
- 7 The countries studied were mainly the DRC, Burundi and Rwanda, as well as the Central African Republic, Chad and Congo-Brazzaville, and, to a lesser extent, Cameroon, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea.
- 8 The March 2013 fieldwork in the DRC was carried out by a team of five people who conducted eighty interviews with media and civil society actors. The July 2014 fieldwork in Burundi was carried out by a team of six people who interviewed twenty-four people in Burundi, twenty-six in Rwanda and nineteen in Eastern DRC.
- 9 On this concept, see Lynch and McGoldrick (2005), Galtung et al. (2002), Price and Thompson (2002) and Howard (2003). For a critical perspective, see Hanitzsch (2007).
- 10 There is little ongoing monitoring of media content in either country. In the DRC, within the “Media for Democracy and Transparency” program (implemented by France Expertise International (FEI) from 2007 to 2013), a regular assessment of the main Kinshasa media was performed as part of the monitoring and evaluation plan of the program. In Burundi, the Monitoring center of the Organization of the Media in Central Africa (MOMO) has regularly issued reports on different aspects of media content. Therefore, the claim that the media content has not improved over the past decade is mainly based on conclusions from these reports and on the subjective feeling of the people interviewed during the field research.
- 11 Polydor Muboyayi, director of the newspaper *Le Phare* and president of the self-regulatory body OMEC, interview, Kinshasa, March 2011, cited in Fierens et al. 2013: 158.

- 12 There were 18,000 candidates competing for 500 seats in the National Assembly.
- 13 Tshivis Tshivuadi, secretary general of JED, personal interview, Kinshasa, 15 March 2013.
- 14 Before May 2015, the Observatory of the Burundian Press (OPB: Observatoire des Médias Burundais) used to publish a monthly report on both the quantity and the quality of information produced by the media. Rema FM was systematically identified as the one that violated the professional code of conduct.
- 15 According to Fierens et al. (2013: 37, 65–68), salaries range from 0 to 500 US dollars (USD; for higher managers) in the DRC, most journalists earning just a few dozen dollars. In Burundi, 58 percent of journalists make less than 163 USD (250,000 Burundian Francs (BIF)) a month. Higher salaries are mostly in the public sector (Nindorera et al. 2013: 107–110).
- 16 The only organization of journalists, the Union of the Congolese Press (UPC), had not held any general assembly since 1988. The 2004 congress led to the establishment of a new general organization, the National Union of the Congolese Press (UNPC), as well as a new self-regulatory body called Observatory of the Congolese Media (OMEC).
- 17 For instance, in 2006, in Lodja (Western Kasai), Radio Losanganya and Radio Grand Tam-Tam were looted and Radio Sankuru Liberté was burnt down by political militants from different sides (Frère 2011a: 168).
- 18 The most active organization is JED, defending press freedom, but the organization complains that it is difficult to organize a collective mobilization of professional journalists even around press freedom issues.
- 19 In May 2014, a special media convention (“Assises des médias”) was organized, gathering all the Burundian media to discuss common concerns.
- 20 While observers of the international community considered the first elections (in 2005 in Burundi and 2006 in the DRC) as “free and fair,” the second polls have been more problematic. In the DRC, in 2011, the results were challenged as many shortcomings were observed during the collection of local results (from the 55,000 voting stations). In Burundi in 2010, the political opposition withdrew from the electoral process (which consisted of five different polls) after the first poll (the communal elections), accusing the ruling party of fraud.
- 21 Gody Ngosa Bupe, director of Radio Communautaire du Katanga (RCK), Lubumbashi, 23 March 2013. The same remark was formulated by Jean-Marie Kasamba, director of Télé 50, on the tenth anniversary of Radio Okapi. See <http://radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/02/25/les-10-ans-de-radio-okapi-critiques-de-la-presse-congolaise/>, accessed 20 September 2016.
- 22 Established in 1992, the CNC was inactive and virtually nonexistent until the early 2000s when INGOs started to support the institution. It has enjoyed a more consistent budget and staff since 2007.
- 23 The CNC is identified as the one granting press cards to journalists. Also, the new law grants the CNC judiciary powers.
- 24 In the DRC, the law still provides that journalists can be jailed for press offences, while the new press law in Burundi just provides for huge fines (some of them twenty times higher than in the previous 2003 law).
- 25 More broadly, several countries in Africa have recently adopted such laws, including neighboring Rwanda. In 2013 the African Commission on Human Rights adopted a ‘Model Law on Access to Information for Africa’ that all member countries can use and adapt to their local context. While South Africa has had such a law since 2000, only three Francophone countries (Guinea, Niger and Tunisia) have adopted one so far.
- 26 Many interviewees agreed upon that issue: “During elections, the RTNC made an effort. The opposition was also on air. There was more debate” (Jeanne Nzuzi, coordinator of the National Committee for Women and Development (CONAFED), personal interview, Kinshasa, 26 March 2013).
- 27 In April 2014, a UN report acknowledged the fact that members of that militia had been armed and trained in Eastern Congo, something that the ruling party is denying.
- 28 The data used here is the “score” of each country and not the “ranking” (as rankings depend on the classification of the other countries in the world). The score allows one to check whether the country has improved or regressed. The higher the score, the more problematic the situation of press freedom. See www.rsf.org, accessed 22 August 2014.
- 29 Chouchou Namegabe, president of the Association of Women Journalists in South Kivu, interviewed by Laurent Kasindi, July 2014, cited in Frère et al. 2014: 206.

- 30 Jolly Kamuntu, director of Radio Maendeleo, interview, Bukavu, 4 April 2013, cited in Fierens et al. 2013: 111.
- 31 Data from UNDP Human Development Index report. World Bank, <http://data.worldbank.org/>, accessed 2 October 2014.
- 32 Data from CIA World Factbook 2014. The situation is improving as, in 2008, 68 per cent of the Burundian budget came from foreign aid. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/> accessed 4 October 2014.
- 33 In the DRC, a 2011 study showed that over the decade between 2001 and 2011, the Congolese media benefited from foreign support estimated at over 80 million USD. A similar sum up does not exist for Burundi, to our knowledge. For the DRC, see Frère (2011b).
- 34 Regarding the press, the economic data shows that the public has not become more able to support the media financially (by purchasing the paper). Circulation remains very low, from a few hundred copies to 1,500 at the most in Kinshasa (*Le Potentiel*) and 2,500 in Burundi (*Iwacu*).
- 35 This is what happened in April 2014, when RPA announced that the Bank of the Republic of Burundi was in flames.

References

- Collier, Paul, Hoeffler, Anke and Soderbom, Mans (2008). "Post-conflict Risks", *Journal of Peace Research*, 45(4), 461–478.
- de Zeeuw, Jeroen (2005). "Projects Do Not Create Institutions: The Record of Democracy Assistance in Post-Conflict Societies", *Democratization*, 12(4), 481–504.
- de Zeeuw, Jeroen and Kumar, Krishna (eds) (2006). *Promoting Democracy in Postconflict Societies*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Diamond, Larry (2006). "Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and failed States. Lessons and Challenges", *Taiwan Journal of Democracy*, 2(2), 93–116.
- Economic and Social Council (2013). "Promoting Economic Recovery in Post-conflict Areas", Leuven, Katholiek Universiteit Leuven (KUL), available at http://www.kulmun.be/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/SG_KULMUN13_ECOSOC.pdf. Accessed 2 October 2014.
- Fierens, Marie, Frère, Marie-Soleil and Bwiti, Godefroid (2013). *Médias pour la démocratie et la transparence* (Media for democracy and transparency), Report. Kinshasa: IMMAR and M.S. Frère.
- Frère, Marie-Soleil (2007). *The Media and Conflicts in Central Africa*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Frère, Marie-Soleil (2011a). *Elections and the Media in Post-Conflict Africa*, London: Zed Books.
- Frère, Marie-Soleil (2011b). "The Democratic Republic of the Congo. Case Study on Donor Support to Independent Media: 1990–2010", Internews, Media Map, World Bank Institute, Annenberg School of Journalism, Report, available at www.mediamapresource.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/DRC.pdf
- Frère, Marie-Soleil (2013). "Media Sustainability in a Post-conflict Environment: Broadcasting in the DRC, Burundi and Rwanda", in Redeker Hepner Tricia and Omeje Kenneth (eds), *Conflicts and Peacebuilding in the African Great Lakes Region*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, pp.161–178.
- Frère, Marie-Soleil (2016), "Silencing the voice of the voiceless: the destruction of the independent broadcasting sector in Burundi", *African Journalism Studies*, 37(1), 137–146. DOI: 10.1080/23743670.2015.1092455
- Frère, Marie-Soleil (forthcoming) "Audience Perception of Radio Stations and Journalists in the Great Lakes Region", in Mano Winston and Willems Wendy (eds), *Everyday Media Culture in Africa: Audiences and Users*, London, Routledge.
- Frère, Marie-Soleil, Nindorera, Willy and Fiedler, Anke (2014). *Promouvoir des médias professionnels et responsables contribuant au processus démocratique dans les Grands Lacs* (Promoting professional and responsible media contributing to the Democratic Process in the Great Lakes region), Report, Bujumbura: Institut Panos Grands Lacs/ABR/Institut Panos Europe.
- Galtung, Johan, Jacobsen Carl G. and Brand-Jacobsen, Kai Frithjof (2002). *Searching for Peace: The Road to TRANSCEND*, London: Pluto Press.
- Hanitzsch, Thomas (2007). "Situating Peace Journalism in Journalism Studies. A Critical Appraisal", *Conflict & Communication Online*, 6(2), available at http://cco.regener-online.de/2007_2/pdf/hanitzsch.pdf
- Howard, Ross (2003). "Conflict Sensitive Journalism: A Handbook", Copenhagen: IMS-IMPACS.

- Human Rights Watch (2012). “You Will Not Have Peace While You Are Living’. The Escalation of Political Violence in Burundi”, available at <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/05/02/you-will-not-have-peace-while-you-are-living-0>, accessed 23 May 2016.
- IMMAR (2010). *Etude médias en RDC 2010. Synthèse des résultats* (Media study in the DRC for 2010. A summary of the results), Koinshasa: FEI-ASDI-UKAid-Coopération franco-congolaise.
- IMMAR (2013). *Etude d'auditoire au Burundi. Résultats quantitatifs* (Audience study in Burundi. Quantitative results), Bujumbura: Institut Panos Paris.
- ICG (International Crisis Group) (2012). “Bye Bye Arusha”, Africa Report No 192, 25 October 2012
- JED (2012). *Report 2011. La liberté de la presse pendant les élections. Des médias en campagne* (2011 Report. Press freedom during the elections), Kinshasa: Journaliste en Danger.
- JED (2013). *Arrestations menaces, agressions des journalistes, censures, fermetures des médias, dénis de justice... RD Congo: La République de l'Impunité* (Arrests, threats, assaults, censorship, closing down of media outlets, denials of justice... DR Congo: the Republic of Impunity), Kinshasa: Journaliste en Danger.
- Kumar, Krishna (ed.) (1998). *Postconflict Elections, Democratization and International Assistance*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Kumar, Krishna (2006). “International Assistance to Promote Independent Media in Transition and Post-Conflict Societies”, *Democratization*, 13(4), 652–667.
- Lynch, Jake and McGoldrick, Annabel (2005). *Peace Journalism*, Stroud: Hawthorn Press.
- Nindorera, Willy, Capitant, Sylvie and Ndarugirire, Tharcisse (2013). *Audit des médias par les médias* (Media audit by the media), Bujumbura: Direction du développement de la coopération DDC de la Confédération Suisse.
- Price, Monroe and Thompson, Mark (eds) (2002). *Forging Peace*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Prunier, Gérard (2009). *Africa's World War. Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Reyntjens, Filip (2009). *The Great African War. Congo and Regional Geopolitics (1996–2006)*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- UN 2015, Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, (S/2015/19), available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_19.pdf
- Wolfsfeld, Gadi (2004). *Media and the Path to Peace*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

17

MEDIA AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Ekaterina Balabanova

Introduction

As an academic subject and an area of practice, international human rights have been approached from a range of different perspectives: legal, philosophical, sociological and political (Carey et al. 2010; Donnelly 2013; Nickel 2007). Only a small number of studies have attempted to develop a comprehensive understanding of the nexus between human rights and the media (Balabanova 2014; Borer 2012a; Shaw 2012). This is partly because of disciplinary boundaries. Scholars from law or political science tend to pay little regard to the media as actor, or factor, when it comes to examining questions around human rights. Likewise research from the field of media and communication studies often ignores the historical and institutional complexities which underpin human rights. For both these reasons existing research linking media and human rights has been narrowly focused on specific types of intersection and particular kinds of cases. This means, for example, exploring which factors influence the capacity of journalism to uncover human rights abuses, or the human rights implications of broader media–state–society relations. Case studies are usually about humanitarian intervention and/or human rights crises in the global south, or conversely about freedom of speech in the global north.

This chapter first offers an introduction to the broad nexus between the media and human rights and contextualises this within understandings of the role of the media in state–society relations. It then goes on to analyse this role – in selecting, influencing and transforming how human rights are known, understood and acted upon – before outlining key challenges for scholars in the area.

The media–human rights nexus

In recent years, interest in human rights has significantly increased prompting Cmiel's (2004: 117) comment that '[f]ew political agendas have seen such a rapid and dramatic growth'. Similarly, the presence and prominence of human rights issues in the media has become more noticeable (Caliendo et al. 1999; Cole 2010; Ovsiovitch 1993; ICHRP 2002; Ramos and Thoms 2007). This recent explosion in interest can be linked to broader patterns

in international relations. In the aftermath of the Second World War the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) – the ‘most authoritative statement of international human rights norms’ (Donnelly 2013: 6) – declared that all people have human rights, specified what these are, and began the process of formal codification. However, after initial enthusiasm, the momentum behind this effort slowed during the early Cold-War years. This reflected the difficulties in reaching consensus over universal values due to ideological cleavages associated with the geopolitical struggles between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union and their respective allies. It was only from the 1970s onwards that this began to change. A revival in interest in human rights from a foreign policy perspective (e.g. the Helsinki process) occurred alongside incremental growth, institutionalisation and consolidation of the international human rights regime.

As the 20th century drew to a close, a number of interrelated phenomena associated with globalisation and technological change provided a catalytic effect in the spread of human rights ideas. This is reflected in the steady increase in international agreements and organisations – both governmental and non-governmental (NGOs) – seeking to implement, evaluate or assess human rights. There has also been a growing rhetorical commitment by governments to incorporate human rights principles into national and international policies and laws (Donnelly 2013; Dunne and Hanson 2013; Kaldor 2003; Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004). The language of human rights in public and political discourses has acquired a prominent place with human rights becoming part of ‘high politics’ (Beitz 2009; Chandler 2006; ICHRP 2002; Internews 2012). Political and technological change seemed to mean a new freedom for journalists to report more independently on issues of their choice (Robinson 2002). Rapid developments in mobile and internet technology in the 21st century, alongside the success of social networking platforms like Twitter, Facebook and content-sharing sites such as Vine, Instagram, Flickr and YouTube have added to this sense of accelerated change. They have created new ways of reporting about human rights and have helped to form connections and networks between people living in distant places (Internews 2012). While this may not have necessarily resulted in the creation of what Carruthers (2000: 201) called a ‘cosmopolitan global consciousness’, the media–human rights nexus has been irrevocably transformed. Taken together, the above developments have collectively contributed to an intensification of both presence and engagement, but there remain deep concerns about the ways that human rights issues are mediated. In order to understand these, it is necessary to consider what assumptions are being made about media’s role within a democratic system.

Media, democracy and human rights

It is a standard understanding of the role of media in a democratic society that they have a responsibility to inform and educate about the issues of the day, to provide a platform for public political discourse (‘public sphere’), facilitate the formation of public opinion and feed that opinion back to the public (Curran 2005; Habermas 1989; McNair 2011). Importantly, the media are also thought to have a duty to act as a ‘watchdog’ – a check on the power of the state. The degree to which they actually deliver on these functions in general has been the subject of much criticism where shortcomings are linked to problems with the media’s agenda, content and style. It has been argued that instead of democratic scrutiny and accountability of the political elite, the media are hijacked by commercial interests to ‘entertain’ and are managed and manipulated by the state in order to ‘manufacture consent’ for policy amongst the population (Herman and Chomsky 1988).

A related problem is that these democratic functions are seen to be in direct tension with dropping standards of journalism characterised by the charge that media is guilty of 'dumbing down' (Franklin 1997), degenerating into 'infotainment'/'tabloidisation' (McNair 2009) or focusing on 'news as spectacle' (Louw 2010). There is also a technical/resource issue when the media has an overreliance on public relations material and news agency copy: the lack of time for fact checking stories as a result of newsroom pressures have arguably led to compromises for the 'fourth estate' (Davies 2008; Lewis et al. 2008).

These general expectations and criticisms apply directly to coverage of human rights issues. Early studies of human rights reporting highlighted its importance and significance for the education, protection of rights and development of foreign policy (Berry and McChesney 1988; Reisman 1984). Indeed, this recognition is evident throughout the provisions of the key human rights documents. Article 19 of the UDHR explicitly states that '[e]veryone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression', a right that is further reiterated by article 19(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Research has underlined the link between press freedom and the achievement of human rights: an increase in press censorship can be associated with an increase in human rights abuses (Apodaca 2007). Most liberal political theories see a freely operating media system as providing a forum for debate. From this perspective, the media operates as a platform, allowing the mobilisation of non-state actors, enabling civil society, promoting tolerance, and shining a light on government activity (Apodaca 2007; Hammarberg 2011; McPherson 2012; Metzl 1996; Pruce 2012).

For those who support and seek to improve the international human rights regime, knowledge about human rights among journalists, policymakers and the general public is essential. This is particularly pertinent, as people do not acquire much of their political knowledge from personal experience. In the words of Walter Lippmann (1922: 18), 'the world that [people] have to deal with politically is out of reach, out of sight, out of mind', and so the media become the key means of connecting. They are able to increase awareness of human rights and place the spotlight on violations. Such reporting potentially places pressure on governments and international organisations to take action. It can identify violators with potential follow-on effects for their reputation and legitimacy, just as it can help to inform the public about their rights and how to access remedies for violations of these rights (Apodaca 2007; Internews 2012; Pruce 2012).

Selecting: misreporting and misrepresenting

There are many aspects of the international human rights regime that remain misunderstood, mis-reported or simply not reported. Analysis of coverage during the Cold-War period highlighted the incompleteness of information 'skewing the public's perception of human rights around the world' (Ovsiovitch 1993: 685), inconsistencies (Berry and McChesney 1988), bias against both 'open' (Reisman 1984) and communist societies (Herman and Chomsky 1988) as well as racial prejudice (Robinson, cited in Ovsiovitch 1993: 672). Post-Cold War the International Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP) in its report *Journalism, Media and the Challenge of Human Rights Reporting* concluded that

Issues that are less visible, or slow processes, are covered rarely. Human rights are still taken largely to mean political and civil rights, and the importance of economic, social and cultural rights is ignored widely by the media in their coverage of

economic issues, including the international economy, poverty, inequity and social and economic discrimination.

(ICHRP 2002: 16)

Key factors thought to account for these deficiencies are knowledge gaps and specific concerns around the understanding, selection and presentation of the main challenges, alongside the quality of reporting (Cole 2010; ICHRP 2002; Internews 2012; Ramos and Thoms 2007). There is ignorance about what human rights actually are, how they are created, promoted and enforced, what national governments' responsibilities are and what the key international human rights institutions and treaties are.

From the 'Western' perspective, human rights violations are understood as matters that occur abroad. As a result, issues that are closer to home, perhaps relating to governmental (or other) interests in Western societies are often not even placed in the context of the international human rights regime. Put simply, when human rights issues are reported as domestic 'news', they are not usually presented as human rights issues. Rather topics such as child abuse, refugees and immigration, unemployment, sexual and racial discrimination among others form part of national politics, framed by locally relevant ideas and interests.

For a number of reasons relating to the changing operational environment and diminishing resources of media operations (Davies 2008), reporting also tends to miss the historical, political, social and local context of human rights stories, failing to provide in-depth or detailed analysis. The combination of the above undermines normative understandings of the media's role in society (e.g. as 'watchdog' or fourth estate), and also leads to a perception that human rights are only relevant to the reporting of distant conflict; it also means that on occasions human rights stories are completely missed.

Perhaps the most damning indictment is the charge that media themselves could be responsible and even complicit in human rights abuses. Examples include invasion of privacy (e.g. the 'phone-hacking' scandal in the UK from 2011), perpetuation of biases and stereotypes (e.g. in the reporting of immigration, asylum and refugee issues), and incitement to violence, murder and genocide (Rwanda, Somalia and the Former Yugoslavia have all been cited as possible examples of this (Thompson 2007; Thompson 1999)). The 2003 Special Report of the United States Institute of Peace claimed that 'across the globe, media have been used as tools to inflame grievances and accelerate the escalation towards violence' (Frohardt and Temin 2003: 1). Schimmel (2009: 444) adds that 'the media facilitates, often inadvertently and unconsciously, the efforts of governments engaged in human rights abuses to deny and cover up their actions, and shield them from public knowledge and scrutiny'.

Other problems are that media 'idealise' the human rights regime as a panacea rather than critically engaging with pressing contemporary problems of violence and inequality in society (Fine 2009). The growing popularity of human rights as an explanation and solution to society's problems, based on a shallow understanding of the complexities of the actual human rights regime, also risks a deterioration of intellectual rigor and coherence as to what human rights are and should be (Follesdal 2009: 77).

How can we account for these misunderstandings, myths and misconceptions in media discussions around human rights? The fact that some human rights issues are more prevalent than others can be mapped back to theories of newsworthiness or 'news values' that specify which criteria determine attention and coverage (Galtung and Ruge 1965; Harcup and O'Neil 2001). Conflicts, crises and natural disasters, particularly if the scale of destruction and human loss is very high or a local/national angle is evident are more likely to be reported upon. Instances of torture and genocide meet criteria of drama, extreme suffering, novelty,

timeliness and so on. Theories of news values suggest that these issues are more likely to be identified as events worthy of coverage and selected to become news. If the story is also 'in line with a newspaper's journalistic, economic, and political aims relative to other bits of information, the more likely it is to be published' (McPherson 2012: 96).

Many human rights stories, however, do not fit this logic so neatly. On the contrary – an increasingly competitive media environment alongside a clear preference for stories that are relatively simple, and can be linked to an attractive image, actually excludes many ongoing day-to-day chronic human rights issues. Stories about poor health services, lack of water, inadequate education and so on will always be more difficult than news about short-term violations of human rights. This leads to what has been described as 'human rights repetition compulsion' where the same narrow range of issues are repeatedly covered (Caliendo et al. 1999; Internews 2012; McPherson 2012; Sandvig 1988; Schimmel 2009).

To what extent should we be concerned about these systematic problems in human rights reporting? The answer to that question depends on how media's significance and influence in the political sphere is understood. The next sections discuss the ways in which this influence can be conceptualised and analysed in relation to human rights.

Influencing: human rights and politics

The media–human rights nexus can be subsumed within the notion of a shift in 'information politics' (Cole 2010; Ron et al. 2005) where advances in communication make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to fully control the dissemination of knowledge (McCorquodale and Fairbrother 1999). Images of torture and ill treatment of detainees in Abu Ghraib, for example, were taken with digital cameras by the soldiers themselves, offering photographic and documentary evidence of what was happening in the prison that could then be communicated through media channels. This demonstrated a weakening in the control over information by government elites. It helped to challenge official interpretations of the war on terror as a fight between 'good' and 'evil' (Bennett et al. 2006; Hersh 2004). As well as revealing hidden behaviours, 'advances in information technology benefit human rights movements by enabling rapid transmission of information to monitor and respond to human rights violations' (Metzl 1996: 705; see also Cmiel 2004; Ovsiovitch 1993; Ramos and Thoms 2007). However, the 'Arab Spring' from 2011 onwards demonstrated that technological advances, while increasingly part of social change, are not sufficient on their own when it comes to real political transformation. The counter-revolutionary response also proved that social media can be used equally successfully by governmental regimes and counter-insurgents.

The effects of social media are therefore mixed. It has intensified network effects, and created new ways to affect public opinion and influence international support. It has led to an even more rapid dissemination of news, multiplying the means and the ability of the individual to spread information globally, and providing an invaluable tool for human rights activists (Kessler 2012; Lindsey 2013). However, for all the benefits, there are also weaknesses in the digital forms of activism it engenders – for example with a lack of strong ties among activists or the absence of a hierarchical organisation – both useful when taking on powerful and organised entities (Gladwell 2010). These lead to problems of control, decision-making and collective identity (Bennett 2003) and the danger of 'slacktivism' (Naidoo 2010) where a click or two becomes a substitute for real sacrifice.

International human rights organisations have often been at the forefront of this new politics of information. Actors such as Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW)

have been able to harness its benefits to increase their profile, showing themselves to be highly proficient in using the media to put human rights issues into the public and political agendas (Dhir 2007; Soh 1996) and leading to real impacts in certain areas (Murdie 2009).

Research into the influence of the media has highlighted the importance of agenda-setting and framing. The former refers to the way media, by focusing on some issues rather than others, direct people to think only about these issues (Lang and Lang 1966; McCombs and Shaw 1972), whereas the latter highlights the way the media can include certain ideas and exclude others, thus effectively ‘defining problems’, ‘diagnosing causes’, ‘making moral judgments’, and ‘suggesting remedies’ (Entman 1993; Pan and Kosicki 1993). Within media studies the concepts of agenda-setting and framing stress media’s role in deciding what to cover and what issues or aspects of a story to highlight; they also point towards an assumed ability for the media to affect how the public view different issues (Brewer and Gross 2005; Lecheler and De Vreese 2010). Applied to the case of human rights this logic suggests a direct correlation between media coverage and political attention to a given human rights issue (Caliendo et al. 1999).

With all theories of media effects there are immense difficulties in proving impacts. In the case of human rights reporting there is some evidence that the increased media coverage is ‘at least partially responsible for the increased awareness of, and support for, human rights found in the US public’ (Pritchard 1991: 138). Studies have found that the specific framing choices of human rights stories “mediate atrocity” by making us aware of, sympathetic to, and actively engaged in the daily, and often unseen, suffering of others’ (Chong 2012: 124) and ‘have the power to indirectly determine emergency responses and disaster priorities’ (Pasackow, cited in Borer 2012b: 22).

It is not just through framing and agenda-setting techniques that the media can grab audiences’ attention and provoke action; there is also the use of shock, horror and celebrities. The success of these approaches has proven to be quite varied. While graphic and disturbing images (and prose) may help to prompt political reaction to a particular human rights issue, there is a danger that they can reinforce the anti-cosmopolitan and pro-national sentiments that they are aiming to overcome in the first place – descending into a form of ‘disaster pornography’ (Borer 2012c; Omaar and de Waal 1993). Celebrities who the public associates with specific human rights issues, such as Bono and foreign aid, Angelina Jolie and refugees and war rape, George Clooney and Darfur, can bring attention to an issue, sometimes even influence policy and public consciousness (Cooper and Turcotte 2012; Dittrich 2009; Valley 2009). However, there are clear limits to what celebrities can do beyond raising money and consciousness. There are risks of oversimplification (Dieter and Kumar 2008), diverting attention from important aspects of the problem (Haynes 2014), the drowning out of alternative voices from the global south, and of grass-roots anti-globalisation voices from the north (Valley 2009), incompetence and lack of representativeness (Dieter and Kumar 2008).

Transforming: cosmopolitanism and the media

When considering the effects of media coverage of human rights there is a deeper question about how this might relate to the way people think about the world they live in. Can increased coverage of human rights impact on the way we think about ‘the other’ – even encourage and nurture a cosmopolitan ethic? These are exceedingly difficult questions to answer, but the normative dimension cannot be ignored. As Ignatieff (1997: 11–12) puts it, ‘[i]mages of human suffering do not assert their own meaning; they can only instantiate a moral claim if those who watch understand themselves to be potentially under obligation

to those they see'. For some, the development of 'mass media' from the mid-20th century had excitingly cosmopolitan implications. Marshall McLuhan (1964: 5) was confident that communication technology meant that 'the globe is no more than a village. Electric speed bringing all social and political functions together in a sudden implosion has heightened human awareness of responsibility to an intense degree.'

While McLuhan's words might now sound rather optimistic, others have explored the general idea that media and communications can foster a sense of global togetherness. This has been through developing a sense of responsibility for distant others (e.g. Silverstone 2007); by normalising difference (Nava 2007: 13); helping to create a global 'civil society' (Kaldor 2003); or making the global 'everyday' through the proliferation of commercial and non-commercial images and brands – 'from Coca-Cola to Greenpeace' (Szerszynski and Urry 2002: 464); through the influential actions of a particular group – that is, journalists that have embedded cosmopolitanism within their professional values and standards (e.g. Dahlgren 2013); or through the creation of a global public sphere (Lull 2007).

A division can be made between those who are more optimistic about the potential for global 24/7-television news to build a cosmopolitan culture (Szerszynski and Urry 2006) and those who are more pessimistic (Chouliaraki 2008). The optimists believe in a transformative potential for global media, from McLuhan's (1964) confidence in technology, to the power of banal cosmopolitanism to touch the 'everyday' (Ong 2009), to the belief in the transformative power of globalisation (Held 2003). Needless to say the pessimists see the same forces but draw different conclusions. They look at the advent of new technologies, the increasing reach of social media and the ubiquity of global media channels and see yet another opportunity for authoritarians (Morozov 2011) or news oligopolies (Scott 2005) to use new communication technologies to consolidate and extend their power. Others have taken a more pragmatic stance and attempted to produce evidence to help determine the effects of global human rights reporting (e.g. Cottle and Rai 2008; Robertson 2010).

Another division that can be identified relates to ideological positions where distinctions can be made between strong and weak cosmopolitans. For the former, the human rights regime is just a starting point – it needs to be defended and improved but it has problems – and more must be done to tackle problems of global distributive justice. For the latter, human rights as they currently exist are more satisfactory – providing minimum standards without overriding the ability of national communities to develop their own systems of justice. Other more critical approaches might reject both these positions and consider cosmopolitanism and human rights themselves as 'quasi-imperialist' imposition of Western values on the rest of the world (e.g. Flikschuh 2011).

As the reference to ideology implies, the conflicts between these positions are not resolvable. Despite expectations from some that an increasingly globalised and interconnected world will nurture a cosmopolitan ethic of care and action to distant others, nationalism and communitarianism have remained the dominant lens or interpretative framework used by the media (Kyriakidou 2009). Also, the idea of solidarity based on an 'other-oriented morality' faces the considerable challenge of increasing individualism within society. This means that concern for others can now become focused on a 'self-oriented morality' where doing good to others is about how it makes us feel (Chouliaraki 2013). Chouliaraki's (2013: 2) 'ironic spectator' – the 'impure or ambivalent figure that stands, at once, as sceptical towards any moral appeal of solidary action and, yet, open to doing something about those who suffer' – exemplifies this trend. The very overexposure to human rights violations and distant suffering through the media might create instead of empathy 'compassion fatigue' (Moeller 1999) or 'distantiation from compassion' (Hojer 2004: 524).

Conclusions: future research

Drawing together the points made in this chapter, there are a number of implications for future research into the media–human rights nexus. First, on a practical level, research needs to recognise the contingencies and complexities of the politics of human rights before exploring how the media is implicated in this process. The tensions around the universality of human rights, their enforcement and monitoring and the role of the individual states and international organisations in this process inevitably inform any discussions about the role of the media in protecting and promoting human rights. There is a need for a balanced approach to the relationship between media and human rights based on both an understanding of media’s dynamics and of the nature and key debates of a particular human rights issue (Balabanova 2014).

Second, the issue of selective reporting of human rights remains a significant one. While we might understand (rather than excuse) the way that news values dictate certain human rights issues gaining more coverage, this still leaves open how a more equal and equitable level of coverage can be achieved. Considering the existing complexities and controversies surrounding every human right, the way that different kinds of human rights are discussed and communicated (or ignored and evaded) becomes all the more important, and meaningful.

Third, capturing what influence or impact the media has on the political process has for a long time animated the research agenda and this is likely to continue. However, the methodological challenges in establishing influence have increased thanks to the multiplication of media forms and technologies. This requires a renewed focus on the creation of useful and rigorous techniques and methods better suited to the internet age.

Finally, returning to the normative dimension, research needs to focus on how (and how effectively) state and non-state actors can communicate and change ideas about human rights, and how they do this in a diversifying media environment. This is especially urgent considering the importance of shared values in facing up to the proliferation of common global challenges (Beitz 2009). Ultimately, this emerging field of study is destined to be a battleground where research will be underpinned by ideological divisions between strong and weak cosmopolitanisms, and where optimists and pessimists will fight over the effects of globalisation and technological change. This chapter has highlighted both the growing interest in human rights and the widespread criticism of how media reports on them. The practical challenge of determining cause, effect and influence or otherwise of the media will inevitably be predicated upon the normative basis upon which one makes sense of human rights and their role in the world.

References

- Apodaca, C. 2007. ‘The whole world could be watching: Human rights and the media’, *Journal of Human Rights* 6(2): 147–164.
- Balabanova, E. 2014. *The Media and Human Rights: The Cosmopolitan Promise*. London: Routledge.
- Beitz, C. 2009. *The Idea of Human Rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bennett, L. 2003. ‘Communicating global activism: Strengths and vulnerabilities of networked politics’, *Information, Communication and Society* 6(2): 143–168.
- Bennett, L., R. G. Lawrence and S. Livingston. 2006. ‘None dare call it torture: Indexing and the limits of press independence in the Abu Ghraib scandal’, *Journal of Communication* 56(3): 467–485.
- Berry, V. and A. McChesney. 1988. ‘Human rights and foreign policy-making’, in *Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy*, T. O. Matthews and C. Pratt (eds) (pp. 59–76). Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
- Borer, T. A. (ed.). 2012a. *Media, Mobilisation and Human Rights: Mediating Suffering*. London: Zed Books

- Borer, T. A. 2012b. 'Introduction: Wilful ignorance – news production, audience reception and responses to suffering', in *Media, Mobilisation and Human Rights: Mediating Suffering*, T. A. Borer (ed.) (pp. 1–41). London: Zed Books.
- Borer, T. A. 2012c. "Fresh, wet tears": Shock media and human rights awareness campaigns', in *Media, Mobilisation, and Human Rights: Mediating Suffering*, T. A. Borer (ed.) (pp. 143–180). London: Zed Books.
- Brewer, P. and K. Gross. 2005. 'Values, framing and citizens' thoughts about policy issues: Effects on content and quantity', *Political Psychology* 26(6): 929–948.
- Caliendo, S. M., M. P. Gibney and A. Payne. 1999. "All the news that's fit to print?" *New York Times* coverage of human rights violations', *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 4: 48–69.
- Carey, S. C., M. Gibney and S. C. Poe. 2010. *The Politics of Human Rights. The Quest for Dignity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Carruthers, S. L. 2000. *The Media at War*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Chandler, D. 2006. *From Kosovo to Kabul and Beyond: Human Rights and International Intervention*. London: Pluto Press.
- Chong, D. 2012. 'Framing strategies for economic and social rights in the United States', in *Media, Mobilisation and Human Rights: Mediating Suffering*, T. A. Borer (ed.) (pp. 122–142). London: Zed Books.
- Chouliaraki, L. 2008. 'The symbolic power of transnational media: Managing the visibility of suffering', *Global Media and Communication* 4(3): 329–351.
- Chouliaraki, L. 2013. *The Ironic Spectator. Solidarity in the Age of Post-Humanitarianism*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Cmiel, K. 2004. 'The recent history of human rights', *The American Historical Review* 109(1): 117–135.
- Cole, W. M. 2010. 'No news is good news: Human rights coverage in the American print media, 1980–2000', *Journal of Human Rights* 9(3): 303–325.
- Cooper, A. F. and J. F. Turcotte. 2012. 'Celebrity diplomats as mobilisers? Celebrities and activism in a hypermediated time', in *Media, Mobilisation, and Human Rights: Mediating Suffering*, T. A. Borer (ed.) (pp. 181–204). London: Zed Books.
- Cottle, S. and M. Rai. 2008. 'Global 24/7 news providers: Emissaries of global dominance or global public service', *Global Media and Communication* 4(2): 157–181.
- Curran, J. 2005. 'What democracy requires of the media', in *The Press*, G. Overholser and K. H. Jamieson (eds) (pp. 120–140). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Dahlgren, P. 2013. 'Online journalism and civic cosmopolitanism: Professional vs. participatory ideals', *Journalism Studies* 14(2): 156–171.
- Davies, N. 2008. *Flat Earth News*. London: Chatto & Windus.
- Dhir, K. S. 2007. 'Stakeholder activism through nonviolence', *Corporate Communications: An International Journal* 12(1): 75–93.
- Dieter, H. and R. Kumar. 2008. 'The downside of celebrity diplomacy: The neglected complexity of development', *Global Governance* 14(3): 259–264.
- Dittrich, L. 2009. 'The celebrity shall save you', *Esquire* October: 118–125.
- Donnelly, J. 2013. *International Human Rights. Dilemmas in World Politics*. 4/e. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Dunne, T. and M. Hanson. 2013. 'Human rights in international relations', in *Human Rights. Politics and Practice*, M. Goodhart (ed.) 2/e. (pp. 42–57). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Entman, R. 1993. 'Framing: Toward a clarification of a fractured paradigm', *Journal of Communication* 43(4): 51–58.
- Fine, R. 2009. 'Cosmopolitanism and human rights: Radicalism in a global age', *Metaphilosophy* 40(1): 8–23.
- Flikschuh, K. 2011. 'On the cogency of human rights', *Jurisprudence* 2(1): 17–36.
- Follesdal, A. 2009. 'Universal human rights as a shared political identity: Impossible? Necessary? Sufficient?', *Metaphilosophy* 40 (1): 77–91.
- Franklin, B. 1997. *Newszak and News Media*. London: Arnold.
- Frohardt, M. and J. Temin. 2003. *Use and Abuse of Media in Vulnerable Societies*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.
- Galtung, J. and M. H. Ruge. 1965. 'The structure of foreign news: The presentation of the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus crises in four Norwegian newspapers', *Journal of Peace Research* 2: 64–91.
- Gladwell, M. 2010. 'Small change: Why the revolution will not be tweeted', *The New Yorker*, 4 October.
- Habermas, J. 1989. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

- Hammarberg, T. 2011. 'Foreword: Media freedom in Europe', in *Human Rights and a Changing Media Landscape*, H. R. Writings (ed.) (pp. 7–20). Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing.
- Harcup, T. and D. O'Neil. 2001. 'What is news? Galtung and Ruge revisited', *Journalism Studies* 2(2): 261–280.
- Haynes, D. F. 2014. 'The celebritization of human trafficking', *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 653: 25–45.
- Held, D. 2003. *Cosmopolitanism: A Defense*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Herman, E. and N. Chomsky. 1988. *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*. London: Vintage.
- Hersh, S. 2004. *Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib*. New York: Harper Collins.
- Hoijer, B. 2004. 'The discourse of global compassion: The audience and media reporting of human suffering', *Media, Culture and Society* 26(4): 513–531.
- Ignatieff, M. 1997. *The Warrior's Honour: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience*. New York: Henry.
- International Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP). 2002. *Journalism, Media and the Challenge of Human Rights Reporting*. Geneva: ICHRP.
- Internews. 2012. *Speak Up, Speak Out: A Toolkit for Reporting on Human Rights Issues*. Washington, DC: Internews.
- Kaldor, M. 2003. *Global Civil Society*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Kessler, S. 2012. 'Amplifying individual impact: Social media's emerging role in activism', in *Media, Mobilisation and Human Rights: Mediating Suffering*, T. A. Borer (ed.) (pp. 205–215). London: Zed Books.
- Kyriakidou, M. 2009. 'Imagining ourselves beyond the nation? Exploring cosmopolitanism in relation to media coverage of distant suffering', *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 9(3): 481–496.
- Lang, K. and G. E. Lang. 1966. 'The mass media and voting', in *Reader in Public Opinion and Communication*, B. Berelson and M. Janowitz (eds) 2/e. (pp. 455–472). New York: Free Press.
- Lecheler, S. and C. H. De Vreese. 2010. 'Framing Serbia: The effects of news framing on public support for EU enlargement', *European Political Science Review* 2(1): 73–93.
- Lewis, J., A. Williams and B. Franklin. 2008. 'A compromised fourth estate? UK newspapers journalism, public relations and news sources', *Journalism Studies* 9(1): 1–20.
- Lindsey, R. A. 2013. 'What the Arab Spring tells us about the future of social media in revolutionary movements', *Small Wars Journal*. Online at: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/what-the-arab-spring-tells-us-about-the-future-of-social-media-in-revolutionary-movements>
- Lippmann, W. 1922. *Public Opinion*. New York: Free Press.
- Louw, E. 2010. *The Media and Political Process*. 2/e. London: Sage.
- Lull, J. 2007. *Culture-On-Demand: Communication in a Crisis World*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- McCombs, M. and D. Shaw. 1972. 'The agenda-setting function of mass media', *Public Opinion Quarterly* 36(2): 176–187.
- McCorquodale, R. and R. Fairbrother. 1999. 'Globalisation and human rights', *Human Rights Quarterly* 21(3): 735–766.
- McLuhan, M. 1964. *Understanding Media*. New York: Mentor.
- McNair, B. 2009. *News and Journalism in the UK*. 5/e. London: Routledge.
- McNair, B. 2011. *An Introduction to Political Communication*. 5/e. London: Routledge.
- McPherson, E. 2012. 'How editors choose which human rights news to cover: A case study of Mexican newspapers', in *Media, Mobilisation, and Human Rights: Mediating Suffering*, T. A. Borer (ed.) (pp. 96–121). London: Zed Books.
- Metzl, J. 1996. 'Information technology and human rights', *Human Rights Quarterly* 18(4): 705–747.
- Moeller, S. 1999. *Compassion Fatigue: How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War and Death*. New York: Routledge.
- Morozov, E. 2011. *The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom*. New York: Public Affairs Books.
- Murdie, A. 2009. 'The impact of human rights NGOs activity on human rights practices', *International NGO Journal* 4(10): 421–440.
- Naidoo, A. 2010. 'Activism or slacktivism: Is the web making it too easy?', *Memeburn*, 14 July.
- Nava, M. 2007. *Visceral Cosmopolitanism: Gender, Culture and the Normalization of Difference*. Oxford: Berg.
- Nickel, H. W. 2007. *Making Sense of Human Rights*. 2/e. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Omaar, R. and A. de Waal. 1993. 'Disaster pornography from Somalia', *Media and Values* 61: 13–14.
- Ong, J. C. 2009. 'Cultural studies. The cosmopolitan continuum: Locating cosmopolitanism in media and cultural studies', *Media, Culture and Society* 31(3): 449–466.
- Ovsiovitch, J. S. 1993. 'News coverage of human rights', *Political Research Quarterly* 46: 671–689.

- Pan, Z. and G. Kosicki. 1993. 'Framing analysis: An approach to news discourse', *Political Communication* 10(1): 55–75.
- Pritchard, K. J. 1991. 'Human rights: A decent respect for public opinion', *Human Rights Quarterly* 13: 123–142.
- Pruce, J. R. 2012. 'The spectacle of suffering and humanitarian intervention in Somalia', in *Media, Mobilisation and Human Rights: Mediating Suffering*, T. A. Borer (ed.) (pp. 216–239). London: Zed Books.
- Ramos, H., J. Ron and O. N. T. Thoms. 2007. 'Shaping the Northern media's human rights coverage, 1986–2000', *Journal of Peace Research* 44(4): 385–406.
- Reisman, M. W. 1984. 'Reporting the facts as they are not known: Media responsibility in concealed human rights violations', *American Journal of International Law* 78: 650–652.
- Robertson, A. 2010. *Mediated Cosmopolitanism: The World of Television News*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Robinson, P. 2002. *The Myth of the CNN Effect*. London: Routledge.
- Ron, J., H. Ramos and K. Rodgers. 2005. 'Transnational information politics: Human rights NGO reporting, 1986–2000', *International Studies Quarterly* 49: 557–587.
- Sandvig, H. 1988. 'The mass media and the United Nations in a human rights dilemma', in *Human Rights and the Media*, A. Eide, A. Skogly and S. Skogly (eds) (pp. 52–70). Oslo: Norwegian Institute of Human Rights.
- Schimmel, N. 2009. 'Media accountability to investigate human rights violations', *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice* 21: 442–447.
- Scott, B. 2005. 'A contemporary history of digital journalism', *Television and New Media* 6(1): 89–126.
- Shaw, I. S. 2012. *Human Rights Journalism. Advances in Reporting Distant Humanitarian Interventions*. London: Palgrave.
- Silverstone, R. 2007. *Media and Morality: On the Rise of the Mediapolis*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Soh, C. S. 1996. 'The Korean "comfort women": movement for redress', *Asian Survey* 30(12): 1226–1240.
- Szerszynski, B. and J. Urry. 2002. 'Cultures of cosmopolitanism', *Sociological Review* 50(4): 461–481.
- Szerszynski, B. and J. Urry. 2006. 'Visuality, mobility and the cosmopolitan: Inhabiting the world from afar', *British Journal of Sociology* 57: 113–131.
- Thompson, A. (ed.) 2007. *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide*. London: Pluto Press.
- Thompson, M. 1999. *Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Luton: University of Luton Press.
- Tsutsui, K. and C. M. Wotipka. 2004. 'Global civil society and the international human rights movement: Citizen participation in human rights international nongovernmental organisations', *Social Forces* 83(2): 587–620.
- Valley, P. 2009. 'From A-lister to aid worker: Does celebrity diplomacy really work?', *Independent*, 17 January.

