

The Discourse of Security

Language, Illiberalism and Governmentality

Malcolm N. MacDonald
& Duncan Hunter

The Discourse of Security

"This volume's innovative approach to the critical study of security discourse will be of tremendous value to Critical Discourse Analysis and Critical Security Studies researchers. It provides a theoretically informed, methodologically sound, and analytically sophisticated empirical account of how 21st century security discourses have been constituted, transformed, and recontextualized across specific temporal and spatial contexts. The authors' insistence that a genuinely critical analysis of discourse requires not only facility with discourse analytic frameworks but also an engagement with discipline-specific critical concepts is a much-needed insight. For their part, MacDonald & Hunter provide a critical analytic framework specific to security discourse which combines critical discourse, corpus linguistic, and argumentative analyses with the concepts of "governmentality," "state of exception," and "ban-opticon." Their effective application of this multifaceted apparatus produces a compelling, empirically-based account of the formation, circulation, and function of 21st security discourses."

—Patricia L. Dunmire, *Kent State University, USA*

"Critical discourse analysis has long-established intellectual links with Foucault's ideas on power and discourse, yet in practice it is rare to see his theories brought explicitly and transparently into dialogue with rigorous text oriented discourse analysis. MacDonald and Hunter achieve just this, focusing in particular on the concepts of biopower and governmentality. They build on recent advances in critical discourse studies, using corpus-aided methods and argumentation analysis to investigate the operation of security discourses across a range of policy fields from the London Olympics to counter-terrorism to citizenship. Through a genuinely transdisciplinary approach, the authors explain how insecurity discourses have emerged as a central form of political power in the early 21st century, and uncover the specific linguistic processes through which governmentality operates in the modern 'illiberal' state. Not only is this a 'must read' for critical discourse analysts and political sociologists, but its accessible style and rich case studies have much to offer political practitioners themselves."

—Jane M. Mulderigg, *University of Sheffield, UK*

Malcolm N. MacDonald · Duncan Hunter

The Discourse of Security

Language, Illiberalism and Governmentality

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Malcolm N. MacDonald
Centre for Applied Linguistics
University of Warwick
Coventry, UK

Duncan Hunter
School of Education
University of Hull
Hull, UK

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Preface

This book arose from a project which we started in 2011 to investigate the language and discourse of security. We began that year by collating over one hundred security-related documents from the websites of UK government departments. This initial investigation has been brought up to date for this book by adding a collection of more recent security documents produced by the UK government, and these are compared with those of our earlier period. During the summer of 2012, London hosted the Olympic Games and, having initiated our project by looking at documents relating to UK security and counterterrorism produced over the previous ten years, it appeared axiomatic that we should now turn our attention more specifically to the security operation for the London Olympics. Since this was no longer a comparative analysis, it also afforded us the opportunity of developing a principled method for incorporating the intuitive, manual analysis favoured by critical discourse analysis, with machine-based approaches developed within corpus linguistics. In Chapter 4, we set out how we developed the technical aspects of analysing our texts; and we describe the outcomes from these first two phases of the empirical part of our project in Chapters 6 and 7.

In 2011, a number of interdisciplinary research groups were initiated at the University of Warwick. Malcolm joined one of these research groups, which focused on Global Governance and, out of a series of workshops held in the summer of 2012, he joined Alex Homolar, Lena Rethel, and Stephanie Schnurr to develop a project entitled *Crisis Leadership in Global Government* (CliGG). This led to the research presented Chapter 8 being supported in part by a University of Warwick Strategic Award (RDF1063), and this award enabled the project team to enlist the assistance of Rachelle Vessey in the collection and analysis of data. In Chapter 8, we recast some of that data (previously published in *Discourse and Communication*, with Alexandra Homolar, Stephanie Schnurr, Lena Rethel, and Rachelle Vessey). In keeping with the focus of this book, we reframe the analysis to foreground the 'recontextualisation' of the language and discourse relating to nuclear proliferation, as it is delocated from the United Nations Security Council and relocated in prominent national newspapers on either side of the Atlantic.

The year 2014 marked the tenth anniversary of the publication of the *9/11 Commission Report*. This recommended the radical re-organisation of the US Security Agencies in the wake of their perceived failure to detect the impending 9/11 attacks. To round off the international focus of our project, we thought it would be revealing to investigate how language and discourse had been used by prominent US security agencies to reconstitute themselves in the ten years since the report. During the summer of 2015, we downloaded and analysed a collection of webpages from the websites of prominent US security agencies; we present the outcome of this final phase of our project in Chapter 9.

In all of this, we are describing the discursive construction of security at a specific historical period, and in particular national and transnational locations. This is not because we want to make any claims for the pre-eminence of UK and US political cultures but because, pragmatically, these were the political cultures—and the language—that we could most readily access in order to undertake our research.

However, we concede that at other periods and in other locations, not only across other European states but also in Islamic and post-communist countries, security is in all likelihood discursively constituted along very different lines.

Coventry, UK — Malcolm N. MacDonald
Hull, UK — Duncan Hunter

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Many people have contributed—wittingly or unwittingly—to the development of this book. The authors would like to thank the following people for their support or suggestions at different stages of this project: Alexandra Homolar, Alison Phipps, Chris Hart, Helen Spencer-Oatey, Jan Aart Scholte, James Harrison, Nazia Hussein, Jane Mulderrig, Johannes Angermuller, Johannes Beetz, John P. O'Regan, Hans Ladegaard, Keith Richards, Lena Rethel, Maggie Conn, Michał Krzyżanowski, Miri Gal-Ezar, Nick Vaughan-Williams, Paul Baker, Rachel Lewis, Rachelle Vessey, Richard Smith, Ronny Scholz, Shanta Nair-Venugopal, Stephanie Schnurr, Sue Wharton, Teun van Djik, and Veit Schwab.

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The following associations, departments and research groups have provided either fora or support which have helped us in our development of this book: *Academic Conference of the United Nations* (ACUNS), *Centre for*

Applied Linguistics (CAL, University of Warwick), *Critical Discourse Across the Disciplines* (CADAAD), *DiscourseNET*, *Global Research Priorities, Global Governance* (GRP-GG, University of Warwick), *International Association for Language and Intercultural Communication* (IALIC), *Professional and Academic Discourse* research group (PAD, University of Warwick), and the *School of Languages, Linguistics and Cultures* (University of Hull).

In particular, Malcolm benefitted from two terms' research leave, granted by the *Centre for Applied Linguistics* at the University of Warwick. This enabled him to develop the initial proposal along with Duncan, as well as to analyse the data presented in Chapter 8. This research also benefitted from a University of Warwick Strategic Award (RDF1063).

This book comprises substantially unpublished and extensively revised material. However, we have presented earlier stages of our project in the following conferences and journals.

- Parts of Chapter 6 have been presented previously at the second International Conference of *Redefining Community in Intercultural Context* (RCIC), the fourth conference of *Critical Discourse Across the Disciplines* (CADAAD), and the tenth conference of *Critical Discourse Across the Disciplines* (CADAAD); and were subsequently published in the *CADAAD* Journal, and in the *Journal of Language and Politics*.
- Parts of Chapter 7 have been presented previously at the eleventh International Conference of the *International Association for Language and Intercultural Communication*, the *Aberystwyth Lancaster Graduate Colloquium Graduate Conference in Critical International Studies*; and were subsequently published in *Discourse and Society*.
- Parts of Chapter 8 have been presented previously at the *Academic Conference for the United Nations* (ACUNs), and the twelfth International Conference of the *International Association for Language and Intercultural Communication*; and were subsequently published in *Discourse and Communication*.
- Parts of Chapter 9 have been presented previously at the eighth conference of *Critical Discourse Across the Disciplines* (CADAAD, 2016); and were subsequently published in *Discourse and Society*.

Finally, Duncan expresses his gratitude to Jessie for her support of the project.

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1

Introduction

By the end of the twentieth century, it had been over fifty years since most countries in Europe and North America had experienced a major attack by a foreign actor on their own soil. Although the USA and its allies had pursued lengthy incursions into other territories such as the Korean Peninsula (1950–1953) and Indochina (1955–1973), the populations of Europe and North America had experienced a lengthy period of relative peace since the end of the Second World War (1945). In the United States (US), this period of relative tranquillity was brought to an abrupt halt on 11 September 2001, when members of an Islamist cell hijacked four commercial planes, crashing two of them into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre and one into the Pentagon. This resulted in the largest loss of life sustained on US soil by a foreign aggressor since the attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941. The 9/11 attacks were subsequently followed by further attacks in Europe: on Cercanías Madrid in 2004 (11-M); and on the London Transport network in 2005 (7/7).

These events led to a range of policy responses from the governments concerned, and, immediately after the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks, provisions were made within the USA and the UK for the temporary suspension

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of a range of citizenship rights (Preston 2009). More radically, claims have been made that the terrorist response across Europe and North America has led to the intensification of a 'state of emergency' which is being invoked to normalise the curtailment of civil liberties and suspension of *habeas corpus* in purportedly democratic societies (Agamben 1998, 2005). The second decade of the twenty-first century has seen an escalation of terrorist incidents across Europe and North America, being carried out by adherents to both right wing and Islamist radical groups; and the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011 has led to the largest forced migration of people since the Second World War. These events have resulted in an intensification of security and counter-terrorism policy by governments on both sides of the Atlantic. Over this period, a series of prominent confrontations also took place between the US, and Iran and North Korea, over claims that the latter two nations were developing the technologies to produce nuclear weapons. This was perceived as contravening the principles of the two international treaties relating to the control of nuclear weapons—the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—and led to the passing of successive censorious resolutions by the United Nation Security Council (UNSC).

Against this unfolding of world events, the principal aim of this book is to explore documentary evidence from a range of different contexts, in order to identify the ways in which the distinctive principles of the period are constituted through language and discourse. The post-9/11 period cannot be considered as homogenous. To conduct this exploration it is therefore necessary to explore the variations in discourse that take place from one historical moment to another, and from one institutional site to another. We thus seek to illuminate the realisation of security as a discursive phenomenon as it is subject to the generative categories of *time* and *space*. We intend to investigate whether changes take place across, and within distinctive periods; we also explore how security as a discursive enterprise operates across a variety of institutional contexts. We discover that there is an intensification of regulation under the conditions of (temporal) transformation as the period proceeds; also that that there is an intensification of the conditions of exception, in particular regarding an identifiable discourse of nuclear proliferation, under the conditions of (spatial) recontextualisation according to institutional location.

In order to carry out this wide-reaching and ambitious project we will propose theory and put forward methods which make an original contribution to the field of discourse studies. In what follows we set out the two axes of contemporary discourse studies that inform the analyses which we go on to present: first, our theorisation of post-9/11 security discourse that draws from critical discourse studies, linguistic and argumentation analysis, and poststructuralist theories of security; and secondly, our development of a procedure for collection and analysis of documents, which combines the principles of critical discourse analysis (CDA) with those of corpus linguistics. In the next two sections, we describe our rationale for engaging with each of these axes, and conclude each section by setting out the objectives of the study relating to each.

Generating Theory Specific to Post-9/11 Security Discourse

To address the aim of the book set out above, our theorisation of post-9/11 discourse combines conventional theories of language and discourse with more recent critical theories in poststructuralist and political philosophy. While discourse analysis is usually the provenance of linguistics and applied linguistics, the study of security is usually the provenance of political science, international relations and security studies. In the first part of the book (Chapters 3, 4 and 6) we will assemble an interdisciplinary approach to the study of discourse in order to combine techniques of discourse analysis and critical theories of security drawn from poststructuralist philosophy, sociology, international relations and political science.

Language and Discourse

The response of the Bush administration to the 9/11 attacks gave rise to a wide range of different critical and methodological approaches. Analyses of the discourse of the Iraq War and its aftermath can be divided into two groups: those which take a broadly 'critical' text-based approach derived from either poststructuralism, CDA, genre analysis or cultural studies (e.g. Graham et al. 2004; Hodges 2011; Silberstein 2002); or more 'cognitive' approaches which explore the use of metaphor and metonymy (e.g. Bhatia 2009; Sahlane 2013; Sikka 2006) and analyse the ways in which different degrees of 'proximization' are deployed to make the threat of attack by a foreign actor appear more or less present (Cap 2010; after Chilton 1996). Dunmire (2011) also examines the strategies of argumentation deployed by the Bush administration to persuade the 'American public' of the legitimacy of the case for the invasion of Iraq. In the wake of the US-led invasion of Iraq, critiques of the policy response to the attacks have also been carried out, particularly with regard to the curtailment of civil liberties (De Beaugrande 2004; Gillborn 2006; Preston 2009) and strategies of surveillance (Simone 2009) on either side of the Atlantic. Another UK-oriented study, closer to the concerns of this book, has also been carried out into counter-terrorism documents produced by the UK Labour government (Appleby 2010). However, since the invasion of Iraq, interest in the critical analysis of the language and discourse of US or UK security discourse has somewhat subsided. While these critical approaches to discourse security have revealed many of the linguistic and discursive features of the speeches and policy documents with which they engage, they tend to draw on conventional theories of language and discourse to inform their analytical approach. Acknowledging the achievements of these studies and drawing from their experience, we will adopt similar theories as one means of informing our analyses during the empirical part of this book (Chapters 7–11).

Insights consistent with a CDA approach will be drawn principally from Michel Foucault's archaeological method (1967, 1970, 1972, 1973), and to a lesser extent from the genealogical approach (1977, 1984). While Foucault's archaeology has instructively described the mutations that occur over the *longue durée* of the European history of ideas, as one discursive formation is superseded by another across the divide of different 'epistemes', for the purposes of our work it falls short of providing a comprehensive analysis in two areas. First, the archaeological approach is less sensitive to 'micro-historical' changes that take place in a discursive field over shorter time periods. Secondly, the archaeological approach tends to regard a discursive formation as being paradigmatically static. That is to say, it fails to account for systematic transformations that take place, either in relation to specific sites in which the discourse of a particular field is produced, transmitted and reproduced, or with regard to the specific genres which are specialised to the different sites through which it is realised. Foucault's approach does not therefore always provide a sufficiently flexible lens to illuminate those variations and developments across time and the space that we have set out as necessary for understanding of the post-9/11 period.

At the start of our empirical enquiry in Chapter 7, we investigate the changes that take place within a specific context of security discourse over time: a collection of documents produced by UK government departments between 2001 and 2016 relating to security and counter-terrorism. From the perspective of archaeology, this entire period—and in all likelihood a considerable period of time both before and after it—would constitute a single 'discursive formation'. However our analytical approach enables us to adopt a more tightly defined temporal focus in order to investigate the transformations that take place over four to five year periods. In so doing, we reveal the changes that take place in the selection, and the combinations, of lexical items within the discourse which are revealed through techniques of corpus analysis. In order to engage with the semantic and syntactic component of our analysis, it was necessary to draw on a systematic description of language and text. This understanding is informed principally by systemic functional grammar (SFL): both by Halliday's foundational conceptualisation of the relationship between language and social context (Halliday 1976); and by the later elaborations of the ideational, interpersonal and textual metafunctions of language (Halliday 1985; Halliday and Matthiessen 2004).

In Chapter 9 we go on to investigate the changes that take within a particular field of security discourse over space: in this case as the discourse of nuclear proliferation is delocated from one site and relocated in another site. We will analyse empirical evidence which suggests that any discursive field is not paradigmatically static, but rather that any field of discourse is manifested by the flow of texts through complex networks of institutional sites. In relation to the discourse of security these involve, minimally, what we will dub here the 'political sphere' and the 'public sphere'. The political sphere includes departments of the state and supranational fora, such as the UNSC. The public sphere includes different forms of media such as social media, radio, television and the national press. The transformations that take place as discourse is delocated from one site and relocated in another has been described as a process of recontextualization (Bernstein 1990, 1996, 2000). Under 'recontextualizing rules', the discursive constitution of objects, subjects, concepts and strategies cannot be the same in their recontextualised context as they were in their original context. As recontextualised texts undergo a process of transformation, relations of power can be articulated through them by the selective appropriation of knowledge from one site and its relocation in another.

Thus, Foucault's archaeological approach (1972) and Bernstein's theory of pedagogic discourse (2000) provide a means of critically interrogating the discursive field with which we engage in Chapter 9, in order to uncover the ways in which relations of power are articulated through the fluid and dynamic movement of texts that takes place through time and across space. However, in order to engage with the texts which are produced at any particular site, it is also necessary to have a systematic means of analysing language and text. In this respect, the archaeological method—or at least Foucault's applications of the archaeological method (1967, 1970, 1973)—can be said to fall short. In Chapters 8 and 10 we will engage with texts produced at two specific sites: the discursive realization of the security operation for the 2012 London Olympic Games (Chapter 8); and the sites within which the US security services discursively reconstitute themselves in the wake of the *9/11 Commission Report* (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the US 2004; Chapter 10). The analysis of texts which we undertake in Chapter 10, in particular, demands an additional descriptive terminology in order to engage with their logical structuring. To enable us to analyse the patterns of reasoning in these documents, we adopted the technique of exposing and exploring argument schemes; and in particular the notions of the *warrant* (or *topos*) and 'argument scheme' (after Wodak 2001). Not least, the analysis of argument schemes enabled us to engage with components of text at a higher level than just lexical or syntactic relations, but also retained the specificity necessary to illustrate the ways in which the processes of meaning and reasoning were constituted in and through the texts.

Governmentality, Exceptionalism and Illiberalism

In Chapters 3 and 4, we set out a fairly conventional conceptual background for our analysis of documents relating to national and international security. However, for us, these more familiar approaches to discourse analysis fall short of providing a sufficiently radical critique of the language and discourse of the documents relating to a particular disciplinary context, and in so doing fail to reveal with a sufficient degree of specificity the relations of power which are constituted within security discourse. Therefore, in Chapter 6, we go on to introduce critical theories specific to the fields of politics and security studies. On this argument, it is necessary for a critical approach to the discourse of a specialist field to engage not only with the technical theories and methods of applied linguistics and discourse analysis, but also with critical theories which emanate from the specialist field itself. Chapter 6 therefore extends the theoretical and methodological frameworks of discourse studies in order to inform the empirical analyses which follow. It argues that the posthumously published Foucaultian theory of governmentality (Foucault 2004, 2007, 2008) and the later manifestations of 'exceptionalism' (Agamben 1998, 2005) and the 'banopticon' (Bigo 2008) are necessary to develop a theoretically informed edifice that is adequate to a critical engagement with security discourse.

We begin Chapter 6 by engaging with the later work of Michel Foucault, in which he extends his analysis of discourse and power into the two inter-related spheres of 'biopolitics' (1984, 2004) and 'governmentality' (2007, 2008). We describe Foucault's (2004, 2007, 2008) theory of governmentality and set out its relationship to the empirical analyses of security discourse. Governmentality is a dispersed means of exercising power upon populations, informed by political economy and articulated through security apparatuses. It comprises three components: discipline, security and sovereignty. Another way in which power is exercised over populations in modern societies is through the control of human life which, in modernity, is carried out by the technologies of disciplinary power. In order to accomplish this control of the conditions of life of the population, a number of mechanisms are introduced which have functions that are very different from those of disciplinary power. Not least, these are realised discursively through various forms of prediction such as 'forecasts' and statistical estimates, which are intended to control the life and biological processes of man-as-species and ensure that they are regularised.

Foucault's conceptualisations of biopolitics and governmentality have been progressed within the social sciences in two rather different directions. The first has been carried forward by the Italian philosopher, Giorgio Agamben (1998, 2005), who has proposed that governments have historically been maintaining a 'state of exception' in which recourse to the legal rights of liberal societies across Europe have been indefinitely suspended due to the prevalence of a permanent and ubiquitous condition of emergency. We suggest, however, that the 'state of exception' is a discursive accomplishment which remains empirically under-researched thus far, either in the more philosophical literature in security studies or in critical discourse studies. The second relates to the French sociologist, Didier Bigo's (2008) conceptualisation of 'illiberalism' in which he argues (contra Agamben) that a state of 'unease' is maintained within European societies, not so much by a totalising suspension of the principles of liberalism, but rather *within* liberalism through the pervasive maintenance of a condition of '(in)security'. By analogy, Didier Bigo has proposed that a contemporary episteme of (in)security has led to the establishment of a 'banoptic dispositif' within late capitalist societies, and particularly within states across Europe. Bigo's conceptualisation of the 'ban-opticon' provides us with a critical framework through which we can view our analysis of the documentary evidence of the heterogeneous assemblage of discourses, institutions, architectural spaces, statutes and administrative measures that realise security practices at a national and transnational level (2008).

Objectives of Theoretical Enquiry

An additional ambition of this book, therefore, is to combine theories of discourse analysis with theories drawn from politics and international relations, political sociology, and philosophy in order to develop a critical analytical theory which is specific to the analysis of security discourse. The outcomes that issue from this theoretical combination can be articulated as three objectives which relate, first, to opposing theories of how the state is governed; and, secondly, to our theory of discourse (after Foucault 1972):

- to explore the extent to which the principles of governmentality are realised in the security discourse produced by national governments, national media, security agencies and supranational fora;
- to explore the extent to which a 'state of emergency' is realised in the security discourse produced by national governments, national media, security agencies and supranational fora; and
- to explore the ways in which the security discourse produced by national governments, national media, security agencies and supranational fora is constituted as a 'discursive formation'.

Developing an Interdisciplinary Approach to the Analysis of Security Documents

The second of the two axes of contemporary discourse studies that informs this book is our development of a procedure for collection and analysis of documents, which combines the principles of CDA with those of corpus linguistics. To reveal principles of the discourse of this period, taking into account temporal and spatial complexity, it is necessary to assemble and explore documents that are sufficiently representative of its historical institutional variety. In the document analysis which we carry out in the latter part of our book, we explore how particular sets of principles relating to the *praxis* of security are realised in the language and discourse of collections of documents assembled from different contexts. The Islamist attacks which took place on the World Trade Centre ('9/11'), the Madrid Cercanías ('11-M'), the London Transport network ('7/7'), and Glasgow Airport, generated a governmental response whose artefacts included the large-scale production of documents relating to security and counter-terrorism across the USA and Europe. In the USA, provisions were initiated through the PATRIOT Act (2001); in the UK—through the Civil Contingencies Act (2004), the Prevention of Terrorism Act (2005)—and most recently the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act (2011)—for the temporary suspension of a range of citizenship rights in certain circumstances (Preston 2009). In this, we engage with exemplars of the security discourse which were produced: both nationally, by the UK government (Chapter 7), UK security organisations (Chapter 8), and US security agencies (Chapter 10); and internationally, by the UNSC and prominent US and UK print media (Chapter 9). While there is both a geographical (national to international) and methodological progression within our analyses, our presentation of the chapters broadly reflects the historical sequence in which the documents were produced.

Documents

As a project that aims to capture a sense of the temporal and spatial variety of the post-9/11 period, this book is necessarily an exploration of collections of *documents*, assembled into specialist corpora that reflect this scope and diversity. Each of our empirical analyses explores a systematically compiled corpus which was assembled to reflect the particular purpose of the investigation. The first collection of documents we examine in this book captures a period between 2001 and 2016, in which successive UK governments generated a plethora of policy and strategy documents to address the issues which they were facing at any one particular point in time. In Chapter 7, we identify and analyse three different periods during which distinctive sets of documents were produced: 2001–2006, 2006–2011 and 2012–2016. These periods revolved around two historical pivots: the first pivot was the attack upon the London Transport Network, which took place on 7th July 2005 (7/7); the second pivot was the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011. Between 2001 and 2006, documents produced during the middle period of the UK New Labour Government (2001–2006) began with the policy aftermath of the 2001 riots and includes some documents which reflected the period of the 7/7 attacks. In the years following 7/7, during the years of the New Labour Government (2007–2010) and the early years of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition (2010–2011), a policy of 'deradicalisation' was implemented in schools, FE colleges and universities and the early years of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition (2010–2011). The third period of UK security policy, 2012–2016, embraces the main period of the UK Conservative—Liberal Democrat Coalition government, followed by the exclusive premiership of David Cameron.

However, in 2012 the UK government was also faced with the challenge of hosting the London Olympic Games within this ethos of counter-terrorism. Indeed, London had won its bid to host the Games just twenty hours before the 7/7 attack on the London Transport System. It was therefore little surprise that security became a major preoccupation of those charged with organising the Olympics. If the first set of documents produced by government departments between 2001 and 2016 were principally for the benefit of politicians, policy advisers and associated policy pundits, the second set of documents we go on to analyse in Chapter 8 were produced to articulate the security policy, practices and procedures for events at the London Olympics. In Chapter 8, we examine how the webpages produced by the various organisations associated with the Olympics conveyed the security principles from the post-7/7 period (2006–2011) to the general public.

While our first two sets of documents generate security discourse particular to the UK national context, for our third set of documents we turn to the international arena in order to investigate documents relating to nuclear proliferation. In Chapter 9, we identify two different sites in which relevant documents were produced over a similar period of time (2006–2012): the UNSC and prominent national press outlets in the UK and the US, two countries which are both permanent members of the Security Council. These sites were posited as being paradigmatic of the ‘political sphere’ and the ‘public sphere’ respectively. Each site produces a distinctive type of text: resolutions from the UNSC and newspaper articles from the national press. We selected all the UNSC resolutions produced between 2006 and 2012 relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in either Iran or North Korea. We also identified four prominent national newspapers for investigation: from the UK, *The Times* and *The Guardian*; and from the US, *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times*. Here, we also selected all the articles produced over this period relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in either country.

The 9/11 attacks also had a dramatic impact on the discursive representation of the security services in the US, since it was widely believed that the two American security services had failed to prevent the attacks. As well as a panoply of other criticisms of their shortcomings, the *9/11 Commission Report* (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the US 2004) lead to a root and branch re-organisation of the US security services. Against this background, in Chapter 10 we will engage with our fourth set of documents produced by the reconstituted US security agencies in order to examine how they represent themselves in the public domain in the wake of the reforms initiated after the *9/11 Commission Report*. To do this, we will investigate a collection of public-facing webpages, generated by the US security agencies, government departments and associated organisations.

Techniques of Analysis

In Chapters 7–10, we combine techniques of critical discourse studies and corpus analysis in order to analyse the corpora of documents drawn from national governments, national media, security agencies and supranational fora. An additional outcome from the successive analyses which we carry out is to develop a sequence for the analysis of substantial numbers of documents that integrates techniques derived from CDA and corpus linguistics in order to maximise the opportunity for the production of insights from both manual and machine procedures.

Each corpus was analysed using a combination of techniques originating from two traditions: corpus analytical procedures using machine tools; and manual techniques selected from the wide repertoire of critical discourse studies. Practices developed by these researchers have converged on a set of techniques in which a sequence of machine corpus and human intuitive tools is applied to explore a useful corpus (c.f. Baker et al. 2008; Fairclough 2000; Koteyko 2014; Leech and Fallon 1992). Conventionally in this approach, these are used first to derive mass, whole-corpus data from their corpora so as to locate key themes and linguistic features as a starting point for subsequent manual investigation (c.f. Baker 2010; Subtirelu and Baker 2017; Vessey 2015). Two of our studies draw on this successful tradition in order to carry out comparative analyses of corpora which have been produced either at different times (Chapter 7), or in different sites (Chapter 9).

By contrast, in our analyses of particular contexts of security discourse (Chapters 8 and 10), we apply an analytical sequence whose design emerged from our experience using these more 'conventional' sequences. The procedure commences with the selection of a small number of texts from the corpus to form the basis for detailed manual analysis (c.f. Baker 2010, p. 138; Gabrielatos and Duguid 2015). This innovation of working with a smaller sample of 'core' documents, identified through a principled technique of selection, proved significant in developing a novel approach which we use used in our analyses of specialised contexts, by exposing language and discourse through the prioritisation of intuitive and contextualised document analysis. In a final stage of analysis, we returned to the repertoire of corpus techniques and tools as a means of pursuing leads furnished by manual analysis. It is in this interplay between manual and machine procedures, driven by the former rather than the latter as in more conventional studies, that we are able to describe innovative procedures that combine the potential offered to us by techniques derived from *both* CDA *and* corpus analysis.

Objectives of Document Analysis

As we have seen, this book aims to examine the changes that take place over time and space as the language and discourse of security is, first, reconstituted by successive national government administrations in response to the unfolding of historical events; and, secondly, is recontextualised from one institutional site to another. The objectives of the document analysis set out in this book are, therefore to investigate.

In relation to time:

- what changes take place in the language and discourse of UK national security as it is transformed in relation to historical events between 2001 and 2016.

In relation to space:

- what characteristics of post-9/11 security discourse can be observed in a variety of locations and institutions beyond those identified in the temporal study: the 2012 London Olympic Games, and the discourse of US security institutions;
- what changes take place in the language and discourse of international nuclear proliferation as it is recontextualised from the political sphere to the public sphere.

Overview of Chapters

The ten chapters that follow on from this introduction can be approached as four parts. Chapter 2 sets out the historical background to our empirical enquiry. Chapters 3–6 set out the theoretical and methodological edifice of the book. Chapters 7–10 set out the findings of the empirical investigations which we carry out in the security discourse which is produced in different contexts. Chapter 11 concludes by drawing out the outcomes of the book relating to the theoretical objectives set out above. The order of the empirical Chapters 7–10 reflects the historical sequence in which the documents under analysis are produced, rather than the unfolding of the methodological approach we use.

Part I: Historical Background

Chapter 2, *Locating the Discourse*, takes up where this chapter leaves off, by describing events in the UK and worldwide that provide the backdrop for the texts that we go on to analyse in our empirical enquiry. In May 2001, riots broke out in Northern England; and in September of that year, members of an al-Qaeda cell flew two planes into the US World Trade Centre. The subsequent invasion of Iraq by a US-led alliance was followed by further terrorist attacks across Europe and North America, which appear to persist indefinitely. Simultaneously, a series of confrontations took place between the UNSC, and Iran and North Korea, over the development of nuclear weapons technology. With the 2012 outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, US and European security agencies became refocused upon the bordering practices of the nation state, particularly regarding the return of 'foreign fighters'.

Part II: Theory and Methodology

In Chapters 3 and 4 we set out the conventional theories of discourse and language which will inform our later empirical analyses. In Chapter 3, *Postdisciplinary Security Discourse*, we set out the antecedents to our study from the perspective of CDA. Here, we review previous critical studies of security discourse relating to the discourse of nuclear proliferation, the discourse surrounding the hypostatised nuclear threat from Iran and North Korea, the verbal rhetoric and policy documentation of the US administration in the run-up to the first Gulf War; and critiques of the legislative responses to the the WTC, Madrid and London attacks. Chapter 4, *Disciplinarity and Discourse*, combines poststructuralist discourse theory with modernist accounts of textual analysis to set out an approach to analysing the language and discourse of security.

On this argument, security is constituted as a discursive formation through a dynamic network of texts which create, maintain and transmit meanings across different sites within the political sphere and the public sphere Salient linguistic features within our texts will be analysed using the classificatory structures of SFL. Finally, the notions of warrant (or *topos*) and 'argument scheme' will be used to unpack the logic of security discourse, particularly the construction of a certain state of affairs as exceptional.

In Chapter 5, *Analysing Security Discourse*, we describe how we addressed the challenge of developing corpus techniques commensurate with the critical approaches set out previously. Corpus techniques enable the principled exploration of documents, in order to expose tendencies, themes and topics in documents assembled as a systematically selected corpus. The chapter begins by outlining the history of mixed method research in which this procedure has been frequently suggested, but seldom as yet applied on a large-scale basis. We describe how we developed a procedure which begins with the analysis of systematically selected core texts, the data from which is then articulated upon the wider corpus. A sequence for effective work is proposed, including a crucial stage of 'tailored' corpus enquiry which, when applied flexibly to pursue leads furnished by manual analysis, can generate findings that powerfully synthesise corpus and critical discourse results.

In Chapter 6, *Biopolitics, Governmentality and the Banopticon*, we propose that further critical theories specific to security and politics are necessary to engage with this specialised discursive field. The first of these, governmentality, is a dispersed means of exercising power upon populations, informed by political economy and articulated through security apparatuses. Power is also exercised over populations through the control of human life which is carried out by technologies of disciplinary power, or 'biopower'. Additionally, the tendency for states to increasingly assert special powers of emergency represents the outworking of the principle of the 'state of exception', through which the sovereign power of the state is totalised by suspending normal juridical procedures. Finally, we discuss how the contemporary episteme of (in)security has led to the establishment of a 'banoptic dispositif' within late capitalist societies (after Bigo 2008).

Part III: Empirical Enquiry

In Chapters 7–10, we set out our analysis of our corpora of documents, systematically assembled from four different contexts in which security discourse is produced. In Chapter 7, *Discourse of Citizenship and Security*, we analyse a corpus of policy documents, which sets out UK national security policy between 2001 and 2016, as an exemplar of the contemporary discourse of counter-terrorism in Europe, the USA and worldwide. To enable a chronological comparison, three sub-corpora are defined: one relating to a discourse of citizenship and community cohesion (2001–2006); one relating to the prevention of violent extremism within the UK (2007–2011); and one relating to the re-emergence of external threats to UK national security (2012–2016). Analysis confirms the appropriation of the discourse of community cohesion by a discourse of deradicalization in the second period; and reveals an intensification of a discourse of regulation in the final period.

In Chapter 8, *Discourse of Olympic Security*, we investigate the discursive realization of the security operation for the 2012 London Olympic Games. We analyse which distinctive linguistic features are used in documents relating to security for London 2012 and how Olympic security is realised as a discursive practice. Our findings suggest that this discourse indeed realised key features of the banopticon: exceptionalism, exclusion and prediction (after Bigo 2008); as well as what we call 'pedagogisation'. Claims were made for the exceptional scale of the Olympic events; predictive technologies were proposed to assess the threat from terrorism; and access to Olympic venues was constituted to resemble transit through national boundaries. Finally, we uncovered lexis which is suggestive of the pedagogic practices which were constituted to regulate the training of security operatives for the Games.

In Chapter 9, *Discourse of Nuclear Proliferation*, we examine how 'objects, subjects, concepts and strategies' are configured within the constitution of nuclear proliferation as a 'discursive formation' (after Foucault 1972). It compares two corpora produced between 2006 and 2012 in the 'political sphere' and the 'public sphere', respectively; and considers the transformations, contradictions and tensions that take place when meanings are delocated from one site and relocated in another. It analyses how nuclear proliferation is constituted across two corpora: UNSC resolutions, and newspaper articles in prominent UK and US broadsheets. The most salient lexical items are categorised as referring to actors, strategic actions and technologies. As these constituents of nuclear proliferation are delocated from the political sphere and relocated in the public sphere, three discursive strategies are articulated: personalisation, exceptionalisation and reification.

In Chapter 10, *Discourse of Post-9/11 US Security Organisations*, we investigate the rhetorical strategies deployed in the web-pages of US security agencies which were formed or reformed in the aftermath of 9/11, to determine whether they present argumentation relating to a state of exception. To expose rhetorical content, strategies are examined which operate at two levels within our corpus. Argument schemes and underlying warrants are identified through close examination of systematically selected core documents. Semantic fields establishing themes of threat and danger are also explored. The chapter uncovers evidence of rhetoric broadly consistent with the logic predicted by theories of exception, but also presents more nuanced findings whose interpretation require careful reappraisal of core ideas within theories of exception.

Part IV: Theory Generation

In Chapter 11, we conclude the book by drawing together the outcomes from the previous chapters: first to establish the fluid and dynamic nature of any particular discursive formation; and secondly to address the aporia that emerges from the tension between more dispersed forms of government (Foucault 2007, 2008) and the claims for a ‘state of exception’ (Agamben 1998, 2005). We suggest that the dynamism of discourse is realised across time by rules of transformation and, across space, by recontextualizing rules. Our analyses have also uncovered distinctive ways in which certain aspects of governmentality are realised through the language and discourse of security. These semantic configurations are not the representation of sets of policies that already pre-exist the documents under scrutiny. Rather, the production of words and statements are coterminous with the very strategies and tactics of governmentality itself. One such strategy is that of creating a 'state of exception' through language and discourse. We conclude that exceptionalism co-exists discursively alongside persistent appeals to liberal values, to manifest a condition of 'illiberalism' (after Bigo 2008).

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2

Locating the Discourse

As we set out in the previous chapter, this book will investigate the way in which language and discourse constitutes the phenomenon of security. It will do so by analysing selected documents relating to the policy, media and security *praxis* of the United Kingdom (UK), the United States of America (USA) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), of which both the UK and the USA are permanent members. Between 2001 and 2016, policy, media and security organisations in these countries generated a highly particularised, and often dramatic, narrative of how the safety of their populations and even their national identities have been challenged by both internal and external actors in the either decade of the twenty-first century.

In this chapter, we set out our version of the dominant narrative of events relating to security and counter-terrorism in the UK and the USA, which underwrites much of the security discourse which we analyse in the empirical part of the book. The chapter is divided into four sections.

- The first section will describe events that took place between 2001 and 2005 in the UK.

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This will provide the background to the first collection of UK security documents which we analyse in Chapter 7.
- The second section will describe the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Centre, and the events which ensued. This informs much of the trajectory of the security discourse which we examine throughout this book. In particular 9/11 leads up to the reconstitution and re-representation of the US security services, which we investigate in our final Chapter. 9/11 was followed by the attacks upon the London Transport network in 2005, the policy response to which informs the second collection of UK security documents which we analyse in Chapter 7, and the security operation for the 2012 Olympics which we explore in Chapter 8.
- The third section will set out the background to the 'nuclear contention' which has persisted between the UNSC, and Iran and North Korea. We explore the discourse relating to this in Chapter 9.
- The final section will describe the most recent events (2012–2016) which inform the third collection of UK security documents which we explore in Chapter 10.

However, setting out such a historical narrative is an invidious task at the beginning of a book which purports to undertake a 'poststructuralist' approach to discourse analysis. For we do not claim any privileged 'truth' to the version of history which we set out here; and indeed later in the book we problematise some of the texts upon which this version of events rests. Rather, what follows is an attempt to set out 'the story so far' for any readers who might not be immediately familiar with this narrative, because it is not part of the shared memory of either their own generation or culture.

From Riots to Retrenchment (2001–2006)

So the story goes, Britain has a long history of groups of people arriving from other countries—either to flee persecution, to escape economic hardship, or simply in search of a good life—and who then stay on to become integral to the fabric of the population. However, this has not always been without some measure of resistance on the part of some members of the indigenous population (Cantle 2008, p. 31). Early arrivals include, notably, Jews who came to Britain in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and Roma who travelled in significant numbers to Britain in the fifteenth century. With the massive expansion of the UK economy in the two decades after the Second World War, large numbers of immigrants from the Commonwealth were invited to travel to Britain to relieve the country's labour shortage. This led to a considerable increase in the minority ethnic population of the UK.

> By 1970, the BME [Black and Minority Ethnic] population numbered approximately 1.4 million, a third of these being children born in Britain—and largely descended from the New Commonwealth countries of South Asia, the Caribbean and Africa. (Cantle 2008, p. 35)

This trend continued through the second half of the century, until by 2001 the BME group had grown to around 4 million (ONS 2003). While officially, the New Labour administration, which was elected in 1997, continued to celebrate this 'diversity' in its embracement of the policy of 'multiculturalism', the scale of UK immigration also met some resistance ranging from reservations on the part of the Conservative party, who increasingly expressed a desire to restrict the number of migrants to the UK; to downright hostility from far-right political groups ranging from the British National Party (BNP) and the National Front (NF) to avowedly neo-Nazi cadres, such as 'Combat 18'.

While London has historically tended to become home to the largest ethnic minority population in Britain, large numbers of migrants also settled in the cities in the North of England in the 1950s and 1960s, where there was traditionally a vibrant manufacturing base. The region was a particularly popular destination for workers who came to Britain from Pakistan and Bangladesh, and this is reflected in the ethnic composition of the cities which are relevant to our enquiry. By 2001, Bradford's comprised the largest proportion of its population originating from Pakistan, at 14.9%, while Oldham and Burnley had relatively smaller populations, at 6.3 and 4.9% respectively (ONS 2003). Of this section of the local population, the distribution was uneven in relation to employment sector, with a disproportionate number of South Asians working in 'lower level blue-collar or working-class occupations' when compared to the whole population—despite their often higher levels of qualifications (Bagguley and Hussain 2008, p. 40). Furthermore, by the end of the century, even this niche for employment had receded and many either had to seek employment in other sectors or remained without employment. By 2001, Bangladeshi and Pakistani males between 16 and 24 'had much lower levels of full-time employment, higher levels of unemployment and involvement in higher education than white British men of the same age' (Bagguley and Hussain 2008, p. 41).

In the early summer of 2001, a series of riots broke out in three cities in the north of England (Bagguley and Hussain 2008, pp. 39–63). These riots were to have a major impact on government policy over the next five years, up to 2006. The riots began in late May in Oldham, a town in Greater Manchester, in the north west of England. On 26 May a series of fights began which escalated into a riot, mainly involving clashes between groups of up to 500 young men of Bangladeshi and Pakistani origin and young men of indigenous British heritage. Notable in the run-up to the violence was local agitation by members of the BNP and Combat 18 (Bagguley and Hussain 2008, pp. 46–48). Between 23 and 25 June, similar disturbances broke out in Burnley, a town 30 miles north of Oldham, which involved violence against members of both ethnic groups involved, as well as damage to property. While a principal concern of some of the documents which we go on to examine in Chapter 7 focused on the South Asian population in these areas, a distinctive feature of the Burnley riots was that two-thirds of those arrested for offences in connection with these riots were white males, with a considerable number over 30 (Bagguley and Hussain 2008, p. 49).

About thirty miles east of Burnley lies Bradford, a city in its own right on the outskirts of Leeds. In early July of 2001, after some skirmishes earlier that year, the City Council had intervened to avoid any escalation of ethnic tension by cancelling (at the last minute) a world music festival that had been due to take place in the centre of the city and banning a march by the far-right group the NF. On the afternoon of 7 July, a demonstration against the NF took place in the city centre, organised by the anti-Nazi League and attended by some hundreds of citizens of various ethnicities. A large number of police officers in full riot gear were also present. Despite the ban on the NF march, a group of around 30 members of various neo-Nazi groups nevertheless turned up and proceeded to behave in an ostentatious and offensive manner. Towards the end of the afternoon, as anti-Nazi demonstrators were preparing to leave, large scale fighting broke out between anti-Nazi demonstrators and the police. This escalated from throwing stone and missiles, to petrol bombing and building barricades. The subsequent violence resulted in personal injuries to many police officers and demonstrators, injured, as well as damage to property in the area. In contrast to Burnley, in Bradford over 80% of those arrested for offences on the day of the riots were Asian (Bagguley and Hussain 2008, p. 58).

The 2001 riots were described in their aftermath as 'the worst racially motivated riots in the UK for fifteen years' (Ritchie 2001, p. 2). Along with related disturbances, their impact on the national consciousness was considerable, even 'eclipsing Northern Ireland as a story of inter-community tensions and disorder' (Ritchie 2001, p. 2). A major part of the response of the UK government was to commission a number of enquiries, which resulted in a welter of policy and strategy documents, many of which will be included in our analysis in Chapter 7. The 'Cantle Report' (or *Community Cohesion: Report of the Independent Review Team* 2001), issued just six months after the disturbances, was an attempt to make sense of these events. It drew together evidence that had been collected during visits to cities just after the riots, including some unaffected by them, on the assumption that these might offer clues as to what caused them. Apart from its numerous recommendations, an important contribution of the report was its offering of the notion of 'community cohesion', a term then already widely used in North America, but to date used only informally in the UK public context (Cantle 2001, pp. 68–69). The term, whose history and definition as a concept is paid careful attention in the report, seems to share many senses with the existing notion of 'multiculturalism'. However, unlike that concept, which emphasised the tolerance of difference and separateness, 'community cohesion' placed greater emphasis on the need to identify common ground between groups, and to promote inter-group interaction (iCoCo 2011). The notion was offered as a response to the idea, conveyed in the report that susceptible 'communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives' (p. 9). The Government responded rapidly, and generally favourably, to its ideas. MP and Home Office minister John Denham issued *Building Cohesive Communities* (also known as the 'Denham Report' 2001) offering broad support for the Cantle approach, and a cross-departmental ministerial group was set up to further consider the proposals (iCoCo 2011).

As the rapid uptake of the name in government policy documents (iCoCo 2011) evidences, the notion of community cohesion soon became ubiquitous in policy discourse concerned with relations between (religious and ethnic) groups within British towns and cities. Several agencies became involved in policy that made use of the idea; in 2002 publications making reference to the notion of community cohesion were issued by the Local Government Agency (LGA), the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM), The Home Office, The Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) and the Inter Faith Network (iCoCo 2011). Ted Cantle was appointed by the Home Office to lead an implementation group, the Community Cohesion Panel, which continued to issue reports up to 2005. While much of its activity was directed at local authorities, the Panel also became concerned with education, issuing standards in 2002 to be adopted in schools. After the Panel published its final report in 2005 the government maintained its enthusiasm for community cohesion as a policy goal, setting up the Institute of Community Cohesion (iCoCo) and the Commission on Integration and Cohesion in 2006. It also issued a 'white paper', *Strong and Prosperous Communities*, in which the community cohesion was presented as a prominent aim; 'a growing part of the place-shaping agenda' (DCLG 2006, p. 151).

9/11 and After: State of Endless War (2001–2016)

On 11 September 2001, at the end of the same summer which had seen local rioting in the UK, nineteen members of an Islamist cell hijacked four commercial planes and flew two of them into the twin towers of the US World Trade Centre in Manhattan, eventually leading to the collapse of the buildings, causing over 2700 deaths in New York City (Hillstrom 2012, p. 76). A third plane crashed into the Pentagon, killing 64 people on the airliner along with 125 military personnel and civilians, and inflicting considerable damage on the external structure of the building. The fourth plane went down in Pennsylvania, killing another 33 passengers and 4 crew, along with the hijackers. In total, almost 3000 people were killed in the attacks (Hillstrom 2012, pp. 63–76). This series of events had a profound impact upon the political and popular consciousness of the USA and its historical allies in Europe, and upon the course of international relations through the early twenty-first century.

The '9/11' attacks were attributed to the radical Islamist organisation, Al-Quaeda. The head of this organisation was identified as Osama bin Laden; originating from Saudi Arabia, he rapidly became a prominent, and widely mediatised, adversary of the US security services and their allies. However, the notion prevalent at the time that 'everything changed' after 9/11 has been dismissed by many critical commentators as an 'illusion' (e.g. Holloway 2008, p. 1). Even within the terms of its own security and US national interest, Osama bin Laden had already twice publicly declared a holy war (or *jihad*) against the USA over the preceding 5 years. Attacks attributed to al-Qaeda had also previously been carried out against American property and personnel, including the bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, and a suicide attack on destroyer *USS Cole* while at berth in Aden, Yemen. Both attacks entailed significant loss of life of American citizens. In this respect, the 9/11 attacks can be seen as part of a much wider ranging Islamist insurgency, which was affecting many other countries, particularly across Europe and extending as far as Russia, which historically had long-standing tensions between the state and radical fractions of minority groups, particularly within the region of Chechnya (Holloway 2008, pp. 1–2). Nevertheless, in our view, however far reaching it might have been, this Islamist insurgency should not be seen as a global phenomenon. For example, many Asian countries, and especially China, historically had very different security concerns which persist into the twenty-first century.

Initial investigations carried out by the US Security Services suggested that the Afghan Taliban had been the likely associates of al-Qaeda in the run-up to the 9/11 attacks, and it was likely that bin Laden was himself residing in Afghanistan (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004). On 7 October 2011 the USA—along with their British allies—carried out large-scale aerial bombardment of al-Qaeda and Taliban encampments across Afghanistan. By the end of that October, US troops commenced a ground invasion of the country, rapidly driving back Taliban forces and installing a new interim government in Kabul under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) (Hillstrom 2012, p. 138). Despite this large-scale intervention by the USA, Osama bin Laden himself was not apprehended and was assumed to have escaped along with his aides into the mountainous region on the Pakistan border with Afghanistan. In December of that year, it was widely reported that he was hiding in the precipitous terrain of Tora Bora. Despite further heavy bombing raids and several expeditions carried out by US and British special forces, Osama bin Laden and his immediate supporters again eluded capture and were once again assumed to have retreated further into Pakistan (Hillstrom 2012, p. 144).

Encouraged by the relative ease with which US forces had invaded Afghanistan, and doubtless frustrated by the continued elusiveness of Osama bin Laden, in 2002 George W. Bush and his closest advisors began to consider the prospects of meting out further retribution for the 9/11 attacks. The country of Iraq, and its long-standing president Saddam Hussein, were historically suggestive as likely candidates for aiding and abetting the 9/11 attacks. The US had already fought a brief and successful campaign with Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in 1990. However, Sadaam Hussein had continued to preside over a regime that was widely regarded as being despotic in nature. Over the intervening decade, not only was he attributed with a range of violent acts against large numbers of Iraqi citizens, but it was also alleged that his administration was developing a range of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, which would enable Iraq to seriously threaten other countries in the region, as well as US interests overseas (Hillstrom 2012, pp. 140–141). Despite the refusal of the UN to support military action against Iraq, the Bush administration—along with the Prime Ministers of

Britain, Australia and Poland—convinced their respective legislatures of the presence of 'weapons of mass destruction' (WMDs), and that this provided a warrant for a ground invasion of the country. After issuing a series of ultimatums to Sadaam Hussein over the alleged WMD programme, which escalated to demands that the Iraqi President leave the country along with members of his immediate family, the order for US forces to invade Iraq was given on 20 March 2003. Once again, supported by extensive aerial bombardment, invading allied forces made rapid progress and symbolically entered Baghdad, the Iraqi capital, on 9 April. On 1 May 2003, standing on deck of a US aircraft carrier, President Bush momentously announced that the invasion had been successfully completed (Hillstrom 2012, p. 143). Since it has been extensively reported elsewhere, the rhetoric of the Bush administration is not itself the focus of the empirical enquiry which we carry out in this book. However, we will review the critical analyses that have been carried out into of the discourse of the Bush administration in the next chapter. In many ways the engagement of this literature has laid the foundation for the reinvigoration of the critical analysis of security discourse over the past two decades.

Initially, Sadaam Hussein himself and his immediate entourage retreated from Baghdad capital to his political power base in Tikrit. However, on 13 December 2003 he was taken prisoner and in due course of time was sentenced to death in an Iraqi court for crimes against humanity. He was hanged at an American-Iraqi army base in 30 December 2006 (Hillstrom 2012, p. 142). If the trial and execution of Sadaam Hussein momentarily appeared to vindicate the US administration's decision to invade Iraq, other events subsequent to 2003 turned out rather less propitiously. Crucially, despite extensive subsequent inspections, no material evidence emerged of the existence of Iraqi weapons with the sort of capabilities that had been alleged prior to the invasion (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004). However, more far reaching than this was the 'insurgency' which began shortly after the US invasion had formally been completed. From 2003 until 2006, a plethora of different indigenous militia groups and incoming Islamist fighters from other countries put up a staunch resistance to the American forces and their allies, who were fighting alongside a reconstructed Iraqi army and police force (Hillstrom 2012, p. 144). In 2006–2007, this insurgency escalated into a wider ranging civil war. Fighting gradually abated from 2007 up to 2011, when the new American President Barack Obama ordered the full withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, which was finally completed by the end of that year.

Throughout the time of the Iraq insurgency, US security services lost track of the person originally identified as the main perpetrator of the 9/11 attacks. After Osama bin Laden escaped death or capture in the Tora Bora mountains at the end of 2001, his whereabouts became untraceable. However, with the advent of a new American President in 2009, Barack Obama ordered security services to step up their efforts to track and apprehend the leader of al-Qaeda. In the second half of 2010, fresh intelligence enabled US security services to identify bin Laden's whereabouts in a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. In a clandestine, night-time time helicopter attack by US special forces on 1 May 2011, bin Laden was assassinated along with several members of his family and his entourage. His body was extricated from the compound, dressed according to Muslim custom, and disposed of at sea in an undisclosed position (Hillstrom 2012, p. 145).

In the wake of 9/11 attacks, a Commission was set up to investigate whether any failings on the part of US security agencies might have contributed to the success of the attacks. There was a widespread perception that lack of mutual communication and the lack of transfer of information between organisations led to lacunae in intelligence that might have contributed to their failure to detect the attacks. As well as a panoply of other criticisms of the shortcomings of the '9/11 Commission Report' (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004), as it became called, lead to a wide-ranging re-organisation of the US security services. Not least, twenty-two different agencies were brought together within the creation of the new institution of Department of Homeland Security. Other recommendations from the Commission included that information should be shared both between agencies and also with other countries. In Chapter 10, we analyse a selection of webpages of the US Security Services in order to explore how language and discourse is currently being used by these organisations to represent themselves to the public, ten years after the Report's publication.

United Kingdom: 7/7

Almost two years after British forces lent their support to the US to invade Iraq, the UK capital sustained a series of fatal attacks by Islamist suicide bombers upon its transport network on 7 July 2007 ('7/7'). Just before 9.00 a.m., as commuters were travelling to work, members of an al-Qaeda cell denotated three bombs in rapid succession on separate underground trains on the London Underground. Around an hour later, a fourth member of the cell exploded a bomb on a double-decker bus in Tavistock Square. A total of 52 people of various nationalities were killed, of whom 32 were British citizens; and more than 770 were injured. All four suicide bombers died in the attacks. Apart from the difference in scale, the '7/7' London bombings diverged from the WTC attacks in as much as all four perpetrators were UK nationals, whereas all the 9/11 perpetrators were foreign nationals, the majority being Saudi Arabian citizens. Given the longstanding debate over multiculturalism and citizenship in the UK that we touched upon earlier, this gave rise to increased strategic and ethical concerns about the degree of attachment which members of ethnic minority groups feel towards the country in which they were brought up (Thomas 2011).

In particular, the UK attacks intensified the focus of relevant departments in the UK government upon the policy of 'community cohesion' which, as we mentioned earlier, emerged as a response to the 2001 riots. Coincidentally in 2005, the Community Cohesion Panel issued its final report; and in 2006, the UK government went on to set up the 'Institute of Community Cohesion' (iCoCo) and the 'Commission on Integration and Cohesion'. In a 'white paper' published in the same year, *Strong and Prosperous Communities*, community cohesion was presented as a prominent aim, as a 'growing part of the place-shaping agenda' (DCLG 2006, p. 151). However, this 'white paper' also showed signs that, in the light of the London bombings, the goal of community cohesion was being re-assessed for a new purpose. In particular, it was suggested that the aim of cohesion had now been made more difficult, 'because it has to be undertaken alongside the need to tackle extremism' (ibid., p. 152). The 2005 attacks, the paper suggested, had 'changed Britain', which was 'still readjusting to the phenomenon of terrorists who have grown up in our own communities' (ibid., p. 156). The notion of community cohesion, taken up in a period when Britain was responding to the crisis of the Oldham riots, now came to be deployed with increasing frequency as part of the policy response to terrorism.

Central to this development was the publication of the government's CONTEST anti-terrorism strategy (Home Office 2006). This set out four over-arching 'workstreams'—'Pursue', 'Prevent', 'Protect' and 'Prepare'—for the UK's counter-terrorism policy (which will be included in our analysis in Chapter 7). Part of the subsequent strategic planning around CONTEST was the publication in 2009 of the second iteration of one of these workstreams, the government's document setting out the *Prevent* (originally *Preventing Violent Extremism*) policy (HMO 2009). As its name suggests, the aims of community cohesion and counter-terrorism are combined in the *Prevent* document, perhaps most clearly in its statement that priority of support would be given 'to those leadership organisations actively working to tackle violent extremism, supporting community cohesion and speaking out for the vast majority who reject violence' (DCLG 2007, p. 9). The link between *Prevent* and the community cohesion agenda was formally acknowledged in March 2009 when a 'refreshed' version of the policy was issued to the public which recognised the role of the existing agenda in meeting the *Prevent* objectives (LGA 2009, p. 4). Once again, in Chapter 7 we will analyse some of the specific ways in which language is used in the successive iterations of *CONTEST* and *Prevent* strategies, along with the universe of documents which circulate around them.

Between 2003 and 2010, the US-led invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan and the pursuit of the al-Qaeda leader was accompanied by further Islamist attacks across Europe, such as on the Madrid Cercanías network (2004, '11-M') and on Glasgow Airport in June 2007. The ethos which this generated in the US administration and across Europe led to the drawing up and circulation of a panoply of policy measures relating to security which informs many of the documents which we analyse in Chapter 7.

In the first part of Chapter 7, we compare a selection of the documents produced after the 7/7 attacks with a selection of documents produced in the wake of the 2001 riots in order to explore the changes that took place in the discursive construction of UK 'security' from one period to another. The 7/7 attacks also took place less than twenty-four hours after London won its bid to host the 2012 Olympic Games. And, even five years on, their memory was still raw as a panoply of government departments, sporting organisations, security agencies and private security firms prepared the security operation for the Games. The language that was used to set out this operation on the webpages of the organisations involved very much reflected this 'post-7/7' ethos of security. We go on to engage with a comprehensive selection of these webpages in Chapter 8.

Nuclear Proliferation and International Security (2006–2016)

The events of 9/11 and 7/7 saw a non-state actor, al-Qaeda, inflict two large scale attacks against two of the twentieth century's most militarised states, and these were to resonate powerfully in the discourse of international security. The attacks prompted the US to invade two countries, embroiling them and their allies in a prolonged and enervating insurgent conflict which would last for over ten years. However, the first decade of the new century saw another source of international tension arising between the USA, standing alongside some of its European allies, and two state actors: Iran and the Democratic Republic of North Korea (DPRK). Over this period, a series of confrontations took place between the USA and these two countries concerning allegations that they were developing the technology to produce nuclear weapons. These actions were perceived as being in contravention of the conditions of two international treaties relating to the worldwide control and monitoring of nuclear weapons (Ford 2015). The first of these, the

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was brought into force in 1970 by the five states who possess nuclear weapons—USA, Russia, UK, France and China—with the ostensible intention of inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons. The NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995, and by 2016 it had been ratified by 191 countries worldwide. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was also drawn up by the UN in 1996 to prohibit the testing of nuclear weapons, but remains unratified not least because the USA refuses to become a signatory (Dahlman 2015). Between 2003 and 2012, Iran was regarded as being in breach of both treaties; and in 1993—after years of questionable compliance—the DPRK went so far as to withdraw from the NPT (Kang 2013).

