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Christine Atieno
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Perspectives from Africa, Latin America, Europe and New Zealand

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Nairobi, Kenya — Christine Atieno
Wellington, New Zealand — Colin Robinson
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Christine Atieno and Colin Robinson

Development cannot take place without peace and democratic governance cannot prevail without political stability. Transformational and progressive ideas for social cohesion and sustainable peace grounded on contemporary realities remains essential and significant during transitional and post-conflict scenarios. This book examines the links between post-conflict security, peace stability and development with a focus on selected countries in Africa, Latin America and Europe.

Global researchers and policy makers in the field of peace, security and development, merge theory and practice hence share findings on individual and societal effects of post war traumas, organised crime and development through reinsertion of ex-combatants. The economic impact of terrorism, effects of macro-regionalism within volatile states and an analysis of reforms within the military apparatus is discussed. The book communicates on the linkages between regional stability, development and peace in post-conflict societies while adding on to the post 2015 international agenda and debate on "peace, security and development belong together".

1.1 International Peace Research Association: *Peace, Security and Development Commission* PSD COMM

PSD COMM's inspiration for this book resulted from the 26th IPRA Bi-Annual Conference of 2016 held in Freetown, Sierra Leone. The five-day forum themed "Agenda for Peace and Development" organised by the Association in collaboration with University of Sierra Leone, 10th Dealing with Disasters Conference Series, Northumbria University, UK and Sakarya University, Turkey, brought

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together peace researchers both in academia and practice to deliberate on tenets surrounding conflict prevention, post-conflict transformation, disaster risk and sustainable development. A key objective of the conference was to provide a platform for peace researchers from across the globe to exchange concepts and proposals on probable effective bottom-up approaches to post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding strategies. The end focus would be deriving a causal link between the lack of development and its relation to conflicts.

Efforts to reach out and engage others in dialogue with the aim of fostering mutual understanding and bringing people closer together may seem ordinary and unexciting, but they, in fact, constitute a bold and daring challenge to create a new era of human civilisation (Ikeda 2012).

1.2 Peace, Security and Development Issues in Africa, Europe and Latin America

Peace sustainability in a given post-conflict society may be threatened whenever a lack of experience towards alternatives to war is witnessed. A threat to peace translates to socio-economic-political instability and consequentially to inconsistencies in development and security.

> There is no development without security and without security there is no development. It is obvious if both concepts are viewed from a broader peace process rather than from a tactical and an anti-insurgency frame. […] In the Philippines case we have seen the interface of both aspects even at the level of implementing an existing ceasefire arrangement (HiPeC and SSN 2008).

Countries that are affected by conflict, violence and political instability are the furthest away from achieving the MDGs. According to the World Bank, two thirds of the poorest people in the world and 60% of the malnourished live in regions affected by conflict. Over the past 15 years the UN Security Council has considered HIV/AIDS, climate change and drug trafficking from a security perspective.[1]

The *Sustainable development goals* (SDGs)[2] adopted at the UN Summit in September 2015 under the Vision 2030 agenda are a universal call to action to end poverty, protect the planet and ensure peace and prosperity amongst all people.[3] It is important for all stakeholders to a peace process to define their development

[1] https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/German_Development_Institute_Janus_Kurtz_22.04.2014.pdf.

[2] No poverty, zero hunger, good health and well being, quality education, gender equality, clean water and sanitation, affordable and clean energy, decent work and economic growth, industry, innovation and infrastructure, reduced inequalities, sustainable cities and communities, responsible consumption and production, climate action, life below water, life on land, peace, justice and strong institutions, partnerships for the goals.

[3] http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals.html.

CONFLICTS AND PEACE PROCESSES AT THE END OF 2015			
Conflicts and peace processes ending with a peace agreement		Sudan (Darfur) SLM-MM dissidents, South Sudan, Mali (CMA- Platform)	3
Armed conflicts underway	With a consolidated peace process	Sudan (Darfur), CAR, Colombia (FARC), Burma / Myanmar	4
	With interruptions in the process	Mali, Ethiopia (ONLF), Sudan (Kordofan-Blue Nile), Libya, DRC (East), Afghanistan, Philippines (NDF), India (Assam), Pakistan (Balochistan), Thailand (South), Turkey (PKK), Ukraine, Israel-Palestine, Yemen (Houthis).	14
	Without formal negotiations	Algeria (AQMI), Nigeria (Boko Haram), Somalia (al-Shabaab), Colombia (ELN), Philippines (Abu Sayyaf), India (Jammu and Kashmir), India (CPI-M), Pakistan, China (East Turkestan), Russia (Dagestan), Egypt (Sinai), Iraq, Syria, Yemen (AQPA).	14
	Subtotal		35
Former unresolved armed conflicts that still require negotiation	With a consolidated peace process	Senegal (MFDC), Sudan (National Dialogue), India (NSCN-IM), India-Pakistan, Philippines (MILF), Cyprus, Kosovo, Moldova (Transdniestria), Armenia-Azerbaijan, Georgia (Abkhazia y South Ossetia)	11
	With interruptions in the process	Mozambique, Sudan-South Sudan, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Burundi, Western Sahara, Philippines (MNLF),	6
	Without formal negotiations	India (Nagaland-NSCN-K), China (Tibet)	2
	Subtotal		19
TOTAL	Ended		3
	With a consolidated peace process		15
	With interruptions in the process		20
	Without negotiations in recent years		16
	TOTAL		54

Fig. 1.1 Conflicts and peace processes year end 2015. *Source* Peace Processes year book (2016)

needs according to what identifies with the people if the SDGs are expected to be achieved.

Globally as at end of 2015, there were about thirty two armed conflicts underway and those unresolved formerly that still required negotiation as summarised in Fig. 1.1.

This thirteenth volume, in Springer's *Environment, Security, Development, and Peace* (ESDP) series, consolidates tri-continental research work on security and peace-related issues. The collated content underline the fact that development in the twenty-first century will only be possible if security can be assured. The unprecedented challenge of climate change will complicate and retard security and development efforts across a wide spectrum.

1.3 Book Chapters

The chapters may be categorised as addressing the inter-related issues of examining DDR and defence reform, and developing-states security on a broader scope. The scripts address local versions of the liberal peace interventionism challenge and myriad local security and justice concerns.

Development cannot take place without peace and democratic governance cannot prevail without political stability. Through the lenses of peace and human security, Robert Esuruku in Chap. 2 examines the impacts of the civil war in Northern Uganda and the post-war security and development distresses witnessed in that region which includes the conflict in South Sudan. Issues such as marginalisation, service delivery, youth unemployment, DDR deficit and case studies on border conflicts and food insecurity are some of those discussed in this chapter. Esuruku details the efforts made by the civil society and the government to respond to these challenges such as the Village Savings and Loan Associations and traditional justice methods to facilitate reconciliation. In conclusion, the author recommends various policies to be undertaken to improve peace, security and development in Northern Uganda.

Urban gangs have been attracting more and more recent scholarly attention (Rodgers and Baird 2015: 478). As a concern, in Chap. 3, Marcos Ferreira investigates the linkages of transnational organised crime and structural violence in Brazil used by groups exploiting drugs and arms trafficking to gain dominance across many urban areas in the country. Ferreira diagnoses how TOC takes advantage of societal configurations that perpetuate social injustice in contemporary Brazil and South America as whole. The data collected from NGOs, United Nations reports inter alia security studies information, shows an existing correlation between transnational illicit networks and structural violence in rural and urban areas. Ferreira also argues that the State repression of drug trafficking against low income population has not changed the social differences (structural violence) neither the homicide rates (direct violence) in Brazil.

In Chap. 4, Roberto Belloni explores the creation of macro-regions in Europe and their influence on peace and stability with the emergence of new regionalist identities. Belloni singles out the Adriatic Ionian region involving the volatile Western Balkans states and examines the implications and challenges in developing multi-centred regionalism.

In Colombia, the prolonged conflict between the armed groups and the government left massive psychological effects on a mass of the populace. Chapter 5 comprising of research team, Aponte, Zapata, and Agudelo detail an evaluation process on mental disorders and risk factors developed jointly in Colombia. It investigates the clinical component associated with violent behaviour and/or delinquent habits of the demobilized population in the current Colombian reintegration program.

The management and resolution of a crisis is significantly affected by DDR processes, and other security and justice reforms. Chapter 6 by Leopold Nangorgo

examines the processes involved in disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration of the ex-combatants and community at large in the Ivory Coast. The author analyses the impacts on the implementation of socio-economic reintegration projects associated with ex-combatants' return, involving behaviour change at reinsertion sites across Ivory Coast. Key significance is the resocialization aspect which he discusses has led to cultural exchange, giving the inhabitants of the surrounding villages an opportunity to discover the culture of the other peoples of Cote d'Ivoire and to accept the trainees through their community activities.

The devastating socio-economic effects of terrorism is a global phenomenon. Kenya is no exception. Charles Wasike in Chap. 7 assesses how Kenya is handling the terrorism scourge giving an overview of the region, the socio-economic impact on the vice within the country and the regional mechanism, IGAD and AU, being used to curb the situation. Wasike highlights the causes of extremist behaviour in Kenya attributable to political and socioeconomic deprivation singling out the coastal and North Eastern population relative to the rest of the country. Wasike advocates also the development of a Kenyan crisis and disaster management policy to serve as a guideline for managing the aftermath of terrorism, and the establishment of a crisis management task force.

There have been minimal undertakings to comprehensively catalogue and assess Defence Reform efforts since the end of the Cold War. In Chap. 8, this author himself assesses the effectiveness and accountability of defence institutions in developed and developing-states. The author examines DR efforts driven by national strategic interests, such as the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and those with more holistic programmes tied into other security sector reform efforts, such as in Sierra Leone and South Africa.

1.4 In Summary

The co-relations between peace, security and development is complex and needs constant innovativeness when deriving sustainable solutions to conflicts especially since post war societies tend to become plagued with high levels of criminality. A transition from combat to bureaucrats poses great challenges in post-war societies. The paradox of solving problems through gunfire and suddenly shifting to managing post-conflict projects without proper governance structures is a serious threat to development processes.

Further, the liberal peace agenda has accompanied most of international state-building since the first international advisors arrived in Cambodia in 1992. However, it is overly technocratic; infused with a blank slate mentality; externally driven by outsiders' strategic and security objectives; often ignores local political and power dynamics; and has unrealistic, enormous costs (Sedra 2017: 30–38). The deficiencies of the liberal peace run headlong into the need for local ownership of reform and peacebuilding programmes. The persistence of liberal peace 'solutions' often "closes the door on political progress and on difficult discussions about

sustainable forms of peace, legitimacy, responsibility and inequality." (Richmond and Ginty 2015).

In the aftermath of armed conflict, neither the wider liberal peace project nor security institutional reforms (altruistic, liberal, or indeed realist), can effectively address their own challenges without recognising that the liberal peace faces existential challenges. Security reforms and intervention will have to better include locals' thoughts and aspirations to succeed in the future.

We hope that this book and its research findings add to the international debate on amicable actions required to address post conflict reconstruction and sustainable peace.

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Chapter 2
Peace and Security in Northern Uganda

Robert Senath Esuruku

Abstract Northern Uganda is still recovering from the impacts of over 20 years of civil war between the *Lord's Resistance Army* (LRA) and the *Government of Uganda* (GoU). The aftermath of displacement and resettlement, psychological trauma, reintegration of former combatants, children born in captivity, land conflicts and *sexual and gender-based violence* (SGBV) continue to worry communities. The region exhibits the lowest indicators in the country in terms of poverty, economic and social opportunities and human development. This paper discusses the trends, status and new dimensions of peace and security issues in post-war northern Uganda.

Keywords Peace · Security · Gender-based violence · Demobilisation Development

2.1 Introduction

Since the signing of the cessation of hostilities between the *Government of Uganda* (GoU) and the *Lord's Resistance Army* (LRA) in 2006, relative peace has returned to northern Uganda and nearly all the formerly internally displaced persons have returned to their home areas and are rebuilding their lives. However, new dimensions of insecurities have continued to manifest themselves in different ways and many communities in northern Uganda appear to be in a state of overt conflict. This frequently manifests itself in the form of collisions between communities and government officials, violent community disputes over land and widespread sexual and gender-based violence.

The legacies of the civil conflict, driven by new and long-standing grievances such as the perceived historic marginalisation of northern Uganda and a weak sense of national identity keep the communities in northern Uganda in a state of latent conflict where trigger events can lead to a rapid escalation of violence. There is

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deep seated anger about the pervasive impunity during the over two decades of the armed conflict for the numerous cases of crimes against humanity and war crimes, as well as torture, extrajudicial executions and enforced disappearances by the LRA and the government forces.

This paper provides an independent view about the trends, status and new dimensions of peace and security issues in post-war northern Uganda. It provides useful information that may feed into the monitoring framework of the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda, a government programme being implemented in the region. The human security framework is adopted to analyse the post-conflict environment in Northern Uganda. Its content provides a brief background to the armed conflict, recent trends in peace, security and development from regional to sub-regional levels. The paper also looks at impacts of government and international development agencies interventions to address human security distress in northern Uganda. Lastly, the paper provides policy recommendations to address post-war human distress in the region. The sources of information are mainly from the annual evaluation reports from the government and NGOs, and also consensus panel discussions conducted in the region.

2.2 Background of the Armed Conflict

The over two decades of armed conflict between the GoU and LRA in Acholi, Lango, Teso and West Nile has been the most virulent of the conflicts Uganda has seen in recent times. The other rebel groups that have operated before in different parts of northern Uganda include the *West Nile Bank Front* (WNBF), *Uganda National Rescue Front* (UNRF2) and the *Uganda People's Army* (UPA) in Teso. In Karamoja sub-region, inter-clan and inter-tribal armed cattle raids in Karamoja – spreading to adjacent areas – have also resulted in insecurity, death, low development, much like in the war areas (Esuruku 2011).

The mayhem caused by the LRA and the National Resistance Army (NRA), resulted in the formation of the *Uganda People's Defence Forces* (UPDF), which caused total destruction and retardation to the northern Uganda region and more specifically Acholi sub-region and the neighbouring districts of Apac, Lira, Katakwi and Soroti. More than 1.8 million people were forced into *Internally Displaced Persons* (IDP) camps throughout northern Uganda – including parts of West Nile – as well as in eastern Uganda for more than two decades. Women and young girls were abducted and taken as wives and sex slaves for the LRA commanders. Some of the serious crimes widely documented are murders, abductions, forced marriage, sexual assault and horrific mutilations such as amputating limbs, cutting off ears, noses and lips (Pham et al. 2007).

Social services including agriculture, education and healthcare systems were severely destroyed and many professional employees deserted the region. Later attempts by the government to rebuild the region through development programmes such as *Northern Uganda Social Action Fund* (NUSAF) were driven by elite

socioeconomic and political interests and succumbed to massive corruption (Hickey 2003). Although social fund approach has the advantage of devolving responsibility to the community and protecting those responsible for project implementation from undue political influence, the availability of substantial resources for development purposes was an attractive source of political patronage in a region long deprived of such resources (Esuruku 2012). The political imperative of ensuring a balanced spread of project benefits undermined the equity objective of NUSAF in prioritising the most vulnerable groups and areas. Politicians keen to re-establish their legitimacy in the region often used the programme as a footstool for advancing their political ambitions.

At the root of this conflict lie issues of inequality, exclusion from state mechanism and development opportunities, which have marginalised a large proportion of vulnerable groups in the northern region. Explanations for the conflict are complex and intertwined and go back to Uganda's colonial history; a tradition of political mobilisation along ethnic and regional lines since independence; and the LRA's religion- and identity-driven agenda (Allen 2006). Insecurity in the Karamoja sub-region was partly rooted in the proliferation of small arms and the problematic disarmament programmes have partly hampered administration of central government services – factors that have resulted in a chronic breakdown of law and order and underdevelopment of the region (Fig. 2.1).

In order to address the specific reconstruction and recovery needs of conflict-affected northern Uganda, the Government of Uganda and Development Partners over the last 8 years implemented the *Peace Recovery and Development Programme* (PRDP 1, 2 and now 3) and other special programmes. PRDP was designed to address development gaps created by the effects of various insurgencies including those of the *Lord Resistance Army* (LRA) and cattle rustling in order to bring Northern Uganda to the same level with other parts of the country in terms of social-economic indicators. The first phase of PRDP commenced implementation in July 2009 and ended in June 2012, and the second phase (PRDP 2) commenced in July 2012 and ended in June 2015. In order to ensure that Northern Uganda as a region fully recovers, the Government of Uganda with support from Development Partners has developed a third phase of PRDP which was subsequently approved and its implementation will run from 2015 until 2020 (Fig. 2.2).

The UNDP *Country Programme Document* (CPD) for Uganda (2016–2020), approved in September 2015, identifies Northern Uganda as one of the focus regions. The CPD is in line with the approved *United Nations Development Assistance Framework for Uganda* (UNDAF 2016–2020). UNDAF is a framework aimed at contributing to the attainment of the second *National Development Plan* (NDP II) for Uganda. The UNDP CPD has two mutually inclusive and reinforcing pillars based upon a Theory of Change. These include (a) *Inclusive and Effective Governance* (IEG); and (b) *Sustainable, Inclusive Economic Development* (SIED).

Fig. 2.1 Political map of Uganda (2005). *Source* Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, The University of Texas Libraries at Austin. This map is in the public domain

2.3 Framing Peace and Human Security

Human security analysis is an essential part of human development thinking (Gasper/Gómez 2014). The concept of human security emerged as part of the holistic paradigm of human development cultivated at the *United Nations Development Programme* (UNDP) by former Pakistani Finance Minister, Mahbub



Fig. 2.2 Map of Northern Uganda (1973). *Source* Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, The University of Texas Libraries at Austin. This map is in the public domain

ul Haq, with strong support from economist Amartya Sen (Jolly/Ray 2006). The UNDP's 1994 global *Human Development Report* (HDR) was the first major international document to articulate human security in conceptual terms with proposals for policy and action.

Human security represents an effort to re-conceptualise security in a fundamental manner. It is primarily an analytical tool that focuses on ensuring security for the individual. Thus exploring options aimed at mitigating threats to the security of individuals becomes a central goal of policy recommendations and actions. In line with the expanded definition of human security, the causes of insecurity are subsequently broadened to include threats to socioeconomic and political conditions, food, health, and environmental, community and personal safety. Policy initiatives generated through the application of the human security framework have incorporated considerations far beyond the traditional focus on military force, greatly reducing the emphasis on armies, if not replacing them altogether (Jolly/Ray 2006).

Experience worldwide demonstrates that violent conflict is detrimental to sustainable human development and adversely affects democracy and good governance. Development cannot take place without peace and democratic governance cannot prevail without political stability. A protracted war within a country accentuates the polarisation of its society. Such polarisation retards efforts towards nation building and sociocultural integration (APRM 2009). Security matters to the poor and other vulnerable groups, especially women and children, because bad

policing, weak justice and penal systems and corrupt militaries mean that they suffer disproportionately from crime, insecurity and fear.

In northern Uganda, despite visible differences between sub-regions that were either directly, sporadically or marginally affected by the LRA conflict, a number of common conflict drivers can be found. Perceptions of neglect arising from poor service delivery and under-developed infrastructure cannot be resolved in the absence of post-war truth, reconciliation and transitional justice processes through which the relationship between state institutions and the people can be repaired. Grievances are being deepened by emerging conflicts over natural resources and property, land and boundary disputes in areas of return, and a proliferation of new districts – a process that appears to weaken governance rather than bringing it closer to the people (ACCS 2013).

Contestation over international borders between Uganda and its neighbours has a tangible impact on the security and safety of communities living in the border areas. Between Uganda and South Sudan, for example, there are continued tensions over alleged encroachments between communities north of Adjumani and Moyo districts in West Nile and their South Sudanese neighbours. The ongoing conflicts within South Sudan and insurgencies in eastern DRC have led to a renewed influx of refugees and asylum seekers in different parts of the country, thus disrupting much-needed service delivery and economic recovery (IRC 2014).

The amalgamation of severe poverty, extreme youth unemployment, socioeconomic and political exclusion, unsettled legacies of the war, and a widespread perception of marginalisation and neglect by the state has fuelled grievances in northern Uganda. A further critical layer to consider in the analysis of regional level conflict drivers is the impact of the wars in north Uganda on the different sub-regions. The PRDP II recognises that the physical and social infrastructure in some sub-regions was severely affected, thus presenting different reconstruction and peacebuilding challenges (ACCS 2012, 2013). The sub-regions found in northern Uganda are grouped as directly affected (Acholi, Karamoja, parts of West Nile and Lango), others as sporadically affected (parts of West Nile, Bunyoro, Teso, and Lango) while the rest were only marginally affected by spillover events related to the conflict (Elgon, Bukedi, and parts of Bunyoro and Teso).

In Acholi sub region which was the epicentre of LRA activities and abductions, historic perceptions of neglect underpin conflict drivers such as frustration at perceived unequal distribution of development assistance and the unexplained phenomenon of nodding disease. Land disputes between returning IDPs have been intensified by land grabs related to oil exploration and gazetting of land by the Uganda Wildlife Authority. Patterns of sexual and gender-based violence accompany shifting gender-related power relations, while youth unemployment and crime, difficulties in return and reintegration, and the establishment of new districts with inadequate capacity also undermine stability. These and other post conflict development challenges have been discussed below and in the appendix.

2.4 Post-war Security and Development Distresses

2.4.1 Marginalisation and Poor Service Delivery

The government of Uganda has acknowledged disparities between northern and southern Uganda in terms of access to basic services and quality of infrastructure (GoU 2007). Poverty rates in northern Uganda are far higher than those in the rest of the country, while key development indicators such as infant mortality, maternal health or the incidence of *Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome* (HIV/AIDS) also remain significantly worse in the northern Uganda (GoU 2014). Poverty breeds despair, disgruntlement and potentially conflict, especially if coupled with a sense of deliberate marginalisation and neglect when others within the country are becoming wealthier. This dynamic is often dangerously manipulated by community and political leaders to strengthen their support base.

Poor infrastructure and the failure of state institutions to deliver basic services was raised as a significant barrier to peacebuilding by stakeholders consulted in 2010 and already contributing to resentment towards state institutions. Although significant investment in infrastructure development in northern Uganda has taken place since end of the armed conflict, perceptions of neglect appear not to have shifted. Districts remain ill-equipped to deliver and oversee service provision and construction/maintenance of infrastructure, while most communities experience difficulties in accessing health, education, basic utilities such as electricity and potable water, and social services (ACCS 2013). At the community level, there is dissatisfaction with services provided in education, health and vocational training skills. These included inadequate staffing and the need to travel long distances in order to access services.

District officials often blame the decline in local level service provision on a drop in funding from the central government. Programme 6 of the PRDP (local government enhancement) was designed to address this problem and aimed to strengthen service delivery capacity. However, no additional funds were provided for this component on the assumption that existing donor funding would be sufficient. Equally, community members consulted in 21 sample districts for PRDP intervention noted that local government responses to their needs, especially in regard to health and education, were just above average. This was largely attributed to their limited participation in planning processes, insufficient community mobilisation and inadequate staffing (International Alert 2014). The situation is even worse in the Karamoja region where, for decades, people have suffered high levels of conflict and insecurity alongside dismal development indicators and severe poverty levels. Districts in Karamoja have failed to attract and retain staff in critical positions in engineering, health and education due to the squalid conditions of work. The community services departments at the district and lower local government level are all understaffed, yet they are responsible for community mobilisation and citizen involvement in government development programmes.

Local governments in northern Uganda have failed to attract and retain skilled and competent staff. This has been attributed to poor work conditions, including low salaries and wages compared to the remuneration offered by the private sector and non-governmental entities. Difficulties in accessing key social assistance were also identified as breeding resentment amongst communities in northern Uganda.

2.4.2 *Land and Border Conflicts*

Land and border conflicts are the most prominent and widespread drivers of conflict in northern Uganda. Land conflicts have increased in the aftermath of armed conflicts and displacements. Some of the factors fuelling land conflicts are historical patterns of land appropriation, dispossession and contestation over identity, ownership, access and usage. This is further exacerbated by population explosion, expansion of urban centres and demand for large farmlands. In the recent past, cross-border land conflicts between neighbouring communities have surfaced primarily in the West Nile, Acholi and Karamoja.

Internationally, Adjumani, Amuru, Lamwo and Moyo districts of northern Uganda have disputes with the Government of South Sudan over the demarcation of their borders. In the case study below the violent conflicts between the Ma'di and the Kuku over border land will be discussed.

Box 2.1: Case Study: Border Conflict between the Ma'di and Kuku. *Source* Esuruku (2015).

In 2009, suspected South Sudanese armed gangs crossed from Kajokeji and beat up people, burnt houses and destroyed crops. In return, Ugandan residents matched to Afoji border post and blocked the road with logs and stones. The Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni, and his South Sudanese counterpart, Salva Kiir, met in Moyo District and addressed the people, assuring them that they would both solve the border issue. In March 2012, six members of the Ugandan parliament Presidential and Foreign Affairs Committee visiting the disputed land on a fact-finding mission were arrested by South Sudanese security personnel. They were eventually released, and called off the visit.

Similarly, in September, 2014, the border dispute between the Ma'di and the Kuku escalated into violence. The trigger to the violent incidents was the arrest of the Moyo District Local Council 5 Chairman and fifteen (15) other Ugandan officials who were detained at Were Police Station in Kajokeji on September 5.[1] They had gone to Wano Village, on the border with South

[1]The authorities from Kajokeji subjected the Moyo District Local Council 5 Chairman, his vice chairman, and the LC3 Chairman, Moyo Sub County to inhuman and degrading treatment by tying and locking them up in a pit latrine.

Sudan, to enumerate resident Ugandans in the area during the 2014 population census exercise.

Ugandan local government officials have accused the police and the army of not providing security, yet they were reportedly tipped by some locals that South Sudanese nationals were planning an attack against Ugandans. On September 15, 2014, the Ma'di people, resident in Moyo District, presented a petition to the President of Republic of Uganda through the Local Council 5 Chairman, Moyo District. The petitioners asked the President to immediately act to secure the boundary with South Sudan and protect the citizens of Uganda against murder, rape, torture and dehumanising treatment.

In response, on September 20 2014, the Second Deputy Prime Minister and the Deputy Leader of Government Business, met with Ministers from South Sudan and various district leaders and security officials of both Moyo and Kejokeji; while the Inspectors General of Police of both Uganda and South Sudan met on September 22, 2014. This was also followed by the visit of several senior government officials, including the State Minister for Relief and Disaster Preparedness, Hon Musa Francis Ecweru. The purpose of these meetings was to look for strategies to calm the situation and to boost confidence among the affected population.

Land disputes involve diverse parties, pitching individuals against their own families, clan against clan, community members against district authorities and/or private investors amongst others. The issues, dynamics, causes and effects of these conflicts are intricate and vary from place to place. The key conflict drivers include competition over commercially valuable land, fraudulent transactions, illegal occupation, contested boundaries, misinterpretation or poor understanding of the land laws and post-war return policies. The problems are more acute in the newly established districts. Many of these districts are facing problems around the demarcation of boundaries, which divert attention and resources from much-needed service delivery and they receive little support or guidance from the Ministry of Local Government.

At the heart of many land disputes is the potential for material gain through the sale, purchase and/or misappropriation of communal property. In Karamoja, for instance, the central government has allocated land for mineral exploration and exploitation without consulting the local authorities and community, thus fuelling tensions between local communities and foreign investors in the sub-region (RLP 2012).

In Zeu Sub-County (Zombo District), eight clans have complained that a tea production company has illegally acquired 1,285 hectares of land, in collusion with the local government. The residents allege that after legally selling 500 hectares for tea growing to the company, the latter proceeded to claim an additional 785 hectares, claiming to have purchased them from the local government. The dispute

has been ongoing since 2008 and in 2011 locals set fire to trees planted by the company (Okethwengu 2012).

The difficult transition from customary land to private ownership, coupled with a lack of knowledge amongst many ordinary citizens about land legislation and the difficulty in obtaining property titles, has left many northern Ugandans vulnerable to abuses of their property rights. Moreover, traditional and customary instruments that used to provide security of tenure to vulnerable groups like widows, children, the disabled and the elderly have been eroded through two decades of forced displacements (Mabikke 2011). In some cases, traditional leaders have sold or loaned customary land to government or private investors without adequate consultation and/or compensation to those affected, thus leading to escalating conflicts in previously peaceful communities. Informal land transactions are rapidly increasing, especially in urban centres in northern Uganda, with cases of youth with legitimate access and rights to land selling plots of lands for cash without the consent or engagement of traditional authorities. This has resulted in community and inter-generational conflicts (Mabikke 2011). While some disputants in land conflicts have legitimate motives, many others are driven by greed and the desire to acquire land for private benefit.

2.4.3 The Conflict in South Sudan

The outbreak of an armed conflict in South Sudan on 15 December 2013 has imposed difficulties on neighbouring countries, including Uganda. A population of two million have been displaced by the violence. About a quarter of these people have fled to the neighbouring states of Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda. According to the recent study conducted by Frontier Economics in collaboration with Centre for Conflict Resolution and the Centre for Peace and Development Studies (2015), about 100,000 people have sought refuge inside UN bases and do not feel safe enough to return home. Although there is no official death toll, the International Crisis Group estimates the figure as between 50,000 and 100,000 people. The conflict has also imposed economic costs on neighbouring countries, notably Sudan and Uganda. Sudan's exposure lies mainly through the shortfalls in its share of earnings of South Sudanese oil production, and the budgetary costs associated with an influx of South Sudanese refugees. The bulk of the latter costs have been borne by the international community through the United Nations.

Uganda deployed troops in South Sudan in December 2013, following the outbreak of conflict. The costs of this deployment are not known with precision. A figure of US$65 million was reported in June 2014 and troop deployment has been financed through the use of supplementary budgets. No definite timetable has been set for operations conducted by Ugandan troops in South Sudan. Working on the basis of annual costs in line with the figure of US$65 million cited above – which is a conservative assumption as it reflects operations in the early period of the

conflict – the military intervention places a significant claim on state resources (Frontier Economics et al. 2015).

Uganda has also been a major recipient of refugees from South Sudan. According to *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees* (UNHCR) March 2015 report, a total of 144,602 South Sudanese refugees have been assisted in Uganda since the influx began in mid-December 2013. Most of the refugees are hosted in settlements near the border of South Sudan. There are 91, 011 refugees in Adjumani, 12,741 in Arua, 33,370 in Kiryandongo and 7,490 in Kampala. This creates significant financial costs, which are largely borne by the international community.

The UNHCR estimates that from 2011 to 2014, the costs associated with humanitarian responses to refugees from neighbouring countries increased from around US$ 76 million per year to nearly US$ 210 million. Clearly, not all of this increase is attributable to the situation in South Sudan, but by taking the conservative assumption that half this increase is due to the conflict in South Sudan, an indication is given of the potential costs associated with prolonged conflict, and indeed of further escalation, with the bulk of these costs likely to fall on the international community (Frontier Economics et al. 2015).

Disruptions to cross-border informal trade with South Sudan may also negatively impact food security in the border regions. The Ugandan authorities observed that GDP growth for the 2013–2014 financial year was 4.7%, which was lower than the projected 6%, and attributed this underperformance in part to the effects of South Sudan's conflict. A projected 30% drop in remittances from returning Ugandan workers is, on its own, estimated to have reduced Uganda's GDP growth by 0.2–0.3 percentage points. Due to Uganda's military involvement in South Sudan, the conflict has also imposed direct budgetary costs through higher spending on security. Security spending for the financial year 2013–2014 was around 111% of what was budgeted (not all of this excess is attributable to the conflict in South Sudan), and, partly as a consequence, spending in other areas (water, transport and health, notably) was below the budget (Frontier Economics et al. 2015).

The violence has also made subsistence farming impossible or considerably more difficult for large parts of the population, thus leading to famine. Furthermore, day-to-day commercial activity in South Sudan has been disrupted and thousands of foreign workers from neighbouring countries have returned home. A number of Ugandans working in South Sudan's construction and service sector have left. This has also affected Ugandan society, as remittances from Ugandans working in South Sudan are an important source of income for their families back home. Since 2006, South Sudan has bought 20 percent of Uganda's export goods, making it Uganda's largest customer. The increased insecurity and instability in South Sudan has thus had a devastating impact on the Ugandan economy.

Given the conflict's economic impacts and the risks associated with security and stability resulting from the proliferation of small arms in South Sudan's neighbouring countries, many external political actors are very interested in securing a

cease-fire and settling the conflict. However, these actors are proceeding in very different manners'. Uganda, which views the continuing conflict as threatening its northern regions with instability, has sent troops to support the South Sudanese government militarily (Koos/Gutschke 2014).

In Uganda, refugees are able to access public services in the host community. The refugee influx has put significant pressure on health services, particularly in host communities of which northern Uganda has more than its fair share. Besides, there was a measles outbreak and malaria epidemic in February and May 2014 respectively. Uganda has eliminated guinea worm and the parasitic disease *Kala Azar* and there is a fear that South Sudanese refugees may reintroduce these diseases (IRC 2014). There is also a risk of cholera if water and sanitation are not improved.

2.4.4 Sexual and Gender-Based Conflict

The post-war environment in northern Uganda has resulted in a deeply-seated culture of violence perpetrated majorly by men against women and by men against other men. During the LRA conflict the constraints imposed by the war thwarted men's ambitions to achieve their gender-based aspirations such as to create a family, to provide for and protect it and to uphold community values of dialogue rather than aggression. Their inability to achieve these aspirations generated further levels of interpersonal violence, self-harm and anti-social behaviour (Judy et al. 2013).

This violence, often sexual in nature, perpetrated in both the private and public sphere continues to permeate communities in northern Uganda. When reporting sexual violence crimes, survivors are too often re-victimised by systems that do not fully account for and are not responsive to their needs. There is a prevailing view that sexual violence is a matter to be addressed between families and outside of the formal justice system with a strong preference for keeping the family unit and wider community unified rather than on punishment for the perpetrator of the violence. This undermines the criminality of the act and interventions that are used to address sexual violence within the home are often not commensurate with the severity of the crime.

However, when female survivors report to the formal system, they are faced with police officers operating with cultural and gender bias, and a corrupt justice system where those who have the privilege of understanding the law have powerful contacts and money to manipulate the system. Mothers of children born out of rape are often presented with the choice of formal justice or the potential of financial security. They have often chosen to pursue financial support from the perpetrator and his family rather than seek formal justice for the crime committed.

2.4.5 *Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration Deficit*

When conflict comes to an end, those who directly took part in fighting may have special livelihoods, economic and psycho-social needs (UNDP 2013). Following the cessation of hostilities between the GoU and the LRA, many young fighters surrendered their guns to the government authorities. Since then, they have not been properly reintegrated into civilian life. Many of them are marginalised and are angry with the government.

In the West Nile sub-region, the male respondents in Yumbe District, on the one hand, were hit by the UNRF2 insurgency and their economic situation affected, more especially following the high expectations from the Bidi Bidi peace agreement. Needless to say, the ceaseless armed violence in the neighbouring South Sudan attract some of the youth in the region to join armed groups in Southern Sudan as a way of earning a living. A number of the youth are also unemployed and are involved in hazardous behaviours such as abuse of drugs and alcohol.

In the case of Acholi sub-region, there has been a lot of effort by *Civil Society Organisations* (CSOs) and cultural leaders to reintegrate the formerly abducted youth into their communities. However, most of them have remained jobless and roaming around town centres, having lost a great deal of opportunities due to the number of years spent in rebel captivity and/or encampment. Amongst the frequently asked question is the paternity of male children born into rebel captivity *vis-à-vis* land rights. These children are regarded as not having any cultural citizenship and hence viewed as alien to Acholi community making them stateless (International Alert 2015).

In the recent past, more than five thousand (5000) former Amuka militia fighters from Lango sub-region who took part in battles against the LRA between 2004 and 2007 were demanding demobilisation packages which they said were long overdue. The militia group was formed in 2003 to boost and support the UPDF in the search for LRA rebels at the height of the insurgency in northern and eastern Uganda. Since demobilisation, no payments have been made to some of the militia. The unpaid militia took the GoU to court in 2013 over the issue but the state preferred to settle the dispute out of court. The Attorney General had earlier said the GoU had no binding agreement with the former militia members and that they were not entitled to any compensation. This statement infuriated the militias, who vowed to use all possible means available to make sure they get their compensation (SAFE 2015).

Given the varied nature in which different youth groups were affected by armed conflict, it is now evident that there should not be a one-size-fits-all approach to the socioeconomic reintegration of youths into their communities of origin. The case of ex-Arrow Force combatants in Teso *vis-à-vis* that of UNRF2 ex-child combatants in

West Nile depicts the caution with which a reintegration process of former combatants ought to resonate with the context in which it is to be implemented. For instance, the Arrow boys from Teso are regarded by their society as heroes and on the other hand, UNRF2 ex-child soldiers are perceived as villains (International Alert 2015).

Failing to address the special requirements of ex-combatants may have long-term consequences for sustainable development, compound the conditions for instability and threaten what can sometimes be fragile peace. Former soldiers may not have the skills or means to earn an income as civilians. The trauma of what they have witnessed might have left them vulnerable to psychological disorders. Disaffected ex-combatants who are left without support networks may seek redress through crime or political violence, especially when the underlying causes of the conflict, such as unemployment, inequity or poverty still exist (UNDP 2013).

Undoubtedly, while the disarmament and demobilisation parts of the DDR process are relatively straightforward, the socioeconomic reintegration of the formerly abducted and conscripted persons has proven to be far more complex. Indeed, the continued presence of unemployed and formerly armed persons poses a threat to community and national level security thereby jeopardising all other efforts aimed at economic recovery and peacebuilding.

2.4.6 Youth Disenfranchisement and Disillusionment

The increasing feelings of hopelessness amongst the youth arising from poverty, unemployment, low educational attainment and poor governance constitute part of a global pattern in areas of armed conflict (Amarasuriya 2009). The issue of youth unemployment poses particular political, economic and social challenges to peacebuilding in northern Uganda, where thousands of young people have returned from displacement to a shattered socioeconomic environment (UNDP 2009). Youth in the post-war environment of northern Uganda have very limited access to and control over key assets, including land and physical and human capital. Many are poorly educated and depend on low-productivity subsistence agriculture and the informal sector for their livelihoods, where returns on labour and capital are generally low.

Some of the youth have returned to their communities and found that their status as returnees, former abductees or ex-combatants has a negative impact on their ability to integrate in their communities. A study of youth perceptions in Acholi and Lango showed that the status of over 87% of respondents in the above categories was known to their neighbours, and that in many cases this had resulted in their stigmatisation and scapegoating for crime and breaches of community peace. Many

youths noted that perceptions in their communities of ex-combatants as being involved in crime is unjust (International Alert 2013).

Following the disarmament campaigns in Karamoja, the promise of increased development has not been adequately delivered thus causing mistrust and hostility towards the state. The hopelessness, fear and frustrations felt by many young Karimojong are incentives to acquire weapons to protect themselves and could fuel the motivation for revenge attacks, which may lead to an escalation of conflict (Saferworld 2012).

On the one hand, some observers of the post-war scenarios in northern Uganda argue that the inability of populations, and more especially male youths, to engage in livelihood recovery is a result of 'relief dependency' coupled with alcohol abuse leading to 'male idleness'. Similarly, there is also evidence that the destitution borne out of repeated exposure to serious violations, asset loss, land grabbing, landlessness and even loss of family labour as a result of the war is contributing significantly to an inability of these war-affected populations to adapt and recover fully (International Alert 2015).

The long period of armed conflict, to which many youth in northern Uganda were subjected, has had devastating ramifications on both their psyche and economic status. There is a noticeable lack of a youth-centred recovery plan on the part of the government to systematically empower the youth in order to assume a dignified citizenship in the aftermath of war. This is partly attributed to the failure of the central government to formulate and implement a comprehensive youth focused recovery programmes. The outcry against maladministration of government programmes designed for youth empowerment nationwide and for socioeconomic reintegration process in the specific context of post-war northern Uganda was reported to have also been configured at the district level. Perhaps, this is one of the prices paid for implementation of the decentralisation policy – the latter being characterised by the ripple effects of centralisation at the decentralised units of government.

2.4.7 Food Insecurity

It is well-documented that armed conflict triggers food insecurity by restricting food production, access to food through the market and various other resources to sustain healthy and productive lives. Uganda's food security situation is complicated by the presence of refugees from neighbouring countries, many of whom lack the means to produce or access food.

Poverty is often the root cause of food insecurity because poor households lack the resources required to access enough nutritious food to live a healthy active life. Poor households are unable to invest in agricultural inputs required to boost their

food production. Poor farmers habitually sell off any surplus food soon after harvest to earn income and repay debts. Poor households have no financial buffer to protect themselves from shocks such as illness of a household member or crop failure due to drought. In times of such stress households often resort to harsh coping mechanisms that may involve reducing food intake and removing children from school, coping strategies that often perpetuate a cycle of poverty which further undermine their already fragile food security situation.

Northern Uganda, especially Karamoja region is known for its chronic food insecurity, poor access to basic social services such as education and health, environmental degradation, erratic rainfall and recurrent droughts. A combination of these factors has undermined the capacity of households to meet their basic nutritional needs. The sub-region is also known for chronic food insecurity as discussed in the case study below.

Box 2.2: Case Study: Food Security in Karamoja. *Source* WFP (2014).

Uganda's north-eastern Karamoja region is known for its chronic food insecurity and vulnerability to hunger, as well as poor access to basic social services such as education and health. A combination of chronic underdevelopment and recurrent drought in Karamoja coupled with persistent insecurity associated with cattle rustling, continue to undermine the capacity of households to meet their basic nutritional requirements. Karamoja also has the highest levels of acute and chronic undernutrition in the country, with wasting at 7.1 percent and stunting at 45 percent.

The food security status in Karamoja in May 2014 was worse than the previous year. The Integrated Phase Food Security Classification (IPC) analysis, which was carried out for Karamoja in April, found that 18% of the population is in IPC phase 3 (Crisis); approximately 252,000 of the 1.37 million people in Karamoja. A further 58% of the population are classified as being in Phase 2 (Stressed). Two-thirds of the households across Karamoja region depict inadequate food consumption. A clear deterioration of food consumption patterns across Karamoja is seen in the period February to June 2014. In this time, the percentage of households with Adequate or Acceptable food consumption has decreased by more than 10%; and there has been a proportional increase in households depicting Borderline food consumption. The prevalence of wasting in most of the districts of Karamoja is serious (>10%) and Moroto has the highest prevalence of wasting (22.2%), categorised as critical. The highest prevalence of underweight (severely wasted and wasted) among mothers is seen in Amudat, Napak and Kaabong districts.

Food insecurity – especially when caused by a rise in food prices – is a threat and impact multiplier for violent conflict (Brinkman/Hendrix 2011). It might not be a direct cause and rarely the only cause, but combined with other factors, for example in the political or economic spheres, it could be the factor that determines whether and when violent conflicts will erupt. Food assistance can contribute to peacebuilding, restore trust in governments and rebuild social capital.

Traditionally, Karamojong social and economic life is structured around the maintenance of livestock. Cattle are households' most important assets, followed by sheep, goats and poultry. These animals are a critical source of food, but are also maintained as a safety net, a means of social exchange and a form of investment (Stites 2010). For many traditional pastoral communities, raising livestock allows them to take advantage of the land's low primary productivity in an efficient manner. However, the recurrent, persistent droughts have often undermined relationships between pastoralists and sedentary farmers. This is because herding activities occur in marginal lands, these conflicts often occur against a backdrop of chronic food insecurity exacerbated by poverty and political exclusion.

2.5 Interventions to Address Security and Human Development Setbacks

In the aftermath of conflict, societies often engage a number of means to respond to past violations committed during conflict. These mechanisms take the form of prosecution, truth commissions, reparation schemes, traditional mechanisms and institutional building. All these are aimed at accountability for violations suffered and reconciliation within communities. During and aftermath of the conflict in northern Uganda, many NGOs and UN agencies provided support to the war affected communities. In this section, the roles will be discussed which NGOs, development partners, religious and cultural leaders have played in peacebuilding in that region.

2.5.1 Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI)

The *Acholi Religious Leader Peace Initiative* (ARLPI), an NGO, has had a positive impact on the lives of the IDPs in northern Uganda. Formed in 1998, the ARLPI is a forum that brings together the Christian and Muslim leaders in Acholi, northern Uganda. ARLPI has played a significant role in creating a bridge between the government and the LRA and advocated for an end to the conflict in northern Uganda. Although the ARLPI never specifically played a role as mediator, it made

sure that the two sides remained in contact. This connection has, on occasion, indicated the possibilities of negotiation. To date, the ARLPI regards their role as a bridge that builds the level of trust and confidence on both sides and their strategy is to put pressure on the rebels and the government to stop fighting and talk peace. As a result of being a bridge, the ARLPI has been, in a number of instances, authorised to convey one fighting faction's message to the other. For instance, in July 2002, the Anglican bishop, Baker Ochola, the Catholic archbishop, John Baptist Odama and Cardinal Emmanuel Wamala were received by President Museveni, who authorised them to begin contacts with the LRA. Since 2006, they have been involved in the peace process as advisors and observers. In addition, the ARLPI has lived up to the common Acholi saying, "*Religious leaders don't bend, they are always straight*," referring to the impartiality and integrity of the religious leaders in the region (Otim 2009). Indeed, they have never bent to either side of the conflicting parties but rather identified with the war affected communities. They opposed the LRA for their continued violence on the population and, in the same manner, opposed the government for their failure to respond appropriately through dialogue or otherwise to bring peace to the civilian population. The ARLPI played a significant role in the formulation of the Amnesty Law in 2000. This law came into force in January 2002. Article three of the law states:

> An Amnesty is declared in respect of any Ugandan who has at any time since the 26th day of January, 1986 engaged in or is engaging in war or armed rebellion against the Government of the Republic of Uganda by (a) actual participation in combat; (b) collaborating with the perpetrators of the war or armed rebellion; (c) committing any other crime in the furtherance of the war or (d) armed rebellion; or assisting or aiding the conduct or prosecution of the war or armed rebellion.

The ARLPI significantly influenced the content of the National Amnesty Law to ensure that it is relevant and appropriate to the local Acholi situation. They also sensitised the LRA on radios about the provisions of the amnesty law. The implementation of the law has led to the return of hundreds of formally abducted children to their communities.

Furthermore, the ARLPI also engages in peace education to achieve its goal of a peaceful society at the grassroots. They do this through training the local communities and working with cultural leaders. Their training focuses on negotiation, mediation and reconciliation process. This peace education is done through an inclusive approach, where stakeholders are involved in peace activities, such as trainings and community sensitisations, in order to reinforce peace ideas among the community. This has created peace structures in the northern Uganda and a culture of peace – forgiveness, tolerance and reconciliation.

2.5.2 *Northern Uganda Early Recovery Programme (NUERP)*

Since signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the GoU and the LRA in 2006, the entire region has experienced relative peace and the people have moved back to their homes albeit the many challenges. The *Northern Uganda Early Recovery Programme* (NUERP) was conceived with the idea of contributing towards early recovery in the Lango sub-region, where support to returning communities had been minimal. The project which was implemented from July 2009 to November 2012 gave particular attention to the special needs of vulnerable members of the community, especially women, children and the youth. The project was funded by the *United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security* (UNTFHS) and it was jointly implemented by three UN agencies: the UNDP, the *World Health Organization* (WHO) and the *World Food Programme* (WFP).

The overall goal of the project was to support the rapid self-sustainable recovery of the conflict affected communities through an integrated service delivery and community-based recovery approach. The project was implemented in the districts of Lira, Oyam, Alebtong and Otuke. The project's purpose was to give the war affected communities a fresh start in life, by working together with a number of implementing partners such as World Vision, the *Food and Agriculture Organisation* (FAO), International Life Line Fund, Sasakawa Global 2000, ACTED, the Ministry of Health and the local governments in each of the four districts (WVU 2012). Since 2009, many positive changes have been registered in the peoples' lives, including improved farming methods and food security; a culture of saving through the Village Savings and Loan Associations (VSLAs); a keen interest in maintaining peace through peace rings (see the case study below); increased awareness of the need to take care of both their health and the health of their environment.

Box 2.3: Case Study: Using "Peace Rings" to curb conflict and improve livelihoods. *Source* UNDP (2013). Using "Peace Rings" to curb conflict and improve livelihoods, at: http://www.ug.undp.org/content/uganda/en/home/ourwork/crisispreventionandrecovery/successstories/Sample_Success_Story_1/ (3rd February 2015).

The project was implemented by the UNDP, the WHO and the WFP with USD 3.8 million from the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security – 90% of it from the Government of Japan. Between 2009 and 2012, the programme resolved 2,288 community conflicts through a 1,090-strong network of peace ring leaders. Through supporting village savings associations, the programme also helped 3,335 people start small businesses; increase their farming acreage, take care of medical emergencies or pay school fees. 12,578 farmers, half of them women, were trained on improved farming techniques and practices as well as given access to seeds and fertilisers. The project

enabled the beneficiary households to increase their farm size and produce sufficient food to eat, sell, or store for replanting. The programme aims to facilitate resettlement and recovery in Lango, a sub-region affected by the presence of the LRA. With the end of the LRA's insurgency in that area in 2006, many families returned home, facing disputes over land and property.

2.5.3 Village Savings and Loan Association

The *Village Savings and Loan Association* (VSLA) programme, was started as people began to move from IDP camps back to their original homesteads. The VSLA programme is a localised banking system, which provides members with three immensely valuable benefits: a way to save money, a way to earn interest, and a way to access previously unavailable capital to start small businesses. As members save and loan money, interest is generated. At the end of a six- or eight-month cycle, the savings are returned to individual group members, along with each member's percentage of the group interest. As of August 2012, the VSLA programme was comprised of ninety-five (95) savings groups consisting of thirty (30) members each (WVU 2012). With structured support and financial instruction from the VSLA programme staff, villagers who had never saved money before are learning life-changing personal finance practices.

According to the 2012 annual report of the World Vision-Uganda, through the NUERP, three thousand eighty-four (3,084) households from one hundred and twelve (112) VSLA groups in Oyam, Alebtong, Lira and Otuke districts were trained on business skills, entrepreneurship management and mentored on the VSLA programme methodology. The provision of savings kits to these groups improved safety and transparency among the VSLAs during and after savings. The groups have been actively saving with 100% of the savings group members actively contributing to the savings on a weekly basis. Cumulative savings obtained from the sampled sixty (60) groups amounted to UGX43, 702, 600 (US$16, 808) within eleven (11) months. In addition, the project built the capacity of one thousand one hundred and ninety (1,190) local government staff and religious, cultural and political leaders of Lira, Oyam, Otuke and Alebtong districts in participatory development, management, human rights and judicial mandates, peacebuilding and conflict resolution, transparency and accountability.

2.5.4 Traditional Justice

The culture of peace and non-violence is a commitment to peacebuilding, mediation, conflict prevention and resolution, peace education, education for non-violence, tolerance, acceptance, mutual respect, inter-cultural and inter-faith dialogue and reconciliation. Culture of peace consists of values, attitudes and behaviours that reject violence and prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation among individuals, groups and nations (UNESCO 2015). In today's globalised and highly interdependent world, it has become clear that peace rests on a complex and fragile fabric of interrelated values, attitudes and behaviours.

The Acholi traditional justice and reconciliation system is a practical reflection and application of the growing concept of transitional justice, namely counter-factual investigations into the past and the present in order to determine the future (see case study below). The unique importance of the Acholi traditional system is that the perpetrators of atrocities will remain in society even after a peace deal is reached. The settlement of the conflict will entail a social future where both perpetrators and victims, and their respective families, live together.

Box 2.4: Acholi rites of reconciliation: Mato oput.

Mato oput is the traditional reconciliation ritual carried out by traditional Acholi leaders to subdue bitter relationship between the warring parties. The Mato Oput process entails the principle of acknowledgement, tolerance, forgiveness and collective guilt where the parties to a conflict resolve their differences amicably. The process recognises and seeks to salvage and affirms the dignity of all those involved- victims, perpetrators and the community at large for the purposes of reconciliation. Mato Oput advocates the severing of relationship between conflicting societies until a cleansing ceremony is performed. Some time lapse is allowed before conducting the cleansing ceremony to allow the victims to suppress their resentment and any remaining hatred towards the perpetrators. A goat and ram are slaughtered and exchanged to remind the perpetrators and the community in general that there is a price to be paid for violating agreed community norms. Therefore, Mato Oput embodies restorative as opposed to retributive justice.

The process of the ritual is symbolic to the parties involved in conflict and society as a whole. For ex-combatants and former abducted children, community members gather as witnesses of the process and also demonstrate signs of forgiveness and welcoming them back to the communities. Key symbols during the procession are raw eggs, hyssop leaves, water and the

oput herbs. Oput is a tree with bitter roots and leaves; the roots are squashed to produce bitter liquid that is taken by warring parties.

An egg is placed at the entrance of the homestead for ex-combatants and former abducted children to step on as they walk to enter the home. The eggs signify cleansing the person from all the atrocities committed while in captivity, or the bush. The hyssop leaves are symbols for welcoming back former abducted children or persons who have committed crime against humanity. Water is sprinkled to forgive and reconcile and the bitter oput herbs which stresses the psychosocial bitterness that prevailed in the minds of the parties in conflict situation. The whole process involves the guilty acknowledging responsibility, repenting, and asking for forgivingness. The mato oput covers offenses across the board.

The principle of conflict resolution among the Acholi is to create reconciliation which brings the belligerent sides together through the intercession of elders, leading to the acceptance of responsibility and an indication of repentance. The precursor for all these processes of societal recovery is acknowledgement. Forgiveness opens the way for individual and collective healing.

2.6 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Northern Uganda is relatively peaceful and nearly all the formerly internally displaced persons have returned to their home areas and are rebuilding their lives. Although the armed conflict has come to an end, hostilities continue to explode into violence intermittently derailing the gains made in post-conflict recovery, development and peacebuilding. The impacts of the armed conflict have remained visible and alive in the minds of the war-affected communities. Conflict drivers such as land grabbing and rivalry over natural resources affect the region. Many of the grievances that led to the outbreak of the civil conflict in the past continue to be raised by community leaders today. These include marginalisation, neglect and political exclusion by the government.

One of the most serious legacies of mass violence is the trauma experienced by individuals and communities. In this context, the psychosocial dimension gains particular relevance involving interventions aimed at overcoming trauma and achieving reconciliation at both the individual and inter-group level while simultaneously working on identity issues. The lack of a comprehensive transitional justice process and piecemeal compensation for war-inflicted losses also contribute to driving conflict today. The legacies of the LRA war, fuelled by new and long-standing grievances, have kept communities in a state of latent conflict where conflict drivers can lead to an escalation of violence if significant trigger events take place.

Although the implementation of the PRDP has made positive contribution in infrastructural development of northern Uganda, it has failed to adequately engage communities in consultation, planning and implementation of projects and in some cases it has become a conflict driver. A lack of transparency has given rise to allegations of corruption, thus fuelling tension between sub-regions, districts and sub-counties, as well as conflicts between district authorities, communities and amongst ethnic groups that consider others to be favoured by its assistance.

2.7 Policy Recommendations

2.7.1 Justice and Fairness

Human beings value justice and fairness, the most obvious example for northern Uganda being political inclusion, reparation, truth-telling and bringing the perpetrators of the conflict to justice. When fairness is absent, injustice and exclusion can present themselves in the form of tensions. There is a need to supplement formal justice with traditional community justice systems. Traditional justice systems so far have proved to be effective in settling land disputes, property and family issues as well as more aggravated crimes such as murder.

2.7.2 Support the Private Sector Recovery

People's top priority after basic security, law and order is their own economic survival. Creating the right environment for businesses is often not enough to attract investment. There is a need to support the private sector to play its catalytic role and one such approach is to reinforce the value chains. Restoring these connections by bringing together market actors and providing information about market trends can create jobs and rebuild social cohesion. Economic opportunities for small and medium enterprises need to be identified by way of establishing short-term employment opportunities in public investment schemes, promoting skills upgrading and on the-job training. Potential and real entrepreneurs need to be trained on business management and planning practices. Additionally, there should be grant mechanisms to support start-ups with a special focus on marginalised groups, including women, youth and ethnic minorities.

2.7.3 Education and Health Reforms

Delivering early tangible results in areas that reflect the priorities of the war-affected communities is vital. Such priority areas include an improvement of the education and health infrastructure, institutions and furnishing them with modern equipment and utilities. Strengthening the inspection of such institutions and addressing the quality of education and health standards are key components. In the same vein, improving the terms of service and working conditions for teachers and health workers is fundamental.

2.7.4 Address Sexual Gender-Based Violence

The rampant cases of post-war *Sexual Gender-based Violence* (SGBV) call for a more robust approach to deal with the menace. There is a need to expeditiously deal with violence against women by punishing perpetrators and rehabilitating victims of SGBV. Local institutions should be equipped to ensure comprehensive responses to domestic and sexual violence by setting up self-help groups and inter-sectoral networks to address sexual and domestic violence. There is need to reinforce awareness-raising campaigns and supplement community efforts to deal with SGBV.

2.7.5 Strengthen Local Government Capacity

Local government authorities are viewed as pivotal in bringing formal state institutions into direct contact with their communities and thus play a crucial role in establishing inclusive patterns of post-war governance, responsively providing services to war-torn communities and consolidating resilient law and order. Furthermore, attention to local governance can give voice to the local population, enhance their participation in the reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts thus alleviate tensions based on social exclusion, polarisation and regional disparities which were the core basis for the civil conflict in northern Uganda. It is, therefore, essential to build the capacities of the local governments to effectively respond to recovery efforts and involve communities in identifying their needs, planning, programming, implementing and monitoring development programmes.

2.7.6 Develop Agriculture and Reinforce Food Security

Private sector involvement in agriculture in northern Uganda is desirable. Recapitalisation of agricultural value chains is critical to boost local food supplies and getting markets disrupted by conflict working again. However, there is a need for conflict-sensitive approach to acquire land for agriculture. The private investors need to work together with the local communities. The government, on its part, needs to provide a reliable operating environment for agricultural development.

Agriculture offers the most promising immediate source of livelihood for the majority of the population in northern Uganda. Therefore, it is a critical aspect of early recovery efforts. Restoring agriculture can have a broad impact on growth and offers widespread benefits to the war-affected communities. There is a need to build resilience in smallholder production systems to effectively enable food-insecure households to adopt both production and consumption behaviours that will enable them to better deal with uncertainties and to recover from external shocks.

Likewise, there is an urgency to develop livestock management and animal treatment techniques that are suitable for severe weather conditions in areas such as Karamoja and parts of West Nile. This should go hand-in-hand with the improvement of subsistence agriculture through effective management of natural resources and selection of suitable local systems for harvest, storage, distribution and trade of agricultural and livestock products.

2.7.7 Land Resources

Customary land tenure systems weakened by the conflict are under even more pressure now with foreign and internal speculation. There is no simple, formalised solution to the land question, but a need to employ an iterative process that informs and involves local communities, working within the customary system to ensure rights. Numerous land conflict mitigation structures exist within communities giving many options to those who find themselves embattled in conflict over land. Efforts to protect land records, mediate land disputes amongst displaced persons and settlers and rebuild capacity in the land governance systems can help reduce tension and stabilise a locale. This in turn sets the stage for productive investments and growth, which may decrease conflicts over land in Northern Uganda.

Appendix

See Table 2.1

Table 2.1 Trends, status and new dimensions of conflicts in northern Uganda

Post-war security threats	Northern Uganda	Regional	Local	Strategies for protection and empowerment
Political insecurity	• Legacies of violence and trauma • Political corruption and greed • Politically motivated land grabbing • People trapped in IDP camps • Refugees influx • Illegal firearms • Contested district boundary demarcations • Conflict between elected and appointed district officials • Lack of truth-telling and reconciliation • Porous borderlines • Conflict between elected and appointed district officials	• Cross-border insecurity • Weak regional states • Weak regional civil society organisations • Refugees influx • Small arms proliferation	• Limited community participation in development planning • Poor social service delivery • Corruption and greed • Exclusion and marginalisation	• Protection of human rights • Strengthen accountability mechanisms • Promote inter-party dialogue • Community participation in development planning • Address root causes of conflict and the ensuing insecurity • Rehabilitation of former IDPs • Political will to fight corruption
Economic insecurity	• Diminished human capital • Lack of access to gainful employment • Collapse of the economy	• Economic instability due to conflict in South Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo • Cross boarder smuggling	• Lack of access to gainful employment • Poverty and inequality • Dispossession by the powerful i.e. land and dispossession.	• Poverty reduction • Infrastructure recovery and restoration of access to basic needs • Job creation • Provision of microfinance

(continued)

Table 2.1 (continued)

Post-war security threats	Northern Uganda	Regional	Local	Strategies for protection and empowerment
	• Destruction of property and infrastructure • Lack of economic opportunities • Inflation and high cost of living • Poverty and inequality • Underdevelopment			• Skills development and empowerment
Community insecurity	• Inter-ethnic violence • Weakened cultural diversity • Animal and human conflicts • Inter-clan conflicts • Unexploded ordinances • Sexual and gender-based violence	• Identity based tensions i.e. the Madi and the Kuku	• Domestic, gender and sexual violence • Female and children headed families • Alcoholism and family breakdown • Petty theft and robbery • Perceived general laziness • Missing family members • Unexploded ordinances	• Rebuild social capital • Social reintegration of ex-combatants • Reconciliation and community coexistence • End impunity by promoting traditional justice system • Unexploded ordinance awareness campaigns
Personal insecurity	• Physical violence • Sexual and gender-based violence • Psychosocial trauma • Petty theft and robbery • Untreated body injuries • Rampant suicide	• Fear of looming civil conflict with the neighbouring countries • Fear of election violence • Fear of imminent attack from al-Shabaab	• Loss of trust in leaders • Social disparities and neglect • Corruption and personal greed	• Restore the dignity of the victims • Reconciliation at individual level • Provision of psychosocial support • Integration of conflict affected individuals

(continued)

Table 2.1 (continued)

Post-war security threats	Northern Uganda	Regional	Local	Strategies for protection and empowerment
Health insecurity	• Nodding disease • Hepatitis A, B, C, D & E • River blindness • Sleeping sickness • Meningitis • HIV/Aids • International disease spread (from refugees)	• Ebola • Maybach fever • HIV/Aids • International disease	• Nodding disease • Malaria • Hepatitis A, B, C, D & E • River blindness • Sleeping sickness • Meningitis • HIV/AIDS • International disease	• Secured access to health services • Community-based disease prevention • Disease surveillance and control • Public health promotion
Environmental insecurity	• Environmental degradation • Illegal exploitation of natural resources • Heavy rains and floods • Extreme dry conditions • Uncontrolled movement of wild animals • Trypanosoma brucei rhodesiense	• Environmental degradation • Illegal exploitation of natural resources • Global climate change	• Environmental degradation • Illegal exploitation of natural resources • Floods, landslides • Extreme dry condition • Mosquitoes, livestock diseases	• Develop early warning and response systems • Sustainable use and management of natural resources
Food insecurity	• Lower food production • Increase on non-food expenditures • Inability to protect livestock from diseases • Subsistence farming • Pests and diseases	• Lower food production • Increase on non-food expenditures • Shift from food crops to cash crops	• Hunger • Famine • Malnutrition • Lower food production • Death of livestock • Prolonged draught • Pests and diseases	• Increase food production and distribution system • Develop famine early warning systems • Revitalise livestock sector • Revive agricultural cooperatives

Source Author's Field data

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Chapter 3
Transnational Organized Crime and Structural Violence in Brazil

Marcos Alan S. V. Ferreira

Abstract This paper is a research note that explores the links between *transnational organized crime* (TOC) – namely the groups linked to drugs and arms trafficking – and the structural violence in Brazil. Grounded on the discussion on violence explored by Johan Galtung and thereafter developed by other scholars of Peace Research, the paper specifically aims to answer the following question: How does TOC take advantage of societal configurations that perpetuate social injustice in contemporary Brazil? The exploratory research is grounded in the analysis of data provided by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) specialized in criminality and violence in South America, government communications and public security studies, as well as United Nations agencies reports (mainly *United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime* (UNODC) and *United Nations Development Programme* (UNDP)). The preliminary results show a correlation between transnational illicit networks and structural violence, with minor differences between rural and urban areas.

Keywords Violence · Brazil · Crime · Transnational organised crime

3.1 Introduction

High numbers of homicides and violent crimes, mainly with the use of firearms, make Brazil one of the most violent countries of the world. According to *Seguridad, Justicia y Paz*, a Mexican NGO which analyses public security in Latin America, 21 out of the 50 most violent cities of the world are in Brazil, fluctuating between 30 and 60 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (Seguridad, Justicia y Paz 2016: 1–4). The sociologist Jacobo Waiselfisz, the coordinator of the yearbook *Mapa da Violência* (Map of Violence), adds more alarming data to this discussion: from Brazilian Ministry of Health data, between 1980 and 2014, at least 830,000 people have been assassinated in Brazil (Waiselfisz 2016: 16).

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High levels of poverty, social inequality and chaotic urbanization are important factors contributing to the growth in homicides rates – and Brazil is not an exception (Saint-Pierre/Mei 2007; Imbusch et al. 2011; Ferreira 2017). Together, these three factors perpetuate structural violence – here understood as conceptualized by Galtung (1969) as a form of violence that often goes unnoticed but that victimizes thousands of people daily through unjust social structures – and spill over into an increase in anomic direct violence, making Brazilians live in a setting which in some spots exceeds conventional battlefields by far.[1]

In this equation, *transnational organised crime* (TOC) is distinct. Its activities take advantage of persistent structural violence seen in Brazil to co-opt new "soldiers of crime" serving its business as well as perpetuates the possibility of young people earning money in a proportion that would be impossible to gain through legal means. Unfortunately, several of these young people do not live sufficiently to spend the gains on themselves or their family. During police confrontations with them and other criminal gangs, have contributed to an increase in the alarming homicide rates described previously. While this connection between social injustice and TOC is very important from Brazilian context, surprisingly there are few studies on the topic made by Brazilian scholars (Dreyfus 2009).

Given this setting and grounded in Galtung's discussion on violence, this paper explores how TOC takes advantage of societal configurations that perpetuate social injustice in contemporary Brazil. It intends to explore the links between TOC – namely the groups linked to drugs and arms trafficking – and structural violence in Brazil.

The following section is dedicated to look into the key concepts of this paper: transnational organized crime and structural violence. The second and largest part presents an analysis of the nexus between structural violence and TOC divided in two dimensions: socioeconomic and political. Lastly, the paper shares some suggestions for continuing examination of nexus between TOC and structural violence.

3.2 Definitions: Transnational Organised Crime and Structural Violence

Although transnational crime is regarded as a new form of post-Cold War phenomenon (Zabyelina 2009), it is a fact that TOC has been part of the international order for decades, as seen with the issue of piracy and slavery in the 19th Century (Marmo et al. 2016). Nonetheless, the sophistication of such activities has gained

[1]For example, according to the Brazilian Forum of Public Security, one of the main NGOs engaged in research and advocacy against violence in Brazil, between 2011 and 2015 the number of killings in the Syrian Civil War was 256,124; in the same period, 279,592 people were assassinated in Brazil (FBSP 2016: 5–6).

momentum with the weakening of border control by the end of bipolarity (Capie 2016), with the intensification of the use of technologies, the greater movement of people and the emergence of global markets – processes that are inserted in what many call globalization (Marmo et al. 2016; Holmes 2016). Although organized crime that transcends borders is a historical fact, globalization also changes the characteristics of this activity. It ceases to be hierarchical and highly centralized to become organized in networks, emulating licit markets and making them more difficult to tackle (Capie 2016: 213; Zaluar 2008).

In such contexts, TOC becomes a fluid threat to international peace. The *United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime* UNTOC (2000), defines organised criminal group as:

> (…) a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.

In turn, Article 3 defines that "serious crime" is "where the offense is transnational in nature and involves an organized criminal group" (UNTOC 2000; Capie 2016: 213; Zaluar 2008). As summarized by Reginaldo Nasser, "transnational criminal groups can be defined (…) as associations of individuals who operate in a transnational manner for the purpose of obtaining monetary, commercial or influence gains by illegal means in one or more states in which they act" (Nasser 2014: 145). Commonly, they are groups with the following characteristics: use violent means to reach their ends; in general do not have political goals; are structured combining elements of static hierarchy and network; have limited or exclusive leadership with a unique subculture and; it is governed by its own rules and regulations (Holmes 2016: 7–8).

Legally, TOC differs from international crime. According to the Rome Statute, international crimes are defined as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crime of aggression, while the TOC is not labelled as an offense against the entire world community (Marmo et al. 2016). As defined by United Nations, transnational crimes are offenses "whose inception, prevention and/or direct or indirect effects involved more than one country" (UN 1995), being a global problem that causes significant damage to states and has economic and social implications (Marmo et al. 2016; UN 2010; Capie 2016).

When TOC is analysed in depth, one can observe that it is only the tip of the iceberg of an entire complex and multifaceted productive chain that threatens peace in many societies. In general, this chain starts at the local level with the commercialization of "raw materials" (plants for drugs, people and weapons), sometimes through business intermediaries (human and arms carriers, drug production laboratories, etc.), going beyond national borders until finally reaching the buyer of the illegal 'product' – this being a 'product' from a human being trafficked to slavery or prostitution, to a narcotic or an explosive to a terrorist attack. With the clash between competitors and sellers in these crime-producing chains – or even as an

end-activity in the case of terrorism – the alarming statistics of deaths and violence resulting from TOC emerge (UNODC 2013).

One of the first and more visible consequences of activities lead by organized crime is the direct violence. That is, "(…) physical and readily apparent through observable bodily injury and/or infliction of pain" (Barash/Webel 2002: 7). To overcome this direct violence is just the first step to really say that a society suffering from the effects of organized crime becomes peaceful – in this case, negative peace (Galtung 1969).

This violent context can be understood both in a security and peace approach. As stated by Galtung, under a security-based bias, organized crime would be an evil party, with strong capability, an evil intention and a clear present danger of violence, real or potential. Only strength could deter or defeat the evil party, in turn producing security as the best approach to 'peace' (Galtung 2007: 23). In such a context, the main objective is defeat TOC. It is not important to deal with the structures of society that fuel this criminality.

However, Peace Studies concepts can be critically reread when one wants to understand the spiral of violence generated by crime. Under a peace-based bias, the existence of organized crime can be understood as a manifestation of a conflict which has not been resolved and transformed and that brings a danger of violence seen as a motivation to "settle the conflict once and for all". Only a conflict transformation, empathic-creative-nonviolent can produce peace, which is the best approach to 'security' (Galtung 2007: 23). Thus, [t]he peace argument against the security approach is strong and works like a bandage over a festering wound. Conflict between parties having goals with too many incompatibilities has to be transformed into a peace formation by bridging the legitimate goals non-violently, empathically and creatively. An untransformed conflict will reproduce violence sooner or later. Not going to the roots, transcending the contradictions, leads to a spiral of violence and counter-violence (Galtung 2007: 23).

In the case of violence related to TOC in Latin America, these contradictions involve a permanent context of inequality, prejudice and poverty. Hence, not only direct violence must be transcended, but also structural and cultural. It is necessary to understand that direct violence – like crime-related homicides – is an *event* resulting from violent *processes* present in the structure of society (structural violence) – like the unjust structures that disseminate inequality and poverty – which are strengthened by cultural elements that *permanently* disseminate violence (cultural violence) – like the prejudice against afro-Brazilians (Galtung 1990: 294). "[T]he reduction of personal violence at the expense of a tacit or open neglect of research on structural violence leads, very easily, to acceptance of 'law and order' societies" (Galtung 1969: 184). Hence, criminal activity must be interpreted as "symptoms of a deeper human insecurities arising from underdevelopment and lack of economic opportunity rather than as destabilizing security challenges that can be thwarted only through international cooperation" (Battersby/Siracusa 2009: 123). Only with the significant reduction of all vertices of a violence triangle (see Fig. 3.1) can positive peace be achieved.

Fig. 3.1 Violence triangle. *Source* Galtung (2004)

In view of that, [t]he direct violence, physical and/or verbal, is visible as behaviour. But human action does not come out of nowhere. There are roots two of which are indicated: a culture of violence (heroic, patriotic, patriarchal, et cetera.) and a structure that itself is violent by being too repressive, exploitative or alienating (…) (Galtung 2004).

Thus, "we shall sometimes refer to the condition of structural violence as social injustice", or a form of violence that often goes unnoticed, but that victimises thousands of people daily through unjust social structures. It is silent, essentially static and seen as natural as the air around us (Galtung 1969: 171, 173). Therefore, building positive peace presupposes reducing structural and cultural violence (Galtung 1990, 1996, 2004). This means a constant search for quality of life, personal growth, freedom, social equality, economic equity, solidarity, autonomy and participation (Galtung 1969: 173). That is, the absence or drastic reduction of structural violence presupposes high standards of social justice in a given society. Structural violence can also be understood as an analytical category that studies the machinery of oppression, being the latter a result of many socioeconomic and cultural unfair conditions, as are the forms of memory erasure and de-socialization that drive the conditions of these structures (Farmer 2004: 307). In turn, this oppression – be it political, economic or both – reproduces or increases social inequality and widens the ground for the performance of TOC.

In contexts of high structural and cultural violence, TOC finds a mass of unemployed young people, mostly living in peripheral regions with high levels of poverty and constantly victims of prejudice from the elites of society. This context occurs within a defined framework in which the tensions of society reproduce a historical structural violence permeated by the cultural violence of elites against blacks, natives, *pardos* and other minorities. Not surprisingly, it is precisely in the unequal America's continent that this context is maximized, in which TOC finds more force and lethality (Geneva Declaration 2015; UNODC 2013).

Lastly, structural violence can be understood both as a structured and structuring category (Farmer 2003). It has had its genesis in society and also structure and triggers new collectively created violent processes that need to be analysed (Bourdieu 1989: 18). "Particular attention must be paid to the role of armed violence and its potential for escalating existing and creating new waves of direct and structural violence" (Schnabel 2014: 22). At the same time, organized crime uses the structure of inequality which manifests itself as structural violence for part of

the population, however also reproduces the violence – structurally and directly. It depletes the economic and social capital that could be used for economic development and improve social cohesion, bringing instability and, in some cases, even a return to armed conflict (UNODC 2013: 77).

In summary, the categories of cultural and structural violence, when analysed in the light of the TOC problem, are no longer mere marginal concepts as has been the practice in mainstream Peace Research and International Security. They become central to a thorough analysis of how TOC is the result of structural violence, and at the same time the structuring of violence. Structural violence thus becomes central not only to understanding TOC, but also as a result of the TOC phenomenon.

3.3 The Nexus Between Structural Violence and Transnational Organised Crime

In Latin America, TOC can be regarded as a complex social issue. Together with a specific inner culture – "*la cultura callejera*" or "*a cultura das ruas*" (street culture) – the marginality is a result of the exclusions from the society (Imbusch et al. 2011: 131; Zaluar 2008). In one of the few studies using Galtung's concept of violence to understand crime, Blackwell and Duarte (2014) reflect that social exclusion is linked to many of the criminal activities and problems of violence that are present in the Americas, including the high levels of homicide, kidnapping and other crimes, as well as a disproportionate number of incarcerations. Faced with these circumstances, social exclusion becomes a form of structural and cultural violence[2] that prevents thousands of people from achieving their personal achievements. This structural violence disproportionately affects the most vulnerable members of society, such as women, youth and ethnic minorities (Blackwell/Duarte 2014: 111–112). Thus, it might be useful to consider some other forms of structural and cultural violence which are in many aspects interwoven with the different forms of physical violence and political order in Latin America. Despite the vagueness of these concepts, neglecting structural or cultural violence on a continent with profound social inequalities and important class and race cleavages, with strong discrimination and social exclusion, with extreme wealth and extreme poverty, is to omit important aspects of violence in this region (Imbusch et al. 2011: 89).

In this setting, South America presents a unique environment for organized crime. In addition to the lack of confidence in public institutions, there is a significant amount of illegal financial flows inserted in an environment of social inequality and deprivation of opportunities in poor areas. According to UNODC,

[2]It is beyond the scope of this article to explain in depth the cultural violence in Brazil. However, an example can be mentioned on the strong presence of prejudice against afro-Brazilians more than a century after the abolition of slavery and the low social indicators specifically in this group of population.

US$72 billion, equivalent to 418 tons of cocaine, are annually moved from South America to other regions of the world (UNODC 2014). This massive quantity of money and goods is driven by criminal organizations with refinements similar to capitalist corporations (Saint-Pierre/Mei 2007: 252) that use large numbers of youth in poor areas as the workforce (Zaluar 2008; Dreyfus 2009; Soares 2008).

It is also known that small arms are trafficked massively every year from North to South America, supporting the capabilities of criminal organizations (Geneva Declaration 2015; UNODC 2011; Graduate Institute 2012). Nevertheless, is not only guns and ammunition coming from abroad that is the main issue regarding arms and crime in South America. There is also a strong regional market for arms trafficking, featuring Brazil as the largest arms industry in the region and a niche serving captive local markets (Graduate Institute 2012; Ferreira 2017).

Drug and arms trafficking, plus the structural violence and TOC, results in a productive chain that propagates violence extensively. Let us use the example of drug trafficking, the main violent criminal activity lead by TOC in the region. In this case, the cycle begins in the producer of the input of a drug (example, the production of coca leaf). This drug is processed in illegal labs protected by armed men serving in the drug and arms trafficking trade. They take advantage of the fragility within the borders to enter in different countries and deliver to consumers who are new addicts. Eventual foreseeable side-effects of this productive chain are the deaths related to war on drugs especially of police, innocent civilians caught up in the firing line or young people that allied themselves with trafficking because of the structural violence (Fig. 3.2).

For a better comprehension of the relation between TOC and structural violence in the particular case of Brazil, it is necessary to understand how inequality manifests, both socioeconomicaly and in the distribution of political power (Galtung 1969: 175), given that structural violence manifests both in economic marginalization and in the repression (Schnabel 2014: 21). These research notes focus on analysis and interpretation of the following question:

How does transnational organized crime take advantage of societal configurations that perpetuate social injustice in contemporary Brazil?

To perform the interpretative analysis of the question, eighty seven (87) reports, official documents, articles and books were examined. The sources include data from NGOs that specialize in criminality and violence in South America, government communications and public security studies, as well as United Nations agencies reports (mainly the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)).

The period chosen is from 2010 to 2016, given the study aims to explore how the nexus between structural violence and TOC manifests in the contemporary Brazil. The inference and interpretation are organized in two categories and its relation with TOC: (a) the socioeconomic and (b) political aspects of structural violence. The following two subsections summarize the findings in each of these categories.



Fig. 3.2 Productive chain of drugs led by TOC and its impacts. *Source* The author

3.3.1 Socioeconomic Dimension of Structural Violence in Brazil: Inequality and the Failure of Economic Policies

Research topics such as structural, interpersonal, domestic, institutional, communitarian or urban violence[3] express the multidimensionality of the violence phenomenon but also the difficulties of circumscribing it (Imbusch et al. 2011: 114). One of the most comprehensive reports trying to deal with such challenge is the yearbook *Mapa da Violência* [Map of Violence].

Violence strongly manifests itself in six geographic and socio-economic configurations in Brazil, according to the yearbook (Waiselfisz 2016). First, new economic growth areas that attract investment to the countryside, but law enforcement does not grow in the same pace therefore easing prospects for criminal individuals and drug trafficking gangs. Second, municipalities in border areas that are strategically located for TOC actions. Third, cities in the arc of Amazon deforestation that presents social challenges such as conflicts between native people and land owners, modern forms of slavery and illegal timbers that provide an atmosphere for violence and homicides. Fourth, predatory tourism in coastal cities, that provide a setting for prostitution and the drug market. Fifth, traditional violence that persists in areas like the "polygon of marijuana" (located in the limits of Pernambuco and Bahia states). Finally, the most known areas of violence in Brazil

[3]I thank Erick Patrício de Magalhães Vieira (CNPq Undergraduate Scholarship grantee [2014–2016], Federal University of Paraíba) for collecting data and support the analysis of this sub-section and the following.

– the urban setting of very populated sub-national capitals and metropolitan areas (Waiselfisz 2015: 55–6).

In all of them TOC is involved in some way, mainly through drug and arms trafficking, sometimes as main actor – as in the metropolitan areas and border cities – others as secondary agents that fuel the violence, like providing illegal small arms, as said by a group of experts on Latin American violence.

The combination of structural inequalities, disorganised urbanization processes, availability of firearms, and weak institutions, together with cultural aspects and a very particular democracy – capable of guaranteeing political but not social rights – are some of the elements key to understanding this scenario (Imbusch et al. 2011: 115).

In the centre of this problem are the historical inequalities that impact Brazilian society (Imbusch et al. 2011: 115). The country presents a positive correlation between homicides and social inequality measured by Gini Index (Jaitman 2015: Table 1.5) while at the same time other related factors also impact in violence like chaotic urbanization, demographic changes and lack of development policies (Soares 2008). A significant proportion of the population lives in poverty, nowadays mainly in urban settings, while the rural poverty still persists (Imbusch et al. 2011: 115). Conditions of structural violence, such as social injustice, poverty, unemployment and poor education, bring a vulnerability that favours drug trafficking. To the individual who is in a situation of exposure to structural violence in Brazil, drug trafficking appears as an alternative income in a system of social injustice where the opportunities to socially ascend to a better condition of life are scarce (GCD 2011; UNODC 2016).

In this same environment, the risky business crime can also organize more adequately using as a strategy, bribing police, politicians and judicial agents. Corruption of state agents through drug trafficking organizations would be a factor generating violence by weakening democratic institutions and impacting on police action. Moreover, it is common that through corruption, criminal groups obtain weapons from the police, paradoxically fomenting the future death of police officers (Zaluar 2008; Alves/Evanston 2012). Moreover, bribes are the key to opening doors for crime to use violence in its activities. In the local level, the crime foster underground practices of violent conflict resolution and permanent struggle for commerce control, making use of threats, intimidation, extortion, aggressions, killings and, in some cases, terrorism (Zaluar 2008: 148).

In addition to this context of inequality and high flow of easy money outside the legal circuits, in recent decades the phenomenon of organized crime has presented significant development in Latin America due to economic crises caused by the external indebtedness of the states and its inability to promote fiscal adjustments. Such setting provides an environment conducive to the growth of informal economies (Dreyfus 2009). With the structuring of organized crime in networks operating across national borders, the informality of the Latin American economies favoured the development of TOC activities on the continent and is one of the ways of legitimizing assets obtained illegally.

Another salient feature of Brazil's socioeconomic context is that the country is one of the main routes of the international drug trade and also the second in the consumer market (UNODC 2016), consuming the equivalent of 17.7% of the global volume of cocaine (Groll 2013). The growth in cocaine use can be seen as a result of the significant increase in disposable income of the younger generation in developing countries. In general, the higher the income, the greater the access to illicit drugs. This relationship can be observed in geographical aspects. In the Southern Cone, which has higher income rates than other South American countries, drug use is higher than in rest of the subcontinent. Particularly in Brazil, the largest number of users can be observed in the southern and south-eastern states, the richest region of the country (UNODC 2012).

Moreover, the inequality and impoverishment reinforced by the neoliberal macroeconomic policies, together with the incapacity of the national states to address poverty and exclusion in the distribution of economic, political and social resources, account for the main reasons for the proliferation of juvenile delinquency, organized crime and violence (Imbusch et al. 2011: 129). The data provided by Waiselfisz (2016: 20–22) shows a correlation between the period of economic openness provided by neoliberal policies – mainly in the beginnings of 1990s in the Fernando Collor's administration – and the growing homicide rates. The rate maintained in the period around 8,1% per year and only diminish in 2003–4 with a combination of new public policies like disarmament statute and its campaign (Waiselfisz 2016: 17), and the policies to struggle extreme poverty lead by Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva's administration like *Fome Zero* and *Bolsa Família.*[4] Nevertheless, Brazil still maintains high level of inequality and poverty both in rural and urban settings. The Gini Index decreased from 58,1 to 51,4 between 2003 and 2014. However the country continues among the ten most unequal countries in the world (World Bank 2016).

Finally, these unequal structures in Brazil can still lead vulnerable groups to use drugs, which also affects the relationship between drug trafficking and violence in the country. For UNODC (2016) and GCD (2011), social exclusion contributes to the use of drugs. To the extent that drug use causes further deterioration in the lives of socially excluded users – that is, when "their somatic and mental achievements are below their potential achievements" (Galtung 1969: 168) – the user is further

[4]*Fome Zero* (Zero Hunger) is a public program introduced by the former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in 2003, expanding the *Programa Comunidade Solidária* (Solidary Community Program) created in Fernando Henrique Cardoso's administration. The *Fome Zero* had the goal to eradicate hunger and extreme poverty in Brazil and was co-ordinated by the Ministry of Social Development and Hunger Combat (*Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome*). The program takes a number of forms, ranging from creating water cisterns in Brazil's semi-arid areas, supporting subsistence family farming and mainly giving access to financial aid to the poorest families (*Bolsa Família*). According an UNDP report, "Bolsa Família and other major CCT programmes in Latin America, such as those in Chile and Mexico, have had an impressive targeting performance, even though they have adopted different targeting methods. However, these programmes should implement constant monitoring of targeting performance in order to minimize the exclusion of potential beneficiaries, particularly the extremely poor" (Soares et al. 2007: 7).

Table 3.1 Socio-economic impact on TOC and structural violence nexus

Socioeconomic factor	Consequences for the nexus TOC and structural violence
Social inequality and poverty	• Drug trafficking appears as an alternative income • Lead groups vulnerable to drug use • Underpaid police and high inequality foster corruption, weakening democratic institutions and impacting on police action against crime • Disorganized urbanization
Economic crisis	• Environment conducive to the growth of informal economies, sometimes lead by TOC • Foster an illegal economy stimulated by criminal organizations, legitimizing organized crime assets obtained illegally or through legal voids in national legislations
Consumption of drugs	• Contributes to the increase of drug-related problems, including direct violence and accentuation of structural violence • Largest number of users can be observed in the southern and south-eastern states, impacting both public security and health
Neoliberal macroeconomic policies	• Incapacity or no prioritisation of the national states to address poverty and exclusion in the distribution of economic, political and social resources • Proliferation of juvenile delinquency, organized crime and violence

Source The author

marginalized in society. Under these conditions, the drug user commits crimes to finance drug addiction, provoking even more violence. In this way, it is clear that by observing the profile of vulnerable people entering the drug trade and those who suffer the most from the effects of drugs, vulnerable individuals can be at the same time victims of drug trafficking and perpetrators of violence related to trafficking in a systemic conjuncture socially unjust, corroborating both the thesis of Imbusch et al. (2011) and Blackwell\Duarte (2014) (Table 3.1).

3.3.2 Political Dimension of Structural Violence: A War on Drugs against (and by) the Poor

As seen previously, structural violence can manifest itself both in the socioeconomic and political dimensions. In a setting of social inequality it is not surprising that political institutions also reproduce structural violence in its policies. Our research shows that this reproduction become apparent in the repressive approach of security forces, directed and reaching mainly the low-income population, but which also spills over to rural areas and smaller cities in the countryside.

In order to deal with TOC, Brazil has defined the strategy "South America as a priority" (*América do Sul como prioridade*), which consists in the promotion of regional institutions and bilateral agreements with neighbouring countries to

strengthen the country's security institutions and to combat the activities of criminal groups that operate through national borders (Muggah/Diniz 2014).

Some of the high levels of violence on Brazil's land border with South American neighbours originated in the illicit activities of Brazilian criminal factions. These criminal factions, such as *Comando Vermelho* (Red Command), *Amigos dos Amigos* (Friends of Friends) and the *Primeiro Comando da Capital* (First Command of the Capital PCC), which seek to control cocaine production areas and drug trafficking routes into Brazil. They have increased their presence and power in the border regions by eliminating intermediate groups, which increases violence (Muggah/Diniz 2014). Although praiseworthy, this international strategy of combat can be considered ineffective when one notices the volume of drugs present in different parts of Brazil and the high rate of violence and repression in the poorest areas of the country – precisely those with more manifest structural violence.

The state's fight against the drug problem in Brazil is now based heavily on a repressive approach that causes more deaths and damages than drug use itself. As summarized by Amnesty International, [t]he re-democratisation of Brazil, which gave rise to the 1988 Constitution (…), failed to bring about changes in the structures of Brazil's public security and police forces, resulting in corps that are out of line with the rule of law and the requirements of a plural and diverse democratic society. Public security policy in Brazil is dominated by repressive police operations, justified by the logic of the "war on drugs", leading to a high number of deaths from police action (Amnesty International 2015: 13).

Police forces have emphasized repressing drug trafficking through one-off operations and raids in peripheral neighbourhoods, in which the trade in illegal drugs is controlled by criminal gangs and organizations which usually have a strong armed presence (Amnesty International 2015). This militarism is seen by Lea Rekow (2016: 82) as part of a wider framework of "structural violence" that produces suffering – both directly through acts of violence, torture, murder and indirectly through an institutionalized political social pathology that results in dispossession, lack of social policies, and insecurity.

Moreover, it is an irrational policy from the point of view of the costs it generates, as to deal with a problem that hypothetically affects public health, a deadly warlike approach is used costing thousands of lives. In this way, a repressive approach does not help to transform the present conflict. On the contrary, it tends to maintain or even worsen structural and direct violence (Garzón-Vergara 2016: 14). In this sense, strategies to combat drug trafficking would be more effective if they looked at those at the top of the pyramid, rather than punishing almost exclusively those who operate at the lowest levels of the segment (GCD 2011: 6).

Another element is *for who* the policy of repression is directed. Although drug use also manifests in rich areas, repression is focused on less economic privileged areas. Consequently, the situation of insecurity and lack of peace in societies like Brazil is closely related to the criminalisation of poverty and securitisation of poor

areas (Gledhill 2015). The securitisation serves extensively as a reproducer of insecurity, in which the state is embedded with an authoritarian approach and creates more tension than pacification. The result is that beyond the suffering with structural violence, poorest class-including the underpaid police are impacted more in terms of direct violence (Gledhill 2015; see also Farmer 2003).

Such repressive policies cause high social costs by fostering the continuation of marginalization of poor areas, violating human rights, increasing the prison population in Brazil and generating a new cycle of obstacles to the development of human capacities disseminating structural violence (Carvalho/Pellegrino 2015: 1–2). Moreover, the repressive policy is discriminatory, given it affects mainly black people (FBSP 2016: 21). As mentioned by Amnesty International, racial discrimination and the resultant inequality mean that the black population, particularly young black people, face a situation of structural discrimination where their rights to access higher education, health, work, decent housing, and so on, have been seriously impaired. (…) Meanwhile, the trivialization and normalization of violence in Brazil, especially violence against certain historically discriminated groups, has generated a number of negative stereotypes associated with black people, especially young black favela dwellers. Consequently, part of Brazilian society is indifferent to deaths of black young people, the main victims of homicides in the country (Amnesty International 2015: 11).

For the Brazilian Forum of Public Security, when the state neglect educational policies or omits in the promotion of social rights, and use security forces as a way to control violently the 'excluded' people, it incentivizes confrontations that become police and population potential victims. Between 2009 and 2016, 741 police were killed in operations against crime, while 17,688 people died in police operations (FBSP 2016: 6–7). In such context, the state institutions – mainly the police – are not seen as reliable exactly by the people that suffer the structural violence (Olinger 2013).

These negative impacts of the state approach combating organized crime paradoxically increase the profits of drug trafficking organizations. By generating more insecurity and reproducing a daunting scenario for the youth within the periphery by not promoting the reduction of structural violence, the state fosters the possibility of this young men turning against their own society when it is associated with TOC. For the affected youth, TOC emerges as an outlet to be co-opted into inorder to meet their basic needs (Blackwell/Duarte 2014). Consequently, this strengthens criminal groups both symbolically and operationally, spreading more violence, intimidation and corruption within the state, and preventing the full functioning of democratic institutions (GCD 2011: 14). Thus, the repressive policies makes few effects in TOC. However in an opposite way it can in some extent it can make the state less effective when TOC finds an opportunity in hiring new youth for trafficking and corrupting state agents (Garzón-Vergara 2016: 16).

Another effect of violence of war on drugs is seen in less populated regions of Brazil, as well as the increase in the consumer market in rural areas[5] (GCD 2011: 2). This "criminal diaspora", as labelled by Vergara (2013), is stimulated by two main factors. First, there is low probability of arrests or interference of security forces in TOC activities. The productive restructuring in Brazil in the last decades has brought changes in the spatial dimension in the country, creating new fields of productivity across the country that attracted both investments and criminality (Olinger 2013: 23). However, the state security institutions are still fragile in those cities. As a result, crime has increased because of the virtual absence of state agencies in small cities and a growing consumer market in these new economic hubs and rural areas (Waiselfisz 2016: 24).

Second, it is the growing of operations against criminal organizations in metropolitan areas and sub-national capitals. Often, it is precisely in the success of repression against a criminal faction in an urban area that can lead to the explosion of violence elsewhere with the migration of the criminal group (GCD 2014). The impact of this criminal diaspora is seen in the statistics. While the homicide rates decrease 22.4% in cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants between 2003 and 2014, in towns with 1,000–50,000 residents, the killings had grown between 34 and 66% (Waiselfisz 2016: Table 5.5) (Table 3.2).

3.4 Final Remarks

While some characteristics of the violence are imminently local, this research note demonstrates that TOC plays a key role in the alarming index of criminal violence and homicides, fuelling local violence and helping make Brazil one of the most violent countries in the world, very far from a peaceful country as commonly known abroad.

The analysis showed that the influence of structural violence in TOC can be seen in two dimensions: the socioeconomic and in the distribution of power. In the socioeconomic dimension, the historical inequality and poverty serves as catalysts for TOC. Moreover, the corruption contributes to TOC's expansion, given that state agents are co-opted to perform their activities without political interference. Finally, while the inequality decreased in the last decade due to public policies, such as *Bolsa Família* and disarmament statute, they were not sufficient to significantly reduce the increase in TOC influence in Brazil.

[5]It is important to mention that, regarding violence, Brazil's countryside is not an island of tranquility. Rural violence is historical "due to structural conflicts that has since time immemorial characterized the national land tenure systems and brought about new forms of violence in land conflicts in recent years" (Imbusch et al. 2011: 99). An example is the development of a political movements fighting violently against state for radical land reform and redistribution, like the MST – *Movimento Rural dos Trabalhadores sem Terra* (Rural Movement of Landless Workers).

Table 3.2 Political impact on TOC and structural violence nexus

Political factor	Consequences for the nexus TOC and structural violence
Regional cooperation to combat TOC	• Seek to control areas of production of cocaine and drug trafficking routes into the country
Repressive approach of security forces	• "Produces suffering – both directly through acts of violence, torture, and murder, and indirectly through an institutionalized political social pathology that results in dispossession, lack, and insecurity" (Rekow 2016) • Tends to maintain or even worsen structural and direct violence • Focused on less economic privileged areas, it criminalizes poverty and securitize poor areas • Poorest class, including the underpaid police, are more impacted in terms of direct violence • Generates a new cycle of obstacles to the development of human capacities disseminating structural violence • Affects mainly black people, the main victims of homicides in the country • Do not affect the expansion of profitability of drug trafficking organizations. When the drug market is threatened, it morphs into other kinds of illicit markets, examples extortions, counterfeits, et cetera • Criminal diaspora for rural areas and less populated cities
Lack of focus on social and educational policies	• Foster the possibility of youth to turn against their own society when the association with the TOC appears as the best alternative • The state becomes less effective and more susceptible to crime influence
Fragility of security forces in less populated cities and rural areas	• Low probability of disruption of TOC activities by security forces • Growing consumer market in these new economic hubs and rural areas

Source The author

In terms of distribution of power, there is a strong focus on repression of drug trafficking, the main TOC activity in Brazil. This repression has not changed the social differences (structural violence) neither the homicide rates (direct violence). The use of force, mainly against the low income population, had no proven effect in the reduction of drug use, nor organized crime operations. It also undermines the confidence in public institutions of the people that suffer structural violence more acutely. Hence, it is the young poor people, mainly marginalised ones that find TOC as an absolute channel to acquire, illegally and violently, the means that the state does not provide. Moreover, the repression in urban areas has brought, as a

side-effect, the spillover of TOC to smaller cities and rural areas, making the problem even more complex and difficult to overcome.

Finally, it is clear that crime and structural violence in Brazil are mutually influencing phenomena. In summary, structural violence is a structured and structuring category. While TOC helps to reproduce conditions of social marginalization, discrimination, devaluation of human life, inequality and poverty, these same structural conditions of violence lead hitherto unaffected youths to join criminal organizations and the users of drugs to commit illicit acts. Thus, a spiral of crime and violence is reproduced, undermining the possibility of peace in Brazil. In such a worrying context, only a conflict transformation approach, involving different actors (state, individuals and civil society), focused in the promotion of policies to overcome the three vertices of violence (direct, structural and cultural), can begin to change Brazilian society towards a more peaceful environment.

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Chapter 4
The Multi-level Dimensions of Peace: The New Macro Regionalism in Europe

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Abstract Since 2009 several macro-regions have been created, or are in the process of being created, on European territory. While scholars have discussed the broader implications of this new development, above all macro-regions' contribution to the pursuit of cohesion goals, little attention has been given to their impact on peace and stability. Focusing on the case of the Adriatic Ionian macro-region, which involves the volatiles states of the western Balkans, this paper examines the macro-regions' ability to further peace and stability. On balance, while there exist considerable challenges in the process of implementation of macro-regions, nonetheless this initiative represents an important attempt to involve Europe's neighbours in the European political and institutional space and, by so doing, extends the European regional peace system to as many states as possible.

Keywords Macro-regions · European peace system · Western Balkans

4.1 Introduction

Macro-regions in Europe have developed as a response to the considerable challenges posed by the globalised economy on nation-states. Westphalian territoriality and nationally based governance institutions are blatantly unable to manage the complexities of transnational economic processes, with their related impact both on human communities and the environment. Macro-regions represent one of the possible answers to this inability. By "including territory from a number of different countries or regions associated with one or more common features or challenges," (Samecki 2009) macro-regions contribute to a much needed rescaling and restructuring of state power and governance processes above and below the nation-state.

This rescaling and restructuring have taken many different configurations. In the European context, the idea of a "Europe of regions" has affirmed itself as one of the

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most promising answers to the increasingly manifest impossibility to efficiently govern complex cross-border events through national programs. According to the European Commission (2013: 3), a macro-regional strategy involves three components: (1) an integrated framework relating to Member States and third countries in the same geographical area; (2) the ability to address common challenges; (3) and the possibility to benefit from strengthened cooperation for economic, social and territorial cohesion. These elements combine to transcend traditional Westphalian statehood by involving sub-national and supra-national actors in a multi-level governance system.

Macro-regions may be based upon cultural or ethnic affinities, a common historical background, functional links or common interests – or a combination of all of these elements. In the case of the Adriatic Ionian macro-region, briefly discussed below, the maritime dimension is central. The macro-region revolves around its natural axis, the sea. Marine biodiversity is high, but a considerable number of species are endangered. While the Adriatic Sea basin remains an important area for fishing, fish stocks have suffered from overfishing. Water discharges of industrial activities and urbanised areas, as well as intensive coastal tourism, have increased the level of pollution. Offshore oil and gas platforms and terminals involve further pressure on the environment. In such a context, research has identified a strong potential in maritime spatial planning in the region (Policy Research Corporation 2011).

Above all, the Adriatic Ionian macro-region aims at integrating the western Balkan region into European institutions at a time when a profound political, economic, and social crisis in Europe has downgraded the integration process among the list of European priorities. Ultimately, this goal reflects the rationale underpinning the construction of a common European space since the beginning in the 1950s, that is, the idea of establishing a working peace system among its members. Macro-regions, as supported by many European institutions, constitute another piece of the hard-won stability and prosperity achieved in Europe since the end of World War II. In the end, the building of a macro-region will blur the distinction between the 'international' and the 'local' and, because of the involvement of both EU states (Croatia, Greece, Italy and Slovenia) and non-EU states (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia) it will soften the distinction between 'Europe' and 'non-Europe.'

Against this background, this chapter discusses three main issues. First, it briefly examines the meaning of the so-called "new regionalism" and the rise of macro-regions in Europe. Second, among the several macro-regions in the process of being established, it focuses on the Adriatic Ionian one because of its geopolitical significance. Indeed, this macro-region involves four states from the western Balkans – a region which has experienced a series of bloody wars throughout the 1990s and it is still considered by some analysts as potentially unstable. Third, the paper examines the broader implications involved in the development of macro-regions in Europe, in particular the possibility of creating a geopolitical model based on multi-centred regionalism. Thus, while considerable challenges exist in the process of implementation of macro-regions, this initiative represents an

important attempt to involve European neighbours in the European political and institutional space through extending the European regional peace system to as many states as possible.

4.2 "New Regionalism" and the Rise of Macro-regions in Europe

Most of the twentieth century ideas about both territory and politics have developed within a context dominated by the primacy of the nation-state. Theories of national integration and assimilation have long explained how the formation of strong national centres would progressively assimilate and absorb peripheries both politically and economically. The end of the Cold War witnessed a renewal of both the theory and the practice of territorial politics and supported the rise of a "new regionalism" as a novel field of study in a number of disciplines (Shaw et al. 2011). New regionalist theories converged around a few basic ideas such as focusing primarily on non-European cases of regionalization emerging from the bottom-up as a response to neoliberal market forces, eluding from the privileging of states as primary actors in regional processes and stressing the significance of functional needs underpinning societal and institutional contacts and networks at the regional level. Put it rather crudely, while 'old' regional politics emanated from the centre and relied heavily on infrastructure, industrial development and tax breaks, "new regionalism" emanated from a decentralised understanding of territorial politics emphasising regions' self-reliance, informal forms of regionalization and regional integration and inter-regional rivalry in an increasingly competitive environment (Söderbaum/Shaw 2003).

While preserving a (limited) role for top-down political processes with the involvement of the European Commission as a 'facilitator' and "strategic coordinator" of macro-regional dynamics (European Commission 2014a: 25–33), macro-regions have assumed a number of new regionalist characteristics and objectives.

Primarily, macro-regions have promoted *multi-level governance* (MLG) as a promising solution to the crisis of government increasingly experienced in most of the western world. While different types of the phenomenon exist (Hooghe/Marks 2003: 233–243), macro-regions adopt an understanding of MLG as an assemblage of functional, problem-solving, task-driven jurisdictions involving both public and private actors without a clear hierarchy between them, and characterised by the prevalence of negotiation in the formulation of policy. Although MLG presents significant conceptual, empirical, and normative challenges (Piattoni 2010), its contribution in sustaining the passage from 'government' to 'governance' has been widely praised as a significant advance in providing citizens with more efficient, transparent, and participatory political, economic, and social institutions (Kohler-Koch/Rittberger 2006: 27–49). The involvement of local actors in MLG is

thought to provide concreteness and effectiveness in policy-formulation and implementation (European Parliament 2015). More generally, by focusing on functional issues and common challenges and opportunities, macro-regional strategies have been gaining a glow of efficiency, legitimacy and professional respectability.

Second, macro-regions aim at stimulating regional integration. The extension of forms of territoriality across and beyond the EU's borders has existed for decades. Cross-border initiatives have prepared candidate states in Eastern and Central Europe for EU membership by providing them with an opportunity to address constructively common needs and to promote common interests between two or more contiguous territories in different European states (Yoder 2003: 90–106). This cross-border dynamics involving EU's neighbours is one of the reasons for the allure of macro-regions which, by including non-member states, are expected to facilitate their transition towards EU accession (Dubois et al. 2009: 9). Consistently with regionalist insights, national boundaries are understood not as sharp dividing lines but as mutable elements artificially separating the borderlands where political, social and economic interaction and exchange are frequent (Keating 1998: 109).

Underpinning this process of integration is a functional understanding of politics within which "best practices" are transferred from more (EU) to less advanced (non-EU) states. Learning and best practice transfers among constituent members are fundamental objectives for all macro-regions, which reveal the attempt to remake, and not simply involve, non-EU states (Gänzle/Kern 2016: 14). As a whole, despite the risk that unaccountable experts may dominate the policy transfer process (Papadopoulos 2007: 469–486), and that MLG could override democratic inputs and accountability mechanisms (Peters/Pierre 2004: 75–89), both MLG and the functionalist paradigm support a participatory understanding of political relationships whereby all stakeholders have an opportunity to influence the policy process and to benefit from it.

Because of these characteristics macro-regions are widely considered as an appealing innovation in European territorial politics. From a policy-perspective, European institutions have stressed in particular the importance of two main aspects. First, macro-regions contribute to address local problems directly involving a relatively small number of states – and thus opening the way for better cohesion at the EU level. While macro-regionalism is not strictly an instrument of territorial cohesion, there are strong links between the two, since both are inclusive, place-based approaches requiring a multi-level implementation encouraging regions and municipalities from different states to work constructively together (Samecki 2009: 3). Second, macro-regions present an important opportunity to promote democratic governance norms through functional cooperation. At a time when the perspective of membership for EU neighbours is either very distant (as in the case of western Balkan states) or non-existent (as in the case of states included in the EU's neighbourhood policy), the EU cannot rely on accession conditionality to stimulate change. Even the so-called 'linkage,' which involves the support of democratic opposition and other civil society actors to enable them to push for the democratization of their own state, has had limited and contradictory effects

(Lavanex/Schimmelfennig 2011: 885–909). Accordingly, functional cooperation and the deepening of horizontal ties between the EU and third countries can enable joint problem solving, rule transfer, progress in the quality of democracy and even growing integration into the EU (Lavanex 2008: 938–955).

Taken together, the application of governance principles, the functionalist ethos and the integration perspective, constitute macro-regions' major added value. Perhaps counter-intuitively, this added value is expected to play out in the context of the EU imposed "three no's": no new regulation, no new institutions and no additional funding (European Commission 2014a). These strict limitations represent both a serious constraint and an opportunity. On the one hand, they may push macro-regions towards irrelevance by drastically reducing the chances of planning and implementing concrete initiatives. On the other hand, the effective integration of existing norms, institutions and funds in a transnational, "integrated framework" (Samecki 2009) may ultimately represent the major advantage of macro-regional strategies (Stocchiero 2015: 35). Indeed, the strategies' most significant practical contribution to governance lies in the rationalization of existing resources and their more efficient use.

Despite the positive atmosphere around the initiative, there exist some important critiques of macro-regions (Stocchiero 2010). First, macro-regional strategies are thematically very broad and thus unlikely to develop into a powerful policy tool. At the same time, and paradoxically, while they aim at integrating broad policy sectors, their focus on projects is too narrow to sustain an intersectoral approach (European Commission 2013). Second, macro-regions' complexity involving a large number of actors into an integrated approach contributes to a limited sense of ownership. In addition, member states' different institutional configurations and administrative experience further complicate the coherence of macro-regional programs (European Commission 2013: 65). Third, not having resources of their own, macro-regional strategies must rely on the possibility of having funds diverted from existing programs, above all from Cohesion Policy programs. However, the EU budget for the period 2014–2020 was reduced compared to the previous 2007–2013 cycle. This diminishing pool of resources cannot easily be transferred because of the required additional administrative and monitoring burdens and because of the perceived limited relevance of macro-regional strategies in relation to existing initiatives (McMaster/van der Zwet 2016: 58–59).

While these critical issues may contribute to slowly undermine the enthusiasm for the new fad, the overall evaluation of macro-regional strategies is complicated by the fact that macro-regional strategies involve new initiatives whose impact requires some time to appreciate. In some cases performance indicators are inappropriate, since targets have been set without any real analysis of their relevance (European Commission 2013: 59). Despite these factors, expectations among both policy-makers and new regionalist scholars remain high – as confirmed by the case of the Adriatic Ionian macro-region discussed below.

4.3 The Adriatic Ionian Macro-region

According to the EU Committee on the Regions, there is a maritime dimension "in every major issue facing the Adriatic Ionian Macro-region today, including environmental protection and conservation, energy, climate change, research and innovation, preservation of underwater and cultural resources, competitiveness and job creation, trade, transport and logistics" (Committee of the Regions 2011, para. 26). Overall, the Adriatic Sea is a very fragile ecosystem under considerable stress. In such a context, research has identified a strong potential in maritime spatial planning, more so, in the building of functional and transnational spaces involving both sides of the Adriatic and Ionian seas (Randone 2015).

The European Commission officially launched on 18 June 2014 a EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region in the form of a Communication and an Action Plan to help the region – which comprises 70 million residents – reap the benefits of closer cooperation in promoting the maritime economy, preserving the marine environment, completing transport and energy links and boosting sustainable tourism (European Commission 2014b). The Adriatic-Ionian macro-regional strategy embraces the underlying rationale and objectives adopted by the Baltic and Danubian macro-regions, established respectively in 2009 and 2011, but it develops a region-specific approach based on the concept of Blue Growth, which includes: (1) Driving innovative maritime and marine growth; (2) Connecting the region; (3) Preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment; (4) Increasing regional attractiveness (European Commission 2013: 1). Overall, the objective is to combine environmental protection with the support of economic activities and the development of communication and energy infrastructures.

This objective is articulated in such a way as to take into account the peculiarities of the Adriatic Ionian context. First, the macro-region's cross-border dynamics are expected to strengthen the logic of European integration. The experience with the enlargement to Central and Eastern European states, where the EU relied significantly on cross-border cooperation programs, demonstrated the useful role regional strategies can play in the enlargement process as a training ground for aspiring new members. The Commission supported the local (re)focusing on European objectives, in a process appropriately defined as "cultivated spillover" (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991: 1–22). In practice, the "EU space" was extended across borders before any of the aspiring new EU members actually joined the Union (Popescu 2008: 424). By contrast, the Adriatic Ionian macro-region, coherently with MLG principles, has relegated the European Commission to a relatively marginal position, relying instead on the development of bottom-up integrative processes and on the spill over effects of cross-border cooperation.

Second, the Adriatic Ionian macro-regional strategy adopts a functional approach to governance. It focuses on "low politics" issues which purposefully concentrate on addressing common challenges at the ground level leaving off the agenda of contentious matters constituting the core concerns of European Council meetings. This approach is meant to both build support for the initiative and, more

ambitiously, to strengthen and deepen the pacifying effects of interdependence. Indeed, the external projection of multi-level, multi-sector networks, which are both highly technocratic and depoliticised, can contribute to the creation of a "regional peace system" (Ohanyan 2015). In the case of south-eastern Europe, which in the 1990s faced bloody wars waged in the name of exclusivist nationalist projects, participation in supranational frameworks can support the development of less conflictual forms of collective identity and by making borders increasingly less important, undermine the logic of territorial nationalism (Belloni 2009).

Third, civil society's involvement within a MLG structure is considered to be an important component in order to reach an "integrated approach" to governance. Since the late 1990s intense transnational interaction in the region has confirmed the existence of a lively and differentiated civil society (Moretti 2015: 85–94). Accordingly, the Adriatic Ionian macro-region hopes to capitalise from existing networks in order to sustain the interest and involvement of a wide range of actors (European Commission 2014b: 11). In sum, the Adriatic Ionian macro-region promotes MLG and a functional approach to European integration. The extent to which the Adriatic Ionian macro-region will impact the political, economic, environmental and social systems of the states involved remains to be seen. Similarly, whether the initiative will contribute to strengthen a regional peace system will be a matter of assessment in the course of the implementation of macro-regional principles. However, at a geo-political level this macro-region, together with the other ones being implemented in Europe, is contributing to re-shape the structure of the European Union and its relationship with 'non-Europe.'

4.4 The European Union and the Macro-region's Geopolitical Value

The experience with the enlargement to Central and Eastern European states, when the EU relied significantly on cross-border cooperation programmes (institutionalised in the form of Euroregions), demonstrated the useful role regional strategies can play in the enlargement process as a training ground for aspiring new members. With their focus on small projects affecting citizens' daily lives, Euroregions contributed to ease mutual suspicion, foster links across the border, support economic development, and provide opportunities to engage in multi-level governance (Yoder 2003: 106). In practice, through the support of a number of funding schemes (such as INTERREG,[1] TACIS,[2] and PHARE[3]) the "EU space" was extended across

[1]Interregional Cooperation.

[2]Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States.

[3]Commenced in 1989 as "Poland and Hungary Assistance for Restructuring Economies" and later extended to the ten countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania).

the border before any of the aspiring new EU members actually joined the Union (Popescu 2008: 418, 438).

Building on this experience, the EU strategy explicitly affirms that the Adriatic-Ionian macro-region is expected to play an important role in promoting the European integration of the Western Balkans. The Adriatic Ionian macro-region, similarly to what happened in the central part of Eastern Europe with the establishment of Euroregions, aims to contribute to the Europeanization of non-EU states at the time when the promise of future membership in return for reforms is hollow and largely off the agenda. In November 2014, the European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker suggested that no further enlargement is expected to take place within the timespan of the Commission mandate (until 2019). While Juncker's statement largely expressed the obvious, since no western Balkan state will be ready to access the Union for several years to come, it nonetheless proved demoralizing for aspiring new members, and raised doubts about the EU's ultimate intentions vis-à-vis the region. The statement confirmed how politically and economically marginal the area has become, a sort of "periphery of the European periphery" (Bechev 2012).

The EU's apparent lack of enthusiasm for any further enlargements after the entry of Croatia on 1 July 2013 has contributed to strengthen in the western Balkans a latent Euroscepticism or, more precisely, an "EU-scepticism" (Belloni 2016). The outbreak of the economic and financial crisis in 2008, and the difficulty in finding seemingly efficient responses to it, had already eroded Europe's image as a land of prosperity and stability. The EU's tough stance on future memberships, together with the related application of strict conditionality vis-à-vis candidate countries, has further undermined the EU's appeal in the region. In this context, Russia has been playing a more assertive and influential role. From a Russian perspective, the western Balkans represents an important strategic area, at least for two reasons (Bechev 2017). First, the region is a valuable transit zone for Russian gas. Moscow plans to replace transit through Ukraine with a Balkan route before 2020. After the abandonment of the South Stream project, the current plan foresees the building of a gas pipeline that, through the Black Sea, will reach Turkey thereafter Western Europe.

Second, while Russia is well aware that it is not able to provide the western Balkans with a realistic alternative to the development of closer ties with the EU, it nonetheless attempts to create obstacles to the (slow) process of European integration. For example, the outbreak of a (controlled) crisis in the region would shift international attention away from the situation in Ukraine, and contribute to bring to the surface European divisions. Unsurprisingly, the political crisis in Macedonia, which intensified in the course of 2015, has seen the direct involvement of Moscow, which tried to influence Macedonian politics for its own foreign policy interests.

In sum, membership prospects for south-eastern European states have become intangible, a sense of EU-scepticism has been taking hold in the region, and other major powers – above all Russia – have been expanding their influence in contraposition to European interests. In this context, the Adriatic Ionian macro-region represents the attempt to keep the region on the enlargement agenda, while not

explicitly engaging in enlargement politics. Meaning, the macro-region constitutes both a way to avoid enlargement and to continue it by other means. It avoids enlargement because, by establishing a form of cross-border cooperation, it postpones answering demands for full membership. At the same time, the macro-region continues on a process of expansion of EU's norms and hegemony on its south-eastern neighbours.

4.5 What Kind of Europe?

The EU does not have a single strategy towards non-EU members. Since the establishment of the Baltic Sea Region in 2009, followed by a Danubian Region in 2011 and by the Adriatic Ionian one in 2014, the EU has demonstrated a growing interest in supporting cooperation in greater European regions. At the same time, however, the EU has developed another wide range of foreign policy tools towards states in its neighbourhood and beyond (Whitman/Wolff 2012). The lack of a single strategy towards non-EU members ultimately reflects the co-existence among European policy-makers of different political-institutional logics. In turn, this co-existence reflects the EU's own evolution from a rather limited political-economic institutional arrangement involving a few states, to a major actor composed by 28 members. Browing and Joenniemi have identified three different geopolitical models to describe this evolution (Browing/Joenniemi 2008: 519).

First, the Westphalian model suggests that the EU is assuming the characteristics of modern statehood, with sovereignty shifting from national to supranational institutions in Brussels. From this perspective, the EU is seen as an empire in the making, which engages in a politics of difference and exclusion while imposing its norms and interests abroad (Dimitrova 2012: 249). However, the re-nationalization of foreign policy, which has followed the outbreak of the global economic and financial crisis in 2008, raises serious doubts about the current relevance of this model. European states have increasingly re-asserted their sovereign prerogatives in all policy-making fields, including foreign policy. In addition, even the establishment of macro-regions, discussed above, suggests the limitations of the Westphalian project.

Second, a Eurocentric or imperial model is arranged around a European core with various degrees of differentiation the further away from the centre. This model reflects a logic of "concentric circles" and interprets power as emanating from Brussels and moving outwards towards the periphery and beyond. As a geopolitical entity, the EU is thought to both insulate itself from external threats through impermeable borders and to promote peace and stability through various forms of association and cooperation agreements and partnerships. This kind of geopolitical approach is perhaps best described as a kind of "regulatory imperialism" with regard to the Union's drive to extend its norms and values to the rest of the world – starting from its near abroad. Whether this imperial logic accurately reflects the evolution of the Union remains a matter of debate. However, it is indubitable that at

time of instability (such as during the wars in the Balkans in the 1990s or in the aftermath of the "Arab spring" in North Africa), the EU tends to interpret its outside as a source of insecurity.

Third, the neo-medieval model conceives of the EU as a networked political space characterised by a polycentric system of government and fuzzy borders where multiple and overlapping jurisdictions oversee territories increasingly heterogeneous both culturally and economically (Zielonka 2006). Importantly, there is no one centre in this model but, as the metaphor of "Europe of Olympic Rings" nicely suggests, there exist various regional cores cutting across borders and levels of authority. While Browing and Joenniemi focus on Northern Europe and the Northern dimension as the most significant empirical illustration for this model, all macro-regions, including the Adriatic Ionian one, could actually be described as a ring in a rather decentralised Europe. Macro-regions suggest the existence of a European integration process which is not simply directed by a strong centre from where policies emanate, but evolves around multiple and diverse regional sites. In this context, the promotion of forms of cross-border cooperation focusing greatly on civil society development further suggests a departure from traditional state-centred geopolitics (Scott 2011: 175).

Above all, macro-regions provide an opportunity to move away from a Eurocentric "Europe of concentric circles" towards more equal and shared partnerships – even despite the material asymmetries between EU and non-EU states (Stocchiero 2010: 28). In a Europe of Olympic Rings, each ring should be seen as interconnected to the other ones. The Adriatic Ionian macro-region could primarily be linked to the Danubian macro-region. Significantly, membership overlap to an extent, with Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia belonging to both macro-regions, in a model of "open regionalism" (Stubbs/Solioz 2012) connecting the area to regional and wider networks. In such a model, the macro-region is expected to be inclusive and open towards all of its neighbours, with a particular attention to Turkey and the Middle East, in order to deal constructively with common problems, including the management of growing migration flows and humanitarian needs emerging from instability in North African and the Middle East.

Drawing from Walters (2004: 674), Browing and Joenniemi further illustrate how the Westphalian, imperial and neo-medieval models convert into four different geo-strategies with regard to the various ways border spaces are organised. First, the "networked (non) border" involves a partaking of responsibilities between EU and non-EU members and actors on the basis of shared liberal principles and values. Second, the "march strategy" envisages the creation of security areas, or buffer zones, along the border in order to keep disorder and instability at a distance. Third, the "colonial frontier" foresees the transformation of the outside in such a way to make it compatible with the inside, and thus easier to absorb/incorporate within the Union. Finally, the 'limes' creates an enduring separation between the inside and the outside, without any attempt to incorporate the latter into the former.

While these geo-strategies are clearly overlapping in practice, and crucially influenced by the stance of external players (with Russia central in the geo-strategic assessments of the EU), they are useful in drawing attention to the existing diversity in EU foreign policy. According to Browing and Joenniemi, in the northern area networked borders reflect extensive regional cooperation. In the East, EU enlargement testifies to the combined influence of a 'march' and 'colonial' strategy. The Mediterranean's focus on the 'limes' reflects a long-lasting divide between Europe and North Africa. Stocchiero takes the analysis further by explaining how different geo-strategies translate into a set of complex and composite policies. EU immigration policy, for example, reflects largely a 'limes' strategy while, by contrast, trade policy suggests the emphasis on breaking down and networking borders (Stocchiero 2015).

Generally, the EU's external policy cannot easily be understood as a hegemonic, imperial project, but rather as a hodgepodge of different cross-border projections. With regard to south-eastern Europe, the creation of an Adriatic and Ionian macro-region evolves from a broader evolution of the relationship between Europe and the western Balkans. Historically, the Balkans have been understood as a region external to European civilization, and thus to be kept at arm's length. The 'Balkans' has been the depository of negative perceptions and, in the aftermath of the violent process of Yugoslav dissolution, occasionally continues to be seen as a 'problem' to be addressed, rather than a (perhaps dysfunctional) part of the European family. Unsurprisingly, to use Walter's terminology, the "march strategy" and the 'limes' have been the prevailing European geo-strategies vis-à-vis the region.

Since early 2000s these perceptions have been slowly changing in the direction of less drastically negative views. Accordingly, the EU's approach moved from a logic of exclusion to one of inclusion based on the promise of future membership of the Union. Ultimately the Balkans constitute a reflection of the European past, thus a repository of troubling memories involving authoritarianism and war rather than simply an instance of Europe's other (Todorova 2009: 17–18). As a result, the Balkans, not unlike Western Europe, can reach a post-modern, Kantian condition of peace and stability. On this basis, a "colonial frontier" strategy aimed at the transformation of the region has taken ground. Significantly, the "Western Balkans" has been devised in Brussels as a bureaucratic rather than geo-political category to describe, in a rather aseptic manner, all states involved in the EU integration process. The creation of an Adriatic Ionian macro-region, in particular with its civil society component, adds a "networked (non) border" element to the European approach and signals a further shift in the way the 'Balkans' are understood and interpreted in Europe. Alternately, the macro-region constitutes another instance of a broader re-conceptualization of Europe where regional differences are recognised and promoted, where the presence of multiple centres is acknowledged and where borders are fluid and not necessarily expressing opposition to 'non-Europe.'

4.6 Conclusion

The achievements of any macro-region will ultimately depend on the political support it will receive from national and regional policy-makers and administrators. However, such a support cannot be taken for granted. Macro-regions are paradoxical entities, since they are based on conflicting logics. On one hand, the territorial logic of the nation-state contributes to conceive of borders as sharp dividing lines, on the other, cross-border cooperation induces a border bridging territorial logic. These conflicting logics explain why national governments may simultaneously promote and undermine macro-regions. National governments may support the development of cross-border links with an ultimate goal of using macro-regions in order to tackle the limits of Westphalian sovereignty, rather than to create integrated territorial entities (Popescu 2008: 418).

In a context dominated by perhaps contradictory priorities, the impact and effectiveness of macro-regional strategies can be easily overestimated. On paper, macro-regional strategies look like the most reasonable tool to address common issues and problems in a particular geographical space. In practice, effectiveness depends on several factors including, in addition to governments' political will, administrative capacities, efficient multilevel governance mechanisms and the availability of resources to turn general priority areas into concrete projects and programs. In this regard, the post-2008 Europe-wide economic and financial crisis may complicate the task, not least because the EU budget for the period 2014–2020 has been reduced compared to the previous 2007–2013 cycle. Seen from a cohesion perspective, the economic and financial crisis has had a visibly negative impact by increasing disparities of wealth between regions (Faucheur 2014). Macro-regional strategies could contribute to reverse this trend, crucially by involving EU and non-EU states, but it remains to be seen whether they will be able to use a diminishing pool of resources in synergic and more efficient ways. Ultimately, the macro-regions' real added value may lie less in their practical achievements and more in the mental maps, or the geographical imagination of common belonging and sharing that they could contribute to foster.

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Chapter 5
Mental Health, Trajectories and Quality of Life: A Proposal for a New Understanding of DDR Processes in Colombia

Diego Aponte, José Zapata and Diana Agudelo

Abstract This chapter presents an evaluation process in mental disorders and risk factors developed jointly by the *Universidad Externado de Colombia* UEC and Colombian Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization. It indicates violent behaviour and/or delinquent habits for the demobilized population in the current reintegration program in Colombia. The findings are based on multidimensional valuation of risk considering: (1) a clinical component which describes the incidence of different mental disorders and personality profiles; (2) inquiry of the vital trajectory of ex-combatants particular domains (normative rupture, cultural context, nets, bond affectation, political, productive, formative, health and, (3) quality of life, that looks into self-acceptance, environment adaptation, socio-affective stability, physical integrity and self-projection. The research results presented are related to the implementation of an evaluation instrument applied to a population of 26,000 former combatants of armed groups in Colombia.

Keywords Mental health · Demobilized population · Trajectories Ex-combatants · DDR · Quality of life

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This paper presents some results of a long-lasting investigation arising from a cooperation agreement between the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalisation, and the University Externado de Colombia.

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5.1 Introduction

The *Colombian Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization* (ARN)[1] is the government institution commissioned to manage the reintegration processes. The ARN has provided its services to approximately 35,000 people who have left armed groups in the last 9 years, including ex-combatants demobilized as a result of the negotiations between the government, self-defence groups and others who have voluntarily left armed groups individually by desertion.

The internal armed conflict in Colombia lasted for more than five decades and has undergone considerable change over time. Currently it seems to be on the verge of reaching an endpoint. Its origins can be traced to 1948, when the popular leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán was murdered. His death led to a period known as "The Violence" when the Government repressed any form of opposition by cruel use of force, creating an extreme polarization between liberal and conservative tendencies. As a result, several groups of rural leaders took up arms in discontent and rebellion. In the 1960s the triumph of the Cuban Revolution, in the context of the cold war, lead to the emergence of new revolutionary guerrillas such as the *Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces* (FARC), the *National Liberation Army* (ELN), the *Popular Liberation Army* (EPL), and the *April 19th Movement* (M19) among others.

During the 1980, self-defense anti-insurgent groups arose, such as the *United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia* (AUC), fostered by landlords, politicians, businessmen and supported by local and regional governments. These groups became paramilitary, and the internal conflict degenerated into a civil war between left wing armed groups and right wing paramilitary forces, affecting civil society as well. Drug smuggling gave birth to huge 'cartels' that sponsored and worsened the conflict, impacting on all armed actors and escalating other phenomena, such as political corruption and social damage.

Presently there are about eight million people recognized as victims of this long-lasting armed conflict. Internal forced displacement has occurred as well as homicides, recruitment of minors, abduction, massacres, extortions, land dispossession, torture, extrajudicial executions, and enforced disappearance inter alia. Guerrilla groups, military and paramilitary forces have been involved as direct perpetrators and sometimes indicted.

[1]ARN was formerly High Counseling for Reintegration and then Colombian Agency for Reintegration (ACR). It was created by the Colombian government in 2008 to advice the Presidency on the process of reintegrating the population that used to be part of illegal armed groups. The ARN has several teams of professionals who provide assistance to former combatants around the country and is financed by the National Government. It is considered as a milestone in the country's history regarding the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process, as it allows long term structured accompaniment of the programme's participants, distinguishing it from previous Columbian DDR processes. Currently, the ARN is also in charge of guiding the process with former combatants of the FARC guerrilla movement, as a result of the peace agreements, signed in 2016.

In 2009, a team of professionals attending the reintegration process of former combatants across the country, realised the need to assess the mental health of this population and to identify risk factors leading to the recurrence of criminal behaviour, violence, substance or alcohol abuse, and re-enrolment in armed groups. This need became pertinent because of the various difficulties observed in the process of reintegration, such as relapse on crime, domestic violence, problematic use of substances and alcohol, relationship difficulties, emotional symptoms or failures in the process of assimilation to civil life.

The requirement at that time was to build a tool that would allow the assessment of mental health problems and determine the risks of reverting to violent, criminal behaviour or substance and alcohol abuse. The design of the tool demanded a comprehensive understanding that would acknowledge several important aspects and that would set in play different assumptions to make connections between mental health issues, history of ex-combatants, particularities of the armed conflict and expected potential risks.

This tool would subsequently be applied to the entire population assisted by the government program and would serve as a guide for designing the support and care paths for ex-combatants. To address this task, the research team conceived a perspective on the construction of the tool that would contribute to an understanding of the Colombian armed conflict.

The overall research objectives that guided the construction of the assessment instrument and the course of the investigation are as follows[2]:

- The path (method) emerged as a phenomenological-complex understanding aimed at observing and evaluating behaviour, conduct or disorders, and emerging situations within a complex weave of individual conditioning factors as well as socio-political and cultural determinants.
- The intention to capture key elements of personal history, collective and social settings where reintegration processes are contextualized and spring to life, avoiding a 'psychiatrisation' or 'psychologising' the population.
- The assessment tool to be utilised as a device to assess human phenomena.

The sequence of analysis involved in the evaluation of the results and fragmented into various components proposes that mental disorder in the sampled population be considered not as an anomaly or an organically conceived effect, but as an expression of various forms of emotional distress. This calls for the understanding of the various symptoms or disorders caused by the experience of armed conflict -such as the results of mourning, mental health damages, exposure to cruel experiences and barbarity, frustration, exclusion, chronic stress and emotional and social bond ruptures- from a phenomenological perspective. It also involves understanding the apprehension derived from the transition from military life dynamics characteristic of armed conflicts to the dynamics of civil life and the process of reintegration. Suffering or unease are both considered effects of

[2]Extracts from the original technical proposal prepared by the research team.

participation in armed conflict. Previous experiences of exclusion, victimization or significant experiences before their admission into armed groups are likewise considered.

The second approach relates to specific characters or personality traits of former combatants, considering that some of these characteristics may be configured as risks for recidivism into criminal or violent behaviour. The perspective of personality traits or these events is not considered deterministic, because it also discusses how far some of the traits may be structural or how much they can be exacerbated by the adaptive conditions required by the state of war.

The third approach considered is that the effect of a protracted armed conflict does not only impact those who have been involved as perpetrators or as victims, but also affects society as a whole. It is therefore important to uncover key elements of the context and history to broaden the understanding hence secure interventions as individuals and contribute to the transformation of society in the context of reintegration of former combatants. An additional view is one that seeks to connect dynamics: individual and collective, familiar and subjective, social and institutional in the framework of historical and contextual processes in which the construction of a society takes place. The underlying viewpoint in the construction of the instrument is the transition of our society towards the consolidation of democracy in its broader conception[3] and the techniques incorporated especially in the perspective of life trajectories analysis.

The last component of the methodological design of the research instrument considers, above all, the contexts of life in the reintegration process, particularly ex-combatants' perception of quality of life during their reintegration process in different dimensions.

These four elements: expressions of suffering, personality traits, life trajectories and quality of life perceptions are the main chapters of the tool when combined and constitute a frontier between the social sciences and the sciences of the psyche in a historic-contextual psychiatry. This perspective facilitates the comprehension of the dynamics of the armed conflict and the different phases of the reintegration process and contributes to orientate the development of actions at different levels. The complexity of these notions and the mental health diagnosis that follows – not limited to the individual suffering including the story, experience and context – have a direct connection with the DDR reintegration purpose. This process articulates implementation actions and strategies with a deeper historical and contextual comprehension of the elements that had conditioned or perpetuated an armed conflict in order to address viable peace building approaches.

Through the application of the tool, the following section discusses and describes in detail each component with the main results of their application.

[3]The concept of democracy would be not only a healthy representative democracy, but it would be closer to the reflections of participatory and deliberative democracy but especially a democracy that links the radical and universal experience of citizenship with the fullness of rights enjoyment in line with social justice, diversity and equity.

Findings were based on an average 27,000 former combatants sampled comprising both guerrillas and self-defence groups. ACR personnel applied the test in different regions across the country.

5.2 Trajectories of War

The scale developed to describe the trajectory of the subjects originally seeks to establish some degree of 'Disposition' they may have to engage in violent or criminal behaviour. This "Subjective Disposition" speaks about the probability of a certain behaviour that is configured on the subject from meaningful experiences. In concept, Disposition is two-fold. It includes aspects of the individual's history and his or her current status and those present in the social environment that can lead to the activation of the Disposition, which we refer to as social-contextual devices.

The Disposition is measured through the trajectory that observes dynamic trends focusing relational experiences of the subjects in three moments of their lives. That is,

A: before entering the armed group,
B: during their permanence in the armed group and
C: after their demobilisation, corresponding to the time of reintegration.

The axis that constitute the trajectory are as follows:

1. *Disposition due to normative breakdown*: Its input is the exploration of the taking of position versus ethical and ethical-normative contexts at different times of life.
2. *Disposition due to cultural context of armed conflict*: Explores aspects such as normalization of contempt for life, generational transmission of social norms of war, lifestyles characteristic of war contexts, appropriation of symbols related to war, identity affirmation as combatant.
3. *Disposition due to risk networks*: Explores aspects such as experiences of exclusion, closeness to criminal networks, absence of father figure, violent family.
4. *Disposition due to damage inflicted to bonds*: Explores aspects like experiences of grief and abandonment, relational ruptures, victimization experiences, exposure to acts of barbarism.
5. *Disposition due to non-democratic political practices*: Explores elements such as exposure to authoritarian political practices, corruption, social participation, armed political practices, and expression of political ideas.
6. *Disposition due to deficit of socio-educational resources*: Explores aspects such as job skills, conflict resolution skills, and formative experience.
7. *Disposition due to labour-productive insertion*: Explores elements such as environments where poverty is prevalent, lack of opportunities, labour exploitation and illegal economy.



Fig. 5.1 Degree of disposition by trajectory components. *Source* The Authors

8. *Disposition due to health and self-care*: Explores aspects such as risk behaviour, alcohol or drug abuse, mental health or coexistence problems, learning difficulties, specific illnesses or disabilities.

Some of the results obtained in the application of the tool are presented in Fig. 5.1.

The general description of the Disposition to engage in violent or criminal behaviour by trajectory produces the following data: the axis that represents the greatest risk by trajectory is the deficit of socio-adaptive resources. In this area 73% of the population reports a degree of medium and high disposition, with 67% reporting a high degree. This would imply that people feel there is imbalance between the skills they have and the possibilities of using them in ordinary life and their legality thus representing an imbalance between capacities and opportunities.

The other axis showing greater difficulty is the Disposition due to damage inflicted to bonds or to the capacity of bonding. 81% of the population reported difficulties and 42% of that are at high risk. It means that they may have a cumulus of events of emotional impact and slight emotional elaboration of the same.

The following axis of non-democratic political practices totals 66.5% of the population in medium and high degree of Disposition. It refers to the persistence of contexts where authoritarian, corrupt and non-participatory political dynamics are in motion. This indicates the need to link the actions of reintegration to changes in political systems.

Other risks considered relevant are that the employment axis relates to 57% of the population and 55% to the fragility of the available networks axis respectively.

5.3 The Ones Who Carry the Weapons

This chapter of the study registered the experience of some events considered as critical, that influenced subjects' trajectory. Notions of personality disorder are drawn from the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual* DSM IV of Mental Disorders classification system which describes information that assesses population trends.

The data shows that prior to the armed conflict, 58% of ex-combatants have not had the presence of a father figure, which may be indicative of consequences of a protracted armed conflict and particular family structures. 71% joined the armed group after considering it a life option while 59% admitted having had close persons or relatives who have died due to the armed conflict. From the internal experience in the armed group, 31% admitted having participated or witnessed cruel or violent acts, and 68% were in the group but did not necessarily face these situations. Figures 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 illustrate the above mentioned results and Fig. 5.6 offers a general description regarding personality traits.

In general, it may be observed that most of the population did not report outstanding personality traits. The most significant are narcissistic traits at 18.8% and paranoid at 17.6%. This is followed by borderline personality at 9.8%, dependent 8.9% and antisocial 3.9%. This data is reaffirmed by the experience of those working with this population, who recognize that most of their profiles correspond to people



Fig. 5.2 Did you have a father or any father figure for support? *Source* The Authors



Fig. 5.3 Did you join the armed group as a life option? *Source* The Authors



Fig. 5.4 Did any of your relatives or close acquaintances die because of the violence of the armed conflict?



Fig. 5.5 Did you participate in or witness any cruel or violent action? *Source* The Authors



Fig. 5.6 Personality traits. *Source* The Authors

who engaged in the armed conflict without any criminal predisposition, or condition particularly different in their forms of relationship and character. On the other hand some of these prominent features are adjustable and characterise a minority that had specific vulnerabilities and difficulties during the reintegration process.

5.4 Spectrum of Suffering

Based on the clinical events, it is clarified that all scales, except the ones related to impulse control and pathological gambling have been built on a stochastic psychometric model known as Rasch model that guarantees important sensitivity and reliability in testing. There have been several control tests of the scales with results between 85–98% of reliability.

1. The test is a screening test that manages to find possible cases that are being reported and that are part of the information presented here.
2. As for Depression, it is not possible to talk about any specific type of depression, only of cases found to be in a general depressive spectrum.
3. In connection to Anxiety, the spectrum detected by the test makes further reference to Generalised Anxiety Disorder.
4. For cases related to Psychosis, the tool has a provision to capture active psychosis, behaviours or psychotic traits of functional order in people that present high self-referentiality or some degree of psychic destructuration yet without active psychosis having been observed in these cases.
5. With regard to the Maniac states scale there is a good sensitivity for manic episodes and other types of affective disorders related to dysthymic type symptoms and other types of manic reactions.
6. The scale for Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome achieves good specificity in its clinical reference.
7. The scales for *Psychoactive Substances* SPA and Alcohol Abuse detect consumption that can be considered problematic from a clinical point of view, but a global underreporting can be assumed because of the resistance of the evaluated participants.
8. The Pathological Gambling scale detects, in a simple and categorical way, the probability of the disorder.
9. The scale for Explosive Intermittent Disorder of impulse control detects as well in a simple and categorical way the probability of the disorder. It is also sensitive to impulsive behaviour and emotional reactivity (Fig. 5.7).

The relevant data are: post-traumatic stress experienced by 31% of the population, anxiety 27%, impulse control problems 26%, manic type episodes 23%, depression 17%, pathological gambling 14%, psychosis 10%, alcohol abuse 8% and substances abuse 4%. Figures 5.8 and 5.9 highlight significant differences by



Fig. 5.7 Expressions of suffering. *Source* The authors



Fig. 5.8 Presence of symptoms by gender-female. *Source* The Authors

sex, indicating greater vulnerability in women and focuses on different forms of care in the context of reintegration.

The most important differences are registered in *Post Traumatic Stress Disorder* PTSD with prevalence of the disorder in 35% of women in contrast to 30% in men; depression affecting 27% of women and 15% of men; anxiety affecting 38% of women and 25% of men. With regard to substance and alcohol abuse, percentages are higher in men with 27% of the male population and 5% of the female population affected with alcohol abuse. Of substance abuse, 13% of men against 2% of women are affected.



Fig. 5.9 Presence of symptoms by gender-male. *Source* The Authors

5.5 Quality of Life

Another additional field of analysis is the quality of life. This section is based on the result of the application of a *perceived quality of life scale* that has five axis of inquiry. This scale was introduced to observe elements that go beyond the measures of discomfort or emotional distress. The five axis measured are self-concept, self-acceptance, socio-emotional stability, physical integrity and projection.[4] The test allows us to know how the people in the reintegration process are feeling, how they value their resources and possibilities vis-a-vis allowing researchers to know about their shortcomings, difficulties and unresolved needs during their reintegration processes and from their own perception of life. Figure 5.10 present the results obtained in this field.

The axis of self-acceptance measures the perception the subjects have on their individual selves with a sense of satisfaction and self-worth. Thirteen percent (13%) of the population perceive a good quality of life while 39% rate satisfactory level.

The axis of adaptation to context explores the internal capabilities (or resources) the population may have to endure within the environment. In this axis, 16% of ex-combatants perceive and value their personal resources for adaptation to the environment as good and 27% are satisfied.

The socio-emotional stability axis explores the forms of interaction and the external resources with which the subject accounts. Fourteen per cent (14%) of the population reports feeling good about their stability in terms of social interactions, relationships and affections, while 29% feel satisfied.

[4]Scales of quality of life, personality and some clinical events have been drawn from Aponte, et al. *Condiciones Teórico-Metodológicas para un Diagnóstico Territorial en Salud Mental* (2000); Secretaría Distrital de Salud de Bogotá). Carolina Valencia has collaborated for the analyses of quality of life.



Fig. 5.10 Quality of life perception. *Source* The authors

In the axis of physical integrity, aspects of satisfaction with basic needs are measured. This section reports that 13% of the population considers having a good quality of life and 36% reports perceived sufficiency and satisfaction.

The projection axis explores elements considered necessary to achieve a life project. Fourteen (14%) of the population perceive their quality of life as good in these aspects and 34% as satisfactory.

In general, an approximated half of the population report satisfaction in the different axis explored.

5.6 Correlation Analysis

In order to illustrate the pertinence and value of this complex perspective of axes interaction in the research, some correlative analysis were selected as examples. In the relation of quality of life and trajectory, a positive correlation between medium adaptation and subjectivity disposition is observed in the social resources axis. The findings also show that within the suffering expressions and trajectories there exists a positive correlation between anxiety and both cultural context disposition and risk networks. The relation of personality and trajectory correlates interestingly between expressions of antisocial traits, the components and context of the war culture.

In conclusion, to contribute to the understanding of the planning and execution of actions, there remains a great need to generate tools and forms of



Fig. 5.11 Cultural context by trajectories. *Source* The authors

assessment based on platforms of complexity and multiple views encompassing the various dynamics related to armed conflicts and reintegration process.

The findings hereunder are of the many correlations obtained as illustrated in Fig. 5.11. Emphasis is on the correlations explaining key elements of the

Colombian armed conflict and the post-conflict reconstruction processes the country is facing.

It refers to various axis of the trajectory. In Pearson's correlation analysis important significate correlations (0,000) between the cultural axis and the presence of fragile networks (0,480) are observed, similarly between the cultural axis and the presence of undemocratic political practices (0,404). The assessment is that these three axis – Fragile and Risk Networks, Undemocratic Political Culture and Cultural Context of War – constitute key elements of the Colombian armed conflict that should be dismantled during the post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding.

This type of assessment and analysis model generates substantive qualitative information, not only to address in an individualised manner, the reintegration route of former combatants, but also to understand the macro-social dynamics surrounding armed conflicts and DDR processes.

Chapter 6
Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration in the Ivory Coast

Yeo Léopold Nangorgo

Abstract The release, management and sustainable resolution of a crisis should be driven by the reform of the security sector (SSR) and *disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration* (DDR). SSR and DDR consequently improve the living conditions of socio-economic targets that players are ex-combatants. The objective of this work is to analyse the impacts of return of ex-combatants on the implementation of socio-economic reintegration projects involving behaviour change at the end of resocialization sites across Ivory Coast. It mentions the various categories of activities that capped the DDR process in the country and measures that could be adopted to curb future threats.

Keywords Process · Disarmament · Demobilization · Reinsertion Reintegration · Social cohesion

6.1 General Introduction

During the 1990s, wars and conflicts in the south of the Sahara revolved around the equatorial axis. For example, the genocide in Rwanda, the Burundian rebellion, the war in Southern Sudan, the border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the militia war in Brazzaville, the repeated mutinies in the Central African Republic and especially the regionalization of the conflict of the former Zaire, now a Democratic

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Republic of the Congo, seemed to indicate that Central Africa and the Great Lakes were sinking to the "Heart of Darkness". Fifteen to twenty years later, the geography of conflict has changed. Now it is Francophone West Africa that appears as the major crisis zone, which until then had been more or less separated from the conflicts in Nigeria, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

In West Africa, Côte d'Ivoire has enjoyed unparalleled political stability in a sub-region shaken and fragile by numerous military coups. In the early 1980s, the country was one of the few in the sub-region to be governed by a civilian government. Rightly regarded as a haven of peace, it was also an economic pole that attracted the nationals of neighbouring countries in search of a better life. However, over the last ten years, they have contradicted the idea of a "haven of peace", and were especially marked by a violent military-political crisis that strongly weakened certain foundations of Ivorian society.

The 2010 election announced as an exit from the war turned into a post-electoral crisis, amplifying the suffering of Ivorians and all those living on the Ivorian soil with its cortege of dead, disabled and homeless. At the end of the fighting that took place the different protagonists, the arms were abandoned by the fighters in their retirement. Some have hidden them and others taken away, which constitutes a danger for all. The uncontrolled use of these abandoned weapons in the hands of different combatants is a major challenge for the government. Indeed, the possession of these weapons creates a climate of insecurity in the country. For some ex-combatants, the weapon is an effective means of threatening to acquire what they need for their survival, hence robberies and other misdeeds.

In the field of armaments, five countries in West Africa – Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger and Senegal – share many common features. Bordering each other, they are all former French colonies and have maintained close ties with their former colonizers, notably in monetary terms (use of the CFA franc) and in the military field (presence of French troops). They do not have large demographic disparities, the most populous being Côte d'Ivoire (20.8 million inhabitants) and Senegal's least populous (14.5 million). Together, they occupy just over half the area of West Africa (including Mauritania). After decreasing in 2010 and 2011, Ivorian military spending rose again in 2012. This is surprising, as one would be inclined to believe that a country emerging from a conflict (in this case the long political crisis -military from 2002 to 2011) tends to reduce its military spending. However, the end of the crisis, following the arrest and extradition of former President Laurent Gbagbo, as well as the return to a certain normality, resulted in an economic recovery, a surge in GDP and the State, which could justify the increase in military spending.

After a crisis, it is essential to help improve the living conditions of the populations. The success of a program of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants then becomes an undeniable factor, indispensable for stability and prosperity. Faced with this situation, the authorities are confronted with a double challenge:

1. Establish durable solutions for peacebuilding and return to social cohesion, and,
2. Support, in the short and medium term, a solution of the Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration type to all young people who are familiar with the use of weapons.

As such, the overall reintegration of ex-combatants must make it possible to improve their economic and social situation and create the conditions for their post-crisis rehabilitation for effective participation in national economic reconstruction. The aim is to facilitate a sustainable return of ex-combatants to civilian life through better understanding and planning of actions. Today, with the efforts of the international and national community and, in particular, of the humanitarian community, the situation seems to be progressing towards normal.

However, the crucial link between security sector reform and DDR in a peacebuilding process must be preserved. DDR is now perceived as a non-technical but highly political process that needs to be specifically tailored to the local context.

The United Nations, the Ivorian State, the technical players at the end of the crisis here as elsewhere are still unanimous on the complexity, the conduct and the management of the DDR. Traditionally, no DDR process is 100% successful. In the context of Ivory Coast it was aimed at exploring various approaches towards its implementation in order to contribute to the consolidation of a social and security fabric which had severely been damaged following the coup of December 1999, the unprecedented military-political crisis of 19 September 2002 and the 2010 post-electoral conflict.

Clear progress has been made in putting the country back on the road to the post-election crisis of 2010–2011. A government decree of August 08, 2012 created the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Authority (ADDR) targeting ex-combatants. The authority completed its mission on 30th June 2015. Out of a total of 78,000 beneficiaries, about 64,000 were picked and 55,000 have been reintegrated into the military, the administration and the private sector. The remaining cases were supported by a light coordination structure, the *Reintegration Coordination and Monitoring Unit* (CCSR). As part of the *Security Sector Reform* (SSR), a regional-based *Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies* (IESD), aimed at training managers and raising public interest in defence and security issues. Security, is still in the launching phase.

6.2 Definition of Key Concepts

6.2.1 Disarmament Demobilization Reintegration (DDR)

If there is consensus on the two 'Ds', which designate the disarmament and demobilization of combatants, the 'R' could be multiplied and indicates several concepts: Reintegration, Rehabilitation, Repatriation, Resettlement, To form alternative acronyms: the DDRR (Rehabilitation and Reintegration) process in Liberia,

or the DDRRR program for non-Congolese combatants in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Generally speaking, however, the symbol DDR is the most used, to designate Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. To achieve disarmament as a process, it is important to define the origins of armaments in Cote d'Ivoire. Where did the weapons that served the war in Cote d'Ivoire come from? Such a question leads to a good analysis of arms trafficking networks to Cote d'Ivoire in particular and to West Africa in general.

6.2.2 Disarming

The Secretariat-General on the administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations of 24 May 2005 (A/C.5/59/31) noted that, disarmament is the collection, control and destruction of ammunition, explosives, small arms and light weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of programs for the responsible management of weapons. By bringing this definition back to Danané, the framework of the study, this stage of the process consisted of collecting weapons that the ex-combatants voluntarily deposited without constraint (Figs. 6.1 and 6.2).

6.2.3 Demobilization

The report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, United Nations, 2004 (A/59/565) recommends that the demobilization of combatants is the most critical factor in the success of operations of peace. Without demobilization, civil wars cannot be stopped and other critical objectives such as democratization, justice and development are unlikely to succeed.

The *United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations* (DPKO) defines demobilization as the formal and controlled process of discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization can range from the placement of individual combatants in temporary centres to the regrouping of troops in camps designed for this purpose (camp sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the proposed demobilized support program known as reintegration. This phase, which succeeds the disarmament phase, begins the period of sending the former combatant into formation who is supposed to have deposited all the military effects in his possession.

The Secretary-General's note on the administrative and budgetary aspects of financing of United Nations peacekeeping operations of 24 May 2005 (A/C.5/59/31) defines reintegration as assistance to ex-combatants during demobilization before the longer-term reintegration process. Reintegration is a form of transitional assistance to cover the basic needs of ex-combatants as well as those of their

Fig. 6.1 Map of working zone of the antenna ADDR. *Source* ADDR – Danane, main report of December 2014

Fig. 6.2 Overview map showing the working zone with the sensitive territories of Liberia and Sierra Leone. *Source* Google maps data

families. It may include transitional allowances for security, food, clothing, shelter, medical services, short-term training, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a continuous and long-term process of social and economic development, reintegration is short-term material and/or financial assistance that meets immediate needs. It can last up to a year. Reintegration effectively begins for the ex-combatant once he has deposited his weapon and any other military effects, and is sent to training (resocialization or joint training in accounting). He or she receives the payment of his training salary and enters the phase of waiting for the transfer of his/her reintegration net.

6.2.4 Reintegration

According to the UN Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2004, (A/59/565): Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and find jobs and lasting incomes. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open schedule that commences within communities at the local level. It is part of a country's overall development and is a national responsibility often requiring long-term external assistance. The ex-combatants having been (re)socialized and already accomplished the *Common Core training* FCC, they await their posting, that is, if retained on the public service list or are assigned to a cabinet as they wait for the transfer of their reintegration to be able to implement individual projects.

The FCC or Common Core Training is a phase of the reintegration process. It ends with the beneficiary being reintegrated back into society. The stages of awareness, list building, and validation of lists are those that set precedence during the FCC training. The resocialisation training phase of the beneficiaries is a key strategy which makes it possible to give the ex-combatants the capacities and the qualities to live a harmonious life in the society. Information, sensitization sessions on Human Rights, Gender and HIV/AIDS are distributed along with conducting sports sessions to help the participant. This phase provides myriad of opportunities for reintegration. On the other hand, for any ex-combatant who is not eligible for resocialization, he receives training in Human Rights, Citizenship and Citizenship, Gender and HIV-AIDS as well as accounting basics.

The FCC concerns not only ex-combatants who are unfit for re-socialization, but also, and above all, the elderly, cases of diseased columns, persons with disabilities, and all vulnerable ex-combatants on the production of an exemption or medical certificate signed by a doctor, illness or infirmity, preventing him or her from leaving re-socialization. A departure from the resocialization programme which involves four weeks of training implies that the participant is in very good physical condition, especially mentally. As for the Reintegration phase, this includes: the constitution of the files, the opening of the accounts, the supply of the accounts (payment of the reintegration savings), and the follow-up of the beneficiaries. This monitoring operation covers three (03) months. At least three visits are planned: a

pre-funding visit – a visit during project installation – a post-installation visit. The net amount of the reinstatement is the sum available by transfer to a current account for this purpose in a local bank in the name of the ex-combatant. In the amount of 800,000 FCFA or 1500, 79 USD, this money is successively paid and delivered in three tranches following the signature validation of the head of office. The net of reintegration is intended for the realization of the project by the ex-combatant. This is usually a very delicate phase as the beneficiary may at times issue threats and become violent to the agents in charge of the follow-up frame.

6.3 Evolution of DDR with the Birth of Adaptive Practices

The practice of DDR has evolved in recent decades by adapting to new contexts and thus requiring institutional reforms. In developing national strategies and programs in collaboration with national partners, senior United Nations officials and DDR professionals are increasingly faced with sporadic and asymmetric security threats that may destabilize peace or feed continuing conflicts.

Prior to the 1980s, the geopolitical aspects of the Cold War were focused on post-conflict security on the disarmament and demobilization of military institutions and on the reconfiguration of the armed forces. Bilateral partnerships have led to the development of dismantlement and reform programs for military structures, as well as other job creation projects and veterans' pension plans.

In the late 1980s, both the United Nations and donors grew more interested in promoting the democratic control of military institutions.

In the early 1990s, UN agencies began to focus more on developmental DDR, but implementation strategies remained sequential and inadequate to the context. During this period, DDR programs incorporated a wider range of post-conflict contexts and set broader goals. The new elements considered included: the livelihoods of ex-combatants and their communities, women and child soldiers, women involved in armed groups, combatants affected by HIV/AIDS and other vulnerable groups. The international community has also begun to focus on the links between DDR and other major peacebuilding themes, such as the rule of law, SSR and economic recovery. Recognizing the need for multidimensional peacekeeping missions in 2000, the report of the High-Level Panel on Peace Operations (commonly known as the *Brahimi Report*) highlighted the importance of missions with stronger mandates in support of peacekeeping peace process and supported the adoption of integrated DDR strategies.

The last seven peacekeeping operations established by the UN Security Council have all included DDR in their tasks. At the same time, the United Nations has increased its involvement in DDR in non-peacekeeping contexts in collaboration with UNDP in more than 30 countries on DDR-related issues.

6.4 Second Generation DDR Practices in Peace Operations

In West Africa, there is greater attention to cross-border issues, particularly the control of small arms and light weapons. A wider range of measures for the destruction, reduction and management of weapons has gradually been introduced. These include measures for the voluntary collection of weapons within the civilian population, capacity building of the security forces in arms management, and the establishment of a regulatory framework governing the possession of weapons and the handing over of weapons against lottery tickets.

In 2006, the *United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration* (IAWG-DDR) published the *Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards* (IDDRS) to provide a comprehensive framework of guidelines and procedures for the implementation of DDR programs for professionals throughout the United Nations system. These guidelines cover multiple policy areas related to the planning, design and implementation of DDR programs, including the roles of various local, national and international actors and cross-cutting issues such as women and gender, children, Youth, health and HIV/AIDS. Other directions and linkages between DDR and other processes, such as SSR and transitional justice, emerged in 2009. IDDRS provides valuable guidance in responding to the broader complex political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic aspects of the post-conflict context. However, as mentioned above, they also define a series of prerequisites for the success of traditional DDR programs.

6.4.1 The Evolution of DDR in the Ivorian Context

The DDR process in Côte d'Ivoire was defined by the *National Policy Letter* DDR (LPN-DDR) adopted by the National Security Council on 02 August 2012. Created by Decree No. 2012-787 of 08 August 2012, the *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Authority* (ADDR) had the task of implementing the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process in Côte d'Ivoire.

Its implementation normally meets the specific objectives assigned to any DDR process, namely:

- Drawing up durable solutions for the consolidation of peace and the return to good social cohesion;
- Bring, in the short and medium term, a solution of the Demobilization, Disarmament and Reinsertion type to all young people who have become familiar with the use of weapons.

As such, the overall reintegration of ex-combatants must make it possible to improve their economic and social situation and create the conditions for their

post-crisis rehabilitation for effective participation in national economic reconstruction.

However, the crucial link between security sector reform and DDR in a peacebuilding process must be preserved. DDR is now perceived as a non-technical but highly political process that needs to be specifically tailored to the local context. In the Ivorian context, on 8 August 2012, Decree No. 2012-787 created the ADDR, under the responsibility of the National Security Council (Decree No. 2012-786 of 08 August 2012). Unlike other DDR processes elsewhere in Africa and around the world, that of Cote d'Ivoire, lead to 78% optimal state intervention while the other 22% coming from bilateral donors and multilateral organizations. This was an important innovation of the first order. Another important specificity is the innovative incorporation of the concept of 'resocialization'.

As the DDR issue is inextricably linked to the return to optimal national security, which inevitably involves security sector reform (SSR), the United Nations, the Ivorian State, the technical players are still unanimous on the complexity, the conduct and the management of the DDR. Traditionally, no DDR process is 100% successful.

The overall and specific objectives assigned to the DDR component in Cote d'Ivoire were based on exploring the approach of the process in order to contribute to the consolidation of a social and security fabric which had been severely damaged following the coup of December 1999, the unprecedented military-political crisis of 19 September 2002 and extending to the post-electoral conflict of 2010. In this context, significant progress has been made in restoring the country back from the post-election crisis in 2010–2011. The *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Authority* (ADDR) of ex-combatants completed its mission on 30 June 2015. Out of a total of 78,000 initial ex-combatants in the database, 64,000 persons were registered and 55,000 were reintegrated into the army, administration and the private sector. The second presidential and general elections have already taken place as a result of the positive results of the DDR implementation process. The remaining cases were handled by a light coordinating structure, the *Coordination and Monitoring Unit for Reintegration* (CCSR), which has already completed its mission (Figs. 6.3,[1] 6.4[2] and Table 6.1[3]).

[1]The graph presents the characteristics of the beneficiaries according to the age bracket. The mean age of the beneficiaries is 36 years. This average is slightly different from the overall average estimated at 37 years of the fact that certain projects of the public administration required a maximum age of 35 years as a selection criteria.

[2]The graph presents the characteristics of the beneficiaries according to the academic level. The reinserted ex-fighters were distributed by level of education as indicated in the chart. School level is determined from the lowest to senior high school level as well as the general and technical education.

[3]Total participants equals those re-instated in 2013 and reintegrated in 2014.



Fig. 6.3 Age bracket of the beneficiaries. *Source* Danane field research office, December 2014



Fig. 6.4 Characteristics of the beneficiaries as per school academic level. *Source* Author (translated from the original French version)

Table 6.1 Statistics of demobbed ex-combatants between 2011 and 2015

Indicators	Overall quantitative objectives	Overall realised	Quantitative objective for the period	Realised over the period	Rate realized (%)
Total number of participants	1500	1416	1500	1416	94.4
Number of reinstated participants	1500	1233	1500	1233	82.2
Number of reintegrated participants	1075	999	1075	999	92.9

Source Annual report of the Principal Head and field team of Danané office, December, 2014

6.4.2 The Resocialization of Ex-combatants Demobilized in Cote d'Ivoire

The issue of DDR management is addressed in Côte d'Ivoire through an analysis of its policy on the reintegration of ex-combatants and above all a part relating to the resocialization component. Resocialization aims to promote sustainable social peace in Côte d'Ivoire, restore confidence in the ex-combatant and help the former combatant to break with his past and certain bad habits. Expectations are that the resocialised behaves as an exemplary citizen thereby accompany him in identifying the choice of a socio-economic reintegration project and reassure the host community of the ex-combatant's reintegration.

To be eligible for resocialization, you must be a combatant confirmed by the database, file your weapon of war, have confirmed your reintegration project in an antenna or an office of the ADDR.

The reintegration phase begins with awareness-raising, list formation, validation of the lists, the re-socialization phase or training of the beneficiaries. On the other hand, for any ex-combatant who is not eligible for resocialization, he receives training on human rights, citizenship and citizenship, gender and HIV/AIDS, locally simplified accounting at Danané.

The reintegration phase begins with the setting up of reinsertion files, the opening of accounts, the provision of accounts (payment of the reinstatement fee of 800,000 CFA francs) and the supervision of beneficiaries. Supervision and supervision is carried out over three months and is implemented by locally recruited firms, but according to donor standards. The recruitment of firms is done through a call for tenders according to a process conducted and validated by the prefect. At least three visits are scheduled: one visit before financing (pre-installation), another during the installation of the project, and one post-installation visit (Table 6.2).

Table 6.2 2013 statistics of re-socialised ex-combatants and sectors absorbed in

Staff 2013			
	Business sectors		Staff
2013	Confirmed craftsmen		674
	Public sector	ONPC[a]	17
		Water and forestry	20
	Transport project/Tricycle I and II		101
	UVD[b]/Plastic valuation		38
	Complex agro pastoral	INTA 2	30
	Total		830

Source Annual report of Danané office, December 2014
[a]National office of the Disaster and emergency services
[b]UVD: unit of plastic valuation

6.4.2.1 Different Types of Projects Operated

The ex-combatants' reintegration projects involved those of trade and services for those already in this field, agro-pastoral, craft trade industry and that of transport trade.

The agro-pastoral projects were classified as simple and complex. The first is the reintegration of ex-combatants already active (acquitted) in the Agro pastoral (breeding or farming) according to the "Confirmed Artisans" scheme. The complex agro-pastoral sector consists of the training of ex-combatants in the various trades of the Agro pastoral (crop production, livestock production) in order to give them the necessary knowledge to start a farm (chicken farming, Pork, beef, sheepfold, rabbit, etc.) or a field (in the food, in the market gardener, etc.). The land used by the agro-pastoral projects is either bought or acquired by leasing from village authorities.

The body of trades and craftsmanship consists of giving practical training to the ex-combatant before the trainee subsequently receives a pre-employment period of six (6) months.

The transport trade consists of reintegrating ex-combatants into the transport sector by putting at their disposal three-wheeled vehicles (tricycle) (Table 6.3)[4].

6.4.3 Why? How? When to Adapt the Ivorian DDR to Other Contexts of Exits of Crises?

The implementation of DDR in Cote d'Ivoire has resulted in significant results and several important commitments through the achievement of positive results, a return to good security and the holding of general elections (presidential, legislative, et cetera). Re-socialization remains the key reason and the fundamental cause of the results and figures obtained.

Another reason is the establishment and creation of a single authority, the authority for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (ADDR), under the responsibility of the *National Security Council* (CNS) (Decree No. 2012-786 of 08 August 2012), presided over by the Head of State.

Unlike other DDR processes elsewhere in Africa and around the world in Cote d'Ivoire, an optimal state intervention of 78% of the state was witnessed and the other 22% was from bilateral and multilateral donors. This is an important innovation in a DDR process, especially in a developing country.

'Resocialisation' concept was another very important and innovative specification in Cote d'Ivoire. It was above all a catalyst for the rapid rapprochement

[4]Tables 6.2 and 6.3 each represents the main training categories undertaken by those reintegrated in 2013 and 2014. This includes the various projects they were involved in through Trade Service and Agro-Pastoral sub-divided into simple, complex, business and craftsmen and transport.

Table 6.3 2014 statistics of re-socialised ex-combatants and sectors absorbed in

STAFF 2014			
	Business sectors		Staff
2014	Trade and service		338
	Agro pastoral	Complex INTA[a] 3 and 4	14
		Simple	31
	PRC/ ONUCI-ADDR[b]	ONG IDE AFRIQUE[c]	88
		ONG KOUADI	114
	Total		585

Source ADDR office annual report of Danané, 2014
[a]Institute of Agricultural Training
[b]Project of community Reintegration (PRC) piloted jointly by the ADDR (Authority for the DDR in Ivory Coast) and United Nations (ONUCI)
[c]Non-Governmental Organisation

between the ex-belligerents of the long and terrifying military-political crisis. Among the most important events of the crisis was the post-electoral crisis of 2011, which left more than 3500 dead, not to mention the destruction of goods and materials. Through its implementation, re-socialization has reduced all the barriers of hatred, lack of cohesion, et cetera. There is no doubt today that resocialization has undoubtedly constituted the crucial link which not only allowed to inculcate behaviour of ex-combatants, but also and above all, to bring ex-combatants closer to the host communities and to facilitate their integration into Ivorian society.

Indeed, the ADDR reached, from August 2012 to 30 June 2015, the demobilization, reintegration and reintegration of 64,000 ex-combatants out of an initial total of 74,000, a rate of Reinsertion of 85%, which was considered very satisfactory, to end the ADDR operations without incurring a high security risk.

Resocialization has also led to cultural exchange, through traditional dances and rituals during the trainees' outing ceremonies, giving the inhabitants of the surrounding villages an opportunity to discover the culture of the other peoples of Cote d'Ivoire. Indeed, these trainees have often been opposed during the post-election crisis of 2010. In this regard, numerous testimonies point to the fact that on many occasions victims and executioners found themselves on resocialization sites and ended up get closer thanks to the intervention of the psycho-medical team that is present on the site during the duration of the internship. Community activities such as weeding, cleaning of gutters, etc. carried out by the trainees in the surrounding communities are part of their acceptance by these communities. They also contribute to social cohesion among trainees.

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Chapter 7
Assessing the Future of Managing Economic and Financial Terrorism Risks in Kenya

Charles Ndalu Wasike

Abstract Terrorism is the threat or use of violence against civilians to draw attention to an issue. Kenya continues to witness terrorism creating more conflicts between the communities in Kenya. The causes of this extremism behaviour are attributable to among others; the political and socioeconomic deprivation of the coastal and North Eastern population relative to the rest of the country and unemployment making it easy for youth to be recruited. Kenya has attempted to alleviate this through organizations like IGAD and AU. Kenya is at the forefront of promoting peace not only in the Horn of Africa but also in Africa. Progressive constitution has provided for good governance and devolution of resources with security apparatus being beefed up.

Keywords Terrorism · Corruption · Ethnicity

7.1 Introduction

Terrorism is the threat or use of violence meted against the people to draw attention to an issue. It can be viewed as the premeditated use or threat of use of violence by individuals or certain groups to achieve a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience, beyond that of the immediate victim. Although the motives of terrorists may differ, their actions follow a standard pattern with terrorist incidents assuming a variety of forms: airplane hijackings, kidnappings, assassinations, threats, bombings, and suicide attacks. The USA Department of State defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. Likewise, as terrorism against tourists often involves international citizens, international terrorism is defined as "terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country". These acts of

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extremism cause untold suffering, despondence and conflicts in the world. Peace cannot be attained if the terrorism is not eliminated.

Terrorism assumes two essential types: domestic and transnational (Enders/Sandler 2006). Domestic terrorism is home grown with consequences for just the host country, its institutions, citizens, property, and policies. In a domestic terrorist incident, the victim and perpetrators are from the host country. The examples here include Oklahoma City bombing on April 19, 1995 a domestic terrorist event, the kidnapping of members of Parliament by Colombian terrorists and the Boko Haram in Nigeria. Many ethno-nationalist conflicts like the Tamils of Sri Lanka are associated with mostly domestic terrorism, unless the rebels desire to target citizens from other countries to publicize their cause to the world. Domestic events tend to outnumber transnational terrorist events by eight to one (Enders/Sandler 2006). On contrast, transnational terrorism involves more than one country. This international aspect can stem from the victims, targets, institutions, supporters, terrorists, or implications. For instance, the 9/11 is a transnational terrorist event because the victims were drawn from many different countries, the mission was financed and planned from abroad, the terrorists were foreigners, and the implications of the events like financial and security, were global. A hijacking that originates in one country but terminates in another country is an instance of transnational terrorism as is the assassination for political ends of a foreigner on a city street. Transnational terrorist attacks often entail transboundary externalities: actions or authorities in one country impose uncompensated consequences on person or property in another country. Thus, spillover costs can result so that the economic impact of a terrorist event may transcend the host country. For instance Chen/Siems (2004) posits that the toppling of the World Trade Center towers on 9/11 killed many British nationals and had ramifications for British financial institutions.

7.2 Motivations for Terrorism

7.2.1 Political Causes

Political exclusiveness in states or grievances against a certain political system may engender proliferation of terrorist groups. Frustrations arising from lack of expressions of political standpoints can turn to violence as an alternative to exclusive political order. However, close this is to ethno-nationalism; the goal here is not independence but emancipation from repressive regimes. Political factors like government repression leads to terrorism. Unstable and undemocratic societies form weak governments causing the people to suffer. Human rights abuses considered a form of repression, falls into this category since it's considered a direct result of government action (Newman 2006). Human rights violations in forms like dispossession and humiliation, cause people to hold grievances against the government.

The Western countries have become victims of these terror acts due to their support of repressive authoritarian regimes for their own national interest. The angered population out of frustration with these regimes, act out violently as the only alternative to political expression.

7.2.2 Strategic Considerations

Bad governance and failed politics breed terrorism. Failure by people to seek redress of their grievances through government engenders violence. Groups resort to this form after analyzing the likelihood of success after other forms of expressions have failed. Exhausting more traditional means of opposition without victory, may call for terrorism as a last option. For instance, African National Congress of South Africa in fighting for independence and self-determination only resorted to the use of terrorism after political avenues were explored and failed. This is not a preserve of groups or individuals, states may use terrorists in the pursuit of their own strategic interests if the sponsored terrorist groups' objectives are congruent to the state objectives. For instance it's in public domain that Libya sponsored terrorists to explode a bomb aboard Pan Am 103 flying from London to New York in 1988, allegedly in response to US and British bombing of Libya.

7.2.3 Psychological Causes

Some individuals or groups engage in terrorism for their personal or group reasons based on their own psychological state of mind. They are motivated by hate or the desire for power. For instance in 1893 Auguste Vaillant bombed the French Chamber of Deputies motivated by hate for the middle classes. This group of terrorists is interested more in getting attention from others for their acts, rather than some grand ideological or strategic goal.

7.2.4 Socio-Economic Explanations

Depravation and lack of upward mobility within society has driven terrorism. Various forms of deprivation can cause terrorism, example, poverty, lack of education and political freedom. With globalization and the vibrant media, awareness has been created on the inequalities existing in the society christened as the "have nots" and 'haves'. The limelight given to opportunities in developed world contrasting the undeveloped world causes frustration and infuriates some in underdeveloped countries. In turn, increasing tension and hostilities consequently allowing

terrorist organizations to gain attention and entry to societies that have felt wronged by these perceived social injustices.

According to Sageman (2004) USA government strategy of combating the jihad based on the traditional reasons of an individual's motivation to turn to terrorism was due to poverty, trauma, madness and ignorance, was ill advised. He asserts that it was the social networks that inspired alienated young Muslims to join the jihad. For the vast majority of the mujahedin, social bonds predated ideological commitment. These men, isolated from the rest of society, were transformed into fanatics yearning for martyrdom and eager to kill. Thus, alienation and discrimination can breed terrorism.

7.2.5 Religion

Religion does play a significant role in driving some forms of terror acts. The thugs of ancient India that murdered to terrorize in the name of the god Kali, the Jewish Zealots who slit Roman throats in public to drive them out of their occupation of Israel and Islamic fundamentalism like Salafi jihad which is a worldwide religious revivalist movement with the goal of re-establishing past Muslim glory in a great Islamist state stretching from Morocco to the Philippines, eliminating present national boundaries (Hoffman 2006).

When Religious Freedoms are violated, sometimes groups employ terrorism to try and solve the problem. A case in point is the Uighur Separatist Movement who responded to the suppression of their religion by the Chinese authorities by launching a bombing campaign.

7.2.6 Poverty

Social stratification in the society as reflected by the inequalities in the distribution of scarce resources has fired embers of hatred and frustrations. Murphy (2001) and Kristof (2002) avers that when a group is absolutely or relatively deprived they rebel. The most popular theory is that poverty causes terrorism. When people are deprived of certain resources and opportunities, poverty can create resentment and cause some to turn to terrorism in order to express their outrage (Newman 2006).

It is therefore important to understand the conditions that create a favourable environment for terror acts. Looking at causes alone may be simplistic without understanding conditions since terrorism is a complex matter. For instance people who do not have a legitimate army at their disposal may resort to terrorism to advance their cause.

7.3 Terrorism in Kenya

Kenya is the hub for Financial, Communication and Transportation services in Eastern and Central Africa with major industries in agriculture, forestry and fishing, mining and minerals, industrial manufacturing, energy, tourism and financial services. Economic surveys of 2015 put Kenya's *Gross Domestic Product* GDP at *US dollars* $69.977 billion making it the 72nd largest economy in the world while per capita GDP was estimated at $1,587.

The country continues to witnesses various attacks attributed to terrorist elements mostly in the northern and coastal regions. The most notable incidents can be summarised as follows: 1980 bombing of the Jewish-owned Norfolk Hotel by the *Palestine Liberation Organisation* PLO, 1998 United States embassy bombings, 2002 Kikambala Hotel and the Israeli-owned Paradise hotel bombing and Arkia Airlines missile attack in Mombasa, 2013 Westgate Mall shooting Nairobi where 67 people were killed, 2014 Mpeketoni attacks in Lamu and 2015 Garissa university attack by the militant group Al-Shaabab.

In response to the attacks, Kenya sent troops to Somalia perceived to be the hideout of the terrorists to fight a war dubbed Operation Linda Nchi. Since this operation began, the Al-Shabaab terrorists' vowed retaliation against the Kenyan authorities. With the militant group's recruitment, a significant and increasing number of terrorist attacks in Kenya have since been carried out by native Kenyans, many of whom are sympathetic to the terrorists' cause. Estimates from one report in 2014 placed the figure of Kenyan fighters at around 25% of Al-Shabaab's total forces. Kenyan youths are preferred due to easiness with which they blend with the Kenyan population as opposed to Somalis and Arab militants due to their ethnic and physical profiling.

Since 1998 after US embassy bombing, Kenya has been the battleground of terrorism incidents that are based on western interests. Majority of lives lost were Kenyan, even though the ideology behind the attacks suggests that locals were not involved in the political dynamics that precipitated the attacks.

7.4 Kenya as an Easy and Soft Target: Vulnerabilities and Risks

Kenya has borne brunt of serious incidences of terrorism with far reaching effects and massive destruction of property and loss of lives. For instance the terror unleashed on Garissa University College in April 2, 2015 resulted in an estimated 147 deaths and the bombing of USA embassy in Nairobi had more than 200 casualties. There has been sporadic terrorist attacks in parts of North Eastern with the *Kenya Defence Forces* KDF currently stationed in Somalia to fight Al Shabab on a mission dubbed "Okoa Kenya". Despite the heavy casualties and continuous terror attacks in Kenya, the global condemnation and attention given has not been

similar to attacks carried out in the Western world. Though the incidences in Kenya had a higher death toll, they did not approach the intense level of commentary from journalists and world leaders like the Charlie Hebdo attack in France. To put this tragedy in context, it would be important to understand the Al-Shaabab threat and Kenya.

7.4.1 Porous Borders

A porous border encourages more targets towards Kenya. The Kenyan government has embarked on a costly project to construct a 424 mile wall along the border with Somalia. North Eastern Kenya is home to one of the largest refugee camps in Africa. The Daadab camp hosts over 336,000 Somalis. These area of North Eastern Kenya especially Garissa County has borne the brunt of terrorism experiencing more than 20% of Al-Shabab's attacks carried out in Kenya between 2009 and 2013.

7.4.2 Weak Security

The terrorist attacks at Garissa University lasted about fifteen (15) hours. This was caused by time lag in deployment of security apparatus that took about seven hours and unavailability of the two small fixed-wing planes that security forces own to transport the officers and their equipment. The law enforcement, police, on the other hand accessed the university after almost half a day analysed as a glacial response.

7.4.3 Local Tensions and Ethnic Conflicts

The lack of development occasioned by limited investments has fuelled tension and instability in the north eastern part of Kenya an area predominantly Islamic. Muslims make up about a tenth of Kenya's population, and they reside primarily in the Northeast and along the coastal region. The former bordering Somalia, has lacked basic infrastructural facilities since independence. Devolution of resources under the current Kenya constitution has however improved the area. In the past, Kenyan-Somali clan conflict and banditry in the area, resulted in the 1980 Garissa massacre and 1984 Wagalla massacre with over 4,000 ethnic Somalis dead. Though North Eastern Kenya is a predominantly ethnic Somali area, the public institutions in the area are patronized by indigenous students and teachers. This phenomenon made it easy for terrorists to target Christians for execution.

7.4.4 Unemployment

Recruitment by terrorists has been possible due to high unemployment rate in Kenya. The terrorist especially Al-Shabab exploits this by targeting the idle youths. According to *British Broadcasting Corporation* BBC, Kenyans make a quarter of al-Shabab's 7,000–9,000 forces. Many are lured by Al-Shabab's high salaries for new recruits, which are reportedly more than *US dollars* $1,000 which is way above, the average monthly salary of $76 ($912 annual) in Kenya. The statistics available puts youth unemployment at 70%.

7.4.5 Corruption

Many agencies both local and international have put Kenya's police force among the most corrupt in East Africa and the world. This report has since aided the easy entry of terrorists in Kenya. According to Kenya's *Ethics Anti-corruption commission* (EACC) report of 2018, Kenya police is ranked second in corruption index second to Murang'a County. This makes it easy for terrorist elements to gain easy passage and visas from officials. For instance in 2014 bribes to police officers made up almost 50% of all bribes in Kenya. Kenya's anti-corruption crusades have not been successful and the police have been given the worst rating by *Transparency International*'s (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index at 136 out of 177 most corrupt being at par with Bangladesh and the Ivory Coast. Majority of citizens mistrust the police according to reports produced by independent bodies. Ninety percent of respondents in a 2011 TI survey in Kenya considered security services to be either corrupt or extremely corrupt. According to media reports, the horrific attack on the Westgate shopping center was as prolonged as it was because troops were busy looting the place before ending the siege. Corruption is so entrenched and institutionalized that the state of development and higher standard of living are not realized as planned in the country. Compounded by terrorism, Kenyans are denied the right to live in a country free from terror. Kenya's auditor general issued a report castigating the security hardware importation as shrouded in secrecy and corruption. There has been deliberate commercialization by civil servants of critical services related to security such as the police, immigration and border security (customs). These actions therefore facilitate the free entry of bad elements into Kenya.

7.4.6 Political and Social History

Kenya's political and social history also provides a better way of understanding the reason for use of Kenya as a base of Islamic extremists. The history of aligning

itself with the US and Israeli interests also explains the frequency of attacks on Kenya's soil and the ostensible disregard for Kenyan lives. Kenya's pro-Israeli alignment was better pronounced during the Entebbe hostage crisis that defined her foreign policy. This position has attracted benefits and costs in equal measure. It is important to understand this historical fact in explaining the expansion of terrorism on Kenyan soil. Further Kenya's unique geographic location makes her act as a passageway from the Middle East and South Asia to East Africa and beyond. This position has been reinforced by heavy infrastructural development to cater for increasing needs. Thus, travel and entry into and around Kenya is quite easy and usually obscure due to its penetrable borders coupled with its surrounding neighbours and unmonitored coastline. For instance the coastal Arabs in Kenya are closely linked to the Arabs in the Middle East for they share a common religion and language. The coastal geographic situation and strategic location relative to Europe, Asia, and neighbouring African countries make it vulnerable.

The political and socioeconomic deprivation of the coastal and North Eastern population relative to the rest of the country poses serious challenges to finding long lasting peace (Otiso 2009). Frustration and poverty with the slow pace of social reforms, coupled with poor governance and lack of social services, facilitates the proliferation of terrorist groups that purport to offer solutions to the poor living conditions (Cronin 2002: 38). People who live on less than a dollar a day tend to lose hope and coerced into acts of terrorism.

7.4.7 Poverty

Poverty and rising disillusionment among the youth have made Kenya and other African nation's easy targets and potential havens for global terrorists. As prior stated regarding effects of bad politics and social set up on terrorism, the frustration and poverty with the slow pace of social reforms, coupled with poor governance and lack of social services, facilitates the proliferation of terrorist groups that purport to offer solutions to the poor living conditions (Cronin 2002: 38).

7.4.8 Unstable Neighbouring Countries

Instability in the region has worsened the situation. Unstable neighbouring countries, especially Somalia and Sudan make it easy for Kenya to be a target of extremists. Kenya hosts the largest number of refugees from troubled countries in the horn of Africa. This makes it mandatory for finding long lasting peace in the region. Poverty, weak borders, corruption, inept police, and rising disillusionment among youth have made Kenya and other African nation's easy targets and potential havens for global terrorists.

7.4.9 *Effects and Economic Ramifications of Attacks*

The economic impact of terrorism can be measured in a variety of perspectives. There are direct costs to property and immediate effects on productivity, as well as longer term indirect costs of responding to terrorism.

There exists many cost differences that can be established from terrorism losses. One is the direct costs. The latter constitute the immediate losses linked to terrorism and include damaged goods, the value of lives lost, the costs associated with injuries (including lost wages), destroyed structures, damaged infrastructure and reduced short-term business. On the contrary, indirect or secondary costs concern attack-related subsequent losses, such as raised insurance premiums, increased security costs, greater compensation to those at high-risk locations and costs tied to attack-induced long-run changes in business. Indirect costs constitute reduced growth in gross domestic product, lost foreign direct investments, changes in inflation, or increased unemployment.

The 2015 Global Terrorism Index,[1] points out a number of factors that affect the cost of terrorism to a country's economy – the diverse nature of terrorism, the economic resilience of an economy and security levels all play a role – so the economic impact of terrorism is varied.

Terrorist incidents have economic consequences such as diverting *foreign direct investment* (FDI), destroying infrastructure, redirecting public investment funds to security, or limiting trade. If a developing country loses enough FDI, which is an important source of savings, then it may also experience reduced economic growth. A sufficiently intense terrorist campaign may greatly reduce capital inflows (Enders/ Sandler 1996). Terrorism, like civil conflicts, may cause spillover costs.

In 2014, terrorism cost the world $52.9 billion, the highest since 2001 (Global Terrorism Index 2015). In Nigeria, it is estimated that terrorism caused FDI flows to drop $6.1 billion in 2010 – a decline of nearly 30% from the previous year. Equally, around the world, the report highlights that the ten (10) countries most affected by terrorism saw decreased GDP growth rates of between 0.51 and 0.8%.[2] The response to the attacks, has however been costly. Defence and homeland security spending are by far the largest cost of the attack. The human cost, of course, is incalculable.[3]

Taking USA as an example the direct cost of the September 11 attack has been estimated at over $20 billion. Paul Krugman an economist in USA in 2004 cites a property loss estimate by the Comptroller of the City of New York of $21.8 billion, which was about 0.2% of the GDP for a year. Similarly, the *Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development* (OECD) estimated that the attack cost the

[1] http://visionofhumanity.org/#/page/our-gti-findings (12 April 2018).

[2] https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/11/which-countries-have-had-the-most-terrorist-attacks/ (20 April 2018).

[3] http://useconomy.about.com/od/fiscalpolicy/p/2008_defense.htm (20 April 2018).

private sector $14 billion and the federal government $0.7 billion, while clean-up was estimated at $11 billion. Barry/Nedelscu (2004) confirmed that the numbers equalled to about a quarter of 1 percent of the US annual GDP, approximately the same result arrived at by Krugman.

New York's financial markets never opened on September 11, and reopened a week later on September 17. The immediate costs to the market were due to damage to the communications and other transaction processing systems that had been located in the World Trade Centre. Although there were immediate repercussions in world markets, based on the uncertainty caused by the attacks, recovery was relatively swift. Defence and security spending increased by a massive amount in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks (Hodgson 2004).

It is estimated that US alone spends about $500 billion annually – 20 percent of the US federal budget – on departments directly engaged in combating or preventing terrorism, most notably Defence and Homeland Security. The Defence budget increased by one-third, or over $100 billion, from 2001 to 2003 in response to the heightened sense of the threat of terrorism – an increase equivalent to 0.7 percent of US GDP. Expenditures on defence and security are essential for any nation, but of course they also come with an opportunity cost. A higher risk of terrorism, and the need to combat it, simply raises that opportunity cost.

Economists also assess terrorism's impact on global supply chains – the sequence of steps that suppliers of goods take to get products from one area to another. These steps can become extremely costly in terms of time and money when extra layers of security at ports and land borders are added to the process. According to the OECD, higher transportation costs could have an especially negative effect on emerging economies that have benefited from a decrease in costs in the last decade thus on countries' ability to combat poverty.

It does not seem entirely farfetched to imagine that in some instances, barriers meant to safeguard populations from terrorism would actually amplify the risk. For instance, poor countries that might have to slow exports because of the cost of security measures are at a greater risk, more so, if their poverty index is high, experiencing political instability and radicalization among their populations.

In May 2014, the United States, United Kingdom, France and Australia began issuing travel warnings to their citizens in Kenya. This had an immediate impact on Kenya's tourism industry, as foreign visitors departed and hotel establishments were consequently forced to lay off staff. The US also reduced its embassy staff in Nairobi. In June 2014, the UK likewise shut down its Honorary Consulate in Mombasa over security concerns.

Terrorism in Kenya has affected the tourism industry. The tourism industry in Kenya is the third most important sector in the economy, accounting for nearly 12 per cent of GDP. Estimated at one million visitors per year, international tourism contributes 10% of Kenya's exports. The country's vital tourism industry has suffered a severe downturn over the years as a result of the combined effects of El Nino, civil unrest, the bombing of the US Embassy in Nairobi and a negative international image. Hotels were almost collapsing and thousands of Kenyans lost their jobs. The Kenya Tourism Federation stated that the suspension of British



Fig. 7.1 Kenya's FDI and capital inflows as a percent of GDP. *Source* World Bank Staff calculations based on CBK and UNCTAD data

Airways regular and charter planes flying to Nairobi, coupled with travel advisories, closed down access to 90% of Kenya's overseas markets. The country was losing an estimated amount of over one billion Kenya shillings ($128 million) per week. In addition to the revenue loss, at stake were over 500,000 direct jobs and another 2.5 million indirect jobs (Gitu 2003).

FDI inflows dropped off sharply in 2008, coming in at only US$96 million (0.3%), and then increased to US$116 million (0.4%) in 2009 and US$186 million (0.6%) in 2010. These figures compare poorly to neighbouring Tanzania and Uganda, which have both posted higher net FDI inflows in dollar terms than Kenya each year since 2005, with the exception of 2007, despite their smaller economies. In 2010, Tanzania reported US$433 million in net FDI inflows and Uganda reported US$817 million (KPMG 2010). UNCTAD data on the other hand shows that Kenya received US$178.1 million (2010) and US$335 million (2011) in FDI. Relatively Kenya's propensity to attract foreign investment is small compared to its peers. Kenya's FDI account was equivalent to a paltry 0.8 percent of its GDP in 2010–11, compared to Rwanda (1.2 percent of GDP), Tanzania (2.8 percent of GDP), and Uganda (6.2 percent of GDP) in the same period (see Fig. 7.1[4]). However, following the recent peaceful elections, and given the improvements in the governance framework since the new Constitution was adopted in 2010, FDI to Kenya is expected to increase in the future. (World Bank 2013)

Kenyan foreign capital inflows in 2008 totalled Kes 92,253 million compared to Kes 110,480 million recorded in 2007. The 16.5% decline in the inflows may be partly attributable to post-election violence and the negative effects of global economic and financial crisis in 2008. The inflows were mainly in the form of debt instruments and FDIs, which accounted for 51.4% and 26.4% of the total inflows respectively. The findings indicate that, Netherlands, France, India, Japan and United Kingdom are the main sources of foreign private capital inflows.

[4]http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Africa/Kenya/kenya-economic-update-june-2013.pdf.

Information and Communication, Manufacturing and Financial and Insurance sectors were the leading beneficiaries of FDI inflows (KNBS 2013).

Kenya spends more billions annually on security which forms a substantial budgetary allocation towards combating or preventing terrorism. The security wall being constructed is going to cost the country more than $17 billion. Moreover, the closure of Dadaab refugee camp to forestall terrorism is costly and affecting other peace initiatives.

There are significant short term negative stock returns around the terrorist event dates as evidenced by the decline in the *Nairobi Stock Exchange* NSE 20 share index, *abnormal returns* (AR) and the *cumulative abnormal returns* (CAR) around the terrorist event dates (Keitany 2012). Therefore, terrorism has a negative effect on Kenya's stock market which plays a critical role in the national economy since it facilitates fundraising activities, trade, investment, economic growth and development.

In summary beyond the loss of life and personal injuries that the victims of terrorist actions suffer and the atmosphere of fear terrorists seek to create with their premeditated use of brutal violence, terror also has real economic costs (Kollias et al. 2010). Terrorist attacks have negative effects on a number of economic indicators and variables such as investments, FDIs, optimal allocation of capital, tourism, increased economic uncertainty, investors' decisions, foreign exchange and stock markets through decreasing company's expected profit (Ramiah et al. 2010; Chesney et al. 2011; Drakos 2009). Terrorist attacks lead to regulations being imposed by the government. Measures put not only to prevent terrorist events, but also to impose transparency on bank accounts including the lifting of bank confidentiality laws thus affecting confidence in transferring money.

7.5 Government's Peace Strategy: Are Mitigation Measures Adequate for Bringing Peace?

After the 1998 bombing, the internal security docket created the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit which is now made up of 400 officers. However, the docket is far too small to be effective against a growing extremist minority in East Africa. The government has had little economic leeway to deal with the myriad of factors that have contributed to poor internal security and susceptibility to terror attacks on its soil. Compared to countries like Egypt and Israel which receive billions of dollars annually in military assistance from the USA for aligning their foreign policy positions with those of US interests, Kenya receives a paltry amount and the defence force in Somalia seems underfunded with little external support over-stretching the little financial resources.

Kenya through many fora is promoting peace in the Horn of Africa and the continent as whole. Peace in the former guarantees of peace in Kenya. The extremist groups have used some countries in the Horn to advance their violent

causes. *InterGovernmental Authority on Development* IGAD and *Africa Union* AU are regional blocs used by Kenya to promote peace.

Kenyan constitution is progressive with attendant benefits in the areas of governance, resource distribution and the rule of law. Devolution has taken root and is providing a vehicle for equal resource distribution. The equalization fund is meant to fund programmes in marginalized counties to bring them at speed with other more developed counties. Programmes to support the marginalised youths, women and physically challenged have been initiated.

Laws and policies have been formulated to help prevent terrorism and alleviate poverty. Anti-money laundering laws, anti-terrorism legislations and funds to finance the programmes of the marginalized are bearing fruit. Notable are the women and youth funds.

Despite the foregoing, Kenya remains a target of extremism groups. Poverty and unemployment are still rife. High poverty levels may breed criminals and terrorists hence drive humans to engage in acts of desperation, hopelessness and conflict with other people or regions. As such, Kenya needs to implement a good governance strategy which includes the reduction of fraud, inefficiencies, inequities and right to a dignified life. If the mass are sure about their rights and privileges, there will be a change of mind-set, thus, positive attitude. The government must ensure the rule of law is observed at all times so that no citizen is denied of their rights and discriminated upon.

Kenya foreign policy strategists must calculate the political, economic and security costs of certain policy positions especially given the religious and cultural heterogeneity of the country. The final foreign policy decisions must be in line with the most favourable long-term interests of the country.

A crisis and disaster management policy is wanting. In case of an attack, Kenya is normally caught unawares precipitating more casualties. It would be important for the country to develop a permanent crisis and disaster management policy to serve as a guideline for managing the aftermath of terrorism. Its prime objective would be to provide a roadmap to follow in a time of confusion resulting from a terrorist attack and facilitate the recovery of tourism from the negative occurrences, thus rebuild Kenya's image. Secondly, a crisis management task force needs to be set up. This task force should consist of committees or departments that should be headed by dedicated locals. Whenever possible, the heads of each department should be professionals with expertise in the respective disciplines infrastructure maintenance, human resources and government assistance (Israeli/Reichel 2003).

Corruption which drives terrorism has become endemic in Kenya. It's now a national disaster. Six months hardly pass without a major financial scandal in Kenya. The police force have been ranked amongst the most corrupt in the region and globe.

There are however concerted efforts to strengthen security with good equipment, pay and hire more. The Kenya-Somalia security wall being constructed is meant to deter terrorism. However, there still remains a serious challenge as the motivation of security personnel is low with few numbers in relation to the population which is below the UN standards and practice. Despite legislation passed in 2011 to overhaul

the police force, intelligence and defence forces in Kenya, not much progress has been made. Anti-terror police units in Nairobi have a budget that is lower per month for operations, and police officers are not remunerated well and working conditions unbearable.

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Chapter 8
Assessing Defence Reform Since 1990

Colin Robinson

Abstract *Defence reform* (DR) was one of the most important original components of *security sector reform* (SSR). It has innate contractions: between fundamental Western assumptions (such as the liberal peace project) and local values and the tension between major-power national strategic interests and local aims. From 1990, DR programmes have frequently focused on effectiveness, not accountability, based on Western major power interests. But DR processes are difficult and involve significant political challenges therefore quick results are virtually impossible. Taking the long view is important. Ahead, the best results for accountability, effectiveness and sustainability are likely to be via abandoning attempts to intervene for national strategic interests, and only initiating programmes slowly in short steps, when interveners' and recipients' values are already closely aligned.

Keywords Defence reform · Security sector reform · Development
Organisational effectiveness · Democratisation

8.1 Introduction

Defence reform (DR) involves making defence institutions more effective and accountable. Little has been done to comprehensively catalogue and assess DR efforts since the world affairs began to shake off the ashes of the Cold War. It is frequently associated with *security sector reform* (SSR). SSR itself, evolving from ground-breaking theorising in 1997–98, is usually seen as efforts to try and build effective and accountable security actors and institutions (ISSAT 2011: 6).

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The then UK International Development Secretary, Clare Short, launched the term "security sector reform" in a speech of 13 May 1998.[1] The principles and practices of the developed world formed the conceptual starting point for both SSR and DR. To make DR programmes part of SSR, they have to aim to enhance both accountability and effectiveness. This vastly reduces the number of programmes that can be considered as SSR. Without thorough democratic accountability, defence assistance programmes continually run the risk of only training better oppressors.

This chapter will survey DR since 1990, first tackling reforms that do not accord with SSR's goals of effectiveness and accountability, looking at post-authoritarian, developing, in conflict and post-conflict states.

DR shows evidence of two major internal contradictions. Firstly, the whole of SSR is part and parcel of the wider liberal peace agenda. The liberal peace underpinning is supremely important, so much so that in many discussions it is internalised and accepted virtually without thought (Sedra 2017: 20–51). The liberal peace can be understood as comprising democratisation, the rule of law, human rights, free and globalized markets and neo-liberal development (Richmond 2006: 292). It "…looks as if it is trying to remake [developing states] in the donors' own images and according to their models of development." (Whitfield 2008). These fundamentally different ideas often conflict with the values of the peoples in the places where DR is attempted (Hills 2000: 55).

The challenge for both SSR and DR is that after nearly thirty years of sustained effort since 1990, the ambitious ideas of the liberal peace seem virtually impossible to implement. From Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, state-building efforts have fallen short, with insufficient resources, political will, and staying power to overcome the resistance of locals. SSR itself faces an existential crisis. In its orthodox form, it is largely impossible, because it is so alien to the countries in which it is tried.

Second, armed forces are the ultimate instrument of the national strategic interest. Their use by major aid donor countries to build partners' capability creates major local ownership challenges. Promoting local ownership – shaping and driving efforts by indigenous instead of outside actors – is a central challenge for SSR. Much of DR is motivated by outsiders' national strategic interests, which reduces meaningful local ownership. For example, DR in Afghanistan and Iraq was motivated by US "war on terror" concerns. This outside interest tends to devalue SSR, instead prioritizing other goals. Programmes frequently have their direction determined by the security problems pressing upon national elites. But elite consensus may not lead to the broad-based ownership required to assure sustainability.

In Narten's words, "legitimate representatives of the local society" need to have control of programmes (Narten 2009: 254). Without transfer to such legitimate

[1]Clare Short, "Security, development, and conflict prevention", speech at Royal College for Defence Studies, London, 13 May 1998. The Center for International Policy and Saferworld together coined the term before the speech. Saferworld hosted a seminar, "Security Sector Reform in Developing Countries", the same month, and were heavily involved in developing the overall SSR concept.

representatives, any new elites coming into power may halt SSR or DR programmes which do not accord with their political views. Thus building broad-based, legitimate local ownership is critical to making sure programmes are not halted, with their effort wasted. Both SSR and DR, to remain viable policy alternatives, need to be re-orientated much more away from impossible liberal peace aspirations, towards locals' wishes.

The post-authoritarian and developing states are the two environments where 'stable' DR is seen. Stability and sustainability are more likely here because politics is less fluid. Thereafter conflict and post-conflict states are examined. The conflict and post-conflict states are where 'stabilization' DR occurs. Here change and forced *ad hoc* responses to events can be frequent.

8.2 Post-authoritarian States

DR in the post-authoritarian states of Eastern Europe was the first and closest to democratic societies' practice. Because the *North Atlantic Treaty Organisation* NATO and the *European Union* EU made adherence to democratic civil–military relations a condition for membership (Hendrickson/Karkoszka 2002: 185), NATO had considerable leverage to force at least some level of DR before candidate accession (Hänggi 2004: 7). But recent research indicates that progress may be limited, hampered significantly by the retention of communist-era military mind sets (Durrell-Young 2016).

Civilian control in Eastern European communist states was a matter of loyalty to the Communist Party, not to the state. The Communist Party was the country's supreme political authority. To ensure compliance with party policy, Eastern European communist governments established extensive control and indoctrination networks within the armed forces (Kramer 1984/85: 46). This starting situation is relevant because it shows the mentality of the armed forces' civilian control under the Soviet system. A qualitative change of mind-set was required to reorient the defence sector towards democratic practices.

DR's starting point thus became Eastern European defence establishments in the early 1990s. Few civilians had been involved in military affairs. In Hungary (Yaniszewski 2002: 389), the Czech Republic (Ulrich 2002: 409, 414–5) and Slovakia general staffs resisted 1990s' reforms, protesting the military's declining power compared to stronger, revitalized *Ministries of Defence* MODs that included more civilians. During the 1990s the slow pace of civilian expertise development was a recurring theme of academic comment on post-communist civil–military relations. To move beyond the military-dominated operational and policy advice of the communist era, Western specialists saw that a cadre of civilian experts was important (Jones/Mychajlyszyn 2002: 378).

Reorientation of Eastern European defence forces in the 1990s was traumatic. There was no longer any need to maintain large mechanized armies designed to form part of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Many long-serving personnel

were ill prepared to remain under the new conditions. Reorientation to a new era brought "catastrophic declines in funding, massive force reductions […] flight of younger officers from service, plummeting morale" and recruiting problems (Jones/Mychajlyszyn 2002: 378). Forces were reduced by hundreds of thousands. Resentment from the officers tossed aside, as well as from the bureaucracy, did not speed reforms.

Recent research however questions whether significant progress towards NATO standards has actually occurred across Eastern Europe. Former Communist bloc armed forces, only haltingly progressed from the rigid ideological framework that defined them for half a century, continue to exhibit highly centralised decision-making, an absence of critical thinking, the belief in a sole, mathematically derived, 'solution' to a planning problem, inadequate defence planning, and actions only allowed if they are specifically sanctioned in law (Durrell-Young 2016: 4–6). Thus even in the most favourable environment for DR, total transformation has been an elusive goal. While NATO and the EU were able to exert significant leverage, and surface change occurred (Durrell-Young 2016: 9) deeper change was much more difficult.

Many years later, the dilapidated state of the Ukrainian defence forces became clear during the Crimean crisis of 2014. For twenty plus years, inadequately coordinated Ukrainian attempts to reform forces inherited from the Soviet period fell short. Funding dropped precipitously and forces were allowed to atrophy (Gorenburg 2014). There was little attempt at rearmament to replace ageing Soviet equipment, little to no interservice coordination, and the partial transition from conscript to professional service undermined the unified military culture by promoting regional identities. In response to the separatist crisis in the east, Ukraine re-established the National Guard, part of the Interior Ministry. The variety of volunteer militias the National Guard began to include increasingly informalised the new force.

Ukraine's painful experience emphasizes the role of outside pressure in sustaining DR and the local ownership dilemmas involved. Without the continued pressure of NATO membership requirements, thorough going reforms had less chance to start properly or gain pace. The political transformations that gave reform so much momentum in Eastern Europe were continually contested by defence forces. When these transformations achieved significant levels of democratic governance, the accountability built by those changes made DR much more sustainable. This result is backed by recent RAND[2] Corporation research (Paul et al. 2013) which looked at a wide range of US security cooperation partners since the end of the Cold War. Stability and the expectation of significant levels of sustainable results place the Central and Eastern European states firmly in the 'stable' DR category.

[2]A non-profit organization formed on 14 May 1948 immediately after World War II to connect military planning with research and development decisions. Its goal aimed at furthering and promoting scientific, educational, and charitable purposes for the public welfare and security of the United States https://www.rand.org/about/history.html.

8.3 Developing States

To consider DR properly in developing states, it is important to put the process in historical context. Many of them gained independence after the Second World War, primarily in the 1960s. Compared to the longest-established democratic societies, developing states had far less resources. Personalized, interconnected networks of commerce, politics, ethnicity and mutual interest owned much of the resources that had been under state control in Europe. Their democracies were fragile, and defence forces were often some of the state's strongest groups.

In the developing world the state's arm was shorter. Due to relatively smaller resources, socio-cultural differences and other factors, the state's monopoly on violence was uneven. Here the state's security agencies were often minority players in a maze of politicized security and vulnerability. Non-state actors had much greater power. DR has arguably never fully appreciated the magnitude of the difference between the global North and the arenas of the global South into which it was quickly drawn.

8.3.1 Africa

Much of the reason for the lack of reform in Africa is the continued preoccupation with state survival and political stability (Wilson/Forrest 2011: 164–5). Beyond a certain point, African authoritarianism makes reform severely problematic, if not impossible. These existential imperatives greatly reduce the political space available for reform (or, more acceptably, 'transformation') in Africa.

Scoping research for this section examined nearly every state on the continent, yet only three states have made (uneven) attempts at achieving accountability. That only three of 54 African states have done so is symptomatic of lack of interest in and opportunity for DR in countries preoccupied with regime survival.

Firstly there are states that are democracies that have made significant reforms to improve governance over security forces. South Africa is arguably a case of near-comprehensive SSR, and is examined separately. In this category we also have Ghana and Kenya. In Ghana, the defence force has effectively withdrawn from politics. But further extension of civilian control and reforms has been "uneven and low-key" and "seems to receive uncertain high-level political support" (Hutchful 2008: 124). The insertion of a civilian UK adviser for a short period in 2008 had only a temporary effect, as there was no political will to begin structural change (Cleary 2011: 65). In Kenya, programmes appear to be focused on effectiveness. In both countries, little accountability improvement appears to have been sustained.

Secondly, there are developmental states with professional but non-accountable forces. Many such states had been governed for long periods under dominant party systems, such as Botswana (Luckham/Hutchful 2010: 40). The army's "features [there] are more reminiscent of the professional armies of the developed West than

those of the developing world" (Henk 2007: 82). Recently declassified 1980s US documents may help explain this sustained climb to capability. They showed some forty Indian advisers who are "incorporated into normal operations occupying key maintenance and training positions" (DIA 1985). In addition, it appears British Special Forces trained the force from the mid-1980s (Connor 1998: 407–409). These two sources emphasize the role of outside personnel for Botswana, and with this, Botswana can now be seen as analogous to Oman. Both states were relatively authoritarian, but both developed quite capable armed forces through significant outside assistance. Namibia, Tanzania and formerly Senegal are the other states in this second category. However, their relative and uneven professionalism is limited to a lack of an overt role in politics (Luckham/Hutchful 2010: 40).

A third category of states are made up of post-liberation states with defence forces built upon former guerrilla movements. Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda and Namibia are the clearest examples. These countries represent the very thin end of the democratizing wedge, where authoritarian governments dominate the political space. The opportunity for meaningful DR in these countries is limited and debatable. But the limited foreign involvement in reforms has meant that programmes have almost always been locally owned, with the exception of Namibia's initial rebuilding in the early 1990s.

Ethiopia and Uganda exemplify the limited sustainability of foreign-inspired reforms, even when designed in close cooperation with the recipient partner. After the end of the 30-year Ethiopian civil war in 1991, much reorganization was necessary. A large DDR programme was put in place. Retention of Dergeera personnel in the armed forces and a somewhat badly perceived campaign against Eritrea, kept potential foreign aid at arm's length for a time.[3] Attitudes in both Ethiopia and the West changed after 2002, and Ethiopia took steps towards reform. Limited UK and US aid was offered. The Ethiopian government deliberately sought additional assistance from other African countries and India. Foreign support for change was strong, but the chief of defence staff, General Samora Yenus, was determined to keep the Ethiopian armed forces indigenous. Samora was quoted in 2009 as saying that his government has been accused of arrogance "for not blindly taking what is on offer". He told UK scholar-practitioners that he would rather be arrogant than foolish (Cleary 2011: 52). Eventually Ethiopians did almost all DR themselves (ISSAT 2010: 5).

Defence reforms in Uganda began as a response to an IMF-imposed cap on defence spending in 1999–2000. President Museveni approached British UK International Development Secretary Claire Short to see if donors would lift the cap. The British government agreed to lobby donors, on the condition that Uganda began a defence review process to justify any spending increase (Williams 2005: 241). Uganda was particularly interested in how a review would address its immediate security challenge – the Lord's Resistance Army insurgency (Hendrickson 2007: 30–31). The donors' key issue was budgetary. Six major

[3]Personal conversation with former British Army officer, 15 August 2013.

donors had recently begun to fund the Ugandan budget directly, and did not want significant funding diverted from poverty alleviation. Increased transparency, accountability and efficiency of the use of Ugandan resources might alleviate pressure to raise the defence budget. Thus a defence review process was initiated, and carried out between February 2002 and June 2004 (Hendrickson 2007: 10).

The proposed defence spending for 2004–2005 was significantly higher than in 2003–2004. The government's priority was security. It believed a higher defence budget was necessary regardless of affordability. Donors wished to balance defence spending with poverty reduction. Donors became concerned that the government's defence spending did not reflect the efficiency emphasized by the review, and were worried that defence spending would primarily flow to measures designed to enhance UPDF[4] operational capability (Hendrickson 2007: 67). Donors wanted to see the government making substantive financial management improvements, rather than just buying equipment.

The deployment to Somalia in 2007 slowed progress. By acceding to US and UK pressure to contribute there, Uganda reduced the leverage available to donors. Operational experience in Somalia acted as a catalyst, inducing further professionalization of the force.

Following the review, some changes did occur, including the reorganization of the MOD and army command to create an integrated structure, implementation of a new defence corporate planning process and some work on procurement processes.[5] Since 2008, defence budgets have continued to rise. In 2013 well-placed observers estimated that the UPDF logistics budget was US$25 million while the training budget was US$5 million.

Uganda represents perhaps the most intrusive case of DR undertaken in a non-post-conflict state. It was forced by donors who were contributing up to 50 percent of the state's budget – giving them, in some ways, access equivalent to those supporting post-conflict states. In 2016 the results appeared meagre. The review's transparency and accountability priorities were simply too much and too soon for the current Ugandan government. The review did introduce the concept of defence reform – but reforms must be embedded into recipient partner governments in a locally acceptable fashion.

First-category countries that have actually initiated meaningful DR can be counted. The defence accountability agenda is very novel for African states that are much younger than its Western originators. Time elapsed towards democratization is significant. Up to 350 years elapsed between the dawn of legislative challenge to executive authority in the UK and the formation of an integrated MOD. Meanwhile the average figure for an African state which achieved independence in the 1960s is about 65 years. Defence accountability is fundamentally inimical to most African states, as it would threaten their leaders' hold on power. For the few states that are

[4]Uganda People's Defence Forces.

[5]In 2008 Mutengesa and Hendrickson wrote that implementation of the review's findings seemed unlikely.

democratizing, promotion of an internal dialogue on defence issues is the best way forward. This would build civilian knowledge and consensus over what role defence should play, to lay groundwork for the future.

8.3.2 Asia and the Pacific

Beyond Africa, donors have much less influence to import concepts of democratizing DR (Hendrickson/Karkoszka 2002: 190). States can be divided into four groups: (1) nearly full democracies, (2) where DR has good prospects, (3) those that have poor prospects (including two countries that straddle the developing and post-conflict categories) and, (4) stubborn examples of defence forces retaining their role in politics.

At the top of the Economist Intelligence Unit's list of "flawed democracies" are Taiwan, Israel and India. Reforms necessary in these states may be more in the nature of adjustments, compared to constant defence accountability crises elsewhere. Two of these states face near-existential threats to their existence, which constrains defence debate in a similar way constant crises do in conflict and post-conflict countries. The People's Republic of China is adamantly opposed to Taiwanese independence, and Israel remains mired in conflict with Palestinian factions, as well as opposing Arab powers further afield. In India needed reforms are hindered by parliamentary and civilian–bureaucrat knowledge deficiencies (which also occur in Africa). This is part of the reason why the three security services have almost undivided control over their internal affairs, with "very little civilian or political oversight" (Mukherjee 2011: 32). The armed forces' failure to "reform, restructure or to revise doctrine" has become increasingly obvious in the past few years (Economist 2018).

The second group, where some progress has been made, includes Indonesia and Philippines. The conditions may be coming into place for future meaningful reforms. The fall of Suharto's regime in Indonesia initially led to several years of significant reforms. Changes were possible all across public life. After 2006 further progress has proven difficult to make. The military has been convinced of its political role for decades (as the Turkish armed forces were) (Beeson/Bellamy 2008: 6). There might be little to replace the military if it did try to withdraw (Beeson/Bellamy 2008: 7). With its deep inroads into the economy and the influence of the regional commands, there seems little likelihood of the defence force withdrawing to solely military duties. Such a change would represent a profound break with over sixty years of Indonesian history. If one considers a purely Indonesian frame of reference, great steps have been made, but compared to the liberal peace ideal, progress falls well short. The Philippine armed forces have historically defended their entrenched interests. Up until 2008 a series of civilian governments proved "corrupt, incompetent or simply lacking in the authority and capacity to implement meaningful reform" (Beeson/Bellamy 2008: 175). In 2010 a new president was installed and reform momentum is gathering. The political and

public context for reform is much improved, even if little is yet to be substantively achieved (see Cruz 2013: 108–133).

In the third group, Malaysia, Singapore, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, DR has poor prospects. Like the second group in Africa, a number of these defence forces (Malaysia and Singapore) are professional and capable, but there are serious questions about their accountability mechanisms. Singapore's hybrid democracy retains troubling authoritarian facets. In Sri Lanka, militarization of wider society has increased since the civil war ended in 2009 (Economist, 23 March 2013). In 2013 Bangladesh was described as still not having institutionalized civilian control over its armed forces (Wolf 2013: 4).

Straddling the developing and post-conflict categories are *Papua New Guinea* 'PNG' and Timor Leste, where DR has been heavily influenced by external actors, notably Australia. Significant external assistance has been provided to PNG in recent years, including 38 Australian trainers, plus a New Zealand-provided deputy chief of staff (IISS 2013; NZDF 2012). External advice aided the 2002–2007 reduction in military force size. Australia has been extensively involved in the country for over a century, yet PNG politicians and senior officers have always retained the final say.

At the bottom comes Thailand and Pakistan, where defence forces have major stakes in government and are resisting the imposition of civilian control. The imminent issue is civil–military relations. Reforms in Thailand have been limited. Continuing questions include "the informal methods used by the army to influence political processes after its formal exclusion from politics" and its ongoing involvement in the economy (Beeson/Bellamy 2008: 12). These processes maintain military influence even when the military is not actually running the country's government. In Pakistan, the defence force still wields enormous influence and there is no political space for a DR debate.

Only a comparatively small group of the countries discussed above are beginning to grapple with DR. Most do not have enough democratic space to create DR entry points. The vast majority of countries in Asia remain authoritarian. What is apparent is that achievements are relatively in line with the very small amount of time that has yet seen concentrated attention on the issue. Donors have far less influence, but when it comes DR might be much more sustainable.

8.3.3 Latin America

In most South American states, governments have primarily driven DR priorities by themselves, without donor pressures, producing a variety of unconnected defence-sector-only initiatives. The SSR discourse is not dominant (Scheye 2010: 3).

Comprehensive and integrated reform of civil and security institutions has not taken hold.[6] Instead, accountability improvements have frequently been driven by civil–military relations concerns, often over past military government abuses. Effectiveness improvements have been initiated depending on a state's particular domestic debate and threat perceptions. They have been dominated by domestic political actors and have been separate, generally disconnected from each other, with most viewed through different conceptual lenses.

Latin American DR can be divided into three groups. The first is where, in the words of Pion-Berlin, "overall civil-military relations have immeasurably improved in recent years", and where most states have civilianized defence staffs and defence organizational structures that maximize civilian control (Pion-Berlin 2009: 583). These states include Chile, Brazil and Argentina. Clearly in a favourable position is Uruguay, which is the only Latin American state among the 25 full democracies listed by the *Economist Intelligence Unit* 'EIU' in 2012.

The second category is those states where democratic institutions are reasonably healthy and civilians have significant influence over defence forces. These states sit in the middle of the "flawed democracies" category used by the EIU. Heading this list is Peru, which has had a civilian defence minister since 2006. Since the democratic transition began in Guatemala there have been significant moves to increase civilian control (de Leon 2006: 63–108).The category also includes the Dominican Republic and El Salvador. These last three states have seen civilian defence ministers much less. The third category includes states which still are vulnerable to military intervention, such as Honduras, Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay. For example, Ecuador's defence force became involved in presidential changes in 2000 and 2005 (Pion-Berlin 2009: 570).

Little progress has been made in Latin America. The continent is still struggling with authoritarianism and the aftermath of military rule. As yet there has been little opportunity to move beyond excluding the military from politics, except in a handful of countries such as those mentioned in the first group above. DR in Columbia has been effectively restricted to modernisation (Grabendorff 2009: 70). Many other states, such as Venezuela and Cuba, remain authoritarian, without adequate political space to begin any real security reforms. Defence forces first need to be effectively removed from politics. Only then can all the other DR areas – from national security councils to parliaments – be properly reinvigorated, to supervise and begin the process of creating democratic accountability.

Common themes can be drawn from the state of DR in developing countries worldwide. They are stable enough to expect some level of reform sustainability should politics make it possible. They join the post-authoritarian states in the 'stable' defence reform category. The meagre absolute progress made is visible in the small number of states that seem to be open to it – perhaps ten or so across Africa, Asia and Latin America. Regime rather than state defence remains the

[6]According to Dammert, the term SSR is hardly used, while references to civil–military relations are constant, either explicitly or implicitly.

priority in Africa and Asia. Regarding civilian involvement, the timidity of parliaments coupled with a widespread lack of civilian knowledge of defence (extending to disinterest in some cases) means there is currently little to build upon. Defence issues have, in the main, remained an executive *pré carré*. This has led often to defence effectiveness being the focus of what cooperation there has been (for example in Kenya). While such "train-and-equip" programmes may not leave any sustainable impact, they are easier to initiate than more intrusive defence accountability projects.

8.4 Conflict and Post-conflict States

Today the countries that dominate DR are the conflict and post-conflict states, especially since the 2001 terrorist attacks that sparked the "war on terror". Due to the heavy international influence on the political processes of these states, including financial assistance and often large military intervention forces, major donors have greater leverage here than in either of the other two categories of states. While international involvement may have led to elections being held, other aspects of democracy are often very weak.

Conflict and post-conflict countries are generally agreed as having the most accessible reform entry points. Donors have enormous influence. However, even here, entrenched local elites frustrate outsiders' initiatives. This has been the case in countries like Afghanistan, where the United States has exerted enormous efforts. Faced with powerful demands that institutions be reformed in accordance with Western standards, reform efforts there were superficial, as in the Afghan Army "patron-client networks, structured into competing factions, can [still] be traced down to the lowest levels" (Munch 2015: 6). Other examples of entrenched elites defying efforts to change the character of defence forces can be found in the DRC, Sierra Leone and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Pressure for change has often been dissipated amid the multiple dilemmas that frustrate state-building.

8.4.1 Modes of Post-conflict Defence Reform

The three modes of DR most often seen in states experiencing conflicts are military mergers between previously warring factions, the institutionalization of a single liberating faction and the creation of an entirely new defence force. Each has different implications for defence accountability.

One of the earliest recognizable cases of post-conflict defence reconstruction started after the Addis Ababa peace agreement that ended the Sudanese civil war in 1972 (LeRiche 2014: 38–41). The agreement included the incorporation of the former Anyanya rebels into the Sudanese Army. Since then most post-conflict defence reconstruction has involved such "military mergers". This approach brings

a majority of the demobilizing groups into the new armed forces, and then attempts to professionalize them. "Military merger" is politically attractive, is a confidence-building measure, and effectively extends time available for the DDR process.[7] After Sudan the technique was used in Zimbabwe from 1980 and in Namibia, South Africa and Mozambique during the 1990s. From mid-1990s similar "military mergers" began to take place in Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sierra Leone and Burundi. Côte d'Ivoire also followed this pattern. From 2002 to 2003 three far less successful programmes also began.

Definitively is institutionalizing liberating forces, which has taken place in Timor Leste and Kosovo. However, these two states show especially worrying accountability issues with ambiguous links between the new defence forces and political actors.

Since 1972 the critical importance of a peace accord has been reaffirmed time and again. The extent to which the liberal peace agenda intrudes on the gritty realities of survival in a post-conflict environment varies. Peace accords may have to paper over the cracks in a state bitterly divided (Sudan in 2005, Bosnia-Herzegovina, South Sudan) or with indifferent loyalties from its citizens (Afghanistan). Incentivizing soldiers to fight by tying them to a greater whole is very important. Napoleon's conviction that "the moral to the physical is three to one" is one of many ways this has been expressed through history. But if the state itself is splintered, this can be very difficult.

In Zimbabwe, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sierra Leone and Burundi the defence forces initially created were unsustainably large. There were many, primarily political, factors preventing their proper reorientation to sizes more suited for current defence needs. One of the most important is the concern with future political stability, which thwarts concerns about accountability or effectiveness where major donors are significantly involved. Some armies, however, have been deliberately too small (Liberia), while in other cases a temporary disciplined service (South Sudan, Kosovo) has been created as an interim solution.

The "de novo" approach demobilizes all existing armed groupings and starts again from square one with a new state army. All prospective soldiers have to meet high entry standards. The resulting force is well positioned to be of reasonable quality. This policy has been applied in Afghanistan, Iraq and Liberia (though via contractors in the last case). The fighters left out of the process constitute an ongoing security threat and the efforts were influenced more by US national security interests than defence accountability. Any emphasis on accountability was "superseded by a singular focus on training and equipping defence forces" (Sedra 2006: 95). In both Afghanistan and Iraq the emphasis has been on raising and training soldiers to put units into the field. Attention to the ministry level, rather than the army itself, seems to have been decidedly secondary. The same factors were at work in the DRC.

[7]Discussion with Dennis Blease, 20 February 2009.

Isolation of DR from wider SSR is particularly evident in "de novo" cases. The isolation of army reforms from other SSR activities in Liberia was the result of several converging factors. First, the US assessments of rebuilding needs were solely focused on the armed forces, and other security institutions were not included.[8] Partially as a result of these factors, no thorough defence review process took place before the shape of the force was agreed upon. Initially DynCorp was contracted only to give basic training to 2,000 personnel and planning for what would happen afterwards was not fully fleshed out. There was no ability for the later *National Security Strategy* NSS process to alter the DynCorp programme, which was dictated by the terms of the contract. Similar challenges were evident in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The intensive vetting programme that DynCorp ran in Liberia showed the potential of thorough vetting to exclude trainees who might have been guilty of war crimes. Despite the extensive effort it absorbed, the programme was much lauded (ICG 2009). However, Liberia was creating a very small army. Opportunities to invest a large amount of resources into so few soldiers are uncommon, as the DynCorp programme in Liberia was disproportionally well funded. When armies of tens or even hundreds of thousands are being refashioned, it is much more difficult to vet every soldier. Political pressures to accept entrants from favoured ethnic groups often also impinge.

Seemingly the only way to maintain some competence amid countries in chaos is to provide significant support on the ground, such as in the 1970s and 1980s in Zaire.[9] This usually only provides a temporary capability, but in some cases this capability may be deemed worth the investment it requires: witness the US willingness to recommit advisers again to Iraq in late 2014 (Stewart and Alexander, 30 October 2014). The Iraqi Army showed a range of significant weaknesses despite the enormous US assistance effort from 2004 onwards. Senior US military personnel must be well aware of the limitations of the training their soldiers have attempted to provide. Surely they appreciate that a long-term improvement in effectiveness is very difficult to achieve. Some experts argue that to build effective defence forces in Arab societies, a political transformation is required (Kandil 2012: 191–2, 232). It seems very likely that US officials are willing to accept a short-term, immediate effect. The force they advise may be maintained at some level of adequate capability, and this may be enough. The political trade-offs surrounding assistance programmes also often constrain advisers' abilities to produce medium-

[8]E-mail from US participant, 12 June 2008.

[9]Following the severe Zairean weaknesses made plain by the two Shaba conflicts of 1977 and 1978, Belgium and France each began to sponsor an individual combat brigade. (Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State (Madison, WI: Wisconsin University Press, 1985, p. 268).) They were provided with advisers, and were islands of relative professional competence while the remainder of the armed forces was in a state of advanced collapse. These units were capable, to a degree, of being able to conduct operations. But as the advisers were withdrawn in the late 1980s, the brigades' potential disappeared. Contact with former NCO with USDAO Kinshasa, e-mail correspondence, 8 April 2010.

and long-term effects. US fiscal resources have been sufficient, historically, to maintain advisers in a variety of forms all around the world for decades. When advisers are constantly addressing any regression in capability, it may not matter that deeper cultural change can be nigh-impossible. Constant effort delivers the required results. This provides one possible answer as to why US military advisory efforts continue despite sometimes very poor effects: because they produce short-term results.

Thus DR efforts persist in states in conflict even in the absence of clear success, for at least three main reasons. First, it eases the burden on major powers' own military forces. Where military threats are addressed by partner states through DR, major powers' own forces are less committed.[10] Second is the preparatory value to major-power defence forces of military–military engagement. The corporate–institutional interests of defence forces benefit from contact with other forces. Third, especially for the United States a short-term, immediate effect may be worth the investment. Other factors include overoptimistic thinking and the "CNN effect" – the belief that "something must be done".[11] These factors together remind one strongly of the Cold War imperatives for defence assistance. Before 1989 defence assistance was often aimed at gaining the allegiance of strategically located states. It served a primarily political, rather than military, purpose. The world has changed significantly since 1989. In 2016 continuities are more important than any change. Governments, defence ministries and defence forces continue to use their military resources to achieve political aims, without necessarily engaging in combat.

8.5 Experiences with DR as Part of Broader SSR Programmes

Sustainable defence reforms, focused on governance, remain rare exceptions (Ball 2014: 17–19). This contrasts with the continuing large number of security assistance initiatives that have been launched, shaped by major-power national strategic interests.

This situation makes it even more important to identify and explore best practices for improved governance of the security sector. Two country experiences stand out as the nearest that has so far been achieved comprehensive SSR (Williams 2005: 233). South Africa and Sierra Leone both saw a major crisis, in the form of the South African transition to democracy and the British intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000. Only the extent of those crises made possible the very invasive interventions that transformed virtually all security institutions in both states. There was foreign support, including significant funding in the Sierra Leone case and deployment of foreign advisers in South Africa, enough of a domestic political

[10]I am grateful to Nicole Ball for emphasising this point. E-mail, 28 November 2015.

[11]E-mail from New Zealand scholar–practitioner, 19 December 2015.

consensus to make change possible over a lengthy period, bureaucratic infrastructure and significant resources. Such opportunities are uncommon. In 2009 a programme which aims at some comprehensiveness began in Burundi. The slower-paced Burundi programme, which explicitly addresses the political aspects of change, appears to foreshadow better future opportunities.

In South Africa DR meant the integration of other forces into the apartheid South African Defence Force (SADF), and later change within the MOD, where the drafting of the 1996 defence white paper also involved wide consultation with parliament and civil society (Nathan 2007: 96–98). The defence white paper later led to much wider-ranging changes.

From 1994 the SADF began to incorporate six other forces: former black guerrilla fighters and the 'homeland' armed forces (IISS 1995: 1–2). This process melded very disparate elements into what has not been an easy partnership. Many of the rank and file of the other six forces were effectively absorbed into the structures of the old SADF (IISS 1995: 122). The former apartheid leadership continued to dominate. This domination only declined after non-SADF officers started returning from training courses and the white paper process began to show effects.

Throughout the reform process there was a strong commitment to consultation within and beyond the government, including civil society (IISS 1995: 123, 94–97). Submissions on the defence white paper were invited and received from a wide variety of people, from military officers to environmental groups and human rights organizations. As a result of the transformative nature of the white paper, a thorough defence review was required and was launched in June 1996. Owing to the positive comment that the consultative nature of the white paper had attracted, workshops and other consultative arrangements were included in the review process (Nathan 2007: 97–98). Contested disputes were resolved through discussion and, where necessary, reference to international expert opinion (Bryden 2007: 22).

The political success in South Africa led to a decline in defence effectiveness. Political reorientation had significant negative effects during the transition. Since 1994 many competent white personnel have left, due to the affirmative action imperatives now operating within the force (Heitman 2010). The field organization of the army was changed with the creation of 'type' formations, to impede any Afrikaner coup. In doing so combat effectiveness was reduced (Baker 2007). Growing problems with finance, morale and discipline hampered retention of capability (especially in small, skilled units) (Wessels 2010: 6). At a more fundamental level, the disdain for black education shown for decades by the apartheid government had serious effects. The declining quality of South African education is affecting force quality, which will have knock-on effects on training and education as new recruits enter the force (Economist 2012; South African confidential source). There have been repeated public reports of crisis (e.g. Townsend 2010; Heitman 2007). A second defence review process developed episodically from 2007. The results, approved in 2014, promised reorganization to address some of the problems left from the previous review, and significant new funding.

In the long term these effectiveness issues are less important than recently rising questions of accountability, applicable to South African governance as a whole. Reforms left defence oversight, especially parliamentary oversight, very weak in comparison to the executive (Nathan 2007: 98). More widely, the *African National Congress* (ANC) still maintains a firm grip on power. The ANC has begun to show recurring similarities with the average new African state of the 1960s, vulnerable to mismanagement. From 2012 ANC corruption and a controversial secrecy law have underscored the risk to democracy posed by corruption and government mismanagement (Economist 2015).

The South African reforms were primarily driven by insiders. The first test case of a comprehensive internationally driven programme to reform the security sector was Sierra Leone. The Sierra Leonean process commenced in the late 1990s, and had a major effect on how SSR itself was conceptualized (Hendrickson/Karkoszka 2002: 198–199). The UK began its intervention in 2000 in an unexpected and unplanned manner, amid ineffective state institutions that were in near-total collapse (Albrecht/Jackson 2014: 95). The armed forces especially were seen as a potential continuing source of instability (Albrecht 2009: 2). This was a major reason why initial activities aimed to strengthen the defence ministry, increase the number of civilians within it, and begin the formulation of a new national security policy.

From 1999 onwards a series of independent military, police and central national security programmes were put in place. But until early 2005 there was no coordinating strategy to link the various parts of the security sector together (Albrecht/Jackson 2009: 118–121). A security sector review began in August 2003, in consultations with civil society who played a prominent role. By 2005 the review was providing input to the formulation of Sierra Leone's poverty reduction strategy paper. From 2005 implementation began, but high-level interest in the newly established national security architecture started to wane (Albrecht/Jackson 2009: 127–130). The effectiveness of the coordinating *Office of National Security* (ONS) led to it developing into a "*de facto* Cabinet Office", encroaching on other departments' proper spheres.[12] In the absence of effective ministerial and parliamentary oversight at that time, this made the ONS potentially vulnerable to political misuse (Albrecht/Jackson 2009: 158–162).

While the process from 2007 was well coordinated institutionally, it may not have had equal levels of ministerial and parliamentary oversight. The system that had been created was seen as competent. By 2006 there was minimal parliamentary oversight because MPs assumed that "the British were looking after security" (Albrecht/Jackson 2014: 96). Oversight would have been possible if it was seen as necessary, but security was viewed as having been 'fixed' already (Albrecht/Jackson 2009: 127–128). More importantly, the Sierra Leonean army appears financially unsustainable. Most observers agree that it is too large (Söderberg Kovacs 2014: 205–206). Circa 2012–2014 the country was heavily dependent upon donors for ongoing budget support, equipment and vehicles, across many

[12]It was significantly dependent upon the person of National Security Coordinator Kellie Conteh.

departments, and for virtually its entire capital budget (Albrecht/Jackson 2014: 97). For different reasons all the SSR efforts, including DR, in Sierra Leone appear to have lacked significant oversight and were increasingly fiscally unsustainable.

In 2009, the Burundi–Netherlands *Security Sector Development* (SSD) programme was launched (Ball 2014). Strengthening security accountability was a specific focus. The politics involved in the programme were constantly discussed, a long-term approach was taken, with a broad, eight-year memorandum of understanding, and it was flexible in terms of both aims and structure. Trust was fostered by initially providing tangible benefits desired by the Burundi Defence Force and police, such as training drivers and mechanics. At the same time, the opportunities to address more fundamental political change issues were assessed (Ball et al. 2012: 36; Ball 2014: 26). In 2010 the Burundi government decided to begin a defence review (Ball et al. 2012: 36). Results included the ability to discuss previously taboo security issues (Hendrickson 2014: 19), the building of Burundian capacity in the process of carrying out the defence review, and the delivery of strategic defence options and a white paper on defence.

The Burundi defence review benefited from its place within the overall SSD programme. The trust created by working on the tangible benefits to defence made it possible to launch the defence review process, which had previously only been informally discussed. The DR process received support from the SSD's governance component, particularly in fostering contacts with other key actors (Ball 2014: 37). The extent to which this was critical to the programme is unclear, however. The earlier Ugandan defence review achieved many goals that were similar to those in Burundi, but without the benefit of a broader programme underway.

The Burundi programme may be one of the exemplars of SSR so far, but it does show how difficult it is to achieve sustainability. Sustainability of the SSD programme is dependent on the attitudes of a handful of the most senior politicians, and cannot be foreseen (Ball 2014: 37). In addition, progress is hostage to political fortunes. After the disputed elections of 2015, the country remains vulnerable to fracture. If Burundi had again descended into violence, the programme's results might have vanished, similar to the failure of the joint integrated units in Sudan from 2011 and the setback in Timor Leste in 2006. Practitioners can do little about unavoidable political turbulence, but they can reduce the number of institutions they work on. More effort invested in a smaller number of institutions should heighten the likelihood of results being sustained. Keeping programmes smaller will increase the chance they can be funded in the long term. The changed procedures and practices also have to be kept in place. People who have gained more skills should be encouraged to stay within reformed institutions. This means formulating effective personnel policies to look after and incentivize them.

8.6 Conclusions

DR (and SSR) was most straightforward in Eastern Europe because Eastern European countries were motivated and had reasonable resources available. Western Europe also had vital national strategic motives for supporting and stabilizing the former Warsaw Pact countries. Nonetheless, recent re-evaluation queries what actually has been achieved. By contrast, a total of about ten developing countries, four in South America, have actively taken steps towards DR. Authoritarian political leaders display little interest. The democratizing essentials of both SSR and DR threaten their power.

Current DR falls relatively neatly into two broad categories. Both are informed in different ways by the essentials of SSR as currently conceptualized. Neither, except in very rare cases, constitutes long-term 'transformation'. First, 'stable' DR is seen more often in the post-authoritarian and developing countries. Here there are democratic deficits, but it is incalculably easier for the population to pressure government for greater accountability in the absence of conflict. These cases gain less attention because donor governments, aid organizations, research institutes and universities are preoccupied with stabilizing fragile states in crisis.

Second but most prominent is 'stabilization' DR, which usually occurs in fragile conflict and post-conflict countries. Due to the constraints of the political environment, somehow falls well short of addressing all necessary areas – from national security councils to ministries to parliaments – or in the necessary depth. It is often rightly criticized as focusing on "train-and-equip" effectiveness activities. Conflict, the vicissitudes of a fluid, vicious political arena and pervasive mistrust can make the process of opening entry points for wider accountability reforms very difficult.

The greatest progress in the developing world has been where access was greatest. The near-existential crises in South Africa and Sierra Leone were very unusual, opening the space for reforms to begin. Greater change was possible, and the political climate generated by the whole effort helped progress within each sector. Another important aspect was significant civil society involvement, less visible in other cases where DR is attempted in isolation. However, the over characterisation of South Africa and Sierra Leone as examples for emulation elsewhere conceals significant weaknesses. These are particularly evident in accountability and fiscal sustainability.

DR's poor record, and the larger problems with the liberal peace agenda, makes it necessary to reassess the entire project.

DR has two futures ahead of it. The more common one is essentially a return to the pre-1998 status quo, with some of the language of SSR employed as window dressing and to keep up with current organizational fashion. This is old-style security assistance aimed to advance the originating powers' strategic national interests. The new twist is the newer players such as Turkey in Somalia arriving on the scene. It will remain animated by the vision of the liberal peace, to pacify and transform the borderlands so that they look more like the DR instigators.

This will mostly see failure because the locals will not often want the same thing, and the resources, patience and political will of the interveners will not be sufficient. One remembers the inadequate staying power of the US in two similar transformative counter-insurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. A more contemporary example is the train and equip programme underway from 2015 for the Iraqi Army by the US-led Operation Inherent Resolve.

There is a more sophisticated variant of this approach, informed by what has been learnt by SSR to date, but still doomed to almost certain unsustainability of reform because it is being implemented for outsiders' national strategic reasons. It will probably still not be locally owned enough.

The other future, which will be seen far less, would acknowledge that liberal peace interventionism is generally a failure. Nothing yet indicates that outside effort can build Tilly-style European states in Africa and Asia within 25–50 year timescales, and this future would stop trying to jump-start such quick changes. State evolution will proceed at its own pace, and climate change has a good chance of transforming the entire world scene in any case, upending most of the certainties of current world affairs.

In doing so, this alternative would return to the acknowledged centrality of local ownership. When nationstate or sub-state, regional governments request assistance, and when those authorities seem likely to abide by much of the values of the West, discussions could commence on long term programmes, aimed at building trust to begin with, and then small steps on building capability to follow. A pre-eminent example is the Burundi-Netherlands SSD programme. Recurrently over the last 25 years, adverse political changes have eroded gains in a variety of countries, so discrete programmes in one sector, rather than more comprehensive programmes likely to stumble (due to the greater number of potential sticking points) are best.

From nearly ten years of examining this subject, this author can see no alternative to reducing ambitions, in order to preserve some of the results. Otherwise the difficulty of the task, and changing politics, means that enormous resources of money, blood and sweat can be invested with virtually nothing to show for it.

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About the Book

This book examines links between post-conflict security, peace and development in Africa, Latin America, Europe and New Zealand. Young peace researchers from the Global South (Uganda, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Brazil, Colombia) as well as from Italy and New Zealand address in case studies traumas in Northern Uganda, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants in the Ivory Coast, economic and financial management of terrorism in Kenya, organised crime in Brazil, mental health issues in Colombia, macro realism in Europe and global defence reforms within the military apparatus since 1990. The book reviews linkages between regional stability, development and peace in post-conflict societies while adding on to the post 2015 international agenda and discusses linkages between peace, security and development.

This book

- Offers a new understanding of the linkages between peace, security and development by addressing practical pragmatic aspects;
- Reviews cross-continental comparisons in defence reforms in Europe, Africa, the Asia-Pacific and Latin America;
- Assesses obligations of combating transnational organised crime networks and managing violence.

More on this book is at: http://www.afes-press-books.de/html/SpringerBriefs_ESDP_13.htm.

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