# INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN MODERN WAR

SCOTT NICHOLAS ROMANIUK

STEWART TRISTAN WEBB

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Introduction

Somewhere, a True Believer is training to kill you.
He is training with minimal food and water, in austere conditions, day and night.
The only thing clean on him is his weapon.
He doesn't worry about what workout to do … his rucksack weighs what it weighs, and he runs until the enemy stops chasing him.
The True Believer doesn't care how hard it is; he knows he either wins or he dies.
He doesn't go home at 1700; he is home.
He only knows the Cause.
Now … who wants to quit?

—US NCO at SF Assessment

Many have seen the effects of insurgent and terrorist activities on television screens from the mayhem that ensued in India's most populated city, Mumbai, when the city came under siege in 2008 by gunmen and bombers; the effect of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) on coalition troops leaving Iraq and Afghanistan; and of course the iconic image of the planes crashing into the World Trade Center (WTC) towers on September 11, 2001 (9/11). These events are part of the continuous interaction among states, violent nonstate organizations (VNSOs), terrorists, extremist ideologies, and insurgencies. Neither terrorism nor terrorists are new to conflict. Rather, they are as old as civilization and conflict itself. The history of insurgency is a history of ethnic, religious, and political conflict and change. Insurgent organizations can be described as "an organized, violent subversion used to effect or prevent political control, as a challenge to established authority" (United Kingdom [UK] Ministry of Defence [MoD], 2010, pp. 1–4). Although insurgencies use terror and violence as weapons, they seek political change as their primary goal and reflect the socioeconomic, political, religious, cultural, and ethnic schisms within and among states.

Insurgencies have shaped our past and will be part of our future. They are a complex part of the development of our past, present, and future of people, states, social structures, political institutions, economic arrangements, and cultural fabric, and they are here to stay. The diversity of state and nonstate responses to insurgencies seen historically and in modern times reflects the diversity of the threat and challenges posed by the insurgencies themselves. For example, the materialization of varied counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrines reflects a plethora of disciplines and approaches. COIN operations, to be sure, are more of an art form than a science. The tragic events of 9/11 in New York and the subsequent United Nations (UN) sanctioned intervention in Afghanistan (and eventually the United States–led invasion of Saddam Hussein's Iraq) have brought insurgencies back into popularity for defense academics, analysts, military personnel, and politicians. Decision makers need to comprehend how insurgencies form and operate, but also how they evolve. Some insurgency groups evolve from merely conducting propaganda campaigns into a group that is able to conduct low-level operations, while others evolve into legitimate political groups. The Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham* (Syria or sometimes "Greater Syria") (ISIS) took the world by storm when it successfully captured and controlled a huge swathe of territory in Iraq and Syria. ISIS's social media campaign attracted foreign fighters across the globe. ISIS did not exactly appear out of nowhere. ISIS evolved from al-Qaeda (in Iraq) (AQ[I]) and later was denounced by the AQ leadership and lost its

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* "ISIL" or "ISIS" has become the acronym for a mere moniker of place names referring to historical lands of which the conflicting and war-torn fiefdoms of Syria and Iraq are a part.

affiliation. ISIS proves to be one of the many examples of evolving insurgent groups. As insurgent groups evolve, COIN operations need to evolve with them in order to be effective.

For the West, the art of COIN was forgotten during the Cold War and shuffled away after the US defeat in Vietnam. It took the United States a number of years of operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq before it developed a clear, contemporary COIN doctrine. One only has to look at the neo-Taliban and Iraq insurgency involvements to understand why insurgencies have become a gripping topic for military and government officials alike. The lack of a concise plan proved to be a setback from the beginning in Afghanistan and Iraq as insurgents started to reverse initial coalition successes. The conventional interstate war era has diminished, becoming an era of prolonged and sustained insurgencies. Old lessons on insurgencies from T. E. Lawrence's experiences in the Middle East and Russia's experiences in Afghanistan have been dusted off and reread. Old COIN and counterterrorism (CT) doctrines have been crafted anew with an emphasis on winning the battle for the "hearts and minds" in order to achieve victory over the greater economic and sociopolitical war. While COIN doctrines have been revived, insurgency doctrines have enjoyed a period of refinement and success. Modern insurgent tactics have likewise evolved and proliferated across the globe. This has been facilitated, in part, by the absorption of foreign insurgents in new insurgencies. These insurgents provide their skill sets and knowledge in person and over the Internet and in other digital forums. As such, Internet traffic monitoring has become common among national security services and brings them a wealth of information, but is at the same time a valuable medium with which contemporary insurgencies have been able to gain exposure and facilitate their cause.

Over time, organized insurgent networks have learned that by working in smaller groups, they promote security for their members, especially for those working in hostile territories. This is because smaller groups are harder to detect than larger ones. Detection of cells precipitates not necessarily the capture of individuals comprising the cell nor necessarily its destruction. Instead, if cells are detected, insurgent operations can still continue as a result of the divorced structural framework of the organization. COIN doctrine has come under increasing fire over the past decade for the ineffectiveness of its detection measures, and it was not until 2007 with the Petraeus doctrine that Western COIN effort received a much-needed framework within which to work. Ensuring the security for large populated areas was part of the US COIN doctrine and a large contingent of soldiers was deployed to both Afghanistan and Iraq to ensure this, and to conduct operations aimed at destabilizing insurgent operations. In addition to this, there was a renewed emphasis on deployment projects and the goal to improve the socioeconomic conditions for indigenous populations. The aim of these policies recognized the need for the indigenous population to feel secure, but also to improve their situation and shift any collusion with the insurgent force. Since 2007, the United States was able to turn back the insurgency in Iraq. The amount of daily violence decreased, a modicum of political order was reinstated, and by the end of 2007, the security situation was the best it had been since 2004. But once again, the gap between insurgency tactics and operation and COIN doctrine applications has become apparent. A similar "surge" was deployed to Afghanistan; however, results have been mixed, and the Taliban continue to operate as a sociopolitical force in the country. In the face of the world's latest outbreak of insurgencies, enhanced global efforts may be needed to improve cooperation between affected states and develop new techniques and doctrines to combat them.

This book concentrates on the intricacies of insurgency. We address the issue of insurgency formation as well as provide an examination of the history of particular insurgent groups, the histories of prolonged insurgencies, and the broad spectrum of insurgency tactics and strategies. The case studies not only provide a concise look at modern-day insurgencies and demonstrate that they are indeed a worldwide phenomenon, but also illustrate that many modern-day insurgencies have deeply historical and nonresolved contentions. The various insurgent groups have their historical foundations entrenched in ethnic, religious, political, and socioeconomic factors and are unique. Each chapter provides detailed analyses demonstrating this and will provide an insightful look on both historical and contemporary (COIN) operations.

CONCEPT OF COMPETITIVE CONTROL

Insurgencies start with a shot that is heard around the world. It is, therefore, quite fitting that this book begins with an exploration of unconventional warfare (UW) (also referred to as irregular warfare or asymmetric warfare). Insurgent tactics have frustrated conventional armies for centuries. Military forces are also primarily trained and organized for conventional interstate conflicts and not to quell low-level insurgencies that utilize UW tactics. Insurgencies do not have the luxury of having a large and consistently well-equipped force to meet opposing troops squarely on the battlefield. Government forces are usually well supplied and sometimes benefit from the support of neighboring regimes. Moreover, successful COIN operations require a particular closeness with populations. Insurgents often cozy up to populations. As a result, bonds are built between people and insurgent groups, and even though they may be tenuous at times, the major advantage for insurgent groups is that they able to maintain closer ties with communities than governments and their military forces. As Gavrilis (2009) noted in a recent study on population-centered warfare from both theoretical and practical points of view, "whoever sleeps in the village at night with guns dictates the political order and allocation of resources" (p. 9). For these and many other reasons, guerrillas and insurgents have employed UW tactics as their principal weapon to further their political movements. Theories and models of UW, such as people's war, Foco theory, urban guerrilla, Palestinian model of terrorism, ethnonationalist terrorism, suicide terrorism, and prospect theory are investigated. Furthermore, the efficacy of UW is analyzed in the areas of US UW campaigns, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a proliferation of intrastate conflicts that primarily consist of insurgent organizations or VNSOs. In order to combat the deadly use of UW, one must understand the multitude of models and theories that have gone into developing it.

For the West, the largest unconventional terrorist attack in recent history propelled the United States and its global allies into the "War on Terrorism" (WoT). AQ operatives hijacked four commercial passenger planes and launched a tumultuous attack that fundamentally altered security arrangements around the world. The 9/11 attacks directly caused the deaths of 2996 people and injured more than 6000, propelling the Bush–Cheney administration into waging what was almost immediately termed an "endless war." The 9/11 attacks, and Europe's devastating experiences with terrorism several years later, demonstrated the destructive threat that an attack against a vital transportation infrastructure can have on the West. The last decade has witnessed a disparate and fragmented campaign by individuals or small groups inspired by AQ ideals that have planned attacks within the countries they live. This has created an inherent challenge in trying to predict future terrorist intentions. Olivier Lewis examines CT and its schools of thought in order to address its shortcomings of being undertheorized in Chapter 1. Although there has been a compare-and-contrast of the various forms of CT by scholars, Lewis argues that because no one has actually sought out and defined what CT actually encompasses, there is a gap not only in the literature but in the actual theory and its practice. Both COIN and CT aim to stop forms of political violence; yet definitions of COIN and CT differ, as does their definitions of the combatant. Lewis discusses what degree of abstraction is necessary in the comparative study of transatlantic CT, and whether more interpretive conceptual analyses (such as radial categories or family resemblances) might be required. One group has propelled insurgency and terrorism studies into the forefront for the twenty-first century, and naturally, that group is AQ.

Insurgent tactics have been honed to create an atmosphere of terror in host countries, but insurgencies themselves require organization and management. Insurgents operate within coordinated and organized structures, and insurgencies become aligned with overarching issues within states whether they are political, economic, or social. To understand how insurgent networks are formed and to develop a COIN model, Shane Drennan utilizes social movement theory (SMT) to understand the underpinnings of insurgencies. SMT has been used to further the understanding of revolutions in the past, but not insurgencies. Insurgencies, Drennan argues, have been consistently viewed through a politico-military lens, giving precedence to the utilization of force and the political

influence of the populace. While these aspects are indeed essential to insurgencies, insurgency and COIN analysts often ignore the very social underpinning of insurgencies. In some respect, most analyses categorize insurgencies as terrorism although revolutions and insurgencies are not societal aberrations. Drennan argues that although revolutions are not always violent, the two overlap and therefore overlap in scholarly literature should also exist. Both insurgencies and revolutions rely on a sympathetic populace to support their structures. This sympathy is borne of shared grievances with the governing body that is sometimes fueled by a common ideology. SMT has been adopted to understand revolutions, and some attempts have been made to understand and analyze insurgencies using SMT approaches. However, these attempts have been informed by older, structure-oriented SMT approaches with little investigation as to which aspects of social movements, and insurgencies specifically, are the most relevant to the COIN problem in question. Drennan reasons that we cannot stop here. He believes that an analysis of the literature on insurgencies and revolutions, and precise points of connection, are needed to identify which SMT approaches are appropriate for understanding and analyzing the formation and continuation of insurgencies that naturally rely on interactions between the state, the insurgents, and the indigenous population. Consequently, Drennan draws parallels in the literature of insurgency leaders, COIN analysts, and revolution analyses by SMT academics. He also describes why these elements are the most germane to an SMT approach to COIN and suggests how these SMT approaches may be applied to COIN in practice. His findings constitute a considerable contribution to the field of scholarly inquiry regarding insurgency and COIN. He explains on what grounds frames and frame resonance, perceived access to change affecting institutions, and perceived opportunities for action are the key social elements affecting insurgencies.

Insurgent and terrorist activities rely on the use of small and independent cells, as they are harder to detect and their autonomy tends not to affect the organization as a whole if eliminated or captured. This ability allows for sustained insurgencies and increases the ability to wear down government or occupying forces. However, sustained insurgencies also prove to be detrimental for the economy of failed or weak states in which they exist and operate. Daniela Irrera explores the intrinsic nature behind the crime–terror–insurgency nexus that occurs in countries affected by long-term insurgencies. The nexus between terrorism and organized crime is seen as the strategic alliance of two nonstate actors, able to exploit illegal markets and influence policymaking at the global level. Drug production and trafficking, ransom demands, and illicit resource production are common in countries that have long-term insurgent groups. This is not only because the local law enforcement agencies are unable to combat this illegal activity owing to instability, but also because insurgent networks take advantage of this instability (or weakness). At times, insurgent organizations provide protection for criminal groups so that they can more comfortably conduct their activities and extract a fee for their protection and cooperation. Both states and international institutions must confront these challenges, as they have impact on politics and policies at the national and international level. In the broader context of multilateralism, the EU is developing its own strategy, which involves both internal and external security. The use of military and civilian missions to foster rule of law, police, and justice reform may constitute a significant innovation in understanding the underpinnings that continue to drive this nexus and the integrated strategy developed by the EU to combat this nexus. In the first part of Irrera's chapter, the nexus is analyzed against the rise of nonstate actors, and in combination with additional threats, namely, weak and failed states. In the second part, an analysis of the integrated strategy developed by the EU is based on the empirical evaluation of the impact of both ended and ongoing missions. In the last part, the nexus is compared to the present set of strategies and approaches developed by the leading political actors in the conceptual framework of multilateral cooperation.

Roger P. Warren examines the ideological motivations of Arab fighters from the days of the Soviet Union occupation of Afghanistan to the present-day civil war in Syria. Using a personal database of over 2500 Arab foreign fighters (in effect, *mujahedeen*), Warren's exceptionally unique research presents a healthy scope of emerging trends indicating that many Arab foreign fighters

followed a trajectory that led them to become terrorists. The data are extracted from martyrdom biographies, interrogation notes from Guantanamo Bay detainees, and Arabic language jihadi websites (particularly from Syria). Warren examines the political and religious ideological motivations of these Arab foreign fighters, starting with Arab-Afghans and moving on to those who fought in the insurgencies in Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir, Afghanistan (post 2001), Iraq (post 2003), and the current Syrian conflict. Warren explains that many Arab fighters were discouraged from returning to their home countries after the Soviet Union withdrawal and were not welcomed in Kashmir. The notion of a *career jihadist* came about with the spread of Islamic jihadi ideology and new theaters opening up. During the early 1990s, Pakistan attempted to deal with the corpus of ex-mujahedeen within Pakistani territory and many of these fighters found themselves offering their services to the conflict witnessed in Bosnia. Approximately a quarter of the Arab fighter cohort served in Afghanistan as Arab mujahedeen. This phenomenon continues in Chechnya, Iraq, and in present-day Afghanistan and Syria. The context (democracy, human rights, education, and socioeconomic) of the Arab world from where they originate is also explored. Thus, his work brings to the table a very praiseworthy cross section of scholarly domains and is therefore truly multidisciplinary in nature. The key ideological trends that emerged from the research include, but are not limited to, the centrality of Islam, the social economic backgrounds, the role of kinship and friends, and the increased commitment to jihad, leading to more than 30% of Arab foreign fighters (veterans from insurgencies) becoming radical Islamist terrorists. Warren asserts that the implications of the research highlight two alarming contemporary themes. First, the Syrian conflict continues to attract hundreds of Arab foreign fighters, a mobilization based on multifarious motivations, but where increased exposure to jihadi violence and insurgency creates the conditions for the emergence of terrorist tactics, including suicide bombings. Second, the potential threat posed by the returning mujahedeen to their native Arab lands demonstrates a threat that may apply more widely to include mujahedeen originating from Western countries.

Michael F. Morris (US Marine Corps [USMC] officer) argues that AQ should not be seen simply as a terrorist network, that rather it should be understood as an insurgent network that is based on a social antimovement. He notes that, despite the lack of consensus in academia and government on what constitutes terrorism, conventional wisdom holds that AQ is a classic transnational terrorist organization. Morris shows that particular circles of scholarship have challenged that verdict, arguing instead that AQ denotes the emergence of a global Islamic insurgency. The distinction between terrorism and insurgency is not merely theoretical, argues Morris, as the appropriate state responses to the two phenomena differ significantly. Therefore, the argument is presented that the United States has mischaracterized its primary and most immediate threat, and in doing so has pursued the wrong path in combating it. AQ's goals of overthrowing governments, imposing a strict (even anti-Islamic) interpretation of Shari'a law, and blocking military and cultural influences from the West are clearly political goals. AQ's goals are limited to regimes in Islamic countries and limiting Western influence by targeting the US and European (including EU) countries. The application of Wieviorka's (1988) inversion theory is made in order to analyze AQ as something much different that what it has previously been accepted as; the results of this methodology suggest that the network represents an incipient insurgency rather than a strain of terrorism. The examination presents a critical comparative analysis of AQ's strategy to that of doctrinal insurgent templates to determine the likelihood of the movement achieving its revolutionary objectives. Policy prescriptions flowing from the preceding assessments are provided to refine the existing national strategy for the WoT.

Colin Maclachlan examines how the threat to transportation infrastructure is still significant and will be economically detrimental by using the example of the Trans-European high-speed rail network and the Madrid train bombings. He draws on modern research such as EU Council directives, National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) reports, RAND terrorism database, and WITS worldwide trend data. This is complemented by the theories raised by modern scholars on the topic. Maclachlan argues that past trends indicate a common theme in rising attacks on Europe, infrastructure, and specifically transport networks despite the vast number of governing bodies set up

to counter such threats. He concludes with a study of the Trans-European high-speed rail network (TEN-R), which links Western Europe through a series of corridors, and how corresponding characteristics fit within terrorist targeting frameworks. Several themes are raised, including the conflict between national security and information sharing between states, and technological advances and reliance and the rise in terrorist-related websites. Until such problems are solved, terrorist groups such as Global Salafi Jihad (GSJ) have clear areas of weakness to exploit. As Maclachlan states, "terrorism is meant to terrify" and affect an audience, but there are no set limitations on the element of terror. Indirect victims of terrorist attacks carry the acts of terror to tremendous depth within and societies.

Oren Magen examines the need for states to take into account domestic-level considerations and the possible emergence of VSNOs. Magen points out that such reflections occur rather infrequently because of moral issues with state-level policy as many approaches include the coercive manipulation of populations. These practices usually lead to retaliations that involve civilian suffering (RICS). RICSs can be counterproductive to a government if its legitimacy is lost among the domestic population, especially when the populace rallies with an insurgent force and supports a violent approach against the government. Groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah are good examples of this, according to Magen, as they have vied for political influence over the populace for its support while the population endures RICS.

Even further direct case studies are made in this volume through investigations of latent terrorist and insurgent forces in developing countries and states considered comparably susceptible to the insurgent practices. Indonesia is the world's most Muslim-populated country, and its insurgent groups are numerous and diversified. Paul J. Carnegie examines Indonesia's battle against extremism, which remains a politically sensitive issue given the country's authoritarian history. The jihadist community faces a lack of popular support among Indonesian Muslims, but remains a credible threat in the country and abroad. The author begins by looking at the transition that Indonesia began in the late 1990s from authoritarian rule. This led many commentators at the time to express concern about the security threat posed by potential Islamist militancy. Initially, Indonesia, states Carnegie, witnessed a proliferation of Islamist paramilitary groups in the wake of Suharto's downfall that heightened its threat environment. However, the author presents the argument that in the decade and beyond since that time, the dire predictions have largely failed to materialize, at least strategically. This outcome raises some interesting questions. *Has Indonesia really contained its extremist and latent insurgent threat? If so, how, and what lessons, if any, can we draw*? This chapter examines the extent to which Indonesia's security concerns have actually and alarmingly diminished.

Like many examples of an ethnic insurgency, Mali's is rooted in colonialism and pursuit of ethnic autonomy. The Tuareg people are a nomadic people living in North Africa in Libya, Mali, and Niger, and their ambitions for an independent region, or *Azawad,* in Mali continues from the days of French colonialism. In 1916, the first Tuareg rebellion occurred when the French colonialists did not give an independent Azawad. Strife between Mali's government forces and the ethnic Tuareg group has been a part of Mali's history since becoming an independent state. Two Tuareg rebellions for autonomy occurred in the 1960s and 1990s. The most recent rebellion in 2012 was significantly different from the previous conflicts. The Tuareg rebels aligned themselves with Islamist terrorist groups, including AQ in the Islamic Maghreb and Ansar Dine. The conflict was fueled by the situation in Libya. The on-the-ground situation in Libya deteriorated after anti-Gaddafi forces were supported by a NATO air operation. The Muammar Gaddafi regime actively recruited ethnic Tuaregs, but many of them returned to northern Mali after the conflict and helped lay the foundations for the next rebellion. These ethnic Tuaregs from Libya had connections with Islamists who operated within the Gaddafi security force and those who operated during the conflict. With Libya destabilized, this also allowed for the freer flow of arms, supplies, and insurgents.

The conflict began in January 2012 and it took a year until it was apparent that the Malian government was on the verge of collapse. The government was also weakened by a coup and the Malian army was poorly trained and equipped. At this time, the insurgent coalition controlled an

area the size of France. The Islamist insurgent groups hijacked the rebellion for their own pur-poses and pushed aside the MNLA (Mouvement National de Liberation de l'Azawad [National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad]) and their hopes for national autonomy. The Islamists imposed Shari'a law on the secular population and even attempted to destroy one of the oldest libraries in existence—only to be hindered by an illiterate gentleman. When French and regional African forces intervened, the insurgent coalition quickly fell apart. The MNLA, who was betrayed by the Islamists, switched sides, as they did not want to be associated with the Islamists and thought that backing the intervention would give them a stronger position at the negotiating table. French and African forces concentrated on the Islamist insurgent groups with the assistance of the MNLA. In order to resolve the conflict, the Malian government and the Tuareg nationalists will have to reach a negotiated settlement. Given the amount of negotiated settlements and the history of the country, however, Stewart Tristan Webb argues that another rebellion can be expected.

The conflict in Mali was not the only story that held international headlines in 2013. The Boston Marathon bombings brought many defense analysts back on television sets to explain the ongoing situation in Chechnya due to the Tsarnaev brothers and their link to Chechnya. Chris Murray traces the historical roots of the modern insurgency in Chechnya and the Caucasus. Today, the Caucasus is a region of both tremendous geopolitical significance as well as instability. One need only look to a map to recognize the Caucasus as a civilizational crossroads. The confluence of ethnic, religious, and nationalistic conflict combined with significant foreign influence and interest in the region is one with deep historical roots. To understand the current situation in the region, one must first trace its historical roots at the very least to the waning days of the Soviet Union. It was in this sociopoliti-cal maelstrom that the emergence of nationalist awakenings, modern independence, and religious movements in the region developed. Beyond this historical foundation, one must also appreciate, according to Murray, the intricacies of modern insurgency, the nature of guerrilla warfare, and the role of breakaway states within a modern global context. Within a region such as the Caucasus—rich not only in increasingly significant energy resources, but also sociocultural, political, ethnic, and religious diversity—there is no shortage of conflict born from competing interests. This chapter traces the historical roots of these conflicts following their evolution from the era of rising national consciousness during the late stages of the Soviet Union through the transition into the post–Soviet era and into the post-9/11 period and the era of the WoT.

An appreciation of the region's position within the contemporary international political land-scape is established. Additionally, an examination of the region's instability and its relationship with tensions throughout the international community is made. Accordingly, issues such as radi-cal Islam; competing ambitions regarding energy resources; a rise in international criminal car-tels dealing in narcotics, arms trafficking, and money laundering; and Russia's quest for regional dominance in the face of fears (whether legitimate or unfounded) of Western encroachment are pursued. Understanding the nature of conflict in the region and why insurgency has been so exten-sive and enduring in the Caucasus fulfills a critical role in providing insight into the nature of the contemporary international climate. Murray places considerable importance on the insight of this understanding because it lends itself to grasping the nature of breakaway states, modern insurgency, and COIN operations. He also emphasizes the importance on factors influencing them, which include the uncertain future of the WoT, and the role that the Caucasus might play in coming events. Although Russia declared victory in its CT operations, violence linked to Chechen insur-gents is on the rise. Murray warns that the violence, which has spread to the North Caucasus as a whole, is no longer directly linked to a Chechen uprising; instead, it is part and parcel of a broad regional Islamic insurgency. Murray argues that the Chechnya insurgency has endured because Russia has forgotten the basic principles of COIN operations: presence, patience, persistence, and professionalism.

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) gained notoriety on the international stage in 2008 with the Mumbai attacks. This orchestrated series of attacks and bombing lasted for several days and claimed more than 160 lives. In spite of this, the history of LeT goes back to the later years of the Soviet Union

invasion of Afghanistan and the aftermath of Islamist jihadi fighters returning to Pakistan. LeT was established in Afghanistan, but because of the rise of the Taliban LeT relocated to the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir. The organization took up the cause for a free Islamic state. It is believed that elements of currently serving or retired Pakistani military and intelligence officials are providing some support to LeT. President Musharraf banned the organization in 2002 after the Indian Parliament attacks and the military standoff that subsequently occurred. Despite the 2002 ban, LeT continues to survive. It has proven itself to be the most inclusive terrorist organization, both ethnically and religiously. LeT has been able to provide services that the Pakistani government cannot fully provide, such as medical and educational support. Its madrassas even teach both English and the sciences, in stark contrast to other groups and overall Western perceptions. LeT's leader, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, has openly led protests that aim to win over the hearts and minds of the Pakistani population. LeT is primarily focused on South Asia, conducting operations in Kashmir and India while organizing protests against NATO and the US drone campaign in Pakistan. It is speculated that LeT has international aspirations and has been known to work as a minor actor abroad in conjunction with AQ and other causes. There have been cases of LeT operatives being recruited and operating abroad. Owing to the WoT, LeT has formed affiliations with other groups internationally, including AQ. An individual associated with LeT was arrested in the United States, and there have been cases of other operatives. Whether this represents the beginning of a shift in policy within the organization or isolated incidents is Webb's aim.