Iran

Despite the widely acknowledged antipathy of religious conservatives in Iran towards the USA, which had prevailed since the 1979 Revolution, by 2001 the political mood had changed to the extent that Iran was one of the first countries in the Middle East to express empathy for the USA in the wake of 9/11. Thus, ironically, the events of 9/11 initially appeared to open up opportunities for detente between the two countries (Ansari 2006, p. 181). However, in his 2002 State of the Union address, US President George W. Bush catastrophically cited Iran as being part of what he termed the 'axis of evil', suggesting that Iran—along with Iraq and North Korea—was party to the continued security threat against the USA (Ansari 2006, pp. 181–195). This, along with the long-standing ambitions of the remaining conservatives in Iran to develop nuclear enrichment, played into the beginning of a new period of prolonged stand-off between Iran and the USA (Ottolenghi 2010, pp. 22–80).

Although it had for some time been widely acknowledged amongst the US administration and its intelligence services, in 2002 issues came to a head when the dissident National Council of Resistance for Iran (NCRI) made public that Iran was indeed in possession of a long-standing, clandestine, nuclear development programme. The leak focused upon the two plants which were being built at Arak (since 1996) and

Natanz (since 2000), and revealed that Iran's nuclear programme was rather more developed that had previously been assumed (Jafarzadeh 2008). Compliance with the NPT is monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and throughout 2002 the Agency attempted to carry out inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities. The following year, an initiative was taken by three prominent European countries—France, Germany and the UK (referred to as the 'E3')—to broker a deal with Iran over the development and monitoring of its nuclear programme. Despite this 'Tehran declaration', in November 2003, after a period of investigation the IAEA issued a formal report which criticised Iran for still failing to declare the aspects of its nuclear development programme which failed to comply with NPT conditions (Ansari 2006, pp. 201–204).

In 2004, the E3 countries brokered the 'Paris agreement' with Iran in order to try and clarify some of the 'ambiguity' within the Tehran declaration. However, two inter-related issues proved to be sticking points for the maintenance of this accord: the length of time Iran was required to suspend uranium enrichment; and the extent to which Iran was permitted to develop its own capacity for enrichment. The election of the conservatives, led by the new President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in the 2005 elections also did not bode well for the latest round of détente (Adebahr 2017, pp. 118–121). Later that year Iran commenced production of materials related to uranium enrichment, and the E3 withdrew from negotiations. The IAEA once more prepared a report which was critical of Iran, this time paving the way for its referral to the UN Security Council (UNSC) (Jett 2018, pp. 348–349).

In the first half of 2006, Iran stepped up its development of nuclear materials, thus resuming the full processing of uranium enrichment, and continued to refuse co-operation with the IAEA. By summer, the UNSC took up the issue of Iran's recalcitrance and non-compliance with the NPT. As well as the original E3—France, Germany and the UK—this now involved the additional 'superpowers' who are permanent members of the UNSC-China, Russia and the US. In other words this group, which became known as the 'P5 + 1', now comprised all the five permanent members of the Security Council ('P5'), plus Germany as one of the original members of the E3 ('+1'). Between 2006 and 2010, the Security Council went on to adopt five resolutions censuring Iran, gradually scaling up its demands to gradually include sanctions, despite the original E3's instinctive aversion to these measures (Adebahr 2017, pp. 60–61; Jett 2018, pp. 349–353). These resolutions are included as one of the corpora of documents which we analyse in Chapter 9. Along with the UNSC resolutions pertaining to North Korea outlined in the following section, we will also explore how the language and discourse of these resolutions was recontextualised in prominent UK and US newspapers during the period between 2006 and 2012.

In 2009 the election of Barack Obama as US President had already paved the way for intensified negotiations to take place between the USA, working alongside its European allies, and Iran. From 2010 until 2013, these included both 'carrots' such as the proposal of a 'fuel swap' whereby nuclear enrichment could be controlled and monitored by materials being shipped outside Iran, and 'sticks' such as a range of more nuanced economic sanctions being put in place by the EU (Adebahr 2017, pp. 118–125; Reardon 2012, pp. 32–34). However, further substantive progress was not finally achieved until 2013, when Hassan Rouhani was elected the new President of Iran (Jett 2018, p. 356). With unemployment and inflation in the country having reached record highs in the previous financial year (Bowen et al. 2016, p. 128), this former nuclear negotiator was inclined to pursue a more pragmatic stance in negotiations over the nuclear issue. Shortly after his inauguration, he resumed negotiations with the P5 + 1. After repeated extensions of the initial interim agreement drawn up later in 2013, the *Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action* (JCPOA) was agreed between the P5 + 1 and Iran in July 2015 (Bowen et al. 2016, p. 126), in return for the EU and the USA providing relief from sanctions. Specifically, the 2015 JCPOA substantially cut back the number of Iran's centrifuges and its stocks of enriched uranium, limited its research and development so it could not produce any weapons-grade plutonium, and extended the length of notice it was required to provide before producing enriched materials. More broadly, the JCPOA required Iran to abide permanently to an additional protocol set out under the NPT, and to permit the IAEA to access its nuclear facilities for the next twenty years (Bowen et al. 2016, pp. 133–134).

North Korea

If negotiations over Iran's development of fissile materials and nuclear weapons were shared between prominent members of the EU and the USA, negotiations over renewed nuclear activity on the part of North Korea (DPRK) were borne rather by neighbouring regional powers, at some points working in tandem with the USA. The engagement of North Korea in the development of nuclear technology and equipment started rather earlier in the twentieth century than that of Iran. And the story of the gradual weaponisation of the DPRK's nuclear materials complements the widely recognised historic isolation of the country and its uneasy relationship over the years with China and Russia, both of whom it borders; as well as the USA. Korea was annexed by Japan up to the end of the Second World War (1945), a 35-year occupation often regarded as brutal in the national memory. The gradual detente which developed between its immediate neighbours and erstwhile benefactors, China and the Soviet Union, and 'the West' through the latter half of the twentieth century, left its aging revolutionary leader, Kim Il-sung, more or less alone as one of the last advocates of radical Marxism-Leninism worldwide. Since the 1950 Korean War, the DPRK had also historically viewed the USA as its inveterate enemy. This concluded in 1953 with the creation of South Korea (the Republic of Korea, or ROK) as a distinct state, where nuclear weapons were introduced in the late 1950s as a deterrent to further incursions south of the demilitarised zone by the communist state to the North (Pollack 2011, pp. 1–47).

Throughout the 1950s and the 1960s, the DPRK began to develop nuclear technology, initially for peaceful purposes: not least since it was perceived that this would help to put the country on an equal footing to the 'superpowers' which it aspired to rival both regionally and internationally. The regime under Kim Il-sung started to move towards weaponisation around the mid-1970s. This process was actually enhanced when the DPRK joined the fledgling IAEA in September 1974 (Pollack 2011, pp. 71–98), and in 1985 it finally ratified the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT). By the early 1990s, after almost two decades of nuclear development, it became clear that the DPRK was on the verge of possessing nuclear weapons capability and, at this point, the republic came under pressure from both South Korea and the USA to disclose their nuclear capacity under the terms of the NPT. However, after sustained prevarication with IAEA inspectors in 1992, the DPRK withdrew from the NPT in 1993 on the grounds that this intrusion violated its sovereignty (Pollack 2011, p. 109). This prompted intervention on the part of the USA, which yielded the negotiated solution that would prevail for the next two decades. The 'Agreed Framework', as it became known, was ratified in June 1994. In it, the DPRK agreed to freeze its nuclear programme in return for the USA providing some of the nuclear materials, such as heavy fuel oil and light water reactors (LWRs), which the DPRK would forfeit under this arrangement (Pollack 2011, p. 114). Shortly after signing the Agreed Framework with US President Jimmy Carter, Kim Il-sung died, and was succeeded as President by his son Kim Jong-il.

The same US trajectory which may have contributed to the escalation of the Iran nuclear issue in the wake of the 9/11, could also have played to the nuclear ambitions of the DPRK. The US administration's attitude towards the DPRK noticeably toughened in the wake of the 2001 attacks. George W. Bush was not only personally critical of Kim Jong-il, the new North Korean President, but the DPRK was also bracketed with Iraq and Iran as part of the 'axis of evil' in the notorious 2002 State of Union address. This had a similar consequence as it had on Iran. Since the US had invaded one of the 'axis' countries, it was logical for the DPRK to fear that it might once again become a target for US military intervention. Accordingly the response of the DPRK was to adopt a defensive strategy powerful enough to deter any likely incursions against them. In the summer of 2002, US intelligence claimed that the DPRK was in the process of acquiring enough equipment and materials to start the large-scale enrichment of uranium. From Pyongyang's perspective, it maintained that since 2001 the USA had been slowing down its shipments of heavy fuel oil, in contravention of its undertakings under the 1994 Framework. In the second half of 2002, the USA had indeed totally suspended heavy fuel oil shipments; and by the end of the year, the DPRK announced that the Agreed Framework had broken down and, in contravention of IAEA restrictions, started to move towards reactivating their nuclear plant. North Korea formally announced its withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003, and correspondingly abandoned any last vestiges of compliance with IAEA safeguarding (Pollack 2011, pp. 131–140).

If prominent members of the EU had to some extent acted as mediators between the US and Iran, it was China who mediated between the US and the DPRK over this nuclear issue, along with some of its near neighbours and old allies. In August 2003, Beijing hosted what become known as the 'Six Party Talks' between China, the US, North Korea, South Korea, Japan and Russia (Buszynski 2013). However, after an initial joint statement in September 2005 in which all six parties committed to the peaceful denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, the main players appeared to drift apart again over the following year. In July 2006 the DPRK undertook, unannounced, its most far-reaching series of missile tests since 1994, firing a total of seven ballistic missiles of various denominations and with varying degrees of success, but clearly in contravention of all earlier agreements. These infringements were immediately referred to the UN Security Council, which rapidly issued Resolution 1695. This condemned the missile launches, prohibited further tests and imposed sanctions on nuclear materials and technology (United Nations Security Council 2006a). That October, North Korea responded by carrying out its first nuclear test since 1994, exploding a device of up to one kiloton (Pollack, pp. 141–149). Once again, the UNSC issued another resolution (1718), this time expressing 'concern' over the nuclear test, imposing further sanctions, and setting up a Panel of Experts to advise the Security Council on the Korean issue (United Nations Security Council 2006b).

The apparent intransigence of the DPRK led to a turnaround in diplomatic strategy, which at this stage by-passed the earlier multilateral talks. China took considerable offence from the actions of the Republic, and largely reduced its role to providing tacit support for the stance of the USA. For its part, the USA ostensibly adopted a more conciliatory role, rapidly moving to bilateral talks with North Korea in Berlin in January 2007 (Pollack, pp. 150–151). Initially these talks were productive, and appeared to augur some movement towards DPRK denuclearisation and in fact, North Korea actually began to disable some of its nuclear plant and dismantle some of its nuclear equipment.

Correspondingly, the USA relaxed some of its sanctions on financial transactions and shipments of heavy fuel oil. However, through 2008 areas of divergence again emerged. These arose mainly from an existential impasse that built up between the USA and the DPRK in relation to what constituted denuclearisation. The DPRK appeared to be prepared to reduce its nuclear capacity, but refused to commit to written verifications, and insisted on retaining its right to nuclear weapons; for its part, the USA was committed to the total elimination of nuclear weapons in the north of the Korean peninsula (Buszynski 2013, pp. 140–163). In December 2008, the Six Party Talks resumed to no avail, with the DPRK still refusing to undertake 'written, binding pledges on verification' (Pollack, p. 153).

In the first half of 2009, despite its leader Kim Jong-il being debilitated from the first of a series of strokes that would eventually kill him, the DPRK made no pretence of once again recommencing the development of weapons grade nuclear materials. In short, the DPRK ruling elite became increasingly of the view that its status as a nuclear power now put it on a similar diplomatic footing to the USA. In April, North Korea attempted to launch a satellite from a missile. This was met with a muted response from the UNSC in the form of a presidential statement from which the DPRK still took offence, and responded by expelling IAEA inspectors from the Yongbyon nuclear complex (Hecker 2013, p. 4). Also, in May, the Republic succeeded in exploding a higher velocity 4-kiloton nuclear test which to some extent overcame the limitations of the 2006 attempt. This was met the same month with a more vigorous response from the UNSC in the form of Resolution 1874, expressing further concern over the nuclear test and once gain extending sanctions (UNSC 2009a). This was followed up in September 2009 by Resolution 1887, which reaffirmed in more general terms the Security Council's commitment to nuclear non-proliferation (UNSC 2009b).

Although tensions rose on the Korean peninsula in 2010 due to the sinking of a South Korean corvette by the DPRK navy (Rozman 2011) and also its shelling of an island in the South, the nuclear issue largely subsided through 2010; and 2011 became a year of 'diplomatic calm' until Kim Jong-il died that December (Hecker 2013, p. 3). The mandate of the UNSC Panel of Experts was extended annually through three further UNSC resolutions (United Nations Security Council

2010, 2011, 2012); and through 2011, meetings were held by nuclear negotiators from the North with South Korea and the USA respectively, culminating in the DPRK agreeing to a suspension of both nuclear development and nuclear tests in February 2012, as well as once again permitting IAEA inspectors access to the Yongbyon reactor (Hecker 2013, p. 4). The UNSC resolutions which were passed between 2006 and 2012 relating to North Korea are included in the corpus of documents which we will analyse in Chapter 9, as we explore how the language of the UNSC was resituated in prominent UK and US newspapers over this period.

However, this period of relative detente was not to last. The dynastic succession of Kim Jong-un to the DPRK presidency in 2011 led to both ballistic missile launches and nuclear tests being recommenced in the North. Most recently, North Korea has carried out two long-range missile tests in 2016 (Anderson 2017, p. 628), and three more in 2017 (McCurry and Borger 2017). The DPRK has also carried out four more nuclear tests of increasing velocity: one in 2013, two in 2016 (Anderson 2017, p. 628), and the most recent in September 2017. All of these were very much more powerful than the tests in the previous decade, with the most recent blast being 100 kilotons - over six times more powerful than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima (Beuge et al. 2017). These further infringements of the NPT and IAEA protocols resulted in a further wave of twelve Security Council resolutions being implemented between January 2013 and December 2017 (United Nations Security Council 2013a, b, 2014, 2015, 2016a, b, c, 2017a, b, c, d, e). These not only further extended the Panel of Experts, but also condemned the missile launches and nuclear tests and once more incrementally strengthened sanctions against the regime.

Inside/Outside: Security Challenges of the Second Decade (2010–2016)

The initial Islamist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the London Transport System in the first decade of the new century gave rise to the spectre of attacks being carried out by cells located within the nation state, upon its population and infrastructure. However, in 2011, almost ten years after the events of 9/11, the attention of US and European intelligence and security agencies become radically realigned. This entailed a new focus upon the 'bordering practices' of the state (Vaughan-Williams 2012) and an enhanced concern not only about those who entered the country for short term or long-term residency, but also about citizens who returned to the country after spending time abroad.

The assassination of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan, by US special forces in May 2011 arguably achieved what the very much more costly US-led invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan had not: the decapitation of al-Qaeda. However, it left a vacuum which was soon filled by another actor which was to challenge both the internal and external security of nation states across Europe, and the USA, in a reinvigorated fashion. Civil unrest in Syria, which began in March of 2011 within the context of the 'Arab Spring' as a series of protests for democracy within the country, escalated into an 'armed insurgency' in July of that year. By the end of 2012, it was widely acknowledged that different armed groups within Syria were engaged in full scale civil war (Lister 2015). These events, along with the continued long running collapse of the Iraqi state in the wake of the US invasion of 2003, led to the demise of al-Qaeda, the group to which had been attributed responsibility for the 9/11 attacks. However, they were superseded by a new radical jihadi group styling itself as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant ('ISIL', also known as ISIS, or Da'ish), By 2014, Islamic State effectively controlled large swathes of territory land straddling the Iraq-Syria border, which it declared an Islamic Caliphate. The rise to prominence of Islamic State in the Syrian conflict provides the context for the final batch of UK security documents which we analyse at the end of Chapter 7. This situation gave rise to two issues which confronted US and UK intelligence agencies and security services at this time: first, the issue of 'foreign fighters'—citizens of European countries or North America who travelled to Syria in order to join Islamic State (Silverman 2017, pp. 1091–1092); and secondly the prospect of the territory controlled by the Caliphate operating as an external base from which attacks against the USA or Europe could be launched. In other words, the Islamic Caliphate, as a supranational actor, now replaced the states of Iraq and Afghanistan as the locus of concern not only for US and UK security forces, but also for the UN Security Council.

A distinctive feature of Islamic State was the attraction it offered for many recruits from other countries (Joffé 2016, p. 810). These were usually in their early twenties, or younger, and were recruited through not only through Islamic State's widely-acknowledged sophisticated and plethoric use of social media but also, at least in the UK, through local community networks (Silverman 2017, pp. 1092–1093). Most recent estimates of the numbers of foreign fighters who travelled to the occupation across the Syrian-Iraqi border vary from 27,000–31,000, with most sources now agreeing that the number was likely to have reached at least 30,000 at its peak in 2015 (e.g. Joffé 2016, p. 808; Barrett 2017, p. 4). While most recruits originated from countries in the Middle East and North Africa, European countries also contributed significant numbers to IS ranks. The velocity of recruitment increased dramatically from the start of the unrest in Syria to when opposing forces started to retake territory held by Islamic State in 2016 (Joffé 2016, p. 809). By 2016 it was widely estimated that citizens from Europe and the USA had travelled to conflict zones worldwide had risen to 7000 (Awan and Guru 2017, p. 25). The Soufan Group reported in 2017 that of the foreign fighters travelling to Iraq and Syria, around 5000 came from the EU overall and over 200 from North America. Of the most numerous EU countries, it is estimated that 1910 fighters (or associates, friends or family) travelled from France, over 915 from Germany and around 850 from the UK (Barrett 2017).

It was this prospect of foreign fighters returning to the UK which was perceived as posing a threat to the internal security of the state (Silverman 2017, p. 109). Of the foreign fighters who had specifically travelled to Iraq and Syria, around 1200 had returned to the EU overall, while fewer than 100 had turned to North America. Of the prominent EU countries, 400 had returned to the UK, around 300 had returned to France and Germany respectively (Soufan Group 2017, p. 12). At the time of writing therefore, within the NATO alliance, the UK is facing the prospect of the largest number of returning foreign fighters. The concern over returnees is heightened in the context of the spate of smaller scope and 'lone wolf' attacks which continue to be staged across Europe and North America through the second decade, often by perpetrators now claiming allegiance to Islamic State. These include:

- in the USA, the attacks on the Boston Marathon (April 2013) and San Bernardino (the December 2015);
- in France, the aborted attack on the Amsterdam-Paris Express (August 2015), the attacks on the Stade de France and the Bataclan theatre, which resulted in large-scale casualties (November 2015), and the truck attack along the Promenade des Anglais in Nice (July 2016);
- in Belgium, the attacks on Zaventem Airport, and Maalbeek metro station (March 2016);
- in Germany, attacks in in Würzburg and Ansbach (July 2016), followed by an attack in Berlin in December 2016;
- in the UK, as well as the large-scale bomb attack on Manchester Arena where 22 people were killed in May 2017, two smaller-scale but no less lethal attacks took place on Westminster Bridge and London Bridge in the capital in March and June of that year.

UK Legislative Context (2012–2016)

Between 2012 and 2016 security agencies from different countries across Europe and North America worked alongside their respective legislative and juridical bodies to introduce or revise measures that could be implemented against (re)domiciled foreign fighters. These consisted, first, of measures to prevent domiciled citizens from leaving the nation state for conflict zones; secondly, measures to deal with those citizens who returned from conflict zones; and thirdly, more nuanced 'non-trial-based measures', such as those that were implemented in the UK (Fenwick 2016) not only to disrupt the activities of those combatants who were leaving and sometimes returning across national borders, but also parties who might be involved in other forms of terrorist activity (see also Fenwick 2015).

The first stage led to a panoply of legislation and other coercive measures being put in place to restrict the movements of subjects who were identified as potential overseas combatants. In the UK it not only became an offence to travel to Syria to join IS, but also to plan to go there (Gower 2015). A particular focus of concern in Britain at this time was the number of families who were leaving the UK for Syria and Iraq, and stories of teenage girls who were travelling, ostensibly to find partners amongst IS fighters. In 2015 at the peak of the exodus, this neared a moral panic, featuring prominently in the popular tabloid press (Christodoulou 2017), and even a television drama (Kosminsky 2017). According to Awan and Guru (2017), this resulted in care proceedings being taken out against families who were suspected of taking children to Syria, parents being threatened with imprisonment, children being removed from their families, and electronic tagging orders being issued. On this argument, 'radicalization' had now become 'a child protection concern' (ibid., p. 25). Measures were also put in place to permit intervention when suspected foreign fighters tried to leave the UK. Chief amongst these was to restrict the travel of would-be combatants by confiscating their passports. Passport seizure was introduced in 2013 by the UK Home Secretary under the powers of the royal prerogative to protect UK citizens. The 2015 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act extended these powers so that police and border officials could confiscate the passports of those intending to leave the country if they were suspected of leaving the UK in order to be involved in 'terrorism-related activity outside the United Kingdom'. Passport confiscation could also be a prelude either to the permanent cancellation of an individual's travel documents or to the enforcement of other counter-terrorism measures against the individual concerned (Fenwick 2013, p. 180).

Measures to deal with citizens who returned from conflict zones fell into two broad categories: imprisonment or some form of 'rehabilitation and reintegration' back into society (Soufan Group 2017, p. 27). Unsurprisingly Scandinavian countries, such as Denmark (Braw 2014), became exponents of more integrationist policies; while, despite calls for 'real community engagement' in countering violent extremism in the UK (Silverman 2017), various forms of detention were carried out in the UK and North America. However, what is most relevant for the analysis of the UK security documents produced over this period, which we carry out at the end of Chapter 7, is the more nuanced extension of 'non-trial-based preventive measures' which were initiated in the UK over this period (Fenwick 2016, p. 185). Up to this time there had been repeated calls for British nationals returning from Islamic State to forfeit their UK citizenship (e.g. Flood 2016). However, under the terms of international law, this was not possible if the returnee possessed naturalised citizen status; in other words, if a returning foreign fighter was born and bred in the country, they could not legally be stripped of their UK citizenship. Therefore, measures were introduced in order to provide a basis for preventive action in the case of UK passport-holders returning from Syria, if they were perceived as presenting a risk to UK citizens. These took the form of 'temporary exclusion orders' (TEOs) which could be imposed if it is considered necessary to protect the population from the threat of terrorism, or if it is suspected that someone 'is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity …outside the United Kingdom' (Fenwick 2016, p. 176). When a TEO is imposed, a person's passport can be invalidated for up to two years, hence preventing re-entry into the country over that period. A TEO can then be extended for further periods. Once an individual under a TEO is assessed as presenting a minimal risk to the population, they can be permitted to return to the UK once further conditions are stipulated.

However, in the UK a third set of measures was introduced, or rather reconstituted, which was brought to bear not only on those returning from conflict zones but also on potential combatants and others suspected more generally of potential terrorist activities. The UK Coalition government which was elected in 2010 presented itself as 'seeking to re-engage with fundamental liberties and as rolling back certain repressive measures introduced under Labour' (Fenwick 2016, p. 183). As part of this strategy, it addressed the issue of 'control orders', a measure introduced under the 2005 Prevention of Terrorism Act which sought to restrict the movement of individuals suspected of terrorism without recourse to trial. Control orders were widely criticised at the time not only for their apparent abandonment of due legal process, but also as falling short of the requirements of international law (Fenwick 2016, p. 182). Modified legislation was passed in 2011, and reinforced in 2015, which again curtailed the liberty of those suspected of terrorist activities without recourse to the juridical procedures, 'by imposing specific restrictions on them, related to the particular types of activity it is thought that they might engage in, with the aim of preventing future terrorist activity before it occurs' (Fenwick 2016, p. 182). The most recent iteration of these 'Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures' (or TPIMs) continued the practice of detaining suspects for long periods of time or restricting their geographical movements, but also reintroduced the option to relocate suspects within certain limits (Fenwick 2016, p. 184). These TPIMs could clearly do service either as a measure to place restrictions on individuals supporting or seeking to join Islamic State, or on individuals returning from a conflict zone who were assessed as presenting a threat to the population. It is the language and discourse of a collection of UK government documents which relate to this period of concern about freedom of movement across borders which will be the focus of the second half of Chapter 7.

Conclusion

The attrition of Islamic State in Syria which took place throughout 2017, and the election of an idiosyncratic Republican as US President in the May of that year, has led to further developments with regard to both national and international security issues that have taken place during the period we have been writing this book. In October 2017, Raqqa—the final significant powerbase of Islamic State in Syria—was captured by Syrian Democratic Forces, leading to the anticipated expulsion of many of the 'foreign fighters' who had been harbouring in the city. This arguably vindicates some of the legislative measures that are reflected in the documents that had been drawn up by the UK government between 2012 and 2016, which we examine in the second half of Chapter 7. Doubtless many of the 200 American nationals who were identified as having transited to Syria will be monitored, on their return, by the reconstituted US security services with whom we engage in Chapter 10. Donald Trump's orientation towards foreign affairs has also led to contrarian developments with regard to the issue of nuclear proliferation. After a year of prevention and excoriating criticism of the 'Iran Deal', Trump finally authorised the USA to withdraw from the JCPOA in May 2018, and the USA began re-imposing sanctions on Iran in the face of resistance from the EU, China and Russia. However, on 3 October 2018, the International Court of Justice ordered the USA that, once again, its sanctions must cease. The vicissitudes of US-DPRK relations have also continued to vacillate during this period. Kim Jong-un completed historic visits to South Korea and China in early 2018. Then, after a year of the two national leaders exchanging insults on social media, President Kim met Donald Trump at a summit in Singapore, heralding a period of detente between the two countries.

In this way, countries across Europe, North America and those states represented on the UNSC continue to respond to their perceived 'threat' of attacks upon the nation state which emanate from both internal and external actors; as well as to engage with the 'nuclear contention' in Iran and North Korea. This makes it all the more urgent for those of us working in political discourse studies to investigate the ways in which language and discourse is used to constitute the relations between the different actors involved: between governments and other state actors, between governments and non-state actors, and between governments and their populations.

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3

Critical Approaches to Security Discourse

In recent years, a discourse-based approach to understanding issues relating to national and international security has been adopted across disciplines within the social sciences including sociology, political geography, political science and international relations (IR). Simultaneously, researchers in applied linguistics and discourse analysis have turned their gaze upon security-related documents and genres, such as presidential speeches, UN resolutions, newspaper reports and national strategy statements. While, from a realist perspective, the term 'security' is conceived of as an object, and language as its means of representation; from a 'constructivist' perspective security is constituted through language and discourse (Aradau 2010, p. 493). The emerging field of security studies, and those in IR researching security of a critical bent, have adopted the 'linguistic turn' in order to counter the realist conceptualisations of their object of study emanating from the more conservative areas of political science. This chapter will explore current approaches towards understanding the constitution of security that arise from discourse analysis, and set out some of the findings to date. As the title of this chapter suggests, a number of different critical approaches have

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been used to investigate the discourses of security that have been produced since the end of the Second World War.

Discourses of Nuclear Crisis and Nuclear Proliferation

Analyses of the political discourse relating to nuclear security fall into two distinct phases, which reflect the framing of the historical events which took place in Europe over the post-war period. The first, and in many ways foundational phase, engages with speeches and documents from the Cold War, the stand-off which took place between the two dominant nuclear powers of the USA and the USSR from just after the end of the Second World War in 1947 until the 'Berlin Wall' was breached in 1991. The second considers the discourse surrounding expectations of a nuclear threat from two states which have been historically alleged to be non-compliant with the international Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT): Iran and North Korea.

Cold War

Analyses of the discourse of nuclear security during the Cold War have been approached from two standpoints: a cognitive approach which focuses on the use of metaphor in key documents of the period (Chilton 1985, 1996), and a dialogic approach which examines discursive flows between some of the different actors of that period (Mehan et al. 1990).

In a wide ranging and influential study published in 1996, Paul Chilton analyses a range of documents and speeches which circulated between 1947 and 1989 in order to describe—in detailed relation to the unfolding of international political events over this period—how certain metaphors emerged as core to the formation of post-war policy and political relations between the USA, Europe and the USSR. Drawing on a classic literature in metaphor analysis (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1987) and sociolinguistics (e.g. Goffman 1967) Chilton argues for a non-realist approach to the discourse of politics and security by proposing that the circulation of metaphor in political discourse is used not only for the purpose of producing new understandings of particular political situations (conceptualisations), but also as a strategy of relaying meanings in a non-threatening fashion between political interlocutors (pragmatics). Crucially, the production, reproduction and circulation of political metaphor is fundamental to the cognitive processing of political phenomena, as shared mental models and schemata become realised by both political elites and popular culture.

Chilton's analysis of early documents produced by the post-war administration of President Truman suggests how the Soviet Union came to be constituted in US foreign policy through four major conceptual schemas: personification, the metaphor of CONTAINER, the metaphor of FORCE and the metaphor of PATH (pp. 142–152). In key post-war US documents, personification was used to refer not only literally to individual leaders or populations in the East and the West, but also as a metaphorical representation of the Soviet Union, government and communist party as if they were persons. These persons were then attributed with defective traits such as being (medically) sick or insane, or (morally) cruel or irrational, and so on. Secondly, the Soviet Union was viewed as an entity which existed within a legitimate, bounded space. The boundaries of this space not only served to limit its purview but also to divide it from the rest of the world. The Soviet Union was also constituted as attempting to exceed its legitimate boundaries, at which point it has to be literally restrained, or metaphorically 'contained' by Western powers. Thirdly, and related to this last point, the Soviet Union appeared to be moving towards a set of goals in order to further its own interests. These threatened the interests of Western states, which by contrast appear to be static and non-expansionist, standing in passive but firm resistance to the PATH of the USSR. Finally, through the use of images drawn from hydraulics and mechanics, the USSR emerged as a FORCE which was exerting expansionist 'pressure' upon the West. On Chilton's analysis, these four major conceptual schemas, and the relationships between them, circulate and function throughout the early Cold War discourse to build up a coherent conceptualisation of the Soviet Union which became widespread amongst US, UK and some European policy makers, along with their respective publics.

The breach of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War brought about a change in the orientation of IR in Europe and America. Rather than conceiving of Europe as being in an external relation to a powerful and over-reaching neighbour, post-Cold War Europe began to be thought of more in terms of its own internal relations. One dominant metaphor that emerges from a range of post-Cold War discourse is that of HOUSE (Chilton 1996, p. 251 ff.). However, analysis of a range of documents from different political actors revealed a range of cross-cultural meanings attributed to this concept. While the word *house* in America and Britain carries the idea of a shared, integrated space occupied by a unified family, equivalent terms in Russian and German conveyed rather different conceptual meanings given the social conditions of the time. For example, the Russian word *dom* and the usage of *Haus* within communist East Germany (the GDR) evoked rather the idea of an apartment in a communal block, which contains 'multiple' rather than 'singular inside-outside' relations. This allows for a residual separation under the one roof that was not conveyed by the image in Anglophone cultures. The differences between such understandings gave rise to paradoxes and confusion even within the thawing relationships which developed both within Europe, and between Europe and its powerful neighbour, through the 1990s.

The paradoxical nature of IR relating to the nuclear threat is further revealed by a study which investigates the arguments over the discursive production, maintenance and transmission of discourse across different actors within the USA. If Chilton draws only on the discourse of successive US Administrations, Mehan et al. (1990) engage with a more heterogeneous corpus compiled from the US Administration, the National Council of Catholic Bishops, the Roman Catholic Church and the speeches of Ronald Reagan. They conclude that the Cold War itself is an 'intertwined system of discourse' (p. 158). For the USA and its allies (such as the UK), a 'dialogic' process took place between distinct actors such as 'strategic analysts', 'the Catholic Church' and 'peace groups' (p. 135). On this argument, the three discursive 'strands' to which this dialogue gave rise—the threat of Soviet expansion, reliance on nuclear weapons to curb the threat from the USSR, and the role of nuclear weapons—ultimately served to deter global warfare over this period.

Nuclear Non-Compliance

If the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1991 led to a decade of relative détente with regard to nuclear issues, the new century was to bring two new state actors into prominence with respect to nuclear security: Iran, because it was suspected of developing nuclear capability by the US and the UN; and North Korea, because it purported rather volubly to be developing nuclear weapons. In contrast with the perspective which Chilton's work brought to the Cold War, analyses of the discourse relating to the Iranian and North Korean nuclear issue draw mainly on the analytic approaches of critical discourse analysis (CDA) and critical linguistics. Critical accounts of nuclear proliferation discourse in relation to Iran have straddled the divide between 'discourse theory' and 'discourse analysis', in keeping with their disciplinary provenance. Papers published in the field of IR and security studies adopt a more poststructuralist, Foucauldian perspective (Adib-Moghaddam 2009; Moshirzadeh 2007); while papers published in the field of applied linguistics adopt a more modernist, text-analytic approach (Behnam and Zenouz 2008; Izadi and Saghaye-Biria 2007; Rasti and Sahragard 2012).

Contra the consistently 'rationalist' accounts of Iran's foreign policy produced by political science and the western media, Homeira Moshirzadeh (2007) teases out the internal discourses that have shaped Iran's foreign policy since the 1979 Revolution and impacted upon the development of its nuclear programme. Defining discourse in a Foucauldian bent as 'a system of "interrelated statements", including concepts, classifications, and analogies that make the world meaningful or in a way construct the world' (p. 522), Moshirzadeh offers an exposition of three 'meta-discourses' that serve to legitimise the Iranian nuclear programme within the Iranian polity and society. These three meta-discourses—a discourse of independence, a discourse of justice and a discourse of resistance—build on long-standing historical narratives in order to reinforce the Iranian people's sense of themselves, which arrives at a material articulation in the development of the nuclear programme as a national project. Adib-Moghaddam (2009) also draws more directly on Foucault's (1972) notion of 'discursive formation' in order to explore the discursive field in which Iran and America are defined in relation to each other in a relation of violence and mutual antagonism. However, as is often the case in solely poststructuralist approaches, while 'language' is referred to, there is little analysis of *actual* texts. For us, this does not so much constitute a point of critique, but rather marks a point of differentiation between the epistemology of the different approaches.

More text-based investigations of this case of nuclear proliferation discourse have tended to be genre specific, analysing corpora of newspaper articles of different sub-genres drawn from the 'elite' press of Iran, the UK and the US. Drawing on van Dijk's (1998) conceptualisation of an 'ideological square' which serves to justify social inequalities through the use of emphasis and mitigation to polarise in-groups and out-groups, Izadi and Saghaye-Biria (2007) analyse a corpus of editorials from the American press relating to the Iran nuclear crisis over two decades, from 1984 to 2004. Drawing their texts from *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, and *The Wall Street Journal*, they uncover a range of lexis which—with some variation across different papers—serve to present Iran's government as untrustworthy and Islam as a threat (p. 151), broadly in keeping with an 'Orientalist' perspective (after Said 1995). The editorials also exhibit to differing degrees the assumption—which they argue is unwarranted—that Iran's nuclear programme is ultimately intended for weapons production (pp. 152–157). By contrast the United States' failure—along with other signatories—to realise its commitment to the NPT through working towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, goes largely unacknowledged (pp. 160–161). Also influenced by van Dijk (1988), Hall (1978, 1992), as well as critical linguists who drew on systemic functional linguistics (SFL, e.g. Fowler 1991; Hodge and Kress 1993), Behnam and Zenouz (2008) undertake a comparative analysis of news reports relating to the nuclear proliferation in Iran from a corpus of twenty Iranian and British broadsheets published in 2004: two on the right of the political spectrum—*Kayhan* and *The Daily Telegraph*; and two on the left—the *Iran Daily* and *The Guardian*. Findings suggest that all four newspapers portray Iran as salient within the SFL transitivity system, either as an Actor, Senser or Sayer, with Iran largely being 'maligned' within the transitivity structure of the UK newspapers. Papers on the left in both countries give particular prominence with respect to verbal process types, acknowledging that the positions described are indeed ideological. One implication of the predominance of verbal processes in the Iranian papers is that its nuclear policy is supported by a political consensus within the country. By contrast, right wing newspapers tend to describe events using material processes in order to bestow them with the air of greater facticity. The British newspapers present a view of a dichotomous world, with the EU and 'Iran' occupying polarised positions, where Iran's uranium enrichment programme is subjected to particular vilification (pp. 213–216).

Drawing on van Dijk again (2001), as well as Van Leeuwen (2009) and Wodak (2001), Rasti and Sahragard analyse the patterns of discourse in 23 articles published in *The Economist* between 2007 and 2010. They describe a lexical polarisation between Iran and 'the West' where the western 'we' is portrayed positively as supporting sanctions, while an Iranian 'they' is represented in a negative light, particularly with regard to 'confidence-building activities' in relation to arguments around the lifting of sanctions (pp. 735–736). This dichotomised evaluation is further heightened through the use of a range of conceptual metaphors within the periodical (pp. 737–739). For the most part the reactions of Iranian citizens are elided from the presentation of the arguments around sanctions and, where they are, they tend to be represented as indiscriminately edgy, unpredictable and self-interested (p. 740). At the level of discourse, the issue of time is frequently invoked to legitimise a negative orientation towards Iran and its nuclear programme along with invocations to an 'indeterminate' group of international actors to position themselves. Additionally, a range of argumentation strategies are used to legitimate international action against Iran, including various 'topoi' (after Reisigl and Wodak 2001) such as 'usefulness/advantage', 'danger', 'justice' and 'responsibility' (pp. 743–744). Finally, the producers of the articles generate a negative perspective on the Iranian nuclear issue with the elision of agency through nominalisation and the use of the passive, as well as plentiful allocation of reference to Western sources compared with a distinct scarcity of Iranian authorities (pp. 745–746).

Despite its long running nature and global significance, discourse analysis relating to the North Korean nuclear issue has been rather more patchy than that relating to Iran. Also engaging with media texts, an early paper (Min 1999) uses critical linguistics (after, e.g., van Dijk 1988; Fowler 1991; Halliday 1985; Hodge and Kress 1993) to undertake a cross-cultural discourse analysis of 92 articles extracted from *The New York Times* and *The Korea Herald*, from the first four months' coverage of the nuclear standoff between North Korea and South Korea, between September and December 1994. While the headlines, or 'macro-propositions', in *The New York Times* accord the US prominence in mediating the North Korean nuclear talks (p. 8), the headlines in *The Korea Herald* focus more locally on North Korean transparency for the security of the Korean peninsula and the freezing of North Korean nuclear activities. *The New York Times* positions US participants as the agents in the negotiating processes, while the agency of the Korean participants is downplayed through a variety of rhetorical devices (pp. 11–12). Unsurprisingly, *The Korea Herald* increasingly constructs the South Korean participants as principal agents in the US-North Korean nuclear talks, with the USA being accorded agency in a less prominent fashion (p. 14). This is realised in part through the respective thematisation of the USA in the headlines of *The New York Times* (pp. 13–14) and South Korea in the headlines of *The Korea Herald* (pp. 23–24). With regard to lexicalisation, in *The New York Times* there is a considerable degree of overwording around words related to the notion of crisis, with the use of associated words such as 'crackdown', 'breakthrough', 'curbs', as well as the word 'crisis' itself (pp. 10–11). By contrast, *The Korea Herald* does not exhibit such plentiful lexicalisation around the theme of crisis; in fact it attests to portraying events on the Korean peninsula as generally less unstable (pp. 19–21).

Discourses of Revenge and Retaliation

If early analysts of security discourse cut their teeth on speeches and documents produced during the Cold War, the response of the Bush administration to the attacks carried out by al-Qaeda upon the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001, and the subsequent US-led invasion of Iraq, gave rise to a dispersal of critical approaches and analytical methodologies. Apart from the personal accusations of ignorance and mendacity that have been levelled at the American President himself (Kellner 2010), the speeches made by George W. Bush in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 have been the main l focus of critique, and his speeches have also been compared unfavourably to those of his principal ally, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair (Johnson 2002). As with more recent analyses of the discourse relating to nuclear security, analyses of the discourse of the Iraq War and its aftermath can be considered in two groups: those which take a broadly 'critical' text-based approach derived from either poststructuralism, CDA, genre analysis or cultural studies; and those which take a broadly cognitive approach.

Critical, Text-Based, Approaches

It has long been maintained that a key constituent of any culture is the multiplicity of genres that circulate within it (Halliday 1976; Eggins and Slade 2004). In this respect, it has been argued that the rhetorical devices used in George W. Bush's speeches resemble those of other American Presidents who came both before and after him: Franklin D. Roosevelt ('FDR'), the WW2 American leader who history has cast in a very different light to some of his successors (Oddo 2011; Silberstein 2002, pp. 15–17); George H. W. Bush; Bill Clinton (Lazar and Lazar 2004); and more recently Barack Obama (Reyes 2011). For Lazar and Lazar (2004), the rhetoric of George W. Bush is part of a more wide-ranging 'order of discourse' (after Foucault 1970) which sets out a 'New World Order', the purpose of which is to create a new existential foe to fill the gap left by the Soviet Union with the cessation of the Cold War. John Oddo (2011) notes that in the speeches of both FDR and George W. Bush, the actions of 'us' and 'them' are set out using 'moralized' verbal processes in which the actions of America are polarised against those of their enemies, be they the Germans in 1941 or the Iraqis in 2001. To this end, 'our' violent actions are set out by both leaders in a positive moral light—American forces 'defend', 'fight', 'defeat', 'win', 'confront' and 'protect', while 'their' violent actions are set out using negatively moralized verbal processes. In their respective eras, German and Iraqi forces 'attack', 'kill', 'invade', 'dominate' and 'murder' (2011, p. 295).

A longer-ranging historical purview also identifies certain generic commonalties in the characteristics of the 'call-to-arms' which George W. Bush regularly invoked between 2001 and 2003. The speeches made by the American President in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and in the run-up to the US invasion of Iraq bear a marked resemblance to other historic speeches delivered by leaders as diverse as the medieval Pope Urban II, the Tudor English monarch, Elizabeth I—and Adolf Hitler (Graham et al. 2004). A particular generic feature is the way these speeches construct their case for the legitimacy of war. They each appeal to a legitimate external, inherently good source of power; they each appeal to the historical significance of the speakers' culture, usually the nation state; they each appeal for unification behind the legitimating source of power; and they each construct 'a thoroughly evil Other' (p. 21).

It is this constitution of an 'evil Other' which has been one of the main lines of enquiry into the speeches and documents of the US Administration and its allies over the period of the Iraq War. This has focused critically upon the ways in which language and discourse are used to polarise the 'West' and the 'American people' in opposition to the 'terrorists' and/or 'Iraqis' (after Caldas-Coulthard 2003; Lakoff 1992, 2003; van Dijk 2001). This argument draws on poststructuralist and postmodernist thought which suggests that no culture or ideology exists in isolation, but rather is defined in terms of its relation to an Other (Lévinas 1998; Derrida 1999, 2001). In other words, a hypostatised 'we' is constituted through a discourse which serves to demonise the 'other' (Sikka 2006, p. 105). From a cultural studies perspective

(Johnson 2002), the rhetoric of both George W. Bush and Tony Blair produced a 'way of life' inasmuch as, from 2001, the culture of the US and UK became (re)defined in relation to that of Islamists, fundamentalists and terrorists. On this analysis, Bush's warrant for the 'war on terror' became grounded on a popular mythology of the American national identity (Silberstein 2002, p. 7). This way of life became presented in powerful, morally absolute terms (Lazar and Lazar 2004) which embraced 'democracy', 'generosity', 'compassion' and 'freedom' (Kellner 2004, p. 45); as well as 'peace', 'security', 'strength', 'goodness', 'humanity', 'success', 'liberty', 'civilization', 'justice', 'resolve', 'prosperity', 'decency' and 'courage' (Oddo 2011, p. 296). These positive attributes are set off against the negative moral values attributed to the (essentialised) 'Iraqis', such as 'terror', 'fear', 'danger', 'destruction', 'aggression', 'violence', 'crime', 'death', 'evil' and 'oppression', as well as 'treachery', 'tyranny', 'murder' and 'ruthlessness' (ibid., p. 296). For Silberstein, these 'despicable actions' and 'mass murder' are contrasted with '"the brightest beacon of freedom", justice and peace' (pp. 7–8). Arguing at length that both the (1990–1991) Gulf War and the (2003–2011) Iraq War were in fact media spectacles (2005), the cultural theorist Douglas Kellner concludes that the Bush administration's 'discourse of a perpetual war against evil evokes a Manichean theological mindset that divides the world into a battle between good and evil and takes for granted that one's own side is the "good" one' (2006, p. 168).

The precise relationship between the principal state actors in the post-9/11 security discourse has been variously analysed from a CDA perspective. In particular, the specific ways in which the pronouns 'us' and 'them' are used to set off the American—and the British—people in binary opposition to the Iraqis has been analysed through the lens of membership categorisation (after Sacks 1992). Not only does the contrastive thread set up within the early speeches of both George W. Bush and Tony Blair form a dialogic network linking the speeches of the two national leaders, but the way in which these categories are formulated is closely tied to action. In this respect, Leudar, Marsland and Nekvapilc conclude that 'category work…is closely tied to actions and serves to justify what has happened in this past, and prepare the ground for future actions' (2004, p. 263). Oddo also notes that the call-to-arms speeches of both FDR and George W. Bush expand the category of ‘us’ to incorporate not just the entirety of America, but also all of ‘civilisation’. By contrast, ‘them’ is not only construed as an errant minority group but is also linked to other deviant groups. For example, Roosevelt links the Germans to the Japanese, Bush ‘conflates’ al-Qaeda with the Taliban to justify the bombing of Afghanistan (Silberstein 2002, p. 15) and—even more preposterously—associates the Iraqis with al-Qaeda in order to justify the invasion of their country (Oddo 2011, pp. 304–306). This discursive tactic is dubbed by Hodges ‘adequation’ (after Bucholtz and Hall 2004), whereby both the state actor Iraq and non-state terrorist group al-Qaeda are both placed in the same “conceptual category marked by lexical descriptors associated with the concept of terrorism (e.g. ‘terror’, ‘terrorism’, and ‘terrorist’)”. This move serves to ‘erase’ the substantial difference between the interests of the state actor and the ‘non-state militant group’ (Hodges 2011, pp. 71–72; after Irvine and Gal 2000, pp. 35–84). Furthermore, the presidential rhetoric constructs Iraq and al-Qaeda as being ‘complementary’: Iraq is continually portrayed as providing resources and succour for the terrorist group; and the terrorist group is portrayed as both benefitting from and being reliant upon these resources in order to carry out further attacks which are alleged to extend even to the threat of biological warfare (Hodges 2011, pp. 74–83).

Over time the ‘othering’ of Iraq—along with the USA’s other designated adversary, Afghanistan—achieved a coherence that enabled the different elements of the ‘war on terror’ to hold together in order to make up a rhetorical unity. In a detailed analysis of seventy speeches delivered by President Bush between 2001 and 2008, Adam Hodges dubs this thematic development the ‘Narrative’ (2011). The elements that make up any narrative derive from an overall unifying structure that brings them together to form a ‘coherent whole’ (Bruner in Hodges 2011, p. 41). On Hodges’ analysis, a schematic structure emerges through the earlier speeches, and then becomes articulated wholesale in later iterations, such as in a speech delivered in 2003 to army families in Fort Stewart, Georgia (Hodges 2011, p. 60). Bush’s Narrative comprises six ‘episodes’ (after Gee 1986), as follows. First, there is a *precipitating event* in the attack by the members of an al-Qaeda cell on the World

Trade Centre on 11 September 2011. Then comes a general account of *America's response*, conducted on many fronts with an assortment of weapons. Next is the *'battle' of Afghanistan*, in which the invasion of the country is set out in bellicose language. Fourthly, the *numerous fronts* on which the 'war on terror' is waged are designated in order to specify its continuous and global characteristics. Then an account of the *'battle' of Iraq* describes the second US invasion. And finally, Bush discusses the *challenges* which confront America in its 'war on terror' and her *commitment* to carry it through in the face of adversity.

By contrast with Hodges' narrative account, Sovlacool and Halfon (2007) state that they are 'moving away from a focus on intent' (p. 226), defining discourse in a more Foucauldian fashion as "a historically emergent system of objects, concepts, categories and theories that mutually reinforce each other, thereby stabilising meaning and identity" (p. 225). In order to explore the discursive construction of the post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq, they analyse documents from strategic reports, presidential speeches and press briefings, identifying four 'narratives' relating to: "the evilness of Saddam Hussein, the helplessness of the Iraqi population, America as protector, and the international legitimacy of Iraqi reconstruction" (p. 238). However, these are ultimately over-determined by the 'historical erasure' of the US sanctions in the run-up to the Iraq War. Taking both a retrospective and prospective view, Krebs and Lobasz also assess how the dominant discourse which the US Republican administration established in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq became 'hegemonic', and unassailable by the Democratic party. In particular, the processes of rationalisation and argumentation in documents and speeches made by the US Administration between 11 September 2001 and 20 March 2003 reveal the deployment of 'incorrigible positions' and 'oracular reasoning' relating to the possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and collaboration with al-Qaeda, as well as the strategic organisation of the sequence of events and disingenuous use of syntax and tenses relating to the threat posed by Saddam Hussein (Chang and Mehan 2008). Even more recently a large-scale analysis of speeches and documents produced by the Bush administration also suggests a paradoxical rhetoric of different temporal modalities in order to justify the invitation of Iraq and subsequent incursions into civil liberties, by portraying the WTC attacks as at once ‘radically discontinuous’, ‘linear’ and ‘timeless’ (Jarvis 2009).

Cognitive Approaches

We have seen that metaphor featured prominently in early accounts of the discourse of the Cold War (Chilton 1985, 1996). Within the post-9/11 discourse, both metaphor and metonym were again regularly used both to frame the nature of the response to the attacks and to set the ‘West’ off against the ‘terrorists’, the ‘American people’ off against the ‘Iraqi people’ (Meadows 2007). Hodges reminds us that from the first, the idea of the ‘war of terror’ was not self-evident, but was in fact a metaphor in its own right:

> The characterisation of 9/11 as an act of war (rather than, as others have argued, a criminal act) and the response to terror as a “war on terror” (rather than an investigation into terrorist crimes) is a discursive achievement. (2011, p. 23)

On this analysis, both the concept of war and the concept of crime feature as metaphors which were deployed regularly throughout Bush’s early speeches. The *war frame*, for example, is constructed through the use of words and phrases such as ‘retreat’, ‘peace’, ‘enemy’, ‘under attack’ and ‘win the war’. The *crime frame* is constructed through the use of lexis such as ‘victims’, ‘murderers’, ‘search is underway’, ‘law enforcement’ and ‘bring them to justice’ (Hodges 2011). Elsewhere, the plethora of antagonistic metaphorical imagery used reinforces George Lakoff’s (1991, 1992, 2003) claim that, in the discourse of the West, war is presented in terms of a fairy tale which conveys categorical moral oppositions through the use of starkly antagonistic language. This was achieved in particular through the regular deployment of the two pejorative terms ‘evil’ and ‘terrorism’, and by the repeated portrayal of the negative relations between American values and the ‘evil Other’ (Graham et al. 2004, pp. 200–201). On this argument, Americans are portrayed as ‘freedom-loving people’ rather than ‘haters of freedom’

(Johnson 2002) and placed in opposition to an ‘evil Other’, ‘evil people’ and ‘the evil ones’. The rhetoric of the Bush administration also displays an ‘elasticity’ that incorporates: “evil do-ers, terrorists, suicide bombers: ‘barbaric’, ‘evil people’ who ‘burrow’ their way into society and ‘lurk’ in order to kill ‘innocent people’” (Graham et al. 2004, p. 201). The ruling Iraqi regime itself is characterised as ‘evil’ (Bhatia 2009; Meadows 2007); and Saddam Hussein is portrayed as a ‘mad’ man (Chang and Mehan 2008, p. 460), a ‘terrorist’ (Meadows 2007, p. 9) and a ‘tyrant’ (Lazar and Lazar 2004, p. 229). This dichotomisation is further evoked by the abstract, value-laden notions of ‘law’ vs. ‘lawlessness’, ‘civilization’ vs. ‘barbarism’, and ‘freedom’ vs. ‘tyranny’ which became attributed to the opposing sides in the conflict (Bhatia 2009). Of these values, it is perhaps ‘freedom’ which features most prominently in Bush’s oratory (Lazar and Lazar 2004; Reyes 2011; Sikka 2006). The idea of ‘freedom’, appeared throughout Bush’s ‘State of the Union’ speeches, and featured prominently in the 2002 speech which immediately preceded the Iraq invasion (Sowińska 2013). Here, freedom was presented as a divine force (e.g. ‘god’s gift to humanity’) and was personified as being on a journey (e.g. ‘freedom’s fight’, ‘freedom’s advance’) (ibid., pp. 800–801).

Metaphorical language was also used in the debate that took place in the public sphere in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq. Compared with political speeches, Sahlane (2013) finds a rather different array of metaphors used in a corpus of op-ed articles published between 2001 and 2003. Here, metaphorical frames were used across British, French and American newspapers, such as: the ‘timetable’ or ‘schedule’ of war; war as a ‘game’; ‘making the case’ or ‘selling the plan’ for war; war as ‘driving’; and war as ‘medicine’. In order to dehumanise the enemy, op-ed writers of different persuasions use euphemistic verb phrases such as ‘polish off’, ‘pay the price’, ‘pay the cost’ as well as the noun ‘fodder’ to describe potential victims of the impending US onslaught. Metaphors of impurity were used in both newspapers and speeches in order to denigrate the enemy, e.g. ‘dirt’, ‘snake’ (Sahlane 2013, pp. 164–166), and ‘parasites’ (Lazar and Lazar 2004, p. 236). Metaphors of bestiality were also used to allude to: the vulnerability of the Iraqi defenders, e.g. ‘cockroaches’ (Sahlane, 2013, pp. 164–166); and the power of the invading forces, e.g. the nouns 'beast,' 'leviathan' (Sahlane 2013, pp. 164–166), and the verbs 'preys', 'devour', 'swallow' (Lazar and Lazar 2004, p. 236).

George W. Bush and his administrative team also deploy highly specific argumentative strategies within the documents and speeches in order to persuade the public of the legitimacy of the case for the invasion of Iraq. From a cognitive perspective, this is achieved through 'representing particular events and social actors as directly affecting a given audience' (Dunmire 2011, p. 56). In both security strategy documents and in presidential speeches this is achieved through the representation of time (temporality), the construction of who is doing what to whom (agency) and the evaluation of these actions as or good or bad (axiology). The representation of temporal, spatial and axiological relations to the audience has now conventionally been dubbed 'proximization' (Cap 2006, 2008, 2010, 2016; Chilton 2004). If elsewhere Adam Hodges illustrates the sequential narrative structure of Bush's speeches (2011), Cap's elegant framework unpacks the ways in which the reader or listener is oriented towards the messages which were conveyed by the successive US Administrations at different stages of the second Gulf War.

Cap's theory of proximization builds on hints Paul Chilton had already set out in his 1996 *magnum opus* (e.g., p. 186). It is a way of systematically setting out the linguistico-discursive realisation of the political strategy of legitimisation. To understand this, we have to imagine the listener or reader at the centre of a conceptual space which is constituted by linguistic and lexico-grammatical resources. Thus, proximization is the way in which a speaker or writer of a text mobilises the lexical and lexico-grammatical resources of language in order to make a particular phenomenon more or less distant to the listener or reader. To achieve this, a range of categorizable linguistic and lexico-grammatical items are deployed along three existential axes: spatial, temporal and axiological (or 'STA' 2008, p. 8). Spatial proximization makes an event appear nearer or further away from the reader or listener, temporal proximization makes an event appear more or less immediate to the reader or listener, and axiological proximization makes an event good or bad. If particular phenomena are construed as being closer to the listener or reader along a particular axis they are referred to as being 'inside-the deictic-centre' (IDC); if particular phenomena are construed as being remote to the listener or reader they are referred to as being 'outside-the deictic-centre' (ODC). IDC elements include the use of particular lexical items which are used frequently through the entire post-9/11 period such as "United States", "other nations", "innocent people", "our country" and "we". ODC elements include lexical items such as "Iraq" and "terrorists" (2008, p. 75).

From a cognitive perspective, spatial proximization was used in the discourse of the post-9/11 US Administration to make a threat appear more or less present to the listener or reader. This applies in particular to the allegation that Saddam Hussein could launch WMDs which might impact upon the USA and its allies. Especially in the period immediately after 9/11 which entailed the justification for the invasion of Iraq, WMDs were constituted as being physically close to the listener or reader through the speed at which they could potentially be deployed (2013, p. 79 ff.), as well as in relation to the gravity of the consequences of their deployment (2013, p. 83 ff.). Temporal proximization situates events in relation to the present time of the listener or reader, either in terms of the past events leading up to the present, or future imagined events which emanate from the present. Cap calls this 'a symbolic "compression" of the time axis, and a particular conflation of the time frames involving two simultaneous conceptual shifts'—one 'past-to-present', the other 'future-to-present' (p. 85). Indicators of temporal proximization are less immediately quantifiable than those of spatial proximization, but include 'nominalisations' such as "threat" and "danger", modal auxiliaries such as "can" and "could", as well as patterns of tense and aspect. Axiological proximization positions phenomena as nearer to or further from the listener or reader in terms of their values. This is defined technically as 'a forced construal of a gathering ideological conflict between the "home values" of DS [discourse space] central interests, IDCs, and the "alien", antagonistic values of the [peripheral] ODCs' (2010, p. 94). ODC values are realised by lexis such as "evil", "radicalisation", "extremism", IDC values by lexis such as "freedom", "liberty" and "democracy". Both of these can operate in conjunction with spatial and temporal proximization to heighten the immediacy of the ideological encroachment. Thus crucially, proximization provides the linguistic resources whereby actions—particularly those of an interventionist nature—can be legitimised by political actors.