PART IV

Media and policymaking within the security state

This page intentionally left blank

18

NEWS MEDIA AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Vian Bakir

Introduction

Across the past decade, intelligence agencies and their methods have frequently been headline news as intelligence has become increasingly central to fighting the seemingly permanent, global War on Terror (2001–) initiated after the events of ‘9/11’. Prominent examples from the USA in the twenty-first century include the use of intelligence agencies and enhanced interrogation techniques to extract information from al-Qaeda suspects in the Bush administration’s torture-intelligence policy; and the Obama administration’s use of intelligence agencies to conduct drone warfare and cyberwarfare, and to mass surveil suspectless citizens. Despite this new prominence of intelligence-related matters in the press, the academic field examining the relationship between the news media and the intelligence community is extremely small and fragmented, with sustained academic analysis limited to a handful of publications. These include Dover and Goodman’s (2009) edited collection, *Spinning Intelligence*. Other noteworthy collections are special editions of academic journals: in 2015 of *International Journal of Press/Politics*, 20(2); in 2009 of *Journal of Intelligence History*, 9(1–2); and in 1990 of *Intelligence and National Security*, 5(4). As will already be apparent, not only is the field small, but it occupies tiny patches of turf in disparate disciplines that rarely talk to each other, spanning media, journalism, international relations and history. Reflecting on these patches of turf, this chapter argues that the field suffers from disciplinary silos that would benefit from greater cross-fertilization. It identifies strong and weak currents within this inter-disciplinary field. The strong current examines the press as a target of intelligence agencies’ manipulative strategies. The weak current examines journalists’ challenges and practices in covering intelligence agencies, these practices ranging from collaborative to oppositional. The chapter then moves to reflect on the implications of these research currents for the press’s ability to hold intelligence agencies to account. The issue of accountability is a key critical issue as, in liberal democracies, the press is regularly presented as a guardian of the public interest – but the extent to which this is possible in the area of intelligence is rarely researched. This lacuna makes it difficult for meaningful reform of the relationship between the news media and the intelligence community to be suggested. The chapter concludes by outlining under-explored areas of critical research in the field, and by calling for more inter-disciplinary work.

A field of patchy turf

The field examining the relationship between the news media and the intelligence community is tiny and fragmented, fed by the different disciplines of journalism, media, international relations and history.

The disciplines of journalism and media are particularly neglectful of the field. A systematic review of sixteen journals from these disciplines, covering these journals' entire archives up until the end of 2014, finds only twenty-three articles centrally addressing intelligence agencies and agenda-building *processes* – even when influence is defined more broadly than the standard agenda-setting concepts of indexing and framing to include psychological operations, information operations, propaganda, public relations, strategic (political) communication, censorship and public diplomacy (Bakir 2015). This lacuna is somewhat surprising given the extent to which the disciplines of journalism and media study political communication (especially agenda-setting and agenda-building processes); and given that manipulation of the press, publics and governments has long been a key function of intelligence agencies (Dover and Goodman 2009). The scale of Snowden's revelations in 2013 of mass surveillance has prompted more recent work – for instance the 2015 Special Issue of *Ethical Space: The International Journal of Communication Ethics* on 'Sleepwalking towards Big Brother? The Ethics of Communication in an Era of Mass Surveillance' (October); and the 2015 Special Issue of *International Journal of Press/Politics*, 20(2), on 'News, Agenda-building and Intelligence Agencies'. However, on past form, it is likely that once this specific issue has been pored over, the disciplines of media and journalism will once again quietly neglect the field.

The discipline of international relations might be expected to pay the field greater attention given the discipline's turn towards studying soft power and public diplomacy (Dodds 2007; Price 2003); and given that much of intelligence agencies' media manipulation is directed abroad – sometimes dictated by law, as in the USA's Smith-Mundt Act [1948] that authorizes the USA to disseminate propaganda outside its borders only. However, mitigating against this, Aldrich (2011) warns that the discipline has yet to integrate intelligence studies. Meanwhile, Deibert et al. (2012) observe that international relations has a long-standing bias against addressing the media. Indeed, traditional and long-standing journals like *International Relations* (1954–), *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (1957–) and *International Security* (1976–) have paid the field no attention whatsoever. The discipline's sole academic journal paying significant attention to the field is the inter-disciplinary journal *Intelligence and National Security* (1986–), the leading journal on intelligence and international relations.

That the discipline of history does not pay the field greater attention is surprising given that the historical method dominates the wider field of intelligence studies (Bean 2013) due to lengthy classification periods for intelligence-related matters (Dacre et al. 2009; Information Security Oversight Committee 2009). However, history's long-standing neglect of media (Hampton 2005) partially explains the fallow ground. Similarly, aside from recent developments in military and international history (Aldrich 2011), intelligence has been largely neglected by academic studies of diplomatic history (Aldrich 2002) and political history, a situation that Andrew (2004) explains as stemming from the inaccessibility of intelligence archives compared with other primary sources, and inadequate academic conceptualization of intelligence agencies within history. Indeed, it is history's niche journal that is the most prolific in the field: namely, the International Intelligence History Association's official publication, *Journal of Intelligence History* (2001–).

Having established that the field is tiny and that the disciplines that feed the field rarely talk to each other, the following section traverses research from these four disciplines to delineate the contemporary state of the field.

Broad currents

Most research on the relationship between the news media and the intelligence community examines at least one of two broad currents. These are the role of the press as a target of intelligence manipulation (a strong current); and journalists' challenges and practices (from collaborative to oppositional) in covering intelligence agencies (a weak current).

Strong current: manipulation of the press

Most research focuses on intelligence agencies' strategies, techniques and successes in manipulating different agenda-building nodes via the press. The main strategies identified comprise secrecy/censorship and propaganda.

The strategy of secrecy/censorship is achieved through various techniques, the most basic of which is withholding information (Gup 2004; Seaman 2005) or deliberately refusing to confirm or deny information. Other techniques are the use, or threatened use, of legal force and criminal prosecution against journalists and whistleblowers (Dee 1989; Hillebrand 2012). For instance, in the USA the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Department of Defense (DoD) in the 1970s used prior constraint to obtain injunctions against newspaper, magazine or book publishers to prevent them publishing classified or restricted information; and the CIA tried to hold ex-CIA employees to the contracts they had signed authorizing pre-publication review by the CIA (Dee 1989). Another technique is the willing self-censorship by journalists who are persuaded by the government's arguments on national security. Johnson (1986) notes CIA attempts to suppress a news story in 1974 about an ongoing operation to retrieve a Soviet submarine from the Pacific Ocean, the suppression achieved through CIA Director William Colby telephoning the various US newspapers to explain the national need for secrecy, with most of them acquiescing. Where direct censorship and self-censorship fail, intelligence agencies may resort to blacklisting, harassing and threatening non-compliant press employees. Examples include the CIA's efforts to destroy the credibility of *San Jose Mercury News* journalist Gary Webb for unearthing evidence in the 1990s that the CIA had conspired with Nicaraguan Contras during the 1980s to import cocaine into the USA (Bewley-Taylor 2008). Beyond the USA, Chanan (2009) documents harassment of foreign journalists by the military junta in El Salvador in the 1980s, including direct threats to their lives.

A second strategy in intelligence agencies' manipulation of the press is that of propaganda, namely true, partially true and false promotional, manipulative and persuasive activity engaged in by intelligence agencies. It is a strategy of enduring popularity, with a broad range of propagandistic techniques involving intelligence agencies documented since World War I. This includes creating propaganda-oriented policy, organizational machinery and institutions (Barth 1943; Briant 2015; Cull 2010). For instance, Cull's (2010) analysis of the public diplomacy work of the United States Information Agency (USIA) shows how the agency's fortunes declined between 1989 and 1993, despite its successful operations via Voice of America broadcasts in China during the 1989 Tiananmen Square disturbances; via the Inter-Agency Working Group on Public Diplomacy during the 1991 Gulf War (that ensured the White House presented a unified voice sensitive to the Arab world's cultural concerns); and its support for democratization in Poland and Hungary such as through providing

cultural centers, exchanges, satellite equipment to enable Eastern Europeans to access programmes from US broadcasters, and funds for economic development such as TV series to teach the basics of management and the market. Other propagandistic techniques include creating or financially supporting foreign news and radio services, usually covertly (Barker 2008; de Vries 2012; Soley 1982). For example, Barker (2008) notes the USA's funding of 'independent' media outlets in the occupied countries of Afghanistan and Iraq post 9/11. Also documented is the provision of propagandistic content for the foreign press, newsreels and radio to persuade foreign publics (Chang 2013; Fletcher 1982; Pullin 2011). For instance, Fletcher (1982) examines the use of the US press by British propaganda to draw the USA into World War II (WWII). He also examines the post-WWII methods used by the UK, via the Foreign Office's Information Research Department (a secret department with close links to the Secret Intelligence Service) to secretly coordinate its anti-communist propaganda and present a favorable image of itself in the Third World while containing domestic opposition. This propaganda included factual information classified as less than confidential, and written from the British point of view, to be used as factual background material by journalists in Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. Another propagandistic technique is the use of opinion-leaders to propagate propaganda (Pullin 2011; Rawnsley 1999). For instance, Pullin (2011) describes how during the 1950s, the USA conducted both overt and covert propaganda activities in India, with Indian domestic opposition working closely with US-backed groups, in particular the Indian Committee for Cultural Freedom, to generate a political alternative to the ruling Congress Party. A final documented propagandistic technique is the use of disinformation and psychological warfare techniques, that is, persuasive techniques often based on forgeries, fabrications and deceptions (Boyd-Barrett 2004; Hess 2009; Martin 1982). For instance, Hess (2009) describes Cold War disinformation campaigns of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) Ministry for State Security (Stasi) targeting the West German press who were often leaked subtly falsified documents to achieve propaganda aims.

As well as attempting to influence the foreign press, the field documents the provision of propaganda to the domestic press to persuade domestic audiences. Here we move into areas often viewed as the most ethically problematic given that the press in democracies is regularly held up as a vehicle of ensuring political – and sometimes intelligence – accountability. A well-researched propagandistic technique is the use of selective authorized leaks, declassification and misdirection (partial truths). These can be used as a powerful means of drip-feeding partial information into the public sphere, with the aim of framing an issue or event a specific way to promote a specific policy (Bakir 2013). For instance, Lashmar (2013) categorizes the various official, unofficial, formal and informal ways in which UK intelligence agencies release information to journalists, examining intelligence agencies' intentions to mislead the media. The longevity of such methods is observed by Shpiro (2001) who notes that Prussia's early intelligence service leaked carefully in order to create the impression of legendary successes for their service, with some newspapers reporting that it had over 30,000 spies in France alone – a myth that helped recruit agents in all main French cities. More recently, Boyd-Barrett (2004) analyses *The New York Times* journalist, Judith Miller's, coverage of the issue of weapons of mass destruction in the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, showing that Miller acted as a conduit for anonymously sourced deceptive stories originating in US military and intelligence agencies and selected Iraqi political opposition groups in exile, that built a case for invasion. Of course, leaks cannot always be so controlled. Ziegler (1999) describes how the US government tried to control the flow of information about its unidentified flying object activities from 1947 to 1956, but how this ended when former intelligence officers turned whistleblower in interviews and books.

Weak current: journalists' challenges and practices

While intelligence agencies' manipulative strategies and techniques are fairly well documented, as indicated above, much less frequently addressed are journalists' challenges and practices in engaging with intelligence agencies, agents, sources and products. Journalists' challenges include negotiating the balance between secrecy in the name of national security and the right to know; finding, verifying and interpreting information; dealing with minimal audience knowledge and interest in intelligence stories; and unconscious reflections of culture. Journalistic practices include collaboration with intelligence agencies and opposition to them. These are discussed below.

Journalists face many challenges in covering intelligence agencies. An important challenge is negotiating the balance between secrecy in the name of national security and the right to know. Researchers have documented how journalists can struggle with ascertaining how best to deal with secrecy – from succumbing to appeals to secrecy in the interests of national security to dealing with censorship (Fox 2011; Macpherson 1987; Shpiro 2001) and negotiating laws on publishing classified information (Hillebrand 2012; Magen 2015). Other challenges revolve around finding, verifying and interpreting information. This includes gaining access to knowledgeable sources, especially where intelligence agents may be prosecuted if discovered to have provided reporters with classified information (Gup 2004; Ziegler 1999); understanding the meaning, and verifying the accuracy, of information (Wheelwright 2014); and having the time and ability to recognize disinformation (Boyd-Barrett 2004; Chanan 2009; Hess 2009). Another challenge concerns audience knowledge of, and interest in, intelligence stories. For instance, it is difficult to convince citizens that they have a vested interest in keeping abreast of the conduct of intelligence, and a legitimate right to express and pursue that interest (Gup 2004). Gup's insight, however, may be a product of a pre-social media era. For instance, Qin's (2015) analysis of whistleblower Edward Snowden's portrayal on Twitter and on mainstream news finds that while the news framed Snowden a traitor, social media users associated Snowden's case with other whistleblowers, bipartisan issues and personal privacy issues, these independent frames all favoring Snowden. A final challenge is journalists' perhaps unconscious (rather than intentional) reproduction of wider cultural values in interpreting the actions of intelligence whistleblowers and spies. Examples include their gender-stereotyped coverage of female spies (Olmsted 2004; van Seters 1998); and sexually stereotyped coverage of whistleblower Bradley/Chelsea Manning that, by focusing on Manning's sexual orientation, deflected attention away from scrutinizing institutional structures, cultures, and practices that led to his whistleblowing to WikiLeaks on the conduct of the Iraq War (2003) and Afghanistan War (2001) (Bean 2013).

Given these challenges faced by journalists in engaging with intelligence, and with intelligence agencies, agents and sources, a small body of research examines what journalistic practices emerge. These journalistic practices range from collaborative to oppositional. Collaborative journalistic practices include acting as intelligence informants and spreading intelligence-sourced propaganda; and concern use of sources and tone and quantity of news coverage. Evidence of journalists acting as intelligence informants exists from the 1870s onwards (Alwood 2010, 2007; Shpiro 2001; Trifanova-Price 2015). Intelligence agencies sometimes directly employ journalists to collect intelligence, although this is difficult to prove, an example being Alwood's (2010) analysis of whether *Associated Press* reporter William Oatis was employed by a US intelligence agency to spy in Czechoslovakia during the early Cold War. Another technique is using the press as a cover for agents overseas. Research on this, however, is minimal and confined to the WWII and Cold War period (Fletcher 1982;

Hess 2009). Other collaborative journalistic practices include spreading intelligence-sourced propaganda (Boyd-Barrett 2004; Johnson 1986; Olmsted 2011). For instance, Johnson (1986) notes that the Church Committee in 1976 referred to several hundred foreign people around the world who sometimes attempt to influence foreign opinion through covert propaganda, providing the CIA with access to foreign press and media outlets. In order to generate a fertile bed for the planting of propaganda, intelligence agencies cultivate sympathetic journalists (Bakir 2013, 2011; Boyd-Barrett 2004). For instance, from the Bush administration's torture-intelligence policy, Bakir (2013, 2011) analyses the prejudicial press coverage of security detainee John Walker Lindh by Robert Young Pelton, a freelance US journalist embedded with Afghan warlord Dostum who was fighting alongside the CIA-linked team of Green Berets in Afghanistan in 2001. Other collaborative journalistic practices involve use of sources, such as formalized or semi-formal agreements with intelligence agencies on how national security information should be made public, as in the use of the Defence Notices committee in the UK (Creevy 1999). Further collaborative journalistic practices deal with tone of news coverage. This ranges from general uncritical reporting of intelligence agencies stemming from a high degree of faith in the government, as seen in the USA in the 1950s (Robarge 2009), early 1960s (de Vries 2012) and 2000s (Bakir 2013, 2011); to corporate journalists reaching an artificial consensus on intelligence events so that they would not appear to be wrong in their own assessment of the issue (Chanan 2009; McCoy 2001). Other collaborative journalistic practices deal with quantity of news coverage. This includes absences of any reporting on intelligence matters due to restrictions imposed on the press by the authorities, resulting in journalists lacking specialist knowledge and reliable sources, as in Spanish journalism from 1968 to 1983 (Fernández 2009).

Oppositional journalistic practices include uncovering intelligence agents' identity (Bar-joseph 2008) and exposing secret policies (Bewley-Taylor 2008; Cubbage 1988; Tulloch 2007), although there is little research pointing to either practice. Slightly more frequently researched is the oppositional journalistic practice of highlighting intelligence failures and demanding reform – a more politically acceptable form of the press attempting to hold intelligence agencies to account. Notably, articles on the press' accountability role tend to be from the disciplines of history, or, if from other disciplines, tend to adopt a historical approach. An early example of this is Fox's (2011) discussion of how the British press became critical of the UK government's silence regarding the Hess affair in 1941, warning of the impact of this official silence on Anglo-American relations and on potential fifth-column activity in the UK. Another example from the UK is Moran's (2011) discussion of how the UK's official cover-up of the mysterious disappearance of naval frogman Lionel Buster Crabb in 1956, ruptured long-standing taboos about secret service work and brought to the fore a brand of investigative journalist determined to make front-page news of intelligence shortcomings and failure. Hess (2009) describes how West German press coverage of the military situation of West Germany after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) command post exercise, Fallex 62, generated a landmark for press freedom in 1962, also noting how the West German press was quicker and often more target-oriented than any of the executive and legislative controls of government and parliament. From the USA, Robarge (2009) notes the increased frequency of normally critical stories about the CIA in the US press since the 1960s, either from beat reporters or investigative journalists; de Vries (2012) discusses how US watchdog journalism emerged from the mid-1960s following the 1967 scandal of the CIA funding private organizations, reaching its apex with the 1971 publication of the Pentagon Papers in *The New York Times* and the 1972 revelation in the *Washington Post* of the Watergate burglary; and Hughes (2008) describes the US and UK press' acclaim

of the book *Legacy of Ashes*, for its recording of CIA intelligence failures. Similarly, Eisin (2009) documents how the Israeli media evolved into a highly critical press following the ‘intelligence failure’ of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, this fully realized in the first Lebanon war in 1982, when for the first time in Israel, the public and the media were openly critical during the operation rather than just in the aftermath. Magen (2015) discusses, across time, the limits of the Israeli media’s ability to hold its intelligence agencies to account. Fernández (2009) describes how Spain’s press paid more attention to intelligence scandals in the mid- to late 1990s, generating considerable deterioration of public trust in the intelligence service, and consequently leading to its reform in 2002 to make it more accountable.

Thus, of the two currents of research, the overwhelming majority focuses on the role of the press as a target of manipulation by intelligence agencies. Less frequently researched are journalists’ challenges and practices in covering intelligence agencies. Within this weaker current of research is an even smaller body of work on oppositional journalistic practices. This weaker current deserves and requires greater attention if the press is to strengthen its ability to hold intelligence agencies to account.

Intelligence, accountability and the press

The issue of accountability arises because in liberal democracies, the press is regularly presented as a guardian of the public interest and a means of achieving political accountability (Hampton 2010). However, how best to ensure the accountability of intelligence agencies remains a contested issue. For instance, a 2014 poll by Ipsos Mori conducted one year after revelations by Edward Snowden (a private contractor working for the USA’s National Security Agency (NSA)) of governmental mass surveillance of the citizens of the ‘Five Eyes’ countries, found that a small majority of the British public are not confident in current accountability arrangements regarding their intelligence agencies:¹ 48 percent were not confident (and only 40 percent were confident) in the current system (a committee of politicians) of holding the intelligence agencies in the UK to account (Ipsos Mori 2014).² The British public shows similarly low levels of confidence in any alternative system of intelligence agency accountability involving politicians. The only institution in the poll that a majority of British adults express any confidence in being able to hold intelligence agencies to account is a judge in a court of law (75 percent express confidence in this). While revealing public dissatisfaction with current accountability arrangements, this poll does not offer any options for achieving intelligence oversight through *public* oversight mechanisms such as the press. Similarly, public oversight mechanisms (including the press, but also other media forms, think tanks, civil society activists and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)) are rarely mentioned in the academic literature on intelligence accountability (for exceptions, see Aldrich 2009; Hillebrand 2012; Hughes and Stoddart 2012; Johnson 2014; Robarge 2009). This stands in contrast to the very large amount of work on executive, legal and judicial oversight of intelligence agencies (Hillebrand 2012; Johnson 2008; Phythian 2007).

Arguably, this marginal attention to the press as a mechanism of public oversight of intelligence agencies arises because of two fundamental obstacles that the press face in this area. Identified earlier in this chapter (the strong current of research), these obstacles are the intelligence agencies’ twin strategies of secrecy/censorship and propaganda. The strategy of secrecy/censorship makes it difficult for journalists to obtain, verify and understand the significance of information, compromising the press’ authoritativeness. The strategy of propaganda compromises the press’ accuracy and independence. The manipulation of the press by domestic intelligence agents (whether in secret or with the press’ complicity)

compromises the press' ability to act as a credible oversight mechanism of that government and its intelligence agencies. The secret manipulation of the press by foreign intelligence agents positions the press as but a stepping stone in wider strategic manipulation of one nation's government by another, again compromising the press' accountability function.

Strengthening the ability of the press to hold intelligence agencies (and their political masters) to account would surely be a laudable and important goal of critical research in the field. To strengthen the press' accountability function in this area requires more research into journalists' challenges and practices in covering intelligence agencies. Identification of problems is an important step towards the identification of solutions, and, of the challenges identified earlier, there is a notable dearth of empirical work regarding audience knowledge of, and interest in, intelligence stories. There is also minimal work on journalists' unconscious reproduction of wider cultural values other than gender and sexuality in interpreting the actions of intelligence whistleblowers and spies: for instance, nationalism, patriotism and militarism are some of the more glaring omissions. Greater examination of journalistic practices in covering intelligence agencies would reveal the extent of uncritical collaboration, as well as an evaluation of its impact on the press' accountability function. However, the area most in need of research is identification of oppositional journalistic practices, particularly in the contemporary period, as this would provide case studies of how things could be done differently, perhaps leading to benchmarks of good practice. Arguably, then, this weaker current of research into journalists' challenges and practices deserves and requires greater attention if meaningful reform of the relationship between the news media and the intelligence community is to be suggested.

Final thoughts on the value of inter-disciplinarity

To summarize, the academic field examining the relationship between the news media and the intelligence community is extremely small. Led by several key journals, the disciplines of international relations (via *Intelligence and National Security*) and history (via *Journal of Intelligence History*) are the most active, but the disciplines of media, and particularly journalism, are strangely quiescent. Arguably, this muteness arises from two factors. The first is the tendency of media and journalism, particularly the strand of research within political communication on agenda-setting, to focus on news phenomena and patterns that are readily visible to the researcher, at best pointing out absences of coverage, but rarely delving into the dynamics and secretive manipulations behind silences. The second inhibiting factor is that to research a field characterized by the strategies of secrecy/censorship and propaganda requires a large amount of contextual knowledge even to realize that there is an issue worthy of research, and then to understand what the material demonstrates. What is required, then, is for media and journalism researchers to traverse their disciplinary silos, to understand the domestic and international, political and historical intelligence dimensions of the issue, as well as the dynamics of the press itself.

Reviewing this inter-disciplinary field, intelligence agencies' manipulation of the press is a strong current of research compared to research on journalists' challenges and practices in covering intelligence agencies. Within this relatively weak current, there is very little research on oppositional journalistic practices, including the press' documentation of intelligence failures and demands for reform (these being examples of the press attempting to hold intelligence agencies to account). Notably, articles directly addressing the press' accountability role tend to be from the discipline of history or adopt a historical approach. Media, journalism and international relation's near silence on the press and intelligence

agencies' accountability can be put down to two difficulties in researching this area of the field in anything other than a historical setting. The first difficulty concerns the practical issue of access to source material. Government-sealed archives on national security issues, journalists' reluctance to discuss their sources, and media institutions' dislike of critical researchers severely limits the availability of source material on intelligence–press issues, making it difficult for researchers to come to conclusive conclusions (although see Briant 2015; Magen 2015; and Trifanova-Price 2015 for exceptions). Intelligence insiders who are willing to talk are unlikely to reveal information that is not already in the public sphere, and may well be actively involved in attempts to misdirect the researcher. In some cases, these obstacles to accessing secretive source material are overcome by extensive whistleblowing, leaks, investigative journalism, national and international inquiries, law suits, and the activities of NGOs and citizens (as in the outing of Bush administration's torture-intelligence policy (Bakir 2013)), but, in other issues, such epistemic networks (Bennett 2003) fail to coalesce and little usable data emerges in the public sphere. Another route into finding and evaluating secretive source material is by examining international intelligence issues (again, as in the Bush administration's torture-intelligence policy that involved at least fifty-four other countries (Open Society Justice Initiative 2013)). Examining international intelligence issues allows the researcher to find and compare information on an issue emanating from the different countries involved: this is helpful if one country is less secretive than the others, or if their manipulative activities are uncoordinated, allowing press manipulation to be more easily spotted. The second difficulty in researching the press and intelligence agencies' accountability in anything other than a historical setting is that researchers may find it ethically problematic to investigate contemporary issues of intelligence accountability failures, as this requires researchers to position themselves as an agent of accountability – a critical position that many may feel uncomfortable with. While mainstream intelligence studies research is overwhelmingly either historical or oriented toward institutional problem-solving, control and prediction (Bean 2013), the disciplines of media and journalism have a long tradition of addressing contemporary phenomena, and often from a critical perspective. What is needed, then, is for international relations researchers to embrace the critical perspectives, and methodologies, already proven within the disciplines of media and journalism.

Should scholars step out of their disciplinary silos and step up to the challenge of examining the contemporary role of the press in holding intelligence agencies to account, this would form a necessary first step in strengthening public oversight of intelligence agencies.

Notes

- 1 On 6 June 2013, classified documents from Snowden regarding massive online and telephone surveillance activities by the NSA, the UK's Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), and other 'Five Eyes' countries were published in *The Guardian* and *The Washington Post*. They revealed that the NSA had been secretly operating electronic surveillance program, PRISM, in participation with Microsoft (since 2007), Yahoo! (since 2008), Google, Facebook and Paltalk (since 2009), YouTube (since 2010), AOL and Skype (since 2011) and Apple (since 2012). As most of the world's electronic communications pass through the USA (given that this is where most of the world's internet infrastructure is based), this enabled intelligence agencies to intercept communications of foreign targets as their data passed into or through the country. Snowden also revealed that the UK's GCHQ intercepted and tracked internet and communications data on a mass basis.
- 2 1,958 respondents aged fifteen+ were polled.

References

- Aldrich, R. (2002) “Grow your own”: Cold War intelligence and history supermarkets’, *Intelligence and National Security* 17(1): 135–152.
- Aldrich, R.J. (2009) ‘Global intelligence co-operation versus accountability: new facets to an old problem’, *Intelligence and National Security* 24(1): 26–56.
- Aldrich, R.J. (2011) “A profoundly disruptive force”: the CIA, historiography and the perils of globalization’, *Intelligence and National Security* 26(2–3): 139–158.
- Alwood, E. (2007) ‘Watching the watchdogs: FBI spying on journalists in the 1940s’, *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 84(1): 137–150.
- Alwood, E. (2010) ‘The spy case of AP correspondent William Oatis: a muddled victim/hero myth of the Cold War’, *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 87(2): 263–280.
- Andrew, C. (2004) ‘Intelligence, international relations and “under-theorisation”’, *Intelligence and National Security* 19(2): 170–184.
- Bakir, V. (2011) ‘Torture and intelligence in the War on Terror: the struggle over strategic political communication’, *Global Media and Communication* 7(3): 239–243.
- Bakir, V. (2013) *Torture, Intelligence and Sousveillance in the War on Terror: Agenda-building struggles*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Bakir, V. (2015) ‘News, agenda building, and intelligence agencies: a systematic review of the field from the discipline of journalism, media, and communications’, *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 20(2): 1–14.
- Bar-joseph, U. (2008) ‘The intelligence chief who went fishing in the cold: how Maj. Gen. (res.) Eli Zeira exposed the identity of Israel’s best source ever’, *Intelligence and National Security* 23(2): 226–248.
- Barker, M.J. (2008) ‘Democracy or polyarchy? US-funded media developments in Afghanistan and Iraq post 9/11’, *Media, Culture & Society* 30(1): 109–130.
- Barth, A. (1943) ‘The Bureau of Intelligence’, *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 7(1): 66–76.
- Bean, H. (2013) ‘Rhetorical and critical/cultural intelligence studies’, *Intelligence and National Security* 28(4): 495–519.
- Bennett, W.L. (2003) ‘Communicating global activism: strengths and vulnerabilities of networked politics’, *Information, Communication and Society* 6(2): 143–168.
- Bewley-Taylor, D. (2008) ‘Crack in the lens: Hollywood, the CIA and the African-American response to the “Dark Alliance” series’, *Intelligence and National Security* 23(1): 81–102.
- Boyd-Barrett, O. (2004) ‘Judith Miller, The New York Times, and the propaganda model’, *Journalism Studies* 5(4): 435–449.
- Briant, E. (2015) ‘Allies and audiences: evolving strategies in defense and intelligence propaganda’, *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 20(2): 145–165.
- Chanana, M. (2009) ‘Reporting from El Salvador: a case study in participant observation’, *Journal of Intelligence History* 9(1–2): 53–73.
- Chang, K. (2013) ‘Muted reception: U.S. propaganda and the construction of Mexican popular opinion during the Second World War’, *Diplomatic History* 38(3): 569–598.
- Creevy, M. (1999) ‘A critical review of the Wilson government’s handling of the D notice affair 1967’, *Intelligence and National Security* 14(3): 209–227.
- Cubbage II, T.L. (1988) ‘Westmoreland vs. CBS: was intelligence corrupted by policy demands?’ *Intelligence and National Security* 3(3): 118–180.
- Cull, N.J. (2010) ‘Speeding the strange death of American public diplomacy: the George H. W. Bush administration and the US Information Agency’, *Diplomatic History* 34(1): 47–69.
- Dacre, P., Cannadine, D. and Pilling, J. (2009) *Review of the 30 Year Rule*. London: The Stationary Office.
- de Vries, T. (2012) ‘The 1967 Central Intelligence Agency scandal: catalyst in a transforming relationship between state and people’, *Journal of American History* 98(4): 1075–1092.
- Dee, J. (1989) ‘Legal confrontations between press, ex-CIA agents and the government’, *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 66(2): 418–426.
- Deibert, R.J., Rohozinski, R. and Crete-Nishihata, M. (2012) ‘Cyclones in cyberspace: information shaping and denial in the 2008 Russia–Georgia war’, *Security Dialogue* 43(1): 3–24.
- Dodds, K. (2007) ‘Steve Bell’s eye: cartoons, geopolitics and the visualization of the “war on terror”’, *Security Dialogue* 38(2): 155–177.
- Dover, R. and Goodman, M.S. (eds) (2009) *Spinning Intelligence: Why Intelligence needs the Media, Why the Media needs Intelligence*. London: C. Hurst and Co.

- Eisin, M. (2009) 'The Israeli intelligence community and the media', *Journal of Intelligence History* 9(1–2): 11–14.
- Fernández, A.M.D. (2009) 'The intelligence services and the mass media in Spain', *Journal of Intelligence History* 9(1–2): 89–104.
- Fletcher, R.J. (1982) 'British propaganda since World War II – a case study', *Media, Culture & Society* 4(2): 97–109.
- Fox, J. (2011) 'Propaganda and the flight of Rudolf Hess, 1941–45', *The Journal of Modern History* 83(1): 78–110.
- Gup, T. (2004) 'Covering the CIA in times of crisis: obstacles and strategies', *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 9(3): 28–39.
- Hampton, M. (2005) 'Media studies and the mainstreaming of media history', *Media History* 11(3): 239–246.
- Hampton, M. (2010) 'The fourth estate ideal in journalism history' in S. Allan (ed.) *Routledge Companion to News and Journalism*. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge pp. 3–12.
- Hess, S. (2009) 'German intelligence organizations and the media', *Journal of Intelligence History* 9(1–2): 75–87.
- Hillebrand, C. (2012) 'The role of news media in intelligence oversight', *Intelligence and National Security* 27(5): 689–706.
- Hughes, R.G. (2008) 'Of revelatory histories and hatchet jobs: propaganda and method in intelligence history', *Intelligence and National Security* 23(6): 842–877.
- Hughes, R.G. and Stoddart, K. (2012) 'Hope and fear: intelligence and the future of global security a decade after 9/11', *Intelligence and National Security* 27(5): 625–652.
- Information Security Oversight Committee (2009) *Report to the President*. Available at: www.fas.org/sgp/isoo/index.html (accessed 25 April 2010).
- Ipsos Mori (2014) *Poll on Privacy and Data Sharing for The Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust*. 30 May. Available at: <http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3388/Poll-on-privacy-and-data-sharing-for-The-Joseph-Rowntree-Reform-Trust.aspx> (accessed 23 May 2016).
- Johnson, L.K. (1986) 'The CIA and the media', *Intelligence and National Security* 1(2): 143–169.
- Johnson, L.K. (2008) 'The Church Committee investigation of 1975 and the evolution of modern intelligence accountability', *Intelligence and National Security* 23(2): 198–225.
- Johnson, L.K. (2014) 'Intelligence shocks, media coverage, and congressional accountability, 1947–2012', *Journal of Intelligence History* 13(1): 1–21.
- Lashmar, P. (2013) 'Urinal or conduit? Institutional information flow between the UK intelligence services and the news media', *Journalism* 14(8): 1–17.
- Macpherson, B.N. (1987) 'The compromise of US navy cryptanalysis after the Battle of Midway', *Intelligence and National Security* 2(2): 320–323.
- Magen, C. (2015) 'Media strategies and manipulations of intelligence services: the case of Israel', *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 20(2): 247–265.
- Martin, L.J. (1982) 'Disinformation: an instrumentality in the propaganda arsenal', *Political Communication* 2(1): 47–64.
- McCoy, M.E. (2001) 'Dark alliance: news repair and institutional authority in the age of the Internet', *Journal of Communication* 51(1): 164–193.
- Moran, C. (2011) 'Intelligence and the media: the press, government secrecy and the "Buster" Crabb affair', *Intelligence and National Security* 26(5): 676–700.
- Olmsted, K.S. (2004) 'Blond queens, red spiders, and neurotic old maids: gender and espionage in the early Cold War', *Intelligence and National Security* 19(1): 78–94.
- Olmsted, K.S. (2011) 'The truth is out there: citizen sleuths from the Kennedy Assassination to the 9/11 truth movement', *Diplomatic History* 35(4): 671–693.
- Open Society Justice Initiative (2013) *Globalizing Torture. CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition*. New York: Open Society Foundations. Available at: <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/globalizing-torture-20120205.pdf> (accessed 23 May 2016).
- Phythian, M. (2007) 'The British experience with intelligence accountability', *Intelligence and National Security* 22(1): 75–99.
- Price, R. (2003) 'Transnational civil society and advocacy in world politics', *World Politics* 55: 579–606.
- Pullin, E.D. (2011) '"Money does not make any difference to the opinions that we hold": India, the CIA, and the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1951–58', *Intelligence and National Security* 26(2–3): 377–398.
- Qin, J. (2015) 'Hero on Twitter, traitor on news: how social media and legacy news frame Snowden', *International Journal of Press/Politics* 20(2): 166–184.

- Rawnsley, G.D. (1999) 'Taiwan's propaganda cold war: the offshore islands crises of 1954 and 1958', *Intelligence and National Security* 14(4): 82–101.
- Robarge, D. (2009) 'CIA in the spotlight: the Central Intelligence Agency and public accountability', *Journal of Intelligence History* 9(1–2): 105–126.
- Seaman, M. (2005) 'A glass half full – some thoughts on the evolution of the study of the special operations executive', *Intelligence and National Security* 20(1): 27–43.
- Shapiro, S. (2001) 'Intelligence, media, and terrorism: imperial Germany and the Middle East', *Journal of Intelligence History* 1(1): 21–35.
- Soley, L. (1982) 'Radio: clandestine broadcasting, 1948–1967', *Journal of Communication* 32(1): 165–180.
- Trifanova-Price, L. (2015) 'Secrets, lies and journalist-spies: the contemporary moral dilemma for Bulgarian media professionals', *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 20(2): 185–203.
- Tulloch, J. (2007) 'Hunting ghost planes: An interview with journalist Stephen Grey', *Journalism* 8(5): 510–516.
- van Seters, D. (1998) 'The Munsinger affair: images of espionage and security in 1960s Canada', *Intelligence and National Security* 13(2): 71–84.
- Wheelwright, J. (2014) 'Beyond the spooks: the problem of the narrator in literary history', *Journalism: Theory, Practice and Criticism* 15(5): 561–572.
- Ziegler, C.A. (1999) 'UFOs and the US intelligence community', *Intelligence and National Security* 14(2): 1–25.

19

COVERING ACTS OF TERRORISM

Heather Davis Epkins

Introduction

Maximum impact of an act of terrorism depends on the bullhorn of media coverage. Understanding the impact of whether, and to what degree, media aid terrorists in publicizing their messaging, and to what end does terrorism aid media in gleaning eyeballs, clicks and readers, has served as an important foundation of intense exploration for journalists, policy makers, scholars and, of course, terrorist groups. Many scholars believe there is potential for lessening terrorism through rigorous investigation of the role of media coverage as a means to prevent, assuage, empower or condone violent or reactionary conflict, and to reconcile/rebuild the communities involved. Burgeoning evidence suggests that journalism could, should and can serve as one catalyst to help mitigate terrorism issues (Beckett, 2008; Eid, 2014a; Hackett, 2014; Lynch & Galtung, 2010; Seib, 2004). General consensus holds that if media are part of the problem, even if unwittingly, they can also be part of the solution.

Covering terrorism breeds a unique kind of reporter. Research exploring American and Israeli journalism finds that journalists who cover the topic of terrorism – termed the ‘national security prestige press’ (Epkins, 2012; Stempel, 1961) – are generally senior in experience, required to offer on-the-spot speculation, utilize anonymous sources with more regularity than other journalist beats, and are less modulated by editors (Epkins, 2012; Witzthum, 2006). Furthermore, given their front lines access to primary sources, these reporters serve as a prolific conduit through which downstream media glean their own stories, definitions and frameworks in a trickle-down effect (Couldry, 2003; Dimitrova & Stromback, 2008; Kellner, 1995). Therefore, these particular journalists possess a substantial opportunity to influence global public opinion, policy, future media stories, and even future acts of violence, through their framing choices (Eid, 2014a; Nacos, 2000). Moreover, terrorists now intrude as a fourth component in the traditional triad of government–media–public communication, and evidence shows that this pressure can cause government overreaction ‘that goes beyond what the decision makers might otherwise be inclined to do’ (Katz, 2009, pp. 201–202). Clearly, this genre of reporting carries unique challenges.

Meanwhile, journalists and their organizations are expected to adopt new routines including maintaining an online brand of their own, working with a skeleton staff and

attempting to legitimize a multitude of questionable sources now available on the Internet (Epkins, 2012). The impact of these realities leaves many inside the press corps concerned about a decline in journalistic standards. Termed the ‘Edward Snowden-era of national security journalism’ (Samuelsohn & Byers, 2014), reporters are faced with increasing competition as they negotiate globalized media where citizen journalists, sources and terrorist alike now skip speaking with a traditionally-trusted news gatekeeper. Therefore, the pressure of new technologies and expectations, coupled with the loss of gatekeeping control, has required journalists to adapt. The term ‘war on journalism’ (Lynch & Galtung, 2010) has emerged to help explain the robust impact of the ‘war on terrorism’ era on this profession. Examining the complex relationship of media coverage and terrorism can help to describe contemporary framing of media discourse and provide a rich discussion surrounding the pressing issues that arise from this coverage.

Overview

The purpose of this chapter is to consolidate, connect and summarize historically-significant hallmarks of media and terrorism scholarship with an eye toward detailing promising models, existing trends and future directions for the study of terrorism media coverage. The chapter is organized in three sections. The first section overviews four major hallmarks of media and terrorism literature: freedom irony, contagion, rallying around the flag, and the ‘spring’ of media globalization. The second section offers promising models and existing trends such as peace journalism, networked journalism, and a more contextualized approach to conducting perhaps the most active area of research – framing studies – as well as a recent methodological movement to embrace a more critical-constructivist approach. The third section will explore issues needing further analysis and call scholars to reconsider traditional beliefs regarding how we study media and terrorism while returning to reapply classic theories to the realities of a non-traditional world.

Hallmarks of media and terrorism scholarship

There are four major hallmarks in scholarship regarding the relationship between terrorists and the media to include discussions surrounding the freedom irony, contagion theory, rallying around the flag and media globalization. This section will explore the historical significance of these hallmarks and discuss how scholars have negotiated the impact of media globalization on covering acts of terrorism. First, the freedom irony describes the contradictory notion where reporters uphold a free press while seemingly promulgating terrorist messaging, particularly from terrorists who blatantly (and ironically) espouse hatred of free press values, yet aim their attacks to garner press coverage. Second, contagion theory (Mueller, 1973; Picard, 1986) contends that media coverage of terrorism begets more terrorism. Third, rallying around flag (Cohen, 1963; Gans, 1979) refers to the tendency for journalists to abandon their watchdog role and engage in nationalism via their quick adoption of official sources as the main frame by which their story is told – especially in times of national conflict, presumably because this best serves the public interest (Nacos, 1994). Finally, the entrance of a pluralized media ‘spring’ or ‘mobile network society’ (Castells et al., 2007), as reporters continue to cover acts of terrorism, is an inescapable and central reality, impacting journalist reports.

The freedom irony

The freedom irony describes the double-edged sword of a democratic press. Even early on, scholars understood that ‘terrorism is a product of freedom, particularly freedom of the press’ (Jenkins, 1983). Famously described as the ‘oxygen of publicity’ by Margaret Thatcher (Apple, 1985), maximum impact of an act of terrorism depends on the bullhorn of media coverage because, generally, terrorism targets the watching audience (Crenshaw, 1981; Hoffman, 2006; Jenkins, 1975; Nacos, 1994). Likewise, terrorism feeds into news values criteria (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Hoffman, 2006; Nacos, 2007) because ‘journalists are attracted to drama, and few political spectacles offer greater dramatic appeal than violence’ (Livingston, 1997, p. 2). At best, media have been termed ‘codependent’ on the terrorist act; at worst, ‘the terrorist’s best friends’ (Laqueur, 1976, p. 104) and ‘active agents in the actual conceptualization of terrorist events’ (Freedman & Thussu, 2012, p. 10).

The value of media finds anecdotal support as echoed by one well-known extremist. In a 2005 letter intercepted between al-Qaeda leaders, Ayman al-Zawahiri directs Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to make careful note of their use of media, saying its ‘good advice for all mujahedeen [holy warriors]’ to ‘film everything... more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media ... you should be aware that every frame you take is as good as a missile fired at the Crusader enemy and his puppets’ (The Economist, 2007). Over the years, researchers have attempted to classify this relationship with descriptors, such as terrorism as theatre, media hijacking, the weaponization of media, and words of mass destruction, but the narrative remains the same: headlines equal power. Enduring, freighted terms to describe this power include ‘mediatized terrorism’ (Cottle, 2006), ‘media-oriented terrorism’ (Surette et al., 2009), and ‘mass-mediated terrorism’ (Nacos, 2007). Clearly, the media are not only implicated as central to the communication of conflict worldwide, but the relationship is increasingly characterized as one of promulgating conflict, as scholars continue to introduce terms such as ‘second hand terrorism’ (Comer & Kendall, 2007), a form of culturally-embedded structural violence (Hackett, 2014) and ‘terroredia’ (Eid, 2014b).

Journalists must overcome steep challenges when covering terrorism. Not only do members of the press need to responsibly uphold freedom of speech – often in the face of covering anti-free media/free market ideologies – they also need to carefully choose their frames depicting the act itself, as well as the involved communities, all the while considering their own role in how terror events unfold. Journalists need to give voice to those involved in a terror attack – both the victim and those who perpetrate the act – as objectively as possible, without serving as a propaganda tool. Therefore, covering terrorism seems like an impossible predicament. However, for terrorist groups, to show an American captive’s beheading ‘is a twisted sort of win-win: Either it succeeds in turning the world’s most powerful and admired tech firms into distribution partners for a message of violent extremism, or those firms clamp down on the content, betraying their stated commitment to the American principle of free speech’ (Bercovici, 2014). New media ecology only exacerbates the freedom irony.