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan did not only have the rise of the neo-Taliban to contend with after initial operations in 2001. The reemergence of the Haqqani Network in 2007 proved to be a thorn in the side for coalition partners. The Haqqani Network was able to harness its political shrewdness and ability to be a middleman for the Taliban. Scott Nicholas Romaniuk and Stewart Tristan Webb examine the Haqqani Network's insurgency dating back from the Soviet Union occupation of Afghanistan. It was then when Jalaluddin Haqqani became an idyllic mujahedeen leader who gained praise from even infamous US Senator Charlie Wilson. Jalaluddin also made significant connections with Saudi Arabia and also Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. After the Soviet Union withdrawal, Jalaluddin demonstrated his shrewdness by becoming a minister for the Taliban. After 9/11 and the subsequent intervention in Afghanistan, the vexation of the Haqqani family began to simmer. Even though Jalaluddin was a Taliban minister, he was not invited to the Bonn Conference, but his archrival, who was from a different subtribe and was a US supporter, was. The formation of the Haqqani Network occurred when the Haqqani's supporters lost their faith in the local UN mission as their objections against US aerial bombings went unheeded. The Haqqani Network began low-level hit-and-run attacks from across the Pakistan border and minor propaganda activities. The Haqqani Network evolved and reestablished links with the insurgent leaders by utilizing three decades' worth of interpersonal contacts and relationships. This has allowed the Haqqani Network to develop close ties with the Taliban insurgency, but also has attracted foreign fighters with the Haqqani's links with the Middle East. Although the Haqqani Network operates predominantly in Eastern Afghanistan, it has become an insurgent force to be reckoned with. While the AQ network assumed a globalized persona, with its affiliate groups scattered in numerous regions, events around the world further captured the international media's attention. The world's attention was gripped by the Mumbai attacks in 2008 as members of LeT ravaged the city in a torrent of violence. This attack provided the world with a reminder of the ongoing insurgency India has against supposed Pakistani proxy groups and that insurgencies in South Asia are not only in Afghanistan. These proxy groups have been able to exist in Pakistan with the complicit, active or inactive, support of current or former members of the Pakistani government and military services.

India is not the only rising power that is facing prolonged insurgency. China's insurgency history goes as far back as the tenth century. The region commonly known as Manchuria in history and as northeast China today has a legacy of being a conflict zone with the infamous Opium Wars and later the Japanese invasion in 1931, and is well known for launching insurgent movements, which

not only succeed in the periphery to which they were born but also have become successful in core regions of China. The Manchurian insurgency case proves to be interesting because its success laid with its pragmatism of being open and tolerant instead of being centered on ethnic or religious considerations. This allowed for the collaboration needed to uproot elites. By looking at the examples of the Khitan Liao in the Middle Ages, the Manchu Qing in the seventeenth century, and finally the troubled fate of the region in the twentieth century, first as the centerpiece of Japanese imperial expansion into China and then as the springboard for communist resurgence and eventual victory in the Chinese Civil War, Christopher Mott hopes to establish that historical Manchuria was a uniquely beneficial place for insurgent movements. By combing through the case studies and showing their unique geopolitical circumstances through multiethnic power bases, tolerance for nonnative cultures, and cultivation of defectors from the core area, an alternative possibility to the more common nationalist and religiously inspired insurgencies which so frequently occur today can be shown, as well as the dangers to core states of any such movement which might one day resemble the various insurgencies of Manchuria.

China has also been attempting to contain dissidents in Xinjiang and Tibet. Francis Grice analyzes the present-day COIN operations, strategies, tactics, and perceptions of the Chinese government. Some of the operations examined include China's actions against the ongoing Islamic insurgency in Xinjiang in northwest China; the pacification of the abortive 2008 uprisings in Tibet, which were timed to coincide with the Beijing Olympics; and the suppression of dissident movements such as the Falun Gong. During the Maoist era, armed suppression was a common method, but China's COIN approach evolved. It eventually encompassed the use of more persuasive methods of economic development, the use of propaganda, and function of education. Today, China is integrating the use of modern technology in its policing and identification of potential dissidents. Xinjiang separatism has become a serious concern for China. This was demonstrated by how China attempted to convince the United States after 9/11 that Xinjiang dissidents were terrorists. Grice considers how the current Chinese government's conceptions of COIN, both within China's own borders and its immediate periphery, link to its broader beliefs about security and military strategy. A major distinction between the Chinese COIN approach and that of the West, the author shows, is that Chinese COIN operations are carried out at home. This has become a catalyst for Chinese military spending and indeed presents pathways for complex but potentially fruitful debate.

The insurgency in Burma has been going on since the 1940s, after Burma won independence from the United Kingdom. The Karen nationalist movement (Karen National Union [KNU]) in Burma is one of the longest-running insurgencies in the world. Tens of thousands of people have been killed, with refugees scattered around South East Asia (SEA). Scott Nicholas Romaniuk analyzes the intricacies of the KNU, a Sino-Tibetan ethnicity that comprises approximately 7% of the Burmese population. However, much of the Karan population has been displaced and has sought refuge in Thailand. As Romaniuk shows, the existence of certain conditions dictates whether an insurgent group (i.e., insurgents, militants, separatists, rebels, and guerrillas) will be successful in its cause. Most insurgencies throughout history have failed. Some succeed. He poses the simple question: *Why?* In some cases, all of the preconditions for success need to be met. In other cases, only some or a combination of those preconditions are required. He examines how the requisite conditions of an effective insurgency campaign can potentially inform attempts at combating and possibly preventing the formation of insurgency.

Since 9/11, the UN has adopted strong measures aimed at reducing the activities of terrorists. However, from 2001 to 2015, several major terrorist attacks in some parts of the world have been carried out successfully. Insurgent and terrorist organizations, such as AQ, rely on international financial support and an influx of foreign fighters. Sometimes international cooperation is needed—more so than what an ostensible "coalition of the willing" can or is *actually* "willing" to provide. Emeka Thaddues Njoku analyzes the measures the UN has undertaken to combat international terrorism. For *realists*, the UN has no role to play, but for *idealists*, the UN has a multitude of organizations at its disposal to combat international terrorism. The UN has adopted numerous legal

instruments since 9/11. The UN has proven itself a highly capable actor, able to freeze financial assets of terrorist organizations, but the lack of a clear definition of what constitutes a terrorist or terrorist organization quite often supplants efforts to enact policy that would otherwise do much to neutralize the critical funding sources of both. In addition to the lack of acceptance of a universal definition of terrorists and terrorism, the major stumbling block for the UN is, ironically, the lack of funds for many of its CT initiatives. The UN can provide a comprehensive and global approach through economic and human rights initiatives. It also creates an arena for global coalitions to be formed through meaningful dialogue.

Another initiative that the UN adopted was the Right to Protect (R2P). R2P proposes that member states have the moral obligation to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity (UN, 2005, p. 30). The catalyst behind R2P was the genocidal events during the breakup of the now deceased state of Yugoslavia in 1991. Marinko Bobić examines the breakup of Yugoslavia. In doing so, he seeks to show that promises of a foreign military intervention do encourage a party in conflict to change its tactics and strategy, namely, by provoking or staging civilian victimization. R2P raises a serious hazard for the international community when a party seeks victimization to receive special benefits. Evidence from the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo show that the concept of moral hazard advances our understanding of behavior in armed conflict, especially during a prolonged insurgency or civil war, by providing a key rationale regarding why victimized civilians are collectively a strategic asset.

The field of security studies has become heavily focused on the issues of insurgency and COIN within less than a decade. Social scientists, security experts and specialists, military professionals, policymakers, and the general readership have grown increasingly interested in the subject matter and its many cognate fields. Some of the world's critical geopolitical results have been driven by irregular and asymmetric conflict and warfare waged by insurgents around the world. COIN planning and operations now constitute a cardinal factor in what has been termed the "American way of war" and has assumed prominent positions in the strategic military doctrines of the world's leading military actors and rising powers. Their operations are directed and indirectly connected to the issues of national and territorial security, the safeguarding of populations, nation and state formation, winning both small and large wars, and the ongoing conflict with current and emerging radical terrorist threats. The very idea of insurgency has even assumed a global specter with the idea of transnational terrorist networks constituting still-growing threats that have proven very difficult to contain. Insurgency is able to exist and thrive in remote parts of the globe—even beyond the reach of governments with the most technologically advanced weapons systems and capabilities, and sophisticated intelligence operations.

The concept of this book grows from the need to look beyond actors such as the United States as the preeminent COIN actors in the contemporary world while reassessing some of the latent and burgeoning insurgent groups, organizations, and networks at home and abroad. This volume, therefore, adopts a diverse lens of analysis, as illustrated in the previous pages, in order to explore and examine such elements as insurgency aims, beliefs, and motivations; their formation, recruitment, leadership, planning, and operations; and responses to state and nonstate actors' efforts to contain their efforts. In part, this book seeks to address the oversaturation of readership with titles that focus either much too broadly on the history of COIN, which claim to be definitive accounts of insurgency across the ages (even hundreds of years) but only take into consideration few and typical cases, or that are entirely too committed to the continued concentration on the United States and its principal allies, particularly as they pertain to the US-led WoT.

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1 Conceptualizing Counterterrorism

Olivier Lewis

CONTENTS

> Now I myself, Phaedrus, am a lover of these processes of division and bringing together, as aids to speech and thought; and if I think any other man is able to see things that can naturally be collected into one and divided into many, him I follow after and "walk in his footsteps as if he were a god."
>
> **Socrates, in Plato's *Phaedrus***

INTRODUCTION

Research in counterterrorism (CT) is currently under-theorized. One possible reason for this is the lack of formal concepts. This chapter will attempt to contribute to the study of CT by providing a review of issues that would need to be considered when conceptualizing the field. This chapter begins with a description of the state of CT literature today. It then reviews common definitions of terrorism and CT. By means of a logical analysis of these definitions, this chapter suggests some basic ways of conceptualizing CT. The two major proposals are to view CT as a purposive activity, and to view CT in opposition to both passivity and terrorism. After discussing the political aspects of CT and the danger of political bias in CT research, this chapter goes on to suggest typologies that could be used to structure essential attributes of CT. This chapter concludes with a brief review of the difficulties that are inherent to the operationalization of CT and its more general study.

STATE OF THE ART

What do we know about CT? Currently, CT studies tend to either describe or evaluate strategies and practices pertaining to one or several states seeking to counter activities conducted by one or

several substate organizations. Although many studies have conducted normative (i.e., ethical) critiques of CT, relatively few go so far as to *explain* either the causes or effects of CT (Foley, 2013, p. 7). When CT studies do go beyond the evaluation of CT ethics, efficiency, or effectiveness, they tend to use nonstructured comparative methods, which prevent the development of generalizations. The abundance of facts, combined with the absence of explanations to account for these facts, leads one to conclude that the study of CT is currently under-theorized (Argomaniz, 2011, p. 8). Reasons for the paucity of CT theories are probably several, and such a question would be of great interest to anyone trained in the sociology of scientific knowledge.[*]

In the context of this chapter, it will be assumed that explanatory research does indeed possess (intrinsic or instrumental) value. But what would be necessary for the future development of CT theories? As of now, the most pressing issue for CT theorists is *concept formation* (for a detailed discussion of the lack of conceptualization in CT research, see Omelicheva, 2010). The current dearth of concept formation in CT studies is astonishing, for well-developed concepts benefit not just explanatory research, but also the type of research that currently dominates the field, namely descriptive research. It is true that conceptualization is primordial to the elaboration of generalizations via structured comparisons. But it is also true that if one seeks to discover differences between cases, then one needs to specify "what" exactly is being compared (Sartori et al., 1975). Beyond qualitative and quantitative comparative studies, it could also be argued that *descriptive* CT research is rarely limited to what is directly observable, and thus would also benefit from forming concepts in a more systematic manner (Gerring, 1999, p. 360). Overall, concept formation can improve construct validity (i.e., proper linking of data to concepts) (Trochim, 2010), and thus can be seen as a means to increased "knowledge-production transparency" (Lupia and Elman, 2014).

From what has been mentioned earlier, one might surmise that no scholar has sought to define CT, to discuss its multiple attributes and types, or to even compare instances of CT in search for differences and similarities across cases. Such surmising would be incorrect. Analysts have produced many parsimonious and eloquent definitions of CT (see section "Defining Terrorism"). Similarly, CT scholars have sought to compare and contrast various approaches to CT (Alexander, 2002; Art and Richardson, 2007; Charters, 1994; Crelinsten and Schmid, 2012; Davis and Cragin, 2009; Fair, 2005; Foley, 2013; Orttung, Makarychev, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], 2006; Roach, 2011), albeit only few of these have done so in a systematic manner (Lum et al., 2006). Finally, many authors have synthesized the numerous CT strategies available to states (Crelinsten, 2013; Forest, 2007; Ganor, 2005; Maras, 2012). What is currently lacking in this field is the conceptualization of CT via one of the many descriptive typologies available (i.e., classical, radial, and family resemblance, among others). Never have the sufficient and necessary conditions "for locating examples" (Gerring, 2001, p. 45) of CT been explicitly enunciated.[†]

Like many subjects in the social sciences, conceptualization is a contested practice, with a number of "schools of thought." Each school advocates one of the descriptive typologies mentioned earlier. According to Gerring (1999), these typologies are contested because they each have their methodological strengths and weaknesses. In fact, Gerring argues that all typologies involve trade-offs between the numerous functions concepts play in the social sciences, namely familiarity, resonance, parsimony, coherence, differentiation, depth, theoretical utility, and field utility. To highlight the importance of concept formation in the study of CT, this chapter will limit itself to a nonexhaustive review of the concept, thus not putting forward any supposedly methodologically ideal concept-type. The hope here is that CT scholars will debate the issues brought up and form concepts tailored to specific research projects. Only then, will the risk of "faulty inferences" and "self-delusion" be reduced (Sartori et al., 1975).

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[*] We could speculate that the absence of structured comparisons and explanatory theories is linked to the policy-oriented nature of CT studies. Yet, its sister subject, terrorism studies, is both policy-oriented and rich in theories seeking to explain the causes and consequences of terrorism throughout human history.

[†] If any such conceptualizations do exist, they have not been widely discussed in the English-language CT literature.

Before starting this review, it should be noted that a concept is traditionally composed of three parts: the term (a.k.a., word, label, or symbol), the definition (a.k.a., meaning, properties, attributes, characteristics, intension, and connotation), and the (potential) referents (a.k.a., objects, phenomena, instances, extension, and denotation). The term, definition, and its referents are interdependent—"a change in any one aspect of a concept will normally affect the other two" (Gerring, 1999, p. 389). Thus, any (re)conceptualization put forward automatically demarcates the relationship between the three aspects of a concept. In this chapter, I will keep the term (i.e., "counterterrorism") fixed, and focus on its definition. As the contested aspects of the definition are discussed, its relation to possible referents will change. Consequently, this chapter will be more analytic than synthetic: this chapter will use logic to form the concept and will not rely on empirical examples (Goertz, 2012, p. 39).

DEFINING COUNTERTERRORISM

According to Goertz (2012, pp. 6–15), the definition of a concept tends to be composed of three levels: the basic level, the secondary level, and the tertiary level, with the basic level being the most abstract and the tertiary level being the most observable. The basic level defines CT and its opposite (Goertz, 2012, p. 35). The secondary level defines the concept's structure (i.e., what is necessary and sufficient to identify phenomena as CT (Goertz, 2012, p. 39). The tertiary level defines the concept's operationalization (i.e., what indicators can be used to measure the concept) (Goertz, 2012, pp. 95–107). In his guidelines for concept analysis, Sartori (1987) recommends: (1) collecting a representative set of definitions, (2) extracting their characteristics, and (3) constructing matrixes that organize such characteristics meaningfully. This is what this chapter shall endeavor to do.

DEFINING "TERRORISM"

According to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), CT is a noun defined as "political or military activities designed to prevent or thwart terrorism" (Stevenson, 2010). The actors in this some-what-ambiguous definition are categorized as either political or military, indicating that the authors see military combatants as nonpolitical agents. Both of these actor-types are goal-oriented however, the purpose of CT is "to prevent or thwart terrorism," which according to the OED is defined as "the unofficial or unauthorized use of violence and intimidation in the pursuit of political aims." Here then no CT actor or method is provided, and the definition of the noun is entirely dependent upon the definition of terrorism. Most scholars agree that terrorism is a political phenomenon (see e.g., Morgenthau et al., 1977, pp. 5–6), but *politics* is also a contested concept.

In sight of this infinite regress, it could be argued that much of the ambiguity of the terms "terrorism" and "counterterrorism" lies in the difficulty of defining and identifying political acts (see Schmitt, 2007; Slomp, 2009). Some authors would argue that the decision to recognize an act as political is not neutral and in fact carries within it *political* consequences (see section "Defining Terrorism") (Crelinsten, 2013, pp. 52, 66–7; Kochi, 2009). Yet, to define CT, a working definition of political violence needs to be established. In this instance, two standard references can be used: Lasswell's (1968) definition of politics as "who gets what, when, where, how," and Sartori's (1987) definition of politics as "collectivized decisions," understood as decisions that are binding on a collectivity (pp. 214–6). If these working definitions are accepted, then political violence can be defined as a form of violence that is not done for personal purposes, but for a goal related to a collectivity.

If the definition of CT is dependent on the definition of terrorism understood as a form of political violence, then terrorism must be differentiated from other forms of political violence. Many scholars argue that what distinguishes terrorism from other forms of political violence is its *deliberately indiscriminate* nature: the potential victims of terrorism include noncombatants, civilians, and the innocent, that is, those often considered, both in democracies and autocracies,

and in times of both peace and war, as *illegitimate targets* (Miller, 2009, pp. 53–4; Morgenthau et al., 1977, p. xi; Wilkinson, 2011, pp. 4–17). Consequently, it could be argued that the more a form of political violence is applied discriminately (i.e., the more it is targeted), the less is can be considered terrorism.

The OED defines terrorism not just in relation to politics and violence, but also in relation to intimidation. Similarly, Merriam-Webster (M-W) defines terrorism as "the systematic use of terror especially as a means of coercion" (M-W, 2005). Thus, another distinguishing feature of terrorism (as opposed to other forms of political violence) is *the use of terror* (i.e., intimidation) as a means to a political end. The study of what causes such fear is a research topic in itself (see Ganor, 2005, pp. 251–73; Sinclair and Antonius, 2012), but it seems safe to assume that any sense of security (i.e., the absence of fear) that exists prior to the terrorist attacks largely depends on the political context in which the illegitimate targets live. Thus, what seems important in the definition of terrorism is not so much that illegitimate targets actually be frightened, but that such intimidation is one of the goals of the violent act—in Clausewitzian terms, terrorism is a tactic used toward psychological aims and political goals (Strachan and Herberg-Rothe, 2007, p. 188). Therefore, the more a form of political violence does not deliberately seek to intimidate, the less is can be considered terrorism. Any political violence that is not deliberately intimidating and deliberately indiscriminate is not terrorism. Insurgents, revolutionaries, and freedom fighters, for example, can only be considered terrorists if they fall within these criteria.

Defining "Counter-"

Indicatively, M-W (2005) does not provide a definition of CT, but rather only provides a definition of "counter-," understood as (1) contrary/opposite, (2) opposing/retaliatory, (3) complimentary/ corresponding, and (4) duplicate/substitute. In fact, many CT scholars have made the distinction between *counterterrorism* and *antiterrorism*, where the former is reactive and the latter is preventive (Celmer, 1987; Nacos, 2008; Shor, 2011, p. 52). This sequential differentiation debate lies at the heart of wider debates on self-defense versus preemption, and due process versus crime control (Crelinsten, 2013, pp. 64–88; McCulloch and Pickering, 2009; Miller, 2009). For simplicity's sake, we will put the sequential differentiation to the side (see section "Isolating Counterterrorism" below), and state: if terrorism (by definition) is a tactic that deliberately uses indiscriminate violence to reach a political goal, and CT (by definition) seeks to prevent or thwart terrorism, then CT must be defined as an activity designed to prevent or thwart the indiscriminate use of violence for a political goal. With this dictionary-based definition of CT in hand, we can now "correct the defects of ordinary language" by theorizing the opposite of CT (Collier and Gerring, 2009, p. 128). It should be kept in mind, however, that in moving away from these common definitions, we move away from Gerring's (2009) first criterion of conceptual goodness, namely familiarity.

ISOLATING COUNTERTERRORISM

According to Goertz (2012), one way of building a concept at the basic level is to "analyze the negative pole;" "theorize the underlying continuum between the poles;" "theorize the grey zone;" "determine whether the concept should be considered continuous or dichotomous;" and "ignore the actual distribution of cases" (p. 35). Given that definitions serve a delimiting function (i.e., they specify boundaries), many other authors agree that searching for the contrary or the contradiction of a concept (a.k.a., *argumentum a contrario*) can greatly increase the general intelligibility of a concept (Gerring, 1999; Sartori, 1987; Sartori et al., 1975). Goertz (2012) recommends considering the question of how "the non-positive and the negative dimensions of the concept" differ (p. 33).

From what has been said so far, it would seem that the logical contrary of CT is enabling or supporting terrorism, and that these two poles include a third possibility, namely the absence of

activities designed to prevent or thwart terrorism (i.e., passivity vis-à-vis the threat of terrorism). This continuum could be represented as

Assisting Terrorism ↔ Passivity ↔ Countering Terrorism

It must be kept in mind, however, that the term "counterterrorism" is meant to denote all possible *reactions*. By definition, CT is always oppositional (Schmid and Jongman, 2005, p. 43). To develop this idea, it might be useful to conceptualize CT in analogy with terrorism, that is, as a purposive action where the "agent is aware of reasons for that action" (Butterfill, 2001).

Concerning the goals of CT much depends on whether one emphasizes the prevention of terrorism per se or the prevention *of the political goals* pursued via terrorism. Hypothetically, a counterterrorist actor could agree with the goals of a particular terrorist, all while seeking to oppose the use of intimidation and deliberately indiscriminate violence. The desire to prevent deliberately indiscriminate violence could be based, for example, on the notion that some means of political contestation are more legitimate than others (on the ethics of violence, see Arendt, 1970; Corlett, 2003; Held, 2008; Hoffman, 1994; Sorel et al., 2012). In this case, it seems less obvious that CT would fall within the remit of political violence. This decidedly non-Manichean distinction, however, depends on the possibility of political neutrality (see section "Defining Terrorism").

When CT is used to oppose the political goals of a particular instance of terrorism, it could be said that this type of CT constitutes a political act; and if the act's methods are violent, then this type of CT constitutes a form of political violence. Moreover, nothing logically precludes terrorist tactics from being used as a method to counter a particular instance of terrorism—whether "fighting fire with fire" is ethical, efficient, or effective are evaluative and normative questions that have often been addressed in the literature (see section "State of the Art"). When terrorism is used as counterterrorist method, then (by definition) this type of CT constitutes a form of political violence. More crucially, in terms of the methods employed, terrorism and CT are not necessarily oppositional terms. In fact, the neologism *counterterror* could be used to indicate a situation where, in a political conflict, terrorism is used to prevent or thwart terrorism. Taking inspiration from the third and fourth M-W definitions of "counter" (complimentary/corresponding and duplicate/substitute), it seems possible to propose an alternative continuum for our basic-level definition of CT. Here, CT is conceived *as a form of political violence* delimited by two poles: "passivity" and *counterterror*.

Passivity ↔ Counterterrorism ↔ Counterterror

This abstract continuum has not been considered by CT scholars, yet it greatly resembles liberal-state CT typologies brought forward by scholars such as Miller (2009, pp. 47–54), Wilkinson (2011, pp. 9–18, 75–103, 84–204), and Crelinsten (2013, pp. 56–7). Such typologies (i.e., under reaction ↔ proportionate reaction ↔ overreaction) tend to be used to evaluate either the ethics or the effectiveness of a state's CT practices. Such evaluations, however, require legitimate violence to be defined in relation to statehood and might constitute a form of bias for any researcher seeking to remain politically neutral (see section "Defining Terrorism").

According to Crelinsten and Schmid (2012), the legitimacy of state violence is largely based on its respect for the rule of law.* These authors argue that terrorism and CT are best analyzed within the larger framework of political contestation, where both a governing regime (i.e., "forces of order" or "power holders") and an oppositional movement ("forces of change" or "power challengers") may choose between or combine violent and nonviolent tactics while perusing their respective political goals (Schmid and Jongman, 2005, pp. 56–9). Crelinsten (2013) also argues that when a state employs terrorism to combat terrorism (i.e., *counterterror*), the phenomena is correctly labeled

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* Crelinsten (2013) defines legitimate state violence in terms of predictability and accountability, and it could be said that it is this predictability that contributes to any sense of security within a state.

"state terrorism" (pp. 3–6). Thus, when a governing regime is confronted with the threat of terrorism, the CT continuum could be rewritten as

$$\text{Passivity} \leftrightarrow \text{State Counterterrorism} \leftrightarrow \text{State Terrorism}$$

Yet, in relation to the concept of CT as akin to state terrorism, two issues must be addressed. First, some critical theorists have inaccurately implied that all CT is state terrorism (see Poynting and Whyte, 2012). This inaccurate categorization stems from the failure to identify the attributes that define terrorism, that is, deliberately intimidating and indiscriminate violence (or threat thereof). This potential for confusion can justify the need to conceive CT as between passivity and counterterror/state terrorism. In other words, the CT can be defined as counterterrorist acts that are not deliberately intimidating and indiscriminate in the use or threat of violence. The less *state* CT falls under these two characteristics, the less it can be considered counterterror/state terrorism.