In his analyses of successive corpora of presidential speeches, both immediately before and after the invasion of Iraq (2010) as well as in later periods of the war (2013), Cap argues that the confirmation that Saddam Hussein was not in possession of the widely publicised WMDs was a game-changer in terms of the rhetoric emanating from the Oval Office. While overall Cap compares four sub-corpora (2010, 2013), his central thesis focuses on the switch from the first corpus period (2001–2003) to the second (2003–2004). Once WMDs were out of the picture, the presidential rhetoric had to change from an appeal to the spatial and temporal proximity of other attacks to appeals which drew much more on civilisational and ethical values, realised through linguistic and discoursal devices of axiological proximization. Crucially, indicators of spatial proximization fall dramatically after the first sub-corpus period in which WMDs were construed as the main premise for the Iraq invasion. Indicators of temporal proximization exhibit more stability over the four periods—with something of a bubble in period three. This could indicate that they play a less central role in establishing the grounds for US engagement over this period. However, in the second corpus period, the counts of indicators of axiological proximization are very much higher than in the first period. These confirm Cap's claims that there was a shift in the grounds for legitimising the Iraq invasion after it was confirmed that WMDs were not in evidence.

In turn Patricia Dunmire builds upon Cap's work to capture the implacable logic of the presidential discourse (pp. 59–73, 90–96). First, the origins of the impending conflict are attributed to the Iraqi regime. Then, these actions are portrayed as having a potentially negative impact on the future. Third, an alternative future is posited whereby, without intervention, a diversity of evils would befall 'the Middle East', 'America' and 'all free nations' (p. 93). And finally, the USA is depicted as an 'effective and active agent' who is reluctantly drawn into the conflict (p. 92). In both the US strategy document NSS02 and the speeches which foreground the Iraq invasions the word 'threat' also appears frequently as a form of nominalisation. This performs two functions: on the one hand it serves to establish Iraq epistemically as being a threat through conflating the present cause of the impending conflict with future effect; but at times it also serves to obscure the precise agency of that 'threat'—thereby rendering it as an objectified, existential and altogether more persuasive force to be dealt with (pp. 61–66, 94–96). Finally, axiological proximization is achieved through the over-lexicalised representation of the Iraqi regime as an 'enemy encroaching on the USA and other free nations in ways that will end in a devastating clash' (p. 67).

Discourses of Control and Containment: UK and US Security Discourse Post-9/11

While Cap's (2010) analysis of the US-Iraq security discourse does run up to 2010, fewer accounts from either a critical or a cognitive perspective have been written specifically of USA or UK security discourse post-2005, the period following the attacks on the London Transport system by which time the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan was already underway. However, the WTC, Madrid and London attacks did give rise to a range of policy responses from the governments involved, particularly with regard to the passing of legal provisions relating to security by the governments concerned. Provisions were made within the USA (through the 2001 PATRIOT Act) and the UK (through the 2004 Civil Contingencies Act and the 2005 Prevention of Terrorism Act) for the temporary suspension of a range of citizenship rights (Preston 2009). Along with calls by the Blair government to raise the minimum detention of terrorist suspects without charge to 42 days, in the UK these measures led to 'a rise in racial profiling and targeting of racialized minorities' (Gillborn 2006, pp. 81–86).

In the USA, the PATRIOT Act served to revoke many of the 'freedoms' which were simultaneously being asserted in the White

House rhetoric (Graham et al. 2004), and greatly increased government capacity to place its population under surveillance (Simone 2009). According to Simone, in order to justify the PATRIOT Act, the US Department of Justice created a complementary website (www.lifeandliberty.com) which contained a four-part syllogism arguing that 'the Act, as the symbol of security, enhances liberty' (p. 5). Throughout the website the propositions of this syllogism are supported once again by emotional categorisations of 'American citizens' vs. 'the terrorists' in order to justify extending national mechanisms of surveillance, as well as suspending for the first time in American history, the rights of habeas corpus (Graham et al. 2004). Rhetorical strategies deployed in the PATRIOT Acts I & II are described using a corpus-based approach (De Beaugrande 2004). These include: excessive use of the term "terrorism" and an insistence that "terrorists" are 'fearsomely devious and dangerous'; deployment of "enemy combatant" as an 'extraordinary category'; placing responsibility for terrorism on "aliens" and equating protest or resistance with aid to terrorists; dense, fragmentary reference to other statutes and an insistence on the weakness of previous legislation; denying information to the public on grounds of resources and proposing that security can be acquired with a massive yet unspecified budget; and proposing to enlist a huge contingent of civilian informants alongside excessive surveillance.

Four counter-terrorism documents produced by the UK Labour government between 2005 and 2007 have been examined using labelling theory (after Becker 1973; Lemert 1951) in order to find out what labels were being used and with what frequency, how the labels created 'categories of sameness'; and how the categories created alienation (Appleby 2010, p. 427). Predictably, within these policy documents, there is a strong linkage of the label 'terrorist' to Islam. This category is polarised against the categories 'British citizen', and 'within the UK' (p. 428). More paradoxically in the light of the origins of the London attackers, while the label 'extremist' is once again linked to Islam, those labelled as 'extremist' are envisaged as living outside the boundaries of British society rather than within it (p. 430). Finally, the documents create a homogenising label for a new, imaginary, social group, ‘the Muslim community’. Once again, by raising concerns relating to the integration of this group, the documents paradoxically serve to alienate the majority of individual Muslim citizens from the British society of which they see themselves as part (pp. 431–433).

Conclusion

Postructuralist and CDA accounts of security discourse, then, have largely emerged around the run-up to and aftermath of the Second Gulf War. Apart from this, cognitive approaches appear to have provided the most developed historical account of the powerful use of metaphor in the period after the Second World War, while Cap’s theory of proximization (2010) now appears to be possibly the most coherent and wide-ranging framing of the relations between discourse and cognition relating to our sub-field of security discourse. However, despite the recent flourishing of cognitive accounts, we intend to explore four corpora of security documents using an approach that seeks to find a linguistic and discursive basis in the texts under consideration for some of the claims implied by the poststructuralist notions of security, which we will set out in Chapter 6. The relations between the theoretical framework of this study and its analytical approaches will be dialectical. From the analytical perspective, it will create a bridge between the ‘micro’ perspective of applied linguistics and the more ‘macro’, policy-related, concerns of security studies and IR. From a theoretical perspective, it will provide us with the grounds for a critical axiology which we can articulate upon the texts under scrutiny. In the next chapter that follows, we will set out some of the more structural and linguistic features of discourse which we will draw on to inform our later textual analysis of the discourse of security and counter-terrorism in the UK.

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4

Discourse, Disciplinarity and Social Context

Security discourse is produced in the political sphere of late industrial societies by national governments, along with their agencies and satellite organisations; and the security fora of supranational organisations such as the United Nations (UN). The discourse is then reproduced within the public sphere through various forms of print and electronic media, such as the national press and social media (e.g., Krzyżanowski 2016; Krzyżanowski and Tucker 2018).

The exercise of unlimited sovereign power that prevailed in nations across Europe up to the eighteenth century has been eschewed in modernity in favour of the adoption of a police apparatus and technologies of 'responsibilisation' (Miller and Rose 2008, p. 77) such as pastoral power and 'biopolitics', through which a less directly 'repressive' rule over populations has been exercised (Foucault 1984, pp. 133–159; 2004, pp. 239–263). However, there is another way in which power was been exerted over populations from early modern to late industrial societies and, as we shall see, is also being constituted within the contemporary discourse of security. From the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries a new 'mechanism of power' emerged which was 'absolutely

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incompatible with relations of sovereignty'. This is what Michel Foucault has called 'disciplinary power' (1977, 2004, pp. 35–38).

Disciplinarity and Discourse

The approach which we will adopt to analyse the discourse of security in this book is derived in part from the poststructuralist discourse theory of Michel Foucault. In this chapter, we review relevant aspects of the approaches he devised in the first two phases of his work: first, archaeology (1967, 1970, 1972, 1973), which mines texts in order to uncover the words, statements, strategies and discourse which constituted distinctive disciplines in the human sciences; and second, genealogy (1977, 1984), which traces the development of discursive practices over lengthy historical periods in order to identify not only the 'ruptures and discontinuities' between them and present day practices, but also how particular forms of practice such as 'good conduct' and 'pastoral power' mutated into the techniques of modern government. However, in the analyses which follow, we will not claim to be carrying out an archaeological or genealogical enquiry. Foucault's insights into disciplinary discourse and discursive practice form part of the theoretical framework of this book inasmuch as they not only inform our understanding of discourse, but they also form a conceptual backdrop within which our findings can be situated. But methodologically, in the chapters that follow our analytical focus will shift from the broad sweep of the historical development of disciplinary ideas (archaeology) and the chronological transformation of institutional practices (genealogy) to analysing the language and discourse that constitutes the praxis of security in late capitalist societies such as the UK, USA and the intergovernmental fora in which they engage, such as the UN.

However, there is one aspect of Foucault's work which does inform our understanding of language and discourse, and this has implications for the methods which we use to analyse the lexis, grammar and genre of the texts which we harvest. In this respect, we share Foucault's ambition to supersede the contradictions of ideology critique (O'Regan 2006; O'Regan & MacDonald 2009), and engage with language and discourse as a realisation of social practice, rather than representing the patterns of attitudes, beliefs and values of certain social or institutional groups. In his eighth 'governmentality lecture' (2007), Foucault justifies his approach to understanding the pastorate thus:

> If we do not take the problems of the pastorate, of the structure of pastoral power, as the hinge or pivot of these different elements external to each other – the economic concerns on the one hand and the religious themes on the other – if we do not take it as a field of intelligibility, as the principle of establishing relations between them, as the hinge-point between these elements, then I think we are forced to return to the old conditions of ideology and to say that the aspirations of a group, a class, and so forth, are translated, reflected, and expressed in something like a religious belief. This point of view of pastoral power, of this analysis of the structure of power, enable us, I think, to take up these things and analyse them, no longer in the form of reflection and transcription, but in the form of strategies and tactics. (pp. 2015–2016)

We therefore regard the language and discourse of our texts relating to the security policy of modern governments and supra governmental organisations, not as the representation of meaning or an indication of structures of cognition, but rather as a form of social *praxis*. In this, lexis, grammar and genre are at once specific realisations of social practice amenable to classification and categorisation, and constitute social action itself inasmuch as—classically—'saying is doing' (after Austin 1962). This therefore puts some distance between the approach which we take and many of the more cognitivist approaches to security discourse which we reviewed in the last chapter (Chapter 3)—particularly Cap (2006, 2013), Chilton (1995, 2004) and Dunmire (2011), but maybe not quite so much as Hodges (2011) who at times adopts a slightly more 'social' view of language and genre in his analysis. In order to analyse the language which will be revealed as salient within our collections of texts through corpus analysis techniques, we therefore adopt the assumptions and classificatory structures of systemic functional linguistics (Halliday 1978, 1985; Halliday and Matthiessen 2004) In this, we are travelling in the mainstream tradition of Critical Linguistics (Fowler et al. 1979; Hodge and Kress 1979) and what has become known as Critical Discourse Analysis, or 'CDA' (Fairclough 1989, 1992, 1995, 2003; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999). However, curiously, to date Systemic Functional Grammar has been used infrequently to inform the analysis of security discourse.

From the beginning of his *oeuvre*, Foucault explored the ways in which different types of knowledge were constituted within various epistemological fields in the human sciences such as psychiatry (1967), economics and the natural sciences (1970) and medical discourse (1973). While the human sciences have conventionally been regarded as value-neutral, Foucault's analyses suggested that the constitution, circulation and implementation of these knowledges entailed the execution of discursive practices within which relations of power were constructed. 'Disciplines…have their own discourse. They …create apparatuses of knowledge, knowledges and multiple forms of expertise' (2004, p. 38). While in some instances—such as confinement (1967), autopsy (1973), monastic and military training (1977), as well as the pathologisation of children (1979), these 'sciences' are exercised directly upon the bodies of the disciplinary subject, in others—such as the control of markets and the economy (1970), power is exercised more obliquely upon populations. From these, two tactics of disciplinary power emerge which are also relevant to our analyses of security discourse which follow: 'surveillance' and 'normalization'.

The architecture of Bentham's Panopticon, which was designed—but never in fact built (Walters 2012)—in late eighteenth-century England, famously enabled one member of staff to stand invisibly at the centre of a circular prison building, or some other institution of confinement, and observe the inmates without out being observed himself. This architecture was constitutive of a distinctive relation of power where the inmates were observed non-reciprocally, ignorant of who was observing them or indeed whether they were being observed at all at any particular time. However, there were other aspects to this 'panoptic schema' through which each disciplinary subject was constituted as a distinctive case. These combined 'individualising observation, characterisation and classification, with the analytical arrangement of space' (1977, p. 203). In these ways, the panoptic institution functioned as a 'laboratory of power', for 'knowledge follows the advances of power, disciplining how objects of knowledge all over the surfaces on which power was exercised' (1977, p. 204). On Foucault's argument, the practice of the panopticon 'was destined to spread throughout the social body' and become a 'generalised function' (1977, p. 207). Thus the panopticon has become a—somewhat over-used—metonym for the general surveillance of modern societies. In fact, the notion of the 'surveillance society' has become something of a cliché in critical studies in contemporary social science (Walters 2012). Nevertheless, with reference to the discourse of security in Europe, the US, and the UK in particular—well known as having the highest per capita proportion of CCTV cameras in the world (BBC 2009)—surveillance is a strategy which we can anticipate being constituted within and endorsed by the security documents which we analyse later in this book.

The second, and possibly more important disciplinary strategy for our analysis of security discourse, arises out of the ways in which 'norms' of human behaviour have been constructed within the disciplines of the human sciences and operationalised through disciplinary institutions from the eighteenth century up until present times inasmuch as: 'disciplines will define… a code of normalization…that is… the field of human sciences' (Foucault 2004, p. 38). On this argument, the discourse of the human sciences creates a plethora of anticipated and enforceable behaviours to which individuals and populations are expected to adhere. These now operate not just in respect to individuals or to national populations, but also globally in respect to the institutional structures of global governance (Scholte 2005), such as the World Health Organisations (WHO), the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Drawing on the scientific and quasi-scientific disciplines through which they are informed, these organisations which operate above the level of the nation state create, maintain and transmit strategies which regulate diverse aspects of the everyday lives of individual citizens, e.g.: levels of gross domestic product (GDP) for each country per year; ranges of temperature for the global climate to be maintained over predictable historical periods; levels of blood pressure to maintained and measured according to particular stages throughout the life span;

and certain 'standards' of achievement in different subjects calibrated to different measurable stages of childhood development in each country (National Centre for Educational Statistics, n.d.). Two aspects of this are of particular interest for us in our analysis of security discourse. The first is the ways in which techniques are being incorporated from the human sciences and STEM subjects (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) in order to inform security operations. This applies particularly to psychology, criminology and education in the human sciences; and computer sciences, mathematics, forensics and phrenology in the 'hard' sciences. Second, is the way in which a range of new norms—and modes of enforcing these norms—are emerging within the plethora of measures that have been initiated, particularly since the 'terrorist attacks' in Europe and the US in the first decade of the new century. In fact, our documentary evidence gleaned from the US security services would suggest that, since the 9/11 attacks, these agencies appear to be consolidating their own epistemological base into something approaching their own 'discipline'.

Formations of Discourse

In this book, we are therefore approaching the contemporary discourse of security drawing on the broadly Foucauldian thesis that since the eighteenth century disciplinary techniques have become exercised upon individuals, not so much on the 'authority' of the ancient sovereign rule of law but on the 'evidence' of modern, 'scientific', formations of knowledge. In this respect, the construction of that which is commonly held to be 'true'—particularly in the human sciences—provides a 'rational', epistemological basis for the articulation of power over individuals in modern societies (Foucault 1977, 2004, p. 39). These disciplinary formations of knowledge are constituted within and through discourse. However, conceptualisations of discourse vary across the different fields within which this work is situated. Within the field of security studies, 'discourse' appears to be something of an abstraction, a fluid and shifting entity which is invoked to underwrite the constructionist nature of much of the enquiry carried out in international relations in the wake of the 'linguistic turn'; whereas in the authors' native terrain of applied linguistics, discourse is viewed more as a tangible substance constituted from discernible lexical, syntactic and generic features, which are amenable to empirical analysis and observation. These two conceptualisations of discourse have not always been viewed as being compatible. Indeed, the apparent tension between them has given rise to some consternation as to whether a theoretical and empirical framework which engaged simultaneously with both levels of discourse was coherent; and indeed whether these two levels of discourse were in fact 'commensurable' (Pennycook 1994). Our view is, firstly, that we are currently working within something approaching a paradigm in the social sciences where 'post-disciplinary' and 'multi-perspectival' understandings of discourse are no longer viewed as being not so much contradictory, as having the potential to provide new outcomes and yield fresh insights in a particular area of enquiry. And, secondly, that one strand of Foucault's own *oeuvre* actually is much closer to applied linguistics than is often acknowledged, in as much as he does—admittedly perhaps earlier rather than later—engage with empirical data. Indeed, he refers to himself at one stage, with perhaps more than a little irony—as a 'positivist' (1972, p. 125).

A detailed theoretical and methodological approach to understanding the constitution of discourse, and the way in which it functions to produce a coherent body of disciplinary knowledge at any one point in history, is set out in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972). And in certain ways, Foucault's later analyses of governmentality (2007, 2008) mark a return to this earlier understanding of discourse, as it theorises the state as an entity which is produced through the convergence of a range of governmental discourses. For the purposes of this book, we are tracing back from these lectures to the archaeological method in order to understand in detail how such a process takes place, i.e. just how discourse realises particular constellations of knowledge which emerged and became accepted as coherent sets of beliefs and practices in a particular historical period. On this argument, any discrete body of knowledge is constructed not as a set of self-evident truths made manifest through the transparency of observable data, but rather is characterised by the way in which a set of objects, subjects, concepts and strategies are constituted as a distinctive 'formation of discourse' (1972). Within a discursive formation words, statements and texts combine systematically to bring a particular view of the world into being: 'to define a system of formation in its specific individuality is … to characterize a discourse or a group of statements by the regularity of its practice' (ibid., p. 74). Thus, 'disciplines…have their own discourse. They…create apparatuses of knowledge, knowledges and multiple forms of expertise' (2004, p. 38).

What is distinctive about the archaeological approach, however—and the way in which it differs from more modernist techniques of discourse analysis—is that it does not focus on the linguistic or logical properties of a text, rather it attempts to describe what are called 'statements' and their 'enunciative function'. Any statement or set of statements always exists in a relationship with other statements within a discursive formation. For example, in a government policy document drawn up relating to 'deradicalization', at each stage nothing it says exists in isolation but rather relates to a plethora of other documents relating to national security more broadly, as well as a background of knowledge in the human sciences which relates to the psychological and social configuration of the sort of person who might become 'radicalized'. Discourse can therefore be defined as 'a group of statements in as much as they belong to the same discursive formation' (1972, p. 117). One of the tasks of the archaeological approach, therefore, is to disinter the principles—or 'rules of formation'—whereby a group of statements cohere to form a discursive formation. The articulation of these rules upon discourse is dubbed a 'discursive practice':

> …a body of anonymous, historical rules, always determined in the time and space that have defined a given period, and for a given social, economic, geographical area, the conditions of operation of the enunciative function. (1972, p. 117)

If Foucault is interested in the way in which discourse coheres into a discursive formation, he is less engaged with the specificity of internal relations within these formations. However in our view, discursive formations are characterised by flows, the dynamics of which are also 'regularities', amenable to analysis. For a discursive formation is constituted from a multiplicity of texts and text types which are constructed at different sites—be they policy documents and reports which circulate in institutions, media texts which circulate in the public sphere or the myriad transactional texts and conversational exchanges of everyday life. With respect to the discourse of security, these different sites might include government ministries, private security firms, police stations and community centres—and nowadays even schools and universities. In this respect, language and texts are appropriated from one site and resituated in another site. This gives rise to a discursive shift as language, texts and knowledge are moved from one site to another.

This is what Basil Bernstein has called with respect to discourse in the field of education, or in his terminology 'pedagogic discourse': 'recontextualization' (1990, 1996, 2000). Through the processes of recontextualisation, the constitution of objects, subjects, concepts and strategies can never be the same in the context in which they have been relocated as it was in their context of origin. On this argument, recontextualised texts undergo a process of transformation as they are delocated from one site and relocated in another. This process of transformation is subject to a set of rules, which Bernstein calls 'recontextualizing rules'. These are the rules which govern the appropriation of a text from the discourse produced at one institutional site by the discourse produced at a different institutional site. For example within medical discourse, the findings of a medical research paper becomes (selectively) summarised within a medical textbook; and during the interview between a doctor and her patient, the consultant or clinician will articulate knowledge and procedures which she has acquired from medical papers and textbooks (MacDonald 2002; MacDonald et al. 2009).

Bernstein identifies two different discourses which operate within pedagogic discourse. One is a 'discourse of competence' which transmits certain skills, for example a pamphlet which describes a simple first aid procedure. The other is a 'regulative discourse' which creates specialised order, relations and identity (Bernstein 1990, p. 183), an example of which would be the inclusion of a description of the first aid procedure within a medical textbook. The primary purpose of regulative discourse is not so much to enable its reader to carry out the procedure, but more to inculcate them in the knowledge that will one day enable them to 'think the unthinkable' alongside the other members of the social group on which this privilege has been conferred. Similar—though not identical—to the 'rules of formation', pedagogic discourse is a principle for appropriating discourses from the site in which they have been produced and subordinating them to a different principle of organisation and relation. In this process the original discourse passes through an ideological screen as it assumes its new form, 'pedagogic discourse' (Bernstein 1996, p. 117). The process of recontextualisation means that a text is stripped of its original context and repositioned according to the principles of the pedagogic device. On this argument, these principles at once reflect and reproduce the dominant principles of society. Thus, for Bernstein, the process of recontextualisation is an ideological process in which 'unmediated discourses are transformed into mediated, virtual or imaginary discourses' (1996, p. 47). And for us—taking a more Foucauldian purview—recontextualisation is a moment where power comes into play in the selective appropriation and relocation of knowledge from one site to another within a discursive formation.

In the analyses which follow later in this book, we will explore the specific features of texts which have been harvested from a variety of institutional sites which are charged with different aspects of national and international security. Three of our analytical chapters undertake an analysis of the texts which are produced in just one institutional site: various ministries and departments of the UK government, in Chapter 7; websites of prominent security organisations charged with the security relating to the 2012 London Olympics in Chapter 8; and websites relating to the US security services in the wake of the 9/11 Commission Report in Chapter 10. On Bernstein's framework, in these three chapters we will be engaging with texts which operate within the 'field of recontextualisation'. That is to say ministries and the agencies of the security services draw on disciplinary knowledge which is produced in the disciplines of the human sciences, such as psychology, criminology, sociology and the political sciences. These forms of disciplinary knowledge are created within what Bernstein (1990, 1996, 2000) dubs the 'field of production'. In turn ministries and the agencies of the security services recontextualise the texts which are generated within these disciplinary discourses in order to operationalise a new, synthesised form of knowledge which legitimises the production of novel relations of power. However, in Chapter 9, we will engage with the analysis of the recontextualizing practices themselves. Here we will consider how a corpus of resolutions drawn up by the UN Security Council (UNSC) is recontextualised within the media which circulates within the public sphere, texts from the UK and UK broadsheets. We are calling this (after Bernstein 1990, 1996, 2000) the 'field of reproduction'. In the analysis in Chapter 9, we will be looking at the ways in which language and knowledge is delocated from a prominent supranational actor within the recontextualizing field (the UNSC) and consider how they are recontextualised in the field of reproduction (media texts which circulate within the public sphere). Elsewhere, we have also considered how this process of recontextualisation is mediated through the speeches and news briefings of political leaders (Schnurr et al. 2015).

Language and Social Context

While Foucault's archaeological approach enables us to conceptualise the ways in which objects, strategies, concepts and subject positions are constituted within discursive formation of security (1972), and Bernstein's theory of recontextualisation allows us to envisage the flows of security discourse from one institutional context to another (1990, 1996, 2000), for the analyses that follow it is also necessary to consider how the production of institutional discourse arrives at a particular textual form which is specific to its context. To do so demands an approach to linguistic description that relates social context to meaning, and meaning to grammar. Such a theory can be found in Michael Halliday's systemic functional grammar (SFL, Halliday 1973, 1978, 1985; Halliday and Matthiessen 2004). Halliday maintains that much of the interaction of human beings with their social and institutional environment is in fact linguistic behaviour. In the earliest conceptualisation of systemic functional grammar, language is seen as an 'open ended set of options in behaviour that are available to the individual in his existence as social man' (Halliday 1973, p. 49). These options are described in terms of the 'potential' that individuals have to act in a certain way or express certain meanings in a particular social context. 'Behaviour potential' refers to the range of actions that an individual can perform in a given situation, and 'meaning potential' renders the theory linguistic. While still being actions, statements are framed by the potential of language to realise the behaviour potential (Halliday 1973, p. 51) within the lexical and grammatical system of the language; that is to say, what a person is able to say or write within a given social context. Linguistic behaviour can therefore be analysed as a set of options which govern the alternate meanings derived from the total meaning potential of language.

From its inception, Halliday's project is to establish the conditions which govern the selection of a particular set of options from the total meaning potential of the language in a given situation (Halliday 1973, p. 55). He distinguishes between two types of extra-linguistic elements expressed in language: the social and the situational. The social aspects of language are composed of generalised social contexts such as 'the establishment and maintenance of the individual's social roles, the establishment of familiarity and distance, various forms of boundary maintenance, types of personal interaction and so on' (Halliday 1973, p. 79). Situation types are the settings—for example the security field, department, agency, ministry or supranational forum—in which language is employed in ways which to gives a text its identifiable characteristics. These options operate linguistically at three different linguistic levels. In terms of the meaning potential, the semantic options can be viewed as the 'coding of options in behaviour' (Halliday 1973, p. 55). Next, the semantic options are articulated upon the options at the level of grammar. And, finally, in spoken discourse the semantic options demand that choices also be made at the phonological level. Since we are principally considering collections of written texts which constitute a range of security discourse emanating from different institutional sites, in the chapters that follow we will be focusing, where necessary, upon the semantic and grammatical options.

The structure of any speech act can be interpreted semiotically as a combination of three dimensions: 'the ongoing social activity, the role relationships involved, and the symbolic or rhetorical channel'

(Halliday 1978, p. 111). These are referred to respectively as field, tenor and mode, and they provide a conceptual framework in order to conceive of social context as a 'semiotic environment in which people exchange meanings.' In this, field is the expression of the text as social action, including in particular the realisation of its conceptual content. Tenor is the nature of the relationships between the participants in an exchange, including differences in degree of authority or formality that is created between the respective speakers. And, finally, mode is the channel which is chosen: for example, the difference between a policy paper, a webpage or the text of a politician's speech. Each of these can then be systemically traced to their linguistic realizations at a textual and grammatical level.

While the different dimensions of field, tenor and mode are systematically related to the linguistic system through the functional components of semantics, they are also related to the text, because of their integrated designation of 'register'. Although the concept of register was originally conceived of in lexico-grammatical terms, Halliday also suggests that register is 'the configuration of semantic resources that the member of a culture typically associates with a situation type' (Halliday 1978, p. 111). In this way register also governs the meaning potential that may be utilised within a particular social context. For example as we shall see in Chapter 7, policy documents relating to UK security which are issued from the UK's Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG) will employ a certain distinctive lexis, be composed with a certain tone on a cline from formal and authoritative to informal and 'user-friendly', and demonstrate certain distinctive ways of organising the text. This renders it a very different type of text if compared with, say, a public-facing webpage generated by one of the USA's security agencies. However, although the realisation of specific alternatives in lexis and grammar enables the register of a particular type of document to be immediately recognizable as a unique choice of words, grammar and structure, it is not to be seen merely as the over-layering of a stratum of content with a predetermined pattern of signifiers, but it is rather more fundamentally 'the selection of meanings that constitutes the variety to which a text belongs' (Halliday 1978, p. 111).

Intermediate between the social patterns of behaviour and the textual patterns of lexico-grammar is the semantic network through which meanings are realised. The semantic network is the 'output' from the behaviour patterns and the 'input' to the grammar. The semantic level expresses the meaning potential related with particular types of behaviour (Halliday 1973, p. 83) in order to take us into the recognizable grammatical structuring of linguistic patterns. The 'basic unit' of the semantic level is the text (Halliday 1978, p. 109); it is the text which puts language into operation. Any text is a series of choices from all the possible options that make up that which can be meant in a particular situation of context; 'a text is the actualisation of the meaning potential' (Halliday 1978, p. 109). However, while a text is made up of a combination of sentences, it cannot be of the same consistency as its component parts. Halliday suggests that the text is 'encoded' in sentences rather than being 'composed' from them (Halliday 1978, p. 109). In some cases texts may be particularly formalised and highly structured instances of 'everyday' linguistic exchanges such as games, transactions, discussions or instructions. With respect to the discourse of security, we will mostly be examining instances of institutionalised linguistic documents which are abstract and rather complex, and which reflects their remoteness from a clearly identifiable 'context of situation'.

A systemic-functional approach therefore establishes a link between linguistic phenomena and social context. Speech acts which are operational at a social level—such as a threat, warning or instruction—can be followed through to greater degrees of 'delicacy' within the grammatical system in order to isolate the meaning options linked to particular aspects of language (Halliday 1973, p. 75, ff.). Thus, generalizable categories of grammar and lexis can be predicted with varying degrees of accuracy from a fully developed semantic network (Halliday 1973, pp. 90–91). These include aspects of: the grammar of the clause (such as the simple clause with transitivity, positive/negative, mood, modality or tense); the paratactic complex with 'and' or 'or'; or the hypotactic complex with 'if'; participant functions (including 'I', 'you', 'we' and 'them'); and lexis (categorizable according to lexical sets).

In as much as all clauses in the English language select from these systems, it is therefore possible to 'relate the choice to the social function of the culture' (Halliday 1973, p. 91). Two possible criteria influence the immediate realisation of a particular semantic option by a certain set of grammatical features. First, the selection can be influenced by the environment; either the more general social context or the more immediate context of situation. Secondly, some choices may appear initially as 'free variants' but with closer examination turn out to constitute a difference in meaning at a more developed point in delicacy. Thus, on the one hand, out of a very general range of social contexts and settings, the speaker ends up with a potential for meaning highly specific to the situation type in question; while on the other hand, the grammatical options (transitivity, mood, modality etc.) through which the semantic options are realised are general to the language as a whole. However, '…the move from general social categories to general linguistic categories involves an intermediate level of specific categorisation where one is related to the other' (Halliday 1973, p. 101). It is this intermediate level of specific categorisation that is the most fundamental criterion for the pre-selection of grammatical options.

This intermediate level is defined by three linguistic 'metafunctions' which constitute the essential interface between meaning and grammar. Inasmuch as these form the 'most general categories of meaning potential, common to all uses of language', these are the fundamental components of grammar (Halliday 1973, p. 100). The three 'metafunctions' are dubbed the 'ideational', the 'interpersonal' and the 'textual' (Halliday 1978, 1985; Halliday and Matthiessen 2004). The 'ideational' metafunction realises the activity of signification, or 'field'; the 'interpersonal' metafunction realises the negotiation and positioning of relationships of status and role, or 'tenor'; and the textual metafunction realises the adoption of particular channels of signification, or 'mode'. Each of these semantic modes is also systematically related to their respective socio-semiotic variables of field, tenor and mode.

The ideational metafunction represents the experience of the speaker in their relations both with the material world and the world of consciousness. It expresses the content of language, what language 'is about'. It is the part of language which 'encodes' an experience of a culture, and through which the speaker 'encodes' the experience of being a member of that culture. The ideational metafunction realises personal experience at two levels: first, 'metaphenomena' (Halliday 1978, p. 112) that are already encoded as facts and reports; and, secondly, the everyday phenomena of lived experience. Within our analysis of texts relating to security, we will principally be considering the former. One example of the ways in which grammar enables us to make sense of the world about us is through the linguistic unit of the clause and the role of 'process' and the 'agent' within it.

> The clause is a structural unit…by which we express a particular range of ideational meanings, our experience of processes, the processes of the external world, both concrete and abstract, and the process of our own consciousness, seeing, liking, thinking, talking, and so on. (Halliday 1973, p. 39).

Thus, the components of the clause, such as 'process', 'agent', or 'phenomenon', have the capacity to form grammatical structures in order to express what is going on in the world, or 'process' (Halliday 1973, p. 39). The relations within the formation of these structures are generated by the options within the system of transitivity in English (Halliday 1973, p. 40).

The interpersonal metafunction assigns communicative roles within the speech event and expresses the affective condition of the speaker. It functions as the participatory aspect of language; or what the speaker 'does' with it. Through this function, the speaker expresses attitudes and judgments, and attempts to affect other people's attitudes and behaviour. This element goes beyond a merely rhetorical function, 'to express both the inner and outer surfaces of the individual', in terms of both personal emotions and interactive relationships (Halliday 1973, p. 107). In the clause, the speaker determines the relationship between himself and the addressee by his selection of mood; and expresses judgement and predictions by modality. The clause also discloses the role taken by the speaker within the context of interaction. Thus within institutionalised modalities of discourse, the speaker can be said to be acceding to the positions which are available within conventionalised types of texts.

The textual metafunction is the way in which the speaker relates language to the context of situation of the utterance, or text. It expresses 'the relation of the language to its environment'. This environment can include both the verbal, intertextual environment of what has been said or written before, as well as the more immediate 'nonverbal, situational environment' (Halliday 1978, p. 113). In this way, the textual function performs a catalytic role with regard to the other two functions; it supports and enables the actualisation of the ideational and interpersonal metafunctions. Thus, the speaker is able to convey the sense of a particular action in a recognizable form; and the listener is able to interpret what he says.

The functional organisation of meaning in language is therefore the essential principle of organisation of the linguistic system. The three metafunctions form 'discrete networks of options' (Halliday 1978, p. 113) within the lexico-grammar. In the clause the ideational function is realised by transitivity; the interpersonal function is realised by mood and modality; and the textual function is realised by 'theme' and 'rheme', or the ordering of the components within the clause. These different levels of meaning are expressed synchronously, rather like the use of polyphony in music (Halliday 1985, p. 112). However, the precise harmonies which emerge from the intertwining of these semantic and lexico-grammatical melodies can only be fully interpreted by also understanding the social or institutional contexts which govern their construction and composition (Halliday 1973, p. 42).

One way in which systemic-functional grammar has been employed in recent years is in the analyses of texts in the public sphere which relate to the discourse of modern government. From a CDA perspective, Norman Fairclough has described how the New Labour administration between 1997 and 1999 had already adopted a strategy of 'governing by shaping and changing the cultures of public services, claimants and the socially excluded, and the general population' (2000, p. 61). This 'cultural governance' operated not least through the crucial role that language plays in the ever-increasing mediatisation of politics and government in advanced capitalist societies (ibid., p. 4). More recently (2003, 2011a, b) in relation to the discourse of the same administration's education policy, Jane Mulderrig has extended the range of SFL grammar by claiming that a special type of verbal process 'discursively enacts[s] a more subtle or "soft" coercive force in contemporary discourse' (2011a, p. 63). Mulderrig uses corpus tools to reveal how specialised verbs such as 'ensure' and 'make sure' realise a process type which she dubs ‘managing actions’, specialised to the ‘grammar of governance’ (2011a, pp. 53–58). In keeping with this contemporary modality of discourse, the use of first person pronominal forms such as ‘our’ and ‘us’ also create a sense of proactive engagement on the part of the government department through the discursive strategy of ‘personalisation’ (Mulderrig 2011b, pp. 565–569).

Argumentation Analysis

More recently, critical studies of discourse have engaged fruitfully with a more global analysis of text than that of either semantics or syntax. Increasingly, discourse analysts have engaged with the processes of reasoning which are realised within political discourse (e.g., Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). For the purposes of the analyses that follow—and in particular those in Chapter 10 which relate to the US security services—the notions of the *warrant* (or *topos*) and ‘argument scheme’ are particularly powerful (see, Wodak 2001). Wodak cites Kienpointer’s (1992, p. 194) definition of the warrant as a ‘conclusion rule’ connecting and justifying the transition of an argument to its conclusion. An example from Wodak’s study into attitudes of Austrians towards immigration is as follows:

- *Argument*: ‘guest workers’ in Austria are so-called because they are not accorded the status of permanent residents;
- *Conclusion*: as guests, they do not enjoy the full citizen status and should not remain permanently;
- *Warrant*: *warrant (or topos) of definition*: ‘if an action, a thing, or a person (group of persons) is named/designated (as) X, the action, a thing, or a person (group of persons) should carry the qualities/traits/attributes contained in the (literal) meaning of X’ (Wodak 2001, p. 75).

In this case it is the speakers’ deployment of euphemistic terms like ‘guest worker’ (*Gastarbeiter*) that signal the use of the warrant.

This technique of exposing and exploring argument schemes is particularly apt to the final phase of our investigation (see Chapter 10). The paradigmatic discursive tactic used by a government department or security agency in order to justify a particular course of action is the declaration that the conditions surrounding a certain state of affairs are 'exceptional' in order to either derogate from the usual legislative regime, or deploy a particular set of forces (after Agamben 2005; see also Chapter 6). The discursive tactic of declaring that exceptional conditions prevail can be understood within the terms of its scheme of argument. If constituted within discourse, its traces will be identifiable through the following moves:

- *Argument*: recent events place the safety and security of the state in special peril;
- *Conclusion*: following from this, that exceptional new measures (of state expansion or the suspension of ordinary liberties according to Agamben's thesis) must be ushered into deal with the exceptional threat;
- *Warrant*: *special danger justifying special measures*: it is reasonable and necessary for democratic countries to expedite 'emergency' powers and suspend normal laws in special circumstances of danger or threat.

This approach to analysing *topoi* as the focus of the critical analysis of discourse has however, not been without controversy. Argumentation analysts such as Forchtner (2011) and Žagar (2010) have criticised the very use of the term *topos* in critical discourse studies (e.g., Krzyżanowski 2009; Wodak 2009) as a misappropriation because of its lengthy pedigree in rhetoric extending into classical history. Žagar raises several qualms concerning its use by these writers, perhaps the most serious of which is that a *topos* should be explicitly present in the realisation of an argument scheme, as a rehearsal of the logic connecting an argument to its conclusion.

While we consider that some of Žagar's critique rests on a misunderstanding of the use of the term by Wodak, we suggest three refinements to clarify and improve the description of techniques based on the exposure of topos-linked argument schemes within discourse analysis. The first of these is that whole argument schemes (argument, conclusion, warrant) rather than only their linking warrant, should be identified as the objects of study. Secondly, we suggest that it be made clear that an argument scheme can indeed be present in discourse, even if its warrant or conclusion are not explicitly rehearsed in the text. In most studies that refer to such argument schemes, both *topos and conclusion* are invoked implicitly through devices deployed by the speaker. In the immigration example given above, it is the phraseology of terms like 'guest worker' that suffices to invoke, through shared knowledge of common sense logic and conventions of language, the warrant and conclusion shown. Thirdly and finally, the tendency of writers like Wodak to label warrants or *topoi* according to features of the argument, rather than the mechanism of the connecting rule, should be avoided; rather an effort should be made to encapsulate the mechanism of the warrant itself in the label. This could be done for example by using 'avoidance of danger' instead of 'danger and threat' as a shorthand for the logic of the example given above.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have set out an approach to the analysis of discourse which yokes together two things: first, elements of discourse theory—an understanding of discourse which often informs work carried out in the field of security studies; and second, elements of discourse analysis—an understanding of discourse which often informs work carried on in the field of applied linguistics. Our understanding of discourse theory is drawn principally from Michel Foucault's theorisation of archaeology (1967, 1970, 1972, 1973) and genealogy (1977, 1984). Our understanding of discourse analysis is drawn principally from systemic functional grammar, both the original conceptualisation of the relationship between language and social context (Halliday 1973, 1978) and the later elaborations of the ideational, interpersonal and textual metafunctions of language (Halliday 1985; Matthiessen and Halliday 2004). However, the analysis of texts which we undertake later in this book also indicated to us that we required a descriptive terminology which goes beyond the semantic and syntactical aspects of the texts in order to engage with their logical structuring. We therefore also draw upon a view of discourse as argument (particularly Wodak 2001). Taken together, these approaches do not suggest that any formation of discourse is a static phenomenon, but rather that the discourse of security is manifested by the flow of discourse through elaborate networks of institutional sites. Such delocation and relocation of discourse is best described by the processes of recontextualisation which are set out in Bernstein's theorisation of 'pedagogic discourse' (1990, 1996, 2000).

In the next chapter, we will set out the technical means whereby we develop an application of corpus tools which combines the intuitive, manual analysis of texts associated with critical discourse analysis, with the wider-ranging, machine-driven analysis of the features of large corpora of texts. Then, in Chapter 6, we will argue that even the range of mainly structural approaches to discourse which we have set out in this chapter are insufficient in themselves to analyse the discourse of a specific field, such as security. We will go on to develop an approach which is specifically aligned with the discourse of security, that will inform our critical engagement with the documents we analyse in the second half of the book in a more theoretically principled fashion.

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5

Analysing Security Discourse

This chapter outlines the approaches that we use to analyse the documents investigated in Chapters 7–10 of this book. We set out the procedures used in these analyses to reveal the ways in which post-9/11 security policy in the UK, USA and international fora such as the UN Security Council has been constituted through language and discourse. Overall, it can be said that we apply a combined corpus and critical discourse analysis approach to the investigation of our corpora, each of which was compiled on a principled basis to focus on a particular dimension of security discourse. As a result of our research experience, a useful set of procedures and an accompanying methodological ethos developed, which allowed us to select from various traditions within the literature applying a combination of corpus and critical discourse techniques.

The notion that corpus tools and techniques might be adapted for the purpose of analyzing discourse has been made convincing by its increasingly confident application in the last decade (e.g. Baker et al. 2008; Koteyko 2014; Mauranen 2003; Mulderrig 2003). A common approach used by researchers combining these methods is to derive mass, whole-corpus data from their corpora in order to locate key themes and linguistic features as a starting point for subsequent

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manual investigation (c.f. Baker 2010a; Subtirelu and Baker 2017; Vessey 2015). The methodology which informs the analyses presented in Chapters 7 and 9 conforms mostly to this pattern and will be discussed further below. By contrast, the analyses presented in Chapters 8 and 10 make use of a less-explored alternative to the usual staging of synthesis. The starting point in these chapters is to sample a corpus so as to derive a selection of texts that are representative of its themes and language. The use of principled text selection as an alternative gambit to the usual 'mass data first' option follows suggestions in the literature (e.g. Baker 2010b, p. 138; Baker 2014; Gabrielatos and Duguid 2015) that have yet to be applied on a large-scale basis. The core innovation of this approach is to begin analysis not with quantitative data extracted (and arguably isolated) from the whole corpus, but rather with texts that have been selected from the corpus on a principled basis. By beginning in this way, we were able to apply human, intuitive analysis of whole documents first, to expose subtle features of language not necessarily visible in lexical frequency data.

As we progressed through the project reported in this book, we extended this less-explored option into a fully-realised sequence that, in our experience, maximised opportunities for the production of insight from both manual and machine procedures. After their principled selection, sample texts were investigated thoroughly, manually, using critical reading techniques that benefit from consideration of complete, contextualised documents. Corpus techniques were then applied flexibly and recursively to pursue phenomena noticed during this manual stage. From a methodological perspective, the approach applied to the analyses presented in Chapters 8 and 10 thus represents both an effort to explore this alternative on a large-scale basis and to extend sampling, as a starting point for investigation, into a fully-realised sequence that maximises opportunities to integrate critical discourse and corpus procedures.

Using Corpus Tools to Analyse Discourse

Leech and Fallon's (1992) *Computer Corpora—What Do They Tell Us About Culture?* seems to represent the beginning of the tradition in which researchers first considered the potential of corpora, and corpus procedures, for the purposes of exploring complex issues such as culture, ideology and ideology. Elements of its methods have been influential—or have at least been replicated by—many subsequent researchers. The study compared frequency tables for words from two corpora (the Brown Corpus of American English, and the Lancaster-Oslo-Bergen Corpus of British English) to provide 'evidence of cultural differences' (p. 31) between the USA and Britain. Leech and Fallon's use of corpus techniques to explore cultural dimensions of texts was novel, repurposing corpora that had been compiled originally for linguistic research to provide, 'comparative information about varied social, political, and cultural aspects of the two most populous English-speaking countries' (p. 29). By identifying differences between the fields of words generated from each corpus, Leech and Fallon proceeded to characterise aspects of, and differences between, the British and American cultures reflected in the texts. More words were found in the American corpus that related to *crime*, for example, than its UK counterpart; evidence, the authors suggested tentatively, of a greater American cultural preoccupation with criminal matters.

Leech and Fallon's study demonstrated the power of corpus tools to reveal patterns of recurrence and difference by observing large amounts of naturally occurring language data. This advantage continues to be referred to frequently in literature promoting the application of corpus tools to the investigation of documents. Hunston (2002, p. 109) for example, explains that patterns of co-occurrence 'are built up over large amounts of text and are often unavailable to intuition or conscious awareness'. Baker (2010b, p. 124) describes corpora as 'repositories of naturally occurring language' which are 'large enough to reveal repetitions or patterns which may run counter to intuition and are suggestive of discourse traces.' A strong early argument for the use of a corpus approach to explore representations of ideology in language was offered by Stubbs (1996) who saw such practice as consistent with the British tradition of data-driven study of language. Stubb's tiny but persuasive analysis of features of Baden Powell's last speeches to the Boy Scouts and Girl Guides, based on the frequencies and collocations found in each, showcased the power of a corpus approach to reveal tendencies in language not available to the 'by eye' observer. By 2002, Hunston (2002, pp. 110–117) was able to point to a six significant studies that had made skilful use of corpora. This included Teubert's (2000) study which analysed the recurrence of items such as phrases and collocations to identify features of Eurosceptic discourse. Similarly, Flowerdew's (2004) study of—then Hong Kong Governor—Chris Patten 's speeches makes use of word frequency lists to derive groups of terms that belong to 'four semantic fields' (p. 465): market economy, the freedom of the individual, the rule of law, and democratic participation. Concordancing is used to reveal collocation and semantic prosody of the terms in the 'economy' group (ibid., p. 465). Not only did these studies further establish the potential of corpus tools for the purposes of studying discourse, but they also demonstrated the further possibility that corpus tools can be used to illuminate texts via their integration with various forms of manual discourse analysis.

The analyses presented in Chapters 7 and 9 largely follow well-established practices combining discourse and corpus analysis in that they: first, make use of comparative frequency information drawn from contrasting corpora; and secondly, use these data as the main starting point for subsequent analysis. However, as our project progressed, an innovation which became important in the development of the methodology (see Chapters 8 and 10), was the selection of a small number of texts from the corpus to form the starting point for analysis. This allowed us to recover techniques more typically used for critical reading and human, intuitive discourse analysis to supplement the insights revealed by corpus tools. In the earlier analyses presented in Chapters 7 and 9, this measure was instituted as a parallel, secondary procedure, used to confirm machine-generated findings and furnish useful examples. Increasingly, however, as our work progressed, we identified that the insights drawn from this selection of samples were equally or even more powerful in terms of revealing nuanced features of the language discovered in the corpora. We began to use leads noticed from manual analysis in an increasingly recursive and dynamical fashion in relation to corpus data so that eventually, by the time we carried out the analyses detailed in Chapters 8 and 10, the sequence of using corpus data as the starting point for analysis had been effectively reversed.

Comparing Keywords to Expose Differences Between Sub-Corpora

The purpose of Leech and Fallon's (1992) study, described above, was to compare lexical frequency information across two corpora in order to expose differences between them. A variation on this idea, the cross-comparison of sub-corpora[1] to suggest *historical* differences, has been used frequently in corpus-supported discourse analysis (e.g. Fairclough 2000; Hunter and Smith 2012; McEnery 2005). Fairclough's (2000) *New Labour, New Language?* compared lexical frequencies in a corpus of New Labour speeches with those calculated from a collection of 'Old Labour' pamphlets. Fairclough was therefore able to present words, including 'new' itself, as characterizing the preoccupations and particular strategies of a New Labour discourse. A further study that made use of chronological comparison is Hunter and Smith's (2012) examination of chronological change in the *ELT Journal*. The researchers compared collections of texts from distinctive periods of an academic journal to trace shifts in the popularity of professional terms. By cross–comparing sub-corpora representing three editorial periods the study provided evidence that, while in a particular era some words gained ground as a focus of professional interest, others became less popular or disappeared.

Both the studies mentioned above make use of *keywords*: words identified as unusually frequent in a study corpus by comparing their word frequencies with those 'expected' based on their observed frequency in a reference corpus. Keywords are used extensively in our own analyses, and hence require some description here. Still a relative novelty (c.f. Hunston 2002, p. 199) at the time of Fairclough's research, keywords perform a similar function to the raw frequency data presented by earlier researchers, such in Leech and Fallon's comparison of different corpora, extending their power to provide quantitative measurement of lexical tendencies observed objectively across large numbers of texts. As objective measurements of observed lexical frequency, they provided the same advantage of uncovering otherwise undetectable patterns of recurrence. Yet, unlike raw frequency data, keywords also show the *relative* frequencies of words in the collection of texts, using the frequencies of words observed in a reference corpus to gain a sense of their salience. Keywords are thus always generated by comparing word frequencies between two corpora. Sometimes two specialised corpora are compared with each other, often to identify chronological change, as we do in Chapter 7. However, often the second, 'reference' corpus is a large 'standard' collection of documents such as the British National Corpus (2007) or the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA). This is the case in Chapter 9, where we undertake a comparative analysis of two corpora comprising different genres of security document: resolutions drawn up by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC); and newspaper articles from national 'broadsheets' in the UK and the USA. However, in the comparative studies reported above, as well as in our own comparison of generically similar sub-corpora of UK policy documents carried out in Chapter 7, keywords are generated via the cross-comparison of similarly sized, and even similarly purposed corpora, so as to more sensitively expose differences in their lexical content. In such cases the choice of the reference corpus powerfully affects the outcome of the keyword calculation, exposing only words whose frequencies vary considerably between the two collections, and 'hiding' terms common in both. Scott and Tribble provide the example of a keyword analysis carried out on Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet* (2006, pp. 59–61) to illustrate the importance of the selection of an appropriate reference corpus. Only by selecting other plays by Shakespeare is it possible to identify distinctive themes in that particular work.

Diachronic and Synchronic Difference (Chapters 7 and 9)

The first two analyses which we undertook in our project were therefore comparative analyses of pairs of corpora, constructed as follows:

- Chapter 7 adopts a diachronic perspective to compare two sets of paired corpora of UK government security documents harvested from three different time periods in order to reveal the changes in the language and discourse which took place from one period to another.

- Chapter 9 adopts a synchronic perspective to compare a corpus of UNSC resolutions with a corpus of newspaper articles from US and UK broadsheets, relating to nuclear proliferation. This will reveal the differences and similarities in the language and discourse which arise when the discourse of international security is delocated from one site of production ('the political sphere', i.e. a supranational governmental organisation) and relocated in another ('the public sphere', i.e. the national print media).

The next section sets out in detail the procedures that we adopted to compare these sets of paired corpora.

UK National Security Documents, 2001–2016 (Chapter 7)

Chapter 7 explores the language and discourse of one, substantial corpus of documents relating to UK national security. This is a corpus of documents which sets out the security policy and the security strategy of the UK government between 2001 and 2016, amounting to 343 texts in total. In order to enable diachronic comparison, the corpus was divided into three, sequentially labelled, sub-corpora from different time periods (Table 5.1).

In order to investigate the ways in which the language and discourse of security change over time, we compared these three sub-corpora in two consecutive phases:

Table 5.1 UK security documents (2001–2016)

Sub-corpus	Years	Texts
Sub-corpus I	2001–2006	44
Sub-corpus II	2007–2011	110
Sub-corpus III	2012–2016	189
Total		343

- *2001–2011*: Sub-corpus II was compared with Sub-corpus I;
- *2007–2016*: Sub-corpus III was compared with Sub-corpus II.

Methodologically, therefore this analytic approach resembles studies previously mentioned (e.g. Fairclough 2000; Hunter and Smith 2012; McEnery 2005) that use comparison of chronological sub-corpora to investigate historical change. Given the intention to expose historical difference, a key element in the design of this corpus, and in particular its segmentation into historically distinctive sub-corpora, were decisions regarding which dates to use as beginning and cut-off points for each sub-corpus. These could not be arbitrary; the content of keywords lists generated through the cross-comparison of sub-corpora—which would then hold to expose differences in preoccupation between periods—depended wholly on these decisions. The rationale for each boundary, which will be enumerated as crucial design decisions in our account of Chapter 7, centered on judgements concerning which 'pivotal' dates to use to determine chronological boundaries. For the boundary between Sub-corpus I and Sub-corpus II, the pivot chosen was the 7 July 2005, London bombings (7/7) after which it might be possible to observe a shift in UK discursive practice concerning terrorism. The date used as the boundary between Sub-corpus II and Sub-corpus III was the escalation of the Syrian Civil War in the summer of 2011 (see Chapter 2).

The comparative analysis set out in Chapter 7 prioritised quantitative, machine analysis. First, the documents in the corpus were converted from their original, varied formats to a uniform text format amenable to machine analysis, and frequency information for each sub-corpus was machine-generated using the Wordlist facility of Wordsmith Tools (Scott 2008). A statistical comparison of Wordlists was then carried out to identify keywords, using the log-likelihood calculation (hereafter LL) in order to determine whether words appeared more or less often than might be expected by their observed frequency in one sub-corpus rather than the other ($p < 0.000001$) (Baker 2006). Thus, in the first period (2001–2011), the frequency of words in Sub-corpus II sub-corpus ('test corpus') was compared with that of Sub-corpus I ('reference corpus'); in the second period (2007–2016), the frequency of words in Sub-corpus III ('test corpus') was compared with that of Sub-corpus II ('reference corpus'). Since the two sub-corpora functioning as 'test' and 'reference' always represented contiguous, chronologically similar time periods, most of the keywords in our lists were lexical items. That is to say, non-lexical items such as articles, prepositions and conjunctions were common to both sub-corpora.

Following Baker (2010a), we proceeded on the basis that the top 100 words identified as statistically key in each sub-corpus should be investigated as 'candidates' for significance, using further quantitative checks and manual, context-sensitive qualitative assessment (after Baker and McEnery 2005; Baker 2010a; Freake et al. 2011) to support claims of 'salience' (Baker 2006, p. 125). Thus, to begin with, we checked the senses and roles displayed by the keywords when checked in context via concordance. Secondly, we looked at statistical data relating to the collocation of keywords, or their tendency to appear in combination or in the company of other words. Lists of collocations using the default horizon of '5-5' (five words to the left and right of each term) were also considered. Thirdly, we considered the clusters of words that regularly formed around the keywords within each sub-corpus. Finally, the linguistic data was grouped together under emergent themes observed in the data, which we will present in Chapter 7.

Nuclear Proliferation Documents, 2012–2016 (Chapter 9)

Chapter 9 explores the language and discourse of two substantial corpora of documents relating to the discourse of nuclear proliferation. The first corpus was a small, specialised corpus consisting of all eighteen of the UNSC resolutions relating to nuclear proliferation that were produced by the UN Security Council between 2012 and 2016. The second corpus was a substantial compilation of all the newspaper articles that were published relating to nuclear proliferation during the same period, sourced from two prominent broadsheets in the USA, and two prominent broadsheets in the UK ($n = 1590$). Since the purpose of the analysis set out in Chapter 9 was to enable a synchronic comparison of two sizeable collections of documents, a sequence prioritizing corpus techniques was used. However, variations emerged in the techniques that were required for a synchronic comparison, in particular in the selection of ‘test’ and ‘reference’ corpora. Whereas the comparison that we carry out in the Chapter 7 is diachronic, comparing sub-corpora which were selected from broadly the same genre of texts to represent different chronological periods, the comparison that we carry out in Chapter 9 is synchronic, comparing two different corpora which were selected from different genres of texts, as they are produced at different institutional locations (supra-national forum vs. national press).

The comparative analysis which we carry out in Chapter 9 again prioritises quantitative, machine-generated for our analysis of data. As with the diachronic analysis described above, word frequency and keyword lists were compiled to generate frequency information about each sub-corpus. However, since the previous analysis of the discourse of UK national security examined similar documents from different chronological periods, it was possible to compare word frequency lists directly, producing keywords lists that might be held to expose chronological change. However, in our analysis of the discourse of nuclear proliferation, each corpus comprised texts which belonged to different genres, and varied considerably in size; therefore direct comparison of this kind was not similarly revealing. Not least, this would have resulted in much of the statistically significant lexis simply revealing differences between the ‘resolution’ and the ‘newspaper’ genres themselves, but not necessarily the ways in which the ‘subjects, concepts, objects and strategies’ relating to nuclear proliferation were themselves constituted (after Foucault 1972). The alternative of creating a massive comparator corpus, comprising all the articles from the four broadsheets published between 2006 and 2012, was also not feasible given the scope of the project. Therefore, both the UNSC resolution corpus and the US/UK newspaper corpus were compared separately with the British National Corpus (BNC 2007), which was used as a common, baseline ‘reference’ corpus. This enabled our analysis to engage critically with more generic features of each type of text than was possible if we applied a direct comparison of the two corpora. A combination of concordance and collocation data was then used to check and extend insights from keywords findings, applying a variation of the same techniques as was described for the previous analysis.

Limitations of a 'Machine-Data First' Approach

In terms of methodological sequence, the approach applied for both the analyses we will set out in Chapter 7 and Chapter 9 was conventional in their prioritisation of quantitative, machine findings as a starting point for analysis. However, our innovation of working with a smaller sample of 'core' documents, identified through a principled technique of selection, proved significant in developing the approach used in the analyses set out in Chapters 8 and 10. By analysing the sample texts manually, through the application of intensive reading, we were able to draw on the techniques of critical discourse analysis, whose effectiveness depends on their application to identifiable, contextualised documents.

Three serious limitations of an approach combining corpus and discourse analysis techniques, but prioritising mass corpus data as a starting point of analysis, are as follows. There is firstly, a danger that quantitative findings might be interpreted too literally and uncritically, when in fact they represent merely measurements of frequency (c.f. Baker 2004; Scott and Tribble 2006, p. 60) that require careful contextual interpretation. Keywords might be disproportionately frequent in a test corpus for all kinds of reasons (e.g. use in proper nouns, titles) and may vary in meanings across instances. A second, related problem is that many linguistic and discourse phenomena that are significant in a corpus might not be readily exposed by what is, at the end of the day, mere lexical frequency data (cf. Hardt-Mautner 1995). Studies interested in observing general 'topics', 'themes' or 'topoi' are well-served by analysis using keywords, since the keyword calculation is held to expose these powerfully. Scott and Tribble, explain that 'for us, keyness is a quality words may have in a given text or set of texts, suggesting that they are important, they reflect what the text is really about, avoiding trivia and insignificant detail' (2006, p. 2). Keywords, in other words, can be indicators of the 'aboutness' of texts (p. 58). Even more succinctly:

> Keyness is a quality words may have in a given text or set of texts, suggesting that they are important, they reflect what the text is really about, avoiding trivia and insignificant detail. What the text "boils down to" is its keyness, once we have steamed off the verbiage, the adornment, the blah, blah, blah. (2006, pp. 55–56)

Yet many phenomena of interest to critical discourse analysts are too subtle or varied to be exposed by such a calculation. Where the tactics and functions of language are the focus of analysis, rather than topic or theme, it is obviously the case that these can be realised using a great potential variety of exponents. Because of this variety and the possibility for realisations of the same tactic to be distributed across different functions, such features are unlikely to be made visible via gross corpus data such as keywords.

A third limitation of the prioritisation of quantitative, machine findings from the perspective of critical discourse analysis is that data like keywords, even when followed up by procedures such as collocation analysis or concordancing, extract and isolate words from the meaning-giving context of their original environment. Hunston (2002), writing at time when the application of corpus techniques to discourse analysis was less established, explained that there was resistance concerning the efficacy of corpus analysis for context-sensitive work within the field of cultural studies (p. 110). She summarised many of the most pertinent points in this discussion when she states that:

> If a corpus is composed of a number of texts, corpus search and processing techniques, such as word-lists, concordance lines and lists of collocations, will tend to obscure the character of each text as a text. Each individual example is taken out of context-that in a sense, is the point. Furthermore, the corpus treats texts as autonomous entities: the role of the text producer and the society of which they are part tends to be obscured. (p. 110)

While he mitigates and provides counter-arguments for this limitation, Baker (2006) also identifies this as a significant issue. The use of corpus techniques for the investigation of texts may, in the eyes of many researchers, provide a view that is too "broad" (p. 7), and 'appears to be subject to some resistance' (p. 6) partly for this reason.

A Revised Procedure, Foregrounding Intuitive Analysis Using Whole Texts

Our decision to use an alternative approach for the analyses reported in Chapters 8 and 10 was partly a result of our observation of these limitations. But it was also the case that the documents and purposes of these later analyses lent themselves less obviously to the more machine-based, quantitative approach. In both of our later analyses, we observed that the features of language most pertinent to our aims were unlikely to be readily exposed by keyword data. Our analysis in Chapter 8, for example, aims at enumerating tactics used in the discourse of documents representing security policy for the 2012 London Olympics. An early observation was that hyperbole—language which constructed these Olympics as the historically largest, biggest, and most wide-ranging event of its kind—was common in some documents. Yet the performance of hyperbole in language can be realised in various ways. Not only can different lexis be used ('biggest, largest', etc.), but other hyperbolic strategies applied, such as listing the Games alongside similar super-scale events ('Wimbledon', 'the Jubilee', etc.). This variety was best enumerated, at first at least, by careful manual and intuitive analysis of texts.

Indeed, given the subtle, distributed nature of the language that needed to be investigated in our analyses, it was clearly more useful to reverse the usual order of analysis. In Chapters 8 and 10, we thus *began* with human, intuitive analysis of texts, applying the usual repertoire of critical discourse techniques to expose linguistic strategies. To retain an element of the systematicity of our earlier analyses, however, and to keep some of the advantages of objectivity afforded by the use of an initial keywords stage, we made use of a careful procedure to select a small number of core texts that could then be used for the purposes of manual analysis. In this way the danger of selective attention and a priori decisions regarding which documents should undergo manual analysis was partly mitigated.

'Sampling First': Developing a Complete Sequence to Prioritise Insights from Manual Analysis

Although we arrived at our 'sampling first' procedure organically, as a natural development of our research, the notion of using a systematically selected sample of texts as a starting point of corpus research was not-we discovered later—a complete innovation, having being discovered independently by others engaged in similar activity (e.g. Gabrielatos and Duguid 2015). Yet it was still necessary to follow this decision with a clear idea as to how the texts could be best explored after manual analysis. We discovered that corpus tools could be applied powerfully at this stage, integrating their use not as the starting point of research, but rather as a tool that could be applied to locate further examples of phenomena using the same (or similar) lexis. It was also possible to use tools like keywords and concordance checks to see whether features identified manually in core documents were also present elsewhere in the corpus—whether they were in fact typical. In developing these techniques it seems possible that our work was wholly innovative, insofar as we were dealing with questions unlikely to recur, except on a similarly large, multi-study project.

In the next two analyses, which we undertook as our project unfolded, we explored single corpora whose investigation was better suited to an approach that prioritised sensitivity to nuanced features of language, much less likely to be exposed through mass data alone. We set out the findings from these analyses in Chapters 8 and 10:

- Chapter 8 explores the language and discourse produced by agencies involved in the security operation for the London 2012 Olympic Games;
- Chapter 10 explores the language and discourse produced by contemporary US security agencies in the wake of the post-9/11 reforms.

In what follows, we set out in detail the procedures that we adopted to analyse these individual corpora.

Web Pages Setting Out Security Policies for the London 2012 Olympic Games (Chapter 8)

Chapter 8 explores the discourse of agencies involved in the security operation for the London 2012 Olympic Games. This is the first analysis in which we used the full method sequence of our 'sampling first' corpus analysis approach. The investigation made use of a corpus of webpages which set out the security policies for the event. This specialised corpus comprised 176 policy texts, produced by a variety of government agencies that shared the goal of setting out the security policy for the impending Olympic Games. Although the methodological approach for the analysis set out in Chapter 8 emerged later in our project, we position our findings immediately following our comparative analysis of sub-corpora of documents relating to UK national security, since some of the substantive implications from the analysis follow on thematically from the findings of Chapter 7.

Phase One: Selecting Samples from a Specialist Corpus

The principled selection of sample texts proceeded for this project by applying procedures we had refined for their selection by observing concentrations of relevant key-keywords. In so doing, we aimed to retain some of the advantages of a corpus-driven approach in which objective machine-generated data could be used to select the texts that represented the starting point for our investigation. To identify our sample texts, we started by carrying out a key-keywords procedure to identify the distribution of keywords across corpus documents. Then, we annotated an Excel spreadsheet containing the key-keyword data in order to identify which documents contained the greatest concentration of highly-distributed (and therefore key-key) items. On this basis seven 'core' texts were chosen for manual analysis on the basis that they were most likely to be representative of corpus-wide themes.

Phase Two: Analysing Whole Documents Using Human Intuitive Analysis

Now we had decided to use whole texts as the *starting point* of our analysis, the second stage of our analysis was to investigate core documents intensively and manually, drawing on the techniques of critical discourse analysis in order to tease out relevant linguistic phenomena for interpretation and critique. This manual analysis revealed an array of varied language strategies, which will be set out in detail in Chapter 8. These included the observation of reifying terms such as the phrase like 'safety and security', the frequent use of terms like 'hazard' to euphemistically construct a threat of violence, the extensive use of hyperbole to construct the 2012 Olympics as historically exceptional in terms of significance and scale, and the insertion of the 2012 Games into lists that included other iconic international events.

Phase Three: Follow Up Corpus Enquiry

At this stage we introduced procedures which we carried out to complete and deepen synthesis between techniques from these traditions. These have been even less explored in the literature describing combined discourse and corpus analysis. To do this, we returned to the repertoire of techniques made available by corpus tools as a means of pursuing leads furnished by manual analysis. Keywords and key-keywords were now re-checked to perceive whether the features we had identified in the core documents were important in the corpus as a whole. Concordances were used reflexively and open-endedly to identify further examples and variations of the features observed in core documents, often furnishing powerful examples that would have been difficult to recover through the perusal of lengthy documents by eye.

Web Pages Produced by US SecurityAgencies (Chapter 8)

Chapter 8 explores the final corpus which we compiled in our project, in order to investigate an issue which had preoccupied the US security services ever since they failed to prevent the 9/11 attacks. Here, we will focus on a corpus of contemporary discourse generated by the US security services in the aftermath of their post-9/11 reform in order to explore how the security services constitute themselves within the public sphere, particularly in this chapter in terms of the activities that they carried out to protect the population. Here we were able to further refine our 'sampling first' corpus analysis approach, not least by extending our engagement with core texts to include the analysis of rhetorical as well as linguistic features.

Phase One: Selecting Samples from a Specialist Corpus

In the first stage of the final application of our new approach, we compiled a corpus consisting of 175 web pages produced by the current US security agencies, which had been reformed as a result of extensive post-9/11 reforms. The procedure applied was similar to our previous investigation of the discourse of the London Olympics security operation, and again generated a core sample of twelve texts. Additionally in this analysis, the technique enabled us to investigate some of the rhetorical strategies which were deployed in these texts. Thus, we were able to evaluate patterns of argumentation to determine whether they supported or disconfirmed a view of the agencies' activities consistent with claims for the conditions of 'exceptionalism' within the current episteme, which we set out in the next chapter (after Agamben 2005).

Phase Two: Analysing Whole Documents Using Human Intuitive Analysis

In the second stage, we again prioritised the manual analysis of our core texts over a machine-based analysis of the entire corpus. This manual analysis not only revealed two types of linguistic phenomena, but also opened up a new line of enquiry into the argument schemes of the text. The first linguistic phenomenon was the occurrence of clauses in which there was an accumulation of grammatical agents in the clause linked to the same verb; the second was the use of certain recurring metaphors, which appeared to become almost formulaic within the discourse (for examples of these, see Chapter 10). Manual analysis also allowed us to notice argument schemes as a productive focus for rhetorical investigation. These appeared to be phenomena that could be only be interpreted intuitively through human agency, rather than being engineered mechanically through corpus techniques. In particular, this approach enabled the exposure of elements of 'warrants', which were often achieved through a certain identifiable set of lexis. When analyzing texts to reveal rhetorical patterns, we mainly used the techniques of argumentation analysis (as set out by Wodak 2001, after Kienpointner 1992, p. 194), detailing the structure of a three-part argument scheme (i.e. argument, conclusion, linking warrant; see also Chapter 4).

Phase Three: Follow Up Corpus Enquiry

Again, keywords and key-keywords were re-checked to determine the range of features identified in the core texts across the whole corpus, and concordancing was used to identify useful examples. To illustrate, during analysis of core texts we had noticed as a feature of the language the tendency to emphasise the connectedness of activities carried out between security organisations. Key-keyword data indicated that the item 'across' was key in fifteen out of the 175 texts. Taking a random sample (10%) of instances of language from the corpus that used this word, it could be observed that the preposition was most frequently deployed in other, non-core texts for the same purpose of describing cross-agency collaboration, frequently accompanying extensive lists of co-operating agencies, as in the manually located examples.

Conclusion

One way of viewing the changes made to our methodological approach between the analyses which we carried out earlier in the project, and those we carried out later, is to regard them as an evolution in our techniques. In a sense, this is true, in that ideas for applying manual stages arose partly as a result of our greater experience in the integration of corpus tools to solve problems in the investigation of language and discourse phenomena. An alternative explanation is that the two pairs of analyses suited different approaches. In the Chapters 7 and 9 analyses, the use of corpus data to identify important themes and isolate differences between our specially designed sub-corpora, was a powerful way to expose themes arising from diachronic and synchronic comparison that would otherwise have remained undetectable. In the research described in Chapters 8 and 10, however, this approach was less obviously fruitful, with much more to be revealed by applying manual, intuitive procedures as the starting point of our enquiry. This, we hope, is a powerful lesson that other researchers can adopt in their own work. Corpus tools can be used most powerfully when they are applied flexibly and intelligently to illuminate language phenomena of interest to researchers. The ideal, as Subtirelu and Baker (2017) indicate, is that corpus tools be used reflexively, both as a starting and return point in analysis. But to make this a possibility, much more in our view needs to be written concerning the experience of using these machine tools as a follow up to manual intuitive techniques. In this way, we hope that one outcome of the methodological advance we adopt in this book is that we are able to contribute to the body of literature making the ideal of complete reflexivity plausible.

In the four chapters that follow, we go on to set out in some detail the outcomes of the analytical procedures that we have described here. In each chapter, its ordering reflects the chronological sequencing of the dates the texts were produced, rather than the order in which we engaged with them; hence the methodological approaches will alternate between them.

- Chapter 7 will use the *comparative keyword approach* to undertake a diachronic analysis of three sub-corpora extracted from a collection of policy documents produced by the UK government between 2001 and 2016.
- Chapter 8 will use the *'sampling first' approach* to analyse a corpus of webpages produced by agencies involved in the security operation for the London Olympic Games in 2012.

- Chapter 9 will use the *comparative keyword approach* to undertake a synchronic analysis of two sub-corpora of documents produced between 2012 and 2016, which relate to nuclear proliferation: UNSC resolutions and newspaper articles produced by prominent broadsheets in the USA and UK.
- Chapter 10 will use the *'sampling first' approach* to analyse a corpus of webpages produced by contemporary US security agencies in the wake of the post-9/11 reforms, accessed between 2015 and 2016.

Note

1. Hereafter we will use the term 'sub-corpus' to refer to a collection of texts, distinguished for the purposes of comparison, within a broader corpus.

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6

Biopolitics, Governmentality and the Banopticon

In the first four chapters of this book, we have set out an extensive historical, conceptual and methodological background for our analysis of documents relating to national and international security that follows. So far, our rationale for discourse analysis has mainly addressed its structural features; yet in our view, an analysis that focuses principally on the structural features of discourse falls short of actual critique. The formal aspects of text at every level—typology, semantics, syntax, register, genre, and even 'discursive formation'—are indeed central concerns for discourse analysis. However, we would suggest that, taken alone, these features of language and discourse are not adequate to provide a theoretical framework powerful enough for us to engage critically with the language and discourse of national and international security that follows. Furthermore, structural approaches to discourse analysis tend to be generic, and universalist in their orientation. That is to say, they are proposed as being applicable to any mode of discourse, irrespective of the specific disciplinary field which it constitutes (e.g. Wodak and Meyer 2016). For us, these more generalist, 'off-the-hook' approaches to discourse analysis fall short of providing a sufficiently radical purchase on the language and discourse of the documents relating to a particular

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disciplinary context, in order to reveal with a sufficient degree of specificity the relations of power which are constituted within any specialist field.

Therefore in this chapter, we introduce critical theories which are specific to the field of politics and security. However in so doing, we are going beyond the naive application of pre-existing ‘grand theory’; rather, by invoking some of the more wide-ranging theoretical approaches which more usually have provenance in disciplines outside applied linguistics—such as politics and international relations, political sociology, and philosophy—we are also seeking to apply the techniques of discourse analysis to documentary evidence to shed light on how far these critical theories themselves hold up in the light of linguistic and discursive evidence. Thus, we would argue that in the current paradigm, in which synergy is sought within the social sciences between disciplines, and even beyond disciplines, engagement with the purely formal aspects of the discourse of a particular field can only go so far. For this book intends to speak not only to applied linguists and discourse analysts, but also to those working in international relations, the diplomatic service and even the security services themselves. Therefore a critical approach to the discourse of a specialist field should engage not only with the technical theories and methods of applied linguistics and discourse analysis, but also with critical theories which emanate from the specialist field itself.

In this chapter, we start by engaging with the later work of Michel Foucault, which extends his analysis of discourse and power into the two inter-related spheres of ‘biopolitics’ (1984a, 2004) and ‘governmentality’ (2007, 2008). Foucauldian conceptualisations of these concepts have been progressed within the social sciences in two rather different directions. The first, has been carried forward by the Italian philosopher, Giorgio Agamben (1998, 2005), who has proposed that governments have historically been maintaining a ‘state of exception’ in which recourse to the legal rights of liberal societies across Europe have been indefinitely suspended due to the prevalence of a permanent and ubiquitous condition of emergency. The second relates to the French sociologist, Didier Bigo’s (2008) conceptualisation of ‘illiberalism’ in which he argues (contra Agamben) that a state of ‘unease’ is maintained within

European societies, not so much by a totalising suspension of the principles of liberalism, but rather *within* liberalism through the pervasive maintenance of a condition of '(in)security'. In order to make sense of the documents relating to national and international security that we will analyse in subsequent chapters, we will go on in this chapter to set out the nature of these radical theories, which more usually have provenance in the fields of political philosophy and the sociology of politics.

Bio-Power and Biopolitics

In a late interview, Michel Foucault claimed that there are 'three fundamental elements of any experience…: a game of truth, relations of power, and forms of relations to oneself and others' (1984b, p. 383). These sum up the three foci of the work published during his lifetime: knowledge, power and ethics. The first two phases of his work, focusing on the constitution of disciplinary knowledge (1967, 1970, 1972, 1973) and relations of power (1977), have proved pivotal with respect to the strand of work which emerged from applied linguistics as 'critical linguistics' (e.g. Fowler et al. 1979; Hodge and Kress 1979) and evolved into the highly influential branch of 'critical discourse analysis' developed by Norman Fairclough and colleagues at Lancaster (1989, 1995, 2000, 2003; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999). However, in his later work, Foucault synthesised these two phases into a critique of the ways in which disciplinary knowledge is articulated by governments upon their populations (1984a, 2004, 2007, 2008), which has gone less recognised within the field of applied linguistics and discourse analysis.

The notion of 'bio-power' was first introduced at the end of volume one of the *History of Sexuality* (Foucault 1984a). Here, Foucault described how bio-power has come to be exercised over populations in modern societies to exercise widespread control over human life (1984a, pp. 133–160). However, the concept did not resurface in his work until the posthumous publication of his lectures on 'governmentality' where the concept of bio-power evolved, within the context of a critique of the different modes of government in late modernity, into the notion of 'biopolitics' (2003, 2007, 2008). Foucault begins by tracing the emergence of bio-power back to pre-modern forms of state rule which he calls 'sovereignty'. His initial focus on bio-power was upon its capacity to set limits upon life according to the modalities of different regimes. In the Middle Ages when the sovereign's own life appeared to be threatened by transgression of his laws, he retained an absolute power over the life or death of the subject. However, from the seventeenth century this medieval power over life developed into two productive, and complementary, forces: an 'anatamo-politics' of the human body which focused on the disciplinary conditioning of the body as a machine; and a 'biopolitics' of the population which focused on the biological aspects of the body in the regulation of its capacity for procreation and survival. In modern times, the feudal sovereign's power to 'take life or let live' has been replaced by the capacity of power 'to foster life or disallow it to the point of death' (Foucault 1984a, p. 138). The modern correlative of the location and exercise of power at an essential, biological level resides in the contemporary potential for genocide, mass slaughter, and the annihilation of the human race. Thus, while in the Middle Ages death marked a transference from a terrestrial sovereignty to another more powerful one, now death is the limit of power over life.

Thus, not only did the concept of biopolitics emerge from bio-power to encapsulate the way in which the power over life is applied to populations through the practice of modern government, but biopolitics actually became established as one of the defining features of governmental *praxis*. By the eighteenth century, this political power began to focus not on 'man-as-body', as was the case with disciplinary power (1977), but upon entire populations, on '…the living man, to man-as-living-being…to man-as-species' (2004, p. 242). This realisation of biopolitics came to govern many of the conditions which underwrite the existence and the survival of the population 'from the cradle to the grave': monitoring, controlling and predicting different aspects of the population, such as the rates of births and deaths as well as the 'length of life itself'; public hygiene; maintaining the population in old age, infirmity and incapacitation; and control of the milieu in which populations live in order to prevent disease and epidemics. In order to exercise this control of the conditions of life of the population, a number of mechanisms were introduced at the end of the eighteenth century whose functions are distinct from those of disciplinary power. These include various forms of prediction—'forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall measures'—which are focused on the 'controlling of life and biological processes of man-as-species and ensuring they are…regularized'. This power of regularisation 'consists in making live and letting die' (ibid., pp. 246–247). One example which brings together these techniques was the constitution of sexuality in nineteenth century Europe (Foucault 1984a). The constitution of the child as a sexual subject and the 'medicalization' of the hysterical woman were developed out of regard for the health of the race and society; while the regulation of birth control and the pathologisation of perversions gave rise to a range of disciplines such as epidemiology and psychiatry. While this bio-power was an important element in the development of capitalism, possibly more important was 'the entry of life into history,' (Foucault 1984a, p. 141), a 'bio-history' in which 'methods of power and knowledge assumed responsibility for the life process and undertook to control and modify them' (Foucault 1984a, p. 142).

However on this argument, a paradox lies at the heart of bio-power in modernity: a form of power that is instituted in order to enable life can also be exercised in order to bring about death and annihilation (Foucault 2004, p. 254). For Foucault, speaking towards the end of his life in the mid-1970s, this emerged from what he calls 'racism'. The paradigmatic manifestation of this in the twentieth century arose from the Nazi regime. For Nazism resurrected the archaic sovereign right of life and death over its citizens and organised it around the modern mechanisms of discipline and regulation.

> The Nazi State makes the field of life it manages, protects, guarantees and cultivates in bio-political terms absolutely coextensive with the sovereign right to kill anyone…There was, in Nazism, a co-incidence between a generalized biopower and a dictatorship that was at once absolute and retransmitted through the entire social body by this fantastic extension of the right to kill and of exposure to death. (ibid., p. 260)

In the twenty first century, we can once again witness that the *praxis* of security in defense of the modern state engages in novel modalities of the power 'to foster life or disallow it to the point of death'—both on the part of those who are tasked with defending liberal society, and by those who conspire to dismantle it. On the one hand, technologies of detection such as biometrics, body scanners, and iris recognition, combine with technologies of detention such as rendition and indefinite extra-territorial detention (e.g. Guantanamo Bay) and technologies of destruction such as 'smart bombs'. These enable members of the police, military and private security firms to detect, detain and destroy potential enemies at a distance; while on the other hand the human body has been constituted as a weapon that at once destroys the enemy along with its bearer. In this respect, at the turn of the last century, the recourse to bio-technology has pitted forces who 'disallow [life] to the point of death' (Foucault 1984a, p. 138) against forces who embrace death to the point of auto-annihilation. One set of forces engages in the tactics of remoteness and technical precision; the other set of forces engages in the tactics of proximity and corporeal obliteration. Both are different modalities of bio-power which are powerfully relevant not only to the practice of maintaining security in self-proclaimed liberal societies but also to its flipside, the deployment of tactics of 'terror' not only to disturb the complacency but also to dislodge the fortifications of postcolonial, liberal regimes.

Governmentality

While the notion of bio-power has received some scant attention within discourse analysis, if anything, Foucault's account of the emergence of modern forms of government has been largely ignored in the field. However, the series of lectures which were gradually compiled, translated, and gradually published over the twenty years since his death (2004, 2007, 2008) have had a profound impact upon critical work in other areas of the social sciences, and particularly in their interface with politics: in international relations (e.g. Larner and Walters 2004; Walters and Haahr 2005), political sociology (e.g. Bigo 2006a, 2007, 2008), political philosophy (e.g. Agamben 1998, 2005) and most recently, security studies (e.g. Vaughan-Williams 2017a, b). In our view, it is not sufficient to assume that the ‘critical’ aspect of discourse analysis can become coagulated into static, and easily reproducible, ‘approaches’ or ‘models’ which can be applied across all fields of knowledge, media and everyday life; rather in keeping with other areas within the social sciences, discourse analysis has to remain fluid, progressive and innovative in order to engage with the specific conditions of language and text, not least of the emergent disciplinary formations which are being generated within late modernity. For us, Foucault’s posthumously published work (2004, 2007, 2008) extends the analysis of discourse and power to address three domains of direct relevance to the documents which we will analyse later: population, government and in particular, security.

More specifically, Foucault’s engagement with the ‘art of government’ builds on his earlier studies of ‘games of truth’ and ‘relations of power’ to provide a framework which makes it possible to examine the workings of modern European politics, and their constitution since the eighteenth century, along three lines of enquiry: according to the deployment of different modalities of knowledge for the purposes of governing the population; relating to the lines of distribution of power between institutions and agencies of government; and in keeping with the ways in which forms of relations are both constructed by government and constituted by individual subjects. Within this nexus, ‘security’ emerges as one strand of governmentality which can be traced through these posthumous lectures (2004, 2007, 2008). In what follows we draw on different themes which emerge from Foucault’s late work in order to inform our analysis of documents produced by modern governments and their agencies as to the ways in which power is exercised by the governments of late industrial societies upon modern populations.

With his theory of governmentality, Foucault sets out to problematise the traditional conceptualisation of the state as being essentialist and monolithic (2004, 2007, 2008). Both within realist political science and much Marxist critique, the state has conventionally been considered as a unified political entity which exercises sovereign power over its subjects. Not least with regard to national security, the state is seen as the instigator of policies enunciated by its agents who are empowered by various state ministries and offices. For modernist historians, political theorists and legislators, the state which arrived at the present form of government in the eighteenth century, has persisted worldwide up to the present day as a form of objective reality. While Foucault certainly agrees with political scientists that a rupture began to emerge within sixteenth century Europe between the absolutist medieval rule of sovereign justice and modern 'administrative' forms of government, he differs radically with respect to the ontology of the modern state. For him, the role of the state is conventionally either exaggerated as some homogenised and confrontational 'cold monster', or is reduced to an account of reproductive forces and relations of production (2007).

In order to counter these monolithic descriptions, the term 'governmentality' was adopted by Foucault to avoid describing the state as an essence, having a 'unity, individuality … [and] rigorous functionality' (2007, p. 109). Rather, at its most conventional, governmentality is concerned with the 'mentalities of government' (Miller and Rose 1990; Rose and Miller 1992), or the different ways in which the 'rationalities', or the logic, of government is manifested (Dean 2010, p. 24). Thus, the way government operates is 'explicit and embedded in language and other technical instruments…and relatively taken for granted…by its practitioners'. From this viewpoint, the authority of government is located in the shared ideas, theories and knowledges which are derived in modernity from economics and political science, and—crucially for this study—constituted through language and discourse. Moreover, as we will illustrate later in this book, the less rational 'mentalities' of government might also be drawn from the more emotive discourses of political rhetoric and the political media which circulate in the public sphere (Dean 2010, p. 25). However more crucially, governmentality also marks an expansion of the exercise of 'bio-power' that we have already explored and, as such, it provides the means to conceptualise and analyse the ways in which power is articulated upon aggregate masses of humankind through establishing rules of conduct for individual subjects (Walter 2012, p. 15). In this respect, Foucault suggests that governmentality might be to the state 'what techniques of segregation were to psychiatry, what techniques of discipline were to the penal system, and what biopolitics was to medical institutions' (2007, p. 120). For Foucault, governmentality is:

> … the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument. (2007, pp. 107–108)

Security

Out of a panoply of dispersed practices, security gradually emerged to become one of the principal ways through which governmental power is exercised over populations. On Foucault's argument (2007), the 'art of government' arose in eighteenth century Europe as 'population' became fully formed, both as a concept constituted within new forms of scientific knowledge such as demographics and economics, and as the 'end and instrument' of modern forms of government. Thus, the ostensible goal of government became to ensure the well-being of the population, expressed through its health, longevity and prosperity. Through these means, 'bio-power' became exercised upon populations through the novel technology of statistics and the principal form of knowledge, political economy. The new techniques which exercise this power over populations become lodged in the 'apparatuses of security,' which operated through two arms within the modern nation state: a police force whose function is to maintain order within the population; and a 'military-technological' wing, whose function until to 1945 was to maintain a balanced distribution of territory within Europe. Broadly speaking, these constitute the historical and theoretical backdrop to what we refer to today as 'national security' and 'international security'.

However, in the exercise of power, governmentality does not so much supersede sovereignty and disciplinary power, but rather incorporates and works alongside these two techniques in regulating the expanding populations of the time. While disciplinary power, and in particular the relations between the disciplines and knowledge (Foucault 1977, 1984a) has for some time informed critical discourse analysis (e.g. Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; Pennycook 2001), for Foucault discipline only constitutes one of three modalities of power—discipline, sovereignty, and security—which fluctuate in their respective dominance over time. In feudal times, sovereignty was the dominant form of power through which the monarch exercised power over the subjects within his territory. This power was exercised by the judiciary and the executive through law and constitution. Disciplinary power was exercised upon individuals ('singularities'), within clearly delineated spaces such as the clinic, the barracks, the school or the prison. Thus, discipline is focused on restrictive spaces in order to regulate specific aspects of the individual, and especially the body (Foucault 1973, 1977). By contrast, security is exercised upon entire populations ('multiplicities') within wider ranging territorial spaces such as the nation state and 'milieus' within them, such as the town. In contrast with the narrower purview of 'discipline', 'security' is expansive and laissez-faire, functioning essentially to regulate the components of 'effective reality' and the relations between them (Foucault 2007, p. 47).

> The fundamental objective of governmentality will be mechanisms of security, or, lets say it will be state intervention with the essential function of ensuring the security of the natural phenomena of economic processes or processes intrinsic to the population. (Foucault 2007, p. 353)

On this argument, while security is distinct from the relations of sovereign and disciplinary power, it does not supersede them. The conceptualisation of governmentality combines these three elements, but it also 'departs from them and seeks to reinscribe and recode them' (Dean 2010, p. 29).

Within this nexus, a central purpose of these new mechanisms of security was to maintain the developing relations between state forces across Europe. From the end of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth century, the economy emerged as a semi-autonomous force which was constitutive of, and differentiated between, nation states. This led to the setting up of competitive relations between the newly emerging European nations: 'manipulating, distributing, and re-establishing relations of force within a space of competition that entails competitive growths' (Foucault 2007, p. 312). Two 'assemblages of political technology' were required in order to maintain this 'field of relations of forces' between nation states: on the one hand, what we have come to know as the 'police'; and, on the other hand, a diplomatic corps and a professional army. The police is the agency we most often associate with regulating order within the state; however, historically its role has changed since its inception in the sixteenth century Europe (ibid., pp. 311–328). In its earliest manifestation, the police was not an organisation comprising a uniformed constabulary charged with keeping the peace. Rather, it was a type of community association which was managed by the public authorities. While the precise nature of the police in the early seventeenth century differed across Europe, its central goal is to take responsibility for the activity of the population in as much as it 'constitutes a differential element in the development of the state's forces' (ibid., p. 322). There were two conditions which underwrote the emergence of the police in its pre-modern form. First was the urbanisation of the territory of the nation state, inasmuch as it became organised around emerging market towns. The second, and more fundamental condition, was the development of commerce and the maximisation of profit as a key principle of governmental rationality (ibid., pp. 337–339). To achieve this, prototypical police forces across Europe performed five central functions, which we would associate today more with the delivery of public welfare rather than the maintenance of public order: controlling the number of the population in relation to the territory they occupied; ensuring the provision of basic needs and sustenance for families; maintaining public health; ensuring that each member of the population was gainfully employed; and making sure that the infrastructure of each region was in a good enough shape to allow goods and products to move around it. Thus, the job of this prototypical police force was not just to ensure the well-being of the citizens of the state, but also to 'convert' this well-being into the 'constitution and development of the state's forces' (ibid., p. 328).

However, the beginning of the eighteenth century saw a radical shift in the police's role, which begins to anticipate the function of the modern security services. This reflected a change in thinking about the economy, which was moving much more towards something like the 'free market' which we experience today. Rather than the well-ordered society which was the goal of rulers from the Middle Ages up to the seventeenth century, in eighteenth century Europe two forces emerged within the state—population and the economy. Both of these appeared to have their own momentum, behaving according to their own laws and becoming the object of the new scientific disciplines of medicine and economics. Thus, the role of the state and its force was no longer the regulation of commerce and the population, but rather to permit these forces the freedom to find their own level in systems that were thought to be self-correcting.

> The fundamental objective of governmentality will be mechanisms of security, or, let's say, it will be state intervention with the essential function of ensuring security of the natural phenomena of economic processes or processes intrinsic to the population. (2007, p. 353)

On this argument, management of the population and the economy was transferred from the pre-modern police force to other government agencies which were charged with 'increasing the forces of the state', and the police took on the role we are familiar with today, of 'ensuring the prevention or repression of disorder, irregularity, illegality, and delinquency' (ibid., p. 353). However, more importantly, the police also became the apparatus which enforces 'a legal system of respect for freedoms' (ibid., p. 354) which anticipates one of the paradoxes of liberalism which we will encounter later in this chapter.

As well as the police, the second arm of the security mechanism of nascent modern governments was 'the military-diplomatic apparatus' (2007, pp. 296–306). This comprised three instruments of security: a permanent diplomatic corps, standing armies and supranational diplomatic organisations. From the sixteenth century, these were set up in order to maintain what we now call 'international security' across European states as a result of the change in the dynamics of power that took place as emerging nation states consolidated across the Continent. The first aspect of this shift lay in the supersession of the recurring dream of medieval times to unify the diverse regions, cities and sovereign states into one, integrated imperial Europe. The pivotal event here was the Treaty of Westphalia which took place in 1648, bringing to an end the Thirty Years' War and establishing the principle of the peaceful co-existence of sovereign states across Europe. But if the principle of Europe from the late seventeenth century onwards was articulated in terms of the express desire for an absence of war, it remained 'a space of political and economic competition', as revealed by the dramatic expansion and contraction of the Spanish Empire between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The second aspect of this transition arose from the collapse of the three constituents of the dynastic power of the medieval prince, on the basis of which relations with other countries, regions or territories had been negotiated: the prince's personal wealth, the extent of his territories, and his alliances through family relationship or marital liaison. From the second half of the seventeenth century, competition between states was instead realised through a 'politics whose principal objective will be the employment and constitution of forces' made up of the 'wealth' of states, the 'resources' of states, and above all the 'force' of states (p. 295).

The emerging relations between state forces across Europe required the development of a mechanism of security to maintain them. First, war could be waged by one state against another in order to maintain the mutual balance of power. Second, standing armies were established that for the first time enabled soldiery to be constituted as a professional career, national infrastructures of fortifications and transportation were constructed, and a science of warfare was founded. Third, the practice of diplomacy came to be exercised through the reciprocal establishment of diplomatic embassies which represented each country across the European states; as well as the setting up of legally underwritten consultative organisations, in particular cities, in order to bring together diplomatic representatives from each state. These three facets of security will emerge in different ways from the corpora of security documents which we will analyse later. Not least will be the way in which the function of the military is seen to blend with the police and private security firms (after Bigo 2008) in the protection of the sports mega-events which have become such potent symbols of the wealth, artistic imagination and prowess of the host nation. And the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), from which we draw our corpus of documents in Chapter 9, purportedly represents the post-Westphalian supranational organisation *par excellence*, committed to maintaining the peace not just across Europe but also around the world.

Both the police and the military-diplomatic assemblage required a means of gathering and processing information relating not only to the population of the state and its own 'forces', but also to the 'forces' of other states. This led to the advent of statistics, a term which originally meant 'science of the state' (2007, p. 101). This new way of analysing knowledge emerged in sixteenth century Europe, and was consolidated in the seventeenth in parallel with the shift in the inter-state relations. The use of statistics began as an administrative tool and became used increasingly as a means of analysing the population. Through the seventeenth century 'population' increasingly became the object of government as it was seen, like the economy, to be operating according to its own laws. Statistics emerged as an instrument of the art of government in order to the calculate the trajectory of diseases, analyse trends in mortality, gauge the productivity of labour, and calculate the wealth of regions as well as the entire nation. In this way, statistics came to be used as a technique and form of knowledge that enabled links to be made between the analysis of the population and the analysis of the economy (2007, pp. 104, 274). However, statistics did not only emerge as a technique of knowledge that operated within the state; from the seventeenth century on they were also mobilised to maintain relations between the states within Europe. On Foucault's argument, statistical knowledge was necessary to maintain a balance of power ('equilibrium') between European states through each state's knowledge not only of its own capacity ('force'), but also those ('forces') of other rival states. This statistical knowledge came to be maintained across Europe by the prototypical police force described above.

> Police makes statistics necessary, but police also makes statistics possible. For it is precisely the whole set of measures set up to increase, combine, and develop forces, it is this whole administrative assemblage that makes it possible to identify what each state's forces comprise and their possibilities of development. Police and statistics mutually condition each other, and statistics is a common instrument between police and the European equilibrium. (2007, p. 315)

However, as we shall see, in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century the roles of the various agencies in Europe concerned with security—police, military, private security companies—start to become less well delineated (Bigo 2008; see also Chapter 8); and in Chapter 10 we will examine discursive evidence that this 'de-differentiation' of forces may well apply, not just to agencies which operate within European states, but also to the re-constitution of the security services within the United States in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.

State of Exception

So far in this chapter, we have argued that an understanding of biopower, biopolitics and the tactics of government developed by Foucault throughout his later work (1984a, 2004, 2007, 2008) is necessary to inform a critical reading of documents which contribute towards the contemporary discourse of national and international security. However, Foucault's account has been both challenged and extended by the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, with his argument both for the politicisation of 'bare life' (1998) and his contention that, since the nineteenth century, a considerably less dispersed mode of government has emerged in Europe and North America, a form of government for which—contra liberalism—the permanent suspension of civil rights and *habeas corpus* has become the norm in the face of a (purported) continuing state of emergency (2005).

Although Foucault's (1984a, 2004) conceptualisation of bio-power and biopolitics was situated within an expansive historical terrain, Giorgio Agamben has argued that his approach only adopted a singular notion of life which, if we go back as far back as Classical Greece, has been expressed in a more variegated way (1998). Agamben suggests that in fact two discrete terms—*zōḗ* and *bios*—were used by the Ancient Greeks used to distinguish between different modes of life. *Zōḗ* indicates the basic condition of being alive which is experienced by all animate beings, animal or human; *bios* refers to 'the form of living proper to an individual or a group' which characterises human sociality, and in particular the engagement of the citizen in political life

(Mills 2008, p. 64). Evidence for this distinction comes from Aristotle's *Politics* (Agamben 1998, pp. 1–2), where the Ancient Greek philosopher opposes the natural state of reproduction and sustenance which is circumscribed within the home (*oikos*) to participation in the social and political life of the city state (*polis*) (ibid., p. 2). Agamben acknowledges that Foucault alluded to this distinction (1984a); however, he himself views this feature as being a defining moment, not just of biopolitics, but also of modern societies from the eighteenth century up to the present: '… the entry of *zōḗ* into the sphere of the polis - the politicisation of bare life as such – constitutes the decisive event of modernity' (ibid., p. 4).

In our view, there are few spheres of modern existence in which this 'politicisation of bare life' takes place more forcefully than in the maintenance of the security of the population of the state; and, indeed to understand this, it is necessary to engage with the ways in which forms of 'bare life' are constituted within the language and discourse of security. Foucault describes power as operating along two lines: the use of political techniques for the state to control the natural life of the population, aided and abetted by the police; and through 'technologies of the self', whereby the subject carries out processes of subjectification which create a sense of self while simultaneously being influenced by governmental forces (Agamben 1998, p. 5; Foucault 1994, pp. 229–232). It is precisely with this separation between the 'juridico-institutional' and the 'bio-political' models of power that Agamben takes issue, arguing that, in fact, 'bare life' (*zōḗ*) has always been included in 'political life' (*bios*). For him it is in political life that the original 'nucleus of sovereign power' lies. Agamben goes on to state emphatically that the 'production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power' (ibid., p. 6). Implicit in this is the view that, contra Foucault's argument for the dispersal of governmental power throughout the modern state, power remains localised in the domain of the sovereign: either literally—as in most European states up to the end of the nineteenth century, the Third Reich, and many totalitarian and 'post-totalitarian' states from Stalin to Putin; or figuratively as in the 'spectacular' pseudo-democracies of present day post-industrial societies (e.g. Debord 1967; Kellner 2005).

Starting with Carl Schmitt's (in)famous definition—'the sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception' (Schmitt 1985/1922)—Agamben goes on to set out two aporias which lie at the heart of sovereignty and sovereign power (1998, 2005). The first is the more fundamental juridical paradox which underpins the positioning of the sovereign within a constitutional legal framework. On the one hand the sovereign, per se, is legally entitled to bring about a total suspension of the law; however, once the constitution is suspended, the sovereign himself becomes placed beyond the juridical system. In this respect, 'the sovereign, having the legal power to suspend the validity of the law, legally places himself outside the law' (Agamben 1998, p. 15). In fact, the sovereign is simultaneously and aporetically placed both inside and outside the legal system. However the exceptional position of the sovereign is a double paradox, in as much as, while the state of exception marks a 'kind of exclusion' in which the individual rule is not included in the general, nevertheless the moment of exclusion simultaneously references the rule from which it is excluded: 'what is excluded in the exception maintains itself in relation to the rule in the form of the rule's suspension' (ibid., pp. 17–18). In fact, Schmitt himself argued that it is the exception to the rule that upholds the rule more decisively than the rule itself (1985/1922, pp. 19–22). Agamben dubs this relation the 'ban', by adopting from Jean-Luc Nancy (1983) an Old Germanic term that means at once exclusion from the community at the decree of the sovereign. He who is banned, or 'abandoned', is like the sovereign at the moment of exclusion, at once 'outside and inside the juridical order' (ibid., pp. 28–29), in an aporetic state of 'inclusion/exclusion' (Agamben 1998; Vogt in Norris 2005, p. 79; Prozorov 2014, pp. 97–98).

Building on this argument, this condition of 'exceptionalism' can also be used as a 'paradigm of government' in which there is an ambivalence between the articulation of law and politics within the state (Agamben 2005, pp. 2–4). The governmental form of this 'state of exception' is closely related to abnormal conditions that arise within the nation state, such as a civil war or an uprising. The equivocal nature of this state of government is suggested by the fact that these conditions are called very different things in different languages. In English, these conditions are referred to as 'martial law' or 'emergency powers'; the French term 'état de siège' can be translated as 'state of siege', while the original words used in German are 'Ausnahmezustand' or 'Notstand' which are broadly equivalent to 'state of necessity' (after Schmitt, 1985/1922). It was the claim for conditions such as these that underwrote the suspension of the constitution when the National Socialist Party came to power in Germany in 1933. This meant that the twelve-year period of the Third Reich can effectively be seen as a continuous state of exception. And, arguably, the world has been engaged in a 'global civil war' ever since (Arendt in Agamben 2005, p. 3; Schmitt in Agamben 2005, p. 3), which has given rise to a widespread and enduring state of exception, 'as a threshold of indeterminacy between absolutism and democracy' (ibid., p. 3).

The focus of Agamben's genealogical enquiry in *State of Exception* (2005) is to examine a wide range of claims by constitutional writers from different European countries as to whether this eponymous state of affairs is regulated by the constitution or by law, or whether it is a political act of expediency which persists unchecked. As with language, Agamben suggests that this differs according to national context: a more juridical approach is favoured by France and Germany; whereas Italy, Switzerland, the UK and USA tend to take a more pragmatic, political, line (ibid., p. 10). In our later analysis of documentary evidence relating to the constitution of a contemporary state of exception, we seek to bring our own interpretation of the rhetorical and semantic features of the contemporary discourse of security discourse to further illuminate this issue. However, Agamben argues that a simple dichotomy between legal and political, constitutional and pragmatic, internal and external ('inside/outside') fails to provide an adequate explanation of the basis of exception as a state of government. Rather:

> …the problem of defining it concerns precisely a threshold, or a zone of indifference, where inside and outside do not exclude each other but

> rather blur with each other. The suspension of the norm does not mean its abolition, and the zone of anomie that it enables is not…unrelated to the juridical order. (ibid., 23)

A central issue which Agamben addresses is the locus of the suspension of the norm, or 'the meaning, place and modes of its relation to the law' (2005, p. 51). In particular, he considers the question of whether the sovereign power that is entailed by this suspension can become invested in a single body, such as 'Emperor', 'Dictator', *Duce*, *Führer*, 'Revolutionary Council' or 'President'. The genealogical line takes us back to Ancient Rome, where in circumstances of a *tumultus* (or 'emergency situation') the State could proclaim a *iustitium*, or 'suspension of the law' (ibid., pp. 41–42). Although it has been suggested that, as with totalitarian regimes of more recent times, the *iustitium* too was a 'dictatorship', this appears a less than adequate explanation; for the state of exception is 'a space devoid of law, a zone of anomie in which all legal determinations…are deactivated' (ibid., p. 50). For Agamben, it is a 'force of law without law' (ibid., p. 39) which negates any recourse to juridical appraisal of acts carried out during the emergency situation (ibid., p. 50). Furthermore, he dismisses as 'fiction' the arguments of those twentieth century scholars who, writing in the shadow of Fascism, claimed that the source of power within the state of exception resided in the figure of the dictator. Rather, for Agamben, the 'secret of power' is impersonal, and resides in the dialectic between the 'normative and juridical' (dubbed *potestas* in Ancient Rome) and the 'anomic and meta-juridical' (*auctoritas*):

> The state of exception is the device that must ultimately articulate and hold together the two aspects of the juridical-political machine by initiating a threshold of indecidability between anomie and *nomos*, between life and law, between auctoritas and potestas. (ibid., p. 86)

However according to Agamben, the state of exception is not just some relic of ancient sophistry, but has become on this account—broadly speaking since the First World War—the defining condition of the modern state. On Agamben's argument, the 'juridically empty' space of the state of exception, having once been contained within the structure of the state, is now expanding to occupy the space of the entire global polis:

> …the coming to light of the state of exception as the preeminent structure of juridico-political de-localization and dis-location. Political organization is not regressing toward outdated form; rather premonitory events are, like bloody masses, announcing the new nomos of the earth, which …will soon extend itself over the entire planet. (1998, p. 38)

Getting closer to our central concerns, it is possible that just such a ‘premonitory event’ took place on 11 September 2001 when—as we have described in Chapter 2—a radical Islamist organisation launched a deadly attack upon the most militarised country in the world, commandeering commercial aircraft to slowly demolish one of the pre-eminent symbols of global capitalism and kill almost 3000 civilians in a spectacle transmitted in real time across the world’s media channels (Kellner 2005). The subsequent passing of the USA PATRIOT Act on 26 October, and the decreeing of the ‘military order’ by George W. Bush on 13 November, issued in—for Agamben and, as we saw in Chapter 3, many of those working in critical discourse analysis—the most far-reaching state of exception initiated by a modern state since the Third Reich. The first edict brought into play ‘indefinite detention’ and trial by ‘military commissions’ of those who did not hold US citizenship and were suspected of being involved in terrorist activities. The second piece of legislation authorised the US Attorney General to ‘take into custody any foreigner who it was believed was engaged in activities that were a danger to ‘the national security of the United States’. What is unique about this decree is that it ‘radically erases any legal basis of the individual, thus producing a legally unnameable and unclassifiable thing’ (Agamben 2005, p. 3). The prisoners who were captured in Afghanistan did not have the status of a prisoner of war as laid down by the Geneva Convention, nor were they judged guilty of any criminal act according to domestic law. They were merely ‘detainees’, the ‘object’ of a detention that is ‘indefinite’ both in terms of it lasting for no demonstrable length of time and in terms of it having no recognisable juridical or legal basis.

The Management of Unease

Foucault's theories of biopower, governmentality and biopolitics emerged from his close reading of documentary evidence relating to madness, illness, criminality and latterly politics, and Agamben's conceptualisations of 'bare life' and 'exceptionalism' are grounded on his study of legal history from Ancient Greece to nineteenth and twentieth century European states; however, we conclude this chapter by engaging with a theorisation of the practice of contemporary security, which perhaps comes closer to the techniques of discourse analysis in being rather more transparently grounded in an empirical approach. For the French sociologist Didier Bigo—along with colleagues who comprise the 'Paris School' of security studies, for us most notably Elspeth Guild (e.g. Bigo et al. 2010, 2012) and Anastassia Tsoukala (e.g. Bigo and Tsoukala 2006, 2008)—have drawn on concepts from Foucault and Agamben such as 'biopolitics' and 'ban', as well as the concept of 'field' originally developed by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1972, 1980), to frame a number of wide ranging research projects into migration and 'bordering practices' within the European Union. These have implications for the practice of security, and in our view more specifically for the discourse of security. Along with other scholars who work outside philosophy in the more empirically oriented disciplines of sociology, political science and international relations (e.g. Ferejohn and Pasquino 2004; Huysmans 2004), Bigo does not entirely go along with Agamben's idiosyncratic interpretation of bio-power and biopolitics, and his claims for the exorbitant nature of sovereign power in contemporary societies.

Illiberalism Within Liberalism

As we have seen, the historical pivot of Agamben's most recent claim for a radical intensification of sovereign power (2005) is the declaration of a state of emergency in the USA which immediately followed the 9/11 attacks. Bigo argues from a rather wider international purview to assert that the fall-out from this declaration was less radical than is often asserted. There are two bases for his contention: first, that the state of emergency was in fact not that widespread internationally, and therefore it is not justifiable only to select the USA as the paradigmatic case; and secondly that, in any case, the declaration of a state of emergency did not so much radically alter the legal basis of the constitution, but rather intensified already existing systems of surveillance (Bigo 2006a).

In fact, three countries formally declared a state of emergency in the wake of 9/11: the USA, UK and Australia. Within the USA, the state of emergency was used to justify the war against Iraq, along with a simultaneous 'militarization of internal security, an enlargement of the role of external intelligence services inside, and a downsizing of the role of the role of police, judges, parliament, and international agreements' (2006a, p. 48). However, Bigo goes on to argue that in the UK the state of emergency was used merely to support 'limited derogations' from existing legislation; while in Australia it was tied much more to a local debate over national identity. Furthermore, the decision of the USA, UK and their allies to invade Iraq without a formal UN agreement alienated many European countries such as Germany, France and Belgium. On this argument, the US attacks provided a pretext across Europe for the intensification of already existing surveillance measures, the criminalisation of migrants, fundamentalists and underground organisations, as well as the introduction of new measures such as indefinite detention and biometric identification. Further afield, other continents went largely unaffected by the crisis in the North. Within the Arab world, even Saudi Arabia—the most notable ally of the USA and the UK—did not radically adjust what was already operationally quite an astringent regime of internal security. Moreover, the other two powerful members of the UN Security Council of a different political hue from the USA—China and Russia—remained more preoccupied with their own international security tensions for the US attacks to have much impact upon their security practices. For Bigo, therefore:

> The idea of September 11 as an exceptional event of violence, as 'hyper terrorism' has to be replaced by the one of September 11, 2001, Madrid in March 2004 and London in July 2005 as a series of intensive bombings of varied intensity followed by a backlash to archaic

> visions of exceptionalism as a solution, either by war or by the dream of a global control of all the individual's on the move around the planet. (2006a, p. 49)

This interpretation of events also speaks to a wider global purview, where India also remains preoccupied with its own regional security concerns; and many countries in Africa remain enmired within their own postcolonial internecine conflicts, and often are simply preoccupied with the struggle to achieve the most basic indicators of economic self-sufficiency.

Professional Field

Members of the Paris School also dispute Agamben's claims (1998, 2005) that there is a coherent strategy of domination by the sovereign state and its agents (after earlier twentieth century political philosophers such as Carl Schmitt 1985/1922). This is particularly the case with regard to Agamben's distinction between a police force which is charged with the maintenance of external society; and a military which is charged with the maintenance of external security. Part of the challenge to the coherence of this thesis has been brought about by the more recent problematisation of what lies inside and what lies outside the borders of a particular territory (e.g. Walker 1993; Vaughan-Williams 2012). To a large extent, the material borders between nation states have been superseded (if indeed they ever really did act as meaningful barriers to ingress and egress from a particular territory) and the management of these borders is carried out by a panoply of technologies which often take place at some distance from the actual geographic boundaries themselves (Bigo 2005a, 2006b, 2014; Bigo et al. 2007). These include 'fingerprinting, biometric identifiers, forge-proof IDs, computerised tracking of entrance, residence, accommodation and exit, setting up expert IT systems, satellite surveillance, … enlarged data-storage' (2006b, p. 414); as well as, more recently, profiling and predictive data analysis (Bigo 2010a). This has been further intensified by the rhetoric generated by the USA and its allies relating to the need to carry out a security operation which is global in scale and intensity (Bigo 2008, p. 10). Bigo contends that this has brought about a '"field" of professionals of the management of unease' within which there is a 'dedifferentiation' of the roles of the police and the military.

> This emergent field of the management of unease explains, on the one hand, the formation of police networks at the global level, as well as the policiarization of military function of combat and, on the other hand, the transformation, the criminalization and the juridiciarization of the notion of war. (ibid., p. 10)

In our view, this globalisation of security is marked by a heterogeneity of strategies, tactics and interests on the part of different actors, which although it extends it, is much more compatible with the framework of governmentality set out above (after Foucault 2007, 2008), rather than the totalising power of the sovereign state.

Over the years (e.g. 2005b, 2007, 2014), Bigo has developed a framework for describing a 'field of (in)security professionals' which consists of four dimensions (2008, pp. 22 ff.). The function of this field relates directly to the analysis of security discourse, not least since it 'depends on the capacity of agents to *produce statements on unease* and present solutions to facilitate the management of unease' (ibid., p. 23, our emphasis). First, the field functions as a 'field of forces', akin to a magnetic field. This refers to a certain tendency towards homogenisation within the field of '(in)security'. Here, although intelligence might be gathered from a number of different sources, it is in the interests of agents to develop convergent perceptions of who their adversary is and what constitutes legitimate knowledge of their foe. Secondly, the field also functions as a 'field of struggles'. Because of its tendency towards convergence, the field is characterised by competition between different agents to claim ownership of, or 'colonise', different areas of activity such as anti-terrorist surveillance or the monitoring of particular flows of transnational migration, as in the case of the recent Syrian Civil War. This extends to rivalry between different agencies such as the police, military and their 'intermediaries' over what constitutes 'security', and who has the legitimacy to 'designate' a threat (after Buzan et al. 1998).

This then relates, in turn, to the way in which the field of security operates as a 'field of domination' in relation to other fields. Agents working in the field of security are assertive of their different rights to declare what constitutes a security threat, rather than those working in other fields such as that of politics—however much the latter might wish to have the last say on security matters. The UK's MI5 and MI6, or the FBI and CIA in America, also compete for access to resources and the attention of politicians and the media. And, as we shall see from our analysis of some of the latter agencies' webpages in Chapter 9, the significant reconfiguration of security agencies, which took place in the USA under the aegis of the Department of Homeland Security in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, involved considerable restructuring of relations and jostling for position between different security actors. The security field is further complicated as it extends from public bureaucracies to the private sector, and particularly—as we shall see in Chapter 8, in the UK—private security firms. However, despite the intersubjective constitution of the security field, it does have certain boundaries which go beyond mere subjectivity. While these boundaries are always on the move in line with the interests of diverse agents, groups of agents and different agencies, they have their own dynamic which is both internal and external as they also maintain relationships with other fields. Thus, the security field is a bounded field (ibid., p. 26): '…the boundaries of the field are framing the doxa of the agents and, then, tend to reproduce the same figuration and to adjust the habitus of the agents along the previous figuration' (after Bourdieu 1972, 1980; Elias 1994).

Finally, we have already noted that the borders of the nation state have become de-materialised and fluid, superseding the traditional notion of a fixed physical boundary and rendering opaque the distinction between what takes place 'inside' and 'outside' the sovereign territory (Walker 1993). For Bigo, it is the space that exists beyond national boundaries, but is not yet delimited by a larger supranational entity such as the European Union, that 'characterizes the relationship between agents' of the security field. In this respect, the field can neither be reduced to a national, bi-national or supranational level, but rather operates within a space that exists between and across these levels. This social space comprises different agencies which operate in spaces which are differentiated not only according to territory (e.g. local vs. national police) and by function (e.g. border controls vs. intelligence agencies) but also by their transnational networks of relations (ibid., p. 28; see also 2007). In this respect, the security field is also a 'traversal' field, inasmuch as its agents occupy the interstitial space that opens up across and between different territorial levels.

Banopticon

The features that we have outlined so far in this section—exceptionalism, the 'field of professionals of (un)ease management', and normalisation of the freedom of movement, coalesce for Bigo in a framework concept he has called the 'banopticon' (2005b, 2006a, 2007, 2008). Here, he synthesises two concepts which we have already encountered. The idea of 'ban' was incorporated by Giorgio Agamben (1998) from Jean-Luc Nancy (1983) to refer to the combined ideas of 'exclusion from the community' and 'insignia of the sovereign'. While Agamben uses the term to emphasise the exercise of sovereign power in the 'framing' of exception, Bigo recalibrates it in order to stress the trajectory of exclusion which is accomplished through the routine, bottom-up practices of security actors, rather than the congealed, top-down power of the notional sovereign (Bigo et al. 2007, p. 11). Foucault's (1977) 'paradigm' of the panopticon is already well known; and here, the root '-opticon' once again conveys the notion of observation. However, if the panopticon conveys the idea of surveillance of the many—as in the 'surveillance society', the banopticon involves the surveillance of the few. Its function is to identify those who should be denied access to, detained or expelled from the sovereign territory, in order to distinguish them from the bulk of the population to whom the right to access or to 'freely' inhabit a particular territory is extended. Both the panopticon and the banopticon therefore exercise a normative function; but while the former is inclusive and extensive in its scope, the latter is exclusive and parsimonious. On our reading, the banopticon—or, drawing even more squarely on Foucault, the 'banoptic dispositif' (2008, p. 31)—is a metonym which encapsulates the exercise of exclusion (and inclusion) in post-industrial societies through surveillance monitoring and 'bordering practices'.

> This formulation… allows us to understand how a network of heterogeneous and transversal practices functions and makes sense as a form of (in)security at the transnational level. It allows us to analyse the collection of heterogeneous bodies of discourses…, of institutions…, of architectural structures, …of laws…, and of administrative measures…. (Bigo 2008, p. 32)

Thus, the banopticon operates not as some unitary extension of the panopticon on a global scale, but rather as a dispersed and heterogeneous network of inter-agency co-operation and transnational collaboration.

The banopticon yokes together three 'dimensions' of security practices: exceptionalism, exclusion, and normalisation (Bigo 2008, pp. 31–36). As we have noted, shortly after 9/11 the USA and the UK put in place exceptional legal measures through the US PATRIOT Act (2001) and the Prevention of Terrorism Act (2005), which limited the juridical rights of both temporary residents and citizens. Agamben (1998, 2005) has focused upon the exclusively legal implications of this in order to posit an all-encompassing 'state of exception' which unleashes an overwhelming 'sovereign power'. By contrast, Bigo (2008) offers a more nuanced account of exceptionalism in which the extra-judicial measures initiated by the USA and its allies operate within a constitutional context combining liberalism with the 'routinized dispositif of technologies of control and surveillance' (p. 33). On this argument, exceptionalism is not seen as a totalising regime, but rather as a situation where extra-juridical legislation and the invention of novel spaces of detention (paradigmatically, the 'camp' at Guantanamo Bay) simply 'derogate' from a state of affairs that nevertheless maintains within an essentially liberal regime. Thus, for Bigo, the particular modality of exceptionalism that has been brought into play since 9/11 can be designated as 'illiberal practices at the heart of liberalism' (2008, p. 35) or, rather more snappily: the 'illiberal practices of liberal regimes' (2008, p. 2). The second dimension of the banopticon is the identification of categories of individuals who appear to be undesirable and their denial of access to, detention, or expulsion from a particular territory or state. To achieve this, modern computer technologies and biometrics are used to collect, collate and analyse data from a wide range of public, private and police sources in order to construct profiles of potentially risky individuals or groups (Bigo et al. 2007). This entails the normalisation of the behaviour of groups of people though pro-active analysis and prediction (Bigo 2006a, pp. 58–63). Thirdly, this 'criterion' of normalisation arises principally from the 'imperative of free movement' across modern, globalised societies, a phenomenon which is set out is more explicitly within the European Union than North America. For Bigo, this imperative does not arise from a dichotomy between those who are permitted access to mobility and those to whom it is denied; rather it becomes a touchstone for the normalisation of the majority of the population, and a focus on the surveillance of a minority (2008, p. 36).

Most recently, this has led to a conflation of mobility with the idea of freedom in the Eurozone and elsewhere. Ironically, it is no longer those who are detained or who are denied free access to nation states across Europe who are subjected to monitoring and surveillance; rather, the continual desire for mobility, comfort and speed on the part of global elites also leads to travellers being monitored through predictive data analysis and the proliferation of smart technologies at virtual borders (Bigo 2010a, b, pp. 410–413).

Conclusion

The various disciplines that we have drawn on in these initial chapters—philosophy and law, sociology, political science and international relations, as well as our own pursuit of discourse analysis—all engage differently with how words and language make sense of the social and political world. Many of the differences between the universes constructed within these disciplines arise not only from the various ways in which language is interpreted through their diverse disciplinary lenses, but also from the numerous techniques whereby it is possible to marshal 'evidence' for different disciplinary purposes. Thus Agamben's 'legal philosophy' (or philosophy of the law) tends to pursue a methodology which is more inclined towards the postulation of more absolutist, atemporal constructs such as 'bare life' (1998); whereas Bigo's political sociology is inclined towards more synthetic conclusions such as the different trajectories of the 'professionals of (un)ease management' and the 'banopticon' (2008).

In the chapters that follow, we will engage in the scrutiny of contemporary documents which we have harvested from a range of national and international organisations tasked with the maintenance of national and international security. Given that in this enterprise, discourse analysis perhaps has most disciplinary affinity with sociology, on a theoretical level we tend to veer towards Bigo's argument that exceptionalism within late capitalist societies is 'linked with a specific form of governmentality' (2006a, p. 47); and that rather than becoming an absolute state of affairs, the conditions of 'emergency' are by and large moderated by the liberal constitutions that prevail within the North. Furthermore, we share the scepticism of many commentators as to whether the nadir of 'bare life' has ever actually been realised by modern societies (e.g. Bigo et al. 2007, p. 12; Laclau 2007, p. 19). However with Bigo, we remain informed particularly by the way in which Agamben perpetuates the broader implications of bio-power and biopolitics (Agamben 1998; Foucault 1984a, 2004). Therefore, the ideas and theories presented in this chapter have formed a necessary conceptual backdrop to the empirical investigations that follow. In the next four chapters, we interrogate a number of corpora of texts produced by governments, supranational organisations and security agencies in order to explore some of the ways in which language and discourse is deployed to constitute the *praxis* of security in modern societies.

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7

Discourse of Cohesion and Security

The Islamist attacks which took place on the World Trade Centre ('9/11'), the Madrid Cercanías ('11-M'), the London Transport network ('7/7'), and Glasgow Airport, generated a governmental response whose artefacts included the large-scale production of documents relating to security and counter-terrorism across the USA and Europe (see also Chapter 2). In the USA, provisions were initiated through the PATRIOT Act (2001); in the UK, through the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) and the Prevention of Terrorism Act (2005), for the temporary suspension of a range of citizenship rights in certain circumstances (Preston 2009). As we will explore in this chapter, the expansion of governmental rationality through security discourse continued to increase exponentially in the UK through the first two decades of the century, in particular with successive iterations of the national counter-terrorism policies set out in *CONTEST* (HMO 2006, 2009a, 2011a) and *Prevent* (HMO 2003, 2009b, 2009c, 2011b).

Various combinations of critical discourse analysis (CDA) and corpus linguistics (CL) have been used to analyse texts in the public sphere which relate to the discursive practice of modern government (see also

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Chapter 4). However, despite the noteworthy publication of Foucault's final lectures in English (2004, 2007, 2008), empirical investigations of the discourses of the modern state have not yet been widely carried out. In one of the few studies that has engaged with this field, Norman Fairclough described the discourse of the early Blair government (1997–2001) as a form of 'cultural governance' which operated not least through the crucial role that language played in the ever-increasing mediatisation of politics and government in advanced capitalist societies (2000, p. 4). In so doing, he described how the New Labour administration between 1997 and 1999 had already adopted a strategy of 'governing by shaping and changing the cultures of public services, claimants and the socially excluded, and the general population' (2000, p. 61). Closer to the particular concerns of this chapter, four counter-terrorism documents produced by the UK New Labour government between 2005 and 2007 have been examined in order to consider what 'labels' were being used, with what frequency, and how they created 'categories of sameness' leading to alienation (Appleby 2010). In particular, there appeared to be a strong linkage of the label 'terrorist' to Islam, which is discursively polarised against the categories 'British citizen', and 'within the UK'. More paradoxically in the light of the origins of the London attackers, while the label 'extremist' is once again linked to Islam, those labelled as 'extremist' are envisaged as living outside the boundaries of British society rather than within it. Finally, Appleby argues that the documents create a homogenising label for a new, imaginary, social group: 'the Muslim community' (2010, pp. 427–430). The language used more broadly in the post-7/7 'Preventing Violent Extremism' discourse has also been criticised for its avoidance of the term 'multiculturalism' and the singling out and referencing of Muslim groups in a negative light (Thomas 2011).

Against this backdrop, the empirical analyses that we carry out over the next four chapters will start by investigating the documents produced by the UK government between 2001 and 2016, which relate to both the internal and external security of the nation state. In so doing, we will consider how UK security is realised discursively as an exemplar of counter-terrorism discourse within the liberal state in late modernity. The goal of the study presented in this, our first analysis chapter, is to provide a historical overview of changes taking place over this extensive period, exposing wide-ranging historical discourse tendencies by comparing lexical frequency profiles across chronologically organised sub-corpora. In doing so, we seek to provide an overview of chronological continuities and shifts in the discursive preoccupations of UK security documents. As the discussion in Chapter 5 has indicated, the study presented in this chapter is the most machine-based, quantitative and data-driven of those reported in this volume. The method used here is arguably less sophisticated, in terms of its integration of machine and manual procedures, than those applied to later analyses, in particular those carried out in Chapters 8 and 10. It is however well addressed towards the purpose of this initial investigation, which aims to scope the discourse of the period, identifying topics and preoccupations that are amenable to exposure through machine-based, lexical frequency analysis.

UK Security Corpora

In order to investigate the changes that took place in the security discourse produced by successive UK administrations, we assembled a corpus of policy documents produced by government departments between 2001 and 2016 (see also Chapter 2). To do this, we searched the websites of the UK government departments principally associated with security and counter-terrorism, using the query: ‘citizenship OR security OR terrorism OR radicalisation/radicalization’. These initially included the Cabinet Office, the Home Office, the Department of Education, the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), and the Department for Innovation, Universities, and Skills. These were then augmented in the earlier period (2001–2011) from the Institute for Community Cohesion (iCoCo) website (iCoCo 2011), and other relevant organisations, such as the Local Government

Association (LGA). For the later period (2012–2016) we also accessed National Security Secretariat and the National Counter Terrorism Security Office.

The total number of documents collected over the period 2001–2016 was divided for comparison into three sub-corpora to enable us to identify the changes that took place in the language and discourse used by successive UK administrations in the realisation of government policies relating to security and counter-terrorism. Demarcation of the three time periods was undertaken by making reference to particular historical 'pivots' that we described in Chapter 2. The pivot between our first and second sub-corpora was the 7/7 attacks on the London Transport system, which took place in June 2005; the pivot between our second and third sub-corpora was the beginning of the Syrian Civil War, which started in the summer of 2011. Preliminary readings of documents suggested that it takes up to a year for the impact of a particular historical event to become absorbed into government policy documents. The total number of documents collected over the period 2001–2016 was 343; the number of words in the entire corpus amounted to around 4.25 million (4,247,792). We go on to describe the three chronological sub-corpora.

Sub-corpus I is constructed from documents produced during the second and third terms of the UK New Labour Government (2001–2006). It starts in the aftermath of the 2001 UK riots and includes the period of the attacks on the London transport system (7 July 2005). After subsequent revisions, deletions and additions aimed at diversifying its representation, the sub-corpus relating to this period currently comprises 44 documents, amounting to almost 1 million words (918,451).

Sub-corpus II combines the later years of the UK New Labour Government (2007–2010) under the premiership of Gordon Brown with a small number of documents from the early years of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition (2010–2011), in which a policy of 'deradicalization' in schools, FE colleges and universities was implemented in the wake of 7/7; and the early years of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition (2010–2011), most recently featuring the third revision of the CONTEST and Prevent strategies in June 2011. Preliminary readings of documents confirmed that the policy impact from the 7/7 attack took at least one year to filter through to official documentation. Broadly speaking therefore, this sub-corpus reflects the thinking which informed UK government policy relating to internal security and counter-terrorism in the wake of the 2005 attacks on the London transport system up to the watershed speech made by David Cameron as Prime Minister in February 2011, on the 'Death of Multiculturalism' (Cameron 2011). It also anticipates themes which inform the security operation surrounding the 2012 London Olympics which we examine in Chapter 8. After subsequent revisions and deletions, the sub-corpus relating to this period currently comprises 110 documents, amounting to around two million words (2,097,208).

Sub-corpus III is assembled from documents produced by the UK government between 1 January 2012 and 31 December 2016. This embraces the main period of the UK Conservative–Liberal Democrat Coalition government (2010–2015), followed by the short exclusive premiership of David Cameron (2015–2016). During this period, there was a switch in the focus of policy concern from the international threat posed by disaffected UK citizens belonging to minority groups to, not only UK citizens, but also international members of terrorist groups operating internationally. In particular, The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as 'ISIS', 'Daesh' or 'Islamic State group') occupied large swathes of territory across the Syria-Iraq border between 2011 and 2012. After subsequent revisions and deletions, the sub-corpus relating to this period currently comprises 189 documents, amounting to more than one million words (1,232,133).

In order to analyse the ways in which the language and discourse of UK security and counter-terrorism change over time, we analyse these three sub-corpora as two sequential pairs. In the first analysis, we use Sub-corpus II as the test corpus and Sub-corpus I as the reference corpus; in the second analysis, we use Sub-corpus III as the test corpus and Sub-corpus II as the reference corpus. A detailed description of the techniques used to analyse our corpus data has been set out in Chapter 5.

From 'Community Cohesion' to 'Preventing Violent Extremism': Sub-corpus II vs. Sub-corpus I

In the first period which we explore in this chapter (2001–2011), we analyse a corpus of documents relating to security and counter-terrorism produced during the second and third terms of the UK New Labour administration (2001–2011) and the early years of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government (2010–2011). We go on to compare Sub-corpus II (comprised of documents produced between 2001 and 2006) with Sub-corpus I (comprised of documents produced between 2001 and 2006). Given the choice of dates selected and their cut-off point, the effect of comparing Sub-corpus II with its chronological predecessor is to expose tendencies in policy language that shift in the wake of the 2007 attacks (described in Chapter 2). A comparative keyword list was assembled after which it was possible to usefully explore potential groupings of keywords under the three-fold framework of governmentality (Foucault 2007, 2008; see Chapter 6). In the event, the theme of *regulation* emerged from the overarching grouping of keywords in Sub-corpus II; although some vestiges of the theme of *population* remain from the 2011–2006 policy period (see also MacDonald et al. 2013). Further alternate comparison between the keywords in Sub-corpus II and Sub-corpus I also revealed how some of the most prominent lexis relating to *population*, paradigmatically the combination 'community cohesion', become repositioned and transformed in the transition from one chronological period to the next, not least as the concept of 'cohesion' became 'securitised' in the wake of the 7/7 attacks.

Regulation

Keywords which were generated from a comparison of Sub-corpus II with Sub-corpus I were categorised thematically, and confirmed after concordance checking to reveal a grouping of the strongest keywords in the first sub-corpus around the theme of *regulation*. This preoccupation with language relating to the theme of *regulation* is unsurprising given that they were produced by UK government in the wake of the 2007 attacks on the London Transport system. The strongest keywords in Sub-corpus II (2007–2011) which emerge to realise the theme of regulation include: *prevent*, *violent, terrorism, extremism*, *security, contest, radicalisation* and *terrorist*.

In the discursive response to the 7/7 attacks, the keywords *prevent* and *contest* become recontextualised from common parlance to function as proper nouns in the titles for the different iterations over this period of two flagship policy documents drawn up by the UK Home Office. 'CONTEST' (2006, 2009a, 2011a) is the superordinate document setting out government policy, in particular its four 'strands'—Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare. Thus, 'Prevent' (2003, 2009b, 2009c, 2011b) is the subordinate strand of 'Contest' whose specific purpose is to set out government policy for agencies, community groups and the public to put into action. The second iteration of *CONTEST*, hugely expanded from the 2006 version, operated as a superordinate policy document which informed many of the other documents in the sub-corpus. In *CONTEST*, and echoed elsewhere across the sub-corpus, the four 'workstreams' of the UK's counter-terrorism strategy are set out repeatedly as a kind of litany. Here we can see an example of ways in which the keywords *prevent*, *violent*, *terrorist* and *extremism* are regularly combined across the sub-corpus.

Delivery of the strategy continues to be organised around four principal workstreams:

- *Pursue*: to stop terrorist attacks
- *Prevent*: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism
- *Protect*: to strengthen our protection against terrorist attack
- *Prepare*: where an attack cannot be stopped, to mitigate its impact (HMO 2011a, p. 6; see also HMO 2009a, pp. 11, 53, 55).

Of these keywords *prevent* emerges as the top ranked keyword in Sub-corpus II, occurring 4382 times. As such, it becomes emblematic of its overarching principle: to deter further attacks upon the UK populace and infrastructure by disaffected cells incubating within any particular minority grouping of the population. When it functions as a verb, the most frequently occurring object of *prevent* is 'violent extremism', with 'extremism' also featuring as its top collocate, e.g.:

> Experience has shown that violent extremism can emerge from even the most cohesive communities, but that extremist messages are less likely to find support in this environment. So work to build cohesion can help prevent violent extremism but will not be enough on its own. (DCLG 2008, p. 11)

In this extract, and regularly throughout the sub-corpus, 'prevent' and 'violent extremism' are used in combination to emphasise that the 'cohesion' of the population is insufficient in itself to deter the incubation of terrorism, rather the population needs an intensified regulatory regime in order to achieve the objectives of government. Likewise, in another repeated phrase, the association of 'prevent' and 'violent extremism' is associated with a particular fraction of the population:

> The delivery of the Prevent agenda takes place through … the government's plans to engage with Muslim communities to prevent violent extremism … (Change Institute 2008, p. 95)

Across the sub-corpus, *prevent* co-occurs frequently as a proper noun in noun phrases, with its top collocates frequently appearing immediately to the right of the noun (R1), e.g.: 'agenda' (as above), 'strategy', 'programme', and 'work'. While the first three collocates have rather abstract, technocratic connotations—the wholesome notion of 'prevent work' operates to bestow positive semantic prosody upon the government strategy, e.g.

> Evaluating your local PREVENT work is an extremely challenging process: it may take a significant time for outcomes and impacts to emerge, and building trust with communities can be a fragile process. (DCLG 2009, p. 22)

Here 'prevent work' is constituted in this document as an almost ethical commitment which requires lengthy periods of 'evaluation' and reflection in a manner suggestive of a contemporary version of the 'pastorate' (Foucault 2007).

Violent and *extremism* also appear as strong keywords relating to regulation occurring 2618 and 2735 times respectively; and, taken together, emerge as the defining theme of our second sub-corpus as a whole. The insistent recurrence of the phrase 'violent extremism' through the entire sub-corpus is set out explicitly in the five 'strands' of the objectives of the *Prevent Strategy* (HMO 2009b; see also HMO 2009c, p. 6; 2011b):

- challenging the violent extremist ideology and supporting mainstream voices;
- disrupting those who promote violent extremism and supporting the institutions where they may be active;
- supporting individuals who are being targeted and recruited to the cause of violent extremism;
- increasing the resilience of communities to violent extremism; and addressing the grievances that ideologues are exploiting.

Also, under the header *Understanding the challenge and its context,* the 2009 iteration of *Prevent* (indicatively subtitled 'Stopping people becoming or supporting terrorists and violent extremists') sets out explicitly two 'aspects' of a framework for regulating the population by maintaining a complex framework for surveillance:

> The threat of individuals and communities in the local area becoming involved in, or supporting, violent extremism should be assessed and regularly reviewed using information from the community, local partners such as the police, and other sources… A deeper understanding of local communities should be developed to help inform and focus the programme of action… (HMO 2009a, p. 12)

Here, as elsewhere in Sub-corpus II, the usage of the two terms 'violent' and 'extremism' appears to be intertwined. As in the examples above, these often occur together as collocates, in a mutually defining semantic relationship. The top collocate of *extremism* is 'violent' (occurring 1836 times), positioned almost always contiguously in the phrase 'violent extremism'. However, the discursive construction of '(violent) extremism' appears to position the source of potential resistance to the 'extremism', and by implication the phenomenon itself, as situated within the population. One example of this can be found in the strategy document published by the New Local Government Network (NGLN) entitled *Stronger together: Prevent agenda and community cohesion*:

> The purpose of Prevent is to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism. It began with a £6 million Pathfinder Fund in October 2006, funded by Communities and Local Government (CLG), to support priority local authorities in developing programmes of activity to tackle violent extremism at the local level. It was, largely, welcomed by the local government community at the time, as recognition by central government of the importance of a community- based response to violent extremism and an understanding that an isolated security stance was insufficient (Turley 2009, p. 5).

Top collocates associated with the phrase 'violent extremism' which are distinctive to Sub-corpus II include terms such as 'preventing', 'communities', 'prevent', 'resilience' and 'people', which—as the above example suggests—occur most frequently preceding the phrase. The collocate 'local' can also be positioned both before and after the phrase. These repeated patterns suggest that 'extremism' is constituted within these documents as a phenomenon which incubates within the population; and indeed it is the population which needs to be regulated by government through the articulation of these security strategies in order that 'society must be defended' (after Foucault 2004). As exemplified above, the phrase 'increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism' recurs as a formulaic pattern which yokes together these terms.

Although the abstract term *extremism* is the form which occurs by far and away most frequently across Sub-corpus II, other words generated from the lemma 'extreme-' are also key across these documents, in particular *extremist* and *extremists* (occurring 656 and 342 times respectively). The usage of both these terms is distinctive within this discursive formation, in particular the continued co-occurrence of both words with the term 'violent' to convey a heightened form of negative prosody. Almost half the occurrences of the plural noun *extremists* are also premodified by 'violent' in the L1 position. However, the singular form 'extremist' never occurs in this sub-corpus as the noun. Rather it occurs in its adjectival form as a negative premodifier: either of groups of subjects, for example in the phrases 'extremist groups' and 'extremist organisations'; or sets of beliefs, for example in the phrases 'extremist ideology' and 'extremist ideologies'. For example:

> …they were more likely to be around increasing the resilience of communities to violent extremism and challenging violent extremist ideology, and supporting mainstream voices. (Kellard et al. 2008, p. 56)

> - reject violent extremist ideology and actively condemn violent extremism. (DCLG 2007, p. 2)

In these examples, the derogatory usage of this lexis is further intensified by again adding the premodifier 'violent', which within this sub-corpus functions as something of a catch-all pejorative term, as in 'violent extremist ideology', 'violent extremist ideologies', 'violent extremist groups' and 'violent extremist organisations'. As we can see from the extracts above, these phrases are also frequently repeated across the sub-corpus. They often occur as objects of verbs which convey an antagonistic position towards them, here 'challenging', 'reject', and 'condemn'. Another repeated pattern is the regular use of the plural form in post-modifying prepositional phrases to describe some form of communication or activity, e.g.: 'messages of violent extremists', 'activities of violent extremists', 'influence of violent extremists'; also, 'recruited by violent extremists', and 'promoted by violent extremists'. The phrase 'violent extremism' is also deployed purposively across this sub-corpus to distinguish between Islamist groups, who are actually prepared to carry out acts of aggression, against the state; and normative forms of Islam, which might include radical Islamist strands which nevertheless are not perceived as constituting a threat to national security (iCoCo 2011). For example:

> The Government has a 'Prevent' strategy as part of its overall approach to countering terrorism with the aim of preventing people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism. The Prevent strategy has five strands designed to address the factors that research suggests can cause people to become involved in Al-Qaida associated violent extremism. (DCSF 2008, p. 13)

Here, the additional pre-modifying phrase 'Al-Qaida associated' is being used to identify the nature of 'violent extremism' as being atypical, in contradistinction from a hypostatised 'mainstream' Islam. Similar rhetorical strategies are also deployed through Sub-corpus II in order to avoid labelling any one particular ethnic minority group.

In Sub-corpus II, the words *terrorism* and *terrorist* also appear as strong keywords in relation to the theme of regulation, occurring 2810 and 1349 times respectively. The top collocate of *terrorism* is, perhaps unsurprisingly, 'counter', with the compound noun 'counter(-)terrorism' occurring regularly in both its hyphenated and unhyphenated forms, e.g.:

> … effective propagandists against Al Qaeda may often be subject to critique from the press and from government sources as well as being potential targets of 'counter terrorism activity' from other policing colleagues; … (Hammonds 2008, p. 103)

> … enhance our strategic counter-terrorism relationships, including by sharing access to key capabilities to enable better border security, transport security, further improving watch list data sharing for aviation security. (Cameron and Clegg 2010, p. 61)

A concordance analysis focusing on words found in the 'R1' position (first single word to the right) of 'terrorist' brings us as close as we get to being able to identify the origins of the terrorist activities to which they refer. As well as the regular occurrence of the vaguer 'international terrorism', we also find the more specific descriptions repeated which ascribe terrorism to three broad fronts: first, 'Al-Qaeda inspired terrorism', 'Islamist terrorism', 'Jihadist terrorism' 'Islamic terrorism'; second, 'Northern-Ireland-related terrorism', 'Irish–related terrorism'; and third, 'extreme right-wing terrorism'. It is intriguing, given the events of recent history that Northern Ireland is mentioned more or less as frequently as Islamist groups as a potential source of terrorism; however, this may concur with the regularly stated policy of creating a balanced account of different ethnic and social groups within the UK. An R1 concord analysis of *terrorist* also reveals that it occurs most frequently as an adjective, again with two main usages: in combinations which indicate either, like 'extremist' above, collectivities—such as 'terrorist group(s)' and 'terrorist organisation(s)'; or some form of aggressive act—such as 'terrorist attack(s)' and 'terrorist threat(s)'. Thus, *terrorism* and *extremism* also occur in a mutually defining semantic relationship. 'Terrorism' is also a top collocate of *extremism*, but they often occur together in order to problematise the relationship between the two concepts, e.g.:

> The relationship between terrorism and extremism is therefore complicated and directly relevant to the aim and objectives of Prevent. It will not always be possible or desirable to draw clear lines between policies in each of these areas. But the lines can be clearer than they have been hitherto. That will also bring greater clarity to the Prevent strategy. (HMO 2011b, p. 25)

If the linguistic and discursive environment of 'extremism' throughout Sub-corpus II is used to position potential adversaries as being 'in the community' and internal to the nation state, the linguistic and discursive environment of 'terrorism' in Sub-corpus II positions potential adversaries as being 'international' and exterior to the nation state.

The final keyword relating to the theme of regulation which we explore this sub-section is *security*. A concord analysis indicates that by far and away the top lexical collocate of *security* is 'national', occurring almost always in the R1 position, with the cluster 'the national security' occurring 173 times. However, 'national security' is rarely positioned in the sub-corpus as the focus of some sort of 'threat' or 'risk', as one might expect. Although it does occur as such in the most recent iteration of *Prevent*:

> In line with CONTEST, the previous Prevent strategy focused on the most significant risks to national security, namely the threat from

> terrorism associated with and influenced by Al Qa'ida. (Home Office 2011b, p. 25)

This late articulation seems to be steering the focus of security policy away from internal ethnic minority groups to those with external origins, in particular those 'associated with…Al Qai'da'. Rather, a further cluster analysis suggests that the strength of this keyword emerges largely from its incorporation into three different categories of names: of *policies*, such as the 'National Security Strategy', and the 'Strategic Defence and Security Review'; of *agencies*, especially the 'security and intelligence agencies'; and of *committees*, especially the 'National Security Council'.

Population

The theme of *regulation* therefore emerges as the defining theme of the 2007–2011 sub-corpus, indicating a definite discontinuity between the language and discourse of that and Sub-corpus I. We suggest this is related to the historical positioning of both sub-corpora before and after the 7/7 attacks on the London Transport system. However, there is another discernible group of keywords in Sub-corpus II which—after due confirmation from concordance checking—was categorised around a second governmental theme of *population*. When compared with Sub-corpus I, the strongest keywords in Sub-corpus II (2007–2011) grouped around the theme of population include: *cohesion, interaction, Muslim, interactions, Muslims, affiliation* and *integration*. In this, the theme of *population* revealed both continuities and discontinuities between the two sub-corpora.

Both *Muslim* and *Muslims* emerged as strong keywords in Sub-corpus II, as one of the distinctive features of the lexis of the 2007–2011 period. Indicative of our thematic grouping of this designation under *population* that the top collocates of *Muslim* are 'communities' and 'community'. The recurring phrase 'Muslim community(ies)' is often premodified by the adjective 'British', as is the keyword *Muslims*. The continual foregrounding of Muslim communities, however positive, can be interpreted as implying that this social group is in some way separate from the mainstream UK population. A concern regarding the stigmatisation of the 'Muslim population', expressed throughout our corpus, is summed up forcefully in the document *Preventing Violent Extremism, Sixth Report of Session 2009–10*:

> The single focus on Muslims in Prevent has been unhelpful. We conclude that any programme which focuses solely on one section of a community is stigmatising, potentially alienating, and fails to address the fact that that no section of a population exists in isolation from others. (DCLG 2010a, p. 3)

Although positioning itself contra *Prevent*, the strength of problematisation realised in this government report only serves to reinforce the Foucauldian thesis with respect to the concern of the modern state with the integrity of its population.

Cohesion also emerges as the other strongest keyword relating to the theme of *population*, occurring with high frequency across the second sub-corpus (9668 times in all). Top collocates of *cohesion* include 'community', 'local', 'promote', 'promoting', and 'building'. Once again, we often find these words assembled in something of a circular litany, e.g.:

> Building community cohesion is about building better relationships between people from different backgrounds including those from new and settled communities. Experience has shown that violent extremism can emerge from even the most cohesive communities, but that extremist messages are less likely to find support in this environment. So work to build cohesion can help prevent violent extremism but will not be enough on its own. (DCLG 2010b, p. 9)

This association of affirmative verbs such as 'promote', 'promoting' and 'building' conveys the word *cohesion* with positive semantic prosody, with the root 'build-' and its derivatives, e.g. 'building', also frequently positioned immediately to the left of the keyword. Two other top collocates of *cohesion* are 'integration' and 'migration', with the phrases 'integration and cohesion' and 'cohesion and migration' occurring frequently throughout the corpus. These combinations highlight the fact that 'building community cohesion' chiefly concerns the flow and absorption of new populations into particular milieu within the nation state. Indeed, the proximal co-occurrence of these referents suggests that 'cohesion' may well be being used as a euphemism for 'integration'. However, the nub of the argument across this corpus is that 'cohesion' is coterminous with security, e.g.:

> It is right that local authorities are at the heart of building safe, secure and cohesive communities'. (Turley 2009, p. 5)

As our examination of the language and discourse in our second sub-corpus suggests, this state of affairs cannot be arrived at without the intervention of government in the everyday life of the population, not least at a local level.

The salience of *cohesion* within Sub-corpus II, however, also reveals a certain point of continuity with our first sub-corpus. 'Community' occurs as the top collocate of *cohesion* in the second sub-corpus and, although not a keyword, it does occur with a massive frequency across the sub-corpus (13,057 times). *Community* also occurs with a high frequency in Sub-corpus I (6148 times), but here—when compared alternately with Sub-corpus II—it does emerge as a keyword. The three top collocates of *community* in the first period (2001–2006) include: 'cohesion', 'local', and 'voluntary'. *Community* also occurs regularly in combination with 'cohesion' both as a proper noun designating a particular government policy, and as a more general noun phrase, e.g.:

> Active citizenship … also relates to how people can promote community cohesion and social solidarity, thereby strengthening civil society as well as empowering individual citizens. (DCLG 2006, p. 12)

This example, from Sub-corpus I, establishes the link between 'community cohesion' and the term 'active citizenship', to emphasise the social contribution of 'cohesion' and to suggest not only that it strengthens 'civil society' but also that it can be used for 'empowering... citizens'. This (re)construction of 'community' takes place 'at a local level', where the term 'local' combines the idea of strategic efficiency with the positive values of unity and activism which are conveyed by 'engagement' e.g.:

> Authorities can collaborate with other organisations at the local level to enhance community engagement in a number of ways:… (Aspden and Birch 2005, p. 6)

The third of these collocates, 'voluntary', is typically found in the first corpus in the combination 'voluntary and community sector' to signify non-centralised government activity, e.g.:

> It is recommended that a series of hubs are supported by the Home Office Civil Renewal Unit and that these link into a consultative learning process building sustainable activity across the voluntary and community sector. (Woodward 2004, p. 6)

This example draws on the connotations carried by the adjective 'voluntary' relating to the idea of service (c.p. Williams 1976: 75–76) in order to enhance the positive prosody accorded to the 'community sector', which would otherwise appear a rather thinner, less inclusive term. This analysis suggests that, while the phrase 'community cohesion' is common to both sub-corpora, it becomes repositioned, and its meaning transformed, in the wake of the 7/7 attacks. Before the 7/7 attacks and in the wake of the 2001 riots 'community cohesion' is associated with voluntarism and 'active citizenship', as an almost ethical commitment to the vigour of the population; while after the 7/7 attacks the combination 'community cohesion' becomes recontextualised as a tactic of security oriented towards the eradication of 'violent extremism' within the population (c.p. Thomas 2011).

However, comparing Sub-corpus II to Sub-corpus I also reveals some prominent lexical items which are used relatively uniquely to constitute the unity of the population within the state, in keeping with the period subsequent to the 7/7 attacks. These include the keywords *interaction(s), affiliation* and *integration*. However, qualitative engagement with the texts suggests not only that these terms are interlinked, but also that they are used throughout the second sub-corpus to constitute various characteristics of ‘community cohesion’. While *integration* occurs in over half the texts in the sub-corpus, its top collocates ‘cohesion’ and ‘commission’ occur most frequently in the recurring phrase ‘Commission for Integration and Cohesion’. Both ‘cohesion’ and ‘community’ also emerge as top collocates of the keyword *interaction*, along with ‘meaningful’, ‘people’, ‘positive’, ‘groups’, ‘different’ and ‘enable’. These terms also often co-occur with a certain density within documents, for example, in this exhortation:

> Cohesion is what must happen in all communities to enable different groups of people to get on well together. Key contributors to cohesion are integration and meaningful interaction, which must happen to enable new and existing communities to adjust to one another. (Specialist Cohesion Team 2009, p. 7)

The proactive connotations of ‘enable’ suggest that the notion of *interaction* between ‘different communities’ to some extent supersedes the more monocultural voluntarism implied by the ‘active citizenship’ of Sub-corpus I. The repetition of the forceful modal auxiliary ‘must’ in this document leaves no doubt as to the obligation upon the subject of the state to engage with fellow subjects in constituting the ‘imagined community’ (after Anderson 1983/2006), irrespective of ethnicity or religious association. In this respect, by far and away the most frequently occurring collocate of *affiliation* is ‘religious’, with this combination occurring 279 times within just one survey document, *Attitudes, values and Perceptions. Muslims and the General Population in 2007–08* (Connolly 2010).

From ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ to the Modern Carceral: Sub-corpus III vs. Sub-corpus II

In this second analysis that we carry out to yield insight into chronological change that took place in the language and discourse of UK government policy documents between 2001 and 2016, we compare Sub-corpus III (comprised of documents produced between 2012 and 2016) with the previous sub-corpus (Sub-corpus II, comprised of documents produced between 2007 and 2011). This third period includes: the third term of the New Labour administration; the period of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition under the premiership of David Cameron; and the early years of the Conservative Administration, subsequently under the premiership of Theresa May. If the historical 'pivot' for our first paired sub-corpora of UK security documents (2001–2011) was the internally facing 7/7 attack on the London Transport system, the pivot for our second pair of sub-corpora (2007–2016) was the more externally facing civil uprising in Syria, and the entrenchment of ISIS in large swathes of territory across the Syria-Iraq border. As popular protests in Syria escalated into full scale civil war in 2011 and ISIS consolidated its hold on large swathes of territory across the Syria-Iraq border the following year, significant numbers of citizens from European countries—including the UK—travelled to Syria to join the ranks of Islamic State. 'Foreign' members of this group were widely perceived as presenting a threat to the internal security of European states, particularly when they returned to their home countries (see Chapter 2).

As before, a comparative keyword list was assembled and then grouped in relation to the threefold framework of governmentality (Foucault 2007, 2008). If the supercession of the security discourse of Sub-corpus II (2007–2012) from that of Sub-corpus I (2001–2006) entailed the foregrounding of the governmental theme of *regulation* over that of *population*, the supercession of the security discourse of Sub-corpus III (2012–2016) from that of Sub-corpus II (2007–2011) entailed an even greater intensification of the theme of *regulation*. In fact somewhat surprisingly, by far and away the largest proportion of the strongest keywords in Sub-corpus III appeared to signify some form of regulatory practice. These was also a perceptible move away from the residual markers of *population* carried over from Sub-corpus I, which we touched upon in the previous section. In what follows, we combine a comparative keywords analysis with the examination of concordance data and samples of text extracted from the sub-corpus in order to uncover some of the subtle modulations that took place within this broad thematic shift. Of the many categories relating to *regulation* that emerged from our analysis of Sub-corpus III, four emerged as particularly relevant to the argument of this book: first, the relationship between regulation and the economy; second, the relationship between regulation and 'exceptionalism'; third, the relationship between regulation and 'bordering practices' and fourth, the predominance of the theme of detention and incarceration within this sub-corpus. These four categories all seemed to intensify the discursive constitution of regulation over the population within the documents produced by the UK government during this period of analysis.

First of all, *security* emerges as the by far and away strongest keyword in Sub-corpus III (2012–2016) when compared with Sub-corpus II (2007–2011). This marks a degree of continuity from Sub-corpus II; however, the term is far more salient in this later collection of documents, occurring 5775 times across 143 texts. The top collocate of *security*, 'national'—occurring in the repeated phrase 'national security'—unequivocally links the term with the integrity of the state–frequently accompanied by 'UK', as in the phrase 'UK's national security'. However, a closer qualitative reading of documentary evidence reveals that the frequent, and widely dispersed, occurrence of *security* across Sub-corpus III appears to be constitutive of a rationality that is not just economic, but explicitly realises the principles of a neoliberal economy (Jessop 2002; Block et al. 2012). This would be commensurate with the change in the UK administration from a centre-left Labour government to a centre-right Conservative government that took place in 2011. The very beginning of the first chapter of the *National Security Strategy* (2015) sets out in the existential phrasal verb 'goes hand in hand with' the logical relationship between 'economic security' and the security of the state:

> Economic security goes hand in hand with National Security. (Cabinet Office 2015, p. 9)

Here, the metaphorical usage, 'hand in hand', conveys the positive semantic prosody of mutual support and assistance. The document moves on to set out in neatly parallel alliterative constructions three 'national security objectives':

> National Security Objective 1 is to protect our people;
> National Security Objective 2 is to project our global influence;
> National Security Objective 3 is to promote our prosperity. (Cabinet Office 2015, pp. 11–12)

Here, an alliterative coherence yokes together the three verbs ‘protect’, ‘project’ and ‘promote’ which all contain the prefix ‘pro’, suggesting a sense of agency and proactive engagement. However, the three words also begin with the soft bilabial stop ‘p’, conveying a relatively benign and emollient texture in the clauses. These linguistic phenomena not only provide textual cohesion within the document, since they constitute headers of three different sections in the document; but they also reinforce the intractable neoliberal logic, linking population and wealth to the hegemony of the nation state (Foucault 2007, 2008). Other top lexical collocates of *security* relate to its scope or organisational and technical execution, e.g. ‘intelligence’, ‘service’, ‘terrorism’, ‘cyber’, ‘agencies’, ‘strategy’ and ‘defence’.

Secondly, as we will find echoed in the discourse of the 2012 London Olympics (see Chapter 8), greater rhetorical effort appears to be expended in Sub-corpus III in order to construct a rationale for the exceptional nature of the menace to the nation state and provide a logic for the security strategy which is being proposed. Across the third sub-corpus, *terrorism* emerges as one of the strongest keywords, occurring 5319 times, with *terrorist* also being key; *threat* and *threats* together occur a total of 1823 times, with both forms emerging in their own right as keywords. In the example below, from the 2015 UK *National Security Strategy*, considerable rhetorical effort is expended in order to create a *topos* (after Wodak et al. 2009) for the exceptional nature of the security strategy which is implemented nationwide. In this extract, the ‘threat’ is established prominently in the thematic position in the sentence, and the logic of the argument is emphasised by the comparative adjectival phrase ‘all the more important’.

> The significant threat posed by terrorist groups makes it all the more important that we invest to tackle this issue head-on at home and abroad using the full spectrum of our capabilities. (Cabinet Office 2015, p. 15)

The subordinate clause here ('that…') yokes together two metaphorical processes that occur frequently across the Sub-corpus III. The verb 'invest', recurring repeatedly throughout the sub-corpus, functions as a metaphor which is paradigmatic of the neoliberal ethos, inasmuch as it does not just signify economic but also human resources. The metaphor 'tackle' is also a material process which is used frequently across the fifteen-year span of the entire corpus, as a catch-all figurative description of the decisive way in which the security services intend to resolve the issue of terrorism.

The third grouping of keywords relating to regulation which emerged from Sub-corpus III was a distinctive focus upon control of the national borders, or 'bordering practices' (after Vaughan-Williams 2012). This grouping of strong keywords around a heightened concern throughout this period with the integrity of the border is, arguably, related to the exit and return of 'foreign fighters' to and from the Syrian Civil War (see also Chapter 2). For example, the lexical items *powers* and *powers* emerge as key across the entire sub-corpus, occurring 1803 and 1031 times, respectively, to signify the legitimation of the agents of the state agents who monitor both internal security (through the detention of subjects suspected of terrorist activity) and external security (through the monitoring of the national borders). *Retention*, *retained* and *retain* are also salient across the sub-corpus, occurring 524, 264, and 218 times respectively. Here, top collocates of *retention* illustrate its semantic relationship to bordering practices and the associated lexis through which they are constituted, e.g. 'data', 'period', 'notice', 'communications', 'powers', 'documents' and, importantly, 'travel'.

There is a certain 'burstiness' of the top keywords from Sub-corpus III within one Home Office document from our corpus in particular: *Code of Practice for Officers Exercising Functions Under Schedule 1 of the* Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 in Connection with Seizing and Retaining Travel *Documents* (HMO 2015, p. 8). This text sets out the procedures whereby police and border officials can confiscate the passports of subjects if 'the evidential standard of "reasonable suspicion"' is met. The following extract displays a line of argumentation that links the seizure and confiscation of passports to terrorism prevention, while at the same time embedding the process within an ethos of liberalism (e.g. 'fairly').

> The power to seize and retain travel documents can play an important role in the detection and prevention of terrorism, and using the power fairly makes it more effective. (HMO 2015, p. 8)

However the regulation of movement across the borders which is constituted in this sub-corpus is also moderated by the accompanying assertion of the values of liberalism. This is set out in the following extract, where 'fairness' is linked not only to an ethic of liberalism, but also to the neoliberal criterion of effectiveness.

> The power contained in Schedule 1 must be used fairly and proportionately, with respect for the person to whom the power has been applied. The power must be exercised in accordance with the prescribed procedures and without discrimination. A failure to use the power in the proper manner may reduce its effectiveness. (HMO 2015, p. 8)

The ethos of liberalism in relation to authority also emerges from another document in Sub-corpus III, which prescribes the *Code of Practice* for detaining subjects under the 2000 UK Terrorist Act:

> The powers and procedures in this Code must be used fairly, responsibly, with respect for the people to whom they apply and without unlawful discrimination. (HMO 2013, p. 4)

The lexis relating to these aspects of the regulatory practice of security at the borders of the nation state are a distinctive feature of this third sub-corpus, and as such are coterminous with the historical events during which this collection of documents are produced. Not least, it marks a radical re-orientation of the security discourse of the UK government from a concern with the internal 'cohesion' of the population—which we touched upon in our consideration of Sub-corpus I—to a concern with the permeability of its territorial boundaries.

However, fourth and finally, the ‘seizure and retention’ of travel documents at the border inevitably entails some measure of detention. Top keywords which appear indicative of the construction of a ‘modern carceral’, relating to an emerging discourse of detention in Sub-corpus III, were grouped around three constituents: first, subject positions, such as *person, officer(s), persons, secretary, commissioner, officers, detainee, investigatory, solicitor* and *subject*; secondly, authorising documents, such as *TPIM(s), schedule, notice, authorisation, warrant(s)* and *legislation*; and thirdly, actions (realised through both verbs and nominalised forms), such as *search, offence(s), enforcement, retention, interception, arrested, investigation, detained*, *detention, charged* and *designated.* The occurrence of this lexis is particularly rich within an annex to the 2000 Terrorism Act: The Police & Criminal Evidence Act 1984 *Code H Revised Code of Practice in Connection with: The Detention, Treatment and Questioning by Police Officers of Persons in Police Detention under Section 41 of, and Schedule 8 to,* The Terrorism Act 2000 (HMO 2013). This sets out highly specified conditions for the detention of subjects in relation to internal security. What is striking in this document, and elsewhere across Sub-corpus III, is the precision with which the ‘carceral subject’ is constituted, on both sides of the custody officer’s desk, in a manner redolent of *Discipline and* Punish (Foucault 1977). For example in this extract, the nature of a ‘police officer’ and other legal agents (‘designated persons’) is set out with a remarkable degree of specificity:

In this Code:

> (a) ‘designated person‘means a person other than a police officer, designated under the Police Reform Act 2002, Part 4 who has specified powers and duties of police officers conferred or imposed on them;
>
> (b) reference to a police officer includes a designated person acting in the exercise or performance of the powers and duties conferred or imposed on them by their designation. (HMO 2013, p. 7)

In this respect, *designated* emerges as a particularly distinctive keyword in Sub-corpus III, occurring 329 times and distributed across about a quarter of the texts in the sub-corpus. This discursive particularity is developed with even great specificity with respect to the subject who is detained. After a forty-page discursus covering all the minutiae of confinement, such as access to a solicitor, juveniles, non-English speaking detainees, non-British citizens, along with every aspect of the detainee’s welfare including dietary regulations, reading materials, cell lighting cell, bedding, clothing, exercise and religious observance, the precise specifications of the social and institutional relations involved in the interview are set out in the following extract:

> If a police officer wants to interview or conduct enquiries which require the presence of a detainee, the custody officer is responsible for deciding whether to deliver the detainee into the officer‘s custody. An investigating officer who is given custody of a detainee takes over responsibility for the detainee‘s care and treatment for the purposes of this Code until they return the detainee to the custody officer when they must report the manner in which they complied with the Code whilst having custody of the detainee. (HMO 2013, p. 40)

The lexis which is highlighted here, relating to the precisely designated positions adopted by the carceral subject within post-industrial Britain, is distributed prominently throughout Sub-corpus III. Emerging from this extract, one of the most distinctive signifiers for the carceral subject across the corpus is *detainee*, which occurs 350 times across the third sub-corpus. However, as we have seen, there is a range of different subject positions which are also salient relating to the ‘post-industrial carceral’ (Table 7.1).

Table 7.1 Strongest keywords constituting subject positions within the modern carceral

Rank	Keyword	Freq.	Texts
8	Person	2052	92
10	Officer	1534	80
14	Persons	1115	86
30	Secretary	1196	104
37	Commissioner	514	42
48	Police	3126	157
74	Officers	967	85
82	Detainee	350	11
87	Solicitor	235	22



September 2001. Thirty-two per cent of persons arrested for terrorism-related offences
nding 31 December 2011: . There were 167 persons arrested for terrorism-related offences
.... 25 Table 1.07 Categorisation of persons arrested for terrorism and of those cha
elated. Table 1.06 Ethnic appearance1 of persons arrested for terrorism and of those cha
have been convicted… Data on persons arrested for terrorism-related offences
s where age was not known. The number of persons arrested for terrorism-related offences
ing year. 3.10 … Statistics on persons arrested for terrorism-related offences
ints on the previous year. The number of persons arrested for terrorism-related offences
r ending December 2015: • There were 280 persons arrested for terrorism-related offences
.... 14 Figure 3.7: Proportion of persons arrested by terrorism category, year en

Fig. 7.1 Sample concordance data of PERSONS + terrorism (R3)

Here, the highest-ranking keywords, *person* and *persons* remain ‘empty signifiers’ without further pre- or post-modification. Unsurprisingly, the top lexical collocates across the sub-corpus for *person* are ‘detained’ and ‘designated’. However, interestingly the plural form *persons* occurs with different linguistic associations, where the multiplicity of ‘persons’ in this sub-corpus are ‘arrested’ in relation to ‘terrorism’, a word which occurs most frequently in the R3 position ($n = 100$), as illustrated in the following concordance sample (Fig. 7.1).

Unsurprisingly, members of police force are also prominently positioned in their different ranks across these documents (e.g. officer, *commissioner*, *police*, *officers*). As the extract above illustrates, the strongest signifier of a member of the police is *officer*, which in turn is premodified by a range of collocates, e.g. ‘examining’, ‘custody’ and ‘authorising’. In this sub-corpus, *secretary* almost invariably signifies a UK government minister. Top collocates of *secretary* are: ‘state’, mostly occurring in the R2 position, as in ‘secretary of state’; ‘home’, mostly occurring in the L1 position as in ‘Home Secretary’; and also, ‘foreign’, mostly occurring in the L1 position as in ‘Foreign Secretary’. The significance of this lexis is that, emerging across Sub-corpus III, is an exacting discursive prescription of the social distribution and political positioning of different subjects in relation to the procedures for ‘retention’ and ‘detention’ within a twenty-first century carceral regime within the UK. This is accompanied by the corresponding, discursively calibrated, distribution of power from those ministers of state who occupy the very highest echelons of the UK government, to the most disempowered ‘mentally disordered or otherwise mentally vulnerable’ subjects.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have carried out a chronological investigation of a corpus of 343 documents produced by the UK government, and its satellite institutes and departments, in relation to the language and discourse of security and counter-terrorism, which were produced between 2001 and 2016. In order to reveal the chronological shifts which took place in this language and discourse over the fifteen year period 2001 and 2016, documents were grouped into three sub-corpora according to broadly comparable time periods of between four and five years: Sub-corpus I, between 2001 and 2006; Sub-corpus II, between 2007 and 2011; and Sub-corpus III, between 2012 and 2016. Although our survey cannot claim to be entirely comprehensive it does, at the very least, attest to the exponential increase which took place in the amount of documents relating to security and counter-terrorism produced by the UK government over this period: roughly doubling from one period to the next, and then doubling again. Comparative keyword lists were assembled and these generated two superordinate themes, which revealed that, over the fifteen year period, a shift took place between two dimensions relating to Foucault’s threefold conceptualisation of governmentality: *population*, and *regulation* (2007, 2008). Overall, each of the two stages of comparison revealed that there was a gradual intensification of and supercession by lexical items which signified features of *regulation*, gradually eclipsing any lexical items which might signify *population* or *knowledge*.

Based on the observation and analysis of the tactics captured by these labels, our comparison of Sub-corpus II with Sub-corpus I confirms a general trend over the period represented by these documents in that the discourse of ‘citizenship’ and ‘community cohesion’, which was produced in response to the 2001 UK riots (see MacDonald et al. 2013), was appropriated and recontextualised within a discourse of internal security in a response to the 2005 attack on the London Transport system. The salience of lexis relating to this semantic field combines with the prevalence of lexis relating to the theme of *population* across the 2001–2011 period to confirm that the UK government policy indeed appropriates a more liberal, multicultural discourse of community cohesion to serve the purposes of a more 'exceptionalist' strategy, entailing the securitization of *population* (c.p. Thomas 2011). Not least, we argue that the ever more localised nature of this discourse led to the constitution of a *praxis* of security which was increasingly socially dispersed and community-centred in keeping with the principles of governmentality set out in Chapter 5 (after Foucault 2004, 2007, 2008). Furthermore, it revealed a shift from a concern with the coherence of the entire population to a concern with the adherence of individual citizens and communities to certain normative behaviours, especially with those who could be classified as being part of a particular fraction of the population.

Our comparison of Sub-corpus III with Sub-corpus II then revealed an even greater intensification of the regulatory aspect of the language and discourse of the documents that were produced between 2012 and 2016. Our analysis exposed the shift that took place between a discourse of internally-facing security which emerged in response to the 7/7 attacks, as it became superseded by a security discourse which was more externally-facing, under increasingly conservative administrations. In this not only were antagonistic relations constituted between the UK and hypostatised non-state actors such as ISIS, but there was also a supersession of the praxis of security from one which grew out of more 'community' based interventions, such as *Community Cohesion* (2001–2006) and the *Prevent Strategy* (2007–2012), by a complex network of discursively constituted intelligence and security networks whose purpose was to maintain a comprehensive surveillance not only of potential 'terrorists' and 'terrorist cells' within the nation state, but also of non-state actors who were operating beyond the nation state. Thus, the discursive construction of security over the final period became more externally facing. Within this trend, we have been able to identify four modalities of regulatory *praxis* which are constituted by the language and discourse of Sub-corpus III. First, a relationship is constructed between regulation and a 'neoliberal rationality' of security (after Jessop 2002; Block et al. 2012). Second, a relationship is constructed between regulation and the 'exceptional' nature of the hypostatised menace to the nation state—both internally and externally (after Agamben 2005). Third, a relationship is established between regulation and control of the border of the nation state. Fourth and finally, the prominence of the lexis of 'detention' and the figure of the 'detainee' in our third sub-corpus is indicative of the establishment of a post-industrial 'carceral', where the limit point of free movement is confinement, with an uncertain recourse to appeal to the 'normal' juridical conventions of the liberal democracy. The relationship between these temporal shifts and Foucault's (2007, 2008) theory of governmentality is explored in greater detail in the final chapter of this book (Chapter 11).

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8

Discourse of Olympic Security

So far, we have considered security discourse being constitutive of a set of measures directed principally at the cohesion of the nation state and the defence of the state against potential aggressors. These measures are ostensibly initiated by the state and carried out by its agents. However within the current *episteme*, the realisation of security is no longer restricted to a set of strategies, tactics and interventions carried out by state actors (Bigo 2008). Security has become a *praxis* that is also associated with the guarding of politicians and celebrities, the protection of corporate interests at home and abroad, and the maintenance of the integrity of large-scale events in the fields of sport and entertainment. This chapter, therefore, examines the discursive constitution of security not so much within the confines of national boundaries, but more within the 'city' and the 'venue'. One type of event where security has become particularly prominent over the past decades is the sports 'mega-event', comprising large-scale spectacles such as the World Cup and the Winter Olympics, and in particular the Summer Olympics. The Olympic Games possibly represent the pre-eminent international mega-event, which rotates every four years round different major global cities. In this chapter, we will apply the lens of governmentality, (in)security

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and illiberalism to consider the ways in which the security operation surrounding the Olympic Games held in London in 2012 was realised through language and discourse, as a paradigmatic case of the implementation of a clearly delimited security operation by a combination of state and non-state actors. From this, four principal themes emerge, relating to different forms of governmental practice: exceptionalism, exclusion, prediction, and what we call ‘pedagogisation’. Inter alia, we argue that these characteristics of the discourse of the Olympics 2012 suggest that both the City of London and the different venues at which particular events were held are realised discursively as a microcosm of the ‘banopticon’ (after Bigo 2008; see also Chapter 6).

In 2005, twenty hours after the announcement that London had won its bid to host the Olympic Games in 2012, the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, returned home from Singapore to be confronted with an attack on the London Transport System which left fifty-two civilians dead and several hundred injured. This memory alone makes it unsurprising that security became a major preoccupation of those charged with organising the Olympic Games in London. Indeed, in the analysis documents in the previous chapter, OLYMPICS emerged as one of the strongest keywords in the 2012–2016 sub-corpus of documents, when compared with those from 2007–2011. This chapter analyses a corpus of webpages harvested from government departments, games officials and security organisations to explore the ways in which the security operation surrounding the 2012 London Olympics was realised through language and discourse. However, first, it will consider the wider context of the security operations surrounding sports mega-events, in which these Olympic Games took place.

Mega-Event Security

Given their massive scale, by the end of the twentieth century the summer Olympics are often regarded—along with events such as, Winter Olympics, the Football World Cup, the European Football Championships, the Asian Games, the Commonwealth Games, the Pan

American Games, and the Universiade—as sports 'mega-events' (Muller 2015). Mega-events are highly visible, 'deeply symbolic' occasions that take place in large cities which are more often than not national capitals. All these events combine intensive media coverage with astringent security and surveillance strategies (Boyle and Haggerty 2009, p. 257). At the time of writing, London 2012 remains one of the more recent of these sport mega-events, and one of those in which the issue of security gave rise to most controversy. Memories of the attacks by the Black September groups upon Israeli athletes in the 1972 Munich Olympics, the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers, and the 7/7 attack on the London transport system combined to provide a powerful rationale for the major preoccupation in mega-event planning and implementation of security (Coaffee et al. 2011; Giulianotti and Klauser 2011; Tsoukala 2006). For Boyle and Haggerty (2009, p. 259 ff.) the high levels of surveillance rolled out at successive Games, combined with intensive levels of media coverage, seemed to bring together aspects of Debord's 'spectacle' (1967) with Foucault's 'panopticon' (1977): 'spectacle persists… and now operates in concert with discipline and surveillance' (Boyle and Haggerty 2009, p. 259; see also Price 2008, p. 2).

The staging of a large-scale sporting event in any city constitutes an unusual event; and this can be used as justification for the temporary and provisional mounting of extensive surveillance technologies for the duration of the Games. However, it is often the case that these intensified measures then become 're-rationalised' and legitimised in perpetuity as part of the 'legacy' of a particular Games (Coaffee et al. 2011, p. 3314; Boyle and Haggerty 2009, p. 266; Samatas 2011, p. 3350). Similarly, different sports mega-events can be used as the ground for the testing and development of surveillance technologies that are not only handed down from one Games to another, but also deployed subsequently across large swathes of the population (Boyle and Haggerty 2009).

It is this which is characterised as the security 'legacy' of a sport mega-event, particularly in the two Summer Olympics which took place over the decade following 9/11: Athens in 2004, and Beijing in 2008 (Samatas 2011, p. 3350). These both entailed not only the more conventional marshalling of human security mechanisms, but also vast, computerised, electronic surveillance systems. For Athens 2004, 'the Greek government signed 38 security agreements with 23 counties in order to guarantee the secure hosting of the Games' (Migdalovitz 2004; Samatas 2011, p. 3351; Tsoukala 2006, p. 45). This security apparatus included 70,000 security personnel (Samatas 2011; Tsoukala 2006), 35,000 soldiers (Coaffee et al. 2011), AWACS aircraft (Brianas 2004), Patriot ground-to-air missiles, police helicopters, fighter jets, mine-sweepers and a now notorious surveillance airship, or 'blimp' (Coaffee et al. 2011). Athens also purchased the C4I (Command, Control, Communication, Computer and Integration System) provided by the American Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), and its sub-contractor Siemens. It featured between 13,000 and 14,000 surveillance cameras, mobile surveillance vans and chemical detectors (Coaffee et al. 2011; Tsoukala 2006). However, the C4I system failed to work—even long after the games were over (Samatas 2011, p. 3353). In turn, China invited 'experts from 75 countries, including Greece, Canada, USA, Germany, France, UK, Israel, Russia' to work together with them for the 2008 Beijing Olympics (Yu et al. 2009, p. 396). This lead to the design and implementation of the wide-ranging surveillance system 'Golden Shield' (Samatas 2011, p. 3354), featuring 24/7 monitoring of citizens by CCTV cameras, use of radio-frequency identification (*RFID*) technology for ticketing, and second generation national ID cards; phone call monitoring by digital voice recognition technologies; and the 'Great Firewall' system of online censorship and filtering (Klein 2008). More traditional elements of the security apparatus included 150,000 security personnel, a 100,000 strong anti-terrorist force equipped with the latest anti-riot gear, as well as hundreds of thousands of unpaid volunteers who patrolled as guards and operated as community informants (Samatas 2011, p. 3354; Yu et al. 2009, p. 399).

Corpus Construction and Analysis

In order to harvest documentary materials relating to the 2012 London Olympics, we identified eleven institutional sites as being pertinent to the security operation. These were the websites of UK government departments, UK security forces, games officials and private security companies (Table 8.1). The sites were searched between 30 March and 3 April, 2012 for documents yielded by the term 'Olympic security'. Searching continued until hits for candidate documents were exhausted, and the corpus amounted to a near-total population of 176 online documents relating to the search term. The entire corpus was then machine-searched using *Wordsmith Tools Version 5* (Scott 2008) for preliminary statistical data such as keywords, key-keywords and collocations of significant lexical items (see Chapter 5).

The analysis of the corpus took place in three phases as detailed in Chapter 6. Our primary approach was to apply corpus-based, machine-driven tools to identify central topics and ideas. Corpus tools were then applied intensively using a combination of concordance, collocation, and cluster data to reveal cross-corpus variations in linguistic phenomena identified previously in the sample. To supplement this mostly quantitative, machine-driven analysis, we then combined interpretive reading and key-keyword analysis to identify a core sample of 12 texts in which corpus themes were most densely concentrated. Then, these documents were treated and coded for linguistic features and preliminary themes. Words and phrases which were selected for interpretation were also cross-checked via themes suggested by the keyword and key-word distribution data.

Table 8.1 Documents relating to Olympic security (2012)

Accessed	Site	Acronym	Docs
1 April 2012	Metropolitan Police	MET	36
1 April 2012	Home Office	HMO	34
2 April 2012	Private security firm	G4S	25
2 April 2012	UK Border Agency	UKBA	18
1 April 2012	Ministry of Defence	MOD	15
2 April 2012	Bridging the Gap	BTG	13
2 April 2012	Security Industry Association	SIA	11
31 March 2012	London Organising Committee for the Olympic Games	LOCOG	9
1 April 2012	Department for Culture, Media and Sport	DCMS	8
2 April 2012	British Security Industry Association	BSIA	6
1 April 2012	Internal Security Service	MI5	1
Total			**176**

The Discourse of Olympic Security: London 2012

In the following sections, we examine prominent linguistic features through which the security operation surrounding the 2012 Olympic Games was discursively realised. These are mapped on to the three key features of the 'banopticon' which we have set out (after Bigo 2008) towards the end of Chapter 6: exceptionalism, exclusion and prediction. We also uncover one additional emergent category, possibly specific to the security operation of these particular Olympics which we call 'pedagogisation'.

Exceptionalism

A number of linguistic devices were deployed to assert the exceptional nature of the Games and justify the extent and intensity of the accompanying security operation. Our examples are gleaned from a qualitative reading of the texts which we identified as core within our sample harvested from the security organisations' websites. In the following examples, superlative and limit adjectives are repeatedly used to refer to the Games, in order to communicate a sense of their size and 'scale'.

> The London 2012 Olympic Games and Paralympic Games will be the largest sporting event in UK history…It will involve the biggest peacetime security operation ever undertaken in the UK. (HMO 2011a, p. 5)
>
> The Government has made safety and security at the Games a top priority to ensure that everyone can enjoy the celebrations peacefully. This is important, as the sheer scale of London 2012 will place many demands on policing, the emergency services and security. (HMO 2011a, p. 5)

Across the corpus, 'biggest', 'greatest' and 'largest' are regularly deployed for a similar hyperbolic purpose, e.g.:

> I am proud to be leading what will be the Police Service's biggest ever peacetime safety and security operation. (MOD 2011)

> The Government is completely behind the London 2012 ticketing strategy, which will give spectators from all walks of life the chance to see the greatest sporting event in the world. (DCMS 2010, p. 3)

Another recurrent theme realised through such language associated with the scale of the Games, is the impact they will have on different security sectors.

> The Olympics are the biggest peacetime operation that the Police Service will have had to undertake and it has to be expected that there will be an impact on policing during 2012. (LOCOG 2012)
>
> This unprecedented call on private security across the UK could affect your business or organization. (SIA 2012a, p. 1)

There are also a number of references to the simultaneity of the Games with other sizeable British events. These suggest that arrangements for the Olympics form only one part of a larger, contiguous security enterprise:

> In addition, World Pride, the Notting Hill Carnival and the Queen's Diamond Jubilee celebrations are due to take place across the same time period. (London Assembly Health and Public Services Committee 2010, p. 7)
>
> Also taking place in 2012 are regular events such as Wimbledon and the Notting Hill Carnival, as well as the celebrations for Her Majesty the Queen's Diamond Jubilee. (HMO 2011a, p. 1)

This phenomenon occurs particularly densely in the core texts, but can also be identified across the whole corpus. In the following, non-core text, the sense of scale and simultaneity are combined.

> This summer will see London host the largest sporting events in the world, the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games…More than 70% of the Games will take place in London, alongside regular events such as Wimbledon, the Notting Hill Carnival and celebrations to mark Her Majesty the Queen's Diamond Jubilee. (MET 2012)

These linguistic features realise three different sets of exceptional circumstances surrounding the Games, and provide grounds for the mounting of a correspondingly extensive security operation.

One phrase in particular is used emblematically (occurring 132 times in just 12 texts) to constitute the over-arching goal of this endeavour, e.g.:

> The Government has made safety and security at the Games a top priority to ensure that everyone can enjoy the celebrations peacefully. (HMO 2011a, p. 5)
>
> We are creating a sporting environment that has safety and security built in, leaving a groundbreaking legacy that will last beyond the Games. (HMO 2011a, p. 10)

These extracts from core texts exemplify the way in which the phrase ‘safety and security’ becomes reified as a formula which occurs 254 times across the whole corpus. While the individual nouns, *security* and *safety*, are high ranked keywords which occur frequently across the corpus (1908 and 397 times respectively), the entire phrase ‘safety and security’ is also remarkably salient in statistical terms (LL = 2871). Lexical collocates of the combined phrase are: ‘strategy’, ‘programme’, ‘delivery’, ‘operation’, ‘plans’, ‘operations’, ’assessment’, ‘disrupt’, and ‘ensure’. Investigating these, further evidence of the nominalisation and reification of these concepts appear, e.g.:

> Assurance of Games-wide readiness: is the delivery of Games safety and security compatible with the broader Games operation. (HMO 2011b, p. 22)
>
> The Centre will support Police and other Services officers delivering safety and security operations to the Olympic Park. (HMO 2010, p. 7)

Here ‘safety and security’ is again formulated linguistically as a pre-established notion no longer amenable to scrutiny or justification.

The dual adjectival phrase ‘safe and secure’ is also used within the corpus, frequently premodifying ‘Games’, and now presented as being coterminous with the Olympic ethos. In this example, the two properties are accorded a positive evaluation in the form of a mission statement from a core text:

> To deliver a safe and secure Games, in keeping with the Olympic culture and spirit. In the context of this Strategy, safe means the protection of people and property from hazards caused by non-malicious incidents. Secure means the protection of people and property from threats, caused by incidents and attacks of a malicious nature. (HMO 2011b, p. 7)

The positive semantic prosody of the expression can be perceived most easily by investigating its adjectival counterpart. The adjectival forms *secure* and *safe* also emerge within the top 100 keywords, with the combination 'safe and secure' occurring 110 times across 51 texts. A concord analysis reveals that the most frequently occurring verbal collocates of the combined phrase are 'ensuring', 'planning', 'ensure', 'disrupt' and 'delivering'. The strong positive semantic prosody lent by these verbs can be seen in the following:

> Our experiences show that access to the 'window of world intelligence' is vital to ensure a safe and secure Games. (London 2012, 2012)

Looking outside the corpus, the positive prosody of 'safe and secure' is exposed by its collocation (British National Corpus 2007) with top ten items such as 'feel', 'children' and 'home'.

Exclusion

Through the Schengen Agreement, 26 countries in Europe have agreed to allow free movement across their borders. However, some agencies and technologies restrict free movement and operate 'exclusion zones' even within the Schengen Zone (Bigo 2008). Examples of these include the large numbers of interviewing rooms used for detention of criminals, refugees and asylum seekers at airports, as well as more extreme cases such as the concealment of detainees in police kennels near Charles De Gaulle airport (ibid., p. 37). Despite the relaxation of passport controls, Bigo goes on to suggest that the EU borders are still being policed, but now clandestinely by ever more dispersed, and heterogeneous, agencies. These include not just national and local police forces but also the military, border agencies, private security firms and airline companies. However, despite the relocation and dispersal of 'bordering practices' away from the physical perimeter of the national state, the principle of exclusion still maintains—even across the ostensibly borderless perimeters of nation states within the European Union. In the analysis which follows, we suggest that the principle of exclusion can also operate even *within* a European state such as the UK through the linguistic and discursive realisation of rules and regulation relating to the freedom of movement of those subjects who travel to, work at, and participate in sports mega-events such as the 2012 Olympic Games.

At the time of the London Olympics, the fact that the UK had never signed up to the Schengen Agreement, and retained passport controls at its national borders, had implications for those who travelled to the sporting events which took place within its shores. Within our core documents, we find public assertions by the UK Border Agency (UKBA) of an intensified regulation of access through controls on UK national boundaries during the period of the Olympic Games, e.g.:

> When you arrive at the UK border, *you* will need to show the following items to a UK Border Agency officer: A valid travel document (for example your passport); A valid visa (if required); A completed landing card … *You* must satisfy a UK Border Agency officer that *you* meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules, so even if *you* do not need a visa *you* may need to show the officer certain documents to support your request to enter the UK. *Your* passport will be scanned and *your* landing card and visa will be checked. The officer may ask *you* for more information about *your* visit before allowing *you* to enter. If *you* hold a visa, *your* fingerprints will also be verified. (UKBA 2012, p. 3)

In this extract, the prospective 'visitor' is addressed directly and insistently through 12 instances of the second person pronoun and possessive adjective, and positioned in a deficit of power, subservient to the 'officer' empowered by the 'UK Border Agency' (UKBA). Moreover, the repeated modalisation of the lexical verb forms—'show', 'satisfy', 'meet', 'scanned', 'checked', 'ask', 'allow', 'verified'—demonstrate the multiplicity of minutely detailed moves through which the securitised subject must yield to the 'gaze' of the UKBA agent (after Foucault 1973, 1977).

In addition to this regulation of national borders, quasi-bordering practices are also discursively constituted in our texts in order to reinforce access and egress from each of the 34 Olympic venues within national boundaries. This core document addresses the 'spectator' directly, constructing her as a compliant, sentient agent realised by the non-agentive mental process 'see', while the security agents are positioned as active participants who 'have a role' and 'use…methods', exemplified by the harsh materiality of 'bag searches', 'screening machines', 'CCTV', 'metal detectors':

> … *you* will see security measures at and around the venues… *We* will use familiar methods that are proven to work, such as bag searches, screening machines, CCTV and metal detectors. As well as police officers, *you* will see stewards, security guards, volunteers and emergency services staff who will all have a role in security at the Games. (HMO 2011a)

Looking across the whole corpus, this construction of the visitor's role is achieved via a number of linguistic devices. In fact, documentary evidence in the corpus suggests that through a process of systemic mimesis, Olympic sites were being modelled to reproduce the mechanisms of exclusion found on national borders. Paradigmatically, each venue's webpage carries the invocation:

> When you get to the Olympic Park, you'll be asked to go through airport-style security screening. With so much going on and thousands of people arriving at the same time, you should expect to wait.

This is followed by another minute specification of the proposed timetable of travel to each of the Olympic venues:

> Aim to arrive at the Olympic Park around two hours before your session starts so you have plenty of time to go through airport-style security screening and get to the Millennium Stadium… You should be at the

> Millennium Stadium 90 minutes before your session starts. Make sure you're in your seat at least 30 minutes before the start time on your ticket for the build-up to competition.

Here a combination of imperative and strongly modalised verb forms convey a sense of urgency to 'spectators' and 'visitors'. This passage continues with a list of tightly specified specific items which spectators are prohibited from bringing into the venues: 'liquids, aerosols or gels in quantities larger than 100ml', 'alcohol', 'glass bottles larger than 100ml …', 'excessive amounts of food', 'large flags, oversized hats and large umbrellas'. All-in-all, the behavioural semiotics of access and exclusion from the Olympic venues appears to be homologous with that found at airports on national borders. Through breaking down the technologies of movement into minutely specified 30-minute segments, the micro-populations who temporarily come to inhabit each of the 34 Olympic sites are constituted as legitimate 'spectators' (c.f. Foucault 1977, pp. 135–170).

Table 8.2 Lexis within the strongest 200 keywords relating to 'exclusion'

N	Key word	Freq.	Keyness
10	Venues	358	3166
14	Park	515	2070
15	Visa	238	2028
32	Biometrics	102	1196
33	Venue	187	1184
76	Stadium	109	624
81	Site	219	597
100	Centre	300	546
129	Biometric	37	422
142	Border	120	394
150	Parkwide	31	376
178	Access	163	330
200	Perimeter	51	294

Through qualitative examination, thirteen out of the 200 strongest keywords emerged as constitutive of the banoptic strategy of exclusion (Table 8.2). Of these, *venues* emerged as one of the strongest keywords in the corpus, e.g.:

> The design and construction of the Olympic Park is based on 'Secured by Design' best practice and has sought to design out vulnerabilities. Additional security measures at Games venues relating to infrastructure and people will be proportionate to the risk and delivered in the most cost-effective way possible. (HMO 2011b, p. 11)

Throughout, 'venues' at the Games are constructed as sites with enhanced security measures that can lead to the exclusion of spectators. 'Security' is the third most frequent lexical collocate of VENUE/VENUES with, predictably, only 'Olympic' and 'Games' being more frequent, e.g.:

> LOCOG will use a private security company to deliver a venue based security operation, which will include searching and screening everyone entering the competition venues. (MET 2012)

Here the longer nominalised phrase, 'venue based security operation', serves to emphasise the focus of security upon the Olympic sites themselves. Additionally, the importance of the legacy of Games both in terms of structure and security is evidenced by its most frequently occurring cluster, 'venues and infrastructure', which occurs 35 times.

Within one of our core texts (SIA 2012a, p. 2), circumstantial adverb phrases are used (after Halliday and Matthiessen 2004) to designate the security operation as being widespread, extending beyond the Olympic venues themselves, e.g.:

> The Olympic and Paralympic Games will be far more than just a London event.
>
> The need for security stretches far beyond the Olympic Park.

Here, the repeated use of the emphatic premodifier 'far' conveys rhetorically the sense of the scope and urgency which the SIA, the security arm of the Home Office, asserts surround the London 2012 security operation.

Prediction

We have already seen in Chapter 6 the ways in which the science of statistics emerged in the eighteenth century as the principal instrument of an emerging governmentality in order to analyse and predict the birth rate, morbidity and economic behaviour of populations across Europe (Foucault 2007, p. 104). Throughout the latter decades of the twentieth century, with the advent of ever more wide-ranging and sophisticated computer databases, prediction has now also become a principal tactic of security services across Europe (Bigo 2008). This has also led to a redistribution of labour between security professionals. Modern police forces are increasingly organised around 'a few highly qualified people…[who]… make prospective analyses based on statistical knowledge, hypothetical correlations and supposed trends' (ibid., p. 35). These few, highly skilled, police agents contrast with a large majority of employees working for the police or allied private security firms, who are relatively low-skilled, low paid and—as we will see in the next section—can even be employed through temporary ad hoc contractual arrangements. It is these agents who are employed to actually manage, or enforce, the logistics of the security operation which focuses on the monitoring and control of the flows of spectators in and out of the venues at sports mega-events such as the London Olympics.

Distinctive statements emerge within our corpus relating to the identification and assessment of possible dangers facing the 2012 Games. For example, the following passage from a core text includes several closely packed linguistic indicators of the strategy of prediction, embedded within a wider ranging language of contemporary 'governance' (Mulderrig 2011a, b).

> A key element of *our* strategy is to identify any threats to the Games accurately and at an early stage. This enables *us* to take appropriate action to ensure that they are disrupted before they can have any impact on safety and security. (HMO 2011a, p. 11)

The transition of this sequence of clauses from a mental process ('identify') to a material process ('disrupt') (after Halliday and Matthiessen

2004) is suggestive of a causal link between the semiotic processes of surveillance and the materiality of intervention; while the adverbial phrases in the first sentence—'accurately' and 'at an early stage'—specify the technical parameters of the security operation. The logical transition between the first and second sentence is realised by the insertion of the less easily classifiable verbs 'enable' and 'ensure'. However, on Mulderrig's description, these verbs realise a process type specialised to the 'grammar of governance' called 'managing actions' (2011a, pp. 53–58). In keeping with this contemporary modality of discourse, the use of first person pronominal forms—'our', 'us'—also creates a sense of proactive engagement on the part of the government department through a discursive process of 'personalisation' (Mulderrig 2011b, pp. 565–569).

The strategy of prediction is also realised in a number of the strongest 200 keywords in our corpus. Those, which on detailed qualitative examination, appear to be strongly consistent with this strategy are: *emergency*, *planning*, *risks*, *strategy*, *risk*, *forecast* and *detection*. While the prominence of *emergency* can be partly accounted for by the frequent occurrence of the phrase 'emergency services' (which occurs 115 times), some instances nevertheless clearly realise this strategy, e.g.:

> Challenges during Games time include public order, crowd control, transport, road traffic, serious crime, emergency planning and counter-terrorism measures. (London Assembly 2012, p. 14)

Planning also collocates strongly with 'security', which emerges as its most frequent lexical collocate (occurring 47 times), e.g.:

> Intelligence will remain critical to the understanding of threats and the evaluation of risk. Safety and security planning and delivery will be intelligence-led and risk-based. (HMO 2011b, p. 11)

Here, the collocation 'security planning' appears within a co-text saturated with linguistic forms suggestive of prediction: the nominal phrases 'understanding of threats' and 'evaluation of risk', as well as the compound adjective 'risk-based'—which appears to have more of a rhetorical than a substantive function. An investigation of *risk* and *risks* yields language thus deployed:

> And our Olympic Security plans take into account the need to cope with the risk of either planned or spontaneous disorder and to ensure the police have the resources they need to deal with it. (May 2011)

This example is notable for its euphemistic labelling of potential attacks. Many incidences of RISK and its top lexical collocates, 'assessment' and 'assessed' are accounted for by documents' reference to one specific policy—the *Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategic Risk Assessment*: initialised as 'OSSRA'. This policy is described as containing:

> [...] assessments of the relative severity of a wide range of major accidents or natural events (collectively known as hazards) and malicious attacks (known as threats), as well as assessments of the potential risks that serious and organised crime, public disorder and domestic extremism may pose to safety and security during the Games. (HMO 2011d, p. 2)

Here, OSSRA divides risks taxonomically into 'hazards' and 'threats'. Of these, *threat* emerges as the more salient across the corpus; evidence that it realises the strategy of prediction can be found in the following:

> We know we face a real and enduring threat from terrorism and we know that the games – as an iconic event – will represent a target for terrorist groups. (May 2012)

The most frequent collocate for *threat* is 'level', which occurs 25 times across the corpus. This relates closely to OSSRA's rating system, which describes perceived dangers from terrorism:

> The threat level represents the likelihood of an attack in the near future. The five levels are:
>
> CRITICAL - an attack is expected imminently
> SEVERE - an attack is highly likely

> SUBSTANTIAL - an attack is a strong possibility
> MODERATE - an attack is possible but not likely
> LOW - an attack is unlikely. (HMO 2012)

The same document designates the current threat level to the UK as 'SUBSTANTIAL'. This example would therefore suggest that the predictive function of the banopticon is not only to identify a generic threat, but also to rank it.

In contradistinction to these precise assertions of the likelihood of an attack, an examination of 'threat' as a collocate of terrorism indicates that—as we have found in the previous chapter—the perpetrators are hardly ever specified, and where they are, only anachronistically (Fig. 8.1). This concordance data reveals only two attributions of terrorism, to the 'Northern Irish' (l.2), and 'related to Northern Ireland' (l. 3). Thus, there appears to be a general reluctance to actually specify the likely origins of a terrorist threat within these policy documents.



```
N    Concordance
1        any given time. Threat from international terrorism The current threat level is
2            possibility. Threat from Northern Irish terrorism The current threat level is set
3                    for setting thethreat level from terrorism related to Northern Ireland,
4              thelevel of threat theUK faces from terrorism at any given time. This system
5          the UK's work tocounter the threat from terrorism. Our primary objective is to
6                          Terrorism The threat from terrorism to the United Kingdom is real
7          we face a real and enduring threat from terrorism and we know that the games —
8             our plans on the basis of a national terrorism threat level of SEVERE; • the
9           The uK faces a sustained threat from terrorism. Beyond traditional methods of
10        basis that thenational threat level from terrorism will be SEVERE and requires
11         in place to combat the threat of global terrorism. 12.2 Activist minorities Alert
12              an increase in thethreat level from terrorism to CRITICAL. 52. All delivery
13      setting thethreat level from international terrorism. To do this, they consider
14            the level of threat the UK faces from terrorism at any given time. Threat from
15        tothis effort. Whether the threat is from terrorism, serious crime and fraud,
16                                                   Terrorism The threat from terrorism to
17        the threat from Northern Ireland related terrorism and international terrorism,
18                     strategy to counter the threat of terrorism a close working relationship
```

Fig. 8.1 Concordance data for *terrorism* + *threat*

Terrorism also emerges in its own right as a strong keyword across our corpus. In a core document relating to the security strategy for the Games, the Home Office states boldly:

> The greatest threat to the security of the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games is terrorism. (HMO 2011b, p. 12)

Thus, it is notable that throughout our corpus the concept *terrorism* only occurs as an abstraction, and once again the noun 'terrorist' does not appear anywhere to attribute agency to 'terror'.

Pedagogisation

So far, our analysis has yielded evidence of linguistic and discursive elements that indicate that the security operation which surrounded the 2012 Olympics displayed three key features of the 'banopticon' which we set out in Chapter 6 (after Bigo 2008): exceptionalism, exclusion and prediction. However, another theme emerged from the webpages which we analysed. Since this related to the recruitment and training of the agents who were employed on an ad hoc, temporary basis for the duration of the Games, we are labelling this 'pedagogisation' (after Bernstein 2000). In order to provide security, LOGOC required that tens of thousands of specially recruited staff be trained for the 2012 Games. Our core texts reveal an intense concern with the provision and monitoring of this process. For example, this extract includes the following series of instructions:

> We have published guidance on our website advising people of the circumstances in which they can and cannot work legally … Security operatives must comply with the law which we and our partners will continue to enforce during this period. (SIA 2012b, p. 1)

Here the addressers, 'we', are positioned in the text as both the authors of the document and the enforcers of prohibitions relating to the integrity of the security operation. This insistence upon the need for legislative control of security operatives recurs elsewhere in this text and throughout the corpus, e.g.:

> It is a legal requirement that an individual who provides defined manned guarding services in the UK holds the appropriate licence. (SIA 2012c, p. 1)
>
> …it is a criminal offence to work in a licensable security role without the relevant SIA licence. (SIA 2012a, p. 3)

In different documents, the repeated impersonal formula 'it is…' combines with opposing articulations of the same phrase, 'legal requirement' and 'criminal offence', to construct a 'doxa' (after Bourdieu 1991), stipulating the presence of a 'licence' as the authoritative signifier of identity. A further stipulation attempts to eliminate the arbitrary relationship between the 'title' on the licence (signifier) and the actual 'job' enacted by its holder (signified) in order to delineate stable, and strongly specified, categories of subject.

> It is important to note that it is not what your job title is, but what you do that defines if you need a licence. For example, you may be referred to as a personal trainer, or a coach, or maybe a chauffeur, but if you provide any of the licensable services defined in this guidance … without a licence you will be committing an offence and be liable to criminal prosecution. (SIA 2012a, p. 6)

Here, we can find the now customary emphasis introduced by the clause 'It is important', the insistent, direct address of the operative repeating the personal pronouns 'you' and 'yours', and the conclusion of this extract with a double threat specified by the unmodalised future auxiliary 'will'.

The precise nature of the security provision is further specified through its pedagogic programming. In order to get a licence, 'operatives' either have to show evidence of previous experience or undergo a proscribed training programme, e.g.

> Close protection training takes 146 hours, door supervision 30 hours and security guarding 26 hours. This training can only be delivered by training providers who have been approved by SIA endorsed organisations. (SIA 2012a, p. 2)

Moreover, it is not just 'security operatives' who are specified in this document, but also 'training providers'. Therefore, a clearly demarcated hierarchy of disciplinary subjects appears to be constituted within this corpus: 'we and our partners' (government agents and their proxies); 'training providers' (pedagogues); and, by implication, their trainees.

Training, which is key in the corpus, is frequently deployed within passages realising this strategy. Surprisingly, less than 5% of the instances of the term analysed in a randomised sample appear to relate to athletic training (as one might perhaps expect in a corpus of documents relating to an Olympic games). Overwhelmingly, it refers to the pedagogic process through which personnel are prepared to assume security roles. In the following, the application of training as a 'disciplinary' technology can be glimpsed (c.f. Foucault 1977):

> Bridging the Gap is made of up to four short training units dependent on your role. You'll need to complete the training units required for your role as well as pass an interview and be 18 years old by 1st July before you can start employment:
>
> Level 2 Award in Door Supervision – 38 hours or four days Skills for Security training (Including Argus Briefing)
> X-Ray operator training (If required for Games Time Role)
> Role specific training. (Bridging the Gap 2012)

The concern which is realised within our corpus around the regulation of security operatives is also reflected in the relative strength of *accreditation* and *accredited* as keywords (occurring 115 and 62 across the corpus respectively). Top lexical collocates of *accreditation* are 'card', 'identity' and, intriguingly, 'category'. Even the 'indexical' text of this card (after Peirce 1991) becomes tightly proscribed by the documents, e.g.

> …"accreditation card" means a valid Olympic Identity and Accreditation Card or a Paralympic Identity and Accreditation Card issued by the London Organising Committee. (SIA 2012c)

as is the nature of its articulation upon the securitised subject of the 2012 Games:

> Many of the people attending the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games venues for official or work purposes will need to be

> accredited…Accreditation is the process of identifying and issuing a pass to those individuals who will need access to Olympic and Paralympic venues in an official capacity during the Games… Accreditation passes are used to identify people and their roles at the Games and to allow access to relevant sites …. (HMO 2011c)

This is confirmed by the word's regularly associated clusters: 'identity and accreditation' and 'accreditation card'.

The Banoptic Games

Recent empirical work in international relations and sociology has suggested that a new modality of (in)security has been brought into play within advanced capitalist societies. In particular, it has been proposed that the contemporary 'management of unease' establishes a 'banoptic dispositif' in UK, France and other countries in the EU (Bigo 2008, p. 10). The range of distinctive linguistic features set out above have been mapped onto three key features of this banopticon: exceptionalism, exclusion and prediction, as well as what we have called 'pedagogisation'.

Previous research carried out in the fields of sociology, criminology, urban studies and sports science (e.g. Boyle et al. 2009; Coaffee et al. 2011; Fussey 2012; Giulianotti and Klauser 2011; Samatas 2011; Yu et al. 2009) has suggested the Summer Olympic Games generate localised conditions under which exceptional legal, military and policiary measures are put in place which often remain indefinitely after the Games have ended. Exceptionalism is also for Bigo, a principal 'dimension' of the banoptic 'dispositif' (2008, pp. 31–36). Our analysis suggests that a range of linguistic devices were deployed to give the impression that London 2012 constituted an exceptional set of circumstances: the use of superlative and limit adjectives, regular references to the impact of the Games on different security sectors and regular references to their simultaneity with other sizeable British events. In keeping with Tsoukala (2006) the function of these hyperbolic descriptions was to create a set of imaginary relations between the Games and its wider context, which could be used as a logical pretext to justify the scale and extent of the security operation for London 2012. This security operation was dubbed insistently in the corpus with the noun phrase 'safety and security' in order to yoke the positive connotations of the word 'safety' with the more problematic concept of 'security' and imbue it with greater positivity. The combination of nouns was also used so repetitiously, and in a manner which became so devoid of context, that it appeared to become a 'reified' concept across the corpus (after Lukacs 1923/1967).

The second 'defining trait' of the banopticon is its 'ability to construct categories of excluded people connected to the management of life'. This practice of exclusion is closely linked to a contemporary principle of normalisation which 'occurs primarily through …the imperative of free movement of people' (Bigo 2008, pp. 35–36). In short, the banopticon operates through maintaining the free movement of 'normal' populations within and across borders; while identifying and restricting the movement of those identified as constituting a 'threat' to society, usually being classified along a cline which runs from 'immigrant' to 'terrorist'. There appeared little doubt on our reading of core texts and subsequent corpus analysis, that control of mobility was a principal tactic whereby power was articulated upon the Olympic subject, whether constituted as 'visitors', 'spectators' or 'Olympic Games Family Members' ('OGFMs'). Not only did we find linguistic assertions of an intensified regulation of movement across national borders but—most strikingly—a distinctive form of site specialised to the Games, the 'Venue', appeared to be discursively constituted with a set of minutely specified controls on the movement of micro-populations into and out of each event. In this respect, the principle of control, surveillance and regulation, which within the Schengen Zone allegedly only takes place on the outer perimeters of member states, now appears to be subject to a process of discursive multiplication and mimesis actually within the borders of the UK.

However, while we discovered evidence of the principle of exclusion as a general discursive strategy, we found fewer signs of one key related component of the banopticon: the identification and expulsion of particular groups of subjects. While a range of lexis relating to the strategy of prediction emerged from our analysis—with *threat* being a particularly salient keyword—attribution of the 'threat' to the Games to any particular individual, group or movement appeared to be absent; and the only two instances of attribution—to the 'Northern Irish'—were bizarrely anachronistic. This refusal to identify oppositional groups as enemy—and noticeably from the point of view of recent history the total absence of the terms al-Qaeda 'Islamist' or 'Muslim' from the corpus—was found even more compellingly in the sub-corpora of documents which we analysed in the previous chapter relating to the constitution of UK government security between 2001 and 2011. We can therefore infer at this point that this elision would appear to be a widespread political tactic articulated within security discourse, at least of the UK government. Instead, the attribution of main threat to the Games was restricted to the abstract notion of *terrorism*; this emerged not only as a strong keyword within our corpus, but also collocated frequently with *threat*.

In his description of the 'field of professional of the management of unease', Bigo distinguishes between 'two types of policing [that] appear within the parameters of the national police institutions':

> …the first employs unqualified or minimally qualified personnel, who are however present and visible at a local level as an auxiliary to the municipality, the prefecture, or other police. The second type takes the opposite approach by employing a few, highly qualified people, who are in close contact with other security and social control agencies, characterised by discretion and distance…these individuals take it as their mission to prevent crime by acting upon conditions in a pro-active way, anticipating where crime might occur and who might generate it. (2008, p. 21)

The polarisation between the technologies of prediction and our final set of linguistic features, relating to what we call 'pedagogisation', confirms this dichotomy within contemporary policing and gave rise to two key areas of problematisation within our texts. The first relates to the identification and regulation of these 'unqualified or minimally qualified personnel'. And the second relates to the ad hoc recruitment and training which was provided for additional security operatives for the

Games; hence the relative strength of the keyword *accreditation* within our corpus. In the event, it was precisely this which gave rise to the greatest source of concern in the public sphere in the final few days before the start of the Games. With just over two weeks to go before the opening ceremony for the Games, it emerged that the security firm G4S—25 of whose documents were included in our corpus—might have fallen short by as many as 9000 security personnel from its promised quota. This resulted in the military being required to provide 3500 extra troops to patrol the Games (Taylor 2012).

To conclude, this sample of documents appears to share the same paradox as the discursive formation surrounding Victorian pederasty which Michel Foucault described in the first volume of *History of Sexuality* (1984). While it is undeniable that starting in 2001, the USA—and subsequently its NATO allies across Europe—have experienced numerous terrorist attacks up to the present time, in the attempt to allay further major incidents a massive discursive effort has been expended which—rather than dispelling the phenomenon of terrorism—actually constitutes terrorism as a chimera within each ensuing panoply of official documentation. The mantra, '[t]he Olympic and Paralympic Games … are sporting and entertainment events, not security events' (SIA 2012b), is now transmitted across successive Games, via the 'Secure by Design' template constructed in the wake of 9/11 (Coaffee et al. 2011, p. 3318; Fussey 2012). However, the 'discursive formation' relating to security analysed above, indicates that the reverse is actually the case. The rolling juggernaut of the modern Summer Olympics appears to provide a quadrennial platform for the *talking into being* of a hypostatised 'terrorist threat' in order to create a pretext for the implementation of periodic massive security operations in major cities around the world. Whilst in less democratic societies such as China, the development and implementation of a surveillance complex does nothing for the democratisation of the state (Samatas 2011, pp. 3358–3360); in purportedly democratic societies such as Greece and Britain, the undemocratic tendencies of such pervasive and potentially permanent surveillance appear to militate against the foundational ideal of the Olympic Games themselves (Tsoukala 2006, p. 53). Rather, the circumstances of the games—constituted at least in part by the accompanying discursive construction of the security operation which accompanies them—ushers in a series of banoptic tactics (after Bigo 2008) which then plausibly remain in place into a limitless future (after Dunmire 2011).

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9

Discourse of Nuclear Proliferation

While the two previous chapters have engaged with security discourse which is particular to the national context, in this chapter we turn to the international arena in order to investigate the discourse surrounding the proliferation of nuclear weapons worldwide. The proliferation of nuclear weapons has been one way in which a sense of 'global crisis' has become intensified through the second half of the twentieth century into the first two decades of the twenty-first century (Houtart 2010). The particular locus of concern over this period, realised both in the talk generated by the forum of the United Nations (UN), as well as through the newspapers and international outlets of the international media, has been the nuclear development programmes of Iran, and latterly North Korea. In this chapter, we examine the ways in which the discourse of nuclear proliferation relating to these two states was constituted in the period from 2006 up to 2012, a period broadly parallel to the two corpora of documents relating to UK security and counter-terrorism policy in the previous two chapters. This period featured some of the most critical moments relating to the protracted stand-off between the United Nations (UN), United States of America (USA), Iran and North Korea (DPRK); and anticipated the partial resolution of the

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nuclear issues with respect to Iran, when it signed up to the *Joint Plan of Action* along with the five permanent members of the United Nations in Geneva (see also, Chapter 2).

As we have already outlined in Chapter 4, a poststructuralist approach to discourse maintains that any discrete body of knowledge, or 'discipline' is constituted not as a set of self-evident truths made manifest through the transparency of observable data, but rather by the set of subjects, concepts, objects and strategies which comprise a distinctive 'formation of discourse'. One way of revealing the distinctiveness of a discursive formation is to analyse the ways in which words, statements and texts combine systematically to bring a particular view of the world into being: '… to define a system of formation in its specific individuality is … to characterize a discourse or a group of statements by the regularity of its practice' (Foucault 1972, p. 74). International relations is one area of knowledge and interhuman engagement which is particularly contingent upon just such a discursive formation. Here, we argue that sets of intergovernmental legal, political and economic associations are created, maintained and transmitted across two realms: a political sphere located in national executives and intergovernmental organisations such as the UN; and a public sphere informed by a national press alongside electronic media such as television, the internet and social networking. This chapter will explore the ways in which the distinctive features of a particular nexus of international events such as 'nuclear proliferation' are not just constituted within any one particular set of texts (as in our previous analyses), but also emerge from the dynamic relations that operate between different types of text which circulate within and between institutional sites.

In the analysis that follows, we go on to compare the language and discourse of a corpus of resolutions passed by the UN Security Council (UNSC) with a corpus of articles sampled from prominent broadsheets which circulate in the USA and the UK, two permanent members of the UNSC. In particular, we will consider what 'contradictions', 'changes' and 'transformations' took place (after Foucault 1972) as the discourse of nuclear proliferation was delocated from the political sphere and relocated in the public sphere.[1]

Nuclear Proliferation Corpora

While the previous studies of the discourse of nuclear proliferation in Iran and Korea (e.g., Behnam and Zenouz 2008; Izadi and Saghaye-Biria 2007; Jiang 2006; Min 1999; Rasti and Sahragard 2012, see Chapter 3) have yielded valuable insights into the ways in which certain lexical patterns are used for ideological effect, they have all restricted their analyses to focusing on just one type of media text, mostly exploration of corpora drawn exclusively from a national press. Furthermore, the corpus size has necessarily been small due to their qualitative approach. By contrast, in this chapter we will employ the corpus analysis techniques we have outlined in Chapter 5 to engage with the constitution of nuclear proliferation as a 'discursive formation' (after Foucault 1972) across different text types. In particular we aim to problematise the ways in which the idea of 'crisis' is constituted, as texts are delocated from the 'political sphere' and relocated in the 'public sphere'. To do this, we compiled two corpora from two different sites, which were selected as being paradigmatic of the 'political sphere' and the 'public sphere': the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and prominent national press outlets in the UK and the USA, two countries which are both permanent members of the Security Council. Each site produces a distinctive type of text: resolutions from the UNSC and mainly newspaper articles from the national press. All the texts were in English, produced between the years 2006–2012, and are concerned with either 'nuclear proliferation' or the 'nuclear crisis'.

UNSC Resolutions

The UNSC resolutions corpus comprised all UNSC resolutions produced between 2006 and 2012 relating to the issue of nuclear proliferation in Iran or North Korea (available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/). Between 2006 and 2012, there were 18 resolutions relating to nuclear proliferation amounting to a corpus of around 33 thousand words (see Table 9.1).

Table 9.1 UNSC resolutions corpus

Year	Resolution	Title	No. Words
2006	S/RES/1673	Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	621
2006	S/RES/1696	Non-proliferation	1065
2006	S/RES/1718	Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea	2041
2006	S/RES/1737	Non-proliferation	3828
2007	S/RES/1747	Non-proliferation	3255
2008	S/RES/1803	Non-proliferation	3291
2008	S/RES/1810	Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	1436
2008	S/RES/1835	Non-proliferation	246
2009	S/RES/1874	Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea	2552
2009	S/RES/1887	Maintenance of international peace and security: Nuclear	2328
2010	S/RES/1928	Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea	304
2010	S/RES/1929	Non-proliferation	7467
2011	S/RES/1977	Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	2471
2011	S/RES/1984	Non-proliferation	510
2011	S/RES/1985	Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea	512
2012	S/RES/2049	Non-proliferation	568
2012	S/RES/2050	Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea	579
2012	S/RES/2055	Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	157
TOTAL		18 texts	33,231 words

Newspaper Articles

Four newspapers were selected for analysis: *The Times* and *The Guardian* from the UK; and *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* from the USA. Not only do these papers from each country represent a spread of political viewpoints, from the 'left' to the 'right' of the political spectrum, but they are also 'broadsheets' which are conventionally regarded as publishing more verifiable, 'serious-minded' content than, for example, UK tabloids. The US/UK broadsheets corpus comprised all articles containing the phrase 'nuclear crisis' or 'nuclear proliferation' between the years 2006 and 2012 harvested from these four newspapers, using the news database site Nexis UK. The corpus was further reduced and focused for the purposes of this analysis by manually extracting all articles relating to the Fukishima nuclear crisis in Japan which took place in 2011. This left us with a considerably sized corpus of 1590 texts amounting to 1.3 million words.

Comparative Analysis

Since each corpus comprised a different genre and was also differed considerably in size, unlike in our other comparative analysis in Chapter 7, it was not appropriate to compare the two corpora directly. Not least, this would have resulted in much of the statistically significant lexis revealing differences between the resolution and the newspaper genres, but not necessarily the ways in which the 'subjects, concepts, objects and strategies' relating to nuclear proliferation were themselves constituted. It was also not possible within the scope of the project to create a massive comparator corpus of all the articles from the four broadsheets published between 2006 and 2012.

Both the resolutions corpus and the broadsheets corpus were, therefore, compared separately with the British National Corpus (BNC 2007) as a common, baseline 'reference' corpus. This enables this chapter to engage critically with more substantive features of the resolutions than was possible in a like-for-like generic comparison.[2] A detailed description of the techniques used to analyse our corpus data has been set out in Chapter 5.

A comparative analysis of the hundred strongest keywords in each corpus revealed that most salient lexical items fell into three categories signifying the particular 'subjects', 'concepts' and 'objects' (after Foucault 1972), which emerged as the principal lexical constituents of nuclear proliferation as a discursive formation (Tables 9.2 and 9.3). The 'strategies' which are articulated as the lexical items which signify these three categories as they are delocated from the political sphere and relocated in the public sphere will be discussed in the final chapter of this book (see Chapter 11). In order to reveal the patterns of

Table 9.2 UNSC resolutions: From top 100 keywords (categorised)

Institutional sites	IAEA, committee, security, Council, entities, experts, panel, nations, governors, AIO, nationals, AEOI, persons, Board
State actors	Iran, States, DPRK, United, China, Tehran
Concepts	Implementation, activities, non-proliferation, cooperation, proliferation, assistance, obligations, programme, efforts, delivery, provisions, safeguards, disarmament
Nuclear weapons technologies	Nuclear, weapons, enrichment-related, missile, ballistic, industries, weapon, water-related, energy
Processes	Decides, reaffirming, requests, recalling, calls, encourages, report, noting, designated, underlines, owned, affirms, controlled, comply, urges, submit

Table 9.3 UK & US Broadsheets: From top 100 keywords (categorised)

Political leaders	Obama, Bush, Obama's, Ahmadinejad, Clinton, Putin, Khan, McCain, Barack, Kan, Kim
State actors	Iran, Korea, Iran's, States, United, China, Iranian, North, Iraq, Washington, Russia, American, Tehran, Japan, Afghanistan, Israel, Pakistan, Korean, Japan's, Korea's, Tokyo,Chinese, China's, Pakistani, India, Beijing, Russian, Israeli.
Concepts	Proliferation, defense, nonproliferation, security, sanctions, program, crisis, intelligence, war, power, terrorism, threat, talks, diplomacy
Nuclear weapons technologies	Nuclear, weapons, uranium, military, reactor, enrichment, reactors, atomic, fuel, energy, plant, bomb, radiation, missile, centrifuges, enriched
Processes	Said

recontextualisation that takes place as the discourse of nuclear proliferation is delocated from the public sphere and relocated within the public sphere, the analysis that follows compares the two text types, starting with the UNSC resolutions, and then exploring what changes in lexical patterns take place as the discourse of the political sphere is recontextualised within the public sphere, comprising media such as popular US and UK broadsheets.

Political Sphere: Resolutions

In the analysis of our resolutions corpus that follows, we adapt the four categories that were originally set out as being constituent of a 'discursive formation': 'enunciative modalities', 'objects', 'concepts' and 'strategies' (Foucault 1972, pp. 31–71). The 'enunciative modality' of a particular discursive formation entails two standpoints: first the 'locus of enunciation', i.e. the position that is constituted within the discursive formation for the 'enunciative subject' who articulates and legitimates the documents in question, here the UNSC and its subsidiary agencies; and secondly the 'subject position', i.e. the position constituted for subjects *within* the realm of discourse, here the nation states who are positioned as protagonists and antagonists within this particular text type. We then go on to consider the most salient 'concepts' and 'objects' that are realised within the discourse (Table 9.2). While discursive strategies are regarded by Foucault as another constituent of a discursive formation (1972, pp. 64–71), we will argue that these are a superordinate phenomenon of discourse, and we will set out with the strategies that seem to us to flow from the discursive constitution of the phenomena within the discourse in the following chapter, Chapter 10. This reflects our contention that on this analysis, the strategies of discourse are realised through the tactics of recontextualisation across different generically identifiable types of text (here, resolutions and broadsheets) within a single discursive formation, rather than within a single type of text or within a collection of texts approached as a typologically homogeneous discursive formation (e.g., as in Foucault 1967, 1970, 1973).

Locus of Enunciation: Institutional Sites

There are a number of institutional sites which are constituted within the resolutions corpus as having the authority to confer legitimacy upon the actions (both verbal and material) which are taken to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The principal institutional site is predictably the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), to which—as the governing international forum for matters of security in the UN—is attributed a superordinate position of authority in the resolution documents (Fig. 9.1). When compared with the British National Corpus (BNC), the individual lexical components of its name therefore feature as key within our corpus[3]: *security*, *council*, *united*, *nations*. The foreshortened compound noun 'Security Council' therefore functions as the grammatical subject of the different process types within the resolution. The most recent resolution in our corpus (UNSC 2012) is worth setting out in in full to illustrate the genre of this document (Fig. 9.1 our emphases, underlined).

As with many other documents which have legally binding status, part of the authority of the resolution genre is created through its heightened formality and regularity. In Resolution 2055 the Security Council is positioned as the Sayer in a single clause which exhibits the verbal process 'requests'. In other resolutions, there are usually multiple



Resolution 2055 (2012)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 6795th meeting, on 29 June 2012

The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolutions 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004, 1673 (2006) of 27 April 2006, 1810 (2008) of 25 April 2008, and 1977 (2011) of 20 April 2011,
Recalling its decision in resolution 1977 (2011) to extend the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), hereafter the 1540 Committee, until 25 April 2021,
Emphasizing the 1540 Committee's significantly increased workload over the course of its mandate,
Recalling, in that regard, its decision in paragraph 5 of resolution 1977 (2011) to continue to provide the 1540 Committee with the assistance of experts,
Requests the Secretary-General to increase the size of the group of experts referred to in paragraph 5 (a) of resolution 1977 (2011) to up to nine experts.

Fig. 9.1 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2055 (2012)

verbal clauses. These are preceded by a number of participial clauses as in Fig. 9.1, which refer to other texts which precede the resolution in question. Once again, the process types are most frequently verbal (here, 'reaffirming', 'emphasizing' and 'recalling') and less frequently mental (here, 'recalling'). The interval in the layout of the text between the 'Security Council' as Sayer (or Senser) and the process in each clause means that analysis of the process types in the corpus is not amenable to collocation analysis. However, certain process types are top keywords within the resolutions corpus, viz: as processes within the clause, *decides, requests, calls, encourages, underlines, affirms, urges;* and as processes within participial phrases, *reaffirming, recalling,* and *noting*. For example, the concordance sample in Fig. 9.2 illustrates the use of *decides* across the UNSC corpus.

However, the acronym *IAEA* (indicating the International Atomic Energy Agency) also emerged as a key legitimating actor in the resolutions with the UNSC. This constitutes the IAEA as the body which has the authority to provide evidence of the compliance or non-compliance of a particular nuclear actor, such as Iran or the DPRK. In this respect, the IAEA operates as the principal institutional site tasked with providing evidence for any censure which is directed against deviant nation

1 ates to the Committee; 14. Decides that States may permit th

2 1737 (2006) 06-68142 7 19. Decides that all States shall rep

3 measures be necessary; 20. Decides to remain seized of the m

4 receiving that report; 25. Decides that the Committee shall

5 l 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7); 8. Decides that the DPRK shall aband

6 of, these resolutions; 27. Decides that the Committee shall

7 or controlled by them; 8. Decides that all States shall pre

8 clear weapons, and further decides that all States shall pro

9 resolution 1874 (2009); 6. Decides to remain actively seized

10 of the United Nations, 1. Decides to extend until 12 July 2

Fig. 9.2 Concordance data (UNSC resolutions corpus): 'decides' as verbal process

states. In the following clause, the Security Council reconfers its authority upon the IAEA:

> Reiterating its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly supporting the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, and commending the IAEA for its efforts to resolve outstanding issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme… (UNSC 2010)

Other legitimating agents also feature within the 100 top keywords in the resolutions corpus, e.g., *governors* and *board*—as in the formulaic phrase 'board of governors' (above)—as well as *committee*. The '1540 Committee' was set up by resolution 1540 (UNSC 2004), which set out an obligation on the part of member nations to adopt widespread measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In this extract, the authority of the 'committee' is reaffirmed by the 'Security Council', who:

> Decides that the 1540 Committee shall continue to intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation by all States of resolution 1540 (2004), through its Programme of Work which includes the compilation of information on the status of States' implementation of all aspects of resolution 1540 (2004), outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation, and which addresses in particular all aspects of paragraphs 1 and 2 of that resolution, as well as of paragraph 3… (UNSC 2008b)

Classically within institutional sites, be they medical, legal or educational—authority is often conferred upon certain statements or groups of statements through reference to 'experts'. The UNSC is no exception to this, with *experts* and *panel* also occurring as strong keywords. These are combined 13 times in the formulaic phrase 'requests the Panel of Experts' as the Security Council seeks additional, scientific evidence to legitimate a particular course of action with regard to the prevention of WMDs on the part of both state and non-state actors. The relative anonymity and impersonality of this institutional lexis serves to evacuate these agents of any personal attributes; and its technocratic and hierarchical nature simultaneously imbues them with a certain power and authority through their positioning within the remit of the United Nations Security Council.

Subject Positions: State Actors

Again adopting a rather more Foucauldian perspective than our previous interpretation of this data (c.p. MacDonald et al. 2015), we argue here that documents circulating in the political sphere create positions that are occupied by the subjects as they are constituted within this discursive formation. Our analysis suggests that these subject positions were occupied by a few prominent state actors. On re-analysing our corpus of UNSC resolutions in comparison to the BNC, three discrete nation states emerge as salient actors in their nominal form: *Iran*, *DPRK* and, potentially, the *United States*. Top collocates of *Iran* in the resolutions are 'nuclear', 'programme', and 'activities' (often co-occurring in regularly recurring phrases describing 'nuclear activities'). In particular in the discourse of the UNSC resolutions, the noun 'Iran' is regularly embedded within lengthy noun phrases which position it as the recipient of some measure of a censure (c.p. Rasti and Sahragard 2012). For example, the distinctive technological phrase 'Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities' recurs 8 times across 5 different resolutions, e.g.

> Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. (UNSC 2006a)

Furthermore compared with other countries, Iran is positioned within the resolutions as the butt of UNSC actions, especially as the 'receiver' of verbal processes (after Halliday and Matthiessen 2006). This is evidenced by the recurring phrases such as 'persuade Iran…', 'calls upon Iran…', 'encourages Iran…', and 'urges Iran…'; as well as the mental process 'review Iran's actions….'. Of the instances where Iran is actually accorded agency in the resolutions, it is regularly subject to some form of coercion or negative evaluation for non-compliance or failure to carry out some prescribed action. To illustrate the censorious nature of this discourse, the concordance data extracted below (Fig. 9.3) displays instances where *Iran* co-occurs with *not* two places to the right of the search term. The name for the capital of Iran—*Tehran*—also appears as a strong keyword in the resolutions corpus. However distinctively, it is never used within the resolutions as a metonym for the state actor itself; rather it occurs more incidentally the resolutions as part of addresses to signify the specific geographical location of 'individuals and entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities'.

While there were only two UNSC resolutions relating to North Korea between 2006 and 2012, 'nuclear' again emerges as a collocate of the acronym *DPRK*, which was used to signify the state actor, the 'Democratic People's Republic of Korea'. However, rather than the more direct phrase 'nuclear programme,' phrases most commonly used to describe DPRK's nuclear technology are 'nuclear-related', 'ballistic missile-related' and even 'WMD-related', as exemplified in the phrase 'nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related and other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes'. Like Iran, the DPRK is also



N	Concordance
139	Tehran Research Reactor, regrets that Iran has not responded constructively to
140	and related materiel; 9. Decides that Iran shall not undertake any activity
141	, in the event that the report shows that Iran has not complied with resolution
142	in paragraph 23 above shows that Iran has not complied with this resolution
143	and 14 November 2006 (GOV/2006/64), Iran has not established full and
144	report of 8 June 2006 (GOV/2006/38) Iran has not taken the steps required of
145	Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has not established full and
146	and enrichment-related activities, Iran shall not begin construction on any
147	and S/2006/815 the export of which to Iran is not prohibited by subparagraphs
148	in paragraph 12 above shows that Iran has not complied with resolution
149	I to this resolution; 5. Decides that Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer
150	Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has not established full and
151	Expresses its intention, in the event that Iran has not by that date complied with
152	(2006) 4 06-68142 7. Decides that Iran shall not export any of the items in
153	water-related facility; 7. Decides that Iran shall not acquire an interest in any
154	, in the event that the report shows that Iran has not complied with resolutions

Fig. 9.3 Concordance data (UNSC resolutions corpus): Negative evaluation of Iranian actions

positioned in the resolutions corpus as the receiver of the verbal processes realised by the UNSC, e.g.:

> Calls upon the DPRK to return immediately to the Six-Party Talks without precondition and to work towards the expeditious implementation of the Joint Statement… (UNSC 2006b);
>
> Decides that the DPRK shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme, ... (UNSC 2009a);
>
> Demands that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or any launch using ballistic missile technology (UNSC 2006b).
>
> Expressing its gravest concern that the nuclear test and missile activities carried out by the DPRK have further generated increased tension in the region and beyond, ... (UNSC 2009a).

While the lexical items *states* and *united* also feature as strong keywords in the UNSC resolutions, they actually only occur twenty-five times in combination to signify the USA as a state actor. Moreover, a concordance analysis reveals that the USA is never referenced individually in the resolutions, but only in its collective role as a permanent member of the Security Council, acting alongside other state actors as a joint signatory of documents and resolutions. Thus top collocates of the nominal compound 'United States' are other state actors such as 'United Kingdom' and 'Russian Federation', occurring in clauses such as:

> … China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States are willing to take further concrete measures on exploring an overall strategy of resolving the Iranian nuclear issue through negotiation on the basis of their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521) and their June 2008 proposals (INFCIRC/730) … (UNSC 2008a)
>
> … the full and expeditious implementation of the Joint Statement issued on 19 September 2005 and the joint documents of 13 February 2007 and 3 October 2007, by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States, … (UNSC 2009a)

As the examples above illustrate, *China* is the only other state actor which appears as key within the resolutions, but again only due to its presence in the repeated litany referencing action by the assembled permanent members of the Security Council. As in the webpages of the US security agencies analysed in the next chapter, these repeated constructions serve to emphasise the coherence and integrated agency of the UNSC, which is discursively constituted as transcending the individual identities of nation states.

Concepts

The next thematic grouping of keywords which emerged from the UNSC resolutions relates to the most salient 'concepts' which are constituted within this discursive formation, and typify the different text types which make up each corpus (after Foucault 1972). Within the resolutions corpus—as found classically within the sites which produce 'official' discourse within CDA analyses (e.g., Fairclough 2003)—certain concepts are realised through nominalised lexical items, or 'grammatical metaphors' (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004, pp. 656–657). The four strongest nominalised keywords in the resolutions corpus relating to concepts are: *implementation, cooperation, non-proliferation*, and *proliferation* (Table 9.2). *Implementation* achieves its salience in the corpus through its collocation with the nominal phrase 'Resolution 1540', agreed by the UNSC in '2004', also a top collocate. The establishment of this intertextual relation is essential for the legitimacy of any resolutions agreed subsequent to 1540, since any resolution relating to nuclear non-proliferation passed after 2004 necessarily presupposes the conditions set out in the former resolutions. The other top collocate of *implementation* is the intensifier 'full' which occurs mostly in the L1 position, often in the context of really quite forceful exhortary statements, e.g.:

> Decides that the 1540 Committee shall continue to intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation by all States of resolution 1540 (2004), through its Programme of Work … (UNSC 2008b)

As we have already revealed through our analysis of the discursive positioning of state actors in the previous section, the resolutions are 'implemented' through discursive construction of cooperation between agents who might otherwise be mutually antagonistic. The paradigmatic antagonists constructed in this corpus are 'Iran' and the 'IAEA', e.g.

> Our goal is to develop relations and cooperation with Iran, based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. (UNSC 2007)

And:

> Iran shall provide such access and cooperation as the IAEA requests… (UNSC 2006a)

As in these examples, *cooperation* frequently combines with another term for rhetorical effect, e.g., 'relations and cooperation', 'assistance and cooperation' and 'access and cooperation'.

The two top collocates of *proliferation* in the resolutions corpus were, unsurprisingly: 'nuclear' and 'treaty'. For example, *proliferation* regularly combines with 'nuclear' in relatively nuanced, formulaic phrases such as 'proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons', and 'proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities'. We also found it co-occurring with both 'nuclear' and 'treaty' in the extended noun phrase 'the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'. Within the resolutions we find nuanced phrases used formulaically such as 'proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons' and 'proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities'. A distinctive feature of the resolutions, however, is that 'nuclear' and 'proliferation' only once combine in the totalising phrase 'nuclear proliferation', and only within a clause which militates against its existential presence: '…effective IAEA safeguards are essential to prevent nuclear proliferation…' (UNSC 2009b). *Non-proliferation* occurs with greater salience than 'proliferation', but it is less productive: occurring mostly in formulaic phrases, in particular through the repeated intertextual reference to the cornerstone 'Treaty on the

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons', which is also mentioned formulaically within these texts.

Strong, non-nominalised, conceptual keywords also emerged from the resolutions corpus, such as: *programme, activities, vigilance* and *safeguards.* As with *proliferation*, similar evidence of the linguistic subtleties of the particular context of the political sphere is afforded by the difference in the combinations of 'treaty' with 'nuclear' and 'proliferation' in the resolutions corpus. Here, these two words combine in the extended noun phrase 'the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'. Top collocates of *programme* were once again 'nuclear', and also 'missile', as in the phrases 'nuclear programme' and 'missile programme'. However paradoxically, *peaceful* also emerges as a top collocate of the phrase 'nuclear programme' in the UNSC resolutions. This combination occurs five times with reference to Iran in the emphatic, formulaic phrase, 'which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme'.

Other strong keywords that we regard as signifying some form of 'concept' in Foucauldian terms (1972), taken on their own would appear to be relatively non-specific in their meaning. However when interpreted in the context of the resolution genre, these operate as the heads of complex evaluative noun phrases. For example, *activities* regularly co-occurs with nominalised forms that attribute minutely specified infringements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to the perpetrator, e.g., 'the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems', 'enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development', 'Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems', and 'enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities'. *Purposes* also combines frequently with 'peaceful' and 'nuclear' in phrases such as '… Iran's nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes…'.

By contrast with these two generalised words, which achieve specificity through their extension and nominalisation, two other resolution keywords *safeguards* and *vigilance* refer to procedures which become reified through their association with institutional processes. For example, *safeguards* refers to the *Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement*, a contract that non-nuclear-weapon states are required to sign with the IAEA under the

NPT, that 'obliges states not to use nuclear material to make weapons or other explosive devices'. *Vigilance* also combines regularly with the verb 'exercise' and 'States' in phrases such as: '…calls upon all Member States to exercise vigilance and prevent specialised teaching or training of DPRK nationals within their territories or by their nationals, of disciplines which could contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon delivery system'.

Objects: Nuclear Weapons Technology

A central theme of both corpora is a distinctive lexis which describes different forms of technology relating to nuclear weapons. In our reinterpretation of our corpus data for this chapter, we therefore posit that this lexis which constitutes nuclear weapons technology constitutes the principal 'objects' of this particular discursive formation. Within the UNSC resolutions, *nuclear* emerged as one of the strongest keywords to signify the type of materiel which is under contention. Top collocates of *nuclear* in the resolutions corpus are 'Iran', occurring often in clauses and phrases signifying it as a perpetrator of proliferation, as well as 'weapons', 'programme' and 'proliferation'. While the phrase 'nuclear weapons' occurs regularly within both corpora, 'weapons' appears particularly within the resolutions in the complex nominal phrases which often typify more technical texts, such as full references to the NPT ('Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons') and repeated phrases such as 'proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons'. While 'Iran' and 'programme' co-occur in both corpora in a recurrent nominalisation of the actor's culpability, the contextualisation tends to vary across the two different text types. For example, this excerpt, from Resolution 1747, maintains the hope that Iran still has the potential to develop its nuclear programme for 'peaceful purposes'.

> Expresses the conviction that …. full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran's nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes… (UNSC 2007)

Other collocates of *nuclear* within the resolutions corpus further reflect the relatively measured tone of this text type. These include a more technical language which conveys a certain degree of positivity and scientificity, particularly when compared with the broadsheets analysed in the next section, e.g.: 'development', 'activities', 'non-proliferation' and 'peaceful'. For example, the association between *nuclear* and 'peaceful' emerges quite markedly from expressions of intent such as:

> For their part, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union High Representative state their readiness:
>
> - to recognize Iran's right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with its NPT obligations;
> - to treat Iran's nuclear programme in the same manner as that of any Non-nuclear Weapon State Party to the NPT once international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme is restored. (UNSC 2010)

Also, repeated phrases such as 'proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities' or 'the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems' appear relatively 'scientific' and value-neutral through the complexity of their nominalisation and technical nature of their lexis.

While the strong keyword *nuclear* emerges as emblematic of the set of events which were unfolding internationally around the non-proliferation 'contention', another set of lexical items signifies the materiel involved in nuclear weapons proliferation. When compared with the BNC, the strongest keywords relating to nuclear materiel appeared to relate to two distinct semantic fields: those keywords which name specific types of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), such as *weapon(s)*, *missile* and *ballistic*; and those nuclear materials which might only potentially be used for WMDs: 'enrichment-related', 'industries', 'water-related' and 'energy'. As one would expect, collocates of *weapons* in the UNSC resolutions include 'mass' and 'destruction'—both recurring regularly in the formulaic phrase 'weapons of mass destruction'. However, more surprising within a small corpus focusing on nuclear non-proliferation is the emergence of 'chemical' and 'biological' as the top collocates of *weapons*. This is illustrated within the repeated clause:

> Remaining gravely concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that non state actors may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery. (UNSC 2011)

In addition, the keywords *missile* and *ballistic* tend to co-occur in the phrase 'ballistic missile'. An R1 concordance search reveals that this compound noun in turn often features in complex, technical, noun phases such as 'ballistic missile program(me)(s)', 'ballistic missile-related', 'ballistic missile activities' and 'ballistic missile technology'. Again, the overall stylistic tendency of the UNSC resolutions towards these semantically dense 'technological' forms of nominalisation characterise its tone of rationality, objectivity and scientificity (after Fairclough 2003). The texture of the highly specialised lexis relating to non-weapons materials (e.g., *enrichment-related*, *water-related*) can best be illustrated by this extract from Resolution 1737 (Fig. 9.4). Here, the rhetorical task of the resolution is to set out concisely the precise specification of the materials which member States are prohibited from conveying to the antagonistic state actor, Iran.

However, it appears to be a tactic of the discourse of the resolutions discourse to combine the 'stick' with the 'carrot'. Elsewhere, while the



4. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of the following items, materials, equipment, goods and technology:

(a) those set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part2 of document S/2006/814 if the State determines that they would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities;

(b) any other items not listed in documents S/2006/814 or S/2006/815 if the State determines that they would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

Fig. 9.4 Extract from UNSC Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006a)

three most frequently occurring collocates of the keywords ‘energy’, ‘atomic’, ‘international’ and ‘agency’ combine in the nominal group ‘International Atomic Energy Agency’ to signify one of the legitimising agents of the UNSC, it is notable that ‘peaceful’ continues to feature as a top collocate, even in the positioning of Iran within these documents, e.g.:

> Iran’s right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with its NPT obligations (UNSC 2010)

Public Sphere: Broadsheets

Both UNSC resolutions and media texts circulate within the discursive formation of nuclear proliferation along with other texts, such as the speeches of political leaders (e.g., Schnurr et al. 2015) and social media (e.g., Krzyzanowski 2016; Krzyzanowski and Tucker 2018). Thus, we are expanding our analysis from previous empirical chapters to explore our thesis that any discursive formation is not just an ensemble of texts which is stable at one temporal point, but rather is composed of dynamic networks of texts in which meaning(s) are constructed and reconstructed according to the purposes of the particular sites in which texts are produced, transmitted and reproduced. As the discourse of nuclear proliferation is delocated from the political sphere and relocated within the public sphere, we would argue that ‘ideology is at play’ through the process of recontextualisation (after Bernstein 2000). Through analysing our selection of broadsheets in the light of the preceding analysis of UNSC resolutions, we will suggest some of the re-articulation of meanings that take place as texts are delocated from one institutional site and relocated within another.

Site of Enunciation: Political Leaders

While the discourse of nuclear proliferation within the UNSC resolutions emanates from a panoply of anonymous, technocratic fora and committees, as it is recontextualised within broadsheets it is the leading political leaders of the time who predominantly occupy the institutional sites of production in this text type. The names of the subjects that are particularly salient within the broadsheets corpus are, predictably, those of the two US Presidents over this period: *Bush* and *Obama* (also *Obama's*). Other prominent leaders featuring within the 100 strongest keywords are, unsurprisingly: *Ahmadinejad*, *Putin* and *Kim* (Table 9.3) Our analysis suggests that the transatlantic broadsheets position the political leaders of the principal nation states as the producers of accounts of nuclear proliferation. In this, the names of the two American leaders inevitably occur as top collocates of the title *President* which was also a one of the strongest keywords within the corpus, occurring 2370 times. The high frequency of this invocation of the title of the speakers, be they one of the American leaders over the period or the leader of one of the nation states positioned in an antagonistic relation to the USA-UN axis, may be one indication of the way the broadsheets underscore the institutional authority of the statements which they reproduce from these leaders in their articles.

After 'President' the next most frequently occurring collocate for *Bush*, *Obama* and the names of other political leaders, is the verbal process 'said', e.g.:

> Bush said the Iranian report "says to me that we must double our effort to work with the international community to persuade the Iranians that there is only isolation from the world if they continue working forward on such a program". (Lynch 2006)
>
> At a news conference Sunday, Obama said that the sanctions "have enormous bite and enormous scope" even though the International Atomic Energy Agency reported last week that Iran may be proceeding with its nuclear weapons program. (Nakamura 2011)

The explicit contextualisation of these statements (e.g., 'At a news conference Sunday…') illustrates in particular the double recontextualisation which is operating within the specialised modality of discourse circulating in the public sphere. Both these statements are situated within a verbal news briefing and refer to UNSC resolutions (e.g. 'the

Iranian report', 'the International Atomic Energy Agency reported…'). The verbal briefing of the political leaders is then further recontextualised within the broadsheets. The selection, repositioning and rephrasing which takes place as particular words and phrases are adopted from the UNSC documents by the 'leaders' (or rather their speech writers), and then further sampled from the news briefing by journalists, permits considerable re-interpretation on the part of other agents in the public sphere, such as newspaper editors, and provides them with the scope to imbue the broadsheet with its particular political leaning (see also Schnurr et al. 2015).

Non-nominalised signification of human agents is also salient in the broadsheets corpus, especially the general category of governmental agents, *officials*, which occurs 1346 times across the broadsheets. Top L1 collocates of *officials* mostly attribute them with nationality, e.g., 'American', 'Iranian', 'Chinese'; but also position them within their state bureaucracy, e.g., 'administration', 'senior' and 'intelligence'. As with political leaders, the verbal process is the paradigmatic action of these subjects, with both 'said' and 'say' featuring as top R1 collocates of the single lexical item 'officials'. The concordance sample in Fig. 9.5 illustrates the combination of the phrase 'American officials' with the verbal process 'say'.

Here, the use of the present tense rather than the past reinforces the truth value of the statements attributed to these subjects (Swales 1990).

Subject Positions: State Actors

As the discourse relating to nuclear proliferation is delocated from the political sphere and relocated in the public sphere, an increasing number of state actors emerge as occupying the subject positions which as constituted *within* the broadsheets. Within the public sphere, the names of ten discrete state actors featured within the 100 strongest keywords within our broadsheets corpus: e.g., *Iran, Korea (+ North), States (+ United), China*, *Iraq*, *Russia, Japan, Israel, Pakistan* and *India* (Table 9.3). In this analysis, we also note the frequent use of metonymy as a stylistic device within these texts: i.e. using the capital city to refer



Korea may be easier, American officials say. The unilateral
ion of nuclear arms. American officials say better remote mo
tan, a facility that American officials say is nowhere near
he atomic age. While American officials say that they believ
s in Mumbai -- which American officials say were most likely
gesture. This time, American officials say, they do not exp
tomic Energy Agency. American officials say that timeline is
o various countries. American officials say they believe tha
the global economy. American officials say Pakistan's triba
o various countries. American officials say they believe tha
on's top ranks down, American officials say they would almos

Fig. 9.5 Concordance sample of 'American officials' + 'say'

to the country, as in *Washington, Tehran, Tokyo* and *Beijing*—which were also strong keywords in the broadsheets—as well as the far less salient *Pyongyang*. By contrast, within the political sphere (resolutions) metonymy is never used as a rhetorical device.

However of these, the most salient state actor remains Iran, which is positioned prominently both in its literal (*Iran*) and in its metonymic form (*Tehran*), occurring 4032 and 575 times respectively across the broadsheets corpus. As with the resolutions corpus, 'nuclear' also occurs as a top collocate of *Iran*, which in turn also co-occurs with 'North' and 'Korea'. 'Nuclear' appears in the phrases 'nuclear Iran', 'nuclear-armed Iran' and 'nuclear-weapons-capable Iran', attributive noun phrases which never appear in the UNSC resolutions. In the broadsheets *Iran* is also more often associated with the phrase 'nuclear weapons' rather than 'nuclear programme' as in the UNSC discourse, as illustrated in Fig. 9.6. The example is extracted from concordance data relating to the collocation of 'nuclear' with *Iran*, sorted three words to the right. It illustrates how the phrase 'nuclear weapons', particularly when preceded by the material processes 'develop', 'achieve', 'get', 'acquire' and 'build', implies there is a greater immediacy associated with the threat of attack.

'Nuclear' is also a top collocate of the metonymic positioning of this state actor within the broadsheets corpus through the use of the lexical



N	Concordance
96	said supported the goal of preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons.
97	stronger efforts by the West to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons.
98	, the renminbi, or on how to keep Iran from developing nuclear weapons.
99	that the United States will not allow Iran to achieve nuclear weapons
100	convinced that it must not allow Iran to get nuclear weapons and is
101	more important to us to make sure that Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons,
102	and it does need to see that nations like Iran do not acquire nuclear weapons or
103	for all people, including Iranians, if Iran does not build nuclear weapons.

Fig. 9.6 Concordance data (broadsheets corpus): Iran associated with 'nuclear weapons'

item *Tehran* to signify Iran. This collocation is often used in the context of the explicit recontextualisation of a document produced by the UN and other fora within the political sphere e.g.:

> Russia has rejected as "unacceptable" EU calls for further sanctions against Iran in the wake of a UN report that Tehran had experimented with nuclear weapon designs… (Borger 2012)
>
> Officials from several countries said the proposal indicates that there is still an appetite for significant new punitive measures against Iran even after the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate last week concluded that Tehran had halted its nuclear weapons program four years ago. (Wright 2007)

Another stylistic shift which takes place as the discourse of nuclear proliferation is recontextualised from the political sphere to the public sphere is the change in the referent used for North Korea. Within the resolutions, North Korea is almost in variably referred to as the 'DPRK' (Democratic People's Republic of North Korea); however, within the broadsheets, the state actor is referred to usually as 'North Korea' (occurring 791 times), and hardly ever as the 'DPRK' (which occurs only nine times across the entire broadsheets corpus). As the defining lexical item in this discursive formation, 'nuclear' once again appears as a top collocate of 'North Korea', mostly occurring in the L3 position in repeated phrases which build up the association, such as 'nuclear crisis with North Korea', 'nuclear proliferation in North Korea', and 'nuclear crisis in North Korea'.

What is more striking, however, in the recontextualisation of the discourse of nuclear proliferation to the public sphere is the homogenizing association of Iran with North Korea that takes place in the discourse of the elite press. This stands in contrast to the UNSC discourse, which constructs each nation state as an individual case. By contrast, *Iran* and *North Korea* both emerge as mutual collocates within the corpus, co-occurring regularly both in the combinations 'Iran and North Korea' and 'North Korea and Iran' in a sinister echo of G.W Bush's disastrous 2002 'axis of evil' speech (see Chapter 2). Here, we find the usual litany of lexis accompanying these combinations, e.g.

> Mr. Bush, who has taken a hard line against nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea, negotiated the atomic energy pact during a visit to India in March, …. (Stolberg 2006)
>
> …the United States was eager for Chinese cooperation in preventing nuclear proliferation in North Korea and Iran. (Calmes 2011)

Concordance data also reveals several examples where figurative language is used to achieve the collective 'otherisation' of the homogenised adversary. These include the use of: first, hyperbole, which projects exaggerated and unsubstantiated future actions onto these two states in phrases such as 'the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran…' and 'the more potent threats of North Korea and Iran …'; secondly, metaphor, such as 'efforts to deny gangsters in North Korea and Iran …', 'caught in a quagmire in North Korea and Iran …', 'greater threats loomed in North Korea and Iran …', 'keys to the deadly puzzles of North Korea and Iran …', 'posturing being done by North Korea and Iran …'; and, finally, even a touch of bathos, as in 'small powers with small arsenals, i.e. North Korea and Iran….'.

As well as *Iran* and *North Korea*, *United* and *States* are also salient lexical times in the broadsheets, with the both words occurring together 1909 times across the corpus. As with the webpages of the US security services analysed in the next chapter, one of the more productive collocates of *United States* was the conjunction 'and', which occurred frequently, mainly in the R1 position. Further analysis revealed that here the discourse of the broadsheets was used in a fashion more similar to that of the resolutions, in order to indicate the discursive constitution of grouping of nations—generally in opposition to 'Iran' or 'North Korea'—mainly highlighting the other permanent members of the Security Council, e.g., 'United States and China', 'United States and Russia', 'United States and Europe'; and also 'United States and its allies'.

Concepts

The three strongest keywords in the broadsheets corpus which related to the constitution of 'concepts' emerged as similar to the resolutions corpus: *proliferation*, *program* and *nonproliferation* (Table 9.3). The top collocates of *proliferation* in the broadsheets corpus were revealed as being not only—as in the resolutions corpus—'nuclear' and 'treaty', but also 'terrorism'. In contrast with the resolutions corpus where it only occurs once, 'nuclear' and *proliferation* frequently combine in the totalising phrase 'nuclear proliferation', which occurs within across the broadsheets 1118 times. As the concept of *proliferation* is delocated from the site of production in the political sphere (UNSC) and relocated in the site of recontextualisation in the public sphere, this phrase also becomes linked hyperbolically with *terrorism*, as a top collocate occurring 84 times to signify an over-arching, existential menace, e.g.: 'Terrorism and nuclear proliferation remain the predominant threats of our time…' (Bolton 2010). Moreover, these threats are 'global', which occurs 83 times as a collocate of 'nuclear proliferation', for example, in an emphatic critique of Russia's 2006 hosting of the G8:

> … global leadership brings with it a responsibility to grapple seriously with global problems, of which nuclear proliferation is among the most pressing… (n.a., *The Washington Post*, 2006)

Similar evidence of the linguistic strategies of recontextualisation is afforded by the difference in the three-way combinations of 'treaty' with 'nuclear' and 'proliferation' in the broadsheets corpus when compared with the resolutions corpus. In the broadsheets, these three lexical items always combine in the contracted noun phrase 'the non-proliferation treaty' both with and without the premodifier 'nuclear', and with and without capital letters. Likewise, the acronym 'NPT' appears *only* in the newspaper corpus. The conventions of exophora would suggest that both these contractions are only permissible because the longer form has been established prior, within the wider discursive network of meanings, and can therefore be presupposed within the newspaper reports. Within the public sphere, 'non-proliferation treaty' is also subjected to a distinctive range of negative evaluative lexis: these range from more prosaic premodifications such as 'poorly observed…' and 'somewhat fragile, threadbare…'; to more figurative tropes which veer from the dramatic, e.g. 'blew open…'—to the slightly absurd, e.g. 'drive a coach and horses through….'. Within the broadsheets corpus, top collocates of *program* again signify: either its apocalyptic nature, for example in association with 'nuclear', 'weapons', 'enrichment', 'uranium'; or its attribution, for example with 'Iran's', 'Iran', 'North' and 'Korea's'. As in the resolutions, 'peaceful' again featured as a top collocate of *program*; however, in the broadsheets many of the invocations of 'peaceful' are mitigated, for example in 'Iran contends that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes…'. (Sanger and Broad 2008).

Apart from these three central concepts, which are broadly similar to those used in the political sphere, other key lexis signifying concepts in the broadsheets emerges as distinct from those in the UNSC resolutions. The most markedly different of these was the emergence of *crisis* as a strong keyword, occurring 623 times across the broadsheets corpus; whereas there was not a single instance of this lexical item in the UNSC resolutions. Top collocates of *crisis* relevant to our enquiry include 'nuclear', 'Iran', 'Iranian', 'global', 'North', 'Korea' and 'Korean'. These emerge in part from numerous direct attributions to specific actors, such as 'Iranian nuclear crisis', 'Iran's nuclear crisis', 'North Korean nuclear crisis'. However, once again the 'nuclear crisis' is also constructed as being 'global' in its scope, e.g.:

> …one more invasion might just do the job and solve the global crisis of nuclear proliferation at the same time… (O'Sullivan 2006)

Another point of contrast that occurs within the broadsheets corpus is that the theme of sanctions emerges as a recurrent topic, while being not at all salient in the UNSC corpus. The keyword *sanctions* occurs 1022 times across the broadsheets corpus—often in relation to 'Iran', which features along with 'economic' as top collocates, to describe their nature. *Sanctions* also appears in the company of a range of adversarial lexis, such as the preposition 'against' and the verb 'impose', as well as 'tougher', 'pressure', 'tough' and 'threat'. However, part of the reason for the greater salience of *sanctions* within the broadsheets corpus is that much of lexis surrounding it is speculative, such as the modal verb phrase in this clause: 'The security council could impose worldwide sanctions but such a proposal could be vetoed by Russia or China'. *Security* also appears as a distinctively strong keyword, often emerging as a concept that becomes reified within the proper name of organisations, not least the 'United Nations Security Council, but also the U.S. 'National Security Council'. Where *security* is referenced existentially in the broadsheets, it is either attributed to the collectivity of the writer and the reader of the newspaper by being pre-modified by 'our', e.g., 'It is, we are told, "rogue states" that now imperil our security'; or is pre-modified by some indication of its scope. The most frequent collocate of this type is 'global', often invoked in the context of expressing severe concerns, here with reference to the UNSC itself: 'the structure created to maintain global security is failing'.

Objects: Nuclear Weapons Technology

As in the resolutions corpus, the leitmotif of the broadsheets corpus is a distinctive lexis which constitutes different forms of technology relating to nuclear weapons. However, as we shall see, the broadsheets differ from the resolutions in as much as they seem to employ a rather more alarmist tone to present the issues relating to nuclear proliferation. This entails the occasional substitution of and, in some cases, the actual introduction of a distinctive lexis which relates to their chosen theme.

In our reinterpretation of the data for this chapter, we now posit that the lexis of nuclear weapons technology in both corpora constitutes the 'objects' of this particular discursive formation. Within the resolutions corpus, *nuclear* emerged as the strongest keyword to signify the type of materiel under contention. Possibly in part due to its inclusion as a search term for the corpus compilation, *nuclear* was also the strongest keyword within the broadsheets corpus, occurring a total of 8374 times. Some collocates of *nuclear* were also common to both corpora—in particular 'Iran', often in clauses and phrases signifying it as a perpetrator of proliferation; as well as 'weapons', 'programme'/'program' and 'proliferation'. While 'Iran' and 'program(me)' co-occur with *nuclear* in both corpora through the recurrent nominalisation of the culpability of the recalcitrant state actor, the contextualisation is rather different in the broadsheets, e.g.:

> …weigh the risks of a failure to impede Iran's nuclear program sufficiently against the risks of a military strike. (Coats and Robb 2008)

This extract from a *Washington Post* editorial is fairly typical of the broadsheets in engaging in a sustained problematisation of the choice between diplomatic and military intervention, particularly by the USA.

The differences between the collocates of *nuclear* across the two corpora also reveal the rather more condemnatory tone of the broadsheets corpus. As we have seen, uniquely within the newspaper corpus, 'crisis' frequently occurs as a collocate of *nuclear*, to which each of the individual theatres of nuclear problematisation in the transatlantic press is attributed, e.g.: 'the Iran nuclear crisis', 'the Iranian nuclear crisis' and 'the North Korean nuclear crisis'. However, other collocates of *nuclear* include 'weapons', 'Iran' and 'power'. These words can combine in such blatant dramatisations of events as this extract from *The Washington Post* (2009):

> Ahmadinejad sat without obvious reaction as Obama chided Iran for its pursuit of nuclear weapons, saying its actions – and similar efforts by North Korea – "threaten to take us down this dangerous slope" that makes the world less secure. (Shear and Balz 2009)

As we have seen, both corpora are characterised by the range of lexis employed to signify the technology of nuclear proliferation (Tables 9.2 and 9.3). While 'nuclear' is used to typify the set of events which are unfolding, another set of lexical items signify the material which is involved in nuclear weapons proliferation. Once again, the strongest keywords relating to nuclear material in the broadsheets seemed to relate to two distinct semantic fields: those keywords which name specific types of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and those keywords which relate to nuclear materials which might not necessarily be used for WMDs (Table 9.4).

In relation to lexis which appears to be directly related to the construction of WMDs, we have already noted that *weapons* and *missile* are also strong keywords in the UNSC resolutions. However, *world* emerges as a top collocate of *weapons* only in the newspaper corpus. This can be used to occasionally realise a note of optimism not found within the resolutions, recurring regularly in the phrase 'world free of nuclear weapons', here in an overgeneralised recontextualisation of Resolution 1887:

> President Obama hailed the unanimous passing of an "historic" UN Security Council resolution aimed at ridding the world of nuclear weapons. (Philp 2009)

By contrast, *military* and *bomb* are strong keywords definitely related to WMD which are found uniquely in the broadsheets. Indeed, like 'crisis' and 'war' in the previous section, the word 'bomb' does not appear at all in the resolutions corpus. The top lexical collocates of *military* are 'action', 'nuclear' and—once again—'Iran'. A cluster analysis of *military* (Table 9.5) suggests that, as the 'contention' over nuclear proliferation is recontextualised in the public sphere, it appears to coalesce around the discursive

Table 9.4 Keywords relating to nuclear weapons technology (broadsheets corpus)

Direct WMD-related lexis			Potential WMD-related lexis		
Keyword	Frequency	Keyness (LL)	Keyword	Frequency	Keyness (LL)
Weapons	2143	11,462	Energy	900	12,098
Military	1530	4642	Uranium	1068	7597
Bomb	641	2464	Enrichment	562	4070
Missile	431	2248	Atomic	606	3259
			Plant	967	2431
			Fuel	603	1891
			Centrifuges	221	1802
			Enriched	286	1601

Table 9.5 Cluster analysis MILITARY (broadsheets corpus)

Cluster	Frequency
A military strike	28
Military action against	23
Action against Iran	16
For military action	12
Of military action	12
Military strike on	10

construction of a possible intervention by one or more state actors against Iran.

In the same vein, top lexical collocates of *bomb* emerge as ‘nuclear’, ‘build’, ‘atomic’ and ‘Iran’. The following concordance sample of Iran as a collocate of *bomb*, in an L4 position (Fig. 9.7) illustrates the way in which, as the discourse of nuclear proliferation is delocated from the political sphere and relocated into the public sphere, this lexis is introduced and combined in different ways.

In relation to the most salient non-WMD nuclear material in the broadsheets corpus, the three most frequently occurring collocates of *energy*, ‘atomic’, ‘international’ and ‘agency’ combine in the nominal group *International Atomic Energy Agency* to make it the strongest keyword in this category. It is also notable that ‘peaceful’ is a collocate of ‘energy’ in both corpora, e.g.

> Under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), to which Tehran is a signatory, Iran has the right to a peaceful nuclear energy programme, … (Borger 2012).



if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, the balance of power in th
top Iran building a nuclear bomb. He used the second day of
lay, an Iran with the atomic bomb would run a coach-and-horse
of Iran achieving a nuclear bomb has little to do with Israeli
eping Iran from gaining the bomb. For Democrats, the opposite

Fig. 9.7 Concordance sample of ‘bomb’ + ‘Iran’

Along with many other texts, the extract above from the *Guardian* echoes the resolutions in upholding Iran's right as a signatory for the NPT to maintain a nuclear energy programme as long as it is 'peaceful'. By way of contrast, while the UNSC resolutions corpus prominently featured the more nuanced compound adjectives *enrichment-related* and *water-related*, they are not at all salient in the broadsheets. Rather we find in the process of recontextualisation that a more direct, prosaic lexis is used to describe the manufacture of potentially WMD-ready materials by antagonistic state actors. For example, the strong keyword *uranium* collocates frequently with the lemma 'enrich' in its different grammatical forms (i.e. 'enrichment', 'enriched', 'enrich' 'enriching') rather than the modulated compound form found in the resolutions.

Conclusion

This chapter has compared a corpus of UNSC resolutions with topically comparable articles from prominent broadsheets, which are produced and circulated in the USA and the UK, in order to investigate what 'contradictions', 'changes' and 'transformations' took place (after Foucault 1972) as this discourse of nuclear proliferation was delocated from the political sphere and relocated in the public sphere. In this, we analysed how two aspects of the 'enunciative modalities' of this particular discursive formation were constituted in these documents, as well as their 'objects' and the concepts'. The first 'enunciative' aspect of the discourse (Foucault 1972) was the institutional position which was constructed in the texts from which the subject spoke. We found that the position of the enunciating subject in the resolutions was occupied predominantly by the UN Security Council itself, and its agents, predominantly the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); whereas in the broadsheets the position from which the subjects spoke was—quite literally—that of the political leadership of the day, and in particular the presidency of USA which was occupied over that period by George W. Bush and Barack Obama; as well as the presidencies of the principal nation states constituted as antagonists in this discourse, occupied by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran and Kim Jong-il (succeeded by Kim Jong-un in 2011). The other aspect of the enunciative modality of these texts was the subject positions that were interpellated for the actors within the texts. Here, there was less difference between the two text types, with both the resolutions and the broadsheets constituting nation states as principal actors in the discourse. However within the broadsheets there was a greater spread of state actors, and some stylistic tropes such as: the avoidance of acronymic reference to 'North Korea'; and the use of metonymy to mitigate reference to the principal antagonists in the discourse—'Washington' and 'Tehran'.

There was, however, greater difference in terms of the construction of the concepts within each discursive site. The resolutions were mainly confined to restricted, but rather complex language which was both technical and scientific in its nature, as if to set out objectively and dispassionately the technical nature of conditions of nuclear development in the two antagonistic countries, Iran and North Korea. By contrast, we found even in the relatively staid national broadsheets under investigation, more alarmist and potentially inflammatory concepts used: in particular, the exclusive use of the word 'crisis', which we never found in the Security Council resolutions. And finally, the most salient objects in this discursive formation emerged as being related to the semantic field of nuclear technology. Here, we found more complex, scientistic and 'value-neutral' lexis in the resolutions; and a simpler, more direct lexis in the broadsheets. The findings so far, appear to endorse our thesis that Foucault's 'archaeological' categories can be productive in for the analysis of the discourse of nuclear proliferation. These strategies of discourse are mobilised as the discourse is delocated from one site and relocated in another site. What these strategies are, and how they are operationalised, we will address in the final chapter of this book (Chapter 11), where we will consider in particular the 'transformations' that take place according to the tactics of recontextualisation (after Bernstein 2000).

Notes

1. This chapter reinterprets data collected as part of a multidisciplinary research project carried out at the University of Warwick, UK under the auspices of the Global Research Priorities (Global Governance). Our thanks are due to other members of the project team—Alexandra Homolar, Lena Rethel, Stephanie Schnurr and Rachelle Vessey—for granting us permission to draw on the data in this chapter (CLiGG 2012, available at: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/research/priorities/globalgovernance/projects/global_crisis_leadership/). The research developed in this chapter was supported by University of Warwick Strategic Award (RDF1063).
2. In this respect, our analysis that follows in this chapter differs from that of MacDonald et al. (2015), which carried out a keyword analysis of the UNSC resolutions corpus by comparing the sub-corpus of resolutions relating to nuclear proliferation with a reference corpus comprising all the resolutions agreed by the UNSC 2006–2012.
3. This was not the case in our previous analysis (MacDonald et al. 2015), since in order to fit the purposes of the research project at the time (Crisis Leadership in Global Governance, CliGG), we used as reference corpus a larger corpus of documents of the same genre, UNSC resolutions. Since the compound 'United Nations Security Council' occurred frequently in both the corpus under analysis and the reference corpus, it did not feature as key in our earlier analysis.

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10

Discourse of Post-9/11 US Security Organisations

In Chapter 8 we described how, in the aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Centre (2001) and the London Transport System (2005), the security operation surrounding the 2012 London Olympics was constructed through the webpages of organisations involved with its planning and implementation. This revealed a refocusing of security discourse around a number of 'banoptic' discursive strategies (after Bigo 2008) such as exceptionalism, exclusion and prediction. However, 9/11 also had a dramatic impact on the discursive constitution of the security services in the USA. It was widely believed that the American security services had failed to prevent the attacks. This perceived failure impacted so much part on the public consciousness that it has provided the tacit backdrop to popular films such as *Zero Dark Thirty* (Bigelow 2012) and long-running television series such as *Homeland* (Gansa et al. 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2017), which have been watched by millions of viewers on both sides of the Atlantic, and worldwide.

As well as a panoply of other criticisms of their shortcomings, the *9/11 Commission Report* (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004) lead to a root and branch re-organisation of the US security services. Not least, was the recommendation for

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the increased use of intelligence and its dispersal amongst allied entities. This included the sharing of intelligence, not just bilaterally with other countries (Reveron 2006), but also across agencies (Rovner and Long 2005). For Svendsen (2008) this constituted a drive towards a 'globalization' and 'homogenisation' of intelligence through a process of 'international standardisation'. In this respect, the reframing of the security services also seemed to embrace the decategorisation of what lies within, and what lies beyond, the hypostatised boundaries of the modern nation state (Bigo 2008; Vaughan-William 2009; Walker 1993). According to Svendsen (2012), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 'tries to fulfil the twin roles of being both a domestic intelligence and a security/law enforcement agency…as [it] tried to operate both domestically and abroad…' (p. 283). One additional focus of the sharing of intelligence within the USA was to make the boundaries more porous between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—conventionally associated with the collection and monitoring of intelligence outside the USA, and the FBI—conventionally associated with the collection and monitoring of intelligence within the USA. Permeability within the state was consolidated by the creation of the new institution of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in November 2002 (Brattberg 2012), under whose aegis 22 agencies were consolidated. Included were agencies as diverse as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)—notorious for its role during Hurricane Katrina—and the Animal and Health Inspection Service (Martin and Simon 2008).

Against this background, in this chapter we will engage with the discourse of the remodelled US security services in order to examine how they portray themselves in the public domain in the wake of the reforms initiated after the *9/11 Commission Report*. In what follows, we will examine a selection of public-facing texts, generated by the US security agencies, in order to explore two views of these changes which draw on the ideas set out in the earlier chapters of this book. The first is, once again, the theme of exceptionalism (Agamben 2005) that we observed in Chapter 8, as being manifested on the webpages for the London Olympics. A second perspective, not yet so widely deployed by commentators on security developments, is that the security services have transformed their practices so as to together attain the characteristics of a discipline, or 'discursive formation' (after Foucault 1972). On this argument, as post-9/11 reforms have taken hold, security agencies have increasingly come to construct intelligence as a form of expertly constituted knowledge, as well as the basis for a new type of professional, disciplinary power. After analysing the discourse which is produced, transmitted and reproduced by actors at the forefront of the US security enterprise, we then go on to evaluate evidence for the plausibility of these two theories.

Discourse of US Security Services

As we have seen in Chapter 6, Giorgio Agamben's (1998, 2005) theory of the state of exception has been widely acknowledged (e.g. Colatrella 2011; Humphreys 2006) as providing a plausible framework to critique contemporary security events and place them within the context of a broader history. We will draw on this once again within this chapter in order to theorise some of the new rationalities which the contemporary US security services put forward to justify their reconstitution in the wake of 9/11. Apart from its acknowledged theoretical consistency and rootedness in historical research, one reason to engage with Agamben's particular vision of the post-9/11 landscape in this chapter is the extent of its influence in a range of contemporary discourses. Numerous instances of journalistic and political discourse in the UK and US draw strongly from his insights. Looking at one obvious example, the first and last of the ten steps described in Naomi Wolf's (2007) *The Guardian* article 'Fascist America, in 10 Easy Steps' are as follows: firstly, 'invoke a terrifying internal and external enemy'; and finally, 'suspend the rule of law'. In 2014 a spokesperson of a UK Parliamentary committee rehearsed similar language when explaining that the UK state may be using the 'War against Terror' as a pretext for its expansion:

> [S]ince 9/11, the government has continuously justified many of its counter terrorism measures on the basis that there is a public emergency threatening the life of the nation […] we are concerned that the government's approach means, that in effect, there is a permanent state of emergency

> and that this inevitably has a deleterious effect on the public debate about the justification for counter terrorism'. (in Alibhai-Brown 2014)

The Academy, too, has embraced Agamben's ideas and regards them as timely evaluations of our condition. Colatrella (2011) explains that conferences dedicated to his themes are routinely held, and literature generated to describe 'new acts of aggrandizement by state powers […]' (p. 98).

Agamben's ideas have not, however, been spared criticism. A common complaint, reiterated in Colatrella's (2011) critique of his work, is that his analysis cleaves too closely to the pessimistic, statist perspective (espoused famously by Schmitt 1985/1922) that it seeks to expose. Agamben's theory is also criticised as monolithic and excessively deterministic. As a further observation, Genel (2006) judges that Agamben's appropriation of the notion of pervasive biopower (after Foucault 1979)—the process whereby modern governments seek to regulate 'the biological processes affecting populations' (Genel 2006, p. 45)—repurposes Foucault's open-ended 'hypothesis' towards his own 'thesis' (p. 46), in which biopower remains firmly in the possession of the state. For Foucault (1979, 2004, 2007, 2008), biopower presents itself as an alternative to, rather than a possession of, sovereignty.

Performative aspects of the documents, exercises and topographies which ensued in the wake of the *9/11 Commission Report* have been addressed by two papers from the field of geography. Martin and Simon (2008) analyse five strategy documents produced by the DHS. Taking a theoretical perspective similar to our own, they draw on Agamben's (1998, 2005) theory to argue that the DHS maintains a 'state of exception' through the discursive construction and maintenance of continuous threat. This is realised virtually in time and space through the discursive articulation of 'vulnerability' and 'preparedness'. In other words, within the DHS strategy documents 'future disasters are treated as real, despite the fact that their actual appearance in the world has not occurred' (p. 286). The temporal and topographical dimensions of the critique articulated by Martin and Simon, chime with Patricia Dunmire's more specifically discourse analytic studies. These trace the legitimation of the doctrine of pre-emptive action through the realisation of the future 'threat' in US National Security Strategy documents and Presidential speeches issued in the wake of 9/11 (2011). Most recently, she has also argued how, spatially, US security discourse 'provides the rationale for an expansionist security strategy that focuses on shaping global society in ways that accord with US values and interests' (2015, p. 298).

Against the wider historical background of strategic studies discourse since the Cold War, Morrissey (2011) also engages with one particular institutional site, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. This provides the unifying element in his exploration of the 'discursive tactics' used in calling for a long-term commitment of US forces to oversee American political and economic interests in the Middle East (p. 442). For Morrissey, the reductive 'imaginative geographies' of the military-strategic complex 'not only support the operations of the US geopolitical and geo-economic calculation in the Middle East; they also contribute to a pervasive and predominant cultural discourse on the region that has all the hallmarks of Orientalism' (2011, p. 449).

Corpus Construction and Analysis

For the corpus, we selected webpages produced by agencies most affected by security reforms, looking in particular: first, at new agencies, such as the DHS, recently formed to deal with the special new threat; and secondly, existing agencies such as the FBI, reformed as a result of extensive post-9/11 recommendations to meet the changed threat. Our purpose was therefore to identify texts generated by the new and reformed agencies for the purpose of publicly explaining their security functions. Ultimately, 175 mainly short texts were assembled as a corpus (see Table 10.1).

Having established a corpus purposed towards the functions of our research, texts were analysed applying a variation in the three-phase process described in more detail in Chapter 5, and previously carried out in Chapter 8. Our primary approach was to apply corpus-based, machine-driven tools to identify central topics and ideas. Corpus tools were then applied intensively using a combination of concordance, collocation,

Table 10.1 US security agency webpage corpus

Agency	Texts	Words
FBI	82	46,527
DHS	62	22,566
National Counter-terrorism Centre	8	3238
FEMA	7	1359
BCT State	6	4404
Office of Director of National Intelligence	6	3492
Federation of American Scientists (FASA)	2	284
Treasury	2	49,851
Total	175	131,721

and cluster data to reveal cross-corpus variations in linguistic phenomena identified previously in the sample. To supplement this mostly quantitative, machine-driven analysis, in the next phase, a smaller number of 'core texts' were identified using an automated key-keywords (KKWs) procedure (Scott and Tribble 2006) which isolated documents in which key themes were most densely concentrated. Then, these documents were treated and coded for linguistic features and preliminary themes. Words and phrases which were selected for interpretation were also cross-checked via themes suggested by the keyword and keyword distribution data.

Discourse of Exception

From this three-stage approach two identifiable set of findings emerge in relation to the construction of exceptional conditions within our corpus: first, we identified schemes that are linked by warrants related to the argument of exception (after Wodak 2001); secondly, we observed the selection of lexis which establishes semantic fields which support exceptionalism.

Argument Schemes Linked By Warrants (*'Topoi'*)

Three different types of relevant argument scheme emerged from our data: two types which are variations ('Exceptional Threat and Danger', 'New Rules Hold') on the warrant of Danger and in contrast, a contrarian variation ('Business as Usual') on the warrant of History. In what follows, we analyse the principal 'warrants', or 'topoi', relating to the argument of exceptionalism (after Wodak 2001; see also Chapter 4). Three different types of relevant argument scheme emerged from our data: two types which are variations ('Exceptional Threat and Danger', 'New Rules Hold') on the warrant of Danger; and in contrast, a contrarian variation ('Business as Usual') on the warrant of History.

Argument Schemes Linked by a Warrant of 'Exceptional Threat and Danger'

Argument schemes were observable in the core documents within which complete, easily identifiable elements of argument and conclusion were visible. In the following instances, linking words clearly delineate argument statements and connect them to their associated conclusions:

> [argument] Because of the tragedy of September 11, [conclusion] it is more important than ever that state and local governments communicate with law enforcement and first responders quickly. (#BoJ-TRAINING)
>
> [argument] Protecting the country from ever-evolving, transnational threats [conclusion] requires a strengthened homeland security enterprise that shares information across traditional organizational boundaries. (#DHS-HOMELAND3)

Perhaps the most detailed scheme, and one which comes closest to explicitly rehearsing its underpinning warrant, is the following:

> The Challenge
>
> [argument] The United States faces a continuing terrorist threat from al-Qaida and other groups and individuals who subscribe to violent extremism […]. [conclusion] To secure our future, we must continue to strengthen our international coalition against terrorism, build foreign partner capacity to mitigate terrorist threats, reinforce resilience against attacks, and counter the ideologies and ideas that fuel violent extremism around the world. (#BCT-BUREAU)

These argument schemes deploy rhetoric that is consistent with the exceptionalist purpose. An argument is present in each case that highlights the changed circumstances of the aftermath of 9/11, and links to a conclusion describing a necessary response to the argued threat. The background warrant we can infer from the schemes is also as predicted; conditions of extraordinary danger require a response that is commensurable to the threat presented. Less consistent, however, is the content of the conclusions rehearsed in these schemes. They do not generally reference the juridical measures, either the expansion of police and military powers, or the imposition of restrictive laws, that are predicted by Agamben's characterisation of the exceptionalist state, as we outlined in Chapter 6. Rather, they tend to depict what appear to be largely bureaucratic, organisational responses aimed at promoting processes of cooperation, and dissolving institutional boundaries that prevent information sharing. This difference will be observed in much of the argumentation analysed in our investigation.

While complete statements are sometimes visible in our texts, arguments are often presented (as in Wodak 2001) using the device of a particular word or phrase. As we have seen with reference to the London Olympics corpus, the frequent deployment of 'new' in the core texts represents a subtle example of such a tactic:

> New terrorist threats will require innovative strategies, creative diplomacy, and stronger partnerships. (#BCT-BUREAU)
>
> Like America's citizens, our nation's law enforcement officers face new challenges to responding effectively to terrorism. (#BoJ-TRAINING)

'New' (occurring 171 times across the corpus), here packages assumptions that the dangers presented by contemporary terrorism are unpredictable, and therefore of unusual concern. Its selection contributes to an atmosphere of uncertainty and particular 'unease' (after Bigo 2008), preparing the rhetorical ground for the presentation of an extensive, wide-ranging response. Looking beyond the core texts, 'new' is deployed in precisely this way in numerous instances, e.g.:

> New terrorist threats will require innovative strategies, creative diplomacy, […]. (#BoJ-TRAINING)

> […] we are uniquely positioned to respond to the changing world with its new adversaries and threats. (#FBI-NATIONAL6)

In the following passage an instance of parallelism can be observed in which 'new' is repeated in both argument (once) and conclusion (twice), reinforcing the connection between the two elements as well as their shared background warrant:

> [argument] Like America's citizens, our nation's law enforcement officers face new challenges to responding effectively to terrorism. [conclusion] To meet these challenges, law enforcement officers must have the training and resources they need to prevent future tragedies. Local and state governments must find new ways to quickly disseminate threat information and rally first responders in the event of an attack. They must also learn new ways to work with the community […]. (#BoJ-TRAINING)

A similar rhetorical purpose is achieved by the use of 'today', (occurring 50 times across the corpus):

> According to program director Daniel DeSimone, "DSAC bridges the information-sharing divide between the public and private sector" on the many security threats facing today's businesses. (#FBI-NATIONAL)

An interesting mirror image of this tactic is the use of 'traditional' in order to construct previous security responses as outdated, requiring extensive reform. In the following, the semantic prosody of 'traditional' is negative, supporting a sense of obsolescence requiring radical innovation:

> Protecting the country from ever-evolving, transnational threats requires a strengthened homeland security enterprise that shares information across traditional organizational boundaries. (#DHS-HOMELAND3)

> The traditional distinction between national security and criminal matters is increasingly blurred as terrorists commit crimes to finance their activities and computer hackers create vulnerabilities foreign spies can exploit. (#FBI-NATIONAL6)

Across the whole corpus this use of 'traditional' is replicated quite extensively. In the following excerpt 'nontraditional' threats are distinguished from 'traditional' threats, to heighten the sense that a new class of unpredictable dangers has appeared:

> The Counterintelligence Division targets both traditional and emerging nontraditional threats and investigates espionage activities using both intelligence and law enforcement techniques. (#FBI~NATIONAL6)

While the Counterintelligence Division responses described here again conform broadly to the pattern of state expansion predicted by the exceptionalist thesis, it is also again noticeable that the measures justified relate to the sharing and dissolving of institutional distinctions, rather than the (theorised) expansion of obviously juridical powers.

Argument Schemes Based on a Warrant of 'New Rules Hold'

A second variation on the Warrant of Danger and Threat can be observed in argument schemes where the September 11th date invokes the Trade Center attack as a historic, game-changing event. Evidence that they are referenced to establish a sense of pivotal shift is present in the following example, where the warrant is exposed by language that makes the connecting logic explicit:

> [argument] The events of September 11, 2001 changed our nation. [conclusion] On that day, fighting terrorism became the responsibility of every American. (#BoJ~TRAINING)

The same argumentation can be observed elsewhere in the corpus:

> It was the attacks of September 11, however, that finally moved forward the longstanding call for major intelligence reform and the creation of a Director of National Intelligence. (#DNI~ABOUT)

> The Department of Homeland Security was formed in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as part of a determined

> national effort to safeguard the United States against terrorism. (#DHS-HOMELAND4)

The warrant operating here is that, because the situation has changed, new rules hold. Security practices developed to deal with conventional threats are rendered inadequate by the game-changing character of the 9/11 events. This 'new rules hold' warrant is sufficiently (though subtly) distinctive from the variant observed in the previous section as to be considered a further 'subtype' (Wodak 2001, p. 75), of the category of Threat and Danger.

Most commonly, short phrases containing '9/11' are deployed in isolation as a compression, or phraseological shorthand, for this scheme's argument. The iconic date embedded within the expression is sufficient to activate associations of collective trauma and grievance that inhere to the attacks. The following example demonstrates the sheer economy with which the 'since 9/11' (occurring 19 times in 18 texts) phrase operates, invoking a warrant that justifies a conclusion in the same sentence:

> In the ten years since 9/11, the federal government has strengthened the connection between collection and analysis on transnational organizations and threats. (#DHS-ECONOMIC5)

Elsewhere in the corpus we observe:

> Since 9/11, the FBI has worked hard to establish career paths for intelligence analysts and senior positions they can aspire to. (#FBI-INTELANALYSTS)

'After 9/11' (five instances in five texts) is deployed in a similar way:

> After 9/11, it became clear that a similar initiative was needed to encourage the exchange of information on domestic security issues. (#FBI-DOMESTIC)

Even stronger evidence for the justifying efficacy of language referencing the iconic date can be observed in its adjectival use:

> The intelligence briefer position resulted in part from post-9/11 reforms that called for better communications among intelligence agencies. (#FBI-INTEL3)

Here the ‘post 9/11’ adjective has a ‘closer’ effect, validating measures (here, ‘reforms’) packaged within the same noun phrase. Concordancing shows that the adjectival phrase ‘post-9/11’ (14 times in 10 texts) tends to perform a similar role throughout the corpus. In the following instance, both ‘new’ and ‘post 9/11’ are deployed in combination:

> With our new post-9/11 intelligence-driven mindset, the last thing we wanted to do at that point was to rush in and make arrests. (#FBI-INTEL2)

The example is interesting from the perspective of *topos* theory; each term invokes its own slightly different but compatible warrant; ‘exceptional threat and danger’ (through ‘new’, as demonstrated in the section above) and ‘new rules hold’ (through ‘post 9/11’).

However, in some places, evidence for the deployment of argumentation quite at odds with exceptionalist rhetoric is also observable in our corpus. This rare but telling variation is identifiable in the following, FBI text:

> The FBI has always used intelligence to solve complex cases and dismantle criminal organizations. Today, intelligence helps us understand threats to the United States, whether they are from gangs, spies, organized crime, hackers, or terrorists, so that we can protect our communities and our national security. (#FBI-INTEL4)

In this passage, intelligence use against terrorists is constituted as necessary, not because the threat is special, but rather because it remains justified as for earlier, historical enemies of the state. This ‘business as usual’ warrant, which can be categorised as belonging to the *historia magistra vitae* (‘history teaching lessons’, after Wodak 2001, p. 76) sub-type of the topos of History, is consistent with the logic present in the FBI's own brief organisational history (FBI, n.d.). This chronology constructs the FBI's history as an evolving contest against an increasingly varied array of internal and external state enemies. It encompasses prohibition-era gangsters, 'anarchist violence', WWII and Cold War enemies, as well as more recent terrorism. This approach arguably represents a discursive strategy used by the FBI, a longstanding organisation compared to many of its more newly-established peers, to retain something of its historic identity and senior standing. Considered in this way, the passage can be viewed as a moment of resistance against the ethos of combination and dissolution of institutional identity that pervades the corpus elsewhere.

Semantic Fields Supporting the Argument of Exceptionalism

The second set of findings emerged most strongly when carrying out a quantitative analysis in the third machine stage of our investigation. As with the documents relating to the London Olympics (Chapter 8), a number of lexical items were identified as key across a substantial number of texts (at least 20%), which could be seen to contribute to a semantic field of 'threat and danger'. Concordancing of the items shown in Table 10.2 (over) to examine their typical senses and collocations confirm their usual conformity to this theme. This pattern of selection, hidden from readers' awareness because of its dispersion across texts, nevertheless contributes to a discursive atmosphere of pervasive jeopardy.

However, more salient given that its observation is less easily predicted by the theme of the corpus, was a second, prominent group of terms contributing to a lexical field of *sharing* and *collaboration* (see Table 10.3). This theme had been noted during earlier argument scheme analysis as common in many conclusions. Instead of describing expansion of state power, we had observed, many outlined efforts to improve collaboration and remove institutional boundaries between security organisations.

Table 10.2 Lexis revealed by concordancing to establish a field of 'threat' and 'danger'

Key Keywords	No. of texts where key	% of texts in corpus in which key	Example concordance instance (most common lexical, non-title collocation italicised)
Threats	85	48	Protecting the American people from *terrorist* threats is the reason the DHS was created, and remains our highest priority. (#DHS~PREVENTING11)
Terrorism	75	42	While much of the media attention is focused on international terrorism, the FBI continues to maintain a robust effort against *domestic* terrorism. (#FBI~THREATS3)
Terrorist	72	41	We are aware that major crimes and terrorist *attacks* can quickly become national emergencies involving dozens of agencies in different (#FBI ~ STRATEGIC2)
Threat	64	36	In this threat environment, having the right *information* at the right time is essential to protecting national security. (#FBI~INTELLIGENCE3)
Attacks	49	28	NCTC also leads Interagency Task Forces designed to analyze, monitor, and disrupt potential *terrorist* attacks. (#CC~OVERVIEW)
Criminal	48	27	Since 9/11, we have greatly strengthened our ability to identify, collect, analyze, and share intelligence across all of our *national* security and criminal priorities. (#FBI~PUTTING)

As Table 10.3 (over) also shows, the principle of 'sharing' is realised by the use of one prominent syntactic feature throughout the corpus in particular, the key-keyword *and*. An extract from *Training Links For Law Enforcement* (#BoJ~TRAINING) drawn up by the Office of Justice Programs (see Fig. 10.1, over) illustrates some of the range and complexity of the co-ordinating clauses and phrases in which it is used. Its most consistent function is to link lists of agents and institutions so as to establish chains of participants collaborating towards common processes. Through such linking of diverse security actors, the ethos of extensive collaboration is established across the corpus.

Returning recursively to the core documents to manually identify further evidence for this discursive preoccupation, two additional language features were observed. The first is the use of the metaphor of 'architecture' (seven instances, though key in only one text). One of its occurrences is as follows:

> […] DHS continues to work with our homeland security partners to build our **architecture** for information sharing. (#DHS~HOMELAND3)

The metaphor conveys a sense of purposeful re-organisation, assembling a new unified intelligence sharing structure re-using the components of the old, fragmented intelligence framework.

Also contributing to the theme of sharing in the core texts is the discussion surrounding 'Fusion Centers'; new offices established as meeting places between agencies:

> **Fusion centers** serve as focal points within the state and local environment for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information between the federal government and state, local, tribal, territorial (SLTT) and private sector partners. (#DHS~HOMELAND3)

The 'fusion center' appears to represent an idealised disciplinary space dedicated to unified intelligence work. It is the paradigmatic realisation of the discursive drive to remove the institutional boundaries that characterised the pre-9/11 security landscape, much criticised by the 9/11 Commission report.

Table 10.3 Lexis revealed by concordancing to establish a field of *sharing* and *collaboration*

N		Key Keyword	No of texts where key	% of texts in corpus in which key	Example concordance instance (most common lexical, non-title collocation italicised)
5	And		90	51	The FBI's special agents, surveillance specialists, language specialists, **and** ***intelligence*** **and** financial analysts are all ***intelligence*** collectors. (#FBI~INTEL)
13	Partners		73	41	Ensure ***our*** domestic and foreign **partners** have access to terrorism information and analysis when they need it. (#CC#STRATEGIC)
34	Sharing		48	27	In addition, DHS continues to improve and expand the ***information*-sharing** mechanisms by which officers are made aware of the threat picture, vulnerabilities, and what it means for their local communities. (#DHS~HOMELAND3)
45	Support		42	24	In those instances, we **support** ***our*** partners any way we can—sharing intelligence, offering forensic assistance, conducting behavioral analysis, etc. (#FBI~THREATS2)
50	Working		41	23	**Working** ***with*** undercover operatives, sources, and Mexican law enforcement, the team uses an intelligence-driven approach in its investigations. (#FBI~HOWWEPROTECT)



Evaluation Information and Tools

BJA's Center for Program Evaluation and Performance Management maintains a user-friendly online evaluation and performance measurement tool designed to assist state and local criminal justice planners, practitioners, State Administrative Agencies, researchers, **and** evaluators in: 1) conducting evaluations **and** performance measurement that will address the effectiveness **and** efficiency of their projects **and** 2) using evaluation information to improve program planning **and** implementation. Visit the Center for Program Evaluation and Performance Management site to learn more.

Research

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) — the research, development and evaluation agency of the U.S. Department of Justice — is dedicated to improving knowledge **and** underst**and**ing of crime **and** justice issues through science. NIJ provides objective **and** independent knowledge **and** tools to reduce crime **and** promote justice, particularly at the state **and** local levels. Access the NIJ site for further information **and** access to research materials.

Linkage of agents to shared processes, often constructing collaboration

Linkage of processes, often projecting an ethos of comprehensive achievement or activity

pairing of nominal forms

Fig. 10.1 Use of AND (Extract from #BoJ~TRAINING)

Intelligence as Discursive Formation

While evidence for the construction of a discourse of exception was located in several of the core texts and more expansively across the corpus, close reading of these documents also uncovered language and logic relating to the second principal theme of this chapter: that the intensity of post 9/11 reforms has given rise to an emerging discipline, or 'discursive formation' (after Foucault 1972), centred on procedures for analysing intelligence. To shed light on this, we found our investigation of one core text was particularly illuminating. This webpage, *Intelligence Overview* (#FBI~INTEL7), explains the new role of, and procedures for, processing of intelligence in the reformed FBI regime. An early passage projects the powerful sense that the FBI has ushered in a new intelligence regime which is historically distinct from its earlier formation:

> *Traditionally*, the FBI has derived intelligence primarily from cases. As a national security organization, we *now* use intelligence to develop a comprehensive understanding of the threats we face. Analysts examine

> intelligence gleaned through cases and combine it with publicly available information about an area's infrastructure, economy, and other statistics. (#FBI-INTEL7)

The terms 'traditionally' and 'now' delineate past from present constructions of practices surrounding intelligence. No longer to be 'derived'-casually and organically as the product of ordinary FBI activity 'cases'—intelligence is now subject to multiple processes ('used', 'examined', 'gleaned' and 'combined') as an industrialised resource. The passage deploys the term 'intelligence' repetitively, both to project the force new centrality of the word, and to avoid the use of a synonym (information, data, etc.) that does not carry the same sense of systematic, disciplined processing.

In the same core document, we perceive that, not unlike Foucault's (1970) account of the emerging nineteenth century natural sciences, the presently ascendant discipline of intelligence is increasingly being constituted through the development of new procedures for the classification and categorisation of knowledge. This particular core text enumerates a complex set of procedures by which information is requested, collected and shared in a systematic, uniform fashion. It begins with the issuing of formalised requests for specific intelligence, referred to as 'Requirements', by any security actor; police, local and state enforcement, as well as agencies like the FBI. Such requests are 'consolidated' and prioritised by specialised analysts. Efforts are made to address the requirement via reference to existing information; where this is insufficient, special squads are dispatched to collect necessary new intelligence. At the core of such interlocking activity lies (it can be assumed) a cross-institutional database that imposes uniform protocols and categories. In the language of these passages, the notion of intelligence 'as data', entered, recovered and rigorously collated across a powerful, widely-shared 'database', is extended to the enterprise of security as a whole. Procedures, whether amenable to machine or human operation, require information to be consistently categorised, captured and processed so as to lend them disciplinary authority.

Also consistent with the theme of disciplinary emergence is the document's enumeration of highly-defined, expert roles for its operators:

> The FBI's special agents, surveillance specialists, language specialists, and intelligence and financial analysts are all intelligence collectors. Forensics experts at the FBI Laboratory, computer scientists at Regional Computer Forensics Laboratories, and fingerprint examiners working on scene in Iraq and Afghanistan all contribute to the FBI's intelligence collection capabilities as well. (#FBI-INTEL7)

In this passage the first, identifying clause ('The FBI's special agents …') deliberately dissolves distinctions between support staff members and special agents who now 'are all intelligence collectors'. At the same time, however, 'support' roles in both sentences are enumerated more precisely, distinguished by the character of their collection role. Actors' relationships with procedures for collection and processing, now determine their designation.

'Procedures' for collection are also introduced using a similar strategy of deliberate enumeration and precise specification:

> Intelligence is collected through activities such as interviews, physical surveillances, wiretaps, searches, and undercover operations. (#FBI-INTEL7)

More subtle, but nevertheless telling evidence of the presence of an emerging discursive formation is the title of the web-page where this and numerous other FBI corpus documents were accessed, amounting to 38 of our documents in all. This title, 'Intel-Driven FBI', establishes the common theme that newly technologised procedures for intelligence-processing now comprise the core of FBI activity. Also revealing is the neologism, 'Intel' (occurring 13 times, across 15 texts) itself. The abbreviated jargon term also projects a sense of technologisation and specialist knowledge within the discourse of the webpages.

Looking further at the wider corpus, the application of corpus keyword tools reveals a class of words that relate to the theme (Baker 2006; Scott and Tribble 2006) of regularised and uniformly-disciplined intelligence processing. It is noticeable that in Table 10.4 (over), 'intelligence' is identified as the most important collocate of each keyword, and analysis of the words in context confirms their frequent semantic association

Table 10.4 Keyword list exposing technology themes in US security agency webpage corpus (top collocations indicated for each in bold)

N	Keyword	Freq.	Concordance example typifying most frequent collocation and use
9	Analysis	26	NCTC also provides USG agencies with the terrorism **intelligence** analysis and other information they need to fulfill their missions. (#FBI~INTEL7)
15	Training	19	After the attacks, we quickly stood up our first College of Analytical Studies, which has since evolved into **Intelligence** Training, offering basic and advanced training for FBI analysts (#FBI~INTEL11)
16	Program	18	Nowhere is that more apparent than in our **intelligence** analyst program. (#FBI~INTEL3)
22	Products	15	[…] JCAT collaborates with other members of the **Intelligence** Community to research, produce, and disseminate counterterrorism intelligence products for federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government (SLTT) agencies […] (#NATIONALCC~THEJOINT)
27	Resources	15	Set strategic direction and priorities for national **intelligence** resources and capabilities. (#DNI~ABOUT3)

with the theme of an emerging disciplinary rigour. The two items ‘training’ and ‘program’, most frequently describe educational procedures deployed to enhance, standardise and technologise procedures for information processing. Consistent with the phenomenon of an emerging discipline, the keyness of these two terms suggests a theme of education to inculcate expertise pedagogically, and standardise disciplinary activity surrounding intelligence. The frequent collocation of ‘resources’ with ‘intelligence’, meanwhile, evidences its construction in the texts as an asset, and even (as we shall discuss below) a form of professional capital.

Further whole corpus evidence that the term ‘Intelligence’ itself has developed new senses peculiar to the emerging discipline can be obtained by comparing its use in our documents to that found in a general (COCA) American English reference corpus.

Exceptionalism and Bio-Power

So far, we have investigated the extent to which a ‘state of exception’ (after Agamben 1998, 2005) has been constructed in the discourse of the US security agencies fifteen years after the 9/11 attacks upon the US World Trade Centre; and the ways in which security is constituted in these documents as a discipline, or ‘discursive formation’. We will begin here by discussing whether the lexical and discursive patterns we have uncovered in relation to the theme of exceptionalism do in fact provide evidence for the monolithic nature of power (after Agamben 2005), or whether they actually indicate a dispersal of power, which is more commensurable with Foucault’s theory of governmentality (2007, 2008). At the heart of this tension is the notion of ‘bio-power’, the meaning of which presents a source of conflict between these two theories. We will then go on to explore the ways in which the realisation of the principles of ‘sharing’ and ‘collaboration’ merge with the constitution of ‘intelligence’ within our corpus to suggest the emergence of security as a discipline, or ‘discursive formation’, within the post-9/11 US context.

By observing the rhetorical strategies exhibited in a substantial corpus of public-facing web pages harvested from the sites of the US security agencies, we have described how argumentation operates at the level of statements in the texts and also how patterns of lexical selection have constructed semantic fields within the corpus. An initial conclusion based on these trends in the data we have observed is that rhetoric conforming to the logic of a state of exception argument *can* be broadly detected. First, argument schemes that rehearse the logic of exceptionalism and conform to its predicted moves were isolated. Schemes included argument statements constructing a condition of special threat, and linked conclusions describing measures justified by the exceptional nature of the present emergency. Supporting the impact of this rhetoric, a topical semantic field of threat and danger was also detected that establishes a theme of pervasive threat. Discursive strategies at both levels combine to produce a co-ordinated argumentative effect; background tendencies in lexical selection contribute to the force of the rhetoric conveyed through argument schemes. This conclusion that the discourse rhetoric is purposed towards constructing a landscape of fearful uncertainty is broadly coterminous with Martin and Simon's (2008, p. 286) suggestion that the 'new geographies of security' constituted by the topological discourses of the DHS maintain a 'virtual ontology of imminent threat' within the USA.

A more fully realised conclusion, however, must take into account the finding that the rhetoric observed appears to frequently deviate from the pattern of exceptionalism in one important respect. As we have seen, in many of the argument schemes analysed, the measures justified on the basis of danger do not obviously contribute to the theorised exceptionalist purpose of instituting partial or whole martial law. Rather than increased policing powers, or the suspension of civil liberties, they relate almost exclusively to bureaucratic procedures promoting sharing between agencies and the dissolution of institutional boundaries. The significance of this divergent theme is also supported by our corpus examination of key-keywords, which reveals lexical selections constructing a field not only of threat, but (just as pervasively) of the necessity of collaboration and sharing. Thus, instead of responses connected to sovereign, juridical expansion, empirical evidence points to measures which relate almost exclusively to procedures which promote sharing between agencies and the dissolution of institutional boundaries. The nuance is consistent with observations in the existing literature. For example both Brattberg (2012) and Rovner and Long (2005), have reported an intensification of intelligence sharing across agencies.

The discursive construction of 'intelligence' in our texts also links the principles of 'sharing' and 'collaboration' to the emergence of security as a discipline, or 'discursive formation' within the post-9/11 context. The construction of intelligence occupies a semantic space which incorporates both technologies for the production of knowledge and ways of thinking. In particular, the range of material processes to which intelligence is subjected suggests the articulation of modern technologies upon knowledge in order to produce a synthesis which can inform the action of security agents. This discipline has been brought about in part by the expanded capacity of computers to manipulate large quantities of data (relating to population of the nation state and the establishment of large, highly skilled bureaucracies), which operates both transnationally and internationally. The emergence of security as a discipline, based on 'intelligence' which is at once extensive, wide-ranging and coordinated, is in keeping with Svendsen's (2008) suggestion there is a tendency towards the 'homogenisation' of security information within the context of international co-operation.

One way of understanding the developments we find represented in our corpus of US security documents is to re-appraise the bureaucratic measures improving intelligence-sharing as reforms designed to strengthen sovereign power. By recognising them as efforts to improve mechanisms of state surveillance over its citizens, they can be seen to constitute an important form of 'bio-power', which we have introduced earlier in Chapter 6 as the modality of power through which modern populations are observed and *en masse* (Foucault 1979, 2004). Bio-power forms a crucial element of Agamben's model of the exceptionalist state, which places 'biological life at the center of its calculations' (1998, p. 6). Indeed, the formation of unified mechanisms for surveillance, made particularly powerful by the very ethos of centralisation and sharing identified by our analysis, could be seen as contributing to the formation of an especially unified and totalised surveillance regime very much in keeping with Agamben's view. By standardising and combining intelligence procedures within a new ethos of organisational collaboration, the state is able to exercise powers of surveillance in a manner that was hitherto impossible.

In entertaining this stance, though, we enter the precise zone of political theory where Agamben's ideas are regarded as most controversial. Foucault, the originator of the notion of bio-power that Agamben has incorporated, explicitly characterises bio-power as a 'power over life', contrasting it directly with the 'right of death' (Foucault 1979) exercised by the sovereign state. Foucault's bio-power is a diffused, modern modality of government no longer in possession of the central state. Bio-power, Foucault argues, in contrast to Agamben's later gloss of the term, is bureaucratic in character, having to 'qualify, measure, appraise, and hierarchize, rather than display itself in its murderous splendor' (p. 144). Genel (2006), defending Foucault's formulation of the notion of bio-power against its recasting by Agamben, reasserts that it is a mode of exercising power that sovereign power cannot completely exploit. Agamben's divergence from Foucault's description of bio-power is not a misapprehension on his part. He explains in *Homo Sacer* that the 'Foucauldian thesis will […] have to be corrected or, at least, completed' (1998, p. 8) to take account of the persistence of bio-power as a sovereign tool. Agamben acknowledges, but rejects Foucault's stance that power in the modern period has become dispersed, operating at every level of society as a ubiquitous technology. Stating that 'biopower is at least as old as the sovereign exception' (1998, p. 6) he considers that it has in fact become the instrument of contemporary state authority *par excellence*.

Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the language and discourse of a substantial corpus of webpages harvested from the US security services. By observing the rhetorical strategies exhibited in these public-facing documents, we have investigated how argumentation operates at the level of statements in the texts and also how patterns of lexical selection have constructed semantic fields within the corpus. This has, first, revealed the ways in which, and the extent to which, a 'state of exception' (after Agamben 1998, 2005) has been constituted in the discourse of the US security agencies during the fifteen-year period since the 9/11 attacks upon the US World Trade Centre. Secondly, it has suggested that the security services have developed many of the characteristics of a discipline or 'discursive formation' (after Foucault 1972), constructing intelligence both as a form of expertly constituted knowledge and as the basis for a new type of professional, disciplinary power. However, through both strands of our investigation, we also uncovered evidence which suggested a common social and organisational domain, which is indicative of the principles of sharing and collaboration within this group of security professionals. This last outcome seems to suggest the discursive construction of a dispersal and heterogeneity of forces within the US security services, which appears somewhat in tension with Agamben's original proposal that the power of the sovereign state is unitary and homogenous (1998, 2005). We will explore this apparent aporia in more detail, and propose a possible resolution in the final chapter of this book that follows.

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11

Language, Illiberalism and Governmentality

In the preceding chapters, we have combined the intuitive, manual analysis of text with corpus-based, machine analysis to explore four substantial collections of documents which relate to the language discourse of security and counter-terrorism. Each corpus is historically and geographically located in conditions specific to the time and place within which the documents were produced, transmitted and reproduced. In this, although we do not claim to be adopting anything which resembles a 'pure' archaeological method, we have come close to exploring what Michel Foucault (1972) described as a 'discursive formation'. Our analyses have suggested that any discursive formation is far from being a unitary phenomenon. It is fluid (in its span of time), it is plethoric (in its reach), and it is heterogeneous (in its complexity). Therefore, an engagement with a discursive formation can only be partial in terms of the temporal and institutional locatedness of the texts with which it engages.

Although in our analyses we have approached discourse as an assemblage of texts, these texts still stand in a relationship with entities which are external to discourse. The principal extra-discursive entities

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which are most readily addressed by the late Foucauldian and post-Foucauldian theory (e.g. Agamben 2005; Bigo 2008; Foucault 2004, 2007, 2008; see Chapter 7) in relation to security are: the state, the subject who is constituted as a 'citizen' of the state, and the institutions which produce the documents under scrutiny. Within our analyses, these institutions, or 'sites of production', have included: agencies which operate subsidiary to the state, such as the security services; organisations which are part of the executive branch of the state, such as government agencies and departments; discursive zones which operate within liberal societies in an intersecting relationship with the state, especially the 'public sphere' which is constituted by the circulation of print and electronic media; and supranational institutions which operate above the level of the state, such as the United Nations (UN) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The extra-textual implications of security discourse supports our engagement in this book with post-Foucauldian theories, such as 'exceptionalism' (after Agamben 1998, 2005), 'illiberalism' and the 'banopticon' (after Bigo 2008). These have enabled us to exercise a productive critique of the discourse of security in relation to its role it plays in politics and society more generally.

With this in mind, we begin this concluding chapter by reviewing the temporal and institutional locatedness of the documents that we have analysed. Then we will go on to consider how these analyses relate to the theoretical, empirical and methodological issues which we set out in the first part of the book (Chapters 3–6). For largely pragmatic reasons which impacted upon the development of this project over several years, the texts which we have analysed have emerged from different contexts.

- Chapter 7 comprised a corpus of texts which have been produced by the government departments and satellite organisations of a single nation state; in this case the UK, over an extended period of time. Here the documents were analysed chronologically across three sub-corpora, in order to reveal the 'ruptures' and 'discontinuities' (after Foucault 1972) in the articulation of security by the state over a time span of 15 years (2001–2016).

- Chapter 8 comprised a single corpus of texts in which the principles of the 2012–2016 sub-corpus above are articulated upon the population through the discursive construction of the security operation surrounding the 2012 London Olympic Games.
- Chapter 9 comprised two corpora of texts: one corpus produced in the 'political sphere' by a supranational organisation (the UN Security Council); and one corpus produced in the 'public sphere' of the US and the UK. Here we could see the flows and transformations of language and discourse that take place as they are delocated from one context and relocated in another.
- Chapter 10 comprised one corpus of texts which suggested that there has some a continuity of discourse over time, as the US security services reconstructed and reconstituted themselves discursively in the wake of the *9/11 Commission Report* (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004).

Throughout this, the different corpora are distinguishable in terms of three dimensions (Table 11.1): the time at which discourse was produced; the site in which the discourse was produced; and (related to this) the genre through which the discourse is realised.

Language and Discourse: Discursive Flows, Discursive Networks

Bringing together the four different empirical analyses in Table 11.1, above, illuminates the fluid nature of any particular discursive formation, such as the discourse of security and counter-terrorism that we have analysed in this book. This fluidity is realised across both time and space: first, through the temporal flow of discourse as language within a discursive formation undergoes transformations as one set of documents supersedes another over time; and secondly by the institutional differentiation of networks of discourse across space, as language within a discursive formation is delocated from one site and relocated in another. Temporal transformation is governed in the last instance by the material

Table 11.1 Overview of texts analysed

Chapter	Time	Site	Text type	Genre
Chapter 7	2001–2006	UK government departments	Government documents	Act of Parliament, Bill of Parliament, Code of practice, Consultation Paper, Impact Assessment, Guidance Note, List, Order, Pedagogic practice, Policy document, Reply, Report, Review, Statistical annex
	2007–2011	UK government departments	Government documents	Act of Parliament, Bill of Parliament, Code of practice, Consultation Paper, Impact Assessment, Guidance Note, List, Order, Pedagogic practice, Policy document, Reply, Report, Review, Statistical annex
	2012–2016	UK government departments	Government documents	Act of Parliament, Bill of Parliament, Code of practice, Consultation Paper, Impact Assessment, Guidance Note, List, Order, Pedagogic practice, Policy document, Reply, Report, Review, Statistical annex
Chapter 8	2012	Olympic Organising Committee (LOCOG)	Webpages	Webpages
Chapter 9	2012–2016	United Nations Security Council (UNSC)	Resolutions	Resolutions
	2012–2016	US and UK National Press	Broadsheets	Editorials, articles
Chapter 10	2016	US Security Organisations	Webpages	Webpages

conditions of history, such as the 7/7 attacks and the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War; recontextualisation across space is governed in the last instance by the power relations and economic interests of different agents and institutions, such as those within the political sphere and the public sphere (see also Hunter and MacDonald 2017; MacDonald et al. 2015). In the preceding chapters, the flow of discourse through time has been revealed by our analysis of documents relating to UK security and counter terrorism (Chapter 7); the relocation of discourse across space has been revealed by our analysis of documents relating to nuclear proliferation (Chapter 9). Both of these analyses entailed the use of more conventional corpus techniques, in particular the machine-driven generation of keywords. However, as outlined in Chapter 5, these were augmented by the intuitive analysis of concordance data to verify and interpret salient lexis in context. In what follows we review the substantive and theoretical implications of the transformation and recontextualisation of the documents across time and space which we have analysed in the previous chapters.

Transformation Over Time

As is well known, within his studies of the discursive formation of the disciplines of the human sciences (e.g. 1970), Michel Foucault challenged the conventional Enlightenment narrative of the linear development of knowledge and science towards some ultimate goal. Instead he argues that disciplines shift in a more arbitrary fashion from one ‘episteme’ to another and—rather than displaying a historically coherent pattern of development—they shift through a series of ‘ruptures’ and ‘discontinuities’. One implication of the archaeological method, however, is that a ‘discipline’ or ‘discursive formation’ is relatively stable within the particular historical period within which it is situated. The temporal span of fifteen years which we adopted for our chronological analysis in Chapter 7 has a somewhat narrower focus to those of Foucault, which focused on entire ‘systems of knowledge’ often spanning centuries. However, our diachronic reach remains considerable when compared with many other critical studies of security discourse, which more often than not settle for a synchronic approach which does not have the scope to engage with patterns of chronological change in the discourse. Even on our relatively 'micro-chronological' timescale, observed changes in the prominence of certain lexis from one period of time to another enabled us to infer shifts in the ways in which security and counter-terrorism was being constituted within the documents; as they were produced at different time periods within the context of one nation state (the UK).

In the first phase of our chronological comparison in Chapter 7, we compared two sub-corpora to reveal changes that took place over the period 2001–2011. Here, it appeared that the words *cohesion* and *community* become recontextualised over time within the second sub-corpus in a discourse which supports the ideological construction of a totalizing, singular, community of the nation state. The appropriation and recontextualisation of the headline words *contest* and *prevent* from common parlance serve to impute to UK government a sense of agency and active engagement in the 'war on terror' against a hypostatised Other. However, although more abstract expressions such as *violent*, *extremism* and *terrorism* also emerged as salient throughout our second sub-corpus in order to signify the target of this government action, we could find little explicit identification of any social group to which these antagonistic tendencies are attributed. In fact, contra some critics (e.g. Appleby 2010) there appeared to be an explicit tendency to shy away from attributing suspicion of extremism to any one ethnic group. However, what also emerged from this comparison as distinctive of the second sub-corpus, was the statistical significance of *Muslim* and *Muslims*. From this we infer that, while the documents in the second sub-corpus appear to consciously avoid any explicit stigmatisation of any ethnic group as being associated with 'violent extremism', there remains an implicit attempt to constitute a normalised form of Muslim affiliation to British values and British identity. Furthermore, we see emerging from this sub-corpus the beginning of a more nuanced linguistic tendency to use 'extremism' to signify an antagonistic position which arises internal to the nation state, and 'terrorism' to signify an antagonistic position which arises external to the nation state.

In the second phase of our chronological analysis, our comparison of the third sub-corpus (2012–2106) with those produced by UK government departments and their agencies between 2007 and 2011, revealed not only that *security* emerged in this period as by far and away the strongest keyword across the entire sub-corpus, but also that the logic of the security operation that was discursively constituted appeared to be bound up with two premises: first, that it is not just the protection of the populace that is now contingent upon national security, but also the 'prosperity' and 'influence' of the nation state; and secondly, that the perceived 'threats' to the nation state are constituted discursively as being (spatially) extensive and (temporally) escalating exponentially into an 'infinite future' (after Dunmire 2011). This infusion of a discourse of national security with the principles of neoliberalism may in part be constitutive of the ideological pursuits of the more right-wing administration that was elected to the UK government in 2011, under the premiership of David Cameron and subsequently Theresa May.

However, our chronological analysis of the security discourse of this most recent period, also suggests another aspect of these documents that changed over this fifteen-year span. As a shift takes place between 2012 and 2016 towards a concern not only with internal, but also with external security, we see emerging from the latest sub-corpus a new concern with 'bordering practices' (Vaughan-Williams 2012). This entails not least the capacity of agents of the state to deprive certain subjects of their freedom of movement, but in more extreme examples, of liberty itself. However, our analysis has also revealed simultaneously an explicit—and even insistent—discursive pre-occupation with the values of 'fairness', 'responsibility', 'proportionality' and 'respect' which characterise the ethos of liberalism. With this caveat, however, a preponderance of lexis throughout this final sub-corpus constitutes a range of subject positions which are distributed throughout the legalo-penal system, of which the figure of the *detainee* emerges as paradigmatic. This leads us to conclude that—despite the focus on the liberal, multicultural concepts of 'community' 'cohesion' and 'citizenship' which feature prominently in the discourse of UK security at the beginning of the twenty first century—the lexis of 'retention' and 'detention' remains a distinctive feature of security discourse well into the second decade.

Viewed overall, our chronological analysis also revealed a gradual move away from a more or less exclusive concern with the internal coherence of the population of the nation state (2001–2006), through a nuanced acknowledgement of external influences upon activities which might pose a threat to the nation state (2007–2011), to a third period in which the spectre of an external threat to the nation state became very much more evidenced (2012–2016). This seems very much in keeping with the paradox which confronted the UK government in aftermath of the London bombings. The attacks were carried out by subjects who possessed UK citizenship, but who nevertheless expressed allegiance to an extra-territorial non-state actor, Al-Qaeda. However, ultimately, our comparison of Sub-corpus III with Sub-corpus II revealed an increasing preoccupation with externally facing security concerns. This does not constitute an absolute supersession of internal by external concerns, but rather indicates the increasing 'de-differentiation' over this period of the discourse of internal security and counter-terrorism, and the discourse of external security (after Bigo 2008). This melding of external with internal security appears entirely in keeping with this final set of documents, which were produced in the context of the gradual expansion of an Islamist caliphate across the Syria-Iraq border and the near-collapse of Syria as a 'viable state' (see Chapter 2).

Recontextualisation Across Site

As well as undergoing temporal transformation, changes can also take place in any formation of discourse when it is delocated from one site and relocated in another. This is no different for the discourse of international security than it is for 'pedagogic discourse' in the field of education (after Bernstein 1990, 1996, 2000) or medical discourse (see MacDonald 2002). Examples of the changes that can take place in this delocation and relocation were revealed in Chapter 9, where we engaged with the language and discourse of nuclear proliferation, by comparing a corpus of resolutions produced by the UN Security Council with a corpus of related articles produced by prominent US and UK broadsheets. Here, we uncovered some of the distinctive regularities and combinations of the lexis by which the discourse relating specifically to nuclear proliferation was constituted through the dynamic network of texts which create, maintain and transmit meanings within and across the political and public spheres. By comparing keywords and their associated lexis, we drew on Foucault's (1972) archaeological approach to derive three principal categories from each corpus: 'enunciative modalities' (comprising both 'locus of enunciation' and subject positions), 'concepts' and 'objects'. In many cases, our qualitative consideration of collocation and concordance data suggested that these categories were constituted differently in the types of text which were produced by sites located within the 'political sphere' (e.g. the UN Security Council) and in the types of text which were produced by sites located within the 'public sphere' (e.g. the offices of elite broadsheets produced in the UK and the USA). For us, the transformations which take place do not indicate a lack of coherence, but rather point to certain discursive 'strategies' which are operationalised as these categories are delocated from one site and relocated within another. In this respect, our approach resembles that of Mehan et al., who describe their (1990) analysis of multiple texts relating to the Cold War as 'a constitutive approach to discourse' (158) which '…shows how the meaning of events is constructed in reciprocal interaction' (137). However, while Mehan et al. view this multi-voicedness as a form of 'polyphony' (Bakhtin 1981; Mehan et al. 1990), we rather suggest that the texts are regulated by the 'rules of formation' of security discourse according to 'the conditions to which the elements of this discourse (objects, mode of statement, concepts, thematic choices) are subjected' (Foucault 1972, p. 38). In what follows we set out in more detail two discursive strategies which emerged from our analysis in Chapter 9: *personalisation* and *reification*.

As the discourse of nuclear proliferation is delocated from the political sphere and relocated in the public sphere, the roles of individual human agents, first, become more prominently positioned as the subjects of the discourse through the strategy of *personification*. An effect of this is to highlight the role of national leaders, and constitute them as protagonists in relation to the unfolding of events. This is realised not so much through 'material' or 'behavioural', but principally through 'verbal' processes, and in particular through the salience of the verbal process 'say' (after Halliday and Matthiessen 2004). More than anything else, a national leader is constructed in the national press as the one who speaks on the topic of the day, here nuclear proliferation. And in this way, political leaders are constituted as the enunciative subjects within our broadsheets corpus. This contrasts with the elision of the names of national leaders within the genre of the UNSC resolution, and the position of the enunciative subject being occupied by the international forum of the Security Council itself (UNSC), and its agents—predominantly the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Thus, the names of nation states and more political leaders feature more frequently in the broadsheets than in the resolutions. We suggest that this realises the first recontextualising strategy of this particular discursive formation, that of *personalisation*. This strategy in part reflects the contextual positioning of the two sets of documents under scrutiny. The resolutions are generated by the UNSC members—not least the five permanent members, China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA—and speak to those in infringement of the NPT. By contrast, the broadsheets in our corpus describe relations between the most powerful players on the UNSC and the alleged perpetrators of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, Iran and the DPRK. The difference in the occurrence of proper names reflects this relationship—the presence of the five permanent UNSC members is presupposed and therefore remains implicit within the resolutions, whereas China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA remain actors who are external to the broadsheets and therefore require explicit mention. We have also seen that the genre of the UNSC resolution exercises an overwhelming rhetorical force, invoking the military and economic authority of the five most powerful nations in the world against the two principal NPT infringers, Iran and the DPRK. Correspondingly, these are both positioned as the receivers of verbal processes and recipients of repeated censure for their acts of non-compliance with UNSC statements.

Secondly, descriptions of nuclear weapons technologies also appear to become *reified* as they are delocated from the political sphere and relocated in the public sphere. Within the UNSC resolutions, actions relating to nuclear weapons technologies are nominalised in highly specific, complex phrases. By contrast, within the public sphere the lexis of these phrases tends to become foreshortened and condensed, often merely to the synoptic phrase 'nuclear proliferation'. Within the public sphere this phrase becomes the signifier of a singular, coagulated concept into which a more variegated panoply of lexis is collapsed, such as the 'development', 'activities' and 'programmes' which are carried out by Iran and the DPRK. While this reified terminology detracts from the precision of the central concept of this discursive formation, its concision and repetition renders it easier to grasp as a focus of aggression and antipathy on the part of citizens and decision makers alike.

Our comparison of the constitution of 'nuclear proliferation' across two types of text in Chapter 8 therefore appears to suggest that the discourse relating to this phenomenon is not a static phenomenon which is constituted within any one particular set of texts. Rather 'nuclear proliferation' is a phenomenon which is discursively produced, transmitted and reproduced across different sites. As 'enunciative modalities', 'concepts' and 'objects' are delocated from one site and relocated in another site, transformations take place in their meaning which are subject to the institutional conditions (pragmatics) and the relations of power (ideology) which are inscribed in their production and reproduction. In this respect, the exploration of corpora relating to nuclear proliferation drawn exclusively from a national press (e.g. Behnam and Zenouz 2008; Izadi and Saghaye-Biria 2007; Min 1999; Rasti and Sahragard 2012)—while useful and insightful at a particular stage in the development of discourse studies—can only give a partial account of how a particular set of events is constituted in the dynamic relations that operate within and between different text types. By contrast, our exploration of nuclear proliferation has so far identified two discursive strategies which are deployed as meanings circulate from one site to another: in relation to subject positions, *personalisation*; and in relation to technologies, *reification*. These strategies are signaled by the changes and transformations that take place in the language used to realise the 'elements' of nuclear proliferation, as it is constituted within a discursive formation which is dynamic, complex and multi-faceted.

Governmentality

The intensified production of counter-terrorism documents in the UK and the USA in the wake of the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks on the national infrastructure of each country, confirms that the issue of national security remains a central concern of the modern state, although it is continuously being reconfigured to meet the conditions of late modernity. The analysis of UK security documents produced between 2001 and 2016, which we carried out in Chapter 7, uncovered distinctive ways in which the threefold framework of governmentality arising from categories outlined by Foucault in his posthumously published lectures (2007, 2008)—*population*, *regulation*, and *knowledge*—was realised selectively and dynamically over time in the language and discourse of this corpus of counter-terrorism documents. In particular, our chronological approach revealed that there was a discursive reconfiguration of the governmental framework over this fifteen-year period. First, when it was compared to the language of the first corpus period (2001–2006) in which the governmental theme of *population* appeared to be more predominant, the governmental theme of *regulation* became foregrounded in the language of the second corpus period (2007–2011). Secondly, indicators of a further intensification of the regulatory aspect of the governmental framework emerged from the language and discourse of the final period we analysed (2012–2016). These trends in the language and discourse of UK security would suggest that there is a progression on the part of the modern state to intensify its regulation of the population as a response to the historical events which operated as the 'pivots' for our corpus analysis: the 7/7 attacks on the London Transport system, and the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War.

For Foucault, population emerged at the beginning of the modern period as the object of the 'science of government' and the calculations of political economy (2007, pp. 103–110). While the most salient lexical items in our two chronological analyses did not reveal a predominance of language which was directly constitutive of this theme over these periods, neither was this dimension of governmentality totally elided over our two periods of analysis. Consideration of our corpus over the entire fifteen-year period confirms that population remains a central concern of contemporary UK government. However, the way in which population is constituted within governmental discourse is subject to variability across different historical periods (as identified our analyses) and in all likelihood across different nation states (as could be explored elsewhere). The comparatively narrow focus of our historical purview in Chapter 7 suggests that there are two aspects of Foucault's conceptualisation of population (2007, 2008) which are being redefined, and to some extent superseded, within in the contemporary discursive realisation of governmentality in the UK: first, the unitary nature of the population of the nation state; and secondly, the objective nature of the knowledge about that population.

Indications of the centrality of *population* to the modern state emerged in particular from the first phase of our comparison in Chapter 7: our chronological comparison of two sets documents produced by the UK government between 2001 and 2011. Here, although their statistical significance varied between the first and second sub-corpora, the contiguous terms 'community' and 'cohesion' emerged as numerically pervasive across the two periods under scrutiny (2001–2006, 2007–2011). Our analysis of the lexical patterns around these terms would suggest that the nature of a concern with population in modernity has now broadened out from being constituted as a demographic 'problem' which is addressed quantitatively through statistics and economics as argued by Foucault (2007, p. 104) to one in which population is now discursively constructed more qualitatively in relation to the homogeneity and affiliation of its members. This concern with the homogeneity of the population is unsurprising, given the recent historical conditions, in which it is largely agreed that there is an unprecedented global flow of economic migrants as well as those seeking refuge from both political and climactic conditions (Faist et al. 2013; MacDonald and O'Regan 2012). Moreover, given the fact that the 7/7 attacks on the London transport system were carried out by UK citizens, concern with the homogeneity of the population arises from the extent to which the constitution of the individual subject as 'citizen' entails subscription to the 'shared values' of the nation state. Therefore, a range of salient lexis in the 2001–2011 corpus appeared to be discursively constitutive of normative values in relation to other ethnic groups within the UK, and controversially one group in particular, the 'Muslim community'. In this, our findings in this book diverge from Appleby's more radical (2010) conclusions inasmuch as we could not find any explicit linkage within our documents between 'violent extremism', 'threat' and the 'Muslim community'. In fact, considerable rhetorical effort seemed to be expended to avoid any explicit connections between Islamic social groups and 'extremist' views or behaviour. However, we do concur more broadly with both Appleby, and Thomas (2011, pp. 172–176), when they observe that the 'Prevent strategy' does, perhaps, place an undue 'focus' on the Muslim community.

Our comparative analysis of the security discourse of the UK government over the entire fifteen years did reveal, principally, the gradual intensification over time relating to the governmental theme of *regulation*, culminating in the generation of the predominance of lexis relating to this theme in the final period (2012–2016). However, if we consider the continuities between the 2001 and 2006 and the 2007–2011 periods, our documentary analysis also indicates that the proximity of engagement of government with the population intensified over these periods. For example, the word *local* occurs with high frequency across the documents produced within the first two periods under analysis, occurring regularly as a collocate across in both sub-corpora—particularly with the words 'community' and 'communities'. The 'localism' of the engagement of modern governments with the population is also indicated by one of the central policy documents from our second sub-corpus:

> The evolution of local government's role as 'place-shaper' means that it is no longer just a deliverer of services but has a key role to play in leading and shaping the way we live our lives with one another. (Turley 2009, p. 7)

The principal agent of government which regulates both the 'shaping' and the security of 'places' is the police. Foucault sums up the role of the police as the 'set of interventions and means that ensure that …coexistence will be effectively useful to the constitution and involvement of the state's forces' (2007, p. 327). In its earliest manifestation, the police were principally concerned with this in terms of utility: the 'number of citizens', the 'necessities of life', 'public health', the 'regulation of the professions' and the 'circulation of goods' (ibid., pp. 322–325; see Chapter 6). While the police force remains central to the contemporary realm of security, our documents construct both the role and the constitution of the police rather differently. First, the police appear to be engaged in the project of 'community cohesion' to the extent that their concerns are constituted as increasingly indistinguishable from those of the 'community' itself. Furthermore, what is in essence an ideological war is constituted throughout our corpus through the use of metaphorical language as rather humdrum artisanal labour, of which the frequently occurring word 'tackle' is paradigmatic. This 'Prevent work' is also no longer being carried out by the police alone but is also marked, particularly within our second sub-corpus (2007–2011), as being 'shared' by a panoply of different agencies, working together collegially in 'partnership'.

Our corpus of documents produced between 2012 and 2016 occurs immediately after the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War (see Chapter 2). Indeed a powerful indication of the embedding of this sub-corpus in historical events arises from the observation that *Syria* occurs as one of the hundred strongest keywords in the sub-corpus from this period when compared with the period in the wake of the 7/7 attacks. Our comparison of this latest sub-corpus with that produced between 2006 and 2011 revealed an even greater intensification of the theme of *regulation*, as indicated by the almost exclusive grouping of the strongest keywords around this theme. We were able to identify four modalities of regulatory *praxis* which were constituted by the most salient lexical items within our third sub-corpus. First, a relationship is constructed between regulation and a 'neoliberal rationality' of security (after Block et al. 2012; Jessop 2002). This is very much in keeping with Foucault's claim that the 'fundamental objective of governmentality will be mechanisms of security… with the essential function of ensuring the security of those natural phenomena, economic processes and the intrinsic processes of population' (2007, p. 353; see also Chapter 6). In particular, qualitative analysis of the *National Security Strategy* (Cabinet Office 2015) revealed an explicit link between the functioning of the economy and the security of the nation state. Second, in a discursive strategy which we explore in greater depth in the next section, a relationship is constructed between regulation and the 'exceptional' nature of the hypostatised menace to the nation state—both internally and externally (after Agamben 2005). Third, a relationship is established between regulation and control of the border of the nation state. However, the lexis and discourse whereby these 'bordering practices' are constituted indicate that the boundaries of the national territory are no longer a matter of physical geography (after Vaughan-Williams 2012), but are more a regime of surveillance, interception and 'retention' of travel documents executed both within and beyond the physical border. In this we can see (after Bigo 2008) that:

> Power is not only repressive. It induces and produces modes of behaviour. The discourses on free movement are central. They normalize the majority and allow for the surveillance to be concentrated on a minority. (p. 42)

Fourth and finally, the prominence of the lexis of 'detention' and the figure of the 'detainee' in our third sub-corpus is indicative of the establishment of a post-industrial 'carceral', where the limit point of free movement is confinement—with an uncertain recourse to appeal to the 'normal' juridical conventions of the liberal democracy.

While the principal features which were revealed in our analysis of the UK discourse of security and counter-terrorism between 2001 and 2016 indicates the supersession of a concern with *population* by an increasing concern with *regulation*, the governmental feature of *knowledge* was also not entirely absent. Although the range of lexis related to the constitution of knowledge in either sub-corpus was limited, one word did emerge as possibly paradigmatic of the Foucauldian thesis relating to the surveillance and control of the population. This was the word *data.* When the 2007–2011 sub-corpus was compared with documents from 2001 to 2006, *data* featured within the hundred strongest keywords. Lexical collocates of *data* included 'collection', 'survey', 'analysis', 'census', 'population', 'ethnicity', which suggest that these government policy documents made regular references to surveys of the national population. This extract from a 2007 document produced by the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG) is telling:

> …. where there have been recent changes in the local population, clearer and more detailed data on the new communities settling there would provide greater understanding of the area and allow for more focused community cohesion work. (DCLG 2007, p. 64)

This not only reveals the linkage, within this period, between 'scientific' studies of the population and the surveillance and control of migrant and ethnic minority social groups, but is also suggestive of a degree of expectation in this data to facilitate the integration of the population in accordance with the polices of the state. Within the 2012–2016 sub-corpus, *data* emerges as a top ranked keyword, when compared with the 2007–2011 sub-corpus. The most frequently occurring collocates of *data* in this later period are indicative of very different preoccupations to those of the earlier one. These include 'retention', 'retained', 'home' 'uploads', 'acquisition' and 'communications', a lexical field which is suggestive of the widespread collection and monitoring of electronic communications across the population. This governmental tactic is explicitly constituted in one of the policy documents within our latest sub-corpus, which also features a clustering of some of the top collocates of *data*:

> The ability of the law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies to obtain access to communications data is vital to public safety and national security. Communications data has played a significant role in major crime and in every major Security Service counter terrorist operation over the last decade… Government intervention is necessary to ensure continued availability of and access to this data, primarily for the police. (HMO 2014, p. 1)

The prevalence and ubiquity of the collection and monitoring of 'communications data' over this period is reinforced by the occurrence of the acronym *GCHQ* (Government Communications Headquarters) as a keyword in the 2011–2016 sub-corpus. This finding is in keeping with the scandal which broke out within this period relating to the extent of the electronic surveillance of the UK population, after the publication of documents alluding to GCHQ's data-sweeping operations leaked by the US National Security Agency 'whistle-blower', Edward Snowden (MacAskill et al. 2013).

Thus, our chronological analysis of a corpus of documents produced by the UK government between 2001 and 2016 in relation to security and counter-terrorism reveal the fluid, and historically contingent, nature of the exercise of power by a modern state. This is constituted through the language and discourse of its policy papers. In keeping with Foucault's pronouncements on governmentality in his late lectures (2007, 2008), this suggests that the tightly specified semantic configurations constituted through the particular combinations, regularities and frequencies of the words which we analysed in Chapter 7 are not the realisation of some set of a priori policies, or constellation of strategies and tactics that already 'exist' in some way pre-defined by the government of the day. Rather, the production of these words and statements are coterminous with the production of the very tactics of governmentality itself. On this argument, what is commonly regarded as the 'state' no longer appears as a unitary, substantive phenomenon but rather as a de-essentialised, plethoric network of lines of engagement in which the delineation of governmentality in any one time and place is realised in its specificity through the production, transmission and reproduction of language, text and discourse.

Furthermore, our chronological engagement with the discourse of governmentality has also enabled us to detect the modulations that take place over time in terms of the relationship between the exercise of power on the individual ('discipline') and the exercise of power upon the population ('biopolitics'). As we outlined in Chapters 4 and 6, discipline focuses on modifying the individual and the body through institutional regimes (c.p. Foucault 1977); while biopolitics 'intervenes' in the population as a whole, 'in its generality'. In the final lecture which he gave in in the 1976 series, Foucault describes some of the 'mechanisms' of biopolitics which we have noted with respect to the 2007–2011 period: 'forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall measures'. However, he emphasises the importance of the 'norm' for biopolitical as well as disciplinary power.

> And most important of all, regulatory mechanisms must be established to establish an equilibrium, maintain an average, establish a sort of homeostasis and compensate for variations within this general position and its aleatory field. In a word, security mechanisms have to be installed around the random element inherent in a population so as to optimise a state of life … It is therefore … a matter of … using overall mechanisms and

> acting in such a way as to achieve overall states of equilibration or regularity; it is …a matter of taking control of life and the biological processes of man-as-species and of ensuring that they are not disciplined, but regularized. (Foucault 2004, p. 246)

In our view, it is just this 'optimization' of a 'state of life' that we have been tracing over this fifteen-year period. It is realised through the distinctive lexis which we analysed in Chapter 7, for example: between 2007 and 2011, 'cohesion', 'interaction', and 'resilience'; and between 2012 and 2016, 'security', 'defence' and 'legislation'. However, emerging from the final period of discourse under analysis, our historical purview has also enabled us to reveal a return to a constitution of disciplinary mechanisms which 'function' within an overarching biopolitical framework. This was exemplified by the distinctive lexis emerging around 'retention' and 'detention', with the figure of the 'detainee' emerging as paradigmatic of this last discursive period. Here, the 'detainee' emerges as emblematic of a post-industrial 'carceral' (after Foucault 1977), focused upon the parameters of the virtual borders of the nation state. Our analysis has illustrated that, while this modern carceral is ostensibly designed to intensify the exit and return of 'foreign fighters' from conflict zones external to the nation state, by extension it constitutes a position for every subject who seeks to exercise their 'freedom of movement' across the territorial borders of the UK (after Bigo 2008).

Illiberal Regimes

Another line of enquiry which has run through this book has been to explore the ways in which, and the extent to which, since the 9/11 attacks upon the US World Trade Centre, a 'state of exception' (after Agamben 1998, 2005) appears to have been constituted through the language and discourse of supranational organisations, governments, government departments, security agencies and the national press. Certainly, our primary analysis of certain key lexis, refined by closer scrutiny within their discursive context, has revealed some indicators of an ‘argument of exception’ emerging from each collection of documents that we have analysed. First, in relation to our corpus of documents relating to UK national security, indications of language and discourse related to the phenomenon of ‘exceptionalism’ were suggested by some of the strongest keywords, which featured in the later period of our chronological analysis (Chapter 7). However, more elaborate arguments for exceptionalism arose in some of the documents produced in 2012 by UK security organisations as a justification for the scale and extent of the security operation surrounding that year’s Olympic Games, held in London (Chapter 8). More surprisingly, evidence of quite distinctive features of exceptionalism also emerged from the international security terrain in relation to the discursive strategies used in the recontextualisation of the discourse of nuclear proliferation from the political sphere to the public sphere (Chapter 9). And finally, the US security organisations also revealed a rhetoric which displayed the logic of a state of exception extensively in the argument schemes and warrants deployed on their webpages (Chapter 10).

Arguments for Exception

However, while some commonalities emerged from the overall trajectory of the ‘argument for exception’ which we encountered in each corpus, the exceptional conditions which were claimed by documents also exhibited a degree of specificity related to the specific institutional and historical conditions under which they were produced. Thus, minimally, our investigation is illustrative of a range of tropes which can be deployed to constitute exceptionalism as a discursive strategy.

First, in relation to our corpus of documents relating to UK national security, indications of language and discourse relating to the phenomenon of ‘exceptionalism’ were suggested by some of the strongest keywords which emerged from the later period of our analysis, in particular *terrorism*, *terrorist* and *threat*. It is well known that since 2006—the year after the attacks on the London Transport system—the UK Home Office and the UK internal security agency, MI5, regularly publish the ‘threat level’ for the UK. This is ranked on a five- point scale ranging from 'LOW' to 'CRITICAL', determined by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) (available at https://www.mi5.gov.uk/threat-levels). At the time of writing the level of threat of terrorist attack in the UK level is currently 'SEVERE', and during the eleven years of measurement reflected in our corpus (2006–2017), it has never dropped below 'SUBSTANTIAL'. This assertion of a ubiquitous, though as we have seen from our documentary evidence largely unattributed, threat to the nation state is referenced, in particular across our 2012–2016 collection of documents. One of the top collocates of *threat* that emerges from this third sub-corpus is 'level'. Further investigation of the recurring phrase 'threat level' reveals that its top collocates all relate to the degree of intensity across this period: 'SEVERE', 'SUBSTANTIAL' and 'raised'. The repetition and saturation of UK security documents with this lexis, particularly our later collection, serves to reinforce what is a very literal delineation of a perpetual 'state of emergency' emanating from the urban centres to the furthest reaches of the United Kingdom.

However, a more tightly specified selection of lexis relating to a state of exception emerges from the language and discourse of the webpages of the security organisations for the 2012 Olympics. Within Chapter 8, we described how a range of linguistic devices were deployed to constitute the security operation for the London Games as taking place within an exceptional set of circumstances: the use of superlative and limit adjectives, regular references to the impact of the Games on different security sectors and regular references to their simultaneity with other sizeable British events. In keeping with Tsoukala (2006), the function of these hyperbolic descriptions appeared to be to create a set of imaginary relations between the Games and its wider context, which could be used as a logical pretext to justify the scale and extent of the security operation for London 2012. This security operation was dubbed insistently in the corpus with the noun phrase 'safety and security' in order to yoke the positive connotations of the word 'safety' together with the more problematic concept of 'security' in order to imbue it with greater positivity. The combination of nouns was also used so repetitiously, and in a manner which became so devoid of context that, like the phrase 'nuclear proliferation' in Chapter 9, 'safety and security' appeared to become a *reified* concept across the corpus (after Lukacs 1923/1967).

The creation of exceptional circumstances also seemed to be constituted in a rather different way with respect to the delocation of the language and discourse of the UN Security Council resolutions and their relocation in prominent UK and US broadsheets. Particularly with regard to the realisation of 'concepts' (after Foucault 1972) relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons across the different text types analysed in Chapter 9 (Table 11.1), a predominant discursive strategy of the resolution appears to be to frame the lexis of nuclear proliferation in normalising, technocratic language. While it is impossible not to be sceptical about this sanitised version of nuclear proliferation, invested as it is with both the military and rhetorical power of the five permanent members of the Security Council, by contrast, there appears to be a dramatisation of events for consumption in the public sphere which marks something of a 'discontinuity' from the more neutral lexis deployed in the political sphere. Our most striking finding in this regard was the uncovering of the word 'crisis' which was introduced to describe the 'nuclear contention' (Rasti and Sahragard 2012) within the broadsheets, when the word did not occur a single time in the nuclear resolutions corpus. Here, the broadsheets used the term, not just in relation to specifically regional events that unfolded over the period 2012–2016, but also to heighten the readers' perceptions that a 'state of emergency' was unfolding across the Korean Peninsula, in Iran, and worldwide. In this respect, not only was nuclear proliferation constructed in the public sphere as having a 'global' range; but it was also linked within the newspapers to other 'exceptional' phenomena such as 'terrorism'. As with the public-facing texts relating to the 2012 Olympics, elite newspapers on both sides of the Atlantic therefore appeared to subscribe readily to Agamben's (2005) doctrine. This was achieved by their use of a third discursive strategy of *exceptionalisation* through the introduction of more hyperbolic language through which they constituted essential 'concepts' relating to nuclear technology in their texts.

The final context within which a 'state of exception' (after Agamben 1998, 2005) appeared to be constituted is by the observation of the rhetorical strategies exhibited in a substantial corpus of public-facing web pages harvested from the sites of the US security agencies, fifteen years after the 9/11 attacks upon the US World Trade Centre. In our final analysis chapter (Chapter 10), we investigated how argumentation operates at the level of statements in the texts, and also how patterns of lexical selection have constructed semantic fields within the corpus. We have already seen how our analysis has revealed an array of lexis through which the US security services construct themselves within a technological and epistemological domain which could be referred to in normal parlance as a 'discipline', but which Foucault proposed naming a 'discursive formation' (1972). However, other trends observed widely in the data also indicated that rhetoric conforming to the logic of a state of exception can also be broadly observed. First, argument schemes were isolated that rehearsed the logic of exceptionalism and conformed to its predicted moves. Schemes included argument statements constructing a condition of special threat, and linked conclusions which described measures justified by the exceptional nature of the current emergency. Supporting the impact of this rhetoric, a topical semantic field of 'threat and danger' was also detected that establishes a theme of pervasive threat. Tactics at both levels combine to produce a co-ordinated argumentative effect; background tendencies in lexical selection contribute to the force of the rhetoric conveyed through argument schemes. This conclusion that the discourse rhetoric is purposed towards constructing a landscape of fearful uncertainty is broadly coterminous with Martin and Simon's (2008, p. 286) suggestion that the 'new geographies of security' constituted by the topological discourses of the Department of Homeland Security maintain a 'virtual ontology of imminent threat' within the USA.

Illiberalism within Liberalism

So far in this section, our synthesis of the semantic and rhetorical features of the corpora which we have analysed in the previous four chapters has revealed some linguistic and discoursal evidence for the possible constitution of an 'argument for exception' across these documents. However, two sets of contradictions emerge if we consider the language and discourse right across our corpora in its totality. First, while the language we have described above certainly appears to constitute a state of emergency as justification for the continuation of extraordinary powers on the part of the police and the security forces, we also find language which, in keeping with the principles of liberalism, simultaneously asserts the checks and balances accorded by juridical processes and the separation of powers. Secondly, while initial indications may indicate an exercise of state—or 'sovereign'—power (after Agamben 2005) which is both 'monolithic' and 'homogeneous', this is in some tension with countervailing evidence that the language and discourse we have analysed in our texts simultaneously appears to be constitutive of a security regime which is at once dispersed and 'heterogeneous' (after Bigo 2008).

There is no doubt that our corpora do exhibit a range of lexical items and discursive strategies which are constitutive of a 'state of emergency'. As we have seen, this is not only constituted within localised sites, such as the Olympic 'Venue' and the nation state, but also across territorial boundaries, as is the case with the nuclear proliferation 'crisis'. However, a liberal counterpoint to indications of the 'suspension of the law' emerges sharply just at the point where our corpus of UK security documents appears to become most restrictive of individual rights. For, just as we observed the salience of lexis which signifies the emergence of the modern carceral in our 2012–2016 sub-corpus, such as 'retention', 'detention' and 'detainee'; simultaneously within these documents we find an appeal to human rights and fair play (see Chapter 7). For example, the lexical items 'fairly' and 'fairness', which we uncovered in the Home Office *Code of Practice* (HMO 2015) occur repeatedly across the 2012–2016 sub-corpus, as in the repeated phrase 'fairness of the proceedings'. This is further exemplified in the explicit modulation of the assertion of emergency powers at the beginning of this document: 'The powers and procedures in this Code must be used fairly, responsibly, with respect for the people to whom they apply and without unlawful discrimination' (HMO 2015, p. 1). Thus, a countervailing tendency also emerges from this corpus, and elsewhere, for assertions of exceptionalism to be modulated by appeals to the principles and practice of the liberal constitution.

With regard to the second contradiction which emerges from our corpus, a particularly striking example of the heterogeneous nature of the security regime is exemplified in the corpus of webpages gleaned from the US Security Services (see Chapter 10). Here, in many of the argument schemes that we analysed in our final corpus, we have seen that the measures justified on the basis of a threat to the nation state do not obviously contribute to the exceptionalist purpose of instituting partial or whole martial law (after Agamben 2005). Rather than constituting an increase in policing powers or the suspension of civil liberties, these relate almost exclusively to procedures which promote sharing between agencies and the dissolution of institutional boundaries within the US security bureaucracies. These also echo some of commonalties that we have found across our 2001–2016 UK corpus relating to the frequent references to the 'sharing' of information and 'partnerships' between organisations, institutions and departments within the network of British security and counter-terrorist operations. This dispersal of the security regime, then, does not appear so much in keeping with the claims for the unmitigated force of sovereign power theorised by Agamben, but is much more in keeping with the dispersion of forces proposed by Foucault in his theory of governmentality (2004, 2007, 2008).

So, how can we supersede this aporia which presents itself so insistently from our corpora: between language which is apparently constitutive of exceptional circumstances which entail the suspension of the law and 'civil liberties', and language which appeals to liberalism as a proportionate limitation of state forces through the checks and balances afforded by the separation of powers; and between language which is apparently constitutive of the unyielding power of the sovereign state, and language which is suggestive of a dispersal of forces? To resolve this paradox, we have to make a more adventurous inference from the mutable and multi-faceted nature of the language and discourse which we have evidenced in our corpora. This is not to regard exceptionalism and liberalism as being constituted in our documents as mutually exclusive categories. That is to say, the language and discourse across our four corpora of texts do not constitute a state of affairs which conforms to a state of exception in the radical form proposed by Agamben: absolute suspension of the law; and totalising sovereign power. Rather, we can see the construction of multiple 'moments of exception' in order to justify certain courses of action within a post-9/11 ethos that do not add up to the 'totalising' 'state of exception'.

In this, our interpretation of the security discourse is similar, but not identical to, the argument put forward by Didier Bigo, based on his extensive research into what he calls the 'professions of (in)security' across Europe (2008). One aspect of his post-Foucauldian trope of the 'ban-opticon' with which we engaged at the end of Chapter 8 (see also Chapter 6) is the thesis that is possible for 'exceptionalism' to operate 'inside liberalism':

> … between the definitions of exceptionalism as suspension of the law, or break in normality, there is room for *other visions of exceptionalism that combine exception both with liberalism and with the routinised dispositif of technologies of control and surveillance*. Exceptionalism works hand in hand with liberalism and gives the key to understanding its normal functioning, as soon as we avoid seeing exceptionalism as a sole matter of special laws. (Bigo 2008, p. 33, our emphases)

We would suggest just such examples of another 'vision' of exceptionalism is suggested by the documents which we have analysed in this book. 'Special laws' such as the PATRIOT Act (2001), the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) and Prevention of Terrorism Act (2005) and policies such as *CONTEST* (HMO 2006, 2009a, 2011a), *Prevent* (2009b, 2011b) and the *Code of Practice* (HMO 2015) do indeed initiate exceptional powers. The extension of these powers combine with a strategic discourse which can be recontextualised from the political sphere to the public sphere to constitute, for example, the nature of an Olympic Games as an 'exceptional event' or a particular 'nuclear contention' as a 'crisis' in order to 'instil at the heart of our present time the idea that we are living in a "permanent state of emergency" or in a permanent state of exception'. However as Bigo argues, these laws and strategies do not 'suspend every law'; rather, they just 'derogate from normalised legislation' (ibid., p. 33). We have also seen, across our corpora, examples of the linguistic, rhetorical and discursive realisation of appeals to this ‘normalised’ legislation. These include the explicit refusal to associate any particular ethnic group with ‘violent extremism’ in the UK security documents; as well as the *absence* of any accusatory or hyperbolic language associated with the constitution of ‘nuclear technologies’ which characterise the genre of the UNSC resolution. In this way, the complexity and heterogeneity of the statements which we have analysed within the ‘discursive formation’ of security testify, *contra* any residual notions of the monolithic power of the nation state, not only to the production of a regime of ‘illiberalism within liberalism’ within post-industrial societies such as the UK and the USA (c.p. Bigo 2008), but also to their constitution of heterogeneous networks of departments, institutions, agencies, organisations and private companies, which operate nationally, transnationally and supra-nationally.

Conclusion

In this book we have undertaken the analysis of four substantial corpora of documents relating to security and counter-terrorism drawn from the UK, the USA and the UN. To analyse these documents, we have combined both conventional and innovative techniques of corpus analysis, with linguistic and text analysis techniques used in applied linguistics and discourse analysis; and we have considered our findings through the critical lens of poststructuralist theories which are specific to security and counter-terrorism. Our combination of chronological, traversal and in-depth textual analyses has revealed the fluidity and complexity of this discursive formation as it undergoes transformations through the delocation and relocation of texts across time (from one historical moment to another) and space (from one institutional site to another). Both these chronological and traversal shifts and our deeper analysis of individual sites have revealed different combinations of lexis which constitute aspects of Foucault’s threefold framework of governmentality in diverse fashion, specific to historical period and institutional location. Emerging from this, we have been able to observe certain lexical configurations of what at first sight appears to be a powerful argument relating to the exceptional conditions under which the populations of the

UK and the USA are living in the first half of the twenty-first century. However, more detailed engagement with the texts across our corpora suggests that these claims were ubiquitously moderated by appeals to the countervailing tendencies of liberalism and the diffusion of state power through the dispersal of its forces. We conclude that the 'post-9/11' ethos of security, counter-terrorism and nuclear proliferation which is constituted in our documents is less commensurate with the totalising 'state of emergency' prefigured by Agamben (1998, 2005), and more in keeping with the dispersed modalities of state power associated with Foucault's (2004, 2007, 2008) theory of governmentality.

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