History of contagion theory

Media contagion theory (Picard, 1986) or symbiosis hypothesis (Miller, 1982; Wardlaw, 1982) has enjoyed hot debates across multiple disciplines to determine if, and how, violent media coverage begets copycat violence ‘whereby violence-prone individuals and groups imitate forms of (political) violence attractive to them, based on examples usually popularized by

mass media' (Nacos, 2009). Originally carrying weak empirical proof to support causal claims, scholars often argued the opposite: that if publicity is withheld, terrorism would only increase (Alali & Eke, 1991) and media coverage only 'enhances public understanding of terrorism and reinforces public hostility toward terrorists' (Barkan & Snowden, 2000, p. 84), as well as serves the 'public's right to know' by notifying them of anti-terrorism measures (Wilkinson, 2009). Perhaps the most persuasive voices against contagion theory are offered by 'those who fear that the notion of the media as agent of terrorist contagion will strengthen the hands of governments in efforts to curb or alter terrorism-related content and thereby interfere with freedom of the press and freedom of expression' (Nacos, 2009). Thus, scholars generally concluded there was no need to regulate the media (Picard, 1986; Weimann & Winn, 1994).

However, newer evidence suggests that when media make terrorist organizations aware of state responses, this may exacerbate terrorist actions (LaFree et al., 2006) and 'help to cultivate a political climate of fear and authoritarianism, contributing to conflict-escalating feedback loops' (Hackett, 2014, p. 33). Even in the late 1980s and early 1990s, researchers uncovered quantitative data that 'yielded considerable evidence of a contagion effect wrought by (television) coverage' in the form of 'shortened lag time to emulation in the case of kidnapping, attacks on installations, hijackings, bombings, and assassinations' (Weimann & Winn, 1994, p. 277). Similar findings have been teased out in three areas: geographical, solidarity and tactical. First, copycat terrorism has been found to increase within the same location over the month following an attack (Rohner & Frey, 2007; Weimann & Brosius, 1989). Likewise, increased terror incidents in one country have been associated with increased events in neighboring states by second-generation groups or foreign sympathizers, presumably demonstrating solidarity (Bloom, 2005; Crenshaw, 1981). Furthermore, successful tactics utilized by one group may spawn copycat incidents elsewhere (Hoffman, 2006; Rohner & Frey, 2007) and that media relay information that can equip terrorists on how to organize and execute an attack (Schbley, 2004).

Few explanatory models exploring the relationship between media and terrorists have garnered systematic traction as most related scholarship employs qualitative case studies (Hoffman, 2006; O'Connor, 2013; Rohner & Frey, 2007). However, recent research uses a classic theory to explore contagion. Utilizing a game theory model to explore the geographical frequency of terrorism news coverage inside two world-respected newspapers (as indicated by a 1968 and a 1999 Merrill poll) – *The New York Times* and the Swiss *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* – and falling in line with well-established research regarding 'terrorist calculus' of media impact (Awan, 2014; Nacos, 1994, 2000, 2007), findings suggest that terrorists will adapt their strategy given traditional media behavior. Specifically, these newspapers focused 'more on Western countries and under-report terrorist acts in developing countries,' regardless of fatality numbers. Researchers concluded that if a terrorist wanted to garner media attention in developing countries, their attack needed to 'produce a lot of blood to attract the attention of the Western media,' whereas Western terrorist incidents can be 'minor' only requiring a 'few fatalities'; this may help to explain why non-Western terror attacks result in more fatalities than Western attacks (Rohner & Frey, 2007, p. 141).

Yet scholars continue to insist that a particular terrorist technique is likely only of interest to those who have already made the decision to engage in terrorism anyway (Sedgwick, 2007). This line of thinking has roots in the ageless debate of whether a person is predisposed to violent acts (and media choices) or if exposure to violence cultivates/serves as an impetus to violence. As early researchers found, 'Violence is inescapable. There is no "before" exposure to violence' and therefore, this phenomenon is difficult to study (Gerbner, 1988,

p. 27). Nonetheless, even a brief survey of current scholarship will indicate ‘little doubt’ that contagion theory ‘is particularly potent when diffused through media forms that are not subject to checks by the traditional media gatekeepers’ in a system of diffusion that is admittedly ‘invariably complex’ (Nacos, 2009) and arguably, if media coverage can communicate that one tactic is ‘more effective’ than another, even if said terrorist group has already decided to perpetrate an attack, the subsequent choice of tactic could still be considered contagion. Moreover, the prominence of social media has deepened both exposure and intimacy with violent media, and therefore the potential for contagion continues to spawn crucial debate.

Rally around the flag

In times of national threat, to ‘rally around the flag’ means to mobilize citizens and silence dissenting voices by aligning with government dialogue (Cohen, 1963; Gans, 1979; Mueller, 1973, 2009). Explained sometimes through the ‘indexing hypothesis’ (Bennett, 1990) or the ‘cascading activation model’ (Entman, 2004), journalists are often accused of serving as apologists for national causes due to their heavy reliance on government sources (Entman, 2004; Norris et al., 2003). When compared to other types of news, ‘the dominance of official, particularly executive branch, sources is even more pronounced in national security stories’ (Bennett, 1994, p. 23). In terms of 9/11, only a few dissenting voices argued that journalists aptly reflected the patriotism and sentiments of the time in their reports (Mogensen, 2011; Nacos, 2003), whereas most scholars found evidence that journalists failed at providing balanced terrorism coverage during the 18 month period between 9/11 and the U.S. Iraq War. Major changes in U.S. policy went initially unchallenged as media blindly adopted the official framing of political elites (Bennett, 2009; Entman, 2004; Seib, 2004). Moreover, news stories laced with fear and nationalism inherently limited post-9/11 discourse to discourage alternative options to a military response (Altheide, 2006; Chermak & Gruenewald, 2006; Moeller, 2009; Reynolds & Barnett, 2003). American journalists are credited (or blamed) with single-handedly changing the way we approach terrorism by their rampant adoption of the term ‘war on terror’ (Epkins, 2010; Lewis & Reese, 2009; Reynolds & Barnett, 2003), which spawned ‘major changes in social definitions and meanings of ... “9/11” and “terrorism”’ both inside America and abroad (Altheide, 2004, p. 304; Moeller, 2009; Norris et al., 2003). Not only have journalists been widely critiqued for their inability to repel the ‘potency of patriotism’ (Cohen, 1963; Entman, 2004; Gans, 1979; Moeller, 2009; Norris et al., 2003; Seib, 2004), but rampant journalist adoption of the phrase ‘establishment phase’ establishes a frame in itself, carrying the danger of making war ‘naturalized as inevitable’ (Caruthers, 2011, p. 43). Even worse, media are accused of actively *promoting* a military response (Kellner, 2003).

Historically, rallying around the flag has no agreed-upon empirical test. Promising research from one study examined political parties’ responses to terror attacks to reveal that rallying around the flag had predictive indicators (number of fatalities, frequency of attacks, identity of the perpetrators); future research should test whether this is congruent in media coverage as well (Chowanietz, 2011). In terms of news coverage regarding the balance of national security and civil liberties, researchers found rampant adoption/indexing by journalists of the ‘war on terror’ frame likely caused the public to more slowly reassert the importance of civil liberties than in previous conflicts (McLeod & Shah, 2015, p. 173).

Moreover, these researchers explored the use of a powerful framing device long used by governments to control the dialogue regarding a conflict – the personification of evil. For example, naming an enemy such as Osama bin Laden can usher inherent government control

of dominant news frames and forge national support for military action. However, inside the 'war on terror' era, the personification framing device was used for an entire decade. And, once Osama bin Laden escaped initial capture, the new 'evildoer' to pursue was Saddam Hussein. These researchers warn that when governments name an evil person, journalists should work to expose war propaganda disguised as peace propaganda in an attempt 'to lift the veil on how personifying the threat of terrorism can alter thinking, foster intolerance, and even spur unjust political actions' (McLeod & Shah, 2015, pp. 168–169).

Meanwhile, other research suggests that the lack of hierarchy and linear information flow frustrates elite dominance (Hoskins & O'Loughlin, 2010). This new power structure tempers traditional indexing as journalists have regained independence compared to their immediate post-9/11 reporting (Epkins, 2012; Schudson, 2002). Perhaps in direct mutiny to manipulative government strategies, scholars are now tracking a paradigm shift, namely the trend to 'rally around the profile' of a once illegitimate source, the terrorist, in lieu of traditional political figures. A new 'paparazzi style pursuit of terrorists' (Kampf & Liebes, 2013, pp. 4, 59) has ensued making the violent actor an increasingly-institutionalized, celebrity news source. In this case, media globalization may help to reflect a more contextualized world to provide deeper understanding, and perhaps solutions, to the problem of terrorism.

Impact of media globalization

The physical witnessing of events is imperative to covering acts of terrorism, but with new technologies, the first person to encounter the event is often a citizen or terrorist, not the journalist. The impact of a pluralized media 'spring,' or the 'mobile network society' (Castells et al., 2007), on covering acts of terrorism has been summed up by the term 'disaster marathon' (Liebes, 1998) where social media provide consistent media coverage of disasters which encourage, often unverified, reports stemming from new media (YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, etc.). One prominent example is how the world first learned of Osama bin Laden's 2011 assassination, namely from a tweet via his next door neighbor's personal Twitter account. In effect, media globalization has erased the hierarchy of communication, increased the speed and pervasiveness of communication, marred traditional processes of influencing world opinion, and introduced new voices to global discourse. This marathon can distract from a contextualized discussion by replacing traditional sources with Internet-based commentary, and encouraging narrowcasting where journalists cater to a specific audience to the exclusion of 'extraneous' contextual information, resulting in new journalist routines, the entrance of the 'citizen journalist' and the rise of terrorist news outlets.

Media globalization has introduced new professional expectations and routines to journalistic news building (Epkins, 2012; Reynolds & Barnett, 2003) including marginalizing the editor (Witzthum, 2006), encouraged on-the-spot speculation, and rampant anonymous source use showing an increase in journalist autonomy (Epkins, 2012) – much of which is a result of an increased difficulty to gain access to national security related information (Moeller, 2009). The events of 9/11 are also credited with the rapid emergence of online citizen journalism as non-traditional 'sources' became increasingly popular (Pew Internet and American Life Project, 2002). The scope of who constitutes a 'journalist' covering an act of terrorism has broadened and is changing news structures. For example, the surge of citizen eye-witness reports undermines the traditional content stranglehold of the media by elites (Gowing, 2009) and has generated an increase in online-generated crises that media easily follow (Pang et al., 2014). Finally, with the emergence of Internet and satellite television, terrorist groups can offer audiences real-time media coverage of terrorist acts, via their own

media outlets. Most accounts purport that al-Qaeda is a pioneer in this area establishing a sophisticated web of media channels under *as-Sahab* and the magazine *Inspire* produced by a cell of Yemen jihadists. Scholars keenly observe that terrorists now possess ‘the ability to shape and disseminate their own message in their own way, enabling them to completely bypass traditional, established media outlets’ (Hoffman, 2006, p. 198). In a 2008 *New York Times* op-ed, Daniel Kimmage writes that al-Qaeda ‘made its name in blood and pixels, with deadly attacks and an avalanche of electronic news media.’

This new reality challenges the traditional notion that media and terrorism are increasingly codependent (Eid, 2014a). From the journalist perspective, telling the story can be easier using new technology. However, at least in the case of Marie Colvin, a BBC correspondent who was killed in Syria by an attack on a makeshift media tent, satellite technology may have contributed to her undoing as ‘the Syrian military is said to have picked up satellite signals used by journalists in the media house next to the makeshift clinic run by opposition forces’ (Doucet, 2014: 84). Unfortunately, the media ‘spring’ can also wield its double-edged sword. This should spur academics and journalists alike to place urgency on remedies via promising models and reconsider how traditional communication theories might serve new interests in an increasingly globalized world.

Promising models and existing trends

The section discusses recent trends and potential models which provide a more contextualized approach to engaging in framing studies and critical-constructivist scholarship. It will end with a call to re-test traditional theory and reconsider classic lines of academic thought in light of our immensely variegated media landscape. While the events of 9/11 elevated the amount of foreign news coverage to levels never previously seen within U.S. media outlets (Project for Excellence in Journalism, 2006), scholars have encouraged media to play a role in eradicating terrorism.

On the one hand, scholars argue that ‘we are validating the supply and demand calculus that motivates media-savvy militants ... a concerted international media blackout against this carefully sculpted theatricality of terrorism might be much more effective’ (Awan, 2014). However, limiting reporting choices in covering terrorism may form for *another* type of attack – censorship – challenging the very foundations of a free press. Therefore, discussions of media self-regulation are often broached because ‘without *massive* news coverage, the terrorist act would resemble the proverbial tree falling in the forest’ (Nacos, 2000, p. 174, emphasis added). Lynch and Galtung (2010) call these notions a ‘war on journalism.’ Still, there are areas of promise as solutions, including peace journalism, networked journalism, reconsidering how to approach framing studies and embracing a more critical research approach.

Peace journalism

Peace journalism encourages journalists to intentionally highlight peace initiatives that facilitate action and intervention (Galtung & Ruge, 1965) and ‘choose to create opportunities for society at large to consider and value non-violent responses to conflict’ (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005, p. 5). Ironically, perhaps inevitably, the ‘war on terror’ in many ways led to a ‘war on journalism’ that has birthed “widespread peace journalism” (Eid, 2014a, p. 852; Lynch & Galtung, 2010). Advocates argue that media could and should place a central role in the stymie of terrorism as they are now considered much more than just a ‘mirror’

(Beckett, 2008; Hackett, 2014; Seib, 2004). With the goal of mitigating the re-circulation of violence (Der Derian, 2005) and citing its successful employment in countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines (Hackett, 2006), the peace journalism movement aims to train reporters to provide a better balance of the presentation of conflict by offering a more robust discussion on the roots of terrorism, as well as viable solutions to the situation. Criticism of peace journalism can be summarized by Richard Perle (as quoted by Lynch, 2008) that 'any attempt to discuss the roots of terrorism is an attempt to justify it. It simply needs to be fought and destroyed.' Moreover, patriotic publics may not welcome this type of coverage (deemed critical of government) during a national crisis (Liebes, 1998).

Networked journalism

One solution proposed by a former BBC journalist is termed 'networked journalism' to describe a process where journalists better connect with communities to 'represent people fairly as well as thoroughly' to ultimately provide a higher quality, more nuanced and contextualized product independent of strict corporate control. He argues, 'I do not think that people become bombers because of simple social or economic factors. But they are surely far less likely to do so in a society that acknowledges the significance of the background context for conflict' citing a 'continuum between global clashes and local disaffections' (Beckett, 2008, p. 134). Not only can this acceptance of wider input from varied communities create awareness, mitigate misunderstanding and help spawn positive feelings amongst varied populations, this approach 'will probably sell more copies and advertising as well.' Networked journalism reconstructs the news production process from a traditional, top-down model to a highly-collaborative effort where citizen engagement, via new media, is the platform for the final product. The overarching aim is to 'save journalism so that journalism can save the world' (Beckett, 2008, p. 1) because 'in the wake of terrorist acts the journalist owes allegiance to no-one but the public' (Beckett, 2008, p. 144).

Re-framing framing studies

Various theoretical approaches have been applied to media and terrorism scholarship, but none has prevailed in substance and momentum more than framing theory (Goffman, 1974). In fact, 'framing studies have far outstripped' other related mass communication theories in overall use (Weaver, 2007, p. 146) and have been broadly and often applied to media with regards to terrorism (Edy & Meirick, 2007; Entman, 2004; Ruigrok & van Atteveldt, 2007; Schaefer, 2003) as a basis for understanding how media cover terrorism. Media frames exercise the power to control and shape public policy debate (Entman, 2004) and can affect the audience frame (Pfau et al., 2004); therefore, the study of framing is a central tenet in studying media coverage of terrorism. Framing describes the process of content selection and exclusion, highlighting certain aspects over others to communicate a particular point of view. A frame can socially construct meaning via 'organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world' (Reese, 2001, p. 11). Furthermore, framing theory offers an opportunity to explore the intricacies of the news production process because this theory provides a window into the 'selection, emphasis and exclusion that furnish a coherent interpretation and evaluation of events' (Norris et al., 2003, p. 4). As Jamieson and Waldman (2003, p. 1) put it, 'journalists deliver the world to citizens in a comprehensible form.' The 'war on terror' frame, for example, quickly became the crux of both reporting and understanding homeland security

issues in America (Norris et al., 2003). However, the concept, scope and criteria of ‘framing’ are inconclusive and still hotly debated in scholarship (Reese, 2007; Scheufele, 2000).

Several methodological challenges are evident in media and terrorism research. Interestingly, characterizations of terrorism media coverage are often framed in a similar manner as insider characterizations of the academy’s attempt to understand this coverage. Scholars have called terrorism media coverage ‘confused’ (Hess & Kalb, 2003; O’Connor, 2013), accusing reporters of using inflated language to communicate exaggerated risk and pro-war fear mongering (Altheide, 2006; Chermak & Gruenewald, 2006) in a de-contextualized and de-historicized manner (Seib, 2004), largely due to a lack of foreign affairs coverage and a skewed focus on the West, non-state terrorism, and al-Qaeda (Nacos, 2009). This evidence suggests journalists have lowered criteria for legitimate sources leaving us with a ‘pseudo’ knowledge regarding terrorism (O’Connor, 2013). However, current characterizations of media and terrorism literature are similar, leaving scarring questions regarding the usefulness and validity of studies in relation to one another, how framing studies have failed/need to be approached, as well as who is framing whom in the cascade of information (Entman, 2004; McLeod & Shah, 2015).

There is also an inconsistent use of agreed-upon models and units of analysis. Methodological approaches and theoretical applications have largely centered on framing studies; even then, a majority of articles disproportionately (but understandably, given easier/cheaper access) rely on newspaper coverage, ignoring the analysis of other types of media such as film, literature and television and focus on Western media outlets (Conway, 2012, p. 448). By ignoring how terrorism is covered in non-Western countries, scholarship is devoid of important information from areas of the world with a considerable amount of terrorism experience and inextricably relevant to U.S. foreign policy. Likewise, most research favors the analysis of non-state terrorism and has focused mainly on al-Qaeda (Nacos, 2009; O’Connor, 2013). These discussions ignore state-sponsored terrorism and focus on one terror group amongst thousands. Still, framing studies have served to provide a large and important portion of media and terrorism research. Researchers who explore ‘commonly observed frames ... can help society mitigate media power as a force of social control’ with profound outcomes, such as the ability to ‘subdue the amplitude of the pendulum swings between national security and civil liberties’ (McLeod & Shah, 2015, p. 173). However, as recent findings support, framing needs to be clearly understood as multi-faceted levels that interact with individual predispositions which may require the adoption of new methodological approaches such as factorial experimental designs (McLeod & Shah, 2015) and individual interviews with journalists themselves to provide important context as we seek to understand the impact of media coverage of terrorism (Bowe et al., 2015; Epkins, 2012).

Embracing the critical

In another prescriptive methodological shift seeking to provide a balance to the available literature, there is a growing movement of support for more critical/constructivist methodological models (Smyth et al., 2008). Specifically, there is general recognition of the need to integrate a more holistic approach across cultures, disciplines and studies, to understand the totality of the relationship between media and terrorism. This should be increasingly achievable as this topic actively attracts the monetary backing of government agencies. Moreover, though qualitative and quantitative studies have certainly added to the academy, a decisive call for a critical approach has born a new journal entitled *Critical*

Studies on Terrorism. Those leading this new journal say they desire to invest in an actor-centered perspective that seeks to understand (Smyth et al., 2008), fosters a multicultural, de-Westernized agenda in communication and media research (Christians & Nordenstreng, 2014), and challenges the impression that the West are ‘always the victims and never the perpetrators of terrorism’ (Poynting & White, 2012, p. 1). This makes sense on two fronts: first, international cooperation is necessary when combating a global threat, and second, the threat levels for one geographical region can quickly migrate to other regions of the world.

The critical movement seeks to achieve greater reflexivity and the disciplinary pluralism necessary to provide a fuller context, particularly in considering the impact of those using the ‘terrorist’ label; questioning prevailing methodology choices; and acknowledging a more intrinsic role of the state as a producer of violence. For example, the ‘terrorist’ label can function to discredit those to whom it is attached, dehumanizing them and suggesting there is no reason behind their actions. This can result in the loss of ‘any incentive an audience might have to understand the point of view of those individuals and groups so it can ignore the history behind those grievances,’ including the impact of an audience’s own country’s policies (Kapitan & Schulte, 2002, p. 178). Although many challenges are evident in media and terrorism research, there is growing optimism surrounding the movement toward greater specificity and introspection when investigating issues surrounding media and terrorism.

Reconsider the traditional/return to the classics

Reconsidering conventional theoretical approaches can help us to *explain* media coverage of terrorism, while embracing a methodologically-critical approach that questions conventional conceptualizations of terrorism can help us to *understand* media coverage of terrorism. The combination is required for empirical advancement. For example, recent scholarship revisiting traditional notions on whether and how the classic CNN effect (Livingston, 1997; Robinson, 2002) is applicable in a post-9/11 society is promising – not only in its critical approach, but also in the act of harkening back to reconsider a ‘traditional’ communication theory as applied to a new media landscape. In fact, post-9/11 roles, sources and outputs of journalists are anything but traditional. First, not only are the lines between traditional and new media blurred, but gatekeepers are no longer simply news gatherers and processors, their role has broadened to include interpretation as well. Second, as media introduce new sources, particularly anonymous sources and terrorists, coupled with a ‘Snowden era of national security reporting’ (Samuelsohn & Byers, 2014) where competitive timeliness can easily take precedence over discretion, governments are increasingly losing legitimacy. Scholars must reconsider the traditional belief that journalists will blindly abandon their independence to align with the political elite. Finally, the emergence of narrowcasting is threatening the traditional quality of reporting output by freeing journalists from the responsibility to provide a broader context and, therefore, limiting the potential scope of public discourse. Given these aberrations from traditional norms, scholars should reconsider how classic and foundational communication theories can be reapplied to a post-9/11 world. For example, organizational scholars could contribute studies of how new institutional conditions and routines of news production influence dominant news coverage of terrorism.

Conclusions

There is ample evidence to encourage further academic exploration of the four major hallmarks surrounding media coverage of terrorism discussed in this chapter. The new

millennium has calcified the online world as a furtive place where would-be terrorists connect and obtain the resources to carry out future terror attacks. This new media ecology clearly transforms the possibility for media–terrorist contagion, only heightens the irony of terrorists using a free press to espouse a message against a free press, and challenges the top-down news structures of old to usher in a new era where rallying around the flag may be a thing of the past.

The freedom irony holds rich, unanswered questions regarding the dynamics of symbiosis between media and terrorists. Tech companies who uphold freedom of speech are commendable, but these organizations should allow for flexibility when terrorists denounce the same value, not to mention life itself. Moreover, although I wholly oppose media restrictions and censorship, understanding how contagion manifests between media and terrorist groups is a crucial step toward determining whether media can serve as part of the solution to the prevalence of terrorism. With the superfluidity of social media, our exposure and intimacy with acts of terrorism in the news has the potential to desensitize. As discussed in this chapter, the danger here is if terrorists (and audiences) remain less than fazed, the next terrorist act must supersede the last act of violence, often by increasing the amount of bloodshed. Most scholars agree that a causal link between media coverage and copycat violence has been established, but unpacking the exact impact from the diffusion of contagion, even after all these years, is still a contemporary debate. Finally, predicative indicators have been discovered in rally around the flag studies and should be utilized in testing the evolution of journalists who traditionally rally around the flag to now rally around the terrorist profile. Opening new avenues for research with terrorists and journalists themselves as primary sources will strengthen the depth of understanding in scholarship by contextualizing multiple voices.

Normative lines of study such as peace journalism, networked journalism and critical terrorism studies (Smyth et al., 2008) are promising areas for scholars to better engage with both sides of the media–terrorist equation, seeking to understand and connect motivations and actions in a broader and deeper context. Given media are not solely brokers of content, scholars should embark on qualitative studies that seek to explore how media and terrorists shape their messages beginning with a more localized context through the eyes of individuals who belong to the communities involved. Though one study has provided in-depth interviews with nearly all of the Washington, DC national security correspondents at the time, and gauged their reactions to critiques of their own 9/11-era reporting (Epkins, 2012), future studies should critically explore the effect of post-9/11 scholarship, routines and public critique on the decision-making performance (Eid, 2014b, p. 248) of national security correspondents in several countries, including the Middle East. The reality of an interdependent, online society can empower peace journalism, networked journalism and new lines of critical-constructivist research.

In conclusion, there is potential for lessening terrorism through rigorous investigation of the role of media coverage as a means to prevent, mitigate, empower or condone violent or reactionary conflict. Furthermore, there is potential for media to escalate or de-escalate emotional and long term responses, offer detailed context and solutions, and to reconcile/rebuild the communities involved. However, dwelling too heavily on the public impact of this media coverage may prevent us from understanding either terrorism or media. Finally, if the common characterizations of media and terrorism scholarship align with the characterizations of reports from press who cover acts of terrorism (i.e. Westernized, myopic, etc.), scholars should consider whether we are allowing journalists to set our research agenda – is the tail wagging the dog? However, new maturity in recent scholarship demonstrates that

researchers are asking consistent questions based on more sophisticated conceptualizations of media and terrorism, while new media offers an opportunity to empower ‘globally local’ media actors. Therefore, it is only a matter of time before the critical-constructivist approach will soon become another hallmark of media and terrorism scholarship.

References

- Alali, A. O., & Eke, K. (1991). *Media coverage of terrorism: Methods of Diffusion*. Thousand Oaks CA: Sage
- Altheide, D. L. (2004). Consuming terrorism. *Symbolic Interaction*, 27(3), 289–308.
- Altheide, D. L. (2006). *Terrorism and the politics of fear*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Apple, R. W., Jr. (1985, July 16). Thatcher urges press to help ‘starve’ terrorists. *The New York Times*, p. A3.
- Awan, A. N. (2014). As the media covers terrorism, it incites more terrorism. Your Middle East. Retrieved from http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/opinion/terrorism-craves-an-audience-and-we-are-playing-into-islamic-states-hands-by-watching_26808
- Barkan, S. E., & Snowden, L. L. (2000). *Collective violence*. Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon.
- Beckett, C. (2008). *SuperMedia: Saving journalism so it can save the world*. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
- Bennett, W. L. (1990). Toward a theory of press-state relations. *Journal of Communication*, 40(2), 103–125.
- Bennett, W. L. (1994). The news about foreign policy. In W. L. Bennett & D. L. Paletz. (Eds), *Taken by storm: The media, public opinion and U.S. foreign policy in the Gulf War* (pp. 12–42). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Bennett, W. L. (2009). *News: The politics of illusion*. New York: Pearson Longman.
- Bercovici, J. (2014, September 4). You Tube’s policies are clear: Beheading is not an act of free speech. *Forbes*. Retrieved from <http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffbercovici/2014/09/03/youtubes-policies-are-clear-beheading-is-not-an-act-of-free-speech/#3f9b4ce31b04>
- Bloom, M. (2005). *Dying to kill: The allure of suicide terror*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Bowe, B. J., Fahmy, S., & Matthes, J. (2015). U.S. newspapers provide nuanced picture of Islam. *Newspaper Research Journal*, 36(1), 42–57.
- Caruthers, S. (2011). *The media at war: Communication and conflict in the twentieth century* (2nd ed.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Castells, M., Fernandez-Ardevol, M., Qiu, J., & Sey, A. (2007). *Mobile communication and society: A global perspective*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Chermak, S., & Gruenewald, J. (2006). The media’s coverage of domestic terrorism. *Justice Quarterly*, 23, 428–461.
- Chowanietz, C. (2011). Rallying around the flag or railing against the government? Political parties’ reactions to terrorist acts. *Party Politics*, 17(5), 673–698.
- Christians, C., & Nordenstreng, K. (Eds) (2014). *Communication theories in a multicultural world*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Cohen, B. C. (1963). *The press and foreign policy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Comer, J. S., & Kendall, P. C. (2007). Terrorism: The psychological impact on youth. *Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice*, 14, 179–212.
- Conway, M. (2012). Introduction: Terrorism and contemporary mediascapes – reanimating research on media and terrorism. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 5(3), 445–453.
- Cottle, S. (2006). *Mediatized conflict: Developments in media and conflict studies*. Maidenhead: Open University Press.
- Couldry, N. (2003). Beyond the televised endgame? Addressing the long-term consequences of global media inequality. In N. Chitty, R.R. Rish, & M. Semati (Eds), *Studies in terrorism* (pp. 73–87). Malaysia: Southbound.
- Crenshaw, M. (1981). The causes of terrorism. *Comparative Politics*, 13(4), 379–399.
- Der Derian, J. (2005). Imaging terror: Logos, pathos and ethos. *Third World Quarterly*, 26, 23–47.
- Dimitrova, D.V., & Stromback, J. (2008). Foreign policy and the framing of the 2003 Iraq war in elite Swedish and US newspapers. *Media, War & Conflict*, 1(2): 203–220.
- Doucet, L. (2014). Dispatches from the frontline. *Index on Censorship*, 43(1), 82–85. Retrieved on June 28, 2015 from <http://ioc.sagepub.com/content/43/1/82.full.pdf>
- The Economist* (2007) A world wide web of terror. 12 July. Retrieved on June 28, 2015 from <http://www.economist.com/node/9472498>

- Edy, J. A., & Meirick, P. C. (2007). Wanted, dead or alive: Media frames, frame adoption, and support for the war in Afghanistan. *Journal of Communication*, 57, 119–141.
- Eid, M. (2014a). The media amid terrorism and counterterrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 26, 842–854.
- Eid, M. (2014b). *Terroredia: Exchanging terrorism oxygen for media airwaves*. Hershey, PA: IGI Global.
- Entman, R. M. (2004). *Projections of power: Framing news, public opinion, and U.S. foreign policy*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Epkins, H. D. (2010). Repercussions of the ‘war on terror’: Contemporary shaping of media discourse through the eyes of Washington, D.C. national security prestige press. Paper results presented to the Global Media and the War on Terror Conference, University of Westminster, London, England.
- Epkins, H. D. (2012). Working the ‘front lines’ in Washington, DC: Digital age terrorism reporting by national security prestige press. *Media, War & Conflict*, 5(1), 22–36.
- Freedman, D., & Thussu, D. K. (Eds) (2012). *Media & terrorism: Global perspectives*. London: Sage.
- Galtung, J., & Ruge, M. H. (1965). The structure of foreign news: The presentation of the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus crises in four Norwegian newspapers. *Journal of Peace Research*, 2(1), 64–90.
- Galtung, J., & Ruge, M. H. (1965). The structure of foreign news: The presentation of the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus crises in four Norwegian newspapers. *Journal of Peace Research*, 2(1), 64–90.
- Gans, H. J. (1979). *Deciding what's news: A study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek and Time*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Gerbner, G. (1988). Violence and terror in the mass media. *Reports and Papers on Mass Communication*, 102, 1–45.
- Goffman, E. (1974). *Frame analysis*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Gowing, N. (2009). *‘Skyful of lies’ and black swans: The new tyranny of shifting information power in crises*. Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, University of Oxford.
- Hackett, R. A. (2006). Is peace journalism possible? Three frameworks for assessing structure and agency in news media. *Conflict & Communication Online*, 5(2), 1–13.
- Hackett, R. A. (2014). Understanding media during times of terrorism. In M. Eid (Ed.), *Exchanging terrorism oxygen for media airwaves: The age of terroredia* (pp. 33–43). Hershey, PA: Information Science Reference.
- Hess, S., & Kalb, M. (Eds) (2003). *The media and the war on terrorism*. Washington, DC: Brookings.
- Hoffman, B. (2006). *Inside terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hoskins, A., & O’Loughlin, B. (2010). *War and media: The emergence of a diffused war*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Jamieson, K. H., & Waldman, P. (2003). *The press effect*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jenkins, B. (1975). *International terrorism*. Los Angeles, CA: Crescent Publications.
- Jenkins, B. (1983). Research in terrorism: Areas of consensus, areas of ignorance. In E. Burr et al. (Eds), *Terrorism: Interdisciplinary perspectives*. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.
- Kampf, Z., & Liebes, T. (2013). *Transforming media coverage of violent conflicts: The new face of war*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kapitan, T., & Schulte, E. (2002). The rhetoric of ‘terrorism’ and its consequences. *Journal of Political & Military Sociology*, 30, 172–196.
- Katz, E. (2009). Media-government-public: Coalitions and oppositions. *The Communication Review*, 12(3), 199–204.
- Kellner, D. (1995). *Media culture: Cultural studies, identity and politics between the modern and the postmodern*. New York: Routledge.
- Kellner, D. (2003). *From 9/11 to terror war: The dangers of the Bush legacy*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Kimmage, D. (2008, June 26). Fight terror with YouTube. *The New York Times*. Retrieved on June 28 from <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/26/opinion/26kimmage.html?th&emc=th>
- LaFree, G., Korte, R., & Dugan, L. (2006). Deterrence and defiance in models of terrorist violence in Northern Ireland, 1969–1992. Research symposium presented at the annual meeting of the national Consortium for Terrorism and the Study of Terrorism (START), College Park, Maryland.
- Laqueur, W. (1976, March). The futility of terrorism. *Harper’s Magazine*, 252(1510), 99–105.
- Lewis, S. C., & Reese, S. D. (2009). What is the war on terror?: Framing through the eyes of journalists. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, 86(1), 85–102.
- Liebes, T. (1998). Television’s disaster marathons: A danger to democratic processes? In T. Liebes and J. Curran (Eds), *Media, ritual and identity* (pp. 71–86). London and New York: Routledge.

- Livingston, S. (1997). *Clarifying the CNN effect: An examination of effects according to type of military intervention*. Cambridge: Joan Shorenstein Center, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Lynch, J. (2008). *Debates in peace journalism*. Sydney: Sydney University Press.
- Lynch, J., & McGoldrick, A. (2005). *Peace journalism*. Stroud, UK: Hawthorn Press.
- Lynch, J., & Galtung, J. (2010). *Reporting conflict: New directions in peace journalism*. Queensland, Australia: University of Queensland Press.
- McLeod, D. M., & Shah, D. V. (2015). *News frames and national security*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Miller, A. H. (1982). *Terrorism, the media, and the law*. New York: Transnational Publishers.
- Moeller, S. (2009). *Packaging terrorism: Co-opting the news for politics and profit*. Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Mogensen, K. (2011). Journalistic norms: The media as shepherd. In R. Izard & J. Perkins (Eds), *Lessons from ground zero: Media response to terror* (pp. 61–77). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Mueller, J. E. (1973). *War, presidents and public opinion*. New York: John Wiley.
- Nacos, B. L. (1994). *Terrorism and the media*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Nacos, B. L. (2000). Accomplice or witness? The media's role in terrorism. *Current History*, 99(636), 174–178.
- Nacos, B. L. (2003). Terrorism as breaking news. Attack on America. *Political Science Quarterly*, 118, 23–53.
- Nacos, B. L. (2007). *Mass-mediated terrorism*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Nacos, B. L. (2009). Revisiting the contagion hypothesis: Terrorism, news coverage, and copycat attacks. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 3(3). Retrieved on June 25, 2014 from <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/73/html>
- Norris, P., Kern, M., & Just, M. (Eds) (2003). *Framing terrorism: The news media, the governments and the public*. New York: Routledge.
- O'Connor, T. (2013). Terrorism and the media. MegaLinks in Criminal Justice. Retrieved on June 28, 2014 from <http://www.drtoconnor.com/3400/3400lect07.htm>
- Pang, A., Hassan, N. B., & Chee Yang Chong, A. (2014). Negotiating crisis in the social media environment: Evolution of crises online, gaining credibility offline. *Corporate Communications: An International Journal*, 19(1), 96–118.
- Pew Internet and American Life Project (2002, September 5). *One year later: September 11 and the internet*. Washington, DC: Pew.
- Pfau, M., Haigh, M., Gettle, M., Donnelly, M., Scott, G., Warr, D., & Wittenberg, E. (2004). Embedding journalists in military combat units: Impact on newspaper story frames and tone. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, 81, 74–88.
- Picard, R. (1986). News coverage as the contagion of terrorism: Dangerous charges backed by dubious science. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication at Norman, OK.
- Poynting, S., & White, D. (2012). *Counter-terrorism and state political violence: The 'war on terror' as terror*. New York: Routledge.
- Project for Excellence in Journalism (2006, September 11). How 9–11 changed the evening news. Retrieved on January 15 from <http://www.journalism.org/2006/09/11/how-9-11-changed-the-evening-news/>
- Reese, S. D. (2001). Framing public life: A bridging model for media research. In S. D. Reese, O. H. Gandy, & A.E. Grant (Eds), *Framing public life* (pp. 7–31). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Reese, S. D. (2007). The framing project: A bridging model for media research revisited. *Journal of Communication*, 57, 148–154.
- Reynolds, A., & Barnett, B. (2003). This just in ... how national TV news handled the breaking 'live' coverage of September 11. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, 80, 689–703.
- Robinson, P. (2002). *The CNN effect: The myth of news, foreign policy and intervention*. London: Routledge.
- Rohner, D., & Frey, B. S. (2007). Blood and ink! The common-interest game between terrorists and the media. *Public Choice*, 133(1), 129–145.
- Ruigrok, N., & van Atteveldt, W. (2007). Global angling with a local angle: How U.S., British, and Dutch newspapers frame global and local terrorist attacks. *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*, 12, 68–90.
- Samuelsohn, D., & Byers, D. (2014, February 7). National security journalism's 'Snowden era.' *Politico*. Retrieved on June 28, 2014 from <http://politi.co/liwXnhU>

- Schaefer, T. M. (2003). Framing the U.S. Embassy bombings and September 11 attacks in African and U.S. Newspapers. In P. Norris, M. R. Just, & M. Kern (Eds), *Framing terrorism* (pp. 93–112). New York: Routledge.
- Schbley, A. (2004). Religious terrorism, the media, and international Islamization terrorism: Justifying the unjustifiable. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 27, 207–233.
- Scheufele, D. A. (2000). Agenda-setting, priming, and framing revisited: Another look at cognitive effects of political communication. *Mass Communication and Society*, 3, 297–316.
- Schudson, M. (2002). News-media and terrorism: Changing relationship, changing definitions. *Sociology Compass*, 8(1), 1–9.
- Sedgwick, M. (2007). Inspiration and the origins of global waves of terrorism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 30(2), 102.
- Seib, P. (2004). *Beyond the front lines: How the news media cover a world shaped by war*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Smyth, M. B., Gunning, J., Jackson, R., Kassimeris, G., & Robinson, P. (2008). Critical terrorism studies—An introduction. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 1(1), 1–4.
- Stempel G. H. (1961). The prestige press covers the 1960 presidential campaign. *Journalism Quarterly*, 38(2), 157–162.
- Surette, R., Hansen, K., & Nobel, G. (2009). Measuring media oriented terrorism. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 37(4), 360–370.
- Wardlaw, G. (1982). *Political terrorism*. London: Cambridge University Press.
- Weaver, D. H. (2007). Thoughts on agenda setting, framing, and priming. *Journal of Communication*, 57, 142–147.
- Weimann, G., & Brosius, H. B. (1989). The predictability of international terrorism: A time series analysis. *Journal of Terrorism*, 11(6), 491–502.
- Weimann, G., & Winn, C. (1994). *The theater of terror*. New York: Longman.
- Witzthum, D. (2006). *Breaking news*. Jerusalem, Israel: Keter Books.

20

CYBER-SECURITY AND THE MEDIA

Myriam Dunn Cavelty

Introduction

The factor of information has been considered a significant aspect of power, diplomacy, and armed conflict for a very long time. Since the 1990s, however, information's role in international relations and security has diversified and its importance for political matters has increased, mostly due to the proliferation of information and communication technology (ICT) into all aspects of life in (post-)industrialized societies. The ability to master the generation, management, use but also manipulation of information has become a desired power resource, as the control over knowledge, beliefs, and ideas are increasingly regarded as a complement to control over tangible resources such as military forces, raw materials, and economic productive capability (Rothkopf 1998; Nye 2010; Klimburg 2011; Betz 2012).

Within the larger set of information age issues, a particular type of danger discourse has been driving the discussion about opportunities and pitfalls of society's increasing reliance on ICT. In recent years, several sophisticated cyber-attacks have given the impression that cyber-incidents are becoming more frequent, more organized, more costly, and altogether more dangerous. As a result, cyber-fears have moved in two directions: upwards, from the expert level to executive decision-makers and politicians; and horizontally, advancing from an issue mainly discussed in the United States to the top of the threat list of an increasing number of countries. On the national level, many governments have released or updated cyber-security strategies.¹ Regionally and internationally, various organizations have put cyber-security on their agendas and several attempts have been undertaken to clarify whether and how cyber-war fits into currently existing international law (UNGA 2010; Schmitt 2013).

Without a doubt, cyber-security has become an issue of prime importance for many actors in the national and international realm—and is in turn an issue that needs sustained attention and scrutiny from scholars. This chapter aims to provide an overview over the reasons behind the rise of cyber-security and will discuss the specific characteristics of the issues that have led to such a status on the political agenda, paying particular attention to the role of the media in this development.

The chapter has three parts. The first starts with a discussion of the technological environment and why it is perennially insecure and then looks at how this technological

basis has influenced the policy debate as well as definitions of cyber-security. In the second part, the chapter discusses the main literature on cyber-security in the larger vicinity of security studies. The last part focuses on the role of 'the media' in cyber-security research.

(In-)Security in and through cyberspace

'Cyber-' is a prefix derived from the word cybernetics that has acquired the general meaning of 'through the use of a computer'. It is also used synonymously with 'related to cyberspace'. Cyberspace—a portmanteau word combining 'cybernetics' and 'space'—connotes the fusion of all communication networks, databases, and sources of information into a vast, tangled, and diverse blanket of electronic interchange. Thus, a 'network ecosystem' is created, a place that is not part of the normal, physical world. It is virtual and immaterial, a 'bioelectronic environment that is literally universal: It exists everywhere there are telephone wires, coaxial cables, fiber-optic lines or electromagnetic waves' (Dyson et al. 1996). However, and importantly for cyber-security, cyberspace is also grounded in physical reality, 'the framework of a "real" geography' made up of servers, cables, computers, satellites, and so on (Sutaneu 2005: 130).

Cyber-security is a type of security that enfolds in and through cyberspace; and the making and practice of cyber-security is constrained and enabled by this environment. Indeed, cyber-danger discourses have always evolved with the opportunities and pitfalls provided by this (non-)space/place. This is not to say that its material conditions are outside and above political decisions and discursive processes. But a close look at the genealogy of the cyber-security discourse reveals how material conditions, or rather, possibilities and impossibilities of threat and countermeasures, have been key to determining the shape of the danger discourse (cf. Deibert 1997; Deibert et al. 2008). Below, the prevailing issues of (technological) insecurity are discussed. Afterwards, the chapter briefly outlines how the technical-material (referent) object in cyber-security leads to change in security concerns over the years and then turns to the 'definition' of cyber-security.

The undercurrent: technological insecurity

The cyber-security discourse has never been static, because the technical aspects of the information infrastructure are constantly evolving and keep influencing various aspects of the debate. As is well known, today's version of cyberspace emerged out of the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET), which was funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) of the United States Department of Defense (DoD) from 1962 onwards, mainly for optimized information exchange between the universities and research laboratories involved in DoD research. From the very beginning, the network designers emphasized robustness and survivability over security; there was no apparent need for a specific focus on security at that time, since information systems were being hosted on large proprietary machines that were connected to very few other computers.

What makes systems so vulnerable today is the confluence of three factors: the same basic packet-switching technology (not built with security in mind), the shift to smaller and far more open systems (not built with security in mind), and the rise of extensive networking at the same time (Libicki 2000). In addition to this, there are significant market-driven obstacles to information technology (IT) security, which came into play when the commercialization of the Internet set in: there is no direct return on investment, time-to-market impedes extensive security measures, and security mechanisms often

have a negative impact on usability so that security is often sacrificed for functionality (Anderson and Moore 2006).

There are additional forces keeping cyberspace insecure: Big Data is considered the key IT trend of the future, and companies want to use the masses of data that we produce every day to tailor their marketing strategies through personalized advertising and prediction of future consumer behavior (Morozov 2013). Therefore, there is little interest in encrypted (secure) information exchange. On top of this, the intelligence agencies of this world have the same interest in data that can be easily grabbed and analyzed. The National Security Agency (NSA) revelations of 2013 have exposed that the intelligence services of this world are making cyberspace more insecure directly, in order to be able to have more access to data, and in order to prepare for future conflict. The NSA has bought and exploited so-called zero-day vulnerabilities in current operating systems and hardware to inject NSA malware into numerous strategically opportune points of the Internet infrastructure (Greenwald and MacAskill 2013). It also seems like the US government spends large sums of money to crack existing encryption standards—and has also actively exploited and contributed to vulnerabilities in widespread encryption systems. Paradoxically, actions geared towards gaining more security are (directly and indirectly) to blame for making both the virtual but also, by implication, the real world *less* and not more secure (Dunn Cavelty 2014).

Changing referent objects

Apart from bringing with it pervasive (and some would say ‘un-fixable’) insecurity, changes in the technical sub-structure also changed what was seen ‘in need of protection’ in the policy debate (the so-called referent object of security). In the 1970s and 1980s, cybersecurity (though not yet under that name) was mainly about those parts of the private sector that were becoming digitalized and also about government networks and the classified information residing in them. The growth and spreading of computer networks into more and more aspects of life changed this limited referent object in crucial ways. In the mid-1990s, it became clear that key sectors of modern society, including those vital to national security and to the essential functioning of (post-)industrialized economies, had come to rely on a spectrum of highly interdependent national and international software-based control systems for their smooth, reliable, and continuous operation. The new referent object that emerged was the totality of critical (information) infrastructures that provide the way of life that characterizes our societies (Dunn Cavelty 2008).

The concept of critical infrastructure includes sectors such as information and telecommunications, financial services, energy and utilities, transport and distribution. It also includes a list of additional elements that vary across countries and over time (Brunner and Suter 2008). Most of these sectors rely on a spectrum of software-based control systems for their smooth, reliable, and continuous operation. The information infrastructure serves as an intermediary between physical assets and physical infrastructure. Bridged and interlinked by information pathways, critical infrastructure systems thus spread over more and more territory. An increasing number of networks, nodes, and growing interdependence in and among these systems increase their complexity, to the point where it becomes intellectually overwhelming (cf. Duit and Galaz 2008).

There are two ways that an image of threat is formed. First, an inward-looking perspective equates complexity with vulnerability. The very connectedness of infrastructure systems is what poses dangers, because perturbations within them can cascade into major disasters with immense speed and beyond our control. Second, an outward-looking perspective sees the

increasing willingness of malicious actors to exploit vulnerabilities without hesitation or restraint. Because critical infrastructure systems combine symbolic and instrumental values, attacking them becomes integral to a modern logic of destruction that seeks maximum impact. In other words, cyberspace becomes a force-multiplier by combining the risks to cyberspace with the possibility of risks through cyberspace (Deibert and Rohozinski 2010). It reformulates space into something no longer embedded into place or presence. In this non-space/place there are no linear distances, no bodies, no physical co-presences: the ‘enemy’ becomes a faceless and remote entity that is very hard to track.

This results in two significant and very powerful characteristics of the threat representation, which help to explain its salience on the political agenda. First, the protective capacity of space is obliterated; there is no place that is safe from an attack or from catastrophic breakdown in general. The threat becomes one with the network; it *is* the network. Second, the threat becomes quasi-universal because it is now everywhere, creating a sense of ‘imminent but inexact catastrophe, lurking just beneath the surface of normal, technologised ... everyday life’ (Graham 2006: 258).

Cyber, what do you mean?

Given these changes over the years, how can we define cyber-security? In the context of this chapter, three points seem particularly relevant. First, the cyber-danger discourse has been (and still is) strongly shaped in a US policy setting. Existing variations in the story plus its political manifestations are mere variations of detail, not differences about the actual substance (at least in liberal democracies) (Brunner and Suter 2008). In the early days (1970s–80s), mainly the hacking sub-culture, computer scientists, and later exponents of the anti-virus industry set the boundaries of the danger discourse (Dunn Cavely 2013). In the mid-1990s, a diverse set of security professionals—mainly from law enforcement, the intelligence and the civil defense community as well as think tankers and military experts—built a more distinct national security connotation on top of this (cf. Warner 2012).

Second, the term cyber-security is a fairly recent addition to a set of concepts and practices that reach back decades. For example, information security, information assurance, computer security, network security, and critical information infrastructure protection (CIIP) are closely related concepts. While they are all found in various policy documents, cyber-security has become the prevalent term, trumping CIIP, which previously held that position. Importantly, cyber-security is not only different in name, but also different in reach. Critical information infrastructures are regarded as the backbone of critical infrastructures since the uninterrupted exchange of data is essential to the operation of (physical) infrastructures and the services that they provide. Cyber-security, however, extends this security-protection aim to all information infrastructures and flows more generally relevant for societal and business relations. In other words, cyber-security is more (also) about protecting economic performance and less (only) about national security. This could either signify a gradual shift away from national security towards economic interests in this domain; or it could be read as an adaptive strategy by governmental actors that try to establish more common ground with business actors in the protection of the information infrastructure (Dunn Cavely and Suter 2012).

Third, two meanings of cyber-security can be identified: a technical (narrow/precise) one and a national security (broad/vague) one. They are obviously connected—and a most interesting question is how these two domains interrelate and constitute each other. From the technical sphere, cyber-security emerges as the body of technologies, processes, and

practices designed to protect networks, computers, programs, and data from attack, damage or unauthorized access, in accordance with the common information security goals (mostly described as protection of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information) (cf. May et al. 2004). In the national security setting, cyber-security can be described as the security one enjoys in and from cyberspace (Cornish et al. 2009). Specifying whose security and what security is at stake here becomes a key (political) question.

In a computing context, the term security implies a technical concept. Arguably, this has little in common with the type of security concepts security scholars are interested in (Buzan et al. 1998: 25; Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009: 1160). Specific security connotations are created through the connection of the cyber-prefix to other things like terror, espionage, war, weapons, or deterrence. By themselves, these neologisms do not suffice to mobilize urgency or establish a threat: they are in need of potential (non-virtual) effects in the form of (*potential*) implications of cyber-disruptions for other referent objects such as society, economy, military, or the state (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009: 1163). In fact, information technology is emerging as the common underlying factor upon which all sectors of security converge (Yould 2003: 78), as most security measures today have cyber- (or computerized) components. Cyber-issues are two things, then: an attack vector potentially threatening things of value for different actors (state, business, and individuals) and a dimension in which countermeasures against various sorts of threats—not only cyber-related—can be situated. This way, cyber-security is not just about the ‘security of cyber’, but is also ‘security through cyber’ (Betz and Stevens 2011).

Cyber-security literature: an overview

One of the main aims of this handbook chapter is to provide a suitable review of the existing literature. But what type of literature? Topics like cyber-security with a strong interdisciplinary leaning need to be situated within one type of literature so that any meaningful statements about the state of knowledge can be made. This chapter chooses to look at security studies first, mainly because security, rather than ‘cyber’, offers the most interesting analytical vantage point. Currently, the field of security studies is criss-crossed by entrenched positions defended by positivists/rationalists on the one side and what is labelled post-positivist or ‘critical/reflexive’ approaches on the other (C.A.S.E. Collective 2007: 561–5; Buzan and Hansen 2009). Following this trend, this section first looks at cyber-security research in ‘traditional’ security studies and then at ‘critical’ security studies.

Traditional security studies

Rather surprisingly, particularly when considering the ruckus the issue is causing on the policy level, cyber-security is still only discussed in relatively small and closed (academic) circles. The majority of books, articles, and reports on cyber-security (and closely related issues) remain more or less policy-oriented, centered on the US as main polity and communicate little with more general international relations theory and research (that has hardly changed since Eriksson and Giacomello 2006). The two main questions that are being tackled are ‘who (or what) is the biggest danger for an increasingly networked nation/society/military/business environment’ and ‘how to best counter the new and evolving threat’ (i.e. Farwell and Rohozinski 2011; Gombert and Libicki 2014). Though often not guided by theory, this literature offers insights either influenced by neo-realist thoughts or easily translatable into them.

The threat form that has triggered the biggest body of literature is ‘cyberwar’ (exemplary, for a vast literature: Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1993; Rid 2013). This is little surprising, given the potentially devastating impact of a full-fledged cyber-aggression and the long tradition in international law and military ethics to address new forms of warfare and weapons systems under legal and ethical viewpoints (cf. Dipert 2010; Barrett 2013). However, and the importance of these publications notwithstanding, the growing body of literature on war in and through cyberspace falls somewhat short of capturing the diversity of cyber-security expressions and practices today. Specifically, the focus on issues of high impact incidents fails to capture malicious cyber-activities that are not destructive and war-like but fall under the far more obscure domain of cyber-exploitation² (but see Inkster 2013 on intelligence and Grabosky 2013 on crime).

Apart from literature with an implicit or explicit problem-solving or purely conceptual orientation, *theoretically* guided academic research is rare. Quite recently, a few cyber-security related articles have been published in high-ranking political science journals like *International Security* (Gartzke 2013; Kello 2013) or *Journal of Peace Research* (Valeriano and Maness 2014), which could mark the beginning of a more sustained focus on cyber-conflict issues (see also Axelrod and Iliev 2013; Eun and Abmann 2014). Given the orientation of these journals, more or less aggressive forms of cyber-war and/or questions of international cooperation will be at the center of attention and not questions of cyber-security more broadly understood as a technological or organizational issue

Critical security studies

In critical security studies, three bodies of literature can be identified. The first focuses on ‘postmodern war’, a form of technical–military interaction that centers on the centrality of information as the ‘new metaphysics of power’ (Dillon 2002; Hables Gray 2005; Brunner and Dunn Cavelti 2009). However, this type of research is interested in the larger shift in war fighting practices rather than specifics and is only considering practices of cyber-security on the side, if at all.

The second body of literature stems from the ‘Munk School’, which has focused on issues like (electronic) surveillance and censorship for a considerable number of years and is concerned with the creation of more insecurity by (state) actors through cyber-means (Deibert 1997, 2013; Deibert and Rohozinski 2010). It has, however, not followed any particular theoretical pathway (if it uses theory at all) due to the exemplary interdisciplinary nature of its setup.

The third body of literature uses frameworks derived from (or inspired by) securitization theory (Buzan et al. 1998) and is interested in how different actors in politics have tried to argue the link between the cyber-dimension and national security (Eriksson 2001; Bendrath 2003; Dunn Cavelti 2008; Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009; Lawson 2013). In a similar vein, some recent articles have focused on metaphors in the cyber-security discourse to explain political response (Barnard-Wills and Ashenden 2012; Stevens and Betz 2013; Dunn Cavelti 2013).

Some scholars claim that cyber-security is a case of a successful securitization (Bendrath et al. 2007; Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009: 1157). Other scholars call the larger cyber-threat debate an example of a failed securitization, mainly due to the nature of countermeasures in place (Bendrath 2001; see also Dunn Cavelti 2008). Indeed, when not only focusing on threat representations—which are full of military analogies and ‘multi-dimensional cyber disaster scenarios’ (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009: 1164)—but on the

actual countermeasures in place, the significant difference between the alarmist content of the threat representations and the selected ‘normal’ policies becomes obvious. Even if securitizing practices are defined more broadly, as not only emergency measures but also as extraordinary, unprecedented or unusual ones (cf. Léonard 2010: 237f), cyber-security practices elude this categorization. These findings support observations made elsewhere that the process of securitization in a given socio-political community is not restricted to one setting and one type of audience only, but often involves several, overlapping and multiple ones, or that there are different political functions of and strategies behind security utterances (Balzacq 2005; Vuori 2008).

Overall, however, critical engagements with cyber-security remain analytically ‘thin’, as their focus and explanatory range is restricted in at least two ways. First, these studies focus narrowly on politically salient speech acts by ‘visible’ political (almost exclusively US) figures that can be approved (or disproved) by the general public. Such a focus reveals the constitutive effects the discursive practices of ‘capable actors’ have in (world) politics, but it is blind towards how these discursive practices are facilitated or thwarted by preceding and preparatory linguistic and non-linguistic practices of actors that are not as easily identifiable as important, including non-state actors (Huysmans 2011: 371). Second, because cyber-security is a type of security that enfold in and through cyberspace, the making and practice of cyber-security is at all times constrained, enabled, and defined by this environment and its technical logic. Cyber-(in)security is therefore inseparable from the technical-material (referent) object that it deals with: computers and computer networks, a factor which is largely ignored by the literature.

The media and cyber-security

Overall, there is no established body of literature that deals with media and cyber-security. Without a doubt, however, the media is a key contributor not just to the dissemination, but also to the actual discursive construction of contemporary cyber-threats, a fact which has mainly been taken into consideration in the securitization-type literature outlined above. Some researchers have focused on the role of media content in the construction of cyber-threats (most prominently Conway 2002, 2008; also Debrix 2001; Sandwell 2006). This literature is briefly discussed in a first sub-section. Beyond looking at media (content) and its link to threat perceptions, a second body of literature, introduced in the second sub-section, embeds cyber-security much more comprehensively in materialist cultural analysis, in which media is not only analyzed in terms of content, but much more broadly as material assemblage.

The media and (threat) framing

In order to explain why certain issues or threats make it on the agenda and others do not, some scholars in the security studies domain have established a link to (cognitive) framing research that explains the success of certain issues by special traits of ‘frames’ employed by key actors (Eriksson 2001; Eriksson and Noreen 2002). Frame theory is rooted in linguistic studies of interaction and points to the way shared assumptions and meanings shape the interpretation of any particular event (Oliver and Johnston 2000).

In that sense, framing refers to the selection of certain aspects of an issue in order to cue a specific response—the way an issue is framed explains who is responsible and suggests

potential solutions conveyed by images, stereotypes, messengers, and metaphors (Ryan 1991: 59). Framing theory addresses three main questions: 1) how frames influence social action; 2) which frames are particularly successful for what reasons; and 3) how frames can be changed (Snow and Benford 1988). Threat framing in particular refers to the process whereby particular agents develop specific interpretive schemas about what counts as threat or risk, how to respond to this threat, and who is responsible for it (Dunn Cavelty 2008).

In cyber-security research, most scholars focusing on processes of securitization have focused on 'frames', in order to explain how the broader public is mobilized, taking into account a different set of sources, including media. Maura Conway for example, has explicitly focused on the (active) role of (mainly US) media in the so-called 'cyber-threat hype'. She argues that the media erode and then invoke certain distinctions to justify the continued hyping of the cyber-terror, including those 'separating the inside from the outside, the offline versus the online world, and the "real" or physical from the virtual or imagined' (Conway 2008: 116). In her opinion, it is increasingly difficult, even impossible, to distinguish cyber-terrorism from its media representations—a statement which seems true for all cyber-security threat forms.

Media archaeology

Going beyond media content and its role in threat politics, Jussi Parikka has developed an approach to cyber-security that embeds it almost completely in a post-structuralist, media-historical cultural analysis. In this approach, the specific development of cyber-security is seen as defined by digital 'accidents' (or break-downs) (Parikka 2007a). Drawing on the writings of Foucault, Deleuze, Kittler, and de Landa, among others, media archeological approaches focus on material (or corporeal) and incorporeal aspects of the computer virus and its various enunciations in and through media (Parikka 2005, 2007a, 2007b; Sampson 2007).

This type of research takes 'the material' very seriously. For example, malware shapes, sometimes even radically *transforms*, the discourse, the security policies in, and even the material infrastructure of, cyberspace. Malicious software consists of 'code'—a distinct number of lines of computer language. However, programs are written to carry out physical computations. Thus, every piece of software must spell out how the constructs of the language (abstract mathematical notions in the form of syntax/semantics) are to be physically instantiated (implementation). As a consequence, they always have an effect (Turner 2007) and code cannot just exist as an amalgamation of symbols, it always (also) exists in its execution or in its 'becoming' (Parikka 2010: 123), in other words, in its performance.

In fact, it is only through its performance that software becomes perceptible, because without it, 'code is imperceptible in the phenomenological sense of evading the human sensorium' (Parikka 2010: 118). This performativity is not purely technical, as it does not only happen in the context of a closed technical system. Software also has a distinct relationality to 'the outsides in which it is embedded' (Parikka 2010: 119), be it (for example) to interfaces of mobile technology, games, browsers, but also highly abstract concepts such as 'the economy', 'national security', and so on. Moreover, code directly affects, and literally sets in motion, processes, in the technical, but also the social and political realms—and thereby can have 'immediate and political consequences on the actual and virtual spaces ..., in which we are increasingly moving and living' (Arns 2005: 7). This approach opens up very interesting avenues for further research into the interplay between cyber-(in)security and the media.

Conclusion

Cyber-security has become an issue of high prominence in politics. However, research on the topic is still in its infancy. The main difficulty for writing a chapter in a handbook on media, conflict, and security is the relative scarceness of literature dedicated to cyber-security at the interface between cyber-issues, the media, and politics. The literature that exists is typically on a specific cyber-threat *sub*-topic, that is, cyber-war, cyber-terror, or cyber-crime, but hardly ever on cyber-security more broadly.

Due to their emphasis on official statements by ‘the heads of states, governments, senior civil servants, high ranked military, heads of international institutions (Hansen 2006: 64), existing scholarship in security studies tends to only grasp a limited expression of cyber-insecurity (usually cyber-war) that is topmost on these people’s minds. Cyber-security is both less and more, however. It is less because it is not only and not very often about situations of greatest urgency. It is a multifaceted set of technologies, processes, and practices designed to protect networks, computers, programs, and data from attack, damage or unauthorized access. And it is far more, because multiple actors use different threat representations employing differing political, private, societal, and corporate notions of security to mobilize (or de-mobilize) different audiences. In fact, there are many layers of social interactions in several social spheres that characterize cyber-security. In today’s increasingly cybered world, cyber-security is co-produced by every private computer user, by computer security specialists and IT support staff in the server rooms of this world, by programmers, by chief information officers (CIOs) or chief executive officers (CEOs) deciding on cyber-security investments, by IT specialists working to secure government networks, by security consultants, by cyber-crime specialists, by cyber-forensics, by regulatory bodies and standardization organizations, and only last by politicians and other government officials that interpret digital events and (re-)act/on them in the form of verbalized expectations and fears or ultimately, policies. In terms of research, there is a lot to do.

Notes

- 1 For a good overview, see <http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/national-cyber-security-strategies-ncsss/national-cyber-security-strategies-in-the-world> (last accessed 5 September 2014).
- 2 The difference between cyber-attack and cyber-exploitation, sometimes also called active and passive threats, is that cyber-exploitations do not seek to disturb the normal functioning of a computer system or network from the user’s point of view like attacks do – quite the opposite. The best cyber-exploitation is such that the user never notices (Owens et al. 2009: 80ff).

References

- Anderson, R. and Moore, T. (2006) ‘The economics of information security’, *Science*, 314: 610–23.
- Arns, I. (2005) ‘Code as performative speech act’, *Artnodes e-journal on art, science and technology*, 4, available at: <http://www.uoc.edu/artnodes/eng/arns0505.pdf>
- Arquilla, J. and Ronfeldt, D. (1993) ‘Cyberwar is coming’, *Comparative Strategy*, 12: 141–65.
- Axelrod, R. and Iliev, R. (2013) ‘Timing of cyber-conflict’, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 111(4): 1298–303.
- Balzacq, T. (2005) ‘The three faces of securitization: Political agency, audience and context’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 11(2): 171–201.
- Barnard-Wills, D. and Ashenden, D. (2012) ‘Securing virtual space: Cyber war, cyber terror, and risk’, *Space and Culture*, 15(2): 110–23.

- Barrett, E. T. (2013) 'Warfare in a new domain: The ethics of military cyber-operations', *Journal of Military Ethics*, 12(1): 4–17.
- Bendrath, R. (2001) 'The cyberwar debate: Perception and politics in US critical infrastructure protection', *Information & Security: An International Journal*, 7: 80–103.
- Bendrath, R. (2003) 'The American cyber-angst and the real world: Any link?', in Latham, R. (ed.) *Bombs and Bandwidth: The Emerging Relationship between Information Technology and Security*, New York: The New Press, pp. 49–73.
- Bendrath, R., Eriksson, J. and Giacomello, G. (2007) 'Cyberterrorism to cyberwar, back and forth: how the United States securitized cyberspace', in Eriksson, J. and Giacomello, G. (eds) *International Relations and Security in the Digital Age*, London: Routledge, pp. 57–82.
- Betz, D. (2012) 'Cyberpower in strategic affairs: Neither unthinkable nor blessed', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 35(5): 689–711.
- Betz, D. and Stevens, T. (2011) *Cyberspace and the State: Toward a Strategy for Cyber-Power*, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies.
- Brunner, E. and Suter, M. (2008) *The International CIIP Handbook 2008/2009 – An Inventory of Protection Policies in 25 Countries and 6 International Organizations*, Zurich: Center for Security Studies.
- Brunner, E. and Dunn Cavelty, M. (2009) 'The formation of in-formation by the US military: Articulation and enactment of infomantic threat imaginaries on the immaterial battlefield of perception', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 22(4): 625–42.
- Buzan, B. and Hansen, L. (2009) *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Buzan, B., Wæver, O. and de Wilde, J. (1998) *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner.
- C.A.S.E. Collective (2007) 'Europe, knowledge, politics engaging with the limits: The c.a.s.e. collective responds', *Security Dialogue*, 38(4): 559–76.
- Conway, M. (2002) 'Reality bytes: Cyberterrorism and terrorist "use" of the Internet', *First Monday*, 7:11.
- Conway, M. (2008) 'The media and cyberterrorism: A study in the construction of reality', in Dunn Cavelty, M. and Kristensen, K.S. (eds) *The Politics of Securing the Homeland: Critical Infrastructure, Risk and Securitisation*, London: Routledge, pp. 109–29.
- Cornish, P., Hughes, R. and Livingstone, D. (2009) 'Cyberspace and the National Security of the United Kingdom. Threats and Responses', Chatham House: A Chatham House Report.
- Debrix, F. (2001) 'Cyberterror and media-induced fears: The production of emergency culture', *Strategies*, 14(1): 149–68.
- Deibert, R. J. (1997) *Parchment, Printing, and Hypermedia: Communication in World Order Transformation*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Deibert, R. J. (2013) *Black Code: Inside the Battle for Cyberspace*, Toronto: McClelland & Stewart.
- Deibert, R. J. and Rohozinski, R. (2010) 'Risking security: Policies and paradoxes of cyberspace security', *International Political Sociology*, 4(1): 15–32.
- Deibert, R. J., Palfrey, J. G., Rohozinski, R. and Zittrain, J. (2008) *The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering*, Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Dillon, M. (2002) 'Network society, network-centric warfare and the state of emergency', *Theory, Culture, and Society*, 19(4): 71–9.
- Dipert, R. R. (2010) 'The ethics of cyberwarfare', *Journal of Military Ethics*, 9(4): 384–410.
- Duit, A. and Galaz, V. (2008) 'Governance and complexity – Emerging issues for governance theory', *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions*, 21(3): 311–35.
- Dunn Cavelty, M. (2008) *Cyber-Security and Threat Politics: US Efforts to Secure the Information Age*, London: Routledge.
- Dunn Cavelty, M. (2013) 'From cyber-bombs to political fallout: Threat representations with an impact in the cyber-security discourse', *International Studies Review*, 15(1): 105–22.
- Dunn Cavelty, M. (2014) 'Breaking the cyber-security dilemma: Aligning security needs and removing vulnerabilities', *Science and Engineering Ethics*, 20(3): 701–15.
- Dunn Cavelty, M. and Suter, M. (2012) 'The art of CIIP strategy: Taking stock of content and processes', in Lopez, J., Setola, R. and Wolthusen, S. D. (eds) *Critical Infrastructure Protection: Information Infrastructure Models, Analysis, and Defense*, Springer: Berlin, pp. 15–38.
- Dyson, E., Gilder, G., Keyworth, G. and Toffler, A. (1996) 'Cyberspace and the war on terror: A Magna Carta for the knowledge age', *The Information Society*, 12(3): 295–308.

- Eriksson, J. (2001) 'Cyberplagues, IT, and security: Threat politics in the information age', *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, 9(4): 200–10.
- Eriksson, J. and Noreen, E. (2002) 'Setting the agenda of threats: An explanatory model', *Uppsala Peace Research Papers*, 6.
- Eriksson, J. and Giacomello, G. (2006) 'The information revolution, security, and international relations: (IR)Relevant theory?', *International Political Science Review*, 27(3): 221–44.
- Eun, Y.-S. and Abmann, J. S. (2014) 'Cyberwar: Taking stock of security and warfare in the digital age', *International Studies Perspectives*, DOI: 10.1111/insp.12073.
- Farwell, J. P. and Rohozinski, R. (2011) 'Stuxnet and the future of cyber war', *Survival*, 53(1): 23–40.
- Gartzke, E. (2013) 'The myth of cyberwar: Bringing war in cyberspace back down to earth', *International Security*, 38(2): 41–73.
- Gombert, D. and Libicki, M. (2014) 'Cyber warfare and Sino-American crisis instability', *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 56(4): 7–22.
- Grabosky, P. (2013) 'Organized crime and the Internet', *The RUSI Journal*, 158(5): 18–25.
- Graham, S. (2006) 'Cities and the "war on terror"', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 30(2): 255–76.
- Greenwald, G. and MacAskill, E. (2013) 'Obama orders US to draw up overseas target list for cyber-attacks', *The Guardian*, available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/07/obama-china-targets-cyber-overseas>.
- Hables Gray, C. (2005) *Peace, War, and Computers*, London: Routledge.
- Hansen, L. (2006) *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*, London: Routledge.
- Hansen, L. and Nissenbaum, H. (2009) 'Digital disaster, cyber security, and the Copenhagen School', *International Studies Quarterly*, 53(4): 1155–75.
- Huysmans, J. (2011) 'What's in an act? On security speech acts and little security nothings', *Security Dialogue*, 42(4–5): 371–83.
- Inkster, N. (2013) 'Chinese intelligence in the cyber age', *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 55(1): 45–66.
- Kello, L. (2013) 'The meaning of the cyber revolution', *International Security*, 38(2): 7–40.
- Klimburg, A. (2011) 'Mobilising cyber power', *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 53(1): 41–60.
- Lawson, S. (2013) 'Beyond cyber-doom: Assessing the limits of hypothetical scenarios in the framing of cyber-threats', *Journal of Information Technology & Politics*, 10(1): 86–103.
- Léonard, S. (2010) 'EU border security and migration into the European Union: FRONTEX and securitization through practices', *European Security*, 19(3): 231–54.
- Libicki, M. C. (2000) *The Future of Information Security*, Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies.
- May, C. et al. (2004) *Advanced Information Assurance Handbook*, CERT@/CC Training and Education Center, CMU/SEI-2004-HB-001, Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon University.
- Morozov, E. (2013) *To Save Everything, Click Here: Technology, Solutionism, and the Urge to Fix Problems that Don't Exist*, London: Allen Lane.
- Nye, J. (2010) *Cyberpower*, Boston, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
- Oliver, P. E. and Johnston, H. (2000) 'What a good idea: Frames and ideologies in social movements research', *Mobilization*, 5(1): 37–54.
- Owens, W. A., Dam, K. W. and Lin, H. (eds) (2009) *Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities*, Washington, DC: The National Academy Press.
- Parikka, J. (2005) 'Digital monsters, binary aliens – computer viruses, capitalism and the flow of information', *Fibreculture Journal* Issue 4 – Contagion and the Diseases of Information, available at: <http://vxheavens.com/lib/mjp00.html>
- Parikka, J. (2007a) *Digital Contagions – A Media Archaeology of Computer Viruses*, New York: Peter Lang Publishing.
- Parikka, J. (2007b) 'Contagion and repetition: On the viral logic of network culture', *Ephemera*, 7(2): 287–308.
- Parikka, J. (2010) 'Ethologies of software art: What can a digital body of code do?', in Zepke, S. (ed.) *Deleuze and Contemporary Art*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 116–32.
- Rid, T. (2013) *Cyber War Will Not Take Place*, London: Hurst & Company.
- Rothkopf, D. J. (1998) 'Cyberpolitik: The changing nature of power in the information age', *Journal of International Affairs*, 51(2): 325–60.
- Ryan, C. (1991) *Prime Time Activism: Media Strategies for Grass Roots Organizing*, Boston, MA: South End Press.

- Sampson, T. (2007) 'The accidental topology of digital culture: How the network becomes viral', *Transformations: Online Journal of Region, Culture and Society*, Issue 14, March, available at: http://www.transformationsjournal.org/journal/issue_14/editorial.shtml
- Sandwell, B. (2006) 'Monsters in cyberspace: Cyberphobia and cultural panic in the information age', *Information, Communication & Society*, 9(1): 39–61.
- Schmitt, M. N. (ed.) (2013) *Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Snow, D. A. and Benford, R. D. (1988) 'Ideology, frame resonance, and participant mobilization', *Social Movement Research*, 1: 197–217.
- Stevens T. and Betz, D. J. (2013) 'Analogical reasoning and cyber security', *Security Dialogue*, 44(2): 147–64.
- Suteanu, C. (2005) 'Complexity, science and the public: The geography of a new interpretation', *Theory, Culture & Society*, 22(5): 113–40
- Turner, R. (2007) 'Understanding programming language', *Mind and Machines*, 17(2): 129–33.
- UNGA (2010) Report of UN Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, A/65/94, 24 June 2010.
- Valeriano, B. and Maness, R. C. (2014) 'The dynamics of cyber conflict between rival antagonists, 2001–11', *Journal of Peace Research*, 51(3): 347–60.
- Vuori, J. A. (2008) 'Illucutionary logic and strands of securitization: Applying the theory of securitization to the study of non-democratic political orders', *European Journal of International Relations*, 14(1): 65–99.
- Warner, M. (2012) 'Cybersecurity: A pre-history', *Intelligence & National Security*, 27(5): 781–99.
- Yould, R. (2003) 'Beyond the American fortress: Understanding homeland security in the information age', in Latham, R. (ed.) *Bombs and Bandwidth: The Emerging Relationship between Information Technology and Security*, New York: The New Press, pp. 74–98.

21

SOCIAL MEDIA, REVOLUTION, AND THE RISE OF THE POLITICAL BOT

Samuel C. Woolley and Philip N. Howard

Introduction

Academics, policy makers, and activists worldwide are increasingly concerned with the role of social media in revolutionary contexts and its use during other conflict and security crises. The 2009 Iranian presidential election brought about an enthusiastic interest in the organizational and publicity-oriented messaging power of such platforms for activists on the ground. The Iranian government's interference with networks during this time, and state-based manipulation of social media tools since, suggest, however, that such enthusiasm be tempered.

Political activists continue to realize novel communication-based affordances of nonpolitical social media platforms such as Twitter, Weibo, YouTube, Google+, and Facebook (Aday et al. 2010; Edwards, Howard, and Joyce 2013; Zuckerman 2013). Protestors involved in the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street demonstrations made effective use of these online tools and opponents of standing governments in Ukraine, Syria, Turkey, and elsewhere continue to do so. Scholars argue that personalized communication-based media networks have changed the face of civic engagement (Bimber, Flanagin, and Stohl 2005). Bennett and Segerberg (2014) suggest that traditional notions of collective action during contentious political situations are now compounded with the emerging use of what they call "connective action" (p. 2), a brand of political organization that is personalized, mediated, and mobile via online social networks.

This chapter makes use of Howard and Parks' three-part definition of social media. According to this explanation,

social media consists of (a) the information infrastructure and tools used to produce and distribute content that has individual value but reflects shared values; (b) the content that takes the digital form of personal messages, news, ideas, that becomes cultural products; and (c) the people, organizations, and industries that produce and consume both the tools and the content.

(Howard and Parks 2012: 359)

This evolving mode of communication is unique in that it consists of such an interactive combination of hardware and software, content and virality, and makers and users.

Both extant academic literature and popular commentary make much of social media's effectiveness as a tool for political propaganda, demobilization, and disinformation. This dark side of social media's political uses is often taken up in terms of political actors' interference on participatory sites or via skeptical views of peoples' genuine activist usage of such sites. Morozov (2011), for instance, argues that the net is often less a tool for advocacy and more one for entertainment and suggests that the web, and social media sites in particular, can function as a powerful tool for control.

Realistically, social media is neither wholly useful as a tool for political organization nor wholly effective as a tool for political control. Like most media, these evolving modes of communication can function in ways that are both useful and distracting. Moreover, those attempting to garner a holistic understanding of social media's usage during political situations ought to seek a moderate analytical frame, one that takes into account both the arguments of technological determinism (suggesting that communication tools cause social changes) and organizational determinism (suggesting that society causes technological changes) (Howard 2006; 2010).

Social media and mechanisms for change

In this chapter, we argue that while social media has been a key causal factor in several important popular uprisings in recent years, this causal pattern is not likely to be permanent or even long lasting. Authoritarian regimes, like social movements, learn from the successes and failures of their ilk. And recently, automated scripts—or bots—have stifled public conversation online and plagued activists and civic leaders using social media. First, we introduce the research on social media and revolution. We offer a critical perspective on some of the high profile cases of political change, cases that have provoked our conversation about the importance of social media. However, our goal in reviewing this research is to highlight the debates and perspectival clashes rather than conduct case studies. Second, we discuss how social bots are impacting the relationships between social media use and political movements.

How was social media used during the Arab Spring and other recent moments of revolution and rapid political change? On one hand, writers like Gladwell (2010) and Staples (2013) are skeptical of the causal role of social media in revolution. Gladwell suggests that the most productive aspects of social movement organization have to happen face to face—over the lunch counter—and that there is sparse added value to having information technologies in the activist toolkit. There is little, he says, to political revolution that cannot be done with paper and a pencil. Others take this notion a step further. They argue that, while social media don't have a causal role in political dissension, other things—prices of commodities or access to food—do (Williams 2012). Staples (2013) suggests that the cataloguing nature of technology and social networking can facilitate surveillance rather than afford liberation. Indeed, Gangadharan and Woolley (2014) outline instances of amassed online data, data often scraped from seemingly mundane social media profiles and search information, being used for oppression and discrimination.

Shirky (2010; 2011) takes an opposite position to those who negate the causal role of social media in political crises. He suggests there are several special organizational dynamics that arise only when social mobilization happens via digital media; that these new communication tools allow massive and rapid responses to democratic injustices. Scholars like Aday et al. (2010), Lotan et al. (2011), and Diamond (2010) argue that the myriad affordances of the Internet and social media, of a globally networked society, enable communication tools like Facebook and Twitter to facilitate large-scale political dissent.

Social media and the mechanisms of successful revolution

Shirky (2008) was among the first to suggest that social media could help people to organize without the need of formal groups like unions, political parties, and non-profits. It was during Iran's 2009 presidential election, however, that the world at large really began to pay attention to the particular revolutionary potential of social media. Blogs, traditional and micro, played multiple roles in the Iranian situation. Social networking platforms were used in political organization and communication efforts by protestors. People and groups concerned with the situation, both in Iran and elsewhere, used social media as news sources and publicity boards (Howard 2010). However, mediated organization efforts failed to produce an outcome favorable to Ahmadinejad's democratically inclined opponents, despite widespread blogging on the subject and global condemnation of the election as rigged.

The protests in Iran did, however, serve as both an example for revolutions to come and a provocation for a larger discussion on social media's role in revolution. Andrew Sullivan (2009) of *The Atlantic* released a short piece, "The Revolution Will Be Twittered," extolling the revolutionary potential of Twitter during the Iranian crisis. Sullivan's suggestions spurred a profusion of articles taking on the subject and, at times, co-opting, altering, and poking fun at the original piece's title (Gladwell 2010; Hounshell 2011; Lotan et al. 2011).

Thoughts concerning the Iranian protests catalyzed differing positions on just how social media are used during revolutions, how effective sites like Twitter are as organizing and publicity tools, and where these particular channels have been used most successfully for democratic and authoritarian aims. Examination of scholarship about recent large-scale social movements, the Arab Spring, Occupy, Los Indignados, and the Israeli Tent protests, reveals that social media have been and are used for democratic organization, global outreach, and news gathering in times of political crisis with varying degrees of success.

The rapidity of peoples' democratic uptake of networking sites during the Arab Spring was aided by the preceding rapid diffusion of both the Internet and smartphones in North Africa and the Middle East (Khamis and Vaughn 2011). In a few short years, citizens in these regions were equipped with the technology necessary to effectively communicate via established social networks like Twitter and Facebook (Lim 2012; Radsch 2011). Now people could instantaneously post videos, photos, and videos of events on the ground to audiences local and global. Though thousands of such posts were read or seen by few, the viral nature of some of them helped to get the word out globally (Nahon and Hemsley 2013).

The way the Muslim world produces news also has a major hand in the role of social media during crises in this area. A shift towards truth and objectivity, stimulated by conversations about ethics among journalists online, has "helped raise standards of professional and pluralistic approaches to news production" (Howard 2010, 109). This said, during the 2011 Egyptian uprising the tone of semiofficial governmental newspapers reporting on the events differed hugely from the way people were talking about them on social media sites. The former group framed the protests as conspiracies against the government, while the latter deemed them acts of democracy and freedom from oppression (Hamdy and Gomaa 2012). Such biases within state run newspapers and television stations have been a major factor in turning people toward the Internet, and social media, for news.

While some journalists are forced to generate intra-state propaganda during times of conflict and unrest, they have been known to undermine these stories by publishing more openly with global media outlets and via social media weblogs. The widespread availability of transnational news online, the reliability of Al Jazeera's online platform, and the growth and increased regard for Middle Eastern blog sites all additionally contribute to

“the internet [being] used for news during times of particular social crisis” in this region (Howard 2010, 108).

Blogs remain among the most important social media platforms used for news and communication in times of revolution and democratic transition. The interactive and networked formatting of blogs provided design inspiration for sites like Twitter and these early user-generated tools were a preliminary site of interactive, and citizen-based, political conversation and commentary (Meraz 2009). Bloggers not only break news stories, they also police traditional news and report on stories not picked up by these larger organizations. The independence of bloggers allows them increased ability to report on human rights violations, corruption, and other governmental misdeeds. Blogs have also been widely used in the Muslim world and elsewhere to coordinate and report on protests (Sayed 2012). Indeed, during both the Occupy and the Indignado movements, blogs were the primary tools used for breaking (often first-hand) reports on new events, plans, and ideas (Gerbaudo 2012; Skinner 2011).

In Tunisia, ground zero of the Arab Spring protests, activists used the “We are all Khaled Said” Facebook page as a site for spreading both the news of their organization efforts and the date for their first major protest (Baker 2011; Khamis and Vaughn 2011; Tufekci and Wilson 2012). The sites’ importance as a communication and management tool for protestors involved in Occupy is showcased by both the widespread profusion of far flung Occupy Facebook pages and the massive membership of Occupy Wall Street (OWS) website (Caren and Gaby 2011; Gaby and Caren 2012).

A search for scholarly articles about Twitter’s potential political uses returns hundreds of pieces from respected journals. Recent uprisings have been covered in the news under monikers such as “Twitter Revolution” and current scholarship and reporting are diffusely affected by original pieces on the thwarted Iranian revolution “being tweeted.” How, then, have protestors in recent political crises actually successfully used Twitter to mobilize?

Activists used Twitter, along with the now famous #Occupy hashtag, in successful efforts to assemble and organize individuals from innumerable backgrounds in public spaces from Wall Street to Oakland (Juris 2012). Throughout the Iranian election protests young people used Twitter to communicate at street level, to find safe hospitals, to alert fellow activists to the movements of Basij militias. Indeed, the site’s importance was deemed so crucial to democratic protestors that “the U.S. State Department asked twitter to delay a network upgrade that would have shut down service for a brief period during daylight hours in Tehran” (Howard 2010, 7).

Lotan et al. (2011) and Howard and Hussain (2013) reveal both the impressive variety of Twitter users and wide array of tweet content affiliated with the Arab Spring movements. Both of these studies suggest a complexity of information about the people who were tweeting and the ways protestors were using the site: for organization, publicity, or more general communication. The appearance of large amounts of bot content revealed in the examination of these tweets, and in later studies specific to the Syrian conflict, are a prelude of things to come in the latter portion of this chapter.

Social media and the patterns of control and co-option

Even though there are several examples of successful popular uprisings in which social media has played an important role, there are also examples of regimes controlling and co-opting these tools. In Russia, Turkey, and Venezuela, political opposition have successfully used social media to draw international attention to human rights abuses. While civil leaders

have demonstrated success at getting their message out, governments did not fall. For instance, while the Occupy movement had impressive global reach, many would agree that its energy has dissipated and that it failed to secure any lasting changes in public policy or governance mechanisms.

The democratic ways in which social media has been used during times of political crisis generally pertain to uses in categories organizational, communicative, and informative. Morozov (2011) and others have led discussion into how social media are co-opted during such events to reinforce authoritarian control via the networked demobilization and silencing of protestors. Some scholars also argue that the ease with which people use social networking tools, and the immediate nature of posting and parsing information, leads more to apathy than mobilization. Notions of slacktivism, censorship, and propaganda on social media sites are among the main criticisms delivered by those wary of social media's political efficacy. There are several noteworthy instances of governments using sites such as Facebook and Twitter for nefarious means, and not all of them involve autocratic governments.

The blanket tactic of simply disabling social media sites during sensitive political moments has been used by both democratic and authoritarian regimes (Howard, Agarwal, and Hussain 2011). Enactors of such policies cite protection of authority figures, issues of national security, and preservation of social and cultural morals as reasons for disconnecting digital networks. Turkey, a democratic republic, prohibited access to Twitter and YouTube in 2014. The single party government of China is well known for not allowing its citizens access to sites like Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter. Instead, cypoccat sites like Weibo are available for micro-bloggers and the like, though they tend to be thoroughly censored and as such are used for political protest with limited success (Canaves 2011; Fu and Chau 2013). In Azerbaijan the government has favored subtlety over outright censorship when it comes to digital media. In this case, the government has worked to dissuade users from advocating for protest or using social media for political protest (Pearce and Kendzior 2012).

Bailard (2012), using the analogies of digital media functioning in terms of "mirror-holding" or "window opening," found that the Internet does not always enrich democratic values. In fact, her study suggested that critical Internet users in Tanzania became less likely to vote, whether due to apathy or disenchantment. The idea that social media contributes to distracting online noise is often cited as one of the chief issues with the civic potential of such platforms. Christensen (2011) defines slacktivist engagement on social media as "activities that may make the active individual feel good, but have little impact on political decisions and may even distract citizens from other, more effective, forms of engagement." Morozov (2009) suggests that this apathy is the fallout of socially mediated politicking. A study by Christensen (2011), however, found no evidence to suggest that online activism substitutes for or supplants offline activism. Rather, this piece suggests recent research on the subject shows a positive, though weak, connection between online civic engagement and activist engagement offline.

Revolution and the automation of social media engagement

The arrival of new methods for exercising political manipulation on social media sites is among the most significant political consequences of the latest innovations in new media. Reporters worldwide have released stories about the increasing sophistication of governmental intrusion and propaganda on several social media sites (York 2011; Krebs 2012; Krebs 2011, 201; Qtiesh 2011). Many of these articles are specifically focused on the large number, and clever advancement, of social media bot technology. Bots generate more than 10 percent

of content on social media websites, and 62 percent of all web traffic, according to security experts (Rosenberg 2013).

The word “botnet” comes from combining “robot” with “network.” It is used to describe a collection of programs that communicate across multiple devices to perform some task. The tasks can be simple and annoying, like generating spam. The tasks can be aggressive and malicious, like choking off exchange points or launching denial-of-service attacks. And not all are developed to advance political causes. Some seem to have been developed for fun or to support criminal enterprises, but all share the property of deploying messages and replicating themselves (Kim et al. 2010; Wagstaff 2013).

Chu et al. (2010) distinguish two types of bots on Twitter: legitimate and malicious. Legitimate bots generate a large amount of benign tweets that deliver news or update feeds. Malicious bots, on the other hand, spread spam by delivering appealing text content with the link directed toward malicious content. Botnets are created for many reasons: spam, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, theft of confidential information, click fraud, cyber sabotage, and cyber warfare. According to Kim et al. (2010), many governments have been strengthening their cyber warfare capabilities for both defensive and offensive purposes. In addition, political actors and governments worldwide have begun using bots to manipulate public opinion, choke off debate, and muddy political issues.

Social bots are particularly prevalent on Twitter. They are computer-generated programs that post, tweet, or message of their own accord. Often bot profiles lack basic account information such as screen-names or profile pictures. Such accounts have become known as “Twitter eggs” because default profile pictures on the social media site ubiquitously feature an egg. While social media users access from front-end websites, bots get access to such websites directly through a mainline, code-to-code, connection, mainly through the site’s wide-open application programming interface (API), posting and parsing information in real time. Bots are versatile, cheap to produce, and ever evolving. “These bots,” argues Rob Dubbin (2013), “whose DNA can be written in almost any modern programming language, live on cloud servers, which never go dark and grow cheaper by day.”

The use of political bots varies across regime types. Political bots tend to be used for distinct purposes during three primary events: elections, spin control during political scandals, and national security crises. The usage of bots during these situations extends from the nefarious cause of demobilizing political opposition followers to the *seemingly* innocuous task of padding political candidates’ social media “follower” lists. Bots are additionally used to drown out oppositional or marginal voices, halt protest, and relay “astroturf” messages of false governmental support. Political actors use them in general attempts to manipulate and sway public opinion. It is clear that understanding the creation and usage of this technology is central to generating political equality both on- and offline and in fostering genuine advancement of democratic social media possibilities.

Differing forms of bot-generated computational propaganda have been deployed in several numerous countries: Russia, Mexico, China, Australia, the UK, the USA, Azerbaijan, Iran, Bahrain, South Korea, Morocco, Syria, and Iraq among them. Current contemporary political crises in Thailand, Turkey, and the ongoing situation in the Ukraine are seeing the emergence of computational propaganda.

In Mexico, bots have been used on Twitter by both ruling and minority parties. In several circumstances over the last five years Mexican political groups have used bots in attempts to twitter-bomb, or massively spam, the messages of their opponents. In cases like these, bots are programmed to co-opt the opposition’s hashtags and send out thousands of garbled or propaganda-laden tweets to block any counter-organizational or communication efforts. In

the USA, the UK, and Australia bots have been used to pad politicians' follower lists. These fake followers can be purchased for nominal prices with the intent of making a user seem more popular or influential. In Syria, the Assad regime has used automated bot scripts to send out large-scale propaganda. These accounts are programmed to look like real users and send out messages in support of the Syrian government.

Bot-generated political content on social media has the potential to affect widespread user populations. Citizens, voters in democratic countries, are often the target of tactics like follower padding. If a politician can seem like they are influential on social media they can seem in touch with young people and the tech-community. Journalists, foreign groups, and individuals are likely the intended target for fake user/bot-driven governmental propaganda coming from authoritarian or contested regimes. Such countries have been known to hire public relations and marketing firms in attempts to seem more legitimate to the global community and authorities like the United Nations. Bots are an increasingly prevalent tool in many of these governments' efforts to sway public opinion both locally and internationally.

Table 21.1 presents a pilot sampling of the diversity of regime types and bot producers around the world, with a democracy score from -10 fully authoritarian to +10 fully democratic (Marshall and Jagers 2010). This preliminary case list suggests that bot usage is often associated with either elections or national security crises. These may be the two most sensitive moments for political actors where the potential stigma of being caught manipulating public opinion is not as serious as the threat of having public opinion turn the wrong way.

Most of the coverage of political bot usage has occurred within mainstream media sources and personal blogs. Little empirical social or computer science work has been done to understand the wide-ranging creation, use, and effect of computational propaganda. Existing research on the topic of bots is limited to studies developing rudimentary bot detection systems, how bots challenge network security, and overviews of bots and botnets—networks composed of bots. Current research fails to develop an understanding of the new political bot phenomena, does not adequately explain the usage of these bots on social media sites, and rarely attempts to understand the makers of this technology. While botnets have been actively tracked for several years, their use in political campaigning, crisis management, and counter-insurgency is relatively new. Moreover, from the users' perspective it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between content that is generated by a fully automated script, a human, or both.

Bots are becoming increasingly prevalent. And social media is becoming an increasingly important source of political news and information, especially for young people and for people living in countries where the main journalistic outlets are marginalized, politically roped to a ruling regime, or just deficient. Sophisticated technology users can sometimes spot a bot, but the best bots can be quite successful at poisoning a political conversation.

Conclusion: technology of liberation, diversion and deceit

While there is active scholarly debate about the role of social media in political revolution, the debate is mostly over the degree of emphasis that communication technology should have relative to other more traditional factors. Perhaps the emerging consensus is that unemployment, disenfranchisement, and social inequality remain important grievances, but that people have been using social media to become aware of each other's grievances and discuss collective action.

The next great challenge for the social sciences is to develop techniques for studying the ways in which political actors attempt to sway public opinion over social media. The

Table 21.1 Social media, bots, and political conflict

<i>Country</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Polity</i>	<i>Deployer, Assignment</i>
Australia	2013	10	Political parties—hiring bots to promote candidate profile and policy ideas.
Azerbaijan	2012	−8	Government—attack opposition, manipulate public opinion about public affairs.
Bahrain	2011	−8	Government—attack opposition, manipulate public opinion about public affairs.
Canada	2010	10	Political candidates and parties—buying followers on social media.
China	2012	−8	Government—disrupt social movements, attack protest coverage, and manipulate public opinion about public affairs.
Iran	2011	−6	Government—attack opposition, manipulate public opinion about public affairs.
Israel	2012	10	Government, military—information war with Hamas and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
Mexico	2011	8	Political parties—misinformation during presidential election.
Morocco	2011	−6	Government—attack opposition, manipulate public opinion about public affairs.
Russia	2011	4	Government—attack opposition, disrupt protest coverage, manipulate public opinion about public affairs, and influence international opinion on Crimea.
Saudi Arabia	2013	−10	Government—attack opposition, manipulate public opinion about public affairs.
South Korea	2012	8	Government—using social media to praise elected head of government.
Syria	2011	−8	Government—attack opposition, manipulate public opinion about civil war, misinformation for international audiences.
Thailand	2014	7	Government—using bots to support coup.
Turkey	2014	10	Candidates—using bots to give impression of popularity. Government—using bots to manipulate domestic public opinion.
UK	2012	10	Candidate—using bots to give impression of popularity.
UK	2014	10	Government—using bots to manipulate public opinion overseas.
US	2011	10	Candidate—using bots to give impression of popularity. National Security Agency—using bots to manipulate public opinion overseas.
Venezuela	2012	2	Government—attack opposition, manipulate public opinion about public affairs.

challenge is to be able to document and demonstrate purposeful manipulation through political bots or computational propaganda. So much revolutionary zeal was generated by the powerful images and narratives that emerged from the Arab Spring, Green Revolution, and Gezi Park protests. But equally powerful are the regime responses that involve bots used with the intent of dissipating the social cohesion of revolutionaries online.

Bots and automated scripts do not simply burden digital networks. There is growing evidence that they can shape public opinion with immense implications for the study of political change. Moreover, the study of social change probably needs an epistemological overhaul as well. Many classically trained social scientists are actively disinterested in discussing the role of new technologies in mediating social relations, and are quick with

accusations of technological determinism. Yet it has been the social researchers who make use of science and technology studies scholarship, who develop new tools for social network analysis, and who understand the impact of technology design on social outcomes, who offer the most compelling explanations of contemporary revolution.

We cannot be certain about how bots will constrain or incapacitate social networks during moments of political crisis and revolution in the years ahead. But what is certain is that new norms of interactivity and expectations for information access are being encoded in these automated scripts, and public leaders in both democracies and authoritarian regimes are imagining new ways of shaping public opinion in ways most social media users do not fully understand.

The work is urgent because the number of bots seems to be growing, and their sophistication seems to be improving—especially so for the bots that are derived with a political agenda in mind. New practices of social computing are being politically institutionalized now, and quick support will allow a new team of social and information scientists to focus on this unusual moment of political transition. This means that research on social media and revolution remains one of the most exciting domains of political inquiry, a domain in which the next generation of researchers must be equipped to understand both social processes of grievance formation and the technical affordances of the technology of the day.

Acknowledgements

The author(s) gratefully acknowledge the support of the National Science Foundation, “EAGER CNS: Computational Propaganda and the Production/Detection of Bots,” BIGDATA-1450193, 2014–16, Philip N. Howard, Principal Investigator. The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Consolidator Award #648311. Project activities were approved by the University of Washington Human Subjects Committee, approval #48103-EG. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of either the National Science Foundation or European Research Council.

References

- Aday, Sean, Henry Farrell, Marc Lynch, John Sides, John Kelly, and Ethan Zuckerman. 2010. *Blogs and Bullets: New Media in Contentious Politics*. Washington, DC: USIP. <http://www.usip.org/publications/blogs-and-bullets-new-media-in-contentious-politics>.
- Bailard, Catie Snow. 2012. “A Field Experiment on the Internet’s Effect in an African Election: Savvier Citizens, Disaffected Voters, or Both?” *Journal of Communication* 62 (2): 330–44. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01632.x
- Baker, Stephanie Alice. 2011. “The Mediated Crowd: New Social Media and New Forms of Rioting.” *Sociological Research Online* 16 (4): 21.
- Bennett, W. Lance, and Alexandra Segerberg. 2014. *The Logic of Connective Action: Digital Media and the Personalization of Contentious Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Bimber, Bruce, Andrew J. Flanagin, and Cynthia Stohl. 2005. “Reconceptualizing Collective Action in the Contemporary Media Environment.” *Communication Theory* 15 (4): 365–88.
- Canaves, Sky. 2011. “China’s Social Networking Problem.” *Spectrum, IEEE* 48 (6): 74–7.
- Caren, Neal, and Sarah Gaby. 2011. “Occupy Online: Facebook and the Spread of Occupy Wall Street.” https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1943168
- Christensen, Henrik Serup. 2011. “Political Activities on the Internet: Slacktivism or Political Participation by Other Means?” *First Monday* 16 (2). <http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/viewArticle/3336>

- Chu, Zi, Steven Gianvecchio, Haining Wang, and Sushil Jajodia. 2010. "Who is Tweeting on Twitter: Human, Bot, or Cyborg?" In *Proceedings of the 26th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference*, 21–30. ACM. <http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1920265>
- Diamond, Larry. 2010. "Liberation Technology." *Journal of Democracy* 21 (3): 69–83.
- Dubbin, Rob. 2013. "The Rise of Twitter Bots." *The New Yorker Blogs*. <http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/elements/2013/11/the-rise-of-twitter-bots.html>
- Edwards, F., Philip N. Howard, and Mary Joyce. 2013. *Digital Activism and Non-Violent Conflict*. Seattle, WA: Digital Activism Research Project. <http://digital-activism.org/2013/11/report-on-digital-activism-and-non-violent-conflict/>
- Fu, King-wa, and Michael Chau. 2013. "Reality Check for the Chinese Microblog Space: A Random Sampling Approach." *PloS One* 8 (3): e58356.
- Gaby, Sarah, and Neal Caren. 2012. "Occupy Online: How Cute Old Men and Malcolm X Recruited 400,000 US Users to OWS on Facebook." *Social Movement Studies* 11 (3–4): 367–74.
- Gangadharan, Seeta, and Samuel Woolley. 2014. "Data-Driven Discrimination." *Slate*, June 6. http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/06/big_data_can_perpetuate_poverty_and_inequality.html
- Gerbaudo, Paolo. 2012. *Tweets and the Streets: Social Media and Contemporary Activism*. London: Pluto Press. <http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2462754>.
- Gladwell, Malcolm. 2010. "Small Change: Why the Revolution Won't Be Tweeted." *The New Yorker* 4.
- Hamdy, Naila, and Ehab H. Gomaa. 2012. "Framing the Egyptian Uprising in Arabic Language Newspapers and Social Media." *Journal of Communication* 62 (2): 195–211. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01637.x
- Hounshell, Blake. 2011. "The Revolution Will Be Tweeted." *Foreign Policy* 187: 20–1.
- Howard, Philip N. 2006. *New Media Campaigns and the Managed Citizen*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Howard, Philip N. 2010. *The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and Political Islam*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Howard, Philip N., and Malcolm R. Parks. 2012. "Social Media and Political Change: Capacity, Constraint, and Consequence." *Journal of Communication* 62 (2): 359–362.
- Howard, Philip N., and Muzammil M. Hussain. 2013. *Democracy's Fourth Wave?: Digital Media and the Arab Spring*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. <http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ayHOyrmmT8kC&oi=fnd&pg=PP2&dq=howard+digital+activism+2013&ots=mJDwHv1nfa&sig=jvnGD3UO3Bg1GuzR2wayT4WD8pl>
- Howard, Philip N., Sheetal D. Agarwal, and Muzammil M. Hussain. 2011. "When Do States Disconnect Their Digital Networks? Regime Responses to the Political Uses of Social Media." *The Communication Review* 14 (3): 216–32.
- Juris, Jeffrey S. 2012. "Reflections On #Occupy Everywhere: Social Media, Public Space, and Emerging Logics of Aggregation." *American Ethnologist* 39 (2): 259–79.
- Khamis, Sahar, and Katherine Vaughn. 2011. "Cyberactivism in the Egyptian Revolution: How Civic Engagement and Citizen Journalism Tilted the Balance." *Arab Media and Society* 13 (3). http://arabmediasociety.sqgd.co.uk/articles/downloads/20110603105609_Khamis.pdf
- Kim, Won, Ok-Ran Jeong, Chulyun Kim, and Jungmin So. 2010. "On Botnets." In *Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Information Integration and Web-Based Applications & Services*, 5–10. ACM. <http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1967488>
- Krebs, Brian. 2011. "Twitter Bots Drown Out Anti-Kremlin Tweets." *Krebs on Security*. <http://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/12/twitter-bots-drown-out-anti-kremlin-tweets/>
- Krebs, Brian. 2012. "Twitter Bots Target Tibetan Protests." *Krebs on Security*. <http://krebsonsecurity.com/2012/03/twitter-bots-target-tibetan-protests/>
- Lim, Merlyna. 2012. "Clicks, Cabs, and Coffee Houses: Social Media and Oppositional Movements in Egypt, 2004–2011." *Journal of Communication* 62 (2): 231–48. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01628.x
- Lotan, Gilad, Erhardt Graeff, Mike Ananny, Devin Gaffney, Ian Pearce, and others. 2011. "The Arab Spring the Revolutions Were Tweeted: Information Flows during the 2011 Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions." *International Journal of Communication* 5: 31.
- Marshall, Monty G., and Keith Jagers. 2010. *Polity IV: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2009*. College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>
- Meraz, Sharon. 2009. "Is There an Elite Hold? Traditional Media to Social Media Agenda Setting Influence in Blog Networks." *Journal of Computer Mediated Communication* 14: 3.

- Morozov, Evgeny. 2009. "The Brave New World of Slacktivism." *Foreign Policy* 19 (5). <http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/05/19/the-brave-new-world-of-slacktivism/>
- Morozov, Evgeny. 2011. "Technology's Role in Revolution Internet Freedom and Political Oppression: Revolutions Depend on People, Not on Social Media, and the Internet Both Promotes Democracy and Thwarts It, Says a Foreign-Policy Scholar. Cyber-Utopians Be Warned: Authoritarian Regimes Are Adapting to the Internet Age." *The Futurist* 45 (4). <http://www.questia.com/magazine/1G1-259704956/technology-s-role-in-revolution-internet-freedom-and>
- Nahon, Karine, and Jeff Hemsley. 2013. *Going Viral*. Cambridge: Polity. http://www.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=rU3DEzIvIskC&oi=fnd&pg=PR3&dq=nahon+hemsley&ots=eLRM90C2l4&sig=pUZRI6G_lsW0l2tfxiA5uD-IC90
- Pearce, Katy E., and Sarah Kendzior. 2012. "Networked Authoritarianism and Social Media in Azerbaijan." *Journal of Communication* 62 (2): 283–98.
- Qtiesh, Anas. 2011. "Spam Bots Flooding Twitter to Drown Info About #Syria Protests [Updated]." Global Voices Advocacy. <http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2011/04/18/spam-bots-flooding-twitter-to-drown-info-about-syria-protests/>
- Radsch, Courtney C. 2011. "Blogsphere and Social Media." *Seismic Shift: Understanding Change in the Middle East*. Ed. Ellen Laipson. Washington, DC: Stimson Center. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2336076.
- Rosenberg, Yuval. 2013. "62 Percent of All Web Traffic Comes from Bots." *The Week*. <http://theweek.com/article/index/254183/62-percent-of-all-web-traffic-comes-from-bots>.
- Sayed, Nermeen. 2012. "Towards the Egyptian Revolution: Activists' Perceptions of Social Media for Mobilization." *Journal of Arab & Muslim Media Research* 4 (2–3): 2–3.
- Shirky, Clay. 2008. *Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing without Organizations*. New York: Penguin Press.
- Shirky, Clay. 2010. *Cognitive Surplus: How Technology Makes Consumers into Collaborators*. New York: Penguin Press.
- Shirky, Clay. 2011. "Political Power of Social Media: Technology, the Public Sphere, and Political Change." *Foreign Affairs* 90: 28.
- Skinner, Julia. 2011. "Social Media and Revolution: The Arab Spring and the Occupy Movement as Seen through Three Information Studies Paradigms." http://aisel.aisnet.org/sprouts_all/483/
- Staples, William G. 2013. *Everyday Surveillance: Vigilance and Visibility in Postmodern Life*. Second edition. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Sullivan, Andrew. 2009. "The Revolution Will be Twittered." *The Atlantic*. <http://www.theatlantic.com/daily-dish/archive/2009/06/the-revolution-will-be-twittered/200478/>
- Tufekci, Zeynep, and Christopher Wilson. 2012. "Social Media and the Decision to Participate in Political Protest: Observations From Tahrir Square." *Journal of Communication* 62 (2): 363–79. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01629.x
- Wagstaff, Keith. 2013. "1 in 10 Twitter Accounts is Fake, Say Researchers." NBC News. <http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/1-10-twitter-accounts-fake-say-researchers-f2D11655362>
- Williams, Greg. 2012. "The Importance of Wheat, Not Tweets, to the Arab Spring." How We Create Value. <http://howwecreatevalue.com/2012/01/31/the-importance-of-wheat-not-tweets-to-the-arab-spring/>.
- York, Jillian C. 2011. "Syria's Twitter Spambots." *The Guardian*, April 21. <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/apr/21/syria-twitter-spambots-pro-revolution>
- Zuckerman, Ethan. 2013. *Rewire: Digital Cosmopolitans in the Age of Connection*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

PART V

New issues in security and conflict and future directions

This page intentionally left blank

22

MEDIA, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND GLOBAL SECURITY

The case of climate change

Neil T. Gavin

Introduction

As this paper's title suggests, the topic is the mediation of environmental security. 'Security', however, can encompass many things – threats to the state or to the public, or to the broader international community, with the recent financial crisis a possible example. Similarly, 'environmental security', and threats to it, can take many forms – like oceanic acidification; fish over-exploitation; deforestation; air pollution; and agricultural or water degradation. The likes of agricultural and water security can, in turn, relate strongly to conventional notions of security, that is they may increase the risk of violent conflict (Barnett, 2010). But rather than explore the mediation of any – or all – of these, what follows focuses on 'climate change', on the grounds that it deserves attention as one of the most commanding environmental security issues.

Even setting aside Lovelock's (2007) bleak, almost doomsday position, that climate change is an imminent and inexorable existential threat, there is ample evidence of a consensus around the very real hazards (Cook et al., 2013). This has to be considered alongside plausible suggestions that scientists have been conservative in their estimates and projections (Brysse et al., 2013). Some are also concerned about the pace of climate change, noting current circumstances '... characterize a carbon cycle that is generating stronger-than-expected climate forcing, sooner than expected' (Canadell et al., 2007, p.18869). In addition, there is no assurance a steady, incremental change in world climate will materialize (Lenton et al., 2008), and palpable danger it could be approaching 'tipping points' involving rapid alteration. Finally, current estimates of actual, against required, carbon dioxide (CO₂) cuts suggest considerable grounds for pessimism on whether dangerous warming can be averted (Anderson and Bows, 2011). Climate change is, therefore, a potential threat to the security of humanity, and not just to that of a state or polity, or definable groups therein. It is a threat to the global community.

The media's role in illuminating such issues is alluded to by Rothschild (1995, p.55): 'the political responsibility for insuring security...is also extended: it is diffused in all directions from nation states, including upwards to international institutions, downwards to regional and local government, and sideways to non-governmental organisations, to public opinion and the press...'

This places a responsibility on the media, which is in general alignment with notions of its 'watchdog' role. But it also highlights its function of raising citizens' awareness and informing public discourse in this domain, as a prelude to opening up opportunity structures for politicians to legislate effectively (Gavin, 2009a). For, as Huysmans (2006, p.7) puts it,

Before an event can mobilize security policies and rhetoric, it needs to be conceived of as a question of insecurity and this conception needs to be sustained by discursively reiterating its threatening qualities. A domain of insecurity is then not simply constructed through policy reactions to a threat but first of all by discourses of danger...

These media-related issues are sometimes almost wholly overlooked in the literature on climate change and human security (for instance, see Redclift and Grasso, 2013). But what follows is an analysis of how the media, in an international context, handle the disturbing climate security issue. The aim is to address a set of important questions. Is media coverage sufficiently prominent to draw it to citizens' attention? And if not, why not? Does this vary between countries, and different media therein? To what extent do the media around the world actually help to obscure the security threat posed by climate change, and if so, under what impulsion? Finally, what do answers to these questions tell us about the actual, rather than the ideal, role of the media in opening space for politicians to act on climate change?

The lie of the land

First, what prominence is the media giving climate change? If it, and any associated environmental security concerns, are to register in public discourse, we might hope it would figure prominently. The world's press coverage profile can be determined from Nacu-Schmidt et al. (2014);¹ the relative weight of coverage is clear. It is greatest in 'Oceania', possibly reflecting the Antipodes' recent experiences with droughts, flooding (particularly in 2011),² severe storms and cyclones. There is more modest coverage in North America and Europe, with South America and the Middle East having the least. However, the shape of coverage is equally clear (and consistent, see Grundmann and Scott, 2014), though not terribly encouraging. All geographical domains experienced a rise in attention through the mid-to-late 2000s, with peaks around 2007–08 and 2009. Yet all have experienced quite a distinctive subsequent decline, followed by plateauing at levels slightly higher than the early 2000s.

But this picture of recent decline is actually more complex – and perhaps even more concerning – than it seems. Few studies place this sort of data in context. One found that 'bread-and-butter' stories (on crime and health) were consistently four to five times more frequent than even the peaks in UK climate change reporting (Gavin, 2009a). And it did not consider other commanding issues, like 'the economy' or 'immigration'. So climate change is virtually swamped by coverage of other issues. This is a concern if UK patterns are repeated elsewhere, which seems likely: sampling papers worldwide, another study suggests climate coverage – on average – amounts to just over half a per cent of all articles published (Schmidt et al., 2013, p.1240). A third suggests the environment (including climate change) comes to only 1.7 per cent of national news stories (Pew, 2010).

What factors explain the consistently limited coverage? Firstly, climate change is just extremely difficult to report (Weingart et al., 2000; Smith, 2005). The science is technically complex, and the phenomenon does not straightforwardly manifest itself. Correspondents are often required to link a range of difficult issues: climate science, meteorology, economics, politics and international relations. Often journalists lack the background necessary to fully

appreciate these issues (Wilson, 2000). Furthermore, few newspapers set aside the resources necessary to underwrite extensive environmental coverage – The Guardian in Britain being a notable, but unusual, example.³ Finally, climate scientists, some suggest, are reluctant – and not particularly good – media communicators, and so have been ineffective in forcing the issue onto the agenda (Andreadis and Smith, 2007).

But such consistent problems cannot explain short-term changes in the levels of reporting (Schmit et al., 2013). Here we need to look to a) norms of professional journalistic practice, b) factors determining a story's 'newsworthiness', and c) broader cyclical influences on environmental news production. Taking the first, it has been noted that reporters often take their cue from authoritative sources, notably political leaders (Boykoff and Boykoff, 2007; Takahashi, 2011). The attention devoted to climate change by world leaders in the mid-2000s (particularly but not exclusively around the 2009 Copenhagen negotiations), would partly explain some of the peaks. And a subsequent – more muted – phase is perhaps implicated in the later drop-off.

Second, the analysis of what gives a story 'news value' encompasses an emphasis on political leadership ('power elites'), but moves beyond it (Harcup and O'Neill, 2001). From this perspective climate change struggles – in the absence of elite backing – because it is complex and, therefore, lacks 'unambiguity'. It is also difficult to frame in 'human interest' terms, and the science is not intrinsically 'meaningful' to citizens. Finally, 'celebrities' do not often give stories 'entertainment' value. Nevertheless, at Copenhagen – alongside elite political engagement – the human plight of people in Tuvalu was showcased, and celebrities like Angelina Jolie, Al Gore and Arnold Schwarzenegger figured prominently. This perhaps explains the short-term surge in coverage.

But such events are not terribly common, and more worrying still is the notion that climate change – like many other environmental issues – has a limited 'issue attention cycle'. Downs (1972), who coined this term, saw environmental news exhibiting distinctive phases (Trumbo, 1996):

- Pre-problem: where only scientists and experts are exercised by an issue.
- Alarmed discovery: where media and political actors become aware of, and heavily engage with, the issue.
- Cost realization: where journalists, politicians and public begin to appreciate the cost of addressing a problem – one which may, in fact, be related to significant societal benefit (for climate change, the efficient power production offered by fossil fuels).
- Gradual decline of interest: when more and more people perceive difficulty in addressing the issue, get bored by it, or feel threatened by it and, therefore, become resistant.
- Post-problem: the agenda moves on, the issue gets less media attention, only resurfacing '...spasmodically...'

Climate change seems to conform to this pattern: modest coverage, a sharp rise, some tailing off, and a noticeable decline – Copenhagen representing a 'spasmodic' resurfacing. Researchers, working in the 1980s and 1990s (Trumbo, 1996; McComas and Shanahan, 1999), speculated that climate coverage conformed to this pattern, identifying an early but meagre rise, then conspicuous fall. Plainly they were premature. Yet the pattern outlined in Nacu-Schmidt et al. (2014) corresponds quite closely to what Downs' analysis anticipated, even if the highs and lows are more pronounced in some geographic contexts than others (Brossard et al., 2004).

Importantly, and worryingly, the issue displacing ‘climate’ may well combine ‘cost realization’, with the ‘alarmed discovery’ of a different commanding problem – the economy. Boykoff (2010, p.21) states:

The stagnation [in climate coverage] from mid 2007 until December 2009 can be primarily attributed to a number of intersecting influences. Among them, media attention on global economic recession displaced/shrank the news hole for climate stories, where immediate worries regarding job security and economic well-being dominated the news throughout 2008.

This is a feature noted by other commentators (Djerf-Pierre, 2012). But the upshot appears to be that ‘economic and financial security’ (de Goede, 2010), in the broadest sense, eclipses ‘climate security’, and by some considerable margin. In future, political leaders may again flag and prioritize climate change, in a way that attracts significant media attention. Yet beyond Barack Obama’s recent pronouncements,⁴ currently this is not overly conspicuous, with some leaders apparently heading in a different direction.⁵ Finally, the economic turbulence of the late 2000s is not obviously ‘just a memory’, in Europe or elsewhere.⁶

Television and the web

Research on press coverage of climate change is well developed – that on television, much less so. It shows that television’s coverage is fairly modest (Boykoff, 2008). In Britain, for example, it can amount to only 23 stories in nine months across the two channel’s flagship bulletins (Hargreaves et al., 2003). A 2005–11 Spanish survey suggests climate surfaced in only 0.19 per cent of stories across five channels, making it a ‘marginal topic’ (León and Erviti, 2015). And coverage is modest, even when we might expect it to receive considerable attention, such as at Copenhagen 2009, or when the United Nations (UN) Independent Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports. This is illustrated in Table 22.1, and Tables 22.2 and 22.3. The latter are derived from a comprehensive survey of coverage of the major UK channels around the recent IPCC reports, September–October 2013 and March–April 2014. Clearly, coverage was intermittent, rarely extending much beyond the day of the report’s publication. In addition, although reports were often flagged at the beginning of bulletins, the stories themselves were twice as likely to appear in the second half, than in the first, suggesting relative unimportance in the running order.

This indicates that climate change is a fairly low priority on television. But looking at the broader sweep of broadcast reports, there is also a suggestion that recently even this has declined (Boykoff, 2008; Jenkins, 2011; Unger, 2014; León and Erviti, 2015), indicating the possible downside of a televisual ‘issue attention cycle’. This is apparent in documentary programming too – a pattern of rising attention in the mid-to-late 2000s, followed by a pronounced subsequent drop-off in attention.⁷ All of this matters since television, alongside the press, is a major source of information in many democracies.

However, the meaningfulness of the term ‘issue attention cycle’ when referring to the web, is less obvious. Material in this domain does not surface, then fade from view, in quite the way it does on television or in newspapers. Clearly, with climate change – as any topic – it is clichéd to note that the internet contains unlimited quantities of accessible material, all communicable instantaneously, many to many. However, we need to appreciate that there are significant country-to-country variations in a) how many citizens are able to access this material, that is the ‘digital divide’ (Norris, 2001; Ofcom, 2012; Sverjensky, 2012), and b)

Table 22.1 TV coverage of the 2009 Copenhagen conference. Sunday 6 December–Monday 21 December

	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M
	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
BBC (early evening)		*	*	*		*	*		*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
ITN (early evening)		*				*	*		*	*	*	*	*	*	*	

Source: Adapted from Gavin and Marshall, 2011, p.1038.

Table 22.2 TV coverage around the first UN IPCC report. Friday 20 September–Friday 4 October 2013

	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F
	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	1	2	3	4
ITN (early evening)								*							
BBC (early evening)				*			*	*							
ITN (late evening)							*	*							
BBC (late evening)				*	*		*	*							

Source: Derived directly from BBC and ITN coverage

their inclination to use the web – or other media – in pursuit of information. It is not always apparent that the public are inclined to use the web as an information source generally (Ofcom, 2007).⁸ This limited use can also extend to climate-related material, although this too varies considerably between countries (see Ashworth et al., 2011, p.36; Bråten et al., 2011; Eurobarometer, 2011; Liarakou et al., 2011; Schäfer, 2012). And there is an added complication: heavily conflicting evidence about whether the web is actually used and trusted (for instance, Wilson, 1995; Whitmarsh, 2009; Sharples, 2010; Ipsos MORI, 2013). Finally, there is some indication the web serves mainly to duplicate, and thereby retransmit, conventional media coverage (Gavin, 2009b; Redden and Witschge, 2010; Gavin and Marshall, 2011).

There is, nevertheless, a great deal of valuable information on the internet, for instance the National Snow and Ice Data Centre website, or the recent joint statement by the UK Royal Society and US National Academy of Sciences.⁹ However, factors pertinent to conventional media coverage of climate are also relevant on the web. For instance, while scientific institutions around the world have improved their public relations (PR) professionalism (Lederbogen and Trebbe, 2003), communicating to the public through the web is not the

Table 22.3 TV coverage around the second and third UN IPCC reports: Monday 24 March–Sunday 20 April 2014

	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S							
	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
ITN (early evening)								★													★							
BBC (early evening)		★						★													★							
ITN (late evening)									★												★							
BBC (late evening)																						★						

Source: Derived directly from BBC and ITN coverage

central preoccupation of many climate scientists (Bonetta, 2007; Schäfer, 2012). So they are ineffective web communicators, as well as poor communicators generally. In addition, environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) – another set of potentially important players – seem disinclined to make full use of the new media to get a message across to the public (Jun, 2011), instead, using them primarily to attract the attention of conventional media (Doyle, 2009; Lester and Hutchins, 2009; Jun, 2011).

Finally, it is also clear the public are much more keen on searching the web for topics other than climate change (Gavin and Marshall, 2011, p.1042). And there is even a loose analogue for the issue attention cycle on the web: searches for ‘climate change’ on Google around the world show an increase in the early 2000s, followed by marked decline since 2007, with some ‘spasmodic recurrence’ around Copenhagen 2009 (Anderegg and Goldsmith, 2014, p.4).

Further impediments to full public appreciation of climate security issues

The patterns illuminated here are unlikely to impact significantly on public anxiety about environment security as an issue, and it is perhaps noteworthy that in some quarters other issues – like the economy – are frequently viewed as the most pressing concerns facing a country.¹⁰ But there are other aspects of media engagement with climate change that may obscure for the public the threat it poses to human security. For instance on the web, and especially the wider reaches of the blogosphere where climate change is a prevalent discussion topic,¹¹ commentary can be disputational, as well as unedifying, shrill, and sometimes aggressively strident (Gavin and Marshall, 2011). Indeed, as one study submits, it can be a ‘rantosphere’ (Gavin, 2009b).

The disputation can take the form of climate sceptics challenging the prevailing scientific consensus. Conservative-leaning sceptical organisations have been particularly active in using the web to get their message across (McNutt and Marchildon, 2009; Gavin and Marshall, 2011; Holliman, 2012; Boykoff, 2013). This material has potentially global reach via nationally situated Google searches (Gavin and Marshall, 2011), and is a concern since we already know that, ‘...in the “denialosphere” [sceptical] arguments never disappear – they are continually recycled’ (Elsasser and Dunlap, 2013, p.760). Furthermore, the denizens of this denialosphere can be hoaxed into circulating and recirculating even the most preposterous and scientifically unsupported nonsense about climate change (Washington and Cook, 2011, p.94). However, we need to remember the web is not always the first port of call for citizens seeking trusted information. And in any event, the evidence suggests such material is sought out more frequently in some locales than in others: notably Canada, Australia and the USA, and the cities of Toronto and London, according to Anderegg and Goldsmith (2014).

But sceptical commentary is also widely evident in newspapers. This is, however, not uniform. A number of studies (Weingart et al., 2000; Dispensa and Brulle, 2003; Billet, 2010; Painter, 2011; Painter and Ashe, 2012; Bacon and Nash, 2012; McGaurr et al., 2013) suggest that its reflection is much more prevalent in some countries (like the UK, USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) than others (Brazil, France, China, India and Germany). These differences may reflect conscious efforts by sceptics to cloud public understanding (Oreskes and Conway, 2010), that are more concerted and effective in the former than the latter. Research suggests they are particularly active in the English speaking world: in the USA (Dunlap and McCright, 2010), Canada (Hoggan, 2009), Britain (Monbiot, 2006; Dunlap and Jacques, 2013) and Australia (McDonald, 2012), to the extent that one commentator has dubbed it an ‘Anglo-Saxon phenomenon’ (Painter, 2011, p.15). But they have been much

less successful in other contexts, like Germany (Weingart et al., 2000; Grundmann, 2007). Yet scepticism is still a persistent presence in newspapers' editorials, op-eds and political commentary pieces (Painter, 2011; Gunster, 2011), with a suggestion that its prominence is not necessarily diminishing, after a high profile scandal about leaked emails between climate scientists – 'Climategate' – had subsided (Painter and Gavin, in press).

On television, there can also be a sceptical turn to coverage, although this is less extensively researched. Its imprint too shows signs of geographical patterning. It is evident in television coverage in Australia (Chubb and Nash, 2012) and the USA (Unger, 2014). One estimate found that 70 per cent of US television stories over a period from 1995 to 2004 carried a 'balanced' take on the causes of climate change (Boykoff, 2011, pp. 127–9). This combined the message that humans contribute to climate change, with the obverse, that our impact is negligible – a common sceptical argument (Gavin and Marshall, 2011). Scepticism also figured prominently in UK television coverage of Copenhagen 2009 (Gavin and Marshall, 2011), and can be found in documentary programming too (Gavin, 2007).

A provisional assessment of the coverage of the latest IPCC reports figuring in Tables 22.2 and 22., suggests that the sort of rhetorical claims regularly made by climate sceptics are strongly evident across these stories: scientific debate and dissensus, exaggeration and uncertainty; flawed or alarmist science; previous IPCC errors; the contribution of solar radiation to climate change; improbable or uncertain projections; the benefits from climate change; and the notion that temperature rises have stopped ('the pause'). All are common sceptic tropes (Gavin and Marshall, 2011), but prominent sceptical commentators – sometimes but not always contradicted in the commentary – also had their say: blogger Andrew Montford, alongside Benny Peiser and Professor Richard Tol (the latter two closely associated with the contrarian Global Warming Policy Foundation).¹²

The sceptical coverage outlined here is in danger of clouding public debate about what are some of the least controversial dimensions of climate science knowledge: climate change is happening and humans are a significant contributor to this. And there is some evidence that such commentary plays a role in confusing viewers and readers (Butler and Pigeon, 2009; Philo and Harper, 2013). This is unlikely to create an environment conducive to a realistic appreciation of climate security issues, or supportive of potentially costly mitigation policies.

However, even a provisional assessment of this UK coverage illuminates some of its most obvious patterns, and illustrates other ways in which debate on associated issues might be inappropriately directed. Throughout the coverage, almost exclusively, and on both channels, the primary creator or cause of CO₂ pollution was abstracted and general: it was man(kind/made), human(s) activity, humankind, 'us' or 'we'. This narrow approach brackets out issues of historical emission (predominately from Western, developed countries; Botzen et al., 2008), per capita emissions (where Australia and the USA are top; Olivier et al., 2012), 'historical per capita emissions' (where Britain is preeminent)¹³ or emissions resulting from production of goods for Western consumption (Guan et al., 2009). This kind of omission in reporting is not a one-off, nor confined to television coverage (Smith and Gavin, 2013). However, it has the potential to distort and narrow debate about who might be thought the most (or ultimately) responsible for mitigating carbon emissions.

Finally, throughout the UK television coverage of the recent reports from the UN IPCC, there were numerous references to the catastrophic aspects of projected climate change: among them, 'extreme weather/projections/flooding'; 'ever-more extreme' or 'dangerous weather/threat/paths'; 'danger to world peace'; 'dangerous/severe/runaway threat(s)'; 'catastrophic flooding'; 'alarm bells'; and 'irreversible' climate change. However, evidence

suggests that such tropes, rather than galvanizing into action those exposed to them, can actually switch them off, and lead to disengagement, fatalism and apathy (Moser, 2007).

Conclusions and implications: 'crisis, what crisis?'

The preceding analysis suggests some broad conclusions. The conventional media appear to be performing poorly in bringing climate change to public attention. And the web is not a straightforward substitute. It is not always trusted, or used as an information source. This is perhaps just as well. The internet can be an informational 'wild west', embracing and recycling impassioned but unedifying debate, facilitating the circulation of dubious facts and data, and offering a platform for contrarian commentary not rooted in the science. Nevertheless, in the conventional media alternative, there is limited coverage of climate change relative to other topics, and a clear issue attention cycle in press and television reporting. This has been compounded recently by limited or ineffective input from political leaders, scientists and NGOs. And alongside a limited overall profile, there are other unhelpful ways in which conventional media can frame climate: as a problem whose cause is 'us' (rather than, more accurately, 'pre-eminently, the developed nations'), or as an imminent 'existential catastrophe'.

However, this does not in any sense mean that the conventional media are negligent or to blame, since coverage profiles are often driven by news values and professional norms that, in turn, reflect what the public want to read and watch. Perhaps this argues for a more realistic view of what the current media can actually achieve, as opposed to some unobtainable ideal. This is a view reflected by Graber (2003). She argues that the media perform well short of the ideal, particularly with regard to its watchdog role. However, she contends, there is still sufficient solid reporting for citizens to get a sense of what is going on. Recent experiences with other security-related issues do not, however, reflect well on this argument. The American media's retrospective admission that they had performed poorly in challenging politicians over weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and Iraq policy (Kellner, 2008),¹⁴ is a case that reflects the poverty of her argument, as it relates to climate change. For our media and their audiences can scarcely afford to look backward at what might be runaway and ultimately uncontrollable climate change, and lament the fact that they might well, and should, have done things differently.

In the meantime, there is ample room for the science community, NGOs and political leaders to draw attention to climate change, and in a way that will stimulate debate and enhance public engagement with the issue. But there is a danger that this may have to await circumstances where there is less economic turbulence than we are still currently experiencing, that is, for climate security to supersede its economic counterpart. One can only hope we can afford the wait.

Notes

- 1 At their website, each domain can be isolated or viewed comparatively.
- 2 See <http://www.csiro.au/Outcomes/Climate/Understanding/State-of-the-Climate-2014.aspx>
- 3 <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/sep/02/guardian-environment-team>
- 4 'For Obama, a renewed focus on climate', *Washington Post*, 4 May 2014.
- 5 'Australia approves A\$16bn coal mine despite Barrier Reef fears', *Financial Times*, 8 May 2014.
- 6 'China reverts to credit as property slump threatens to drag down economy', *Telegraph* 13 May 2014; 'Eurozone economic growth loses momentum', BBC, 15 May 2014.
- 7 <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmsctech/254/254vw21.htm>

- 8 <http://www.people-press.org/2008/12/23/internet-overtakes-newspapers-as-news-outlet/>
- 9 See <http://nsidc.org/> and <http://royalsociety.org/policy/projects/climate-evidence-causes/>
- 10 <http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/2905/Issues-Index-2012-onwards.aspx?view=wide>
- 11 ‘Bloggers focus on two favorite subjects: Health care and global warming’ (http://www.journalism.org/index_report/bloggers_focus_two_favorite_subjects_health_care_and_global_warming).
- 12 <http://www.thegwpf.org/>
- 13 ‘Climate Change: Key Facts’, *New International*, Issue 442, May 2011, p.22.
- 14 ‘The Times and Iraq’, editorial, *The New York Times*, 26 May 2004.

References

- Anderegg, W.R.L., and Goldsmith, G.R. (2014), ‘Public Interest in Climate Change Over the Past Decade and the Effects of the “Climategate” Media Event’, *Environmental Research Letters*, 9(5): 1–8.
- Anderson, K., and Bows, A. (2011), ‘Beyond “Dangerous” Climate Change; Emissions Scenarios for a New World’, *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A*, 369(1934): 20–44.
- Andreadis, E., and Smith, J. (2007), ‘Beyond the Ozone Layer’, *British Journalism Review*, 18(1): 50–6.
- Ashworth, P., Jeanneret, T., Gardner, J. and Shaw, H. (2011) *Communication and Climate Change: What the Australian Public Thinks*, Clayton South, Victoria: Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation.
- Bacon, W., and Nash, C. (2012), ‘Playing the Media Game: The Relative (In)visibility of Coal Industry Interests in Media Reporting of Coal as a Climate Change Issue in Australia’, *Journalism Studies*, 13(2): 243–58.
- Barnett, J. (2010), ‘Environmental Security’, in Burgess, J.P. (ed) *The Routledge Handbook of New Security Studies*, London: Routledge, pp. 123–131.
- Billet, S. (2010), ‘Dividing Climate Change: Global Warming in the Indian Mass Media’, *Climatic Change*, 99(1–2): 1–16.
- Bonetta, L. (2007), ‘Scientists Enter the Blogosphere’, *Cell*, 129(3): 443–5.
- Botzen, W.J.W., Gowdy, J.M., and Van Den Bergh, J.C.J.M. (2008), ‘Cumulative CO₂ Emissions: Shifting International Responsibilities for Climate Debt’, *Climate Policy*, 8(6): 569–76.
- Boykoff, M.T. (2008), ‘Lost in Translation? United States Television News Coverage of Anthropogenic Climate Change, 1995–2004’, *Climatic Change*, 86(1–2): 1–11.
- Boykoff, M.T. (2010), *Who Speaks for the Climate: Making Sense of Media Reporting on Climate Change*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Boykoff, M.T. (2011), *Who Speaks for the Climate?: Making Sense of Media Reporting on Climate Change*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Boykoff, M.T. (2013), ‘Public Enemy No.1?: Understanding Media Representations of Outlier Views on Climate Change’, *American Behavioral Scientist*, 57(6): 796–817.
- Boykoff, M.T., and Boykoff, J.M. (2007), ‘Climate Change and Journalistic Norms: A Case-study of US Mass-media Coverage’, *Geoforum*, 38(6): 1190–204.
- Bråten, I., Strømso, H.I., and Salmerón, L. (2011), ‘Trust and Mistrust When Students Read Multiple Sources about Climate Change’, *Learning and Instruction*, 21(2): 180–92.
- Brossard, D., Shanahan, J., and McComas, K. (2004), ‘Are Issue-Cycles Culturally Constructed? A Comparison of French and American Coverage of Global Climate Change’, *Mass Communication and Society*, 7(3): 359–77.
- Brysse, K., Oreskes, N., O’Reilly, J., and Oppenheimer, M. (2013), ‘Climate Change Prediction: Erring on the Side of Least Drama’, *Global Environmental Change*, 23(1): 327–37.
- Butler, C., and Pigeon, N. (2009), ‘Media Communications and Public Understanding of Climate Change: Reporting Scientific Consensus on Anthropogenic Warming’, in Boyce, T., and Lewis, J. (eds) *Climate Change and the Media*, Oxford: Peter Lang, pp. 43–58.
- Canadell, J.G., Le Quéré, C., Raupach, M.R., Field, C.B., Buitenhuis, E.T., Ciais, P., Conway, T.J., Gillett, N.P., Houghton, R.A., and Marland, G. (2007), ‘Contributions to Accelerating Atmospheric CO₂ Growth from Economic Activity, Carbon Intensity, and Efficiency of Natural Sinks’, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 104(47): 18866–70.
- Chubb, P., and Nash, C. (2012), ‘The Politics of Reporting Climate Change at the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’, *Media International Australia*, 144: 37–48.

- Cook, J., Nuccitelli, D., Green, S.A., Richardson, M., Winkler, B., Painting, R., Way, R., Jacobs, P., and Skuce, A. (2013), 'Quantifying the Consensus on Anthropogenic Global Warming in the Scientific Literature', *Environmental Research Letters*, 8(2): 1–8.
- de Goede, M. (2010), 'Financial Security', in Burgess, J.P. (ed) *The Routledge Handbook of News Security Studies*, Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 100–9.
- Dispensa, J.M., and Brulle, R.J. (2003), 'Media's Social Construction of Environmental Issues: Focus on Global Warming – a Comparative Study', *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, 23(10): 74–105.
- Djerf-Pierre, M. (2012), 'Issue Dynamics and Attention to Environmental Issues in Television News Reporting Over 30 years', *Journalism Studies*, 13(4): 499–516.
- Downs, A. (1972), 'Up and Down with Ecology: The Issue–Attention Cycle', *The Public Interest*, 28(1): 38–50.
- Doyle, J. (2009), 'Climate Action and Environmental Activism', in Boyce, T., and Lewis, J. (eds) *Climate Change and the Media*, Oxford: Peter Lang, pp. 103–16.
- Dunlap, R.E., and McCright, A.M. (2010), 'Climate Change Denial: Sources, Actors and Strategies', in Lever-Tracy, C. (ed) *Routledge Handbook of Climate Change and Society*, London: Routledge, pp. 103–16.
- Dunlap, R.E., and Jacques, P.J. (2013), 'Climate Change Denial Books and Conservative Think Tanks: Exploring the Connection', *American Behavioral Scientist*, 57(6): 699–731.
- Elsasser, S.W., and Dunlap, R.E. (2013), 'Leading Voices in the Denier Choir: Conservative Columnists' Dismissal of Global Warming and Denigration of Climate Science', *American Behavioral Scientist*, 57(6): 754–76.
- Eurobarometer (2011), *Special Eurobarometer 364: Public Awareness and Acceptance of CO₂ Capture and Storage*, Brussels: EU Commission.
- Gavin, N.T. (2007), 'The Global Warming Issue in Britain and the Politics of Documentary Journalism', a paper prepared for the PSA Media and Politics Group conference, University of Staffordshire, November.
- Gavin, N.T. (2009a), 'Addressing Climate Change: A Media Perspective', *Environmental Politics*, 18(5): 765–80.
- Gavin, N.T. (2009b), 'The Web and Climate Change: Lessons from Britain?', in Boyce, T., Lewis, J. (eds) *Climate Change and the Media*, Oxford: Peter Lang, pp. 129–42.
- Gavin, N.T., and Marshall, T. (2011), 'Mediated Climate Change in Britain: Scepticism on the Web and on Television around Copenhagen', *Global Environmental Change*, 21(3): 1035–44.
- Graber, D. (2003), 'The Media and Democracy: Beyond Myths and Stereotypes', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 61: 139–60.
- Grundmann, R. (2007), 'Climate Change and Knowledge Politics', *Environmental Politics*, 16(3): 414–32.
- Grundmann, R., and Scott, M. (2014), 'Disputed Climate Science in the Media: Do Countries Matter?', *Public Understanding of Science*, 23(2): 220–35.
- Guan, D., Peters, G.P., and Weber, C.L. (2009), 'Journey to World Top Emitter: An Analysis of the Driving Forces of China's Recent CO₂ Emissions Surge', *Geophysical Research Letters*, 36: L04709.
- Gunster, S. (2011), 'Covering Copenhagen: Climate Change in BC Media', *Canadian Journal of Communication*, 36(3): 477–502.
- Harcup, T., and O'Neill, D. (2001), 'What is News', *Journalism Studies*, 2(2): 261–80.
- Hargreaves, I., Lewis, J., and Speers, T. (2003) *Towards a Better Map: Science, the Public and the Media*, Swindon: ESRC.
- Hoggan, J. (2009), *Climate Cover-up: The Crusade to Deny Global Warming*, Vancouver: Greystone Books.
- Holliman, R. (2012), 'Advocacy in the Tail: Exploring the Implications of "Climategate" for Science Journalism and Public Debate in the Digital Age', *Journalism*, 12(7): 832–46.
- Huysmans, J. (2006), *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*, London: Routledge.
- Ipsos MORI (2013), PREPARE - Climate Risk Acceptability: Findings from a Series of Deliberative Workshops and Online Survey, London: Ipsos MORI.
- Jenkins, J.C. (2011), 'Democratic Politics and the Long March on Global Warming: Comments on McCright and Dunlap', *The Sociology Quarterly*, 52(2): 211–19.
- Jun, J. (2011), 'How Climate Change Organizations Utilize Websites for Public Relations', *Public Relations Review*, 37(3): 245–9.
- Kellner, D., (2008), 'War Correspondents, the Military, and Propaganda: Some Critical Reflections', *International Journal of Communication*, 2: 297–330

- Lederbogen, U., Trebbe, J. (2003), 'Promoting Science on the Web: Public Relations for Scientific Organizations – Results of a Content Analysis', *Science Communication*, 24(3): 333–52.
- Lenton, T.M., Held, H., and Kriegler, E. (2008), 'Tipping Elements in the Earth's Climate System', *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 105(6): 1786–93.
- León, B., and Erviti, M.C. (2015), 'Science in Pictures: Visual Representation of Climate Change in Spain's Television News', *Public Understanding of Science*, 24(2): 183–199.
- Lester, L., and Hutchins, B. (2009), 'Power Games: Environmental Protest, News Media and the Internet', *Media Culture and Society*, 31(4): 579–95.
- Liarakou, G., Athanasiadis, I., and Gavrilakis, C. (2011), 'What Greek Secondary School Students Believe about Climate Change?', *International Journal of Environmental and Science Education*, 6(1): 79–98.
- Lovelock, J. (2007), *The Revenge of Gaia: Why the Earth is Fighting Back and How We Can Still Save Humanity*, London: Penguin.
- McComas, K., and Shanahan, J. (1999), 'Telling Stories about Global Climate Change', *Communication Research*, 26(1): 30–57.
- McDonald, M. (2012), 'The Failed Securitization of Climate Change in Australia', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 47(4): 579–92.
- McGaurr, L.C., Lester, E.A., and Painter, J. (2013), 'Risk, Uncertainty and Opportunity in Climate Change Coverage: Australia Compared', *Australian Journalism Review*, 35(2): 21–34.
- McNutt, K., and Marchildon, G. (2009), 'Think Tanks and the Web: Measuring Visibility and Influence', *Canadian Public Policy*, 35(2): 219–36.
- Monbiot, G. (2006), *Heat: How to Stop the Planet Burning*, London: Allen Lane.
- Moser, S.C. (2007), 'More Bad News: The Risk of Neglecting Emotional Responses to Climate Change Information', in Moser, S.C., and Dilling, L. (eds) *Creating a Climate for Change: Communicating Climate Change and Facilitating Social Change*, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 64–80.
- Nacu-Schmidt, A., McAllister, L., Gifford, L., Daly, M., Boykoff, M., Boehnert, J. Andrews, K., and Wang, X. (2014), World Newspaper Coverage of Climate Change or Global Warming, 2004–2014, Center for Science and Technology Policy Research, Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences, University of Colorado, http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/media_coverage
- Norris, P. (2001), *Digital Divide: Civic Engagement, Information Poverty, and the Internet Worldwide*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ofcom (2007), *New News, Future News*, London: Ofcom.
- Ofcom (2012), *Adult Media Use and Attitudes Report*, London: Ofcom.
- Olivier, J.G.J., Janssens-Maenhout, G., and Peters, J.A.H.W. (2012), *Trends in Global CO2 Emissions: 2012 Report*, The Hague: PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency.
- Oreskes, N., and Conway, E.M. (2010), *Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming*, London: Bloomsbury Press.
- Painter, J. (2011), *Poles Apart: The International Reporting of Climate Scepticism*, Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism.
- Painter, J., and Ashe, T. (2012), 'Cross-National Comparison of the Presence of Climate Scepticism in the Print Media in Six Countries, 2007–2010', *Environmental Research Letters*, 7(4): 1–8.
- Painter, J., and Gavin, N.T. (in press), 'Climate Scepticism in the British Press, 2000–2001', *Environmental Communication*. DOI:10.1080/17524032.2014.995193
- Pew (2010), *Global Warming Generates Little Heat in the Media*, Washington, DC: Pew Research Center for the People and the Press.
- Philo, G. and Harper, C. (2013) *Communicating Climate Change and Energy Security: New Methods in Understanding Audiences*, London: Routledge.
- Redclift, M.R., and Grasso, M. (2013), *Handbook on Climate Change and Human Security*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Redden, J., and Witschge, T. (2010) 'A New News Order? Online News Content Examined', in Fenton, N. (ed) *New Media, Old News: Journalism and Democracy in the Digital Age*, London: Sage, pp. 171–86.
- Rothschild, E. (1995), 'What Is Security?', *Daedalus*, 124(3): 53–98.
- Schäfer, M. (2012), 'Online Communication on Climate Change and Climate Politics: A Literature Review', *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change*, 3(6): 527–43.
- Schmidt, A., Ivanova, A., and Schäfer, M.S. (2013), 'Media Attention for Climate Change around the World: A Comparative Analysis of Newspaper Coverage in 27 Countries', *Global Environmental Change*, 23(5): 1233–48.

- Sharples, D.M. (2010), 'Communicating Climate Science: Evaluating the UK Public's Attitude to Climate Change', *Earth and Environment*, 5: 185–205.
- Smith, J. (2005), 'Dangerous News: Media Decision Making about Climate Change Risk', *Risk Analysis*, 25(6): 1471–82.
- Smith, E., and Gavin, N.T. (2013), 'Climate Change: The British Press and Coverage of China at the 2009 Copenhagen Conference', a paper presented at the MeCCSA conference, University of Derry, January.
- Sverjensky, N. (2012), 'Digital Divide: The Reality of Information Haves and Have-Nots', in Costigan, S.S., Perry, J. (eds) *Cyberspaces and Global Affairs*, Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 239–48.
- Takahashi, B. (2011), 'Framing and Sources: A Study of Mass Media Coverage of Climate Change in Peru during the V ALCUE', *Public Understanding of Science*, 20(4): 543–57.
- Trumbo, C. (1996), 'Constructing Climate Change: Claims and Frames in US News Coverage of an Environmental Issue', *Public Understanding of Science*, 5(3): 269–83.
- Unger, S. (2014), 'Media Context and Reporting Opportunities on Climate Change: 2012 versus 1988', *Environmental Communication*, 8(2): 233–48.
- Washington, H., and Cook, J. (2011), *Climate Change Denial: Heads in the Sand*, London: Earthscan.
- Weingart, P., Engels, A., and Pansegrau, P. (2000), 'Risks of Communication: Discourse on Climate Change in Science, Politics and the Mass Media', *Public Understanding of Science*, 9(3): 261–83.
- Whitmarsh, L. (2009), 'What's in a Name? Commonalities and Differences in Public Understanding of "Climate Change" and "Global Warming"', *Public Understanding of Science*, 18(4): 401–20.
- Wilson, K.M. (1995), 'Mass Media as Sources of Global Warming Knowledge', *Mass Communication Review*, 22(1): 75–89.
- Wilson, K.M. (2000), 'Communicating Climate Change through the Media: Predictions, Politics and Perceptions of Risk', in Allan, S. et al. (eds) *Environmental Risks in the Media*, London: Routledge, pp. 201–17.

23

PROPAGANDA AND PERSUASION IN CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT

David Miller, Piers Robinson and Vian Bakir

Overview

The term propaganda is frequently understood to be an activity that can be relegated either to history or to non-democratic ‘enemy’ states and actors. For example, the term often conjures up images of World War II (WWII) Nazi activities headed by Joseph Goebbels or the demonisation of Germans and Japanese during US and British WWII propaganda campaigns. In the contemporary context, when talking of enemies, any given political actor will frequently dismiss their media output and claims as propaganda. As an activity, however, that is inherently geared towards persuasion and influence through some kind of manipulation, propaganda is not always clearly distinguishable from many, although not necessarily all, of the activities that Western academics and practitioners label in more benign terms. These include *perception management*, *psychological operations (psy ops)*, *public diplomacy*, *public affairs* and *strategic communication*. In fact, scholars such as Philip Taylor, a leading historian on the subject of war and propaganda, have little patience for the use of these alternative labels:

Let us first dispel with the euphemistic nonsense that surrounds this topic and which does in fact obscure what we are actually talking about – namely propaganda. ... an entire euphemism industry has developed to deflect attention away from the realities of what they do, ranging from ‘spin doctoring’ and ‘public affairs’ at the political level to ‘international information’ and ‘perception management’ at the military level. ... despite the euphemism game, democracies have grown ever more sophisticated at conducting propaganda, however labeled, which only they deny to be propaganda in the first place.

(Taylor 2002: 20)

In this chapter we adopt Taylor’s position and employ the term propaganda to describe the variety of activities today employed in order to persuade people and influence behaviour. Of course, this position is not uncontroversial, as many believe that propaganda is an activity distinct from ‘strategic communication’ or ‘public relations (PR)’ and it is necessary to be clear on our reasoning for this choice. First, the term propaganda, understood as a strategy of persuasion

involving some level of manipulation, is in fact the historical term used to describe activities now frequently referred to as PR or strategic communication. Here it is worth remembering that, in the early twentieth century, the term propaganda carried few negative connotations. However, its extensive use during World War I (WWI) increased awareness of its manipulative nature and led to a drive by advocates of propaganda to 'rebrand': Edward Bernays (founding father of PR) stated that: 'propaganda got to be a bad word because of the Germans ... using it [during WWI]. So what I did was to ... find some other words. So we found the words Counsel on Public Relations'. A contemporary expression of this approach in PR scholarship is Grunig and Hunt's influential four models of PR. As Moloney notes, these set out four categories of PR, three of which involve propagandistic or manipulative communication. The fourth category – non-propagandistic symmetrical two-way communication – 'has taken hold in many universities ... to over-emphasise PR as a practice of virtuous messaging, known as two-way communications between equal, listening, negotiating, mutually respectful message senders and receivers'. Adoption by many PR scholars of Grunig and Hunt's two-way symmetrical model as representative of contemporary PR activities presents a distorted view of reality. Moloney is scathing when he writes that it takes 'the PR academy into a neverland of perfection'. Second, we contend that most of the activities described as public relations or strategic communication do in fact involve some level of manipulation that are consistent with nearly all historical and contemporary definitions of propaganda. Certainly, 'PR' activities in the realm of war and conflict often involve manipulation (for example through deception via omission, distortion or, in extreme cases, lying). Using terms such as 'PR' or strategic communication perpetuates an inaccurate and misleading impression that these persuasion activities are largely free from manipulation.

We do argue that, as a field, persuasion studies need to grapple more effectively with understanding non-manipulative forms of persuasion, as well as mapping the variety of ways that persuasion can become manipulative. Neither those who use terms such as PR, nor those who employ the term propaganda, have really got to grips with this and we explore this at the end of the chapter. We argue that there is a real need for a clearer conceptualisation of those propagandistic forms that are highly manipulative – namely, those entailing deception and/or coercion. This is an important point because, by identifying deception and coercion as important propagandistic forms, this enables us to appreciate the scale and scope of contemporary manipulative propaganda. It is only through such recognition that scholars can take the next critical steps. These would entail a) mapping out how persuasion could work through less manipulative means; and b) articulating those circumstances where deception is necessary, but also how and when deception should be exposed. While these critical steps are beyond the scope of this introductory chapter, a detailed exposition can be found elsewhere (Bakir et al. 2015; Herring and Robinson 2014).

With these points in mind, this chapter provides an introduction to propaganda in relation to war and conflict. In particular, we see this area of study as being renewed at this point in time, with increasing attention from academics (e.g. Bakir et al. 2015; Jowett and O'Donnell 2012; Moloney 2006) to the field of propaganda. In this sense, propaganda is a 'new old' subject area. We start by outlining the importance of these activities to the contemporary generation of policymakers and noting also the relevance and significance of deception as a political strategy. We then map three distinct areas in which propaganda plays a key role in conflict: 1) influencing domestic opinion; 2) shaping international/global opinion; and 3) 'winning hearts and minds' within conflict zones. The chapter concludes by specifying key areas in which further conceptual/theoretical, ethical and empirical research are necessary in order to further our understanding of the role of propaganda in contemporary society.

The importance and relevance of propaganda (and deception) today

Whether one wishes to call it strategic communication, perception management or propaganda, these activities aimed at influence and persuasion are of profound importance to the political sphere, especially so when it comes to war and conflict. For example, in the US context, Bennett et al. describe how, for the Bush administration, public affairs firmly established itself as a new form of governing with the ‘malleable and subordinate nature of reality, the elastic human capacity to perceive it, and the mechanisms used to shape it’ meaning that, to policymakers, ‘narratives matter more than material reality’ (Bennett et al. 2007: 136–137). In turn, narratives shape perceptions of reality that ‘open the way to the use of power to create those realities’ (Bennett et al. 2007: 137). Bennett et al.’s interview with independent journalist Ron Suskind provides evidence of this mentality; Suskind quotes a senior administration official:

We’re an empire now, and when we act we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality-judiciously as you will—we’ll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that’s how things will sort out. We’re history’s actors ... and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do.

(Bennett et al. 2007: 138)

In the UK context, in part flowing from the Labour Party’s bitter experience with a hostile right-wing British press, the Blair government (1997–2007) was focused on public relations. Indeed, the reputation of the Blair government for spin has been widely documented and discussed (e.g. Franklin 2003). Recently, Blair’s Chief of Staff, Jonathan Powell, published his memoirs, titled *The New Machiavelli: how to wield power in the modern world*, in which he devotes a full chapter to detailing their approach to dealing with media. With Director of Communications and Strategy Alastair Campbell in charge, Powell states ‘we needed a proactive media operation that not just responded to stories, but created them’ (Powell 2010: 193). Finally, an important insight into the extent to which concern over public relations had increased in the years running up to the Iraq invasion is provided by an MI6 officer during the Chilcot inquiry into the Iraq war. When asked about the presence of Campbell during briefings from MI6, he notes that

[p]ost 1997, the culture, disciplines, attitudes of HMG [Her Majesty’s Government] went through phases of profound change. It wouldn’t have happened before, closer to the Cold War ... I think it’s difficult for the Chief to say, ‘[c]an I have a private word, Prime Minister. I can’t do it in front of Campbell’.¹

To the extent that the notion of propaganda is often understood to entail a suggestion of deception, it is necessary to briefly discuss the importance of the latter phenomenon to politics. Political deception, in fact, has a long pedigree and has been a perennial concern as far back as Ancient Greece and includes Plato’s *The Republic* and Aristotle’s *On Rhetoric* (Bakir et al. 2017; Corner 2007). For some scholars and practitioners, deception is frequently a matter of necessity, especially in the challenging and dangerous realm of international politics and conflict. For example, in his work *Why Leaders Lie*, Mearsheimer (2011) describes how lying is frequent in the realm of international politics and, counter-intuitively, argues that leaders lie to their own publics more frequently than they do to other leaders. He argues that the threatening realm of international politics demands that leaders sometimes lie for reasons

of state, but also notes how leaders of liberal democratic states lie when their behaviour falls short of liberal ideological claims regarding the law-abiding and war-averse nature of liberal democracies (2011: ch. 7). Harking back to Plato's 'noble lie', he also notes how nationalist myths designed to foster a cohesive state frequently involve lies and half-truths (Mearsheimer 2011: 75).

Others see deception as a more fundamental 'reality' to the demands of governance and social stability. For example, the elitist writings of Leo Strauss represent a twentieth century manifestation of Plato's critique of democracy and the associated claim that governance by the wise is preferable to rule by the majority (Strauss 1975; see also Strauss 1958). Plato's advocacy of 'the noble lie' was based upon the idea that, in order to maintain harmony in the context of a social hierarchy, myths needed to be created in order to help people accept their location in the hierarchy: God made some to rule (the golden race), others to build (iron and bronze workers) and still others to fight (soldiers). Many see in Strauss the continuation of the Platonic idea that democratic politics is too idealistic and that the greater good can only be achieved by deferring to wise and enlightened elites. Strauss's concern is that, at times, the truth would threaten political stability and, consequently, deception becomes essential to political order and stability. Strauss has come to be associated with, and deployed by, those making anti-democratic and elitist arguments, most recently in the neoconservative movement in the US (for analysis of this use see Norton 2005), though such use of his work has been disputed (Smith 1997; Zuckert and Zuckert 2006). Mearsheimer (2011: 60) quotes the leading neoconservative Irving Kristol:

There are truths appropriate for children; truths that are appropriate for students; truths that are appropriate for educated adults; and truths that are appropriate for highly educated adults, and the notion that there should be one set of truths for everyone is a fallacy of modern day democracy, it simply does not work.

(Cited in Bailey 1997)

Of course, not all propaganda is the same and it is certainly true that there exist wide variations between propaganda involving outright lying and that which involves less blunt forms of manipulation such as half-truths and exaggerations and pointedly one-sided presentations of the truth. At the same time, to the extent that all of these activities are frequently aimed at persuasion via some degree of manipulation, the issue is essentially one of a continuum and, as some propaganda experts explain it, the essential difference is between *White* forms of propaganda, involving selective and biased narratives, and *Black* forms involving outright deceit. As Jowett and O'Donnell (2012: 26) put it: 'propaganda thus runs the gamut from truth to deception. It is, at the same time, always value laden and ideology laden. The means vary from a mild slanting of information to outright deception'. White Propaganda:

...is what one hears on Radio Moscow and V[oice] O[f] A[merica] during peacetime. Although what listeners hear is reasonably close to the truth, it is presented in a manner that attempts to convince the audience that that the sender is the 'good guy' with the best ideas and political ideology ... National celebrations, with their overt patriotism and regional chauvinism, can usually be classified as white propaganda. ... Black propaganda is when the source is concealed or credited to a false authority and spreads lies, fabrications, and deceptions. Black propaganda is the 'big lie' including all types of creative deceit.

(Jowett and O'Donnell 2012: 17)

Whether these current definitions and conceptualisations are adequate is a matter that we will return to in the final section of this chapter. Now, we turn to providing an overview of three key ways in which propaganda, and various forms of deception and coercion, are employed in relation to conflict.

Propaganda and conflict

Mobilising populations for war

Subject to extensive scholarly attention (e.g. Brewer 2009; Cull 1995; Taylor 2003) the role of propaganda in mobilising populations for war is perhaps one of its most important roles vis-à-vis war and conflict. Historically, such propaganda campaigns frequently involved demonisation of the official enemy and, for example, WW1 and WWII propaganda posters would often portray Germany as a savage monster or gorilla, focused on global destruction. Other components of early twentieth century propaganda campaigns also frequently involved atrocity stories, both real and imagined, designed to simultaneously highlight the depravity of the enemy and the moral superiority of 'our' side. Indeed, exploitation of actual atrocities, such as the sinking of the RMS *Lusitania* in 1915 by a German U-boat, have often been a critical part of persuading populations to support war. The RMS *Lusitania* carried almost 2000 civilians, although it was also carrying armaments, and its sinking caused a groundswell of international opinion against Germany, contributing to the eventual entry of the US into the war. The exploitation of the event as propaganda involved downplaying/denying the military cargo of the ship and highlighting its civilian passengers. Naturally, appeal to patriotism has frequently been a cornerstone of wartime propaganda. Also, fabricated/exaggerated attacks have been a key part of propaganda strategies aimed at achieving war. For example, immediately prior to WWII, Germany staged a bogus attack on a German radio station to use as a pretext for invading Poland (Mearsheimer 2011: 79–80) whilst, during the Vietnam War, false or inaccurate claims regarding an attack on a US warship by North Vietnam were used to mobilise support from the US Congress for a major escalation of US involvement in Vietnam (Alterman 2004; Mearsheimer 2011: 47).

Today, many academics researching this area tend to present state attempts at mobilisation in more benign terms and, in particular, the phrase *strategic narratives* has come into use (e.g. Miskimmon et al. 2013). In some of this new literature the focus is on how effective any given narrative is and with a tendency to present such propaganda efforts as attempts at reasonable and rational argumentation in favour of a war. So, for example, Ringsmose and Borgesen (2011) analyse how successful the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) strategic narratives have been vis-à-vis maintaining public support for war in Afghanistan and the focus is on how successful messaging involves articulating 'a clear and compelling mission purpose ... promise of wartime success ... [and a] coherent and consistent [message]' (2011: 513–514). However, even if it is the case that contemporary 'strategic communication' or 'public affairs' campaigns appear less crude and emotive than those of earlier eras, it certainly is also the case that it retains some of the features, discussed above, of propaganda activities from earlier eras. For example, in the run-up to the 1991 Gulf War, the PR firm Hill and Knowlton arranged for a Kuwaiti woman to lie to a US Congressional Committee that she had witnessed Iraqi soldiers removing babies from incubators and left them to die (MacArthur 1992: 58–59).² The false testimony (the actual occurrence of such an event has never been independently verified, see Mannheim 1994) from a young

woman who turned out to be the daughter of the Kuwaiti Ambassador to the US, was clearly employed in order to further demonise Saddam Hussein's regime and build support for military action (see also Bennett and Paletz 1994). Other notable examples of recent wartime propaganda, this time aimed at maintaining public support for an ongoing war, was the case of Jessica Lynch during the 2003 Iraq War. In this instance, the true story of a US soldier injured in an ambush, and then treated by Iraqi medics who then attempted to hand her back to US forces was manipulated and distorted into a dramatic story. The narrative was about her fighting to the last bullet (she never fired a shot) and then being valiantly rescued in a night-time helicopter rescue under enemy fire (there was no resistance and no Iraqi forces present at the hospital) (Robinson et al. 2010: 132–140). Finally, the way in which US and UK governments went about building support for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, by publicising intelligence-based allegations of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) production, has become a seminal example of highly manipulative, even deceptive, propaganda being used in order to mobilise populations in support of war. Herring and Robinson (2014) argue that British officials engaged in intentional deception when producing a dossier, for public consumption, which suggested that the intelligence was certain that Iraq possessed current WMD, whilst Mearsheimer (2011) argues that both the US and UK British governments actually lied to their publics on multiple occasions regarding alleged Iraqi WMD.

Overall, whether propaganda campaigns are in support of righteous or nefarious wars, whether they are focused on appeals to patriotism, horror of enemy atrocities or based upon wilful distortions and deceptions, accurate, unbiased and propaganda-free communication is a scarce resource when states go to war. As the well worn phrase states: in war the first casualty is truth. It is also the case that, as a general rule, domestic populations can be easily susceptible to propaganda emanating from their own governments (see Robinson 2015). For example, few Americans in the early years of the 'war on terror' questioned official propaganda narratives and many accepted inaccurate suggestions such as the one that Saddam Hussein was involved with orchestrating 9/11 (Milbank and Deane 2003).

Going global: 'public diplomacy' and soft power

Propaganda has never just been about states and their populations; it has also been a major part of the process by which states project power on the global stage. Indeed, according to some scholars of propaganda, ideological struggles such as that of the Cold War were won and lost according to who possessed the most persuasive propaganda: 'Democratic propaganda has always relied upon credibility and creditable truths for its effectiveness. That is what "won" the Cold War—that other monumental struggle for hearts and minds that took almost 50 years—two generations—for western ideals and values to prevail' (Snow and Taylor 2006: 401).

Of course, as Taylor has noted elsewhere, the issue of 'truth' is probably more accurately understood as 'our' 'Western' truth. In any case, propaganda has clearly been understood by great powers as being a key component of exercising power and influence and is frequently referred to as *public diplomacy*. In recent years these battles for global public opinion, and the propaganda association with them, have occasionally been conflated with Joseph Nye's (1990) notion of *soft power* (Miskimmon et al. 2013). This concept refers to non-coercive (and non-military) approaches to projecting power and influence in the world. In some ways, this conflation is misleading. The original emphasis with the notion of soft power was on the inherent attractiveness of a particular country to other people and the power and influence that that supplied. So, for Nye (1990), the US possesses great soft power attraction because many people around the world admired its proclaimed democracy and freedom. Propaganda,

of course, suggests that a far more active process is in play whereby there are continual and systematic attempts to encourage people to think positively about another country.

Proactive and systematic strategies designed to influence perceptions do, of course, occur and so-called public diplomacy, the favoured term for such global propaganda, has a long history. For example, the US government's Voice of America first started radio broadcasts in 1942 aimed at promoting democracy and, in time, came to be broadcast in forty-five languages with over 100 million listeners worldwide (Gilboa 1998: 58). In 1953, the United States Information Agency was created in order to 'coordinate the combat against the spread of communist ideas' (Taylor 2006: 5). Overall the aim of public diplomacy has been to attempt to influence the citizens of foreign nations in ways conducive to US interests so that they can in turn influence their respective governments accordingly. As Gilboa (1998: 58–67) describes with respect to the US case, public diplomacy, conducted through both media and other fields, including cultural and educational initiatives, has been aimed at long-term influence of target audiences around the world, functioning very much at an ideological level by both promoting values (such as democracy, human rights and capitalism) and attempting to persuade peoples of the world that the USA is the leading example of such values. Similarly, so-called *media diplomacy* has been more narrowly focused upon both promoting US interests vis-à-vis specific issues and attempting to promote a US agenda throughout the world's media. So, for example, following the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, President George Bush alighted upon a US aircraft carrier against a banner that read 'Mission Accomplished': it is likely that the event was carefully crafted so as to produce images that offered a symbol of success to the America public and send a powerful signal vis-à-vis US military prowess to the governments and peoples of the world. Similar activities and strategies were employed during the Cold War by the Soviet Union and, today, emerging global powers such as China and India are paying increasing attention to these mechanisms of influence and power projection.

Propaganda aimed at global audiences, then, is just as significant a part of propaganda operations as are those campaigns targeted at domestic audiences. In terms of effectiveness, however, they are likely to be less effective, on balance, than campaigns aimed at domestic audiences. Global/foreign audiences are far more likely to adopt ambiguous or oppositional responses to these propaganda messages. This is in part because they are not already primed to believe these messages: that is, they are coming from a government other than theirs and hence the influences of nationalism and national loyalty are in play in reverse. But it is also because other powerful states are also attempting to project power and influence via their own propaganda efforts. The current global information wars between the US/European Union (EU) and Russia vis-à-vis the Ukraine and Syria, playing out across global news media and social media, are testament to the competing propaganda narratives that are being aggressively promoted. In this contested information environment, success is by no means guaranteed, as one nation's audience is more readily able to perceive at least some of the deception being aimed at them by foreign nations.

Targeting foreign audiences in war zones

Finally, a third significant use of propaganda is in relation to actual combat operations within war zones. So-called *information warfare* (or *information operations*) refers to a wide range of activities which include battlefield communication, public communication and intelligence gathering. As a subset of *information warfare*, *psychological warfare* and *perception management* play a key role on the battlefield, especially in the context of counter-insurgency operations. In the

broadest sense, these activities involve ‘influencing the population’s perception of events and the host nation’s legitimacy, as well as insurgent decisions and decision-making processes’. Much of the basic strategy involves co-ordinating and maintaining consistent messages, or narratives, aimed at countering insurgent narratives and propaganda, and draws upon psychological operations, military deception, electronic warfare and other capabilities. These activities include engagement with local and international news media and, beyond that, dissemination of print media such as the NATO newspaper *Sada-e Azadi* in Afghanistan, advertising (such as the billboard adverts aimed at deterring suicide bombers in Afghanistan), as well as close integration of information operations with counter-insurgency operations. Regarding counter-insurgency operations, communication of key themes and messages is seen as an integral part of operations.

Of course, the effectiveness of these campaigns, compared to propaganda aimed at domestic audiences and global audiences, is relatively limited. In part this is because these audiences are rarely inclined to see things from the point of view of occupying forces. As Andrew Mackay and Steve Tatham (2011: 107–8) describe in relation to operations in Afghanistan:

In Iraq and in Afghanistan the Coalition pushed out messages, on specific channels, and hoped to achieve attitudinal change. As we have already seen, in Iraq these messages were focused on supporting the establishment of a democracy whilst in Afghanistan they were designed to build support for the government of Hamid Karzai and the continued presence of NATO and ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] forces. ... it did not take into consideration that the audience themselves may already have held preconceived views about Karzai, GIROA [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan] and ISAF, views that might contextualise their attitudes and behaviours ... In short, the audience was not already buying into the coalition message – in Afghanistan it was not a straight binary decision between the Taliban (let’s not forget they are someone’s father, brother, son) and ISAF ... In Iraq, the same binary offer existed, and here too the Iraqis refused to accept it. For them it was not a straight choice between elements of Saddam’s former Ba’ath party and a new Western-supported government. Many Iraqis were simply not convinced by either ...

The second limiting factor concerns the degree of control over the information environment. At least when it comes to domestic audiences in the West, there exists a greater degree of certainty compared to war zones such as Afghanistan as to the channels through which most of the public receive at least some of their news and information about the world. Although traditional news providers have, in the digital era, become increasingly concerned about the lack of loyalty of audiences, and especially younger generations, to legacy news, in war zones it is even less likely that the intended audience will even be exposed to the foreign propagandist’s message. For example, and again drawing upon Mackay and Tatham’s critique, attempts to introduce media that can be used to influence perceptions meet with an uphill struggle in terms of gaining interest, let alone legitimacy, amongst the population. They describe how the NATO newspaper in Afghanistan involved the production of over 400,000 copies every fortnight but that ‘anecdotally less than 10 per cent reach the intended audience’ whilst many ended up being ‘sold off to locals for wrapping shopping and food in the markets’ (Mackay and Tatham 2011: 285).³ In a nutshell, audiences here are much more likely to have an oppositional response to the messages being promoted during propaganda campaigns.

It is perhaps for these reasons that propaganda activities within war zones have a significant coercive component to them. For example, ‘information operations’ are closely integrated with counter-insurgency operations, whereby US humanitarian aid and positive messaging are combined with military action and seen as a suitable hybrid approach to ‘winning hearts and minds’ (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2009). Critically, these carrot and stick activities are not seen, by those that devise them, as separate, but as part of an integrated strategy aimed at organising conduct via a communications environment that is inextricably enmeshed with the physical context (Miller and Sabir 2012) including violent acts which largely function to persuade a broader audience. Miller (2015) discusses Commander Steve Tatham, the ‘intellectual lead’ on UK strategic communications, and notes that he: ‘acknowledged that the official view does not see strategic communication as simply a matter of communication itself. Any definition of strategic communication must “recognize”, Tatham wrote, ‘that the success of non-kinetic effect is amplified by threats of kinetic activity.’ Kinetic, in this context, means the use of force and violence. In short, propaganda in war zones is as much as about communicating threats to ‘target populations’ as it is about selling the claimed benefits of the war that is going on around them.

Conclusion: mapping areas for further research and development

As we have seen, organised approaches to persuasion and influence play an important role in contemporary conflict and do so across domestic, international and local (i.e. combat zone) contexts. In this final section, we wish to identify a number of areas that we believe to be in need of scholarly attention. These concern a) the development of a more rigorous and comprehensive conceptualisation of persuasive communication and propaganda; b) exploring the ways in which propaganda strategies have been adapted to the new Internet-based media environment; and c) greater critical engagement with both practitioners and publics regarding the avoidance of highly manipulative propaganda as well as greater engagement with more democratic forms of persuasion. We shall deal with each in turn.

Conceptualising propaganda and non-manipulative (democratic) persuasive communication

A critical area in which conceptual and theoretical advances are needed concerns our understanding of persuasive communication that involves manipulation, and how this can be distinguished from more consensual and non-manipulative forms. Most scholars who employ the label *propaganda* presume that it is, by definition, manipulative. Conversely, most scholars who use euphemisms such as *strategic communication* and *public relations* presume that these activities are (relatively) free of manipulative techniques such as deception (Bakir et al. 2015). Across both of these literatures very little conceptual work has been done in terms of elaborating precisely the mechanisms by which propaganda manipulates, or theorising what non-manipulative persuasion might look like in practice (see Corner 2007 and Herring and Robinson 2014 for initial steps). A framework that conceptualises both non-manipulative and manipulative forms of persuasive communication would go some considerable way in terms of bridging scholarship on propaganda (which deals with manipulation), Taylor’s ‘euphemism industry’ (which uses terms such as ‘strategic communication’ and ‘public diplomacy’ and tends to avoid critical engagement with issues of manipulation), and aspirations for more democratic and consensual modes of persuasion (see Bakir et al. 2015).

Propaganda in the digital age

Important changes in the information environment, underpinned by the convergence of media communication around the Internet and the ubiquity of personal digital communication, means that propaganda strategies have had to adapt (e.g. Hanson 2012; Hayden 2016). In fact, the digital environment has undoubtedly provided new opportunities for political actors to seek to influence and shape conduct and behaviour and, in particular, seems vulnerable to strategies of deception. Examples abound. For instance, exploiting the digital age's capacity for 'mass self-communication' (Castells 2009) is the use of public relations techniques such as the 'front group' where vested interests are disguised by ostensibly independent groups. Also, online identities can be assumed and used deceptively – a phenomena known as the 'sock puppet' – a fake online persona. Though they can be used playfully, they are also used in economic and political influence strategies by, for example, Stella Artois (Watson 2012) and the Special Operations Command of the US military (Fielding and Cobain 2011). Another example of new propaganda opportunities presented by the digital environment comes from the revelations, in 2013 by whistle-blower Edward Snowden, that British signals intelligence agency, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), deploys a vast range of operational tools for mass collection and analysis of citizens' online communications as well as for active deceptive communications. The leaked documents show that GCHQ propaganda unit, the Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group, possesses a wide range of tools that can alter the very fabric of digital communication through online covert action including the publication of fake materials and deceptive content. For instance, 'CLEAN SWEEP' is said to be able to 'Masquerade Facebook Wall Posts for individuals or entire countries'; 'GATEWAY' can 'artificially increase traffic to a website'; and 'SLIPSTREAM' can inflate page views on websites. Its 'techniques' include: 'CHANGELING' which provides the 'Ability to spoof any email address and send email under that identity'; 'HAVOK', a 'Real-time website cloning technique allowing on-the-fly alterations'; and 'SPACE ROCKET', a programme covering insertion of media into target networks⁴ (Greenwald 2014; Greenwald and Fishman 2015). While such propaganda is targeted at those defined by the Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group (JTRIG) as 'terrorists' or 'extremists', intended targets are not, of course, the only recipients in a globally interconnected, digital media environment. This potentially generates unintended consequences as non-target audiences consume the propaganda. Taking deception to the next level, some propagandists actively exploit this permeable boundary. For instance, Briant (2015) shows how post-'9/11', in recognition of the fragmentation and global fluidity of audiences, there has been greater Anglo-American coordination in the military's public affairs and psyops to generate the desired propaganda effect. She shows how the close Anglo-American relationship is used to overcome domestic restrictions in propaganda for purposes of counterterrorism, exploiting the two countries' different capabilities and the UK's weaker legislative restrictions on propaganda.

In short, manipulative propaganda involving deception is clearly alive and flourishing in the contemporary new media environment and there is ample work to be done in terms of investigating, mapping and theorising these activities.

Engaging academics, practitioners and publics

In many ways we have a weak grasp of the extent to which propaganda shapes the political, social and economic world around us. In part this is because many of those who analyse propaganda do so by exploring historical examples such as WWI, WWII and the Cold

War rather than engaging with contemporary events. In part it is because those who examine contemporary persuasive communication activities do so by largely ignoring the manipulative, propagandistic, dimensions of these activities, a tendency which is reflected in the use of euphemisms such as ‘strategic communication’ and ‘perception management’. This weakness is worrying. The industry underpinning what we have referred to as propaganda is massive (Davis 2013) and impacts across environmental, economic, military, political and cultural spheres. The last fifteen years have also borne witness to major Western-led wars, in which propaganda and deception have played key roles and what now, in 2016, appears to be an ever escalating ‘war on terror’ and regional conflagration in the Middle East. The world also faces an uncertain future: global climate change, resource wars and fear of superpower rivalry between the major global states (US, China, Russia etc.) are all major issues and ones in which propaganda and persuasion are playing a central role.

In this context it seems crucial that academics should engage much more directly with the question of how power is being exercised through propagandistic communication. This entails critically analysing the most highly deceptive and manipulative forms of propaganda and, in doing so, engaging with both the public and practitioners of propaganda. For the former an essential task will be to help educate people, the targets of propaganda, so that they are better able to evaluate the veracity of persuasive messages – especially those emanating from their own nation’s propagandists. For the latter, an important task is to help steer producers of persuasive communication toward communication strategies that are non-manipulative and ethically grounded. Ideally, such persuasive communication would avoid all forms of deception and coercion. If deception and coercion are deemed unavoidable and the propaganda is seen as vital to furthering the ‘national interest’ (for instance, a nation faces an unavoidable war and the only way to mobilise the population rapidly enough is through deception), then there should be some form of post-event ethical reckoning. In short, if public opinion and truth matter, and if states and powerful political actors need to be held accountable for their actions, we need much more critical attention to, and research into, propaganda.

Notes

- 1 SIS4, *Chilcot Inquiry*, p. 63.
- 2 See also ‘Deception on Capitol Hill’ *The New York Times*, 15 January 1992. <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/15/opinion/deception-on-capitol-hill.html>, download date 2 January 2016.
- 3 For a fuller discussion of these issues see Robinson 2015.
- 4 See for example <https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2014/07/14/jtrig-tools-techniques/>, download date 26 May 2016.

References

- Alterman, E. (2004) *When Presidents Lie: A History of Official Deception and Its Consequences*. New York: Viking.
- Bailey, R. (1997) ‘Origins of the Specious: why do neoconservatives doubt Darwin?’ *Reason*, July: 22–28.
- Bakir, V., Herring, E., Miller, D. and Robinson, P. (2015) ‘Organised Persuasive Communication: a conceptual framework for identifying, situating and challenging propaganda’ (unpublished working paper).
- Bakir, V., Miller, D., Herring, E. and Robinson, P. (2017) ‘Lying in Politics’ in J. Meibauer (ed.) *Oxford Handbook of Lying*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bennett, W.L. and Paletz, D.L. (eds) (1994) *Taken by Storm: the media, public opinion and US Foreign Policy in the Gulf War*. Chicago, IL and London: University of Chicago Press.

- Bennett, W.L., Livingston, S. and Lawrence, R. (2007) *When the Press Fails*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Brewer, S.A. (2009) *Why America Fights: patriotism and war propaganda from the Philippines to Iraq*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Briant, E.L. (2015) 'Allies and Audiences: evolving strategies in defense and intelligence propaganda' *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 20(2): 145–165.
- Castells, M. (2009) *Communication Power*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Corner, J. (2007) 'Mediated Politics, Promotional Culture and the Idea of Propaganda' *Media, Culture & Society* 29(4): 669–677.
- Cull, N.J. (1995) *Selling the War: the British propaganda campaign against American neutrality in WWII*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Davis, A. (2013) *Promotional Culture: the rise and spread of advertising, public relations, marketing and branding*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Fielding, N. and Cobain, I. (2011) 'Revealed: US spy operation that manipulates social media' *The Guardian*, 17 March. <https://theintercept.com/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipulation/>, download date 8 January 2016.
- Franklin, B. (2003) 'The Hand of History: New Labour, news management and governance' in A. Chadwick and R. Heffernan (eds) *The New Labour Reader*. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 304–308.
- Gilboa, E. (1998) 'Media Diplomacy: conceptual divergence and application' *Press/Politics* 3(3): 56–75.
- Greenwald, G. (2014) 'How Covert Agents Infiltrate the Internet to Manipulate, Deceive, and Destroy Reputations' *The Intercept*, 25 February 2014. <https://theintercept.com/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipulation/>, download date 8 January 2016.
- Greenwald, G. and Fishman, A. (2015) 'Controversial GCHQ Unit Engaged in Domestic Law Enforcement, Online Propaganda, Psychology Research' *The Intercept*, 22 June 2015. <https://theintercept.com/2015/06/22/controversial-gchq-unit-domestic-law-enforcement-propaganda/>, download date 8 January 2016.
- Hanson, F. (2012) *Baked in and Wired: eDiplomacy@State*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution, Policy Paper No. 30.
- Hayden, C. (2016) 'Public Diplomacy: managing narratives vs. building relations' in P. Robinson, R. Froelich and P. Seib (eds) *Routledge Handbook of Media, Conflict and Security*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 142–155.
- Herring, E. and Robinson, P. (2014) 'Report X Marks the Spot: The British government's deceptive dossier on Iraq and WMD' *Political Science Quarterly* 129(4): 551–583.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States (2009) *Counter Insurgency Operations*, Joint Publication 3–24.
- Jowett, G.S. and O'Donnell, V.J. (2012) *Propaganda and Persuasion*, 5th edn. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- MacArthur (1992) *Second Front: censorship and propaganda in the Gulf*. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Mackay, A. and Tatham, S. (2011) *Behavioural Conflict: why understanding people and their motivations will prove decisive in future conflict*. Saffron Waldon: Military Studies Press.
- Mannheim, J. (1994) 'Strategic Public Diplomacy: managing Kuwait's image during the Gulf conflict' in W.L. Bennett and D.L. Paletz (eds) *Taken by Storm*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, pp. 131–148.
- Mearsheimer, J. (2011) *Why Leaders Lie: the truth about lying in international politics*. London: Duckworth Overlook.
- Milbank, D. and Deane, C. (2003) 'Hussein Link to 9/11 Lingers in Many Minds' *Washington Post* Saturday, 6 September.
- Miller, D. (2015) 'Sociology, Propaganda and Psychological Operations', in M. Dawson, B. Fowler, D. Miller and A. Smith (eds) *Stretching the Sociological Imagination: Essays in Honour of John Eldridge*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 163–188.
- Miller, D. and Sabir, R. (2012) 'Propaganda and Terrorism: doctrine and practice' in D. Freedman and D. Thussu (eds) *Media and Terrorism: Global Perspectives*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, pp. 77–94.
- Miskimmon, A., O'Loughlin, B. and Roselle, L. (2013) *Strategic Narratives: communication power and the new world order*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Moloney, K. (2006) *Rethinking Public Relations: PR propaganda and democracy*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Norton, A. (2005) *Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Nye, J. (1990) *Bound to Lead: the changing nature of American power*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Powell, J. (2010) *The New Machiavelli: how to wield power in the modern world*. London: Random House Books.

- Ringsmose, J. and Borgesen, B.K. (2011) 'Shaping Public Attitudes towards the Deployment of Military Power' *European Security* 20(4): 505–528.
- Robinson, P. (2015) 'News Media, Communication, and the Limits of Perception Management and Propaganda during Military Operations' in R. Johnson and T. Clack (eds) *At the End of Military Intervention: historical, theoretical and applied approaches to transition, handover, and withdrawal*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 271–291.
- Robinson, P., Goddard, P., Parry, K., Murray, C. and Taylor, P.M. (2010) *Pockets of Resistance: British news media, war and theory in the 2003 invasion of Iraq*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.
- Smith, G.B. (1997) 'Leo Strauss and the Straussians: an anti-democratic cult?' *PS: Political Science and Politics* 30(2): 180–189.
- Snow, N. and Taylor, P.M. (2006) 'Revival of the Propaganda State: US public opinion at home and abroad since 9/11' *International Communication Gazette* 68: 389–407.
- Strauss, L. (1958) *Thoughts on Machiavelli*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Strauss, L. (1975) *The Argument and the Action of Plato's Laws* Chicago, IL University of Chicago Press.
- Taylor, P.M. (2002) 'Perception Management and the "War" Against Terrorism' *Journal of Information Warfare* 1(3): 16–29.
- Taylor, P.M. (2003) *Munitions of the Mind: a history of propaganda from the ancient world to the present day*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.
- Taylor, P.M. (2006) 'Strategic Communications and the Relationship Between Government "Information" Activities in the Post 9/11 World' *Journal of Information Warfare*, 5: 1–25.
- Watson, T. (2012) 'The Lobbyists, the Russians, Google and "Wife Beater"' Tom-Watson.co.uk, 2 February.
- Zuckert, C.H. and Zuckert, M.P. (2006) *The Truth about Leo Strauss: political philosophy and American democracy*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

24

COMMUNICATIONS, HUMAN INSECURITY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

Simon Cottle

In the post-Cold War period ideas of human security help to expand the historically forged parameters of humanitarianism and human rights. They do so principally by broadening conceptions of human needs and entitlements in an age of global threats, interdependency and inequality. The United Nations' Commission of Human Security, for example, re-conceptualizes security by:

(i) moving away from traditional, state-centric conceptions of security that focused primarily on the safety of states from military aggression, to one that concentrates on the security of the individuals, their protection and empowerment; (ii) drawing attention to a multitude of threats that cut across different aspects of human life and thus highlighting the interface between security, development and human rights; and (iii) promoting a new integrated, coordinated and people-centred approach to advancing peace, security and development within and across nations.

(OCHA 2009: 6–7)

As we shall hear, the United Nations' responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine also strives to position human security at the heart of its efforts to protect human populations from atrocity crimes, deliberately re-conceptualizing sovereignty so as to recognize the threatened 'sovereignty' of individuals and communities as well as that of territoriality and nation states. The concept of human security is broadly pitched and invites us to recognize the human threats produced through complex systems of global interdependency. From climate change to new forms of international terrorism, financial meltdowns to forced migration, food shortages to ecological collapse, energy shortages to world poverty, and humanitarian disasters to the denial of human rights, these, and other crises of human security, represent the dark side of our globalized planet (Cottle 2009, 2011). Their origins and outcomes are not confined behind national borders and they are rarely best understood through

national prisms of understanding. They are also highly dependent on the world's media and communication networks, a further and crucial index of globalization.

It is an unfortunate oversight, we think, that the recent theorization of human security and its discussion in policy arenas so often fails to recognize, much less elaborate on, the increasingly central, often critical roles and responsibilities performed by contemporary global communications within such situations and/or in respect of measures designed to respond to them (Kaldor 2007, CHS 2003). Notwithstanding the recent interest in media and peace processes (Wolfsfeld 2004, Spencer 2007), peace journalism (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005, Cottle 2006, Keeble et al. 2010) and media involvement in processes of post-conflict civil society reconciliation and reconstruction (Price and Thompson 2002, Goodman 2006, Thompson 2007, Deane 2013), there has been little explicit engagement with the issues and policy agendas of human security.

This chapter sets out to explore four broad and analytically distinct ways in which contemporary media and communications have become deeply implicated in the sharp-end of human (in)security, that is, when human populations are subject to systematic violence and deliberate forces of destruction. Though recognizing the continuing relevance and indeed necessity for humanitarian and human rights approaches to war and civil violence, ideas of human (in)security help to further focus the more complex ways in which the precarity of life for many on the planet is not only globally enmeshed but often conditioned by global communications – from the *inside out*, and *outside in*. This is not, therefore, a rehashed claim for the ‘CNN effect’, a claim based on the dubious causality presumed to run directly from scenes of human suffering to public outrage to foreign policy response and military intervention (Gilboa 2005, Robinson 2005). Rather, as argued elsewhere (Cottle 2009, 2011, 2013), we want to point to the more complex, diverse and *constitutive* roles and performances of global communications and media surveillance within contemporary situations of human (in)security and specifically when populations are placed in mortal jeopardy and subject to extreme threats of violence.

Global communications and media surveillance are inextricably implicated in situations of human (in)security, as we shall hear, by extending beyond traditional propaganda and information war to shape the conduct of modern warfare itself; producing a silent moral scream of use to those who would carry out atrocity under the cloak of media invisibility and evade world censure and legal process; providing the means not only for recording representations of violence but also the motivation for its deliberate, brutal enactment in front of cameras; and, finally, becoming part of the civil society apparatus that can yet throw a torchlight of shame and expectation not only on those who would commit atrocity but also the world's states who are not prepared to support the collective pledge, post-Holocaust, post-Rwanda, to ‘never again’ and endorsed in the United Nation's (UN's) fledgling attempts to institutionalize the world's responsibility to protect. In such ways global media surveillance has become, we suggest, more than simply monitoring and information conveyance through a globally encompassing network of communication systems. It is more than a matter of information and cognition or, even in times of war and conflict, information management and propaganda (though the latter are also clearly still in play). In a world in which the capacity to bear witness to human conflicts and atrocity anywhere in the world has become technologically feasible, global surveillance becomes implicated within those very same events in profound and sometimes disturbing ways.

Media beyond propaganda: the new Western way of war

The nature of wars is changing in a globalizing context and the global flows of media and communications increasingly enter into and shape the events being reported. Global media surveillance, for example, conditions the 'new Western way of war' (Shaw 2005) and threatens human security by positioning civilian populations in the firing line.

In modern Western wars, argues Martin Shaw, the physical risks of war are transferred from governments to the military, and, because of the political and electoral damage incurred by news reports of military casualties and images of body bags returning home, military risks are effectively transferred to civilian non-combatants. Military actions prosecuted through high altitude bombing, in contrast to boots on the ground, for example, incur far less 'risks', both physically and politically (see also Tumber and Webster 2006). In other words, this concern with public perception and public reactions to media images of military casualties becomes incorporated into a complex process of risk-transference. And it is this that helps to explain the increased incidence of civilian casualties, so-called 'collateral damage', in contemporary Western wars (in contrast to the deliberate targeting of non-combatants in new wars discussed next (though in both civilians become exposed to increased deadly violence). Shaw's thesis of risk-transfer war thus recognizes the enhanced importance of the news media in managing public perceptions of war as well as the added risks to the political legitimacy of states, politicians and military when war is subject to global media surveillance.

Because electorates are almost exclusively national, Western governments still think largely of national surveillance. However, even this element of surveillance is mediated through the global and the international. National publics take notice of what allied governments and publics think, as well as of broader international official and public opinion. National media are influenced by global media. National politics and media are affected by norms of international legality and by decisions and judgments in international institutions. Although governments think in terms of accountability in a national public sphere, this is never autonomous to anything like the extent to which it was in the total war era. On the contrary, governments must always recognize how integrated global media, institutions and public opinion have become.

(Shaw 2005: 75)

The new Western way of war, with its sought deployment of overwhelming firepower coordinated through computerized surveillance and communication systems and delivered from a safe distance with devastating 'shock and awe', seeks to avoid the political risks of losing legitimacy. In such a context, the aestheticization of high-altitude bombing or 'computer game' imagery of electronically guided ordnance finding their targets perpetrates, to borrow a phrase from Pierre Bourdieu, a form of 'symbolic violence', imagistically dissimulating and occluding the human consequences and carnage of war and contributing to the physical disappearance (and destruction) of combatant and civilian bodies alike (Cottle 2006: 155–162). The significance of global media surveillance is not exhausted, however, with reference to the conditioning impacts exerted in the risk-transference of the 'new Western way of war' and its representational 'symbolic violence'.

The media's silent moral scream – new wars

The human insecurity and humanitarian catastrophes that result from new forms of violent conflicts and warfare around the world, and typically in failed and failing states, cannot be seen as aberrations only, as simply a result of excess violence. According to Mary Kaldor the violence is endemic to the nature of new wars, their goals, methods and means of funding (Kaldor 2006: 95–118). New wars are usually defined by their extreme violence: the deliberate targeting of non-combatants, use of systematic terror and forced expulsions ('ethnic cleansing'). They can be situated and theorized in a global context (Duffield 2001, SIPRI 2004, Kaldor 2006, Ploughshares 2007, Shaw 2013) where their global entanglement 'challenges the distinction between the "internal" and the "external"' (SIPRI 2004: 1).

When global economic forces exacerbate processes of state failure and dissolution and prompt shadow economies, illicit global transactions, criminal and terrorist networks, and new forms of social violence (Duffield 2001, 2007, Kaldor, 2006, UNEP 2009), these are forms of global enmeshing and response – from the inside out. When military intervention, under the guise of humanitarian motives ('military humanism') and humanitarian interests allied to military and state objectives ('humanitarian war'), come to characterize Western forms of intervention, as they have in recent decades (Macrae 2002, Rieff 2002, Duffield 2007, de Waal 2007, Weiss 2007, Barnett and Weiss 2008, Shaw 2013), those on the receiving end become enmeshed within the surrounding regime of global power – from the outside in.

Some wars and conflicts remain largely invisible within the world's news media, notwithstanding the advanced development of the technological means of recording and disseminating news images around the world (Hawkins 2008, AlertNet 2009) or, indeed, the development of new satellite surveillance that has the capacity to map atrocity from high in the sky (Sri Lanka, Darfur) or social media close-up from the killing zone (Sri Lanka, Syria). When lack of mainstream news media interest and visibility renders some wars and conflicts into 'hidden wars' and 'forgotten disasters', the latter are not necessarily untouched, however, by the technological capability for global media surveillance – such is the universalizing impact of today's global media surveillance potential. If new wars are characterized by endemic, extreme violence targeting non-combatants in contravention of international humanitarian law and universal human rights, those who seek to commit such acts will generally seek to do so out of sight of the world's news cameras (Rwanda, Srebrenica, Aceh, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Darfur).

It is for this reason, in part, that the deliberate targeting of journalists and humanitarian workers by insurgents and combatants has increased over recent years, with perpetrators seeking the cloak of invisibility for their inhumane acts including mass atrocity. In globally mediated times, the news media, as paradoxical as it may sound, can thereby influence the field of violence when *both* reporting it as well as when they do not. In today's mediated world, the absence of the world's media and news cameras unwittingly becomes complicit with the murderous practices of contemporary warfare and, by its collective silence – its 'silent moral scream' – facilitates war's most inhumane expressions. In today's news environment of potential global surveillance, 'proper distance' (Silverstone 2007) in the context of war shrinks necessarily, if repugnantly, to the killing zone. The rise of social media, citizen journalists and combatants equipped and capable of recording scenes of impending and unfolding atrocity and quickly disseminating them via the Internet to the 'outside' world fundamentally renders any future claim that 'we did not know' implausible. To what extent, when, how and why such images are variously selected and incorporated into mainstream news media for wider public recognition, concern and possible action,

however, has yet to be fully theorized and explored. Which is not to suggest, regrettably, that such communications are sufficient in themselves to ensure, post-Holocaust, post-Rwanda, post-Srebrenica, that the world's repeated pledge to 'never again' finally comes true (Sri Lanka, Syria, South Sudan).

Media staged and enacted atrocity – DIY shock and awe

A further, morally repugnant, way in which contemporary media have entered into the field of human insecurity deliberately turns the spotlight onto the humanitarians and journalists themselves, forcing them to become both spectacle and story. Dreadful incidents, ten years apart, remind us of what's at issue here before thinking a little more conceptually about what, communicatively, is going on.

On 19 October 2004 Margaret Hassan, director of Care International based in Baghdad was kidnapped. Her captors calling themselves 'an armed Islamic group' soon released a video of her in which she was visibly distressed. A further video was then released to Al Jazeera. This was so distressing the global broadcaster refused to screen much of it. According to those who have seen it, the first part showed Margaret Hassan pleading for her life before fainting. A bucket of water was then poured over her as she lay on the floor. She was then forced to stand and, crying, again pleaded for her life. Her captors threatened to hand her over to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, (the leader of al-Qaeda Iraq), who had earlier that month beheaded Kenneth Bigley, a British civil engineer working in Iraq. His colleagues, Jack Hensley and Eugene Armstrong, had also been kidnaped that month and murdered. Videos of their killings had been posted on websites and blogs and before that videos recording their pleas for help and scripted criticisms of the British and US governments' intervention in Iraq. Margaret Hassan's sister made an emotional media plea for her release following her sister's distressed video, and this was broadcast and publicized widely. In it she emphasized how her Irish-born sister was now an Iraqi, having married an Iraqi man, and how she had selflessly dedicated her life to helping the Iraqi people. Her appeal fell on deaf ears and dead hearts. A further video was passed to Al Jazeera, this time of her execution. She had been blindfolded and shot in the back of the head and died on the second attempt as she slumped onto a plastic sheet (Burke 2004, Fisk 2008).

Ten years on, in August 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS) captured US journalist James Foley. In a chilling video he was beheaded in the desert in an orange jump suit in front of a camera, images that were subsequently posted to the world via the Internet, though quickly censored by most websites. The video was preceded by the words of a British jihadist extolling the virtues of the Islamic State and challenging both the US and Western governments and condemning their interventionist actions. Over the following two months Steven Sotloff, another US journalist, was also paraded on video by the same group and similarly killed. British aid workers, David Haines, and then later Alan Henning, former taxi driver and volunteer aid worker, and American aid worker Peter Kassig followed. Video appeals by friends and families and condemnatory statements by politicians and religious leaders have become an established part of the visual iconography surrounding these staged, choreographed, videoed killings.

In these crude DIY 'shock and awe' video productions, the iconic and symbolic become merged in an inhumane spectacle. Such repugnant images are produced to shock and assault most, though clearly not all moral sensibilities and they communicate a dreadful message to aid workers, journalists, foreign nationals and their countries of origin. This calculating 'violent symbolism' – staged, choreographed and disseminated around the world – functions

as both weapon and tactic in the new warfare (Cottle 2006). As Michael Ignatieff observes: 'Terrorists have been quick to understand that the camera has the power to frame a single atrocity and turn it into an image that sends shivers down the spine of an entire planet. This gives them a vital new weapon' (Ignatieff 2004: 2).

This is 'image wars', where violence and war is enacted and conducted in and through media and communications as well as war being communicated and represented by them. In so far as this deliberate use of media both prompts and shapes the practices of violence, as it most certainly does, so this becomes an example of *mediatized conflict* (Cottle 2006: 143–166). In mediatized war and conflicts, then, the involvement of media and communications becomes actively and performatively heightened, becoming implicated in the acts of violence themselves. It appears that the historical 'transformation of visibility' (Thompson 1995) facilitated by new media and communications has thus taken a new and malevolent turn in the field of mediated human (in)security and conflict.

Such violent, inhumane, media productions are constructed in a global context of political and religiously inspired enmity and hatred and often for local–global audiences. They are part of asymmetric warfare. They cannot simply be taken in technologically determinist fashion as manifestations of the latest new communication technologies but as expressive of a dangerous global turn in world affairs where humanitarians as well as journalists have become perceived by some as working at the behest of Western governments and/or colluding with them. Humanitarian aid spending by Western donor governments, according to the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report (2014) has risen to nearly 75 per cent over the past ten years and aid has also become increasingly militarized in recent years (GHA 2014). Humanitarian Outcomes (2014) documents 460 aid workers deliberately subject to violence in 2013 (155 killed, 171 seriously wounded, 134 kidnapped).

The director of operations for the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), John Ging, sums up well the changed global context of human insecurity confronting humanitarians: 'More and more we're seeing parties to conflicts around the world ignore the rules of war to achieve a political end – directly targeting civilians, carrying out collective punishment, inciting ethnic violence, impeding the delivery of lifesaving humanitarian supplies to affected people and attacking humanitarian actors themselves' (Ging cited in Whiting 2014). It is in this global context that humanitarian workers and journalists find themselves on the receiving end of targeted violence and it is in this same context that new communication technologies, as we have heard, are increasingly put to work in mediatized acts of inhumane violence. Here it is the deliberate production of 'violent symbolism' in contrast to the 'symbolic violence' of aestheticized and emotionally distanced war images in the new Western way of war, or the invisible violence of new wars, that comes to the fore.

Media humanitarianism – the responsibility to protect (and to report)

In a world progressively sensitized to human rights now upheld by international institutions and frameworks of law (Hunt 2007, Robertson 2012), the imperative to report atrocities and collective human rights abuses around the world finds wide normative support (Kaldor 2006, 2007, Weiss 2007, Balabanova 2014). Combined with journalism's historical commitment to the 'public's right to know', growing numbers of staffers and freelancers have sought in recent decades to report from the killing zone of conflicts around the world. And many of them have paid the ultimate price (Cottle et al. 2016). The Committee to

Protect Journalists documents 70 cases of journalists killed, motive confirmed; a further 25, motive unconfirmed; and 4 related media worker deaths in 2013 alone, the majority covering news beats of politics, war and human rights (CPJ 2014).

Ideas of inviolable national sovereignty historically embedded since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 have also become qualified in the *longue durée* of history. Both the United Nations General Assembly and the UN World Summit of 2005, for example, endorsed the 'responsibility to protect' doctrine (Weiss 2007, Barnett and Weiss 2008, Evans 2008). With its injunction to all nation states to intervene, and with military force if expedient, to protect populations from the four atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, the R2P doctrine is fundamentally about securing human security. In the aftermath of the Holocaust, genocides in Cambodia and Rwanda and crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia, East Timor and Darfur, the doctrine of R2P was explicitly formulated to empower the international community's expressed commitment to 'never again'.

Since the 2005 UN World Summit, when the majority of the world's nations signed up to its outcome document (UNGA 2005), the UN has officially endorsed, though not always managed to implement, its commitment to R2P and its three fundamental pillars. R2P stipulates that:

Pillar one is the enduring responsibility of the State to protect its populations, whether nationals or not, from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and from their incitement.

Pillar two is the commitment of the international community to assist States in meeting these obligations. It seeks to draw on the cooperation of (UN) Member States, regional and sub-regional arrangements, civil society and the private sector.

Pillar three is the responsibility of Member States to respond collectively in a timely and decisive manner when a State is manifestly failing to provide such protection.

(UN 2009: 8–9)

As with human security issues generally, R2P has with few exceptions only, attracted little serious media scholarship (Sidahmed et al. 2010, Tsatsou and Armstrong 2014).

A recent study, based on a systematic review of the world's press across the 12 year period January 2002 to December 2014 and a comprehensive sample of 3,599 news items that made explicit reference to R2P, provides some preliminary insights into the nature of this reporting (Cottle and Hughes 2015).¹ In summary, Western countries, predominantly Canada, the US, the UK and Australia, have given more prominence to R2P in their multiple English language newspapers than others, but R2P also figures in and across the less numerous, though now generally available English language press found in most other countries in the world (World Newspapers 2014). Many African as well as Asian countries are well represented in the world's press coverage of R2P. Some, such as Zimbabwe, Sudan and Sri Lanka that have become subject to world opprobrium for their actions in violation of R2P principles, also feature prominently, when generally seeking to counter such criticisms or condemning R2P entirely as an imposed Western ideology serving geopolitical interests.

Across the research period that incorporates initial R2P policy discussions leading to the UN endorsement of R2P in 2005 and since, the profile of R2P has steadily increased across much of the world's media. This often follows political and humanitarian crises where R2P principles have become invoked. These include the worsening situation in Darfur, Sudan

(2004), inter-communal violence following elections in Kenya (2008), government violence in Guinea (2009), the violent culmination of the civil war in Sri Lanka (2009), presidential election violence in Côte D'Ivoire (2010–2011), inter-communal violence in South Sudan (2011, 2014), and the eruption of the Arab Spring (2011) leading to the UN sanctioned military measures in Libya (2011) as well as the protracted and worsening conflict and atrocities in Syria (2012–2013) and the grotesque inhumanity of ISIS in Iraq and elsewhere in the region (2014–2015).

The R2P doctrine explicitly posits a dynamic understanding of R2P situations in respect of preceding context, crisis events and post-crisis civil-society rebuilding, and deliberately therefore incorporates a plethora of non-military as well as military responses that can be applied separately, in combination, or cumulatively, as each R2P scenario unfolds over time and as events on the ground demand (UN 2009, 2010, 2011). These are not confined to military actions but include preventative diplomacy, fact-finding missions, economic sanctions and embargoes, as well as military operations, such as no-fly zones, monitoring and civilian defence missions (Evans 2008).

Pillar one reporting predominates across world newspapers with the majority of articles (66 per cent) focusing on a particular state that is failing to protect a significant segment of its own population or is engaging in or threatening acts of aggression and atrocity in contravention of R2P principles. A minority of items only (13 per cent) were principally about pillar two 'international assistance and capacity-building', while just over a fifth of all R2P-related press reports (21 per cent) principally focused on 'timely and decisive response' (pillar three). Notably, of these, 83 per cent of all such news reporting focused on military interventions and actions. In such ways world news coverage appears to narrow considerably the available range of responses that have been identified and sometimes implemented by the UN and others in responding to R2P situations and which are not confined to military intervention (Evans 2008, UN 2009).

Since the initial formulations of R2P by ICISS (2001), advocates of R2P have argued that any coercive action should only be contemplated when positive responses can be gauged in respect of four R2P precautionary principles based on (1) the right intention, (2) the last resort, (3) proportionate means, and (4) reasonable prospects of success (Evans 2008: 141). These precautionary principles rarely figure within the generality of the world's press reporting of R2P situations, despite the panoply of more nuanced and multiple forms of response available to the international community as well as neighbouring states and the immediate region. This also represents a major silence, we suggest, and one that can only produce wider misconceptions about R2P and undermine its emergence as a shared world norm.

Nonetheless our study also documents that the vast majority of news reports explicitly supported R2P as a general doctrine (92 per cent) with a small minority only (8 per cent) criticizing it in general terms. In part this correlates with the majority of world news reports focusing on pillar one situations where human lives have already been lost or are in dire jeopardy, and where calls for something to be done are likely to invoke R2P in support of this. The failure to intervene militarily in such cases can also summon forth condemnation of governments and policies, and the press has generally been supportive of military actions when conducted under the banner of R2P.

While critics of R2P may want to question the motivations and possible geopolitical interests behind the scenes, there is nonetheless considerable press support for recognizing the human plight of others in jeopardy. This is something that those interested in human security as well as peace communications could and perhaps should seek to build on. Notwithstanding some of the criticisms made of press reporting of R2P above, the news

media can and sometimes does shine a powerful spotlight on precisely those situations that must never be allowed to be rendered invisible – out of sight and out of mind – because of a failure of journalism to live up to its normative commitment to the responsibility to report. The study of the world's press included examples of crafted forms of R2P reporting based on narratives that incorporated not only empathetically charged eyewitness accounts, but also context and critical analysis of the wider institutional and political field and the forces that are responsible. Consider, for example, this powerful news account below.

Slaughter of the Innocents

The international community claimed to have learnt the lessons of Rwanda. Yet 10 years on, the terrible cycle of ethnic violence has started again – in neighbouring Burundi. By Kate Holt and Sarah Hughes

In the wreckage, the torn-out pages of a child's book, a burnt shoe and a small pile of battered cooking pots. A team of people arrived and started to pull down the charred remains of the tents and pick their way through the possessions of the refugees who had once lived at the Gatumba transit camp in Burundi. Their job was to dismantle what little was left.

Large tents made of UNCHR (United Nations Commission on Human Rights) green plastic sheeting flapped in the wind. In some places the plastic was blackened by smoke, in others it was all but destroyed. Scattered on the ground were the white masks and gloves dropped by the charity staff who had gathered up the dead into body bags. The men worked in silence, and the smell of charred wood and dead bodies still lingered in the air.

Just over two weeks have passed since 160 Burundi Banyamulenge refugees were killed in this desolate transit camp, which lies under the shadow of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Kivu mountains. They had come here to the Burundian border seeking respite from the war that continues to ravage the Congo, hoping if not for peace then at least for a temporary rest from the horrors that they have grown up with for most of their lives. They found instead that war cannot be outrun. ...

'We were overwhelmed by victims when they arrived,' says the hospital director, Dr. Nzotungwamayo. 'Some had only small wounds, but others had been shot or injured by grenades, others cut with knives and machetes. Two pregnant women had been kicked in the stomach. Both miscarried.'

In the crowded wards, women lie groaning, unable to suppress their pain. Others simply turn their backs, expressing their grief internally. Judith Nabeza, 23, is trying not to worry about her son, Prince. He is seven years old and he lost his leg to a grenade during the attack on the camp.

That night, Judith says, she and Prince prepared to sleep as normal. They lay down in the small bed in the plastic shelter where they had made their makeshift life with their families. Then the shooting began. 'Prince was lying next to me and suddenly we heard all the noise and shooting,' she says. 'I took Prince to try and leave but a grenade went off and got his leg ... and I was injured in the stomach.'

The story behind the massacre in Gatumba is one of responsibility and ethnic conflict. It is the story of a country attempting to make the transition from war to

peace, and of the internal and external tensions that threaten that transition. But it is also the story of the international community, of how much – or how little – protection they owe to refugees and of how well equipped they are to deal with violence when it begins.

(Holt and Hughes 2004)

This crafted piece of journalism, informed by an empathetic concern for the people and their experiences, deliberately moves to contextualize the massacre in Burundi within the country's earlier political history as well as the shifting regional and wider interests that intervene from afar. It seeks to raise questions about those charged with the responsibility to protect at national, regional and international levels. The personal testimonies of victims, non-governmental organization (NGO) workers, and government and UN officials, all populate the full report – while the human consequences of failure to protect are graphically described and bodily invoked. This is an example, we think, of journalism taking its responsibility to report seriously.

There is, of course, more to today's media ecology than English speaking newspapers. New communication technologies – from satellites to social media, alongside the world upsurge in telephony, 24/7 news formations and online news and global communication flows – can all play their part in ensuring that populations confronting atrocity are not invisible to the outside world (Cottle 2009). In a rapidly globalizing world some news outlets and many journalists recognize their professional and moral obligation to alert the world to human carnage – wherever it may occur – and some may even be supportive of those longer term processes of civil society regeneration and development aimed at enhancing human security and peaceful existence. Many, as we have heard, put themselves in harm's ways to report terrible situations of human insecurity (Cottle 2013, Cottle et al. 2016). The role of the world's media in communicating human (in)security, including imminent and unfolding atrocities around the world whilst providing publics with an accurate understanding of the UN's responsibility to protect and the power plays that surrounds it remains one of the most critical challenges confronting journalism, and all of us, in the future.

Conclusion

This discussion has outlined four ways in which global media and communications enter into and condition contemporary acts of human destruction. We have briefly considered how, for example, contemporary media have become *constitutive* of the 'new Western way of war' (Shaw 2005) and how, following the ideas of Martin Shaw and others, this extends beyond traditional notions of information war and media propaganda with global media surveillance contributing to the shaping of warfare itself. We have also considered how, in a world of interconnected top-down (satellite) and bottom-up (social) media surveillance, so-called 'hidden wars' and 'forgotten wars' continue nonetheless to go unseen and unheard in the 'silent moral scream' of much mainstream media with its non-reporting of atrocity in new wars. In new wars civilian populations characteristically are targeted with extreme violence, and under the cloak of media invisibility those who would commit atrocity can better evade the world's moral opprobrium as well as possible political, criminal and other repercussions, and encourage others to do the same. Third, we have also addressed how in recent years global communications have become deliberately deployed by insurgents and terrorists in despicable acts of inhumanity – promoted, staged, choreographed, filmed and uploaded to the world's media – and based on the brutal killing of individuals and groups in

front of cameras. Finally, fourth, we turned to recent research into the media's reporting of the UN's R2P and summarized how the world's press has variously and unevenly granted support to this emergent, though still fragile, world doctrine.

Together these very different modes of media and communication involvement serve to signal the complex and constitutive ways in which contemporary media and communications can enter into situations of human insecurity involving war, violence and atrocity. Each warrants further in-depth study and these are by no means exhaustive of the many different ways in which media and communications can enter into the field of human insecurity from the *inside out* and *outside in*. We have not considered, for example, local media and regional media and their part in fear-mongering, fuelling deep-seated enmities and inciting hate crimes and atrocity (Thompson 2007, Deane 2013), or the ways in which local media have diverse roles to perform in rebuilding civil societies and bonds of trust in post-conflict, post-genocide contexts (Price and Thompson 2002, Goodman 2006). Deliberately focusing on the sharp end of human (in)security in a global context we have nonetheless discerned something of the diverse and immersed ways in which global media and communications enter this arena.

These range across the humanly solidaristic and democratizing to the particularistic and tyrannical. The availability of new communication technologies, ease of visual recording and increased access to communication systems can seemingly enfranchise everyone, from ordinary citizens and human rights activists to foot soldiers who can bear witness to acts of inhumanity anywhere in the world, and thereby encourage appropriate humanitarian and political responses. These same communication developments, however, can also be put to more malevolent ends in support of particularistic identities and hegemonic ambitions. These include building public support and legitimacy for the prosecution of national wars through emotionally distanced and aestheticized spectacles of war – forms of 'symbolic violence' associated with the new Western way of war – or the production and dissemination of public fears through mediatized acts of terror based on 'violent symbolism' (Cottle 2006: 155–162). And we have also heard 'the silent moral scream' of mainstream media in its under-reporting of hidden, forgotten, often intractable but always deadly 'new wars'. This failure to bear witness in a world of media and communications abundance not only implicates media and journalism but also the current lack of traction of the UN's fledgling commitment to the responsibility to protect.

There are signs to suggest, however, that the media can and sometimes do enact their responsibility to report; a responsibility that secures its mandate not only from the journalist profession's commitment to the 'public's right to know' (that now extends beyond national frontiers), but also, increasingly, from the surrounding culture of humanitarianism and advance of legally enforced human rights. The responsibility to report and the responsibility to protect in today's globalizing world of human insecurity are inextricably entwined and, from an historical vantage point, discernibly if slowly on the move.

Note

- 1 The author is grateful to Charles Martin Hughes for his assistance in the preparation of data and ideas contributed to this section of this chapter, based on Cottle and Hughes 2015.

References

- AlertNet (2009) AlertNet: Alerting Humanitarians to Emergencies. Available at: <http://news.trust.org/humanitarian/> (last accessed 7 June 2016).
- Balabanova, E. (2014) *The Media and Human Rights*. London: Routledge.
- Barnett, M. and Weiss, T. (eds) (2008) *Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics*. Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press.
- Burke, J. (2004) Margaret Hassan: Obituary. *The Guardian*, Wednesday 17 November.
- CHS (Commission on Human Security) (2003) *Human Security Now*, cited in United Nations Trust for Human Security (2009) *Human Security in Theory and Practice*, New York: United Nations, Human Security Unit.
- Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) (2014) 'Journalists Killed in 2013'. Available at: <https://www.cpj.org/> (accessed 25 May 2016).
- Cottle, S. (2006) *Mediatized Conflict: Developments in Media and Conflict Studies*. Maidenhead: Open University Press.
- Cottle, S. (2009) *Global Crisis Reporting*. Maidenhead: Open University Press.
- Cottle, S. (2011) 'Taking Global Crises in the News Seriously: Notes from the Dark Side of Globalization', *Global Media and Communication*, 7(2): 77–95.
- Cottle, S. (2013) 'Journalists Witnessing Disasters: From the Calculus of Death to the Injunction to Care', *Journalism Studies*, 14(2): 232–248.
- Cottle, S. and Hughes, C. (2015) "'The Responsibility to Protect" and the World's Press: Establishing a New Humanitarian Norm?', in J. Hoffmann and V. Hawkins (eds) *Communication for Peace*. London: Routledge, pp. 76–91.
- Cottle, S., Mosdell, N. and Sambrook, R. (2016) *Reporting Dangerously: Journalist Killings, Intimidation and Security*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Deane, J. (2013) 'Fragile States: The Role of Media and Communication'. BBC Media Action Policy Briefing, 10 October.
- de Waal, A. (2007) 'No Such Thing as Humanitarian Intervention: Why We Need to Rethink the "Responsibility to Protect" in Wartime', *Harvard International Review*. Available at: <http://www.harvardir.org/articles/print.php?article=1482> (accessed 21 March 2009).
- Duffield, M. (2001) *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merger of Development and Security*. London: Zed Books.
- Duffield, M. (2007) *Development, Security and Unending War*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Evans, G. (2008) *The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press.
- Fisk, R. (2008) 'The Tragic Last Moments of Margaret Hassan', *The Independent*, 7 August 2008.
- Gilboa, E. (2005) 'The CNN Effect: The Search for a Communication Theory of International Relations', *Political Communication*, 22: 27–44.
- Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) (2014) Emerging Findings from the Forthcoming 2014 Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) Report Highlights. Available at: <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/GHA-2014-highlights-summary-1.pdf> (accessed 25 May 2016).
- Goodman, T. (2006) 'Performing a "new nation": The Role of the TRC in South Africa', in J.C. Alexander, B. Giesen and J.L. Mast (eds) *Social Performance: Symbolic Action, Cultural Pragmatics and Ritual* (pp. 169–192). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hawkins, V. (2008) *Stealth Conflicts*. Houndmills: Palgrave.
- Holt, K. and Hughes, S. (2004) 'Slaughter of the Innocents', *The Independent*, 25 August. Available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/slaughter-of-the-innocents-6163156.html#> (accessed 10 February 2015).
- Humanitarian Outcomes (2014) 'Aid Worker Security Report 2014'. London: Humanitarian Outcomes Canalot Studios.
- Hunt, L. (2007) *Inventing Human Rights*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.
- Ignatieff, M. (2004, November 20) 'The Terrorist as Film Director', *The Age*, Melbourne, p. 2.
- International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (2001) 'The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty'. Ottawa: International Research Development Centre.
- Kaldor, M. (2006) *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in A Global Era*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Kaldor, M. (2007) *Human Security*. Cambridge: Polity.

- Keeble, R., Tulloch, J. and Zollmann, F. (eds) (2010) *Peace Journalism, War and Conflict Resolution*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Lynch, J. and McGoldrick, A. (2005) *Peace Journalism*. Stroud: Hawthorn Press.
- Macrae, J. (ed.) (2002) 'The New Humanitarianism: A Review of Trends in Global Humanitarian Action'. HPG Report 11, London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) United Nations (2009) 'Human Security in Theory and Practice'. Available at: http://www.tr.undp.org/content/dam/turkey/docs/news-from-new-horizons/issue-41/UNDP-TR-HSHandbook_2009.pdf (accessed 25 May 2016).
- Ploughshares (2007) 'Armed Conflict Report 2007 Summary'. Ontario: Project Ploughshares.
- Price, M. and Thompson, M. (eds) (2002) *Forging Peace: Intervention, Human Rights and the Management of Media Space*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Rieff, D. (2002) *A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis*. London: Vintage.
- Robertson, J. (2012) *Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice*. London: Penguin.
- Robinson, P. (2005) 'The CNN Effect Revisited', *Critical Studies in Media Communication*, 22(4): 344–349.
- Shaw, M. (2005) *The New Western Way of War*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Shaw, M. (2013) *Genocide and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sidahmed, A.S., Soderlund, W.C. and Briggs, E.D. (2010) *The Responsibility to Protect in Darfur: The Role of Mass Media*. New York: Lexington Books.
- Silverstone, R. (2007) *Media and Morality: On the Rise of the Mediapolis*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Spencer, G. (2007) *The Media and Peace: From Vietnam to the 'War on Terror'*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (2004) *SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Thompson, A. (ed.) (2007) *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide*. London: Pluto Books.
- Thompson, J. (1995) *The Media and Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Tsatsou, P. and Armstrong, C. (2014) 'Responsibility to Report: The Politics of British Press Reporting of the Darfur Humanitarian Crisis', *Global Media and Communication*, 10(2): 193–219.
- Tumber, H. and Webster, F. (2006) *Journalists under Fire*. London: Sage.
- United Nations (2009) 'Implementing the Responsibility to Protect'. Report of the UN Secretary General. A/63/677. 12 January.
- United Nations (2010) 'Early Warning Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect'. Report of the UN Secretary General. A/64/864. 14 July.
- United Nations (2011) 'The Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect'. Report of the UN Secretary General. A/65/877. 27 June.
- United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) (2009) 'From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment'. New York: UNEP.
- United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) (2005) 'The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document: Resolution A/RES/60/1'. 24 October.
- Weiss, T. (2007) *Humanitarian Intervention*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Whiting, A. (2014) 'Attacks on Aid Workers Worldwide Hit Worst Levels on Record', Reuters. Available at: <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/08/19/uk-foundation-aid-attacks-idUKKBN0GJ05820140819>
- Wolfsfeld, G. (2004) *Media and the Path to Peace*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- World Newspapers (2014) 'World Newspapers, Magazines and News Sites in English'. Available at: <http://www.world-newspapers.com> (accessed 4 April 2014).

25

CONCLUSION

Looking ahead

Piers Robinson, Philip Seib and Romy Fröhlich

As can be seen in the contents of this handbook, the range of topics currently mapped by the existing body of scholarship on media, communications and conflict is indeed impressive and can be linked with a remarkably large number of specialist fields that can be found across the security studies literature, ranging from the topic of traditional war and human security concerns through to newer issues such as global environmental change and cybersecurity. At the same time, the act of editing and drawing together the existing literature into one place has allowed us to perceive more clearly areas that, between us as editors, we feel are particularly worthy of further sustained exploration. By way of conclusion, we draw these thoughts and opinions together in order to suggest a number of areas and issues in need of further research.

Gender

Empirically based gender-sensitive research in the field deserves fuller development beyond mere inclusion of a particular socio-demographic variable (see Chapter 2 Fröhlich). In order to advance upon the existing qualitative single case study analyses, more complex empirical research is necessary. For instance, researchers frequently claim that gender stereotypes in media (in particular stereotypes of suffering women) are used by politicians and the military to promote wars and to obtain public support for military interventions. To date, however, empirical support for this claim is weak and what we need is more in the way of rigorous and systematic quantitative content and/or framing analysis. Furthermore, if media coverage does indeed promote these questionable gendered stereotypes in their conflict and war coverage, a critical research question would then be to analyse the role that strategic actors (e.g. governments and militaries) play in influencing these stereotypes (see Chapter 11 Hayden and Chapter 23 Miller, Robinson and Bakir): these strategic communication activities are important sources of the journalistic production process and frequently shape media coverage with their particular point of views – often sold as ‘exclusive insights’ into battlefields or diplomatic back-stages. Of course, quantitative research involving, for instance, longitudinal content analysis across different conflicts and different types of communicators necessitates sizeable research budgets which are

not always available. More broadly, researchers of media and security studies need a more fundamental understanding of gender-sensitive research as a cross-sectional issue rather than a separate (and separated) research topic of its own. With respect to this, we support the view of the EC's Directorate-General for Research and would encourage further research(ers) to consider 'gender' as a 'key analytical and explanatory variable in research. If relevant gender issues are missed or poorly addressed, research results will be partial and potentially biased. Gender can thus be an important factor in research excellence' (Directorate-General for Research 2009, part 1.4).

New technology and changing media environments

A persistent theme throughout many of the chapters contained in this handbook has been the consequences of the so-called new media environment in particular with respect to power relations (see for example Chapter 3 Pötzsch, Chapter 4 Gillespie and O'Loughlin, Chapter 7 Allan and Sreedharan, Chapter 9 Livingston and Chapter 11 Hayden). For many, developments such as the Internet, social media and citizen journalism have profoundly transformed power relations between power actors, traditionally states and corporations, and 'challenger' (Wolfsfeld 1997) groups whether they be protest movements, terrorists or publics. Certainly there are many reasons to take seriously the pluralising and 'diffusing' (Hoskins and O'Loughlin 2010) consequences of new media and communication technologies. Specifically, Internet-based media exert an increasingly pervasive influence within security studies fields because of the new relationships these media foster between those who govern and those who are governed. Global publics have unprecedented access to information and ever-expanding ways to disseminate content on their own. These factors contribute to these publics' expectations that they will 'participate' in diplomacy- and security-related matters that once belonged exclusively to policymaking elites.

These expectations manifest themselves in various ways. First, these publics want to be listened to. This means that governments must devise new ways to monitor public opinion. Traditional survey research will no longer suffice; sentiment about salient issues, such as matters related to conflict and peace, can materialise and metastasise rapidly. At least in democracies, a commitment to listening should logically lead to improved responsiveness by policymakers, which in part involves using publicly accessible tools, such as social media. Policymakers are also adapting to this new communication environment. The results of the 2015 Iran nuclear negotiations, for example, were initially reported by the lead negotiators from the United States, Iran and the European Union, not through a traditional mechanism such as a news conference, but rather through dispatches they themselves sent via Twitter, moments after the agreement was reached. At the same time, social media are no longer merely a gimmicky home for cute cat videos and other trivia; they have become vital parts of global information networks. In times of conflict, they serve as an equaliser in contests for public opinion. A big difference between the Gaza-Israel war of 2008–09 and the war between the same parties in 2014 could be seen in the parties' respective efforts to control the information battleground. During the first conflict, the Israelis clearly had the upper hand in this, limiting news media access to Gaza and, mostly successfully, controlling the news content much of the world saw. Meanwhile, the Palestinians lacked the resources to directly convey their version of what was happening in the combat zone. But by the time of the 2014 conflict, the Palestinians had become far more media-savvy in terms of using social media – such as Twitter and YouTube – and through using these and other media venues were far more effective in presenting their case to the world.

This new kind of balancing can foster changed perceptions of conflict in its many forms. Consider how the Islamic State (IS) has used new media for tasks such as spreading its images of terror and recruiting its fighters. IS and its supporters are estimated to use about 50,000 Twitter accounts. They hack into other accounts, such as that of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), doing so much and moving so quickly that their enemies cannot keep up with them (CNN 2015). Communication responses by governments to IS have been largely ineffective because, quite simply, IS is more knowledgeable about techniques needed to raise messaging to the level of attracting the desired notice and having the desired effect on its audience, whether it be to horrify or to recruit. Competition for attention is fierce because the information marketplace is so busy. Some basic statistics: Facebook, as of late 2015, has 1.6 billion active monthly users; YouTube also has more than a billion users and its video content is uploaded at the rate of 300 hours every minute; Twitter sees more than 500 million tweets every day; Instagram has shared more than 30 billion photographs. Given these numbers, part of the challenge posed by new media for everyone – from governments to individuals – is being heard or just noticed. The Islamic State has leveraged its media skills to become more than a ‘non-state actor’. It can best be described as a ‘quasi-state’ or a ‘virtual state’ partly because its media-enhanced existence includes governmental infrastructure – ‘departments’ for education, taxation, health care and such – as well as an array of subsidiary ‘provinces’, primarily in the Arab world and Africa. Functioning of the entire structure is enabled by media connectivity among the various pieces of the Islamic State, however this entity is categorised.

At the same time there are reasons to be cautious as to the extent to which the new media environment has fundamentally altered power relations (see for example Chapter 5 Freedman, Chapter 8 Aday, Chapter 10 Rojecki, Chapter 14 Robinson, Chapter 21 Woolley and Howard). Despite the apparently diverse, pluralised and fragmented communications environment, it is also the case that major corporations’ ownership of media outlets and the powerful impact of capitalism has played a major role in shaping the fabric of the Internet (McChesney 2013). Moreover, the online variants of existing mainstream media continue to take the lion’s share of audience attention and, broadly speaking, powerfully influence the news agenda and what people get to see and hear about (Robinson 2015: 80–82). At the same time, these large media organisations now face massive economic challenges, in part due to ever increasing concentration of ownership and the increasingly precarious nature of journalistic labor. Here the possibility exists that there is an ongoing erosion of journalistic professionalism and autonomy due to the new economic realities of the industry, which will influence the quality of journalism. In particular the comparatively expensive field of conflict and war reporting (travelling, insurance issues, individual security provisions, special security training etc.) will be likely affected by economic constraints. Certainly, it is most important to gain more systematic knowledge about the effects of economic imperatives on the production and quality of conflict news and war coverage.

More broadly, even if one accepts the argument that a degree of pluralisation and fragmentation has indeed occurred, interesting questions are then raised with respect to the implications of this for the exercise of power and the ability of political actors to mobilise and influence political processes. For example, with respect to the issue of media, intervention and humanitarian crisis (see Chapter 14 Robinson), the relatively diverse new media environment may have contradictory consequences for international responses to conflict and humanitarian crises. As Gilboa et al. (2016: 9) explain, there may be an increase in the number of actors trying to influence responses due to the variety of media available, but an associated decrease in the ability of any one group to influence public and political awareness

precisely because of relative diffusion of media outlets and fragmentation of audiences. As articulated in Chapter 14, the problem here is principally one of the possible fragmentation of public spheres, both global and national, in which innumerable voices are all calling for attention but none of which become 'loud' enough to be heard; in information technology (IT) terms, a problem of poor signal-to-noise ratio' (Robinson 2015).

Overall, the picture is probably a relatively complex one in which existing structures of power and influence at times prevail, or are even strengthened, whilst at other times are vulnerable to inversion and/or significant weakening. The challenge facing scholars of media and conflict is to develop theoretical and empirical approaches which help us to understand and explain better this complex environment and in a way that recognises both the potential for powerful actors to shape and influence communication environments and the circumstances in which 'challenger' (Wolfsfeld 1997) groups become more influential and potent. Also important is the need to expand our theorising beyond the traditional focus on elite Western media, publics and their associated foreign policies so that we recognise more fully the truly global and multi-level nature of the contemporary media environment (Gilboa et al. 2016; Chapter 9 Livingston). In other words, models and conceptual frameworks need to build upon, and not exclude, the existing body of critical literature which explores media-state relations within Western states (usually the US or the UK) (e.g. Hallin 1986; Herman and Chomsky 1988; Bennett 1990). There is much work to be done on this front.

Moving beyond media: arcane politics, strategic communication and propaganda

Understanding the relationship between media, conflict and security also requires scholarship to look beyond its usual focus on media organisations, communication technology and their relationship to conflict and war by starting to explore more fully the political communication processes that, in the first instance, shape the information environments in which conflict and violence emerge and are perpetuated (see in particular Chapter 11 Hayden and Chapter 23 Miller, Robinson and Bakir). Put simply, understanding the significance of media and communications vis-à-vis violent conflict and security requires us to examine not only media institutions and journalistic practices but also the political institutions and practices within which the former operate. There are at least a couple of reasons why this is perhaps of critical importance today.

First, a comparatively new topic within our field is represented by the developing awareness of so called 'arcane-politics' in democracies (Brüggemann 2005; Horn 2011; Fenster 2015; Walters 2015). Arcane-politics involves political debate and decision making occurring behind closed doors in which critical background information is withheld from public scrutiny. Much of international diplomacy, and global trade deals such as the current Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations between the US and the European Community, are frequently cited as typical examples of arcane-politics. Arcane-politics hinder, if not preclude, democratic control of state activities (as defined by Habermas 1973: 351) by citizens and their political representatives in parliaments and media. It is assumed, if not feared, that increasing arcane-politics will lead to the increasing influence of strategic communicators engaged in public relations (PR) and propaganda (see below) who aim to fill in the information gaps, with whistle-blowers being seen as the ultimate chance to leverage the truth, and a rise in so-called 'conspiracy theories' and a general loss of public trust in media and elected political representatives. Certainly, in recent years there has been increased attention to concerns about the role of deception and manipulation in

politics (Mearsheimer 2011; Herring and Robinson 2014, 2015; Bakir et al. 2016). The field of international relations, security politics and military intervention has always been prone to arcane-politics. However, if arcane-politics is truly on the rise, it is important to investigate its effects on conflict/security journalism, the production process of war and security coverage and the future evolution of public trust in the democratic institution 'media'.

Second, overlapping with the issue of secrecy and deception is the issue of contemporary propaganda, strategic communication and public diplomacy (see Chapter 23 Miller, Robinson and Bakir and Chapter 11 Hayden). Today, more than ever, political actors devote huge resources to persuasive communication. For example, the US federal government spent \$16 billion¹ on 'outside PR, ads' between 2002 and 2012 whilst PR workers now outnumber journalists by more than three to one. The 2013 Snowden leaks demonstrated the extensive deception engaged with by 'Five Eyes' liberal democracies, in the form of mass surveillance of citizens without their consent, and manipulation of digital environments for propagandistic aims. The sophistication of recent communication activities by entities ranging from Putin's Russia to Islamic State highlight the ubiquity of contemporary persuasive communication activities and their success in constructing alternative realities. Against the backdrop of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, interest in both strategic narratives and public diplomacy has emerged in the context of the contemporary digital information environment (e.g. Miskimmon et al. 2014). Consequently, understanding the extent and nature of these 'organised persuasive communication' (Bakir et al. 2016) activities is essential to understanding the informational and communicative aspects of political power as well as other core political communication concerns including media content, political journalism and public opinion.

There is much to be gained here by locating our understanding of media within the context of broader political dynamics (e.g. arcane-politics and deception in politics) and the institutions/actors tasked with attempting to shape the overall information environment (e.g. the strategic communicators and the propagandists). First, this focus can help to extend the reach of existing critical accounts (see Chapter 5 Freedman, Chapter 8 Aday, Chapter 10 Rojecki, Chapter 14 Robinson, Chapter 21 Woolley and Howard) which tend to avoid exploring the institutions and actors that work to shape, or distort, the information environment well before communications media come into the equation. Here, even accounts such as that of Herman and Chomsky's (1988) 'manufacturing consent' works primarily via examination of the mainstream media and pays relatively little attention to the much wider field of professional communicators (i.e. strategic communications, propaganda) which shape the broader environment within which the media operate (and the ranks of 'professional communicators' have themselves grown significantly). Second, and on a more general theoretical level, exploration of both deception/arcane-politics and propaganda/strategic communication promises a firmer foundation for the now extensive engagement of international relations and security studies literature with questions of language and power (e.g. Risse 2000; Mattern 2005; Debrix 2015) and the role of speech acts in the construction of security issues (see the Copenhagen School and also Waever 1995). Much of this literature, whilst providing a welcome engagement with the role of communication and language in political processes, often has a relatively under-developed understanding of agency, strategic action and manipulation whereby actors attempt to secure and/or pursue interests through the exercise of power via communicative acts. Here, existing scholarship on strategic communication and propaganda, with its engagement with agency, institutions, strategic action and manipulation, has much to offer to this important body of scholarship.

Beyond these areas in which we believe further academic attention is merited, the fields of media, communications and conflict studies and security studies have much to learn from

each other. Further mutual awareness, cross-fertilisation and synthesis promise to produce significant intellectual rewards. This handbook offers a first step toward this aspiration in what is a critical, timely and indeed urgent area of research for the 21st century.

Note

- 1 'Feds spent \$16B since '02 on outside PR, ads' *Washington Times*, 25 November 2012. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/nov/25/feds-spent-16b-since-02-on-outside-pr-ads/> Accessed on 20 September 2016.

References

- Bakir, V., Herring, E., Miller, D. and Robinson, P. (2016) 'Lying and Deception in Politics', in J. Meibauer (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Lying*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bennett, W.L. (1990) 'Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States', *Journal of Communication*, 40(2): 103–127.
- Brüggemann, M. (2005) 'How the EU Constructs the European Public Sphere: Seven Strategies of Information Policy'. TranState working papers, No. 19. Available online: <http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/28269/1/497822334.PDF> (retrieved 20 September 2016).
- CNN (2015) 'CENTCOM Twitter account hacked, suspended'. Available online: <http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/12/politics/centcom-twitter-hacked-suspended/> (retrieved 20 September 2016).
- Debrix, F. (ed.) (2015) *Language, Agency and Politics in a Constructed World*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Directorate-General for Research (ed.) (2009) 'Toolkit Gender in EU-funded Research (EUR 23857 EN)'. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Available online: http://www.yellowwindow.be/genderinresearch/downloads/YW2009_GenderToolKit_Module1.pdf (retrieved 20 September 2016).
- Fenster, M. (2015) 'Transparency in Search of a Theory', *European Journal of Social Theory*, 18(2): 150–167.
- Gilboa, E., Jumbert, M.G., Miklian, J. and Robinson, P. (2016) 'Moving Media and Conflict Studies beyond the CNN Effect', *Review of International Studies*, 24(4): 654–672. DOI: 10.1017/S026021051600005X. Available online: <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=10215099&fileId=S026021051600005X> (retrieved 20 September 2016).
- Habermas, J. (1973) *Theory and Practice* (trans. J. Viertel), London: Heinemann.
- Hallin, D. (1986) *The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Herman, E. and Chomsky, N. (1988) *Manufacturing Consent: The Political of the Mass Media*, New York: Pantheon.
- Herring, E. and Robinson, P. (2014) 'Deception and Britain's Road to War in Iraq', *International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies*, 8(2–3): 213–232.
- Herring, E. and Robinson, P. (2015) 'Report X Marks the Spot: The British Government's Deceptive Dossier on Iraq and WMD', *Political Science Quarterly*, 129(4): 551–584.
- Horn, E. (2011) 'Logics of Political Secrecy', *Theory, Culture & Society*, 28(7–8): 103–122.
- Hoskins, A. and O'Loughlin, B. (2010) *War and Media: The Emergence of Diffused War*, Cambridge: Polity.
- Mattern, J.B. (2005) 'Why "Soft Power" Isn't So Soft: Representational Force and the Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 33(3): 583–612.
- McChesney, R. (2013) *Digital Disconnect*, New York: The New Press.
- Mearsheimer, J. (2011) *Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics*, London: Duckworth Overlook.
- Miskimmon, A., O'Loughlin, B. and Roselle, L. (2014) *Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Risse, T. (2000) 'Let's Argue! Communicative Action in World Politics', *International Organization*, 54(1): 1–40.
- Robinson, P. (2015) 'The Propaganda Model: Still Relevant Today?', in A. Edgley (ed.) *Noam Chomsky*, London: Palgrave, pp. 77–96.

- Waever, O. (1995) 'Securitization and Desecuritization', in R.D. Lipschutz (ed.) *On Security*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Walters, W. (2015) 'Secrecy, Publicity and the Milieu of Security', *Dialogues in Human Geography*, 5(3): 287–290.
- Wolfsfeld, G. (1997) *The Media and Political Conflict*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

INDEX

Page numbers followed by *n* indicate note numbers.
Hashtags starting with # are alphabetized by the following word.

- Aberdeen, Earl 9
- Action for Equality: Article 13 22
- Aday, Sean x, 106–17
- Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) 271
- aesthetics: mimetic versus 37
- affect: ‘textual’ amplification of 41–3
- Afghanistan 106, 110, 157, 162, 189, 315; UN intervention 198
- Africa 127*n*2
- African Commission on Human Rights 227*n*25
- After September 11 team 55
- AI. *See* Amnesty International
- al-Assad, President Bashar 99
- Al-Hurra satellite news channel 146
- Al-Jazeera 55, 98, 136, 172, 192
- Allan, Stuart x, 93–105
- al-Qaeda attacks 54–5, 59, 121, 243, 257
- al-Shabab 218
- American Sniper* 139
- Amnesty International (AI) 234–5
- anti-war movements, media, dissent and 130–41. *See also* war; changing information environment 133–4; Cold War 131–2; post-Cold War complication 132–3; public opinion and 138; terror, political culture, and militarism 135–8; Vietnam Syndrome and risk transfer war 134–5
- AOL 251*n*1
- AP. *See* Associated Press
- API. *See* application programming interface
- Apple 251*n*1
- application programming interface (API) 287
- Arab Spring 58, 65*n*11, 80, 111, 171, 173, 283, 284, 285, 328
- ARM. *See* Audience Research and Measurement team
- ARPANET. *See* Advanced Research Projects Agency Network
- art: aesthetics beyond 37–8; ‘high art’ in popular culture 38; role of novels and films in cultural war memories 40
- Arusha Peace Agreement 226*n*4
- assassinations 163; in Burundi 211–12
- Associated Press (AP) 95, 247
- Association of Women Journalists 227*n*29
- attachment: journalism of 12
- Audience Research and Measurement (ARM) team 152
- Australia: bots 287; social media and 288–9
- Avatar* 46
- Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 31–2*n*6
- Azerbaijan: bots 287; social media and 288–9
- Bahrain: bots 287; social media and 288–9
- Baker, Norman: on intelligence 16
- Bakir, Vian x–xi, 243–54, 308–20
- Balabanova, Ekaterina xi, 230–40
- Basingstoke Gazette* 201
- BBC 55, 57, 68, 98, 172, 192
- Beckett, Charlie 68
- Belgium 175
- Bennett, Lance 75

- Bernays, Edward 309
 Bernstein, Carl 17
 Big Data 272
 'Big Media' organisations 85
BioChemFX 42
 Bloggers Roundtable 84
 blogging 164
 blogs 285
 Borger, Julian 15
 Bosnia 86, 187, 188
 'botnet' 287
 bots: social media and political conflict 288–9
 Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre 68
 British Film Institute 65
 Broadcasting Standards Commission (BSC) 65
 Brown, John 143
 BSC. *See* Broadcasting Standards Commission
 Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs (ECA) 146–7
 Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) 145
 Burton, John W. 198, 199
 Burundi 226*n*7; assassinations in 211–12; elections 227*n*20; fieldwork in 226*n*8; gross domestic product 221–2; variables impacting media landscape in post-conflict 224–5; war's end 226*n*1
 Bush, President George 96, 121, 123, 132

 Cameron, Prime Minister 62
 Cameroon 226*n*7
 Canada: social media and 288–9
 Carr, David 93
 Carroll, Kathleen 95–6
 cascade model 123–4; cascading activation model 123–4, 259
 Castells, Manuel 126, 148
 Cavelti, Myrian Dunn xii, 270–81
 censorship 106, 127*n*1, 164, 249; self- 219
 CENTCOM. *See* US Central Command
 Central African Republic 226*n*7
 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 15, 245
 Chad 213, 226*n*7
 Chandrasekaran, Rajiv 14
 'CHANGELING' 317
 chemical weapons 176
 Cheney, Vice President Dick 15
 China 143, 245, 286; bots 287; social media and 288–9
 Chomsky, Noam 18
 Chouliaraki, Lilie xi, 171–85
 Church Committee 248
 CIIP. *See* critical information infrastructure protection
 citizen journalist 100, 192; citizen voice in war and conflict reporting 172–4; conflict reporting in war 171–85; as eye-witnesses 176–7; hierarchies of place and human life 183–4; in Libya 176–9; overview 171–2; as politics of pity 174–5; securitisation 174–6; in Syria 179–83; terrorism and mobilisation of citizens 259–60; witnessing and deliberation 175–6
 'CLEAN SWEEP' 317
 climate change 296–8; security issues 301–3; television coverage 299–300
 Clinton, President Bill 25, 132
 Clinton, Secretary of State Hillary 146, 150
 CNC. *See* National Communication Council
 CNDD-FDD party 215
 CNN 55, 84, 172; casualty coverage effect and 108–9
 CNN 'Effect' 84, 123, 161, 264, 322; debate and 1990s interventions during humanitarian crises 187; disempowerment 192–3; humanitarian action and 186–96; new directions and new issues 192–4; overview 186; power of new media environment 192; role of humanitarianism in propaganda and persuasion 193–4; short-termism, media framing and masking of geo-political strategy 189–92; state of knowledge regarding media-driven humanitarianism 187–9
 CNN 'Effect Plus' 111
 Colby, William 245
 Cold War 40, 131–3, 160, 247–8, 313; disinformation campaigns 246; media interpretation following 52; post-war complication 132–3; post-war world 76
 'Collective 24' 219
Commentary 139
 Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) 326–7
 communication science 23; conceptualising non-manipulative and persuasive 316; human insecurity and responsibility to protect 321–33; as ritualistic 53; social 200
 Communism 160, 198
 computer games 42; 'black box nature' of 42; war games 41
 CONAFED. *See* National Committee for Women and Development
 conflict: absence of 198; alternative media 17–18; broadening definitions of journalism 17–18; citizen voice and conflict reporting in war 171–85; constraints on reporting 74–7; countries affected by armed conflict 202; critical perspectives on 68–79; cynical approach to 10–11; ethical challenges for journalists 14–15; ethics of coverage 9–21; how conflicts are reported 157–8; intelligence and ethical implications of journalists 15–16; journalism of attachment 12; journalists, whistle blowers and the need for constant scepticism 16–17; media

- coverage for a century 156–67; mockery, critique and limits of acceptable debate 13–14; new media, war and 110–12; news coverage of 108; overview 1–5; patriotic imperative 11; post-conflict coverage 210–29; professionalism and 9–10; propaganda and persuasion in contemporary conflict 308–20; public diplomacy's role in managing 142; role of media during 212–13; role of 'necessary mavericks' 12–13; war correspondent as 'eye witness' hero 11–12
- Conflict & Communication Online* 203, 204
- Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means 199
- Confucius Institutes 143
- Congo-Brazzaville 213, 226*n*7
- contagion theory 257–9
- Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 326
- Corporate Watch* 18
- cosmopolitanism: human rights and 235–6
- Côte D'Ivoire 328
- Cottle, Simon xi, 321–33
- CPJ. *See* Committee to Protect Journalists
- Crimea, Republic of 150–1
- Crimean War 70
- critical/constructivist methodological models 263–4
- critical information infrastructure protection (CIIP) 273
- Critical Studies on Terrorism* 263–4
- critique 13–14; changing context of 86–8; radical 81–3
- Cronkite, Walter 71
- CSAC. *See* Higher Council for Communication and Broadcasting
- culture: politics and 135–8; pop 139; violence and 200
- culture–media–security nexus 36–50. *See also* media–security nexus; aesthetics beyond the arts 37–8; cultural expression 47*n*4, 47*n*6; culture effects between attitude and position 45–6; film and 38; international politics of popular culture 38–9; myths about 40; new media technologies and 43–5; overview 36–7; photography 46; role of novels and films in cultural war memories 40; text, context and meaning 39–41; 'textual' amplification of affect and emotive engagement 41–3; war games 41
- cyber-attack 278*n*2
- cyber-exploitation 278*n*2
- cyber-security 270–81. *See also* information and communication technologies; technology; changing referent objects 272–3; critical infrastructure of 272–3; 'cyber-threat hype' 277; description of 273–4; literature 274–6; media and 276–7; Munk School of Global Affairs 275; overview 270–1; security in and through cyberspace 271–4; security studies 274–6; technological insecurity 271–2; threat framing 276–7
- Czechoslovakia 247
- Dairieh, Medyan 164–5
- Darfur 189, 324
- DARPA. *See* Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
- Day, Robin 73
- DDoS. *See* distributed denial of service
- debate 13–14
- 'Deep Throat' 16–17
- Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) 158
- Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 271
- democracy: media, human rights and 231–2
- 'Democracy Video Challenge' 146
- Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 189, 226*n*7; elections 227*n*20; fieldwork in 226*n*8; foreign support benefits 228*n*33; jail time for journalists 227*n*24; variables impacting media landscape in post-conflict 224–5
- Diamond, Larry 219
- Digital Outreach Team 84
- digital war 184*n*2
- dissent: media and anti-war movements 130–41
- distributed denial of service (DDoS) 287
- DORA. *See* Defence of the Realm Act
- Downmunt, Tony 18
- Doyle, Arthur Conan 159
- DRC. *See* Democratic Republic of the Congo
- Dupont, Ghislaine 226*n*3
- ECA. *See* Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs
- Egypt 80
- Eisenhower, President Dwight 47*n*7
- Elizabeth I, Queen of England 13
- El Salvador 245
- emotions: engagement of 41–3; language of 178–9
- Entman, Robert 123–4
- environment: climate change 296–8; media, global security and 295–307; stagnation in climate coverage 298
- Epkins, Heather Davis xi–xii, 255–69
- Equatorial Guinea 226*n*7
- ethics: challenges for journalists 14–15; implications for journalists 15–16; of media coverage 9–21
- Ethiopia 189
- EU. *See* European Union
- European Union (EU) 222; information wars 314

- Facebook 88*n*2, 251*n*1; building followers via social media 147
 Falklands conflict 81
 Falklands/Malvinas War 106, 135, 157, 161
 Fawcett, Liz 203
 FBI. *See* Federal Bureau of Investigation
 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 17, 120–1
 FEI. *See* France Expertise International
 Felt, Mark 17
 film 139
 ‘Five Eyes’ countries 251*n*1
 fixers 102*n*1
 Fleet Street journalists 18
 ‘Fourth Estate’ 70, 75
 framing studies 262–3; cyber-security and 276–7
 France Expertise International (FEI) 226*n*10
 Freedman, Des xii, 68–79
 freedom 257
 Free Syrian Army 99
 Frère, Marie-Soleil xii, 210–29
 Fröhlich, Romy x, 1–5, 22–35, 334–40
Frontline 18

 Gabon 226*n*7
 Gaddafi, Col 16, 97–8
 Galtung, Johan 198, 199, 202
 ‘GATEWAY’ 317
 Gavin, Neil T. xiii, 295–307
 Gaza 335
 GDP. *See* gross domestic product
 Gellman, Barton 121
 gender 334–5; deficits of research and challenges for the future 29–31; definition of 25; distribution of power between men and women 25; media, security and 22–35; public perceptions of 31; roles during war 30; social perceptions of 26; theoretical and empirical findings 25–9; threat towards 22
 Geneva Conventions 95
 Germany 160, 175, 246; radicalism in 158
 Ghraib, Abu 234
 Gibbs, Philip 159
 Gilboa, Eytan 108, 192–3, 314, 322, 336–7
 Gillespie, Marie xiii, 51–67, 65*n*11
 Glassman, James 146
 global communications 322
 Global Justice 134
 global security 295–307; climate change 296–8, 301–3; overview 295–6; television and the Web 298–301
 Goddard, Peter xiii, 156–67
 Goebbels, Josef 160, 308
 Goodman, Amy 17–18
 Google 251*n*1
 Gore, Al 297
 Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) 14, 19*n*1, 251*n*1, 317
 Graham, David A. 97
 Greek–Persian war 40
 Gregory, Bruce 146
 Grenada 106
 gross domestic product (GDP): in Burundi 221–2
The Guardian 251*n*1
 Guillion, Edmund 143
 Gulf War 76, 134, 135, 162, 245, 312

 Hallin, Daniel 13, 73, 119, 132, 160–1
 HAM. *See* High Authority of the Media
 Hammond, Philip xiii, 80–90
 Hanitzsch, Thomas 203
 Hardie, John 68
 Hassan, Margaret 325
 Hastings, Max 11
 ‘HAVOK’ 317
 Hayden, Craig xiii–xiv, 142–55
 Hedges, Chris 69–70
 hegemony model. *See* propaganda model
 Herman, Edward 18
 Hetherington, Tim 97
 ‘hierarchy of influences’ model 13
 High Authority of the Media (HAM) 218
 Higher Council for Communication and Broadcasting (CSAC) 218
 Hironde Foundation 222
 Hitler, Adolf 73
 Hobbes, Thomas 10
 Homeland Security Act of 2002 31–2*n*6
 Hondros, Chris 97
 Howard, Philip N. xiv, 282–92
 HRW. *See* Human Rights Watch
 Human Development Report 24
 human insecurity 321–33; media beyond propaganda 323; media humanitarianism 326–9; media’s silent moral scream 324–5; media staged and enacted atrocity 325–6; slaughter of the innocents 329–30
 humanitarianism: debate and 1990s interventions during crises 187; media and 326–9; role in propaganda and persuasion 193–4; state of knowledge regarding media-driven humanitarianism 187–9
 human rights: cosmopolitanism and media 235–6; media, democracy and 231–2; media and 230–40; media–human rights nexus 230–1; misreporting and misrepresenting 232–4; overview 230; politics and 234–5; selective reporting of 237; violations 233, 236
 Human Rights Watch (HRW) 234–5
 human security: citizen voice in war and conflict reporting 171–85; definition of 24
 Hungarian Uprisings 58
 Hungary 245–6

- Hunt for Red October* 139
 Hussein, Bilal 95–6
 Hussein, Saddam 73, 110, 162, 187, 314
- ICHRP. *See* International Council on Human Rights Policy
 ICISS. *See* International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
 ICTs. *See* information and communication technologies
 IIP. *See* Bureau of International Information Programs
 Independent Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 298, 302
 Indexing hypothesis 122, 132
 Indian Committee for Cultural Freedom 246
 Indonesia 204
 information and communication technologies (ICTs) 133–4, 270. *See also* cyber-security; technology; control of information environment 164; flow of 164
 information management 125; changing information environment 133–4
 information technology (IT) 193, 271
 information warfare 314–15
 ‘infowar’ 44
 INGOs. *See* International non-governmental organizations
 Institute of Peace 233
 intelligence: implications for journalists 15–16
 intelligence agencies, news media and 243–54; accountability and the press 249–50; inter-disciplinarity value 250–1; journalists’ challenges and practices 247–9; overview 243; press manipulation 245–6; propaganda 246; relationship between 244–5
 Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act 31–2n6
 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 184n1
 International Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP) 232–3
 International non-governmental organizations (INGOs) 185, 214, 227n23; foreign support by 222
 international relations theory: securitization in 47n1
International Security 275
 Internet 88n2; mass media prior to 130; rise of 133
 Interviews 222
In These Times 18
 IPCC. *See* Independent Panel on Climate Change
 Iran: bots 287; Green Revolution 110–11; social media and 288–9
 Iraq Wars 106, 107, 110, 156, 162, 189, 246; 1991 51, 56; 2003 56, 76, 85; bots 287; camera as weapon of truth in 94–6; TV news cultures before and after the Iraq War in 2003 56–7; UN intervention 198
 iReporting 173
 ISIS. *See* Islamic State
 Islamic State (ISIS) 157, 325
 Israel 189, 335; coverage of assault on Gaza in 2014 69–70; social media and 288–9
 Israeli Tent protests 284
 IT. *See* information technology
 iWar 45
- Jakarta Post* 204
 Japan 143
 JED. *See* Journaliste en Danger
 Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group (JTRIG) 317
 Jolie, Angelina 297
 journalism. *See also* photojournalism, in war: accountability 249–50; ‘adversarial’ 71; of attachment 12; balance of 82–3; broadening definitions of 17–18; censorship 106; cynical approach to 10–11; deaths of journalists 100–1; ‘elite’ coverage 72; elite-driven news 109–10; ethical challenges for 14–15; framing 77; impartial coverage 69; intelligence implications for journalists 14–15; journalists’ challenges and practices 247–9; mass surveillance stories 121; need for constant scepticism 16–17; networked 262; oppositional practices of 248; pay level of journalists 215–16, 227n15; peace 32n8, 265; professionalism and 9–10; role of ‘necessary mavericks’ 12–13; standards of 232; two-step model of de-escalation-oriented style of conflict reporting 205; war correspondent as ‘eye witness’ hero 11–12
 journalism of attachment: definition of 12
 Journaliste en Danger (JED) 215, 227n18
Journal of Peace Research 275
 JTRIG. *See* Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group
- Kavumbagu, Jean-Claude 218
 Keeble, Richard Lance xiv, 9–21
 Keller, Bill 121
 Kennedy, President John F. 199
 Kipling, Rudyard 159
 Kitchener, Lord 158
 Knightley, Phillip 73; on ethical challenges for journalists 14–15
 Kosovo conflict 80, 86, 123, 135, 188
- La Benevolencija 222
 language: emotional 178–9
 Lederach, John Paul 198
 legislation: Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 31–2n6; Defence of

- the Realm Act 158; Homeland Security Act of 2002 31–2*n*6; Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act 31–2*n*6; Official Secrets Act 158; Smith-Mundt Act 244; US Patriot Act 31–2*n*6
- Legitimising Radicalisation 59–60
- Leigh, David 14–15
- Leitz, L. 136–7
- Le Phare* 214
- Libya 80, 194, 328; citizen reporting in 176–9; through a fractured lens 97–9; UN intervention 198
- Lippmann, Walter 87
- Livingston, Steven xiv–xv, 118–29
- London bombings 58
- Los Indignados 284
- Loyn, David 68, 77
- Ludendorff, General Erich 159
- Lynch, Jake xv, 197–209
- Machiavelli, Niccolo 10
- Manoff, Robert Karl 205
- Massive Open Online Course (MOOC) platforms 147
- McCarthyism 131
- media: accountability 249–50; alternative 17–18; archaeology 277; beyond politics, strategic communication and propaganda 337–9; beyond propaganda 323; censorship 127*n*1; changing environments 335–7; compopolitanism and 235–6; coverage for a century 156–67; coverage of terrorism 255–69; critical perspectives on 68–79, 71; cyber-security and 270–81; democracy, human rights and 231–2; diplomacy 314; dissent and anti-war movements 130–41; -driven humanitarianism 187–9; ‘elite’ coverage 72; environment, global security and 295–307; filters 71–2; ‘Fourth Estate’ 70, 75; gatekeepers 132; globalization and terrorism 260–1; ‘hate media’ 210–11; humanitarianism and 326–9; human rights and 230–40; hybrid 127; impartial coverage 69; as impartial observer 70–1; importance of digital 112; intelligence community and 243–54; liberal coverage 70–1; mainstream 74; media’s silent moral scream 324–5; media/state relations and power 80–90; news as propaganda 71–4; new technologies 43–5; online 86; outlets after decade of peace 214–17; overview 1–5; political leaders and 215; post-conflict coverage 210–29; power of new media environment 192; press–state relations 75; prior to Internet revolution 130; public diplomacy and 148–50; reporting the ‘new media ecology’ 163–4; role of media during conflicts 212–13; staged and enacted atrocity 325–6; surveillance 323; threat framing 276–7; traditional 126; value of 257; war, public opinion and 106–17; war and conflict with new media 110–12
- ‘Media for Democracy and Transparency’ program 226*n*10
- media–security nexus 51–67. *See also* culture–media–security nexus; diasporas and diplomacy 57–61; identities and identifications 64; legitimising discourses of radicalization 59–62; overview 51–4; power and effects 62–3; power through large news media 52; questions for research 62–4; schematic of 57; television news and transnational audiences after 9/11 54–6; temporalities of 63–4; TV news cultures before and after the Iraq War in 2003 56–7; value of 54
- media/state relations and power 80–90; changing context of critique 86–8; CNN ‘effect’ of 84; complexity of 83–6; as military targets 80; overview 80–1; radical critique of 81–3
- mediatization 142, 148–50. *See also* technology
- Media Wars 62
- Mexico: bots 287; social media and 288–9
- Microsoft 251*n*1
- Middle East Report* 18
- Miliband, Ralph 81
- militarism 135–8
- military: confidence of people who run the military 137; female soldiers 26; forbidden images of dead U.S. GIs 106; media as military targets 80; re-purposing of soldier imagery 99
- military-entertainment-complex 44
- military-industrial complex 47*n*7
- military-industrial-media-entertainment network (MIME-NET) 44
- Miller, David xv, 308–20
- Milosevic, Slobodan 12
- MIME-NET. *See* military-industrial-media-entertainment network
- Ministry for State Security (Stasi) 246
- Ministry of Information (MoI) 160
- mockery 13–14
- models: of ‘adversarial’ journalism 71; cascading activation model 123–4, 259; critical/constructivist methodological 263–4; embedding 106; ‘hierarchy of influences’ 13; propaganda 12, 71, 122, 124, 193–4; on radicalisation 60; of terrorism 261–4; two-step model of de-escalation-oriented style of conflict reporting 205
- MoI. *See* Ministry of Information
- MOMO. *See* Organization of the Media in Central Africa
- MOOC. *See* Massive Open Online Course

- platforms
 Morocco: bots 287; social media and 288–9
Mother Jones 18
 Muboyayi, Polydor 214, 226*n*11
 Mueller, John 107
 Munk School of Global Affairs 275
 Muslim media 284–5
- Namegabe, Chouchou 227*n*29
 National Committee for Women and Development (CONAFED) 227*n*26
 National Communication Council (CNC) 218, 227*n*22
 National Public Radio (NPR) 120
 National Security Agency (NSA) 16, 120, 121, 249; cyber-security and 272
 National Union of the Congolese Press (UNPC) 227*n*16
 NATO. *See* North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 Nazi administration 160
 NEFA. *See* Nine/Eleven Finding Answers
 Net Press 218
 New Left 131–2
 news. *See also* peacemaking/peacebuilding:
 elite-driven 109–10; intelligence community and 243–54; as propaganda 71–4; reporters' access to sources 132; television as main source of 88*n*2
The New York Times 84, 95, 120, 121, 122, 248
 NGOs. *See* non-governmental organisations
 Nietzsche, Friedrich 10
 9/11 24, 122, 135–6, 243. *See also* terrorism;
 After September 11 team 55; humanitarian activities following 193–4; media coverage following 85–6; photojournalism and 93; television news and transnational audiences after 51–2, 54–6, 65*n*3; transnational television news and 55; as trigger for research 54–5
 Nine/Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA) 60
 Nixon, President Richard 17
 Nkurunziza, President 226*n*4
 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 84, 182, 231, 251, 301
 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 73–4, 157, 248, 312; Kosovo conflict and 80
 NPR. *See* National Public Radio
 NSA 251*n*1
- Obama, President Barack 107, 243
 Observatory of the Burundian Press (OPB) 227*n*14
 Observatory of the Congolese Media (OMEC) 216, 227*n*16
 Occupy 284
 #Occupy hashtag 285
 Occupy Wall Street 134
 OCHA. *See* Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
- Ochlik, Remi 99–100
 Office of Special Plans (OSP) 15
 Official Secrets Act 158
 O'Loughlin, Ben xv, 51–67, 65*n*11
 OMEC. *See* Observatory of the Congolese Media
 OPB. *See* Observatory of the Burundian Press
 The Open University 65
 Operation Allied Force 188
 Operation Deliberate Force 187, 188
 Operation Provide Comfort 187
 Operation Restore Hope 187
 Orange Order march 203
 Organization of the Media in Central Africa (MOMO) 226*n*10
- Paglen, Trevor 46
 Palestine 189
 Paltalk 251*n*1
 Pamment, James 147–8
 Panos Institute 222
 Parry, Katy xv–xvi, 156–67
Pax Romana 197–8
 peace journalism 32*n*8, 199–202, 261–2, 265; experiment in 206; media outlets after decade of peace 214–17; objections to 203–4
The Peace Journalist 202
 peacemaking/peacebuilding 197–209. *See also* news; implementation of 202–3; objections to peace journalism 203–4; objectivity and practicality 204–6; overview 197; peace journalism 32*n*8, 199–202
 Pentagon Papers 248
Philippine Daily Inquirer 204
 The Philippines 204
Philippine Star 204
 photography 46. *See also* photojournalism; forbidden images of dead U.S. GIs 106
 photojournalism, in war 93–105. *See also* journalism; photography; camera as weapon of truth in Iraq 94–6; Libya through a fractured lens 97–9; overview 93–4; Syria under siege 99–101
 PM. *See* propaganda model
 Podhoretz, Norman 73
 Poland 245–6
 policymakers: perceptions of security matters 56–7; security and 53
 politics: activists 282; bots and social media 288–9; culture and 135–8; human rights and 234–5; international politics of popular culture 38–9; media and political leaders 215; of pity 174–5; 'political economy' analysts 82; political environment in post-conflict coverage 217–21; political opportunity structure theory 139; public diplomacy and 144; social media and 43;

- society and 47*n*2; strategic communication, propaganda and 337–9; state–media relations and 119
- post-conflict coverage 210–29; audience 222–3; financial resources 215–16; foreign support by international NGOs 222; journalists under threat 219; lack of access to information 218–19; legal and regulatory framework 218; media and political leaders 215; media in ‘post-conflict’ countries 211–12; media outlets after decade of peace 214–17; overview 210–11; political environment 217–21; professional training 214; ‘public’ broadcasters hijacked 219; recovering economy 221–2; role of media during conflicts 212–13; stakeholders 221–3; weak professional organizations 216–17
- poststructuralist thinking 2–3
- Pötzsch, Holger xvi, 36–50
- Powell, General Colin 134
- Powell Doctrine 134
- power: cultural and symbolic forms of 36; effects of 62–3; through large news media 52
- PRISM 251*n*1
- propaganda model (PM) 12, 71, 81, 122, 124, 246; beyond politics, strategic communication and 337–9; conceptualising non-manipulative and persuasive communication 316; cynicism and 73; in the digital age 317; engaging academics, practitioners and public 317–18; ‘filters’ 122; importance and relevance of 310–12; media beyond 323; mobilising populations for war 312–13; overview 308–9; persuasion in contemporary conflict 308–20; public diplomacy and soft power 313–14; role of humanitarianism in persuasion and 193–4; targeting foreign audiences in war zones 314–16
- protection 24
- public diplomacy 142–55, 313; cultural relations and 144; definitions and conceptual ambiguity 143–8; as extension of diplomacy 144; mediatization, media logics and 148–50; as national projection 144; new 144; overview 142–3; as policy tool 150–2; as political warfare 144; public’s right to know 258; role in managing conflicts 142; soft power and 313–14; in the United States 146–8
- public opinion: on anti-war movements, media, and dissent 138; identity of 125; of Vietnam War 109; war, media and 106–17
- Putin, Vladimir 73
- Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review 146
- R2P. *See* Responsibility to Protect
- radicalization: legitimising 59–62
- Radio Bonesha 215
- Radio Grand Tam-Tam 227*n*17
- Radio Isanganiro 215
- Radio Losanganya 227*n*17
- Radio Maendeleo 220
- Radio Mille Collines (RTLM) 211
- Radio Moscow 311
- Radio Okapi 215–16, 217, 218, 222–3
- Radio Publique Africaine (RPA) 215
- Radio Renaissance 215
- Radio Star 215
- Radio Télévision Nationale Congolaise (RTNC) 219, 227*n*26
- Radio Télévision Nationale du Burundi (RTNB) 215
- Radio Umuco 215
- Rambo* 139
- rape: during wartime 28
- Reagan, President Ronald 161
- refugees 186; slaughter of 329–30
- Rema FM 215, 218
- reporters: access to news sources 132; cost of reporting 163
- Reporters Without Borders (RSF) 163, 220
- ‘reputation management’ 149
- Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 171, 327–9
- Resolution *see* UN Security Council: Resolution
- Reuters 181
- Rice, Condoleezza 86, 121
- Risen, James 120
- RMS *Lusitania* 312
- Robinson, Piers ix, 1–5, 308–20, 334–40
- Rockingham Cell 15
- Rojecki, Andrew xvi, 130–41
- Roosevelt, President Theodore 159
- RPA. *See* Radio Publique Africaine
- RSF. *See* Reporters Without Borders
- RTLM. *See* Radio Mille Collines
- RTNB. *See* Radio Télévision Nationale du Burundi
- RTNC. *See* Radio Télévision Nationale Congolaise
- Rumsfeld, Defense Secretary Donald 15
- Rupert Murdoch’s News International 46, 82
- Russell, William Howard 9, 70
- Russia 143. *See also* Soviet Union; Ukraine Communications Task Force; bots 287; social media and 288–9
- Rwanda 213, 226*n*7, 329–30
- Sahwanya-Frodebu 211
- Sarkozy, President Nicolas 100
- Saudi Arabia: social media and 288–9
- sceptism: journalists’ need for 16–17
- Schwarzenegger, Arnold 297

- SDS. *See* Students for a Democratic Society
- Search for Common Ground 222
- Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) 14–15, 19*n*1
- securitization theory: citizen voice in war and conflict reporting 174–6; international relations theory and 47*n*1; ‘referent object’ 47*n*3
- security: definition of 24–5; national 54; overview 1–5; policymakers and 53; social versus societal aspects of 30; strategies 28; technology 23
- Security Service 14, 19*n*1
- security studies: critical 275–6; history of 1–5; traditional 274–5
- Seib, Philip ix, 1–5, 334–40
- self-censorship 219
- Serbia 132
- Shattuck, United States Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor John 25
- Shepard, Alicia C. 120
- Shifting Securities 56, 58, 62; findings 63–4
- Short Message Service (SMS) 147
- Skype 251*n*1
- Smith-Mundt Act 244
- SMS. *See* Short Message Service
- Snow, Jon 68
- Snowden, Edward 247, 249, 256
- social media 88*n*2, 164; blogs 285; bots and political conflict 288–9; building followers via 147; definition of 282; effects of 234; mechanisms for change and 283; mechanisms of successful revolution and 284–5; overview 282–3; patterns of control and co-option 285–6; politics and 43; revolution and automation of engagement 286–8; revolution and rise of political bot 282–92
- society: politics and 47*n*2
- soft power 313
- Soka Gakkai International 202
- Somalia 132, 189
- South Korea 143; bots 287; social media and 288–9
- Soviet Union. *See also* Russia: geopolitical struggles between United States and 231
- ‘SPACE ROCKET’ 317
- Spec Ops: The Line* 41
- Sphere of Deviance 120
- Sphere of Legitimate Controversy 119
- ‘Spirit of America’ project 84
- Sreedharan, Chindu xvi, 93–105
- Sri Lanka 83, 324, 328
- Stamp Acts 9
- Stasi. *See* Ministry for State Security
- state–media relations, during war and crisis 118–29; cascading activation model 123–4, 259; overview 118; Sphere of Deviance 120; Sphere of Legitimate Controversy 119
- Stevens, William 151
- Stirner, Max 10
- Storm, Hannah: on Libya 97
- Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) 132
- ‘substantive framing’ 201
- Swiss Foundation Hirondele 215
- “symbolic annihilation” 28
- Syria 194; bots 287; citizen reporting in 179–83; social media and 288–9
- Szondi, Gyorgy 143
- Tahrir Square protestors 112
- Taubman, Philip 121
- Tea Party movement 133, 134
- technology 335–7. *See also* cyber-security; information and communication technologies; mediatization; during the 1990s 44; attitudes toward 149; design of digital 42; digital platforms 171; digital war 184*n*2; media–security nexus and 52–3; new media and 43–5, 83–4; propaganda in the digital age 317; security and 23
- television: global security and 298–301; as main source of news 88*n*2; 24/7 live coverage 44
- terrorism 135–8. *See also* 9/11; peace journalism; violence; copycat 258; fighting against 121; freedom irony and 257; history of contagion theory 257–9; media and terrorism scholarship 256–61; media coverage of 255–69; media ecology schematic of 61; media globalization 260–1; methodological challenges 263; mobilisation of citizens 259–60; models of 261–4; networked journalism 262; overview 255–6; peace journalism and 261–2; re-framing framing studies 262–3; research on 55–6; tradition/return to the classics 264
- Tet Offensive 75–6
- Thailand 287; social media and 288–9
- threats: active and passive 278*n*2; ‘cyber threat hype’ 277
- Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research 202, 203
- Top Gun* 139
- torture 121
- Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 337
- TTIP. *See* Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
- Tuning In: Diasporic Contact Zones 58, 62; findings 63
- Turkey 188, 287; social media and 288–9
- ‘21st century statecraft’ 146
- ‘Twitter eggs’ 287
- UCTF. *See* Ukraine Communications Task Force

- UDHR. *See* Universal Declaration of Human Rights
- Uganda 218
- Ukraine Communications Task Force (UCTF) 150–2. *See also* Russia
- Ukraine–Russia conflict 26
- UN. *See* United Nations
- UNCHR. *See* UN Commission on Human Rights
- UN Commission of Human Security 321
- UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) 329
- #UnitedforUkraine hashtag 152
- United Kingdom: bots 287; social media and 288–9
- United Nations (UN) 171, 193, 197
- United Nations Development Programme 24
- United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 184*n*4
- United States: bots 287; geopolitical struggles between Soviet Union and 231; information wars 314; public diplomacy in 146–8; social media and 288–9; surveillance and warfare 46
- United States Information Agency (USIA) 146, 245
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 199, 231
- UNPC. *See* National Union of the Congolese Press
- UNSC. *See* United Nations Security Council
- UN Security Council: Resolution 1325 22, 32*n*10
- Unsworth, Fran 68
- US Central Command (CENTCOM) 336
- USIA. *See* United States Information Agency
- US Patriot Act 31–2*n*6
- US–Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission 153
- US Young African Leadership Initiative 145
- van Buren, Peter 14
- Venezuela: social media and 288–9
- victims: slaughter of the innocents 329–30
- Vietnam Syndrome 161; risk transfer war and 134–5
- Vietnam War 135, 312; anti-war movement in the 1960s 76; media coverage of 75, 82; public opinion of 109; US coverage of 70–1 violence 200. *See also* peace journalism; terrorism; cultural 200
- VOA. *See* Voice of America
- Voice of America (VOA) 153, 311, 314
- Wadley, Jonathan 24
- war 45. *See also* anti-war movements, media, dissent and; absence of 198; casualty coverage and CNN effect 108–9; citizen voice and conflict reporting in 171–85; civilian casualties 172; elite-driven news and 109–10; global communications and 323; information wars 314; iWar 45; media, public opinion and 106–17; media coverage for a century 156–67; mobilising populations for 312–13; new media, conflict and 110–12; openness versus control in covering 158–62; photojournalism and 93–105; reporting and the ‘new media ecology’ 163–4; reporting into the twenty-first century 162–3; state–media relations during crisis and 118–29; successful 164; targeting foreign audiences in war zones 314–16
- war correspondent: as ‘eye witness’ hero 11–12; power of 71; women as war reporters 29
- ‘War on Terror’ 51, 135, 137, 162, 243
- ‘War on Terrorism’ 122
- Washington Post* 122, 248, 251*n*1
- Watergate scandal 16–17
- weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 15, 136, 193, 313
- Webb, Gary 245
- Weekly Standard* 139
- Weinberger, Secretary of Defense Caspar 144
- Wells, H.G. 159
- whistle blowers: Ellsberg, Daniel 16; Gun, Katherine 16; journalists and 16–17; Manning, Bradley/Chelsea 16; Ponting, Clive 16; Shayler, David 16; Snowden, Edward 247, 249, 256; Tisdall, Sarah 16; van Buren, Peter 14; Vanunu, Mordechai 16; Watergate scandal and 16–17; Wright, Peter 16
- WikiLeaks 16, 163
- Wolsfeld, Gadi 212
- women: female soldiers 26; as passive victims 39; rape during wartime 28; stereotypes of 334; threat towards 22; as victims 27; as war reporters 29
- Woodward, Bob 17
- Woolley, Samuel C. xvi, 282–92
- World Summit 327
- World War I 87; outbreak of 158
- World War II: mass mobilisation at the start of 160; refugee crisis 186
- World War III: possibility of 131
- World Wide Web 133; global security and 298–301
- Yahoo! 251*n*1
- Yanukoyvich, President Viktor 150
- YouTube 88*n*2, 151, 164, 251*n*1, 336
- ‘You Tube Effect’ 186
- Zaharna, R.S. 146
- Zero Dark Thirty* 139
- Z Magazine* 18
- Zway, Suliman Ali 97