Second, state terrorism in its entirety is not necessarily CT. While state CT (defined as a reaction to terrorism) is logically impossible in the absence of terrorism, it is, nevertheless, empirically possible that the specter of terrorism be used as a pretext.[*] In this case, the state's use of terrorism is an action, and not a reaction. Moreover, a state can conduct (directly or indirectly) terrorism domestically or abroad without ever calling its practices "counterterrorism." Overall, the continuum of state CT can be seen as bounded by "state terrorism" on both sides: on the left, the threat of terrorism is absent; and on the right, the threat of terrorism is absent and used as pretext. For clarity's sake, we will use the neologism *pseudo-counterterror* when referring to the latter form. Thus, the state CT continuum can be more accurately represented as

$$\text{State Terrorism} \{\neq \text{Passivity} \leftrightarrow \text{State Counterterrorism} \leftrightarrow \text{State Counterterror}\} \neq \text{Pseudo-Counterterror}$$

BIAS IN TYPOLOGIES

Knowledge-production transparency is the foundation of ethical research. When forming the basic-level definition of CT, scholars must reflect upon the possibility of political bias. Within social science, there are essentially two types of scientists: those who seek objective knowledge and those who seek critical knowledge. Both types, however, have an ethical duty to make any potential for bias explicit. Specifically, researchers making normative critiques should make their values explicit, while researchers seeking to be as neutral and objective as possible must justify their choice of concepts (e.g., through criteria of conceptual goodness).

According to Crelinsten (2013, pp. 5–7), in the context of CT research, there are many ways to avoid political bias. One can, for example, focus on the behavior and communication of actors, at the expense of their intentions and goals, which requires a considerable amount of interpretation on the part of the researcher. Such a move, however, might be difficult if the conception of CT is specifically based on intentions and goals. Another way to avoid bias is to not omit the political dimension of terrorism and CT.

Proper conceptualizations are essential for avoiding bias (Schmid and Jongman, 2005, pp. 43–50). Consequently, these authors recommend avoiding actor-based typologies (for an example of an actor-based typology, see Figure 1.1). Actor-based typologies of terrorism and CT often conceal many assumptions concerning what types of actors exist, and which of these are the most interesting for policymaking or theorization (see e.g., Art and Richardson, 2007). To avoid bias, differences between developing states, nation-states, empires, democratic states, authoritarian states, totalitarian states, and so on, in the conduct of CT should be determined by a comparison of the empirical data, and not via *a priori* reasoning or via biased case selection.

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[*] Today, both democratic and authoritarian states are regularly accused of exaggerating the threat of terrorism or of miscategorizing nonviolent opposition as terrorism.

FIGURE 1.1 Levels of abstraction.

As shown, the definition of CT does not require an exclusive focus on CT as practiced by states. Yet, the vast majority of CT research does just this. For example, Schmid (2013) provides an actor-neutral definition, that narrows the field by reefing to state-specific means a "proactive effort to prevent, deter, and combat politically motivated violence directed at civilian and non-combatant targets, by the use of a broad spectrum of response measures—law enforcement, political, psychological, social, economic, and paramilitary" (p. 620). Similarly, Art and Richardson (2007) provide a definition of CT that does not specify the nature of CT actors, but limits terrorists to nonstate groups and limits the goals of CT to protection from violence. As such, they reason that CT refers to "combating or countering terrorism means devising policies to cause non-state groups that employ this technique to stop using violence to achieve their political goals (p. 1). According to Schmid and Jongman (2005, pp. 45–50), an alternative approach when seeking to conceptualize CT would be to use *political-orientation* as a defining feature. In this scenario, terrorism is defined as a tactic used by states and vigilantes, but also by many types of insurgents, such as revolutionaries, separatists, and single-issue actors (Schmid and Jongman, 2005, p. 48).

Overall, state CT should be conceived as a subtype of CT, and nonstate CT should be conceived as a diminished subtype, with both subtypes being situated at a lower level of abstraction (see Figure 1.1) (for more on conceptual hierarchies, see Collier and Levitsky, 1997, 2009). The fact that states currently tend to have a monopoly of legitimate violence, and that this explains why the vast majority of CT research focuses on state-led CT does not entail that no other types of actors could or do conduct CT. In fact, in the case of terrorism conducted by a state, it is quite conceivable that substate actors would conduct CT campaigns. Avoiding the study of CT by nonstate actors constitutes a political act on the part of the researcher, for it is an implicit judgment on who can legitimately conduct CT; it is a form of nonrecognition (on the politics of recognition, see Kochi, 2009; Schmitt and Ulmen, 2006). Not studying CT by nonstate actors is not inherently unethical, but not justifying this decision can constitute a source of bias. What is more, excessive focus on states at this conceptual level can potentially lead to a form of "concept stretching" (see section "Isolating Counterterrorism") (Collier and Mahon, 1993; Goertz, 2012, pp. 63–5; Locke and Thelen, 1995).

Now that we have reviewed some of possible opposite terms of CT, and proposed several ways to situate the basic-level definition between two poles, it is possible to address the secondary-level of the concept "counterterrorism," where the necessary or sufficient attributes are determined.

DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

The search for differentiation and "field relevance" requires that CT be distinguished from counterinsurgency (the contemporary version of which is often referred to as COIN), and thus that

terrorism be distinguished from insurgency. Unfortunately, just as in the study of CT, "conceptual misunderstanding" is a problem in the study of COIN (Rich and Duyvesteyn, 2012, p. 364). In want of a proper conceptualization, for now a brief overview of COIN will suffice to distinguish the concept from CT.

Both insurgency and COIN are contested concepts. In essence, both terrorism and insurgency represent a type of political violence, are conceptually independent from each other, and are potentially complimentary. It has been said that the defining characteristic of terrorism is not a specific political goal, but the tactics employed (i.e., the use of fear and violence against illegitimate targets). The defining characteristic of insurgency, however, is the specific political *goal* of removing "an established authority" (typically a state or an empire) and "building structures to take over power and political responsibility" (Rich and Duyvesteyn, 2012, pp. 360–70; Ucko, 2012, p. 71). For example, according to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) (2013), "insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region" (p. ix). In this sense, violent revolutionaries and violent anticolonialists are subtypes of insurgents.[*] Terrorism can have as goal the political control of a region; it can also have many other goals. Similarly, although insurgents can potentially use terrorism as a tactic, the use of terrorism is not in itself a defining characteristic of insurgency. A typical example of these terrorism/insurgency distinctions can be found in the writings of Ernesto "Che" Guevara (2002):

> It is necessary to distinguish clearly between sabotage, a revolutionary and highly effective method of warfare, and terrorism, a measure that is generally ineffective and indiscriminate in its results, since it often makes victims of innocent people and destroys a large number of lives that would be valuable to the revolution. Terrorism should be considered a valuable tactic when it is used to put to death some noted leader of the oppressing forces well known for his cruelty, his efficiency in repression, or other quality that makes his elimination useful. But the killing of persons of small importance is never advisable, since it brings on an increase of reprisals, including deaths (p. 60).

From this rapid comparison of insurgency and terrorism, we can move on to a comparison of CT and COIN. "Whether or not it is ethical to fight a particular counterinsurgency" is a question that cannot be answered via the definition of the concept (for more on the ethics of COIN, see Coker, 2012; Dixon, 2012). But due to the political nature of counterinsurgencies, the study of them will necessarily entail the same risks of political bias as encountered in the study of terrorism. Nor is it within the remit of this chapter to conduct an extensive classification of all the different actors, methods, aims, and goals of COIN. For example, much has been written on what is referred to as cyber warfare (CW), policing, robotics, peacebuilding, and so on. It will suffice here to give the general outlines of a conceptualization of COIN, thus allowing for a proper differentiation of this concept from CT.

In terms of aims, as with CT, COIN "is primarily a political struggle" (deCourrèges et al., 2010, p. 8; JCS, 2013, p. ix; Rich and Duyvesteyn, 2012, p. 360). Yet, as much as CT reacts to a political tactic, COIN reacts to a political goal. In fact, it could be argued that counterinsurgencies are political in a direct way (seeking to counter a threat to an authority), whereas CT is political in an indirect way (seeking to counter the *tactics* of a political threat to an authority).

In terms of actors, unlike the concept of CT, it is more difficult to imagine *substate actors* conducting COIN operations.[†] Like CT, COIN is essentially a "state-centric concept" (Rich and Duyvesteyn, 2012, p. 368). On the basis of the concept of the territorially delimited state, COIN operations can be conducted by the state authorities (i.e., government) or by external authorities

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[*] The concept of *revolutionary insurgents* includes those who seek political change on a global level.
[†] Although it can be argued that "reactionary" counterinsurgencies did exist in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, today most substate counterinsurgents are militias and private corporations serving as state proxies.

(i.e., an empire) (deCourrèges et al., 2010, pp. 5–6).[*] In practice, however, since insurgencies are typically "of, by and for the people," what differentiates the insurgent from the "counterinsurgent" is the legitimacy of the political violence in the eyes of the population (deCourrèges et al., 2010, p. 15).[†] Contemporary COIN scholars often debate the benefits of insurgent-centric operations versus more ambitious "population-centric" operations (i.e., coercing, coopting, and protecting populations) (Boyle, 2010; Forest, 2007; Rich and Duyvesteyn, 2012, p. 362; Ucko, 2012, pp. 72–6).[‡] Within this debate, the insurgent/counterinsurgent competition for popular legitimacy is a recurrent theme. David Kilcullen (2012), for example, states that "at the operational level COIN remains a competition between several sides, each seeing to mobilize the population in its cause." Thus, just as with CT, noncombatants are crucial to many definitions of COIN.

In terms of methods, nothing precludes insurgents from using terrorism. When this is the case, COIN operations can potentially involve some form of CT. Discovering the most efficient, effective, and ethical ways to counter an insurgency is one of the central research topics in the academic and practical study of COIN. Nothing precludes counterinsurgents from *resorting to terror* to defeat a threat to an established authority. Potential terrorist COIN methods could include "carpet bombing, chemical warfare, reprisals, massacre, torture, rape, starvation, [and] deportation" (Dixon, 2012). Thus, it could be said that it is logically possible for a COIN to take the form of state terrorism, just as it is possible for a state to use an inexistent insurgency to justify state terrorism.

Overall, what differentiates COIN from CT is the former's reference to irregular combatants and the latter's reference to irregular practices. These two subtypes of "irregular" political violence should not be confused.

ASCRIBING ATTRIBUTES TO COUNTERTERRORISM

The basic-level definition was discussed in relation to two of Gerring's (1999) criteria of conceptual goodness, namely familiarity and differentiation. In the review of the secondary-level, it will be necessary to keep familiarity and differentiation in mind, but will also be necessary to balance these against *parsimony* and *coherence*. A good concept is a concept that has few defining attributes (also referred to as dimensions).

> It should be pointed out that the distinction between the formal "definition"—the intension-and "accompanying properties" is rarely hard and fast. On this head, many hairs have been split. About all that one can say in general about this problem is that the benefits a prospective attribute may bring to a concept must be weighed against the desideratum of parsimony. A long intension, even if composed of closely related attributes, will create a cumbersome and unappealing semantic vehicle (Gerring, 1999, p. 371).

To seek coherence is to avoid synecdoche—the secondary-level definition should include all essential attributes. The coherence criterion also requires that the definitional attributes of the concept should be related in some logical or functional manner. In other words, if contradictory attributes apparently define a concept, those attributes that are essential to the meaning should be favored (Gerring, 1999, pp. 373–5). Hence, the goals of second-level concept formation are: (1) to not just list the attributes of the concept, (2) to be explicit about the necessary attributes, (3) to provide sufficiency criteria, and (4) to "make the conceptual structure explicit" (Goertz, 2012, p. 39). To order

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[*] Whether and how peacekeeping missions should/could be distinguished from COIN operations is subject that merits further conceptual reflection.

[†] In the Ukraine–Russia crisis of Spring 2014, Russia's alleged use of "little green men" (i.e., covert special operations) and in collaboration with local irregular forces can be considered both as an insurgency and COIN. This topic would be an interesting case study for both the definition of CT and COIN.

[‡] In this debate over gaining legitimacy versus eliminating threats, COIN authors often refer to the latter method as "counterterrorism." This definition of CT as limited to modern military approaches should not be confused with the general definition of "counterterrorism" presented in this chapter.

and structure definitional attributes according to their necessity and sufficiency, researchers may employ a number of different descriptive typologies (i.e., classical, radial, and family resemblance) (see Box-Steffensmeier et al., 2008, pp. 152–67).

According to the OED definition, CT can be defined as a purposive action; it is a goal-oriented practice. Yet, the dictionary-based definition failed to specify whether CT aimed to thwart or prevent: (1) deliberately indiscriminate violence, (2) deliberate intimidation, (3) the political goals of terrorism, or (4) all the above. It could be argued that these three goals are the attributes that define CT, but it could also be argued that whether they are necessary or sufficient for defining CT is unclear. Following once again an argumentation *a contrario*, it might be possible to infer the following three stipulations:

1. The less an action seeks to prevent deliberately indiscriminate violence, the less it resembles CT.
2. The less an action seeks to prevent intimidation, the less it resembles CT.
3. The less an action seeks to prevent the political goals of terrorism, the less it resembles CT.

These three stipulations are an ideal fit for the passivity/counterterror continuum (see section "Defining Terrorism"), for they serve as both boundary conditions and as definitional attributes.[*] Thus, along the lines of a security framework, a first goal of CT might be physical security; a second goal might be psychological security; and a third goal might be political security (for more on securitization, see Buzan et al., 1998).

As noted earlier, the political dimension of CT is contested. If one accepts the possibility of political neutrality, then determining whether a counterterrorist act is political can only be established empirically, on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, negotiating or conceding to terrorist demands can be one possible way of achieving the physical and psychological goals of CT (Browne and Dickson, 2010, p. 379; Shor, 2008, p. 52; Weill, 2014). Within the CT literature, making "concessions" is an emotionally loaded term that is also referred to as "political solutions"—the ethics and effectiveness of such measures remains controversial. Overall, it could be argued that "opposing the political goals of terrorism" is not a defining characteristic of CT. To the contrary, this aspect is regularly omitted.

The attributes logically *necessary* to define CT are thus the goal of physical security and the goal of psychological security. Functionally, this makes sense, for if the (threat of) violence *and* the fear of violence are removed, terrorism as a tactic is likely to be less effective (on psychological resilience and secruity, see Ganor, 2005, pp. 251–70; Henrotin, 2010; Posner, 2001, p. 682). Consequently, the overall structure of CT could be conceptualized in a hierarchical form. On this basis, we can analyze the secondary-level definition of CT through the prism of a two-dimensional *purpose-based* matrix (see Figures 1.2 and 1.3). Under this conceptualization, the two dimensions are not substitutable, and, together, they are sufficient to define CT.

It is also possible to understand CT solely in terms of physical security, that is, CT as an activity designed solely to prevent or thwart deliberate indiscriminate violence—after all, some typologies of terrorism completely ignore the terror of terrorism, and solely focus on the discriminate or indiscriminate use of violence (Martin, 2012). But such a secondary-level definition of CT would not differentiate it from activities designed to prevent deliberately indiscriminate violence in general. For example, ever since Hobbes wrote the Leviathan, the state has been conceived as a means to avoiding civil war, which is a form of indiscriminate violence. Yet, it would be illogical to deduce that all state actions are CT actions. For example, when the state seeks to prevent indiscriminate violence conducted for economic or personal reasons, this can hardly be called CT. Thus, if the

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[*] Sartori (1987) pejoratively refers to this as "degreeism," but nonarbitrary cut-off points (to distinguish CT from passivity and counterterror) can be determined, possibly via graded membership, during operationalization (see section "Isolating Counterterrorism"), that is, at the tertiary level of the concept. To repeat, extreme differentiation at a more abstract level could lead to concept stretching.

FIGURE 1.2 Levels of definition.

term CT is to be highly denotive and precise, it needs to keep either its political dimension or its psychological dimension—the goal of physical security appears to be a necessary, but not sufficient attribute of CT.

In fact, it could be argued that the psychological dimension is a defining characteristic of CT. Although this might distance the concept from its common definition, such a characterization would match perfectly the passivity/CT/counterterror continuum described earlier. In this sense, responses to (threats of) deliberately indiscriminate violence would be scored according to a continuous variable measuring to what extent the CT actor is seeking to build resilience amid the population of illegitimate targets (however defined) or monger fear amid the "innocent." Whether this reasoning is perfectly compatible with both targeted and indiscriminate forms of violence would have to be determined at the tertiary level (see section "Isolating Counterterrorism"). It is clear, however, that

FIGURE 1.3 Conceptualizing CT.

if one is scoring the aggregate measure of several acts of CT, and not just one specific act, it seems quite possible to view both physical security and psychological security as two dimensions of one continuum. The dimensions of these two goal-oriented acts could be represented as follows:

Passivity ↔ Intentional Physical Protection ↔ Intentional Indiscriminate
of the Innocent   Violence

Passivity ↔ Intentional Psychological Protection ↔ Intentional Widespread
of the Innocent   Intimidation

One way to remove the general ambiguity concerning which of the two attributes define CT would be, when operationalizing the concept, to weight the attributes differently according to criteria justified not by logic, but by the goals of the research project (Goertz, 2012, pp. 46–9). For example, the weighting could be justified in relation to what is being explained or via a functionalist ontology (mentioned above) (Goertz, 2012, pp. 46–8). Such a solution, however, is not without consequences. Embedding hypotheses into the concept, via the use of weights, requires that these hypotheses be tested empirically (Goertz, 2012, pp. 65–6).

OPERATIONALIZING COUNTERTERRORISM

The scientific study of CT also requires the development of valid and reliable indicators. Any empirical study of CT will require the concept structure to match the indicator structure. Such matching is called "concept-measure consistency" or "construct validity" (see section "State of the Art") (Goertz, 2012, pp. 95–107; Trochim, 2010). The lack of theorization and conceptualization in CT research causes most quantitative studies to have poor construct validity—in other words, these studies might often be measuring something else than CT (see e.g., Lum et al., 2006; Omelicheva, 2010; Shor, 2011).

One of the benefits of using a purpose-based typology (as opposed to an actor-based typology) is that it allows the indicators to be tailored to each actor-type (see section "Defining Terrorism"). In other words, intentionally not stipulating the actors at the basic and secondary levels allows for a comparison between different types of actors across space and time. A more discriminatory conception of CT (i.e., one that is state-centric) could lead to the problem of "concept stretching" (Goertz, 2012, pp. 63–5). Logically, the indicators designed to measure the presence or absence of physical and psychological security goals will vary according to the type of CT actor in question.

In general, collecting data on CT is difficult. No matter the actor, the majority of such activities are clandestine, or at least the goals of such activities are not made public. Moreover, as already mentioned, determining the intentions of an actor is quite a subjective task. In the study of state CT, for example, either *legal* or *event data* have often been used to study CT (see e.g., Omelicheva, 2010; Shor, 2011; van Dongen, 2010). Yet, social legal studies have demonstrated that studying CT through the sole lens of the law risks separating the goals from the actual practice, while studying CT through the sole lens of public event data risks separating the actual practice from the intended goals (Deflem, 2008). Thus, one way of studying state CT might be to combine these two data-types. If this approach were followed, scores could be given to states in terms of their intention to cause or prevent deliberately widespread intimidation and indiscriminate violence. The aggregation of both scores could be placed on the CT matrix depicted in Figure 1.3. Here, a form of graded membership between CT and counterterror could be conceived (for more on graded membership and fuzzy logic, see Decock and Douven, 2014).

More qualitative methods could also be used to rank activities (of state and nonstate actors) along a predetermined communication-based scale. Taking inspiration from the United States (US) Army's "spectrum of conflict" (White, 2006, p. 15) and the "mirror scheme" developed by Schmid and Jongman (2005, pp. 58–9), scholars could design a catalog of counterterrorist acts specific for

each actor-type. The state-centric CT literature, for example, is rich in typologies of CT methods that would fit nicely on the passivity to counterterror continuum—that is, from civil emergency planning, reduction of "root causes" and the use of nonterrorist-related legislation (i.e., rule-law model); to special legislation, extended surveillance, and indeterminate detention (preventive crime model); to targeted torture, targeted renditions, and targeted assassinations (war model); to general curfews, general censorship, and indiscriminate death squads (state terrorism model) (McCulloch and Pickering, 2009; Pedahzur and Ranstorp, 2001; Schmid and Jongman, 2005, pp. 58–9). Of course, the above is not an exhaustive review of all possible operationalizations, which would need to be specific to the research project in question. Concepts and their measures are often designed to address specific research questions (see section "State of the Art"). It is important, however, to understand that proper operationalization is contingent upon proper conceptualization—in empirical research, you cannot have one without the other.

CONCLUSION

It should be clear by now that the conceptualizations proposed earlier focus not on the actors, methods, or political issues involved in CT (what Aristotle (1999, Chapter 2, p. 9) called the efficient, material, and formal causes), but on the purpose of CT, that is, one the last or final causes. The justification for this teleological formulation was based on the definitions found in common language, thus guaranteeing a certain degree of familiarity for the term. In the latter variants proposed, CT was situated between two poles: *passivity* and counterterror. The justification for this was based on an argumentum a contrario that sought to demonstrate that common definitions tend to not stipulate any specific methods as the (necessary or sufficient) defining characteristics of CT. It was also argued that the common definitions of CT tend to not specify if a CT action seeks to counter the violence, the intimidation, or the political goals entailed in the definition of terrorism, or all of the above. Due to this definitional ambiguity, CT can potentially be taken as a form of political violence. On this basis, it was argued that the complete opposite of *passivity* in the face of a terrorist threat can be conceived as the use of terrorism (i.e., illegitimate political violence, "counterterror"), and that in the middle one finds the possibility of nonintimidating and nonindiscriminate CT activities (i.e., legitimate political violence). Defining legitimate violence, it was noted, is an eminently political act (Kochi, 2009). Consequently, it was argued that this ambiguity potentially leads to political bias in CT research. The final portion of this chapter focused on the specific attributes of CT, different ways of structuring them, and the many possible ways of operationalizing these attributes. The argument here was that operationalization requires both open-source data and proper conceptualization. The current absence of these two ingredients does not make scientific research in CT impossible, but it does pose a major obstacle. Overall, it was argued that the best way to improve the study of CT was for researchers to put more thought into the development of their concepts.

SUGGESTED READING

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2 The Socially Constructed Insurgency
Using Social Movement Theory as a Framework for Analyzing Insurgencies

Shane Drennan

CONTENTS

All China is littered with dry faggots, which will soon be aflame. The saying, "a single spark can start a prairie fire," is an apt description of how the current situation will develop. We need only look at the strikes by the workers, the uprisings by the peasants, the mutinies of soldiers and the strikes of students, which are developing in many places to see that it cannot be long before a "spark" kindles a "prairie fire" (Zedong, 1966, p. 7).

INTRODUCTION

Insurgencies[*] are social movements.[†] To contextualize insurgencies as social movements, one must consider their very social nature. Insurgencies are grassroots movements composed of socially charged and motivated actors, coordinating contentious violent action against a governing authority or authorities in response to some grievance(s) and a lack of agency within the existing political praxis, having the aim of significantly changing or overthrowing the sovereign as a means of affecting desired normative or policy change(s). This unconventional attempt to change the rules of the game, the established rules of the polity, is a socially constructed "Warden's Dilemma," which rallies against or altogether rejects the incumbent structure's power and requires the incumbent to revise policy or altogether step down.[‡] It is possibly because the social nature of insurgencies is overlooked[§] in favor of a military/political understanding of the phenomena that the social aspects and power of insurgencies are often a secondary consideration for battlefield commanders and policy-makers.[¶] On the other hand, those studying social movements are often more involved and interested in understanding what forms and informs these collectivities and are less concerned with affecting them.

Hence, the literature on insurgencies and counterinsurgency (COIN) is distinctly different from the literature on revolutions[**] and social movements. Whereas revolutions are not always insurgencies insofar as they are not always violent, there is indeed overlap between the two, more often than not, which beckons an overlap of scholarship. There is overlap in the concepts espoused by each of these types of literature, but it is not readily apparent because the lexicons are different (one is produced largely for the military and the other for academia) and the aims of the authors are different. As literature on insurgency and COIN is concerned with affecting the battlefield, its focus is the immediacy of causal mechanisms; the focus is on winning. Because of this focus, works on insurgency and COIN are often terse and even reductionist in their attempts at scientific understanding of the insurgency social movement. Their suggestions for pursuing a "winning" strategy attempt to reduce causation to "if A then B" or, more accurately "if A, B, C then D" strategies. Academia is more fascinated with

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[*] *Insurgencies* are defined herein as an "insurrection against an existing government, usually one's own, by a group not recognized as having the status of a belligerent" (Random House, n. d.). The rubric term "insurgency" generally encompasses both violent revolutions against reigning sovereigns by internal nonstate revolutionary groups as well as violent revolts against invading or occupying forces by nonstate insurgent groups. I chose to use a relatively unbiased dictionary definition of insurgency as the term is often defined in books and articles on the subject to meet or further the political objectives of the definer.

[†] *Social movements* are defined herein as the sum of the noninstitutional, socially compiled and organized inputs, and the episodic interactions and processes of a collectivity of people, ideas, and resources involved in public contention occurring outside of established institutional or organizational spheres, surrounding some grievance and advocating some normative or policy change. This definition is designed to represent a relatively comprehensive and inclusive understanding of social movements, from both the structuralist and culturalist perspectives within SMT. As such, it borrows from several sources, including, but not limited to Armstrong and Bernstein (2008, p. 11), Della Porta and Diani (2006), McAdam et al. (2003, p. 5), and Snow et al. (2007, pp. 3, 6–11).

[‡] Fierke created the Warden's Dilemma model as an evolution from the Prisoner's Dilemma. In the Warden's Dilemma, the prisoner rejects the choices presented and undermines the warden's mechanisms of power in such a way that the warden is forced to recognize the agency of the prisoner and thus negotiate the desires of the prisoner. For a full explanation of this model, see Fierke, (2012b).

[§] Daase (2007) explicitly notes that insurgencies are the most socially constructed types of war.

[¶] To be fair, it is now summarily required that battlefield leaders must not only be capable of finding and neutralizing networks of insurgents, they must also be providers of protection, medicine, basic social services, and jobs to the local populace among other things. They are essentially expected to be ambassadors with weapons—perfect Machiavellian Princes.

[**] Revolution is defined herein similar to Lawson (2005): Revolution is "the rapid, mass, forceful, systemic transformation of a society's principal institutions and organizations" instigated and driven by forces outside of and opposed to the reigning polity. I agree with Lawson that the difference between revolution and evolution is in the "scope, depth, and effect" of the change (pp. 479–480).

"understanding" in the tradition of Weberian *verstehen*,[*] followed closely by the desire to explain[†] and thus explore areas that are less obviously causally relevant. Although they may be functionally relevant within a broader ontology of causation such as that espoused by Kurki (2006, 2008), Social Movement Theory (SMT)[‡] approaches may not always appear to be useful to the insurgent/counterinsurgent. For instance, Eyerman and Jamison's (1991) approach explores the "cognitive praxis" of movements that "gives social movements their particular meaning or consciousness," which is informed largely by the movements epistemology and ontological construction of its environment. Surely, it is difficult for an infantry lieutenant to understand why (s)he should care about how modes of knowledge are innovated during social movements while (s)he is planning a patrol and concerned with the success of the mission and safety of his/her troops. However, upon digging into both sets of literature, it becomes clear that insights from SMT are useful and compatible with insurgency/COIN strategies and potentially elucidatory concerning some elements of insurgency that are either lacking an analytical framework or are overlooked altogether.

The perspective taken in this chapter treats agency as dialectic between the state (the locus of revolution and insurgency) and those agents with a mind to test their agency vis-a-vis the power of the state. In exploring this dialectic, it is useful to ask the following question: *What affects people's determination that they can and should risk action in order to make social, political, or normative gains against or altogether overthrow a ruling regime?* This question connects directly with the perception of agency and the change in perception of agency that sets the stage for massive violent revolt and insurgency and its decline. Political violence is not engaged in upon a whim or because of some single incident. It is the result of a seething disenchantment with the ruling regime that has been building for months, years, and even decades. Per the earlier-mentioned quote by Mao, once the prairie is necessarily dried, just a spark is sufficient to start the fire of insurgency.

In this chapter, I aim to highlight connections between the broad arguments and theories regarding insurgency, COIN, revolution, and SMT before recommending an analytical framework for understanding and affecting the social aspect of insurgencies and revolutions. As such, I first explore works produced by insurgents/revolutionaries as well as COIN theorists and commanders as the texts relate to the efficacious conduct of warfare. In that section, I draw out overarching themes within insurgency and COIN literature, and highlight the social aspects therein. I then engage the literature on revolutions and SMT as revolutions are often analyzed via an SMT framework. I find that, although the literature on revolutions/SMT champions myriad approaches to understanding this type of contention and conflict, there are some very useful parallels to the literature on insurgency/COIN. In conclusion, I suggest that insurgencies should be analyzed via a framework appropriate to their socially constructed and conducted nature and recommend which SMT approaches may provide the most immediately affective elements.

INSURGENCY AND COIN

Although warfare studies are littered with accounts and "lessons learned" from battlefield commanders and military scholars concerning insurgencies (Cassidy, 2006; Connable and Libicki, 2010;

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[*] To understand, as per Weber, is to contextualize phenomena socially, culturally, politically, and historically within the temporal and spatial places they occur. Smelser and Baltes (2001) relate the concept of verstehen as the scientist trying "to make empathetic sense of the phenomenon by looking for the perspective from which the phenomenon appears to be meaningful and appropriate" (pp. 16,165–70). In plainer language, verstehen is simply standing in the shoes and seeing through the eyes of the participant or participant-observer of the phenomenon.

[†] This point is highlighted by Caren (2013) who notes that SMT is "a discipline that favors explaining what happened and why instead of forecasting trends" (p. 364).

[‡] SMT is defined herein as a framework designed to study and explain phenomenon of the coalescence of an organized, noninstitutional collectivity created to challenge authority institutions or social norms. This definition is derived from the general concepts in Crossley (2002), Tarrow (1992), and Tilly (1978) excellent overview of the approaches to analyzing social movements to date. The nuances of the approaches in SMT will be further explicated below in the section dedicated to the subject.

Corum, 2008; Gordon and Perry, 2008; Hashim, 2005; Jones, 2008, 2010; Kilcullen, 2009a,b, 2010a,b; Malkasian and Marston, 2010; Rashid, 2012; Ricks, 2006, 2009; Ucko, 2009), there have been rare attempts to use a structured framework for analyzing a number of matters. Such matters include that which makes possible the coalescence and dissipation of these socially generated, grassroots movements beyond the proper application and structure of force, proper leadership and personnel, and the winning of the "hearts and minds" of the local populace. Authors of COIN texts either ignore or implicitly accept prima facie that the conditions facilitating an insurgency's beginning are sufficiently explained either by theories on traditional war (civil or state vs. state war) or by insurgency theorists—they are not. And, as the focus of COIN is the cessation of the insurgency, and theorists of the subject come largely from a military background, the tendency is to focus on the factors that are both evident and easily (I use the term "easily" relatively—nothing in war is easy) manipulated by battlefield commanders; largely force structure, leadership and personnel characteristics, and the engagement of the local populace. From the insurgents' perspective, insurgency leaders and theorists also generally champion force structure, personnel attributes, and integration with the local populace as the keys for both creating and winning an insurgency. While these are indeed important, this largely structuralist perspective effectively ignores other, and I argue equally pertinent, variables necessary to form and pursue an insurgency. As COIN is a response to insurgency, I explore the violent revolutionaries' perspective on force structure, integration with the local populace, and personnel attributes before moving to COIN theorists' dedication to these subjects.

Insurgency

Revolutionary commanders and scholars almost uniformly present the revolution as a comprehensive way of life for those involved, including elements of politics, social structures, culture, economics, warfare, and so on. However, there are three recurring themes throughout the literature from those who blueprint revolutions: the structure of forces (Ackerman, 2003; Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001a,b; Beckstrom and Brafman, 2006; Black and Drennan, 2006; Cozzens, 2009; Dobratz and Waldner, 2012; Guevara, 1961; Joosse, 2007, 2012), leadership and personnel (Al-Suri, 2004b, p. 923, 1127; Guevara, 1961, pp. 39–40; Lia, 2008, pp. 106, 443–5), and support from the local populace (Al-Suri, 2004b; Guevara, 1961; Moreno, 1970; Zedong, 2000). There is interplay between each of these themes so that one affects and influences the other, creating a fluid amalgamation of the above-noted elements ubiquitous in revolutionary warfare. With the notable exception of Al-Suri aside,[*] the instructions regarding how to properly utilize these themes to optimize the conditions necessary and sufficient for success is rather vague.

Force Structure

There are generally two types of structures proposed by insurgency theoreticians and strategists—a progression from network to hierarchy according to battlefield allowances, and the leaderless

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[*] Mustafa Setmariam Nasar (also known as Abu-Mus'ab al-Suri) is the most prolific writer on jihadi methods, strategy, life of the mujahedeen, and generally the execution of all things jihad. His 1600 page *magnum opus*, "The Call for Global Islamic Resistance" is just one of dozens of his works dedicated to a pragmatic analysis of the history of jihad that he uses as a basis for prescribing the proper execution of the modern day jihad. In his volumes of jihadi thought, though al-Suri goes to great lengths to detail just how the jihad should be waged in different environments, delineating between active jihadi (war)fronts and the largely conflict-free states that need to be engaged via his "system" of individual jihad. He also describes the characteristics that compose an ideal jihadi, which those involved in any component of the "global Islamic resistance" should strive for. However, even al-Suri is a bit light in theory and historical analysis of what composes and how to compose an ideal social milieu for pursuing the end-goal of a reestablished Caliphate. See Al-Suri (2004a).

resistance model with a recent progression of the leaderless resistance to a "swarming" model as was used in the "Arab Spring" revolts. As structure is the focus of most insurgency and COIN doctrines, I engage organizational, or force structure, models in some detail. I posit that these blueprints, while extremely important to the effective conduct and sustainability of battle, are only important insofar as they relate to the proper manipulation of the sociopolitical environment. The best organizational doctrine and tactics in the world are of no use if you have no adherent and motivated force behind them.

The first and most popular type of organizational dynamic proposed by insurgency leaders is the use of small networked-groups of highly trained and ideologically motivated fighters as the initial vanguard of an organization. The intent is to structure that force into a more traditional military as the insurgent group gains popular favor in the conflict milieu. Mao argues for a progression from small guerrilla groups to a more structured force from the first to third phases of the insurgency respectively (Zedong, 1967, pp. 212–4). For the most part, insurgency and revolution leaders have followed suit, advocating the use of guerrilla tactics and small, clandestine units for operations in the beginning of conflict, graduating to larger forces only after significant ground is gained against the military belligerent. The doctrines of Guevara (1961, 2003), Zarqawi (Black and Drennan, 2006), and Takfir wal-Hijra (Cozzens, 2009) are just a few of the many that follow Mao's model of a gradual buildup and introduction of hierarchical forces in order to maintain combat efficacy and superiority despite inferior weapons, established structures, and number of personnel. This is the most classic model of contemporary insurgency, which was used successfully in China, Vietnam, and, for a time, in Iraq.

Taking organizational design a step further are the proponents of leaderless resistance movements. Al-Suri's "Call for Global Islamic Resistance" capitalizes upon the religious concept of fard al-ayn, which is the Muslim's religious individual duty to answer the call of jihad of the sword when the ummah is under attack; a claim resounded in nearly every contemporary Global Salafi Jihadi (GSJ) text. As such, he champions a "system" of individuals learning and radicalizing from online sources and interacting with a lone, unconnected trainer, then carrying out multiple, small-scale attacks (Lia, 2008, pp. 443–55). The Earth Liberation Front (ELF) and Animal Liberation Front (ALF) operate in a similar, broadcast-recipient manner. They also lessen risk by encouraging adherents to do only what they can and eschewing killing, which reduces the moral dilemma of other, more violent movements (Ackerman, 2003; Joosse, 2007). Some within the far right and white power movements also advocate this "leaderless" model as being virtually impenetrable by law enforcement since only individuals can be neutralized, versus a group or network (Dobratz and Waldner, 2012).[*] However, in practice, the leaderless resistance model does not quite function as *leaderlessly* as evidenced by the ability of law enforcement organizations to continuously exploit links in the above-named organizations as a means of penetration and prosecution.[†] This is likely because the actions required of insurgents and revolutionaries weigh so heavily on the personal psyche that most individuals[‡] require

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[*] Also of note, nonviolent organizations (NVOs) and legal or groups not sought by law enforcement seem to employ the leaderless movement model best as noted in Beckstrom and Brafman (2006).

[†] For example, the 2006 "Operation Backfire," a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) initiative that identified and led to the capture and prosecution of several ELF adherents belonging to a large ELF network known as "The Family," is evidence that not every "elf" acts alone or in "small groups." The methods used by the FBI to identify and capture "The Family," common intelligence channels relying on exploiting network connections, are proof that the ELF is not as diffuse and impenetrable as once believed by authorities. See FBI (2008).

[‡] The rare exceptions to this are the "two percent" as Grossman (1996) calls them, or lone wolf cases such as Timothy McVeigh wherein individuals are so radicalized, dedicated, and potentially predisposed to violence that they are wholly willing and sometimes have a desire to act without interaction and support from even the most like-minded extremists. See Grossman (1996, pp. 177–85).

some sort of social interaction for logistical support, operational information, direction, and, most importantly, reaffirmation of the righteousness of their intended actions.[*]

Most recently, however, the events of the "Arab Spring" give indications that Arquilla and Ronfeldt's (2001a,b) concept of "swarming" may prove to be an extremely useful transmutation of the leaderless resistance model if state security and intelligence organizations are unable to effectively stymie broadcast communications lines. In the "Arab Spring" revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia and, to some extent in Libya and Syria, this model was used successfully as evidenced by the toppling of the first three named governments and in combatting the fourth. In the cases of Egypt and Tunisia, the use of social media broadcast systems such as Twitter, Facebook, blogs, and grassroots media outlets created such an overwhelming response of popular support that violence in the form of a full-scale insurgency was unnecessary to force the governments to cede power (Stephen, 2012). Because of the success of these broadcast communications systems, the peaceful revolutions of the "Arab Spring" are often given the moniker of the "Facebook Revolution,"[†] both by revolutionaries and the established official media of the world.

LEADERSHIP AND PERSONNEL

Regarding the proper type of person needed to carry out the fight, Mao, Guevara, and al-Suri agree that the cadre must be composed of individuals wholly dedicated to both the physical fight and the overarching social reform. Mao determines that officers in the guerrilla army must have "great powers of endurance so that in spite of any hardship he sets an example to his men," and "be able to mix easily with his people" with a spirit of "strengthening the policy of resistance." Mao noted that the most important characteristic of a guerrilla fighter is "loyalty to the idea of people's emancipation" insofar as every other important characteristic will develop from that loyalty (Zedong, 2000, pp. 85–6). Guevara (2003) went so far as to say that each warrior must be "a true priest of the reform to which he aspires," constantly engaging and reinforcing his beliefs through teaching and dialog (pp. 39–40).

Al-Suri, more than any previous insurgency strategist, wrote extensively (and fervently) on the need for turning men excited by the prospect of engaging in their romanticized concept of the battle against an oppressor into a cadre of wholly educated and indoctrinated scholar-fighters. Al-Suri's (2004a) recommended path of jihad was taken from Ali's[‡] response to non-Muslims who wished to join him in battle: "Become a Muslim, then fight" (p. 1127). This stems from his observation that many of the mujahedeen he encountered seemed less committed to the cause than he perceived, declaring, "people come to us with empty heads and leave us with empty heads" (Lia, 2008, p. 106). To rectify these deficiencies Al-Suri (2004a) proposes (and has long championed) a deep ideological education encompassing religion, politics and statecraft, and warfare in order to "use the best and most suitable methods during the stages of jihad which will help him to avoid repeating the same mistakes" (p. 923)—a process that may take years before they are truly prepared to begin fighting. There is variation in what are believed to be necessary requirements for an insurgent, revolutionary, or jihadist between these authors. But, the common notion throughout most insurgency authors'

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[*] Grossman (1996) overtly reiterates this point. Sageman's (2004) studies of terrorists—individuals who are undoubtedly dedicated to a group willing to kill—notes that terrorists, like all other humans, are social animals and are drawn to join groups in large part due to social bonds. Even his typology of "leaderless jihad" and the cases he attributes to that moniker is a socially constructed group of individuals, which varies significantly from al-Suri's idealized suggestion of individual jihad. In fact, in Sageman's book, *Leaderless Jihad*, he offers very little discussion of individuals acting outside a proximal group of like-minded individuals and seems to assume that a small "bunch of guys" guided by broadcast Internet "commanders intent" is the smallest functional terrorist unit. See Al-Suri (2004a, p. 1398), Lia (2008, pp. 443–65), and Sageman (2004, pp. 99–174, pp. 152–8).

[†] I use this phrase as it is commonly used to describe the actions aimed at overthrowing the sovereigns in these countries. A series of Google searches using the phrase "Facebook revolution" combined with the terms "Egypt," "Tunisia," "Syria," "Libya," and "Arab spring" resulted in over 100,000 hits when run on November 29, 2012.

[‡] Ali ibn Abu Talib—the 4th rightly guided Caliph according to Sunni Muslims.

texts is that the nonstate fighter requires political, social, moral, and personal motivation far beyond what a professional state trained and funded soldier needs to fight and persevere.

THE LOCAL POPULACE

Mao, Guevara, and the contemporary Salafi jihadi current are a few of the many who suggest that the key to a successful insurgency is the indigenous population and operating environment. Mao's famous quote, "the guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea" is the basis of his theory on effective insurgency warfare—that those wanting to promote and commit violence against a government force must make themselves an integrated part of the operational environment. As such, Mao warned guerrillas about hostilities against the populace, noting that because "guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them; it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation" (Zedong, 2000, p. 44). Every learned insurgent since Mao has tried to apply this concept. Guevara too notes: "The guerrilla fighter needs full help from the people of the area. This is an indispensable condition." Guevara relies heavily on the local populace for logistics and intelligence, suggesting that once the government security forces begin a large-scale assault on the foco (Guevara's term for the guerrilla cadre responsible for the instigation of the security forces and rallying the people to action), the populace will undoubtedly rally in favor of the foco as an antivenin response to the security forces' previous repressive and criminal actions (Guevara, 1961; Moreno, 1970). Even for millenarian and absolutist outfits such as al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Taliban, the local population has become a concern in response to the Salafi jihadi failures in Algeria, Iraq, and waning support for the GSJ elsewhere.[*] The Taliban's "code of conduct," published in 2009, shows a shift away from their authoritarian and repressive dogma to a more "friendly" modus operandi designed to lessen the use of violence as the preferred means of coercion for support.[†] Likewise, Abu-Mus'ab al-Suri criticized AQ for their exclusivity and self-righteous, elitist attitude toward the Taliban and the local populace in Afghanistan because of AQ's determined proper reading and implementation of the Sunnah and fiqh.[‡]

The focus of insurgency and revolutionary theorists regarding the people is the necessity of the violent forces to be accepted and integrated into the populace mostly for logistical reasons, with little attention given to how the insurgent force must mobilize new, local recruits. The assumption seems to be that the local and indigenous population will fall in line ideologically simply because the revolutionaries and insurgents are righteous and active participation then becomes a function of cost–benefit analysis swayed by the classic coercion and deterrence theory of carrots and sticks.[§] I argue that there is much more to this issue than ideological alignment to the righteous and that the manipulation of socio-political perspectives of the local populace is the key to encouraging a shift from passive or active nonviolent support to the violent insurgency.

It is evident that, although insurgency theorists understand that there are necessary and sufficient conditions for an insurgency to occur and be successful, there is little understanding of how to generate those conditions. For instance, Guevara (1961) suggests, regarding the precipitous effect of the seeds of revolution, "[i]t is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can create them" (p. 7). However, he gives no description of what those conditions are. Each of the above-named insurgency theorists gave only vague reference to what actions will create an environment conducive to and supportive of a successful guerrilla war. While it is tempting to

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[*] The recent popular rejection of the attacks in Benghazi against the United States (US) consulate as well as the calls by Tunisian political activists for the rejection of violence and the Salafi influence within the nascent government are two of the numerous examples sparked by the "Arab Spring" events of 2011–12.

[†] The Taliban's new code of conduct is a prime example of this strategy. See Foundation (2009).

[‡] Islamic jurisprudence based on Islamic law termed Shari'a in Arabic. These criticisms are lodged throughout the first seven chapters of Al-Suri (2004a).

[§] For one of the more popular and classic texts on deterrence theory, see Schelling (1966).

suggest that these theorists allow for interpretation in the immediate local context by guerrilla leaders, it is more likely that their theories are, at times, conjecture based on a single experience. While focusing on force structure, leadership, and personnel as well as the manipulation and utilization of the local populace are undoubtedly important during insurgency wars; those wanting to start an insurgency are left with an outline for conducting combat, but with no direction regarding what is necessary and sufficient for starting the conflict in the first place.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

Contemporary COIN experts have (rightly) attempted to direct the focus of COIN strategy away from the proper manipulation and application of the military and force as the key to stamping out an insurgency toward more innovative approaches inclusive of lessons learned from battlefield experience (Amos et al., 2007; Galula, 1964; Hammes, 2004; Kilcullen, 2009a, 2010a; Kitson, 1971; Mack, 1975; Moyar, 2009; Nagl, 2002; Ney, 1961; Sloan, 2002). In general, former military commanders also champion organizational structure (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001a,b; Galula, 1964, pp. 65–6; Hammes, 2004; Lind et al., 1989; Nagl, 2002, p. 192), leadership (Galula, 1964, pp. 66–7; Hammes, 2004; Lind et al., 1989; Nagl, 2002, pp. 192–204; Taber, 1970, pp. 1–24), and garnering support from the local populace (Galula, 1964, pp. 1–28, 53; Gray, 2006, p. 20; Kitson, 1971, pp. 15–8, 29–32, 49–63, 71–7; Ney, 1961, pp. 47–63, 121–34, 145–65; Rid, 2009, pp. 190–204; Tzu, 1971, pp. 63–4), reflecting a counteractive approach to the goals of insurgency commanders and theorists. Additionally, there are numerous authors on COIN warfare who promote similar "magic bullets" for winning insurgencies.[*] But, as Zedong (1967) noted,

> epistemologically speaking, the source of all erroneous views on war lies in idealist and mechanistic tendencies on the question. People with such tendencies are subjective and one-sided in their approach to problems. They either indulge in groundless and purely subjective talk, or, basing themselves upon a single aspect of temporary manifestation, magnify it with similar subjectivity into the whole of the problem…Therefore, only by opposing idealist and mechanistic tendencies and taking an objective and all-sided view in making a study of war can we draw correct conclusions on the question of war (p. 12).

I argue that no single proposed approach for combating insurgency is complete—a synthesis of these and other approaches is necessary.

Force Structure

The most prominent suggestion for defeating insurgency is the restructuring of forces. This often involves the remaking of a significant portion of conventional forces in the image of insurgency forces so that they are agile, cognizant of the entirety of the war and how their actions affect it, and independent enough to make operational and tactical decisions at very low levels. Nagl (2002) promotes an organizational restructuring of forces involved in insurgency campaigns, which encourages optimal organizational learning and adaptation per the engaged environment, arguing in his comparative analysis of the conflicts in Malaya and Vietnam that, "organizational effectiveness in the two conflicts required organizational change" (p. 192). He recommends that force structure and unit tactics be handled at the tactical levels with only guidance and input from the garrison command to facilitate implementation and occasionally temper the battlefield commander's ideas. Galula (1964) suggests that, while command must be central and indeed in the hands of the political leadership in order to maintain coherent political strategy, the deployed forces must remain light and mobile with support forces (still fairly light) not far behind (pp. 65–6).

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[*] Building projects and better intelligence are two approaches outside the force structure, leadership, and personnel, and local populace support suggestions. See Flynn et al. (2010) and Kilcullen (2009a,b, pp. 153–4).

Hammes (2004) and Lind et al. (1989) in their discussions of "fourth generation warfare" (4GW) concur with many of Nagl's ideas.[*] In explaining their generations of warfare model, Hammes (2004) and Lind et al. (1989) argue that the current military structure is unsuited to the most prominent type of wars in which militaries will engage in henceforth, namely technologically proficient insurgencies. To successfully combat adversaries employing 4GW strategies and tactics, Hammes (2004) and Lind et al. (1989) champion a large-scale restructuring of much of the military into forces closely resembling special operations wherein small, mobile teams of fighters who are both well trained in innovative combat techniques and well versed in the local polity and information operations are given the leeway to operate how they see fit to carry out the strategic guidance issued by the commander (Hammes, 2004; Lind et al., 1989). Regarding the proper application of small, mobile units, Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001a, b) recommend a swarming technique against insurgents where numerous small COIN units deployed throughout an area can coalesce and overwhelm an insurgent unit when identified at the proper time and setting.

LEADERSHIP AND PERSONNEL

In leading these redesigned forces, there is an obvious need for a particular type of leader, different from the leader of conventional warfare insomuch as they are able to conceive of the environment in which they are engaged as something more than a combat arena. It is generally acknowledged that the proper leader of COIN forces, at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, must be cognizant of the political (Galula, 1964, pp. 66–7; Taber, 1970, pp. 1–24) (and cultural) milieu in order to capitalize upon that key battleground—the "hearts and minds" of the local populace. For instance, Nagl (2002) suggests that visionary leaders with the knowledge of and courage to fight for and implement comprehensive "political-military-economic" strategies in concert with innovative tactics are the type of individual necessary to lead effective COIN campaigns (pp. 192–204). To take this archetype one step further, Hammes (2004) and Lind et al. (1989) encourage the reconfiguration of a large section of the military into small, mobile units, which are led by individuals as well versed in the political, social, cultural, and strategic aspects of their conflict as prescribed by Abu-Mus'ab al-Suri noted earlier.

THE LOCAL POPULACE: "HEARTS AND MINDS"

The idea of "winning hearts and minds" is one drummed into the heads of today's Western military personnel involved in COIN campaigns.[†] However, the concept of gaining and maintaining the will of the populace during war is one with a long history. In probably the most widely read military treatise, "The Art of War" by Sun Tzu (1971), the first, and most important "fundamental factor" of war is "moral influence," which is what "causes people to be in harmony with their leaders, so that they will accompany them in life and unto death" (pp. 63–4). In the centuries to follow, the will of the people has been a, if not the, key factor in war and warfare. In contemporary literature, Ney and Kitson (Kitson, 1971, pp. 15–8, 29–32, 49–63; Ney, 1961, pp. 47–63, 121–34, 145–65) suggest that manipulating the populaces' perception of the righteousness of the guerrilla campaign is the key to collapsing insurgencies. Galula (1964) suggests that the answer to cultivating an indigenous counterinsurgent force is identifying the "active minority against the cause" and using them to garner support from the "neutral majority" (p. 53). Herein Galula (1964, pp. 11–28) hints at developing frame resonance in the form of a cause and identifying political opportunity through the weaknesses of the counterinsurgent, hinting at some of the aspects that SMT champions. Kitson (1971, p. 51) further proposes implementing "popular projects" as a means for (re)gaining the support of

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[*] 4GW is essentially another term for contemporary insurgency warfare. Hammes (2004) and Lind et al. (1989) reference Mao's insurgency formula as the epitome of 4GW.

[†] Author's own experiences in Afghanistan in 2001–2, and Iraq in 2003 and 2005.

the people relative to the opposition, a suggestion strongly encouraged more recently by Kilcullen (2009a). In nearly every text on COIN, authors pay some respect to the notion of "hearts and minds," even if a mere mention of the centrality of this battleground. However, the only recommendations these scholar-practitioners give is that we need to understand why "they" are fighting and counter it. Understanding the "cause" insurgents are fighting for is one thing; countering their desire to pick up arms is another altogether. What is ignored is that there is a difference between encouraging people to not believe in a cause and encouraging people to pick up or lay down arms.

As a corollary to "hearts and minds," numerous authors note the need for good and comprehensive intelligence of the insurgency battleground as a key factor in defeating the insurgent force. Most authors note that comprehensive and current intelligence concerning insurgents as well as the local populace is necessary in order to win "hearts and minds" by constructing effective information operations campaigns.[*] For instance, Kilcullen (2010b) suggests that intelligence gathered by forces designed for other-than-intelligence purposes (especially law enforcement services) should be utilized to collect intelligence on the milieu, especially "grassroots political intelligence" in order to develop a thick understanding of how the local populace perceives the conflict environment (pp. 153–4). Recently, "human terrain" has become been employed in military operations involved in, or potentially involved in, conflicts which require a nuanced understanding of the local populace in order to effectively promote the counterinsurgent's interests (McFate, 2010, pp. 190–204). And, force is indeed a key component of any COIN campaign, Gray (2006) posits that, "[t]he key to operational advantage in COIN is timely, reliable intelligence" (p. 20). In sum, intelligence is critical to winning an insurgency; however, it is the proper collection, type, and application of that intelligence in political and military actions designed to effectively counter the insurgency which remains without much guidance beyond "go counter the insurgency."

In each of these COIN approaches, authors champion some fix for the situation, only inadvertently hinting at the possibility of changing what I identify below as the conditions, which allow and facilitate the insurgency to continue and grow, and completely ignoring the possibility of prevention where COIN-style forces are deployed in (initially) peaceful intervention capacities. Indeed, battlefield commanders must be most concerned with the immediate effective employment of force and the proper application of force is a key component to successful COIN. Additionally, force structure, leadership and personnel characteristics, and the engagement of locals through "hearts and minds" campaigns are integral to COIN. However, the design within which these tactics, techniques, and procedures is conceptualized and implemented is flawed and should be filtered through a socio-political approach to warfare (SMT as the most appropriate filter) in order to quicken and encourage lasting success. As a counter to Mao's most apt wisdom, if you poison the water, you kill the fish.

Recently, some have attempted to view insurgency and COIN through the lens of SMT. However, the work done to date often relies on a structuralist, rational choice perspective of SMT and seems to make assumptions that both the sociological and choice elements in the concerned populaces' minds are binary; that is to say that the authors believe that framing, resources, mobilization structures, and political opportunity either exist or do not, and that people's choices are either to fight for the insurgents or the counterinsurgents.[†] The reality of the battlefield and the socio-political environment is never that neat. Moreover, a binary view of the socio-political elements that allow and instigate revolutions/insurgencies ignores the fact that framing, resources, mobilization structures, political opportunities, identity, and other elements of social movements are omnipresent in some

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[*] Although this concept is ubiquitous in any study of war and warfare, authors such as Kitson (1971, pp. 71–7), Ney (1961, pp. 122–4), and Flynn et al. (2010) call for a focus of intelligence upon the local populace in order to understand the human terrain in which the counterinsurgent must operate; this is of course in addition to intelligence regarding the insurgents themselves.

[†] See Lewis and Metzger (2009), Lopacienski et al. (2011), and Simmons (2009). It is notable that there seems to be a budding insurgency/SMT nexus from the US Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), likely excited by the staff there who have worked significantly with SMT; namely Mohammed Hafez, John Arquilla, Anne Marie Baylouny, Sean Everton, and Doowan Lee.

form and that there is no clear formula for identifying where "cognitive liberation"[*] reaches critical mass and the movement explodes on the streets. The cases of dictatorships throughout the Middle East, which ruled with iron fists for decades and were constantly challenged by illicit organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah, Takfir wal-Hijra, Hamas, and Hezbollah, are evidence that simply being unpopular and not meeting expectations and needs of the populace, the presence of opposition mobilization structures, and political opportunity are not binary necessary and sufficient conditions for creating a viable insurgency. However, this foray into the utility of SMT regarding insurgencies is a welcome advance of the study of countering insurgency from a social movement perspective as social movement studies of insurgencies and revolutions are generally concerned most with how they form and what that form is during the period of contention.

REVOLUTION AND SMT

Revolutions, unlike insurgencies, are almost prima facie analytically accepted to be social movements[†] aimed at the mass replacement or overthrow of the reigning regime. As such, most literature assessing revolutions relates heavily to SMT. In this section, I first engage some of the more prominent works on revolutions before dividing some of the more relevant and prominent SMT approaches into useful temporal compartments for analyzing revolutions and insurgencies. Approaches to understanding revolutions have largely evolved concurrent with theories of international relations and sociology. Early texts regarding revolutions were largely focused on structure (the state) as it relates to the creation and cessation of revolutions. Further, as with international relations (IR) and sociology, early theories borrowed heavily from economics theories as they relate to market structure forces influencing consumer behavior. These theories were applied wholesale to both fields of IR and sociology where the structure of the problem is equated to the market and the actions of the actors within the structure are equated to consumer behavior.[‡] In sociological approaches to revolutions, the more recent "culturalist" literature has given thought, and in many cases, more weight, to agents and agency,[§] although in analyzing causality, the focus still remains upon the agency of elites.[¶]

   The structuralist vein of theories on revolution favor analysis of the structure and behavior of the state as the key to the creation and cessation of revolutionary movements. Skocpol (1979), for instance, gives preponderance to the "objective relationships and conflicts among variously situated groups and nations rather than the interests, outlooks, or ideologies of particular actors in revolution" (p. 17). "State-centered" analyses regarding revolutions focus on states policies and actions with regard to its constituents and can be categorized as Goodwin (1997) has into four perspectives: (1) state autonomy, (2) state capacity, (3) political opportunity, and (4) state constructionist.[**] State autonomy analyses are concerned with state leaders' conquest for power, both for the state and for themselves, and how that affects those within the civil society.[††] Skocpol (1979) argues

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[*] Cognitive liberation is the point in time where a mass of society recognizes a systemic wrong and its own agency for change, and acts in order to correct the wrong. For further reading on cognitive liberation, see McAdam (1999) and Nepstad (1997).

[†] Note that revolutions are a type of social movement. To be clear, I am not suggesting that all social movements are revolutions.

[‡] For examples of structuralist approaches to analyzing revolutions, see Gleditsch and Ruggeri (2010), Goodwin (1997), Lachmann (1997), Mann (2003, pp. 723–39), McAdam et al. (2003), Migdal (1988), Skocpol (1979), Smelser (1965), Tarrow (1992), and Tilly (1978).

[§] See Armstrong and Bernstein (2008), Collins (2001), Eyerman and Jamison (1991), Foran (1997), McAuley (1997), Melucci (1980), Moghdam (1997), and Selbin (1997).

[¶] See Eckert and Jenkins (1986), Goldfrank (1979), and Lachmann (1997).

[**] Goodwin's (1997) term is used here as it is the most apropos and more descriptive than the rather generic "structuralist" term which describes a much broader analytical cant throughout the social sciences.

[††] Mann suggests that this can be overcome by placating the most threatening section(s) of the civil society and repressing those posing less of a threat through acquiescing policies favorable to the greatest threat and palatable to the ruling regime (Mann, 2003, pp. 723–39).

that revolutions only occur because of "the emergence of politico-military crises of state and class domination" as they relate to the autonomy of the state's regime (pp. 3–32). Once state policies' and actions' negative effects upon its constituents reach a critical mass, a revolution needs only resources, leadership, and a catalyst to occur. State capacity approaches can be likened to Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT), but from the state perspective wherein a state loses the monopoly on violence because it lacks the ability to "appropriate resources for particular purposes and to regulate people's daily behavior" and mobilizes the population extensively (Migdal, 1988, p. 261).[*]

The political opportunity approach to revolutions is taken directly from social movement theorists, namely Tilly (1978) and Tarrow (1992). This approach suggests that opportunities are made either by schisms within the ruling elite, an increasing struggle between competing elites, or an opportunity created, at least in part, by the revolutionaries themselves, wherein the state lacks the capacity to remove the opportunity before revolutionary leaders capitalize upon it.[†] Finally, the state constructionist approach moves toward a culturalist approach, but does so from the perspective of the state. This approach suggests that states' actions that shape identities, grievances, social bonds, and other aspects of its constituents culture are key to understanding how and why states are to blame for the actions of their peoples (Goodwin, 1997, pp. 13–4). Unfortunately, the state-centered structuralist perspective goes so far as to suggest that the reasons revolutions occur, both how and why, are able to be deduced solely from the policies and actions of the state. While it is true that the state must maintain centrality in analysis of revolution because political revolutions are indeed aimed at the state, revolutions involve (at least) two parties. Ignoring the opposition in an analysis of revolutions and insurgencies is unwise to say the least.

The events of the "Arab Spring" force a rethink of the state-centric structuralist approaches, at least in part, insomuch as multiple revolutions throughout the Middle East snowballed from a series of events in Tunisia with little change in state policy or state autonomous wielding of power. To use the term most representative of the events and the media through which they transpired, revolution "went viral." Whereas states remained the focus of these revolutions and their policies, and actions were undoubtedly the reason these revolutions were able to occur, the timing and means of contention of the revolutions had more to do with the agents and the people of the revolutions than the states.[‡] To further my suggestion to move away from a severely structuralist perspective is the conspicuous lack of the role of elites, even on the movement side, in the recent "Arab Spring" revolutions, possibly a harbinger of the future of revolutions.

For most of history, revolutionary movement formation was often instigated, or at least spearheaded, by elites opposed to the ruling regime.[§] Given that elites had access to the public eye via both formal and informal media outlets, it was often necessary to include elites in a revolution in order to better the chances of success. Moreover, elites opposed to the ruling regime often used promising revolutionary movements as a means for bandwagoning their way to dethroning the ruling party. However, the cases of the "Arab Spring" revolutions are evidence that grassroots insurgencies utilized by bandwagoning elites may become more prevalent with the diffusion of media power to anyone with a computer, an Internet connection, and a talent for persuasive and energizing arguments. This loss on the monopoly of media power indicates that elites may be less significant in the formation of a revolution, but are likely still integral to movement's formal integration into polities. Moreover, new elites may be born of revolutions rather than created. Though it is still too early to tell, future revolutions may be becoming increasingly driven by grassroots social factors and increasingly less by the political structure.

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[*] It is also a point made by Wiktorowicz and Hafez (2004).
[†] See Gleditsch and Ruggeri (2010), Lachmann (1997), Smelser (1965, pp. 203–17), Tarrow (1992), and Tilly (1978).
[‡] Regarding perceptions and "repertoires of contention," see McAdam et al. (2003), Selbin (1997), and Tilly (1978, p. 143).
[§] Indeed, the emphasis of elites is so heavy in scholarship on revolutions, that some assert that revolutions can only happen because of conflict of elites. See Eckert and Jenkins (1986) and Lachmann (1997).

Most proponents of the culturalist approach contend that they are unconcerned with causation questions in revolutions. But, they recommend that the culture of revolution, or the social aspects which compel revolution, must be read as dialog with state policies and actions. Unfortunately, they give little indication as to how the analysis of that dialog contributes to the greater question: *Why revolution?* In essence, culturalists champion an understanding of how agency develops in revolution with little attention to explaining causation, giving the state and structure a far backseat role in the fomenting of revolutionary inclinations by a previously content or doxic (to use Bourdieu's [2005] term)* populace. Culturalist SMT scholars investigating revolutions suggest analyzing framing and frame resonance (although only a few term their analyses as such) as it relates to collective memory of action and state reaction (Selbin, 1997), identity formation in the socio-political milieu (McAuley, 1997; Moghdam, 1997), and political culture (Foran, 1997) to name a few perspectives. Some give attention to causation, but purport that through understanding various aspects of the culture of a revolution, we become able to interpret and predict how revolutions coalesce and effervesce as well as why they succeed or fail. However, the complaint lodged by the structuralists and those championing a state-centric approach is valid—as the state is the central point of contention, it must also maintain centrality in the analysis of contention. More to the point of the structuralists, culturalist perspectives that eschew the role of the state in favor of culturally constructed aspects of revolution fail to maintain theoretical relevance across multiple cases, or contain too many vague and unclassifiable elements to be of use over a set of comparable cases for understanding why revolutions occur. Fortunately, most proponents of a culturalist approach to analyzing revolutions do suggest that the culture of revolution, or the aspects which compel revolution, must be read as dialog with the state. But, just to say that there must be a dialectic† analytical model is not enough. Analysts and policy makers need to know what has greater or lesser pertinence in immediately affecting revolution. There is also the question of when something is more or less important—it is not static.

Braudel's (2009) suggestion of mixing longue durée and short-term studies of events is particularly salient for studying social movements. His approach to understanding is best clarified in his 1949 article on la longue durée:

> if one wants to understand the world, one has to determine the hierarchy of forces, currents, and individual movements, and then put them together to form an overall constellation. Throughout, one must distinguish between long-term movements and momentary pressures, finding the immediate sources of the latter and the long-term thrust of the former (p. 182).

Taking this suggestion, that which affects contention can be divided into four general temporal phases. In these phases, different culturalist and structuralist aspects of a social movement have varying degrees of importance and salience. They are predisposition, constitutive conditions, causal mechanisms, and dynamics of feedback.‡

1. *Predisposition:* This includes the set of cultural, social, economic, and political variables that are largely static and grounded in the history of the society in question and

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* Bourdieu uses the term "doxa" to refer to the "universe of tacit presuppositions that organize action within the field" (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 37). A doxic populace is bound by what they perceive to be possible in a given historically and socially constructed milieu or "field."

† A term and concept used and championed by Bourdieu in his approach to understanding the relationship, a dialectical one, between structures and agents. See Bourdieu (1977, pp. 72–87). For Bourdieu, structures and agents reciprocally inform and shape one another, dialectically forming the structures and rules of power, agency and contention.

‡ A more philosophical approach and framework that mirrors this is Aristotle's "four causes" which suggests that materials (material causes), forms and formation of those materials (formal causes), actions (efficient causes), and end-state goals (final causes) are the four different aspects that compose the entirety of any "why" question we may have. Recently, Kurki used this Aristotelian framework to draw together various approaches within international relations and the same could be done for social movements. See Kurki (2006, 2008).

predispose it to activities that may lead to or result in political revolutionary actions (e.g., rigid and/or repressive regimes, proclivity to protest, extrajudicial responses to crimes, violence as an accepted problem solving mechanism, etc.). SMT approaches that are most relevant here are longue durée studies of identity (Cesari, 2007; Cohen, 1985; Gamson, 2009; Hatina, 2007; Hayes, 2011; Jasper and Polletta, 2001), Marxist and Gramscian analyses of class contention and cultural "counter-hegemony," and collective memory and shared history (Makdisi and Silverstein, 2006; Tilly, 1994) among others.

2. *Constitutive Conditions:* These consist of social, economic, and political conditions that are influenced and informed by the society's predisposition but are dynamic in nature and are often manipulated in the immediate term to encourage/discourage certain types of action (i.e., state laws, state use of security services for specific events, allowance/disallowance of competing political parties, injustice frames, political elections, political, or economic incentives). SMT approaches that are most relevant here are state autonomy and state capacity (Skocpol, 1979), political mediation theory (Amenta et al., 2005, 1994; Cress and Snow, 2000), relative depravation theory,[*] Marxist theory, framing, frame alignment, and frame resonance (Benford et al., 1986; Benford and Snow, 1988, 1992; Buechler, 1993; Henriksen and Vinci, 2008; Joosse, 2012; Katz and Woodhouse, 2005; Klandermans, 1984; Robinson, 2007), accesses to change affecting institutions, political opportunity, resource mobilization (Jenkins, 1983; McCarthy and Zald, 1977, 2001), social network analysis[†] (Beyerlein and Hipp, 2006; Petrie, 2004), and identity work (Benford et al., 1994; Hayes, 2011; Snow and McAdam, 2000) among others.

3. *Causal Mechanisms:* These involve specific events that catalyze political revolutionary action (i.e., the killing of a popular opposition figure, the encouragement of other recent and successful revolutions, opposition elites' decisions to act, tit-for-tat escalations of contention between the state and the populace). SMT approaches that are most relevant here are changes in state autonomy, changes in state capacity, political opportunity, the role of elites (Eckert and Jenkins, 1986; Lachmann, 1997), frame resonance (Benford and Snow, 1988; Matesan, 2012), and analyses of the effects of martyrdom (Collins, 2001; Katz and Woodhouse, 2005; Makdisi and Silverstein, 2006) among others.

4. *Dynamics of Feedback:* This includes the social actions taken by structures and agents informed by feedback of performance in order to gain political and military advantage over the other during episodes of public (and often violent) contention (i.e., changes in state social and security policy, changes in rally cries by the opposition, redirection of the opposition's goals, alterations and innovations in repertoires of contention, and so on). SMT approaches that are most relevant here are political mediation theory, frame alignment, identity work, alterations in accesses to change affecting institutions, conveyance and perception of political opportunity, resource mobilization and resource alignment, the Warden's Dilemma (Fierke, 2012a,b), and cognitive praxis (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991) among others.

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[*] For works using relative depravation and insurgencies, see the chapters on Hegel, Engels, Marx, Fannon, and Malcolm X in Karim and Lawrence (2007, pp. 17–100, 143–56). For works using relative depravation and social movements see Blumberg (2009) and McAdam (1990).

[†] Snow provides an excellent overview of SMT research focusing on the social network aspect of movement dynamics in addition to his structuralist approach to social networks in Ekland-Olson et al. (1980). For a detailed study on the use of existing social networks and their utility in facilitating a burgeoning social movement reaching the point of mass cognitive liberation, see McAdam (1990). For the prevalence of social networks in entry into terrorist organizations see Magouirk et al. (2008), Reinares (2009), and Sageman (2004).

ANALYTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Given all these choices of analytical approaches and frameworks, the task of analyzing revolutions and insurgencies seems daunting if not impossible—it need not be. It is here that I draw the discussion of insurgency, COIN, revolution, and SMT literature back to the central question nagging at political and military policy-makers: *What affects people's determination that they can and should risk action in order to make social, political, or normative gains against or altogether overthrow a ruling regime?*

Usefully, some SMT approaches are apropos to the above-noted foci of insurgency and COIN scholars: force structure, leadership and personnel, and support of the local populace. SMT structuralist approaches favoring an emphasis (if not a disregard for everything else) on the structure of the ruling regime as the condition and cause for revolutions/insurgencies can be linked to force structure. SMT approaches highlighting the role of elites and their abilities to capitalize upon opportunities mirrors the insurgency/COIN emphasis on leadership and personnel. The more culturalist-oriented social movement theories that give precedence to aspects such as existing social structures, grievance frames, framing work and frame resonance, and identity work are germane to understanding the will of the local populace. While this division is by no means neat or clear-cut, it is useful for relating the foci of SMT to the foci of insurgency/COIN scholars noted above. Still, relating SMT explanatory approaches to insurgency/COIN foci does not answer the question of COIN policy makers concerning what is affective in insurgency.

The insurgency/COIN area the most susceptible to sociological pressures is the will of the people. Affecting the decision making process of a populace that may support, at least passively,[*] one of the two sides in a revolution/insurgency campaign is key to winning. Both sets of literature do call for an analysis of "hearts and minds" and recommend the proper composition and employment of military forces and other state apparatuses for engaging and controlling the population. Force and power structures are undoubtedly important. Likewise, both categories of literature address the character and role of elites and leadership in affecting political and military conflict, which is also important. However, the will of the populace, the battleground of "hearts and minds," is where insurgencies are won and lost. Thus, I posit understanding the general populace's drive to act coupled with its understanding of its own agency vis-a-vis the regime or COIN forces should be the basis of what informs military and political analyses and action. Understanding what social conditions are necessary and sufficient for revolutions to occur continue, and decline in violent or nonviolent manners is what maximizes the effect of the structure and application of force and the rhetoric and actions of military and political leadership and personnel.

The focus of regimes, COIN and insurgency commanders, and movement makers is on what can be immediately affected regarding the will of the people. So, we can generally discard the predisposition and "sparks" of revolutions as they are largely outside of the realm of control. Predisposition is historical and the length of relevant history varies from culture to culture and stretches from years to decades or centuries in some cases. Whereas history can be distorted and retold in a means beneficial to a cause, that distortion and retelling is part of the framing process and is a constitutive condition. The sparks of revolution are often some event that sets mass mobilization in motion like the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi in Tunisia or the beating to death of Khalid Said in Egypt. There were previous self-immolations in Tunisia and countless cases of Egyptians tortured and beaten to death by state security apparatuses that did not result in revolution. These did because the necessary constitutive conditions were in order to make these events sufficient for revolution. So, concern is best placed in how to affect the constitutive conditions of what sets the stage for insurgency and the feedback dynamics and mechanisms of the insurgents and potential insurgents.

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[*] My inclusion of passive roles in insurgencies and revolutions is an acknowledgment that some consider passivity to be an insurgent role in the spirit of "if you aren't with us, you're against us." See (Meijer, 2005, pp. 281–2). I disagree that nonparticipation should be viewed as support for one side or the other as this approach to the populace in a revolution/insurgency milieu is simply a political and military mechanism for coercing support.

Even within the constitutive conditions and dynamics of feedback aspects of revolutions/insurgencies there are too many factors to analyze in an efficient manner. Hence, I distill these myriad approaches into three potent forces that can be efficaciously and immediately affected: framing and framing work (which dialogs with and significantly informs identity); perceived accesses to change affecting institutions (which engages state autonomy, state capacity, and political mediation); and perceived opportunity for action (which engages political opportunity, opportunity limitations due to resource mobilization capacities, and biographical availability).

Insurgencies/revolutions are generally formed as a response to some perceived injustice such as authoritarianism and/or relative depravation[*] or more normative issues such as the inclusion/exclusion of a particular cultural norm in official law, which is largely opposed to or incompatible with the current system.[†] As such, the opposition to the incumbent power generates frames designed to engage and dialog with the local populace (through the above-mentioned social structures). These frames must resonate on a personal level to motivate a mass response to the grievance taking the form of mass protest or, in the most severe cases, armed insurgency. Likewise, the incumbent structure attempts to create frames that assuage or deter revolutionary and insurgency tendencies. Dialog between the revolutionaries and the local populace is also important for conveying how motivated individuals can find their way to access the good fight of the insurgency/revolution. It also informs them how they may become involved in their desired roles within the revolution, though there is a lack of research on this exchange. Conversely, the ruling structure and force may use political mediation dialogs to convey some access to the opposition's desired change. As there is no official mechanism for identifying when the situation is ripe for a particular form of contention, insurgency/revolution leaders determine political opportunity. This determination is subjective, relying on movement makers' perception of the state of opportunity or, in less planned revolutions/insurgencies, by a mass, socially constructed consensus of political opportunity. Moreover, although there may be a perceived opportunity to act, there may be mitigating factors such as a lack of resources that make opportunities for action irrelevant. Opportunity is of course constantly constrained and otherwise shaped by the structure and the ruling force's actions. By recommending these three facets of social movements for analysis, I aim to provide a somewhat parsimonious framework for analysis while engaging the broadest possible set of causal factors affecting social movements.

It is necessary to point out that perception of agency in social movements is everything. By this, I mean it is how revolutionaries (or potential revolutionaries) view the state as a friend or foe, as accessible or inaccessible, and as impermeable or vulnerable. Understanding where this perception comes from is the key to analyzing both the predisposition and conditions, which make revolutions possible and probable.[‡] The state, its policies, and its wielding of power create and fuel the perceived grievances of the populace, if and only if the populace interprets and frames state policies and power as negative—generally in the form of injustice frames. As a response to those frames, individuals seek access to alternative structures, and "counter-hegemony" as a means of

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[*] It is important to note that relative depravation is a perception by the populace and not a hard figure. It is also important to note that some relative depravation and injustice is present in every government/constituent relationship. For further reading on alienation and relative depravation regarding movement participation, see Blumberg (2009) and McAdam (1990).

[†] The current "Arab Spring" uprisings are exemplary of this. In each case, those protesting are calling for a revolutionary change in the system they view as anachronistic and thus responsible for the increasing deprivation and injustices throughout the past decades.

[‡] This is similar to Kamrava's (1999) analysis of revolutions where he suggests that revolutions are caused by a combination of structure and agent factors, more weight given to one depending on the type of revolution. Methodologically, I depart from Kamrava in that I posit that more weight should be given to agents or structures dependent upon the facet of the revolution process, one is analyzing.

affecting meaningful change.* From the political opportunity approach, the perception of political opportunity by agents of revolutions is realized through elites calls to arms, media encouraging the movement (including social media), and demonstrations, each precipitating the others. So, if those completely disenfranchised by the state with a view toward revolution and insurgency perceive that they have the capacity, the agency, to change the rules of the game and force the state to (or completely off!) the negotiating table, revolution and insurgency are likely. During this competition within the realms of frames, accesses to change affecting institutions, and opportunities for action, both social movements and the structures and forces they are fighting against are in constant contention for resources. In this contention, they dialectically reconstruct the rules of the game through "rapid, mass, [and] forceful" socio-political change. As frames resonate or fade and accesses and opportunities are perceived as available and worth pursuing, movements rise and decline.

CONCLUSION

Revolutions and insurgencies are social movements. Hence, the social aspects of these event types must be understood as the cause for their occurrence, continuation, and decline. This understanding should serve as the basis for political and military analyses of the situation and effective action. As SMT approaches help explain why a social movement can manifest and the manner in which it manifests, that understanding is clearly useful in applying effective preventative, diminutive or even encouraging political and/or military action against revolutions and insurgencies. By understanding what frames resonate to the point where they instigate action, how individuals perceive the availability of access to change affecting institutions and the opportunities to do act, policy-makers can work more effectively toward their goals: bolstering an active opposition, activating the neutral population, countering the recruiting efforts of the opposition, and dividing and disrupting the active opposition.

While SMT has been broadened into a sledgehammer for every type of nail, I suggest that certain analytical approaches should be plucked from SMT in order to investigate very specific types of questions. Three variables distilled from the field of SMT (frames and framing work; perceived accesses to change affecting institutions; and perceived opportunity for action) are the most pertinent in answering the following question: *What affects people's determination that they can and should risk action in order to make social, political, or normative gains against or altogether overthrow a ruling regime?* Although any SMT approach will assist an overall knowledge and understanding of the situation, frames, accesses, and opportunities are the most susceptible to immediate political and military efforts. In the politico-military "game" of revolutions/insurgencies where the power structure is being challenged to the point where many of the old rules no longer apply, using SMT gives the analyst and policy-maker a means for making the right moves to an end.

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* Whether that access is affective is unknown, and sometimes unimportant, as participation itself can be the goal. Studies on "collective identity" promote the concept that participation satisfies the goal of the individual participant, regardless of the movement's progress toward, or attainment of, the stated objective. For some readings on collective identity, see Bjørgo and Horgan (2009), Hayes (2011), Horgan (2012), Jasper and Polletta (2001), Klandermans (1984), Postmes and Jetten (2006), and Snow and Byrd (2007).

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3 The Crime–Terror–Insurgency "Nexus"
Implications for Global Security

Daniela Irrera

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The publication of the first article on crime–terror in 1999 was the starting point of a long, controversial, and intense debate—among academics, practitioners, and policymakers—that complemented the parallel observations of changes occurring in wars, insurgency, and military interventions. The ability of organized criminals and terrorists (including groups and networks) to progressively increase their performance at a global level, to establish their headquarters inside failed (and failing) and weak states, and to interact with other groups that violently oppose the state—namely insurgents and paramilitaries—deserves to be evaluated within a more comprehensive theoretical framework. Undoubtedly, empirical analysis are complicated by the sensitivity of the topic and the difficulty in obtaining and using reliable data. Nevertheless, the use of terror tactics by criminals for securing the environments in which they act and the exploitation of illicit markets by terrorists for funding are largely becoming visible manifestations as well as interactions with insurgents. Thus, the phenomenon needs to be reconceptualized in order to include more flexible features and to understand the reason(s) why it requires a collective response.

Multilateralism can constitute the framework within which the set of responses can be understood. It is defined in this chapter as a sophisticated form of interaction among states, and international and regional organizations, and is founded on universal principles, equal participation of states in collective mechanisms, and is not subjected to discrimination when putting principles into action (Attinà, 2013a). Cooperation was based on the attempts of Western powers to export and impose their *domestic* definitions, expressed in political, economic, and moral terms to the rest of the world. This regularly occurs through the production of formal definitions, norms, and documents. At the same time, this procedure is based on governments' understanding of *threats* initially as two separate ones. The more substantial aspect of the United States (US) contribution to

multilateral cooperation in this field is the shifting process from an almost exclusive law enforcement approach, to organized crime and terrorism, to a more comprehensive strategy—essentially founded on blurring boundaries between internal and external security. This is the present trend toward which multilateral cooperation is moving, and led by the United States but with the increasing and evolutionary contribution of the European Union (EU) security model. This chapter addresses the following research questions: *Does the crime–terror nexus represent a threat to the current global security agenda and which one? Does the presence of insurgent groups represent a third "component" in exacerbating the nexus and, if so, which is its impact? Which features are currently shaping the state of response on a global level? Which actors are more relevant in shaping cooperation? Which is the role of the EU?*

In the first part of this chapter, the crime–terror nexus is reconceptualized in order to understand the level of implications it poses to both the regional and global levels. It is then analyzed against additional threats, represented by insurgency, armed conflict, and weak and failed states. The investigation is based on empirical data (provided by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], Uppsala Conflict Data Program [UCDP], Peace Research Institute's [PRIO], Armed Conflict Database [ACD], and the Global Terrorism Database [GTD]). In the second part, the current set of strategies and approaches are explored through the lenses of multilateralism theories. The analysis focuses on the roles played by the United States as well as European states. The final part addresses the security strategy developed by the EU. Some conclusions on the nexus perception within the political agendas at a global level—as well as potential future perspectives—are presented at the end.

ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORISM, AND ARMED CONFLICT: RECONCEPTUALIZING THE THREAT

The scientific debate about the concept of the crime–terror nexus has only recently started, but has produced very fruitful results. It refers to the connection between two very different actors, each with distinct identities, aims, and methods. However, despite the distinctions that can be easily observed, both are willing to go beyond them for practical purposes. According to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), which thus far represents the only universal legal tool, an organized crime group usually: (a) consist of a collaboration of at least three people; (b) are gathered for a prolonged or indefinite period of time; (c) are suspected or convicted of committing serious criminal offences; and (d) have as their objective the pursuit of profit and/or power (UNODC, 2000, art. 3).

The concept of *terrorist group* is much more controversial and deals not only with the identity of an actor (governmental or nongovernmental), but also with the nature of an act of violence. According to the EU, it is conceived of as a structured group of more than two persons, established over a period of time, and acting in concert to commit terrorist offences (EU Council, 2002). This type of violence differs from other forms of political violence (i.e., paramilitary, which includes groups that maintain some form of violent capacity and yet are not in any way part of the state nor private enterprises employed by states for providing assorted services) (Tupman, 2009). The concept of *insurgency* is also very different, which refers to the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region.

Scholars have analyzed various ways through which the different natures of both actors (entrepreneurial for criminals and political for terrorists) may converge and produce various forms of connection. Thus, the first debates focus on the nature of the phenomenon. Makarenko (2000) was the first to describe the environment in which such threats emerge and to apply the term *nexus*. She sustained that the immediate Post–Cold War environment provided both actors with more access to technological advancements, and to financial and global market structures. Despite very explicit differences, the intensification of the transnational dimension of organized crime activities in the 1990s

and the changing nature of terrorism have contributed to the obfuscation of the distinction between the two. Moreover, these factors have led to the renewal of existing operational and organizational similarities (Makarenko, 2004, 2009; Wang, 2010). She has depicted the process through distinct phases that can be placed along a *continuum*. Starting with the adoption of tactics of the other for achieving mutual benefit of a practical nature, it can proceed with the appropriation of methods or tactics from the other; the merging of a criminal and terror group, producing a functional alliance; finally, an evolutionary phase marked by the transformation of the tactics and motivations of one entity into another. The continuum presents potential steps that can be taken by groups as well as a wide variety of case studies—dependent on different conditions and causes (Makarenko, 2004). Alliances among criminals and terrorists have received negative attention in much of the scholarly literature. Williams (2002), for instance, argues that the actions of organized criminals and terrorists are based more so on opportunistic reasons rather than on being informed by actual changes in attitudes and nature. He stressed that terrorists and terrorist groups are able to use illicit activities for funding, while criminals and criminal organizations are able and willing to provide illicit goods and services to any buyer irrespective of their motivations and intentions (Williams, 2002). Subsequent analyses concentrate on the contexts in which such alliances may proliferate. Shelley and Picarelli (2005) investigated features that facilitate interconnectivity, arguing that a state of chaos and ongoing conflicts as well as regions with large shadow economies provide invaluable safe havens.

According to other scholars (Cornell, 2005; Holsti, 1996; Kaldor, 1999; Pettinger, 2000; Rabasa et al., 2007; Ridley, 2008), the nexus needs to exist within unstable countries for proliferation to take place while political and economic instability, rather than acting as structural causes simply exacerbate conditions (Pettinger, 2000). The impact of criminal activities and the intersection of both groups pose the least risk in regions affected by economic transition or in failing states (Irrera, 2007; Ridley, 2008). These dimensions are defined as conditions of *nongovernability* and *conduciveness* to the presence of terrorists or insurgents. That is, conditions in which the presence of criminal networks opens the possibility of strategic alliances through which terrorists or insurgents and criminal groups can share logistical corridors, safe havens, and access to sources of funding (Rabasa et al., 2007). Cases such as Afghanistan and Sierra Leone constitute the most visible examples used by scholars and policy-makers to describe—and to some extent measure—the phenomenon. Therefore, the scientific debate pertaining to the *nexus* has been enriched by investigations on the linkages between the *nexus* and institutional failure or instability and, increasingly, to war and civil conflict. Some analyses aimed, in fact, at investigating the extent to which the *nexus* may have an impact on the escalation and/or duration of conflict, or alternatively, the how existence of armed conflict may act as a facilitator (Cornell, 2005).

At the end of the Cold War, growth in the number of intrastate conflicts produced a vast discussion on a wide range of security threats. Debate on the difference between *old wars* and *new wars* centered on the idea that the shift from the interstate to the intrastate dimension of war implies that the effects of conflict are not necessarily contained within state borders; and that they can spread from one country to another as well as from one region to another (Holsti, 1996; Kaldor, 1999). In the wake of state collapse, war becomes primarily a competition among various nonstate actors (NSAs) over the use of scarce resources, the population as startegic asset, and the available flow of food, money, and other various materials (Kaldor, 1999, p. 90). This explains the rise of ungoverned conditions in which criminals and terrorist may flourish. Even though the sensitiveness of the phenomenon may affect the availability of empirical data, the literature has offered a wide range of case studies to operate nonetheless. The analysis presented here is intended to deepen the connections between the *nexus* and *armed conflict* in order to assess their global impact on security management.

Empirical Overview

Data used in this chapter are provided by three different sources. The GTD, managed by the University of Maryland, includes information on terrorist events around the world from 1970 to

2012. The UCDP offers a number of datasets on armed conflict, organized violence, and peacemaking. Data on criminal activities are provided by UNODC. All figures present data that refer to the period between the end of the Cold War and 2012, and are divided by region. The primary aim is to understand whether the connection is strong and consolidated in the most troubled areas of the global system. Figure 3.1 describes the number of terrorist attacks (regardless of the perpetrator and weapon type) between 1989 and 2011.[*]

The graph includes both active and inactive groups, which are particularly relevant at the end of the Cold War. Despite the fact that attacks are widespread, some regions are extraordinarily more affected by terrorism. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA), South East Asia (SEA), and Africa are regions in which the presence of nondemocratic regimes, unstable institutions, and failed and weak states is considerably high, thus making them an ideal place for the birth and development of subversive groups. However, even the most secure and stable regions—where we find the presence of democratic regimes and very stable institutions—are not free from terrorist presence and violent attacks. Groups, either internal or external, have had an increasingly deep impact on the security of Western Europe, for example. In comparing data to the presence of conflict, the UCDP (2014) states, "an armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths." Thus, conflicts presented in Figure 3.2 possess all the features described by the scholarship pertaining to both *old wars* and *new wars*—the use of violence by NSAs, the eventual presence of insurgent groups, and massive flows of refugees.

Given this definition, it is clear that regions characterized by political stability and democratic regimes, such as North America, Australia, and Western Europe, present very low percentages regarding the convergence of actors. There is strong presence of actors, as evidenced by the date, in MENA, SEA, and Africa. Both conflict and postconflict (transitional) periods are marked by the lack of rule of law, inefficient law enforcement structures, permeable borders, and profitable criminal opportunities (Oheme, 2008). These conditions tend to favor terrorist groups by facilitating their development, planning of operations, and other activities as opposed to strong liberal democracies

FIGURE 3.1 Number of terrorist attacks by region (1989–2011). (From the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [START], Global Terrorism Database [2012], 2013. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.)

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[*] Given that data (terrorist attacks/conflicts) gathered from two distinct sources have been crossed, the author has deliberately chosen the timeframe 1989–2011 in order to formulate a homogeneous set of results. Data was collected from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) database (2013) and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (2012). The author acknowledges that the readers might find it peculiar to see this timeframe, altering the dates would ultimately present disorderly results. Therefore, timeframe selection is ideal for the purpose of the analysis presented in this chapter.

FIGURE 3.2 Terrorist attacks and armed conflict by region (1989–2012). (From the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [START], Global Terrorism Database [2012], 2013, retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd; UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, 2013. Data presented in Themnér, L., and Wallensteen P., *Journal of Peace Research,* 51(4), 2014, 1946–2013.)

(even though democracies remain strong targets of these groups). Data regarding the prosecution of persons reveal that all regions are considerably affected (see Figure 3.3).

Data provided by UNODC (2013) focus on cases involving the prosecution of individuals for their participation in criminal activity. The UNODCs definition of individuals prosecuted refers to "alleged offenders prosecuted by means of an official charge, initiated by the public prosecutor or the law enforcement agency responsible for prosecution." The number of suspects—arrested and prosecuted—largely depends on local law enforcement agents' ability and efficiency in response to criminal activity, and generally speaking, to the capacity of state institutions to maintain stability. These factors may explain the relatively low numbers observed in SEA. The transnational dimension of illegal activities, the cross-border character of their implications, and the movement of people have all contributed to increasingly porous borders. However, these factors explain the significant number of prosecutions in Europe (mainly northern Europe) and North America.

Focusing on the specific transnational dimension of this phenomenon (which is at the core of UNODC analysis) and on the definition given by the UN Palermo Convention, it is possible

FIGURE 3.3 Number of persons prosecuted by region (2003–2010). (From UNODC, 2013.)

to highlight more features. Terrorist groups also need to identify affordable sources of funding. According to the reports of major agencies, the exploitation of illegal activities by terrorists as well as the occasional and more regular use of terroristic tactics by criminals is increasing. They may vary, according to the local context, but they usually involve the use of violence for destabilizing law enforcement control and political power. Table 3.1 provides an assessment of transnational organized crime threats and evaluating its impact on a regional basis.

The date provided by the UNODC builds a clear picture. Somali pirates, Mexican and Colombian cartels, Italian criminal groups, the PKK, and AQ have very different purposes and aims, but their respective abilities in establishing functional interactions are growing stronger and becoming increasingly professional. Additionally, the interactions they have with other political or economic actors—either ethnic factions or local insurgents—may vary immensely as well as the impact that the *nexus* can have on a region's stability and levels of violence. This does not mean that group activities are confined only to regions of with observable instability and violence, or that established and strong liberal democracies cannot and do not provide ideal conditions for criminal and terrorist activities. This preliminary empirical analysis has raised essentially three main points. First, armed conflict and insurgencies may exacerbate the nexus and they can be a relevant component of it, but

TABLE 3.1

Organized Crime Impact by Region

Region	Major Threats (by Type)	Criminal Groups Involved	Other Actors Involved
South America	Cocaine trafficking, corruption, violence	South American	The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia [FARC]), United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefenses Unidas de Colombia [AUC]), National Liberation Army (Colombia) (Ejército de Liberación Nacional [ELN]), and Shining Path
Central Africa	Illegal exploitation of minerals, gold, diamonds, weapons; armed conflicts	Groups based in Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, and Tanzania	Use of illegal trafficking as a source of insurgency funding
West Africa	Cocaine trafficking, armed violence, and corruption	South American and Locals	Rival military and nonmilitary factions
Central America	Cocaine trafficking, corruption, and instability	Colombian and Mexican cartels and Central American affiliates	Armed local groups
Horn of Africa	Piracy for ransom	Groups based in Somalia	Local insurgents
Central Asia	Heroin trafficking, insurgency, and terrorism	Local groups and criminals	Al-Qaeda (AQ), Taliban (Afghanistan), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and groups based in Pakistan
Southeast Europe	Heroin trafficking, political fragmentation, and ethnic rivalry	Groups based in the Balkans and Turkey; Mafia groups based in Italy	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK); Former militants can be mobilized
SEA	Opium trafficking and insurgency	Local ethnic groups	Use of opium trafficking as a source of insurgency funding

Source: From UNODC, The Globalization of Crime, A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment, 2010, http:// www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf.

they do not represent the only possible conditions. On the contrary, this phenomenon affects all regions, with a significant impact on European countries, either as traditional basis of criminals and as a larger transit area. Second, the evaluation of such factors introduces some innovations in the reconceptualization of the *nexus*, in terms of how alliances may be conceived and how they work. Third, the challenges posed to states by the *nexus* produce implications on both regional and global levels. The *nexus* constitutes a threat to state capacity to provide security to its citizens as well as to regional and international institutions' ability to manage the flow of people across borders.

THE NEED FOR RECONCEPTUALIZATION

The data presented in this chapter show that the intersection between terrorism and organized crime has diversified over the years. Scholarly debates have produced many explicative efforts and the continuum remains useful for understanding the escalating relationship between criminal and terrorists. In a more in-depth analysis, Makarenko (2007) discusses the concept of regional variations of the crime–terror *nexus*, stating that the level of stability within the geographic region in which it operates determines the *nexus*. This presents a troubled context in which a transitional state or a democratic regime can have an impact on the *nexus*, its main features, performances, and its actions. Thus, the phenomenon needs to be reconceptualized in order to include more flexible and changing features as well as to understand the reason *why* it requires a collective response. Accordingly, the analysis at this point focuses on three larger categories: *cooperation*, *coexistence*, and *convergence*. Together, these three categories are equipped to better describe various gradations of activity.

The notion of cooperation refers to the most envisaged case that is the establishment of alliances between terrorist and criminal groups. Short-term, occasional, and ad hoc relations may be frequent and outweigh the risks of prosecution mechanically associated with this set of relationships. The alliances between FARC and cartels in Colombia provide a solid example. In some cases, as Hansen (2012) describes, *customer service provider relationships* have developed, as both criminals and terrorist groups often require similar expertise, support structures, and services—including fake passports, information technology, and communications equipment. Coexistence can be found in an intermediate position, producing a condition whereby criminals and terrorist groups operate closely but actually prefer to remain separate entities. The exception to this can be instances where criminal and terrorist groups make a rational choice to work together in order to achieve a specific end. This can actually occur during a conflict or in a nondemocratic political regime (i.e., Nigeria, Sudan, or Malaysia), but such an occurrence should only be taken as a rare exception. Some of the features that build a situation conducive to organized crime also make it attractive to terrorist groups. As noted previously, lack of border control and law enforcement, and the eventual presence of specific types of infrastructure and services for operations may be found in democratic states (i.e., Italy or Greece) as well. The combined presence of organized crime and terrorism can amplify the threat to state structures—in both weak and democratic states—even if they do not explicitly coordinate their operations or work together in any other sense.

Convergence is apparently the most difficult case to explain even though it refers to a very frequent condition whereby the two actors make use of their respective capabilities for practical purposes. Organized criminal networks have long used terror tactics to safeguard business interests and protect their working environments, but even the use of criminal expertise by terrorist groups in order to meet operational requirements is increasing. A strong case of the former emerged during the 1990s when the criminal syndicate Cosa Nostra ("Our Thing") in Sicily initiated bombing campaigns to threaten the Italian government. The PKK in Turkey and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) in Northern Ireland provide examples of terrorist groups involved in drug trafficking to fund their operations. While the crime–terror *nexus* can represent a tangible threat that is still rather difficult to measure, additional problems begin to arise when taking into consideration that the *nexus* has evolved into something even more complex over recent years. The multilayered

implications—produced by the *nexus*—should be more broadly analyzed and take into account states most affected and those suffering indirect effects.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A GLOBAL RESPONSE

The long and gradual process, producing a set of policies and measures in tackling organized crime and terrorism, is paradigmatic of the relationships among major states at the end of the Cold War. Largely initiated and shaped by the United States, cooperation involved only the most relevant European states deemed capable of actually combating organized crime and terrorism. This was coupled with cooperation by regional organizations that were considered to have the requisite skills, experience, and resources available to assist in this task. The *internationalization* of policing primarily reflects ambitious efforts by now several generations of Western powers to export their own definitions of both crime and terror, not just for political and economic gain, but also in an attempt to export their own Western-style morals elsewhere in the world (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006). Any *internationalization* process of the definition of both crime and terror, and their subsequent control is the result of the export of domestic perceptions and definitions. This is precisely what happened in the aftermath of the Cold War through the production of formal definitions, norms, and documents drafted and from which policy was formulated and implemented from North America and Western Europe. At the same time, this procedure is based on governments' understanding of particular threats. In this case, threats are taken as criminal and terrorist groups and initially treated as two entirely different threats (Irrera, 2011).

The different policies, produced by the US and European states during the 1990s reflected their rather different understanding of organized crime and terrorism. This should not be entirely surprising as the United States and its (Western) European counterparts took radically different approach to understanding security. However, evolving perceptions of national, regional, and international security environments, together with the parallel transformations of the global system (politically, economically, and socially), pushed states (those that were considered major players in international matters) to change their attitudes so as to strengthen multilateral cooperation in order to developing responses appropriate to meeting the demands of new (immediate Post–Cold War period) threats. Even before September 11, 2001 (9/11), trans-Atlantic law enforcement infrastructures were actively working, through several joint initiatives, to counter money laundering operations and the budding problem of cybercrime. 9/11, not surprisingly, drastically changed the fundamental nature of those initiatives by modifying the perceptions and therefore understandings of threat(s). Attempts to facilitate greater cooperation in crime control and counterterrorism (CT) on an international level began strengthening as countries came together (partly as a result of the Bush–Cheney–Rumsfeld administration's declared "War on Terror" [WoT]) for promoting communication, establishing guidelines and best practices, and ultimately for regulating cooperation (Hignett, 2008).

Multilateralism, especially through its more recent developments, constitutes the framework within which cooperation in this field can be more rigorously analyzed. Multilateralism has become, since its first development within the UN system, a set of practices and principles, upon which cooperation among states collectively manages threats facing individual states, partnerships, and alliances in the modern world (Keohane, 1990; Ruggie, 1993). Scholars have extensively debated about the ways multilateralism has evolved, entangled more actors, and diversified its outcomes. Multilateralism is firstly a mode of action, a sophisticated form of cooperation that, over the decades, required specific qualities of international actors. The multilayered dimension of security and the flexible nature of current global problems have imposed on to states and international organizations to develop and expand their capacity to contribute, by following the rules of the game and fulfilling the fluctuating requested criteria (Telo, 2012; Wouters et al., 2008). Also, the need to employ more expertise and resources has pushed additional actors, such as regional organizations, to assume more responsibility in managing global issues (Attinà, 2011). Furthermore, the increasing set of incentives explains the normative potential of multilateralism, in the sense of the conviction about how international cooperation should function to increase multilateral security

(Caporaso, 1993). Therefore, multilateralism is different from any form of international cooperation resulting from negotiation and bargaining about national interests and can be perceived as a set of international practices that are founded on principles of conduct widely shared by states, the equal participation of states in the rules and mechanisms of the principles of implementation, and the non-discriminating application of the principles, rules and mechanisms (Attinà, 2013a).

Common rules and norms are generally created for solving problems and they facilitate coordination, instead of rivalry or juxtaposition (Caporaso, 1993; Keohane, 1990; Lake, 2006; Ruggie, 1993). These considerations bring some important political implications. The responses and the new partnerships created for replying to global threats and emergencies should be addressed, first of all, to solve a specific problem, and, at the same time, can serve as a catalyst for changing the existing political conditions to tackle other problems, for establishing new rules of conducts, and, in the long period, for enforcing the rules themselves. The more substantial aspect of the US contribution to multilateral cooperation in this field is the shifting process from an almost exclusive law enforcement approach to organized crime and terrorism to a more comprehensive strategy.

Since the first articulated analysis, made by the Kefauver Committee in 1951, the US perception of organized crime as a domestic issue has significantly changed. The alien conspiracy has turned into a larger involvement in illegal migration and border control issues, especially in the relationship with Mexico and other countries in Central America (Bynum, 1987; Finckenauer, 2005). Drug trafficking and money laundering were considered as the most important targets as part of the *narcoterrorism* phenomenon that dominated the last decades of the Cold War and, which was essentially applied to the most important US spheres of influence, that is Central and Southern America. The strategy was based on the protection of American interests, and the strengthening of law enforcement and information system. In the aftermath of 9/11, the US contribution to the multilateral cooperation increased, since officials started to include counter narcotics in a broader security strategy, focused on lawless zones (Irrera, 2011).

Documents issued after the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers marked the formalization of this change, stressed the need to tackle the root causes of the threats, and contributed to link new global challenges, including organized crime activities and terrorism to *fertile* grounds which can be easily found in weak or failed states (National Security Strategy [NSS], 2002, 2006). The official launch of the War on Terror was characterized by a very imposing and militarized language. The list of key security issues consists of terrorist threats, weapons of mass effect (WMEs), and state failure as key dangers. The NSS affirms that "the United States must start from the core beliefs and look outward for possibilities to expand liberty" (NSS, 2002, p. 3) and that there are many *enemies,* especially among *rogue states*, which remains a political category usually associated to terrorism sponsorship and now to other security threats, including organized crime. In the aftermath of the military intervention into Afghanistan and the successive invasion of Iraq, the United States took the lead but also reminded to the allies the need to take their own responsibilities. National security is still the main concern but it is no more defined in traditional terms, and associated to globalization of threats and to greater cooperation. No direct reference to the nexus (as a unique phenomenon) can be found, but the perception of its single components is paradigmatic of the distance, which separated the US from other political actors, in the security strategy formulation.

The NSS, issued by President Barack Obama in 2010, marked an evident shift in the language and establishes new patterns of cooperation. Even though the challenges posed by terrorism is a priority, the use of criminal activities for funding is stressed as well and, more importantly, they are associated to other security threats whose boundaries cannot easily be traced. The document relaunches the need of reinvigorating old alliances and to build new ones and the role of multilateral institutions and practices is essential. Any analysis of the US propensity for multilateralism in tackling crime–terror nexus should be combined with the evaluation of the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime (SCTOC), released in July 2011 by US National Security Staff. In this case, organized crime is defined in a very traditional way (as previously seen through the Palermo Convention) and in terms of the threat to national security of US citizens. But also at the same time, it is presented

as Transnational Organized Crime, stressing the fact that the cross-border dimension of alliances and activities is the first feature, in terms of policy (SCTOC, 2011). In other words, hegemony and multilateralism can coexist in security policies coexist, but the hegemonic state tends to use its influence to shape the procedure through which intervention is decided (Attinà, 2013a). More importantly, the success of such strategy is also dependent on the abilities and resources actors are investing. In this sense, the EU has offered a wide range of expertise in the field, based on single member states' experience in the framework of the Justice and Home Affairs structures.

THE IMPACT OF THE NEXUS ON THE EU SECURITY AGENDA

The impact that the nexus is producing on the EU agenda should be analyzed by taking into account that the traditional difference between internal and external security has more sense. The *internationalization* of European Community/European Union (even before the Maastricht Treaty) crime control started at the beginning of the Cold War, through the development of cross-border policing institutions, and the extension of its own practices to the neighbours. The deepening and widening of the European integration contributed to the expansion of this process. This can be attributed with the combination of close cooperation with underdeveloped countries, in the field of aid and relief. This last one offered the already exploited platform and expertise for improving cooperation with third countries and international organizations in the field of drugs through closer coordination of policies within the EU.

In the European Council's "A Secure Europe in a Better World," issued in December 2003, the EU High Representative (EUHR) J. Solana (2003) points out the main elements, which are required to build a strong and solid European Security Strategy (ESS). The abovementioned set of principles is also used for enlarging EU capabilities and contribution to global security. The European Security Strategy (ESS) stresses European responsibility for global security, the need of effective multilateralism, and the extension of the international rule of law, considering that, "the Post–Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked" (ESS, 2003). The ESS lists five key threats to Europe: terrorism, the proliferation of WMEs, regional conflicts, failed/failing states, and organized crime. The last one, in particular, is strictly linked to the conditions that cause conflict, fear, and hatred, a criminalized economy. This economy profits from violent methods of controlling assets, weak illegitimate states, and the existence of warlords and paramilitary groups. Even in the case of the EU, the main character of its contribution is the shifting process from a Home and Justice Affairs approach to a more comprehensive plan, which is essentially founded on the blurring boundary between internal and external security.

The common objective, which is the protection of citizens and States from risks, explains why the threat of terrorism and organized crime was identified in the ESS, which had an explicit external perspective and then appears in the set of documents, which constitutes what is commonly described as the Internal Security Strategy (ISS) of the Union.[*] The ISS addresses a wide list of security challenges the European countries face in their domestic borders, including terrorism, organized and cross-border crime, cyber-crime, violence in all its forms, accidents (i.e., transport, industrial), and natural and man-made disasters, and implicitly suggests a larger reflection on the *European Security Model*, consisting of common tools and a commitment to

> a mutually reinforced relationship between security, freedom and privacy; cooperation and solidarity between Member States; involvement of all the EU's institutions; addressing the causes of insecurity, not just the effects; enhancing prevention and anticipation; involvement, as far as they are concerned, of all sectors which have a role to play in protection—political, economic and social; and a greater interdependence between internal and external security (EU Council, 2010, p. 5).

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[*] *Towards a European Security Model*, prepared by the Council and approved at the European Council in 2010 (doc. 7120/10); *The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe*, of 22 November 2010 (see Attinà, 2013b).

Special attention will have to be paid to "weak and failed states" so that they do not become hubs of organized crime or terrorism. In this context, the ISS serves as an indispensable complement to the ESS, developed in 2003 under the EU's European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to address global risks and threats, and to commit to the social, political, and economic development beyond the fuzzy borders of Europe and the EU, as the most effective way of achieving long-term security (EU Council, 2010, p. 17).

According to the document, the EU aims to cope with these phenomena and develop adequate responses, through a coordination of existing agencies (Europol, Eurojust, Frontex, Community Civil Protection Mechanism, the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator), which will be strengthened. Therefore, the need to integrate all the existing European strategies relevant to internal security, to strengthen coherence and consistency, and to promote truly effective policies is urgently underlined (Attinà, 2013b). The necessity to tackle these challenges, which goes beyond the EU states' national, bilateral, or regional capability and which strongly require multilateral efforts, has therefore produced two main outcomes. On the one hand, the EU is improving its institutional capacities and actions in a wider framework of international cooperation for preserving its own citizens and its neighborhood, from increasing domestic political violence by local organized groups. On the other, as made clear in the ESS, the rationale on which the fight against crime and terror is based is part of a broader security culture the European countries founded in the early 1990s and deals with the contribution the EU is able to provide for preserving global society.

The constant use of the common actions, in the last decades, has contributed to the rising of a specific international image of EU as a civilian power. The will to build long-term stabilization, to act through multilateralism, and to be inspired by norms and ideas are the main elements of the global *actorness*. The EU has developed the promotion of democracy and security (Duchene, 1972). The more complex set of competences the Treaty of Lisbon has contributed to link this policy to the common security and defence policy and to the civilian and military assets in support of peace-keeping missions, conflict prevention and international security outside the Union (Treaty of the European Union [TEU], 2009, art. 42). The number of military and civilian missions the EU has deployed outside Europe has increased and developed over the years. Even though they are envisaged as the last resort, civilian missions have been extensively used for tackling nontraditional threats, including crime and terrorist issue. There is, thus, a general absence to explicitly mention to fight against terrorism among the objectives of the Union's missions. This is despite the fact that all of them were carried out after September 11, 2001 (9/11) and despite their respective implementation have originated occasional demands. This tendency has not changed as the list of missions expanded (Oliveira and Ferreira-Pereira, 2012).

Figure 3.4 includes all missions deployed by the EU, both civilian and military, and includes missions that are either still active or that have already ended. The argument can be made that the EU is more active beyond its own borders, using its crisis management abilities in countries affected by criminal organizations, terrorism, and insurgency. Thus, civilian missions are entrusted with a number of executive tasks: *Security Sector Reform*, *Rule of Law*, and *Border Control*, which are suitable institutional arrangements for countering these three major issues. The use of civilian missions constitutes a unique feature of the EU's contribution to multilateral cooperation. There is, however, no clear reference to the *nexus* in any of its mission mandates, and therefore a major gap that can be seen in this otherwise comprehensive strategy.

CONCLUSION

The primary aim of this chapter is to understand the extent to which the *nexus* between organized crime and terrorism represents a security threat. It also sought to weave the element of insurgency into the *nexus*. This chapter presented a very useful working definition of the *nexus* that treats it as a strategic alliance between two nonstate actors, both able to exploit illegal markets and influence policymaking on national, regional, and international levels. Such effects may be deteriorated in

FIGURE 3.4 EU civilian and military missions (February 2014). (From EU External Action, 2014, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/.)

troubled contexts, affected by war and insurgency, which can constitute safe heaven because ungoverned entities. Nevertheless, failed and weak states do not attract criminals and terrorists per se. They can be considered additional features, but not a constitutive one.

The empirical analysis aimed at understanding first the kind of threat the nexus represents for the current global security agenda and, second, since challenges are posed to both states and international system, producing important implications for policy at national and international level, there is a need to understand how multilateral is the current state of response. Although they still remain two separate phenomena, the changing nature of global security and the increasing effects of globalization have contributed to blur the distinction between political and criminal motivated violence and to reveal operational and organizational similarities. While the presence of armed conflicts and the insurgents' activities may considerably exacerbate the nexus, they do not represent the only condition. On the contrary, it is sustained that different contexts—stable or unstable—have a direct effect on the nexus performance. This does not mean that the crime–terror–insurgency threat is disappearing or decreasing, rather the fact that the evanescence of traditional boundaries is currently marking the new manifestations of the nexus and imposing to scholars and policy-makers a reconceptualization of the whole phenomenon, which include on one hand the flexible set of interactions between separate entities and, on the other, the multilayered implications they can produce on a regional and global level.

In particular, it is here analyzed through three large categories (*coexistence*, *cooperation*, and *convergence*), which describe various gradations of intersections between the two actors. While cooperation expresses the traditional way to conceive the nexus, in terms of alliances, coexistence and convergence better represent the more practical use of terrorist techniques by criminals or the illicit activities by terrorist for funding in an occasional and functional perspective. Empirical data also demonstrate that all categories may be found in both ungoverned and democratic states and can occur in a very fluid way. The challenges the nexus poses to states are definitely marked by the global and regional widespread and can be placed on a double level. It constitutes a threat to the state capacity to provide security to its citizens and to the regional and international institutions ability to manage cross-border flows. This is the reason why it is listed among those issues of global concern, which require a collective response.

As for global responses, multilateralism can constitute the framework within which they can be understood. Multilateral cooperation is here considered as a sophisticated form of interaction among states, international and regional organization, founded on universal principles, equal participation of states in collective mechanisms, and no discrimination in putting principles into action. In this specific field, the internationalization of crime and terror control was essentially the export of law enforcement rules—namely the domestic definition of security and of organized crime—from the Western powers to the rest of the system. Even though they tried to collaborate on various

initiatives, since the Cold War, the United States and EU offered somewhat contrasting views of the threat and of the way they should be tackled. Both the United States and EU contributed to shape the international set of definition and rules in the field of organized crime and terror, by using their different but leading roles. The globalization process, the rising of non-State actors and the consequent development of the human aspects of security, as well as the events of 9/11 pushed the main international political actors to change this composite structure of relations. The potential EU has developed and, in particular, its complex strategy based on an integrated strategy may be a promising step for advancing multilateral cooperation.

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4 Ideological Motivations of Arab Foreign Fighters as Insurgents and Terrorists

From 1980s Afghanistan to the Syrian Insurgency

Roger P. Warren

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The reaction within the Arab and Muslim world to the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan resulted in a contemporary generational phenomenon of "the Arab foreign fighter," or in Arabic, the *mujahed(een).* The brutal insurgency in Afghanistan revived the ancient Islamic ideological concept of jihad, and attracted "Muslims from around the world—5000 were recruited from Saudi Arabia, 3000 from Algeria, and 2000 from Egypt—who became known as the 'Afghan-Arabs'" (Post, 2007,

p. 195). After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the Afghan Arabs "hardened and radicalized by the experience, returned to their home countries, joined pre-existing terrorist groups and radicalized them" (Richardson, 2007, p. 66). Their home countries were wary of the Afghan-Arabs, and consequently they were "discouraged from returning home because of the threat they might pose" (Stern, 2003, p. 117), resulting in the creation of an Afghan-Arab diaspora. According to Kepel (2008) "the dispersion all over the world … of these hardened veterans of the Afghan jihad … more than anything else, explains the sudden, lightening expansion of radical Islamism in Muslim countries and the West" (p. 299). From this diaspora spawned two subphenomenon: the al-Qaeda terrorist organization, and the notion of "the career" Arab foreign fighter. Both of them have different but often overlapping ideological motivations; however, being dynamic, they continually evolve over time.

Since Afghanistan (1979–89), there have been five major insurgencies involving Arab foreign fighters: Bosnia (1992–5),[*] Chechnya (1994–6 and 1999–2009),[†] Afghanistan (2001–14), Iraq (2003–14), and Syria (2011–4). The participation in these insurgencies was/is driven by a "jihadi ideology [that] is based on the religion of Islam … which calls on Muslims to defend their religion" (Zwitter, 2007, p. 36). In effect it is a noble undertaking and as such, a defensive jihad should not be conflated with terrorism. There are of course other Muslim insurgencies, for example, Kashmir, but Arab foreign fighter involvement here is minimal. All these insurgencies have unique characteristics but they are interconnected, insofar that many Arab foreign fighters migrate between insurgencies, and eventually many embrace a radical Islamist ideology that promotes terrorism. For example, "a number of foreign fighters who have fought in Chechnya have subsequently become al-Qaeda operatives, including … two of the 9/11 hijackers" (Moore and Tumelty, 2008, p. 423).

To ensure an academic anchor, some definitional issues must be addressed briefly. The term insurgency used in this chapter is "an organized, violent subversion used to effect or prevent political control, as a challenge to established authority" (United Kingdom [UK] Ministry of Defence [MoD], 2010, pp. 1–4). The term "ideology" is understood to mean "the beliefs, values, principles, and objectives—however ill-defined or tenuous—by which a group defines its distinctive political identity and aims" (Drake, 1998, p. 54). Moore and Tumelty (2008) usefully define foreign fighters as "non-indigenous, non-territorialized combatants who, motivated by religion, kinship, and/or ideology enter a conflict zone to participate in hostilities" (p. 412); while specifically Muslim (or Arab) foreign fighters are defined as "unpaid combatants with no apparent link to the conflict other than religious affinity with the Muslim side" (Hegghammer, 2010a, p. 53). In the light of the insurgency in Syria, where Arab foreign fighters are now fighting fellow Muslims (predominantly Alawite[‡] and/or Shi'a Muslims), this chapter uses Arab foreign fighter to denote "a Sunni Arab combatant with no apparent link to the conflict other than religious affinity with the Sunni Muslim side." Finally, the chapter adopts the term "radical Islamist terrorist" to denote an individual operating possibly under the guise of al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda-related groups, based on the premise that they are radical—in the sense of holding extreme beliefs; Islamist—in the sense of "advocating Islam as a political as well as a religious system" (Aboul-Enein, 2010, p. 2); and terrorist—in the sense that their modus operandi involves "the intentional use of, or threat to use violence against civilians or civilian targets, in order to attain political aims" (Ganor, 2004, p. 6). The label is adopted, fully mindful that "Islamist terrorist movements are a small minority compared to the overwhelming majority of Islamist movements, which are non-violent" (Dalacoura, 2006, p. 510). These radical Islamist terrorists are either ideologically motivated to a "global jihad" (generally focussing on attacking Western interests), or ideologically motivated to attack any civilian target, that does not adopt their world-view (generally focussing on attacking fellow Muslims).

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[*] "Jihadists from Peshawar … a total of 4000 men … went away to fight in Bosnia" (Kepel, 2002, p. 239).

[†] Approximately 80 Middle Eastern Arabs fought against the Russians during the 1994–6 war in Chechnya (Moore and Tumelty, 2008, p. 418).

[‡] "The Alawis are often called shi'ites but, despite the reference to Ali … their doctrines do not correspond in any way to shi'ism as such. (They do, however, have a marked affinity and sympathy to shi'ites.)" Glasse (2008, p. 37).

There have been numerous studies that have examined foreign fighters (Malet, 2010, 2013; Hegghammer, 2010b, 2011), and other studies that have focused on the six major insurgencies involving foreign fighter mobilizations. They include Afghanistan (Roy, 1990; Gerges, 2005; Hamid, 2005; Rana and Bukhari, 2007; Hafez, 2009); Bosnia (Kohlmann, 2004); Chechnya (Moore and Tumelty, 2008; Williams, 2010; Garner, 2013); Afghanistan (Stenerson, 2011); Iraq (Cordesman, 2005; Paz, 2005; Krueger, 2006; Felter and Fishman, 2007; Hegghammer, 2007); and more recently Syria (Zelin, 2013). However, there has been no single study that attempts to join these individual foreign fighter mobilizations together in order to analyze the overall phenomena, and analyze the linkages that exist to radical Islamist terrorism, from 1979 to the present day, to include Syria. Additionally, academics have noted the need for "more and better research into the role of ideology, religion and media in inspiring and instigating terrorism" (McAllister and Schmid, 2013, p. 262). This chapter aspires to fill that gap in the literature.

The aim of this chapter is to analyze the evolution of the ideologies underpinning Arab foreign fighters within insurgencies, and radical Islamist terrorists (from the Arab world), within a framework of the "context" and the "cohort," in order to recognize the ideological distinctions between them, and assess their relative threats. The "context" includes analysis of the Arab world environment (social, political, and religious), while the "cohort" are the mujahedeen being studied and includes analysis of individual Arab foreign fighters and radical Islamist terrorists. Focus on the Arab world is based on the fact that "nowhere is the presence of political Islam more apparent than in the Arab world" (Dekmejian, 1995, p. 211), consequently studying Arab world involvement in both jihad and terrorism, appears to offer the greatest dataset and understanding of the underpinning ideologies. The analysis includes examination of their social culture vis-à-vis kinship and social ties, prior "jihadi" experience, and the ideological centrality of Islam. The latter point examines the role of local mosques, clerics, and ideologues; the amount of formal Islamic education and training; and the individual motivations and vulnerabilities for martyrdom (where applicable). As Moore and Tumelty (2008) opine, "questioning the motivation, radicalization, and modus operandi of foreign jihadi fighters is central to understanding contemporary political violence" (p. 412).

The overarching theoretical framework to best analyze the "context" and the "cohort" is based on Social Movement Theory (SMT) utilizing the structuralist approach and the culturalist approach, respectively. This multidisciplinary approach offers a more nuanced portrayal; no single theoretical framework can adequately explain Arab foreign fighter or terrorist ideology. The structuralist approach provides the best theory to analyze "the context" of the Arab world, because "without considering these wider social and political dynamics, the behavior of militants cannot be adequately explained" (Jackson et al., 2009, p. 162). The culturalist approach (within the social movement setting) is used to analyze "the cohort" of mujahedeen, as "the real essence of social networks [is] culture" (Cozzens, 2006, pp. 135–6). The notion of culture is best described by Swidler (1986) who conceptualizes it "as a 'tool kit' of symbols, stories, rituals, and world views, which people may use in varying configurations to solve difficult kinds of problems" (p. 273). In particular, this culturalist approach will examine the Islamic dimension behind the mobilizations, given that the "most important and volatile aspect of cultural identity is often religion" (Ditzler, 2004, p. 203).

This last approach does have its critics though, particularly vis-à-vis Muslims in the post-9/11 environment. According to Abdul Rahman (2009), "the pervasive influence of the culturalist approach woven into the understanding of terrorism has had the effect of thrusting into focus Islam and certain presumptions of the identity and culture of the Muslim community" (p. 109). This view however is not universally shared; Hafez (2006) argued that the "religious notions of martyrdom and jihad are constant features of Islamic culture" (p. 170). This chapter does not claim that terrorism or suicide are inherently Islamic, or indeed support the "classical racist representations of … the fanatical, cruel, despotic Muslim or Arab man … which can be traced back to the Crusades in the Middle Ages" (Jordan and Weedon, 1995, p. 289). The chapter aims to analyze "sympathetically the ways Middle Eastern people try to live out their ideals—how they fail, how they succeed, and the sorts of strains and paradoxes that arise in response to the demands of their ethical world" (Lindholm, 2002, p. 6).

The central argument of this chapter is that since 1979, the contemporary Arab world is going through an extended generational phase where it is predisposed to political violence, powered by radical Islam. Many Muslims (from all socialeconomic backgrounds) in this generational phase appear to demonstrate an ideological vulnerability to a perceived threat to their Sunni coreligionists, and feel compelled to participate in jihad, as Arab foreign fighters, in support of Muslim insurgencies. However, as a result of the experience fighting jihad, they are subsequently becoming (further) radicalized and display an increased propensity for greater involvement in militant activity. These Arab foreign fighters begin to embrace an ideology that justifies and promotes acts of terrorism, devoid of any religious or moral principles, often against fellow Muslims. The acts of terrorism include suicide attacks and particularly savage rituals such as beheadings that are completely out of harmony with the Islamic faith. In effect although the ideological rhetoric implies greater adherence to Islam, the result is the promotion of sacrilegious behavior. This generational phase is therefore underpinned by a radical (and perverted) interpretation of Islam, a visibly growing Sunni/Shi'a divide, the genuine injustices within the Arab world, and an increased awareness of, and connectivity with, fellow Muslim sufferings. It is a Muslim problem, requiring a Muslim solution.

Such a hypothesis will not be without its critics, but it directly recognizes the reluctance of academics, identified by Dalacoura (2011), to openly express the notion that "the precepts of Islam may encourage terrorism's emergence or that Islamism as a political ideology is inherently prone to terrorism" (p. 32). The argument in this chapter takes solace in the observation, by academics such as Laqueur (2001) that, "the frequency of Muslim—and Arab inspired terrorism is still striking … [requiring academics to] devote more time and space to investigating Muslim and Islamic terrorism" (pp. 129–30).

The methodology used in this chapter is grounded within a flexible design framework primarily based on content analysis, due in part to it being "unobtrusive … and that the data … can be subject to re-analysis, allowing reliability checks and replication studies" (Robson, 2002, p. 358). It comprised the author's dataset of 2146 Arab foreign fighters who have been involved in one or more of the six major Muslim insurgencies. It utilizes the rich contextual data found in the biographies of Arab martyrs; the Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs), and from the burgeoning data (often in Arabic) posted on the Internet on Arab foreign fighters in Syria. Naturally, there are certain issues associated with martyrs' biographies posted on the Internet, for as Hegghammer (2007) noted authors "are most often anonymous … the information cannot always be verified … [and] jihadist propagandists embellish stories and inflate numbers of martyrs" (p. 7). In most cases, however, it has been possible to corroborate the biographies, owing in part to the wide number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and media organizations covering the Syrian insurgency. This chapter covers chronologically the six major insurgencies involving Arab foreign fighters, exploring 'the context' and 'the cohort' for each insurgency, identify the ideological similarities and crossovers between them, and explores the process where increased exposure to defensive jihad leads some individuals to eventually embrace a radical Islamist ideology.

THE AFGHAN-ARABS IN THE AFGHAN INSURGENCY

The Context

The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan came at the end of a tumultuous year for the Arab and Muslim world. First, there had been the Islamic Revolution in Iran in the first half of 1979, followed by the siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Initially, the Arab and Muslim world were slow to react and it was not really until 1982 that a Palestinian ideologue, named Abdullah Azzam, awoke the Muslim world from its stupor. Having visited Afghanistan and witnessed firsthand the plight of the Afghan people, he began to preach and write about the responsibility of

Muslim countries to react and support their coreligionists. Hegghammer (2010b) argued that jihad in defense of the Afghan people was an individual duty (fard al-ayn) for all Muslims. Abdullah Azzam declared that "the first obligation after imaan [faith] is the repulsion of the enemy aggressor who assaults the religion and worldly affairs." The two critical notions, jihad and "individual duty" are recurring themes throughout the other five major insurgencies involving Arab foreign fighters, and hence warrant an explanation (p. 41).

First, according to Glasse (2008), jihad is a "Holy War, a divine institution of warfare … to defend Islam from danger" (p. 271) and "is mentioned 26 times in the Quran" (Holbrook, 2010, p. 20). It may be offensive or defensive in nature. Wiktorowicz (2005) suggests that defensive jihad occurs in Islamic jurisprudence

> when an outside force invades Muslim territory whereupon it is incumbent on all Muslims to wage jihad to protect the faith and the faithful … [while] offensive jihad functions to promote the spread of Islam … very few Islamists focus on this form of jihad (p. 83).

The ideology of a defensive jihad represents the most suitable, religiously sanctioned, response to the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, and as Wiktorowicz (2005) subsequently noted, "Azzam is the most important figure to resurrect active participation in defensive jihad" (p. 84).

Second, the concept of "individual duty" (fard al-'ayn) is a "divinely instituted obligation, which is incumbent upon on all [Muslims]" (Glasse, 2008, p. 151). However, the notion of an "individual duty" for Muslims living outside Afghanistan to participate in a jihad in defense of the Afghani people was not supported initially by mainstream clerics. Initially, the accepted religious wisdom saw the concept of an "individual duty" applying only to those Muslims living in Afghanistan. According to Hafez (2009) "images of Afghani suffering publicized by government media and clerical networks encouraged young Muslims to volunteer" (p. 75). Soon the Grand mufti of Saudi Arabia, Shaykh Abdul-Aziz bin Baz (also known as Bin Baz), issued a fatwa declaring "it obligatory on all Muslims to make jihad against the Russians" (Allen, 2006, p. 279). In response to this fatwa, "mosques and universities across Saudi Arabia turned into recruitment centers for Islamic volunteers who thirsted for the blood of Russian infidels" (Trofimov, 2007, p. 244). The die was cast, and Bin Baz was to continue to propagate the Islamic obligation to participate in jihad, vis-à-vis Bosnia and Chechnya, until his death in 1999.

The Cohort

The young Muslims who volunteered for jihad in Afghanistan were primarily from Arab countries, and became known as Afghan-Arabs. The term "Afghan-Arabs" used here "refers to Arabs who volunteered to aid the struggle of the Afghan Mujahedeen against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–89) and the subsequent toppling of the communist regime of Muhammad Najibullah (1989–92)" (Hafez, 2009, p. 74). The dataset supporting this chapter comprises of 301 Afghan-Arabs, of whom only 30% (92) survived. Analysis of the 92 veterans reveals three enduring trends: the notion of a "career mujahid," the increased propensity for greater involvement in militant activity, including terrorism and the concept of martyrdom in Islam.

First, the dataset reveals that 41% (38) of the Afghan-Arabs who survived Afghanistan became "career mujahedeen" and subsequently went to fight in the Bosnian war, defending the Bosnian Muslims from Croatian and Serbian aggression. Empowered by the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, many Afghan-Arabs looked for their next jihad, and as Hafez (2009) observed, "the Arab Afghan experience produced capable ideological leaders, religious ideologues, and military commanders that would lead future struggles in places like Algeria, Egypt, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Iraq" (p. 82).

Second, and perhaps more alarming, is that the data reveal that nearly half (49%) of the Afghan-Arab veterans went on to embrace the radical Islamist ideology espoused by al-Qaeda. This process

was not immediate and often resulted from further involvement in other jihads, such as Bosnia and Chechnya. This trend of Arab foreign fighter participation in classical jihads was religiously sanctioned as an individual duty, defending coreligionists against foreign aggression. On the face of it, it is an entirely noble duty that involves defending coreligionists while targeting foreign military forces. However, this exposure to classical jihad appears in time to evolve into involvement in terrorism often targeting civilians and other Muslims (both Sunni and Shi'a), underpinned by a radical Islamist ideology, often involving martyrdom.

According to Hafez (2009), the Afghan-Arabs "developed a culture of jihad and martyrdom, and a template for mobilizing Muslims in defense of Islamic causes" (p. 77). Again ideologically, it is important to make the distinction between the martyrdom of the Afghan-Arab and the "martyrdom" witnessed later in the insurgencies of Iraq and in Syria. The concept of martyrdom should not be confused with suicide. Martyrs are defined as "believers who die for the faith, in defence of it, or persecuted for it, are assured of Heaven" (Glasse, 2008, p. 339). Their actions are religiously sanctioned, and the 209 Afghan-Arabs (from the dataset) who died in Afghanistan could be defined as martyrs. Conversely, those Arab foreign fighters who blew themselves up in Iraqi markets should not be considered martyrs. Their actions were suicidal, which is forbidden in the Holy Quran "… And do not kill yourselves (nor kill one another). Surely, Allah is Most Merciful to you" (An-Nisa, 4:29). The contemporary ideology of "martyrdom" in the five other major Muslim insurgencies is discussed later in the chapter.

The ideological development between the martyrdom of the Afghan-Arabs during the Soviet occupation and the later "martyrdom" of former Afghan-Arabs is demonstrated within the dataset. The data reveal that 62% (13) of the 21 individuals indicted by a federal grand jury in New York City on November 4, 1998, for their involvement in the 1998 al-Qaeda bombings of the US embassies in East Africa were from the Afghan-Arab cohort. Piazza (2009) recognized this connection noting that "many of the key figures in the al-Qaeda groups … are veterans of the Soviet Afghan war of the 1980s" (p. 74). It is important however to note that in the 1980s and 1990s, there was a distinction between an Arab foreign fighter (a mujahid) and a radical Islamist terrorist. The former was an individual who felt compelled to help his coreligionists and get involved in jihad. It was a religiously sanctioned activity, and as noted above, had a noble quality to it. Mujahedeen targeted military forces of the Soviet Union (SU). In contrast, radical Islamist terrorists tend to select civilian targets, and their actions lack any semblance of nobility. The perceived nobility of the Afghan-Arabs, and indeed the Afghan mujahedeen themselves, can also be seen in the way they conducted themselves on the battlefield. According to Roy (1990), "Soviet prisoners were always well treated … understanding the political advantage to be derived from adopting a humanitarian attitude toward prisoners; such a policy improves the image of the resistance" (p. 77). A recurring theme throughout this chapter is the conduct of the Arab foreign fighter, but as shall be demonstrated later, this humanitarian side of the noble mujahid, soon disappeared in the mountains of central Bosnia.

THE BOSNIAN CAMPAIGN

The Context

According to Hegghammer (2010b), the "Bosnian conflict erupted at a time when the rug was being pulled from under the Afghan-Arabs in Pakistan, and many militants needed a new place to go" (p. 48). The initial leader of the Arab foreign fighters in Bosnia was a Saudi former Afghan-Arab called Abdul Rahman al-Dawsary (also known as Barbaros), who wanted to be the "Abdullah Azzam of Bosnia." The main motivating factor was "the horrific plight of Bosnian Muslims caught up in the worst armed conflict in Europe since 1945" (Kohlmann, 2004, p. 11). Just as the Afghan-Arabs had come to the aid of the Afghan people in the 1980s, there was now a new call to come to the aid of the Bosnian Muslims in 1992. The Bosnian war may not be considered by some historians

and academics to have been an insurgency; however, it is included here as it illuminates the developing ideological trajectory of Arab foreign fighters and radical Islamist terrorists.

THE COHORT

The data extracted from the 139 biographies of those Arab foreign fighters who fought in Bosnia reveal that 27% (38) were former Afghan-Arabs. The cohort of 139 is composed primarily of Saudis 38% (47), Egyptians 14% (19), and Yemenis 11.5% (16). The numbers fairly reflect the host Arab governments' concern of returning Afghan-Arabs, and the threat they may pose in the form of "blowback." For example, in the early nineties, Egypt in particular was struggling to contain the Islamist threat to the Hosni Mubarak government, mainly from al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (GAI), Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Between 1992 and 1995, the Egyptian regime arrested 38,145 people, killed 475, and injured over 300 (Hafez, 2003, pp. 86–7). In addition in February 1993, as a result of a GAI bomb in Cairo's main square that killed three civilians, the Egyptian government took control of over 40,000 private mosques. Aware of this crackdown, returning Afghan-Arabs from Egypt felt safer fighting in Bosnia. Of interest, of the five Egyptians who did survive the Bosnian war, all later became involved in al-Qaeda-related activities.

One who became involved in al-Qaeda-related activities was an Egyptian (a former GTMO detainee) called Tariq Mahmood al-Sawah. He became a member of the MB in 1975, and graduated from Alexandria University, receiving a Bachelor of Science degree in Geology. In 1981, he was imprisoned at the infamous Tora Prison in Cairo due to his affiliation with the MB. Following his release from prison, he earned a teaching certificate in religious studies from the al-Azhar Islamic Institute in Cairo. He later fought in the Bosnian war and then moved to Afghanistan and became a bomb making expert. Tariq Mahmood al-Sawah's story is instructive. He was an intelligent man, political motivated in a country that lacked any real vestige of Human Rights, freedom of speech, or democracy. His experience in Tora Prison, like other well-known Egyptian recidivists,[*] is likely to have made him more politically motivated as a result of his likely torture and abuse. The rate of recidivism amongst Islamist militants is a recurring theme from Arab prisons,[†] particularly Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt. Indeed according to former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) case officer Baer (2011), "if you want a serious interrogation, you send a prisoner to Jordan. If you want them to be tortured, you send them to Syria. If you want someone to disappear, never to see them again, you send them to Egypt."

Another emerging theme from the dataset is the number of Arab foreign fighters who were formally educated in Islam. The data extracted from the 139 biographies of those who fought in Bosnia reveal that 14% (19) had received a formal four-year Islamic education. It is here during the Bosnian war where the ideological cracks began to appear in the Arab foreign fighter, and it became difficult to understand how an individual who had received formal training in his religion could later embrace a radical Islamist ideology.

The other emerging theme that started to appear in Bosnia was the level of gratuitous brutality, savagery, and atrocities, displayed by some Arab foreign fighters. This marked a departure from the conduct of the Afghan-Arabs, where, as noted earlier, "the humanitarian side of the noble mujahid" was being replaced in Bosnia by gruesome atrocities. Examples were numerous, but a visit to Miletici by a representative of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) summarizes the modus operandi of many of the Arab foreign fighters, particularly the Saudis. The representative reported seeing the aftermath of four men who had been brutally tortured by Arab foreign fighters, and witnessed a man whose "face had been sliced off. Another's head was almost severed. Two

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[*] Sayyid Qutb (jailed and tortured 1954–64); Ayman al-Zawahiri (jailed and tortured 1981–4).
[†] The rate of recidivism from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, is discussed later in this chapter.

others had had their throats cut" (Kohlmann, 2004, p. 86). This level of cruelty began to creep into the accepted repertoire of the Arab foreign fighter, and as we shall see, it underpinned their ideological modus operandi in the Iraq insurgency and in later Syria.

Perhaps related, of the 78 Arab foreign fighters who survived Bosnia, 66.6% (52) went on to later embrace the radical Islamist ideology of al-Qaeda, including two of the Saudi 9/11 hijackers (Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi). A further link with this ideology came in the form of kinship: former Afghan-Arab and cousin of Osama bin Ladin, Abu Zubayr al-Madani, fought and was later killed in Bosnia in 1992. The conflict in Bosnia ended in 1995 with the signing of the Dayton Agreement on December 14, 1995. Article 3 of Annex 1A (of the Dayton Agreement) stipulated that "all foreign Forces, including individual advisors, freedom fighters, trainers, volunteers, and personnel from neighboring and other States, shall be withdrawn from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina" within 30 days. This led those Arab foreign fighters, who were willing to leave Bosnia, to look for another Muslim insurgency to support. They did not have far to look. Of the 78 who survived Bosnia, 49% (37) went to Afghanistan (to fight for the Taliban against the Northern Alliance); 9% (7) went on to Chechnya, and 3.8% (3) went to Tajikistan.

THE CHECHEN INSURGENCY

The Context

The insurgency in Chechnya had a huge impact on the conscience of the Arab world in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular. Gerges (2005) suggested that, "young Muslims from many countries, felt compelled to defend their coreligionists in … Chechnya … and to wage war on their behalf" (p. 57). Now that Bosnia had gained peace, Chechnya became the next natural mobilization. The first Chechen War (December 1994–August 1996) appeared to attract more Arab foreign fighters, than the second (August 1999–April 2009), owing to increasing access restrictions into Chechnya, and post-9/11, Arab foreign fighters became more focused on Afghanistan and Iraq. That said, according to Hegghammer (2010b) "the outbreak of the Chechen war in 1999 created a very favorable environment … because there was outrage in Saudi society over the images of civilian suffering" (p. 126).

Such was the ideological lure of helping coreligionists in Chechnya, that according to the 9/11 Commission Report (2005) "available evidence indicates that in 1999, Atta, Binalshibh, Shehhi, and Jarrah decided to fight in Chechnya against the Russians" (p. 165). The fact that the four pilots of the 9/11 attacks were initially ideologically motivated by the Chechen insurgency indicates ideological support for a defensive jihad. A critical conceptual point arises here and throughout this chapter: *What makes a "noble" Arab foreign fighter become an "ignoble" radical Islamist terrorist?* It appears that "context" has much to do with it, for having arrived in Afghanistan for training, with further ideological indoctrination, the 9/11 pilots subsequently demonstrated a commitment for global jihad. This theme was identified by Sageman (2008), who argued that once in Afghanistan "their ideology was … reinforced through lectures more sophisticated than those they had heard previously" (p. 70). This example demonstrates the susceptibility of those who initially subscribed to a noble defensive jihad, but who later demonstrate vulnerability for a more radical agenda involving nihilistic terrorism, as a result of in-group indoctrination. According to Sageman (2004), it was only once they had "abandoned their bonds to the outside world," that the real indoctrination started (p. 149). Being mallocated from their families, they no longer had the traditional family bonds, so famous in the Arab world, and they appeared to become less accountable for their actions. They turned perceptions into truth, and developed "in group" love, and "out group" hate. This phenomenon is revisited later in the chapter, where in Syria; the Arab foreign fighters have quickly morphed and adopted a radical Islamist ideology, often exploiting the Sunni/Shi'a schism.

THE COHORT

The data extracted from the 69 biographies of those Arab fighters who fought in Chechnya reveal that 20% (14) were former Afghan-Arabs and 16% (11) were former veterans from the Bosnian war. Again, Saudi Arabia provided 55% (38) of the Arab foreign fighters, owing in part to the fact that most Islamic clerics supporting Chechnya were Saudi. Of particular note perhaps is that the vast majority 95.7% (45) of the 31% (47) Arab foreign fighters who survived Chechnya went on to later embrace radical Islamist ideology and became involved in al-Qaeda. Notable individuals from the Chechen cohort are two of the 9/11 hijackers "Ahmed al Ghamdi and Saeed al Ghamdi" (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2005, p. 233), two GTMO High Value Detainees—Abdul Rahim al-Nashiri and Walid Bin Attash, and two individuals involved with the USS Cole bombing—Walid Bin Attash (again) and Muhammad Hamdi al-Ahdal (United Nations, 2014, The al-Qaida Sanctions List—QI.A.20.01).

According to Moore and Tumelty (2008), "the motivations for jihadi fighters to support, travel, and volunteer for combat in the Chechen conflict are … complicated, and reflect a range of motivations … based on religion, kinship, or ideology" (p. 427). Picking-up on the religious motivation, the data reveal that 35% (24) of the 69 of the Arab foreign fighters who fought in the Chechen insurgency were compelled by a religious duty to defend their coreligionists. In addition to these individuals, a further 10% (7) had received formal religious training. Again, it is reasonable to suggest that these individuals were participating in a noble jihad, which was ideologically supported by their faith. Although it is not the intention in this chapter to profile the Arab foreign fighters, it is worthy of inclusion to note that nine possessed undergraduate degrees, one possessed a graduate degree, and one was a medical doctor. The combination therefore of both religiously and academically educated men, somewhat dismisses the myth of a bunch of unemployable, uneducated terrorists.

The notion of kinship is prevalent in many biographies of Arab foreign fighters who were veterans of Chechnya. Saudi GTMO detainee Ghalab al-Bayhani had three brothers involved in al-Qaeda-related activities: Tawfiq al-Bayhani (captured in Afghanistan); Mansoor al-Bayhani (killed in Somalia in June 2007), and Zakaria al-Bayhani (part of a group of 23 Yemeni prisoners). This notion of kinship and social ties was identified by Horgan (2009, p. 13) who defined it as a "predisposing risk factor" to involvement with militant activity, and by Sageman (2008) who uses the euphemism of a "bunch of guys" (p. 87).

Finally, the recurring theme of "career jihadis" is best represented by two Saudi foreign fighters. The first, Abdul Wahid al-Qahtani had, in addition to Chechnya, fought in four other insurgencies. He was a former Afghan-Arab, a veteran of Bosnia, who had fought against Israel in 1996, and fought the US in Afghanistan. He was killed by a US rocket on November 19, 2001. The second, Abu Turab al-Najdi had, in addition to Chechnya, also fought in four other insurgencies. He was a former Afghan-Arab, a veteran of Bosnia, who had fought the US in Somalia and in Afghanistan. He was killed at Khoja Ghar (near Qala al-Janghi Jail) in November 2001. These two Arab foreign fighters epitomized the example of an individual who "had developed into a battle-hardened guerrilla … that an existence outside of war was no longer a tolerable possibility" (Kohlmann, 2004, p. 55).

INSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN POST-9/11

THE CONTEXT

The period after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States was highly charged and witnessed a polarization between the West and the Middle East. Unsurprisingly, having been attacked by 19 terrorists from the Middle East, 15 of them from Saudi Arabia, the West in general, and the United States, in particular, initially held the moral high ground. That was soon squandered by the US government, with the poorly labeled "War on Terror" (WoT) and comments from former President George W. Bush such as "you are either with us or the terrorists." Less

than six months later, the Pew Global Attitudes Project (2002) discovered that "true dislike, if not hatred, of America is concentrated in the Muslim nations of the Middle East," a dislike that was echoed and exploited by Islamic clerics in the Arab world (p. 1). The most influential cleric was Shaykh Hamud bin Uqla al-Shuaybi (also known as al-Shuaybi) who was "a stern and serious man who commanded considerable authority in conservative religious communities by virtue of … his background from the *Wahhabi* scholarly establishment" and whose fatwas "followed political developments very closely" (Hegghammer, 2010b, p. 84). In his post-9/11 fatwa, al-Shuaybi (2001) lambasted America, declaring all Americans to be legitimate targets in that they had democratically voted for the members of Congress, therefore guilty by association. He continued by declaring "that America is a Kufr State that is totally against Islam and Muslims … [and] the obligation and necessity of opposing unbelievers and hating them, as well as rejecting them." With the obvious and imminent invasion of Afghanistan looming, his fatwa was to encourage Arabs to defend the Taliban against the United States. The dataset reveals a new cohort of Arab foreign fighters who traveled to Afghanistan, post-9/11 but prior to the US-led invasion, to augment the foreign fighters already there.

The Cohort

The cohort of Arab foreign fighters involved in the insurgency in Afghanistan post-9/11 is illuminating. As the fourth insurgency, it is possible to reflect on the specific ideological motivations at the time of involvement of the Afghan-Arabs, and the veterans of both Bosnia and Chechnya, in order to identify trends. Using the dataset of 384 Arab foreign fighters who were involved in the Afghanistan insurgency post-9/11, the most revealing detail is that 16% (64) of the "Arab insurgents" had no previous involvement in bygone insurgencies, al-Qaeda training camps, or had any prior terrorist links (i.e., the Algerian GIA). They were a new generation of Arab foreign fighters, arriving in September and October 2001, as a direct result of the threat of an invasion of Afghanistan by the United States. Their ideological motivation remained a religious duty, in the form of a defensive jihad, against a foreign invasion. And despite what the Bush Administration may have said at the time, these 64 individuals cannot be labeled terrorists; they were simply engaged in a noble jihad. However, once having tasted jihad, the trend in all other jihads had been an increased commitment and greater involvement. An example would be Badr Salim al-Sharari from Saudi Arabia. He went to Afghanistan after 9/11 to fight the Americans, but was able to later escape from the Americans, and returned to Saudi Arabia. There he was imprisoned for four months, from where he then went to Iraq in November 2004 and was killed by US forces in April 2005. Figure 4.1 shows the breakdown of 384 Arab Foreign Fighters in Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks.

It is this new cohort of post-9/11 Arab foreign fighters that deserves the most attention. Their "triggering event" was the US invasion of Afghanistan. Horgan (2005) introduces the concept of a "triggering event" and defines it as a "significantly provocative event," in effect becoming an individual catalyst (p. 84). Involvement in jihad against the Americans in Afghanistan was religiously sanctioned through the medium of Islam and encouraged through the influence of kinship and friends. The dataset reveals that 68% of those Arab foreign fighters, who went to Afghanistan in September and October 2001, were influenced by Islamic ideology (through an ideologue, fatwa, at a mosque, or having received Islamic training); 19% and 13% were compelled through kinship ties and friends respectively. Figure 4.2 offers a detailed breakdown.

Most fatwas were spread using the Internet and mosque notice boards, and were far reaching. For example, directly after the 9/11 attacks, a Saudi Air Force captain, Khalid Abdullah al-Morghi, having read a fatwa on the Internet issued by Shaykh Hamud bin Uqla al-Shuaybi supporting the Taliban, deserted his post and went to Afghanistan around 29 September 2001.* The centrality of

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* He was not the only one. Abdul Rahman al-Husaynan serving in Saudi Armed Forces also deserted and went to Afghanistan directly after 9/11. He escaped but was later killed in eastern Afghanistan.

FIGURE 4.1 Breakdown of veteran Arab foreign fighters and new cohort in Afghanistan post-9/11 ($n = 384$).

mosques as a medium to spread the message to the greatest possible audience is axiomatic. The data demonstrate that 23% of the post-9/11 cohort was influenced by gatherings or sermons, within the mosque environment. In the seminal study of "35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists" conducted by Post, Sprinzak, and Denny (2003), they discovered that "for the Islamist groups, almost 50 percent cite the mosque … or other religious influence as central" (p. 173). This is clearly understood by the autocratic regimes across the Arab world, and would explain, for example, the post-9/11 policy of the government of United Arab Emirates, to allow only government sanctioned sermons to be preached.

The other key recurring theme vis-à-vis the 64 Arab foreign fighters who arrived in Afghanistan post-9/11 to defend the Taliban is the notion of kinship and friendship. The data reveal that 26% (17) of the 64 Arab foreign fighters were influenced either by kinship 59% (10), or close family friends 41% (7). Social Network Analysis (SNA) software would likely reveal the importance and connectivity between families and tribes. Diagrammatically, the influence of kinship and friends of Arab foreign fighters in Afghanistan post-9/11 is presented in Figure 4.3.

FIGURE 4.2 Ideological influences on new Arab foreign fighters in Afghanistan post-9/11 ($n = 64$).

FIGURE 4.3   Influence of kinship and friends on new Arab foreign fighters in Afghanistan post-9/11 ($n = 64$).

The influence of kinship and friendship in the mobilization of Arab foreign fighters is a much studied phenomenon, and facilitates "mutual group reinforcement … [and] allows them to leave behind traditional societal morality for a more local morality, preached by the group" (Sageman, 2008, p. 87). An essential conceptual point arises in that many of the family and friends influencing the new cohort were already involved in some form of Islamic militancy, or were veterans of previous defensive jihads.

The Taliban and elements of al-Qaeda were quickly suppressed after the US invasion of Afghanistan, and while many escaped, many also were captured and sent to Guantanamo Bay Prison. Of those who went to GTMO and were later released, some were quick to return to jihad. The latest estimate of recidivism revealed by the US Director of National Intelligence (2013) of the 603 GTMO detainees is 16.6% (100) "confirmed of reengaging," and 12.3% (74) "suspected of reengaging." The next natural defensive jihad in both time and space for former GTMO detainees was the Iraq insurgency.

THE IRAQ INSURGENCY

THE CONTEXT

The build up to the United States and coalition invasion of Iraq was at best very controversial. It did not have the full backing of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and was sold to the public that President Saddam Hussein was developing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Beyond the controversy, the Arab world was preparing to witness the occupation of Muslim land, and by default, a defensive jihad would be the religiously sanctioned response. It was a carbon copy of Afghanistan during the 1980s and in 2001, Bosnia, and Chechnya. Unsurprisingly, Hegghammer (2007) in his study based on analysis of 205 biographies of Saudis who died in the Iraq insurgency noted that "local *Imaams* and some senior clerics were encouraging participation in the Iraqi resistance … [Saudis] were inspired to go to Iraq by sermons at a local mosque" (p. 16).

As the US invasion of Afghanistan was a "triggering event" for many Arab foreign fighters as noted earlier, so too was Iraq. According to a study of Saudi militants in Iraq, Obaid and Cordesman (2005) found that "most of the Saudi militants in Iraq were motivated by revulsion at the idea of an Arab land being occupied by a non-Arab country" (p. 9). It was always going to be a controversial war, but later even when emotions had subsided, the ICM Guardian Muslims Poll (2004) found that

80% of British Muslims thought that the decision by the Western governments to go to "war against Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein was unjustified." Worse still the Iraq insurgency radicalized yet another generation of Arab foreign fighters, and indeed elements within the wider Muslim community. Who better to identify this than the former head of Britain's Security Service (MI5), Baroness Manningham-Buller (2010), who in her testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, admitted,

> our involvement in Iraq radicalized, for want of a better word, a whole generation of young people … who saw our involvement in Iraq, on top of our involvement in Afghanistan, as being an attack on Islam … [and] saw the West's activities in Iraq and Afghanistan as threatening their fellow religionists and the Muslim world (p. 19).

Therefore the political, social, and religious context underpinning the mobilization of Arab foreign fighters to Iraq was highly charged and emotive. Muslim land had been occupied, Muslims humiliated, and also killed. To the Arab world, the Iraq insurgency was a noble jihad to be involved in. However, the key point of the Iraq insurgency was more than a defensive jihad against an apostate invader. For the first time, it publically exposed to the world, the cracks in the Islamic faith between the majority Sunni (90%) and minority Shi'a (10%). In Iraq the demographics were majority Shi'a (53%) and minority Sunni (44%), yet the Sunni Ba'ath Party under Saddam Hussein had ruled the country. Although beyond the scope of this chapter, the recently uncovered Sunni/Shi'a divide in Iraq is stoking the flames of sectarian tensions particularly in Bahrain, Lebanon, and Syria.

The Cohort

The cohort who mobilized for the Iraq insurgency has been the subject of various researchers (Cordesman, 2005; Paz, 2005; Krueger, 2006; Felter and Fishman, 2007; Hegghammer, 2007; Hewitt and Kelley-Moore, 2009). However, probably the most comprehensive study occurred as a result of the "Sinjar Records"—data on "almost 600 al-Qaeda in Iraq personnel (*sic*) records for foreign fighters crossing into Iraq, between spring 2006 to summer 2007" (Fishman et al., 2008, p. 5). The dataset of 45 Arab foreign fighters used in this chapter does not overlap the Sinjar Records, and any reference to it will be for comparatives only.

The dataset reveals that 66% (30) of the cohort came from Saudi Arabia. This majority participation of Arab foreign fighters is broadly consistent with the Sinjar Records, which identified Saudi Arabia as providing 44% (267) of the fighters. As Fishman et al. (2008) noted, "low levels of civil liberties are a powerful predictor of the national origin of foreign fighters in Iraq," which goes some way to explain Saudi fighters' involvement in Iraq (p. 11). However, it is likely that the motivation is more a religious than a Human Rights issue, for as Trofimov (2007) argues, "many … official missionaries preached hatred of the infidel, dedication to global jihad, and rejection of anyone not sharing Wahhabi ideals as an apostate" (p. 243). Additionally, Emerson (2005) suggests that "publications from Saudi Arabia and Saudi websites, either officially operated by the regime or those of non-government organizations … spread an extremist view of Islam throughout the world" (p. 5). The available evidence suggests that Saudi Arabia officially or unofficially supported and often facilitated the movement of Saudi fighters to jihads into Iraq. Iraq was no different to any of the other insurgencies, for example, Bosnia, where Hegghammer (2010b) recorded that "all of Saudi Arabia, starting with the government, the religious scholars, and the ordinary people, were on the side of driving the youths towards jihad in Bosnia-Herzegovina" (p. 35). Despite the majority of Arab foreign fighters being young (average age was only 22 years of age) and inexperienced, the Iraq insurgency still attracted (10%) veterans from previous conflicts. From the dataset, two fighters were former Afghan-Arabs who were also veterans of Bosnia, and a further three had trained in Afghanistan during Taliban rule. This trend is entirely consistent with other insurgencies, but it is clear that a lot of "young blood" was now gaining exposure and experience to jihad, that in the future could be reimported back to their home countries.

The last phenomenon of the Arab foreign fighter cohort in Iraq was the high number of suicide attacks and the number of gruesome atrocities. From the dataset, a staggering 31% (14) were suicide bombers, with 64% (9) originating from Saudi Arabia. One individual Ahmad Abdullah ash-Shaya survived his suicide attack and although badly injured, was arrested and interrogated. However, he was to reappear again, this time in Syria, and his story is covered in detail below. The high level of willingness to participate in suicide bombings in Iraq is striking. The Sinjar Records also identified this trend, noting that 47.6% (70) of Saudis volunteered to be suicide bombers. This level of religious commitment, indoctrination, and radicalization is staggering, especially as their target-set was primarily other Muslims. Probably "the greatest" Arab foreign fighter, ideologue, and proponent for such attacks was the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (Brisard, 2005), a former Afghan-Arab and convicted terrorist prisoner (1996–9). He, more than anyone else, appeared to have been responsible for exposing the once "worst kept secret" of Sunni/Shi'a disunity.

The Sunni/Shi'a disunity was perhaps the catalyst for the blurring of the distinction between Arab foreign fighters involved in a noble jihad, and radical Islamist terrorists, of the persuasion of Zarqawi. These radical Islamist terrorists are not on a global jihad to attack the West per se, but are involved in mass casualty terrorism against Muslims, under the banner of Islam. This change of tack did not go unnoticed by al-Qaeda and prompted Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2005 to write a letter that "chastised Zarqawi for publically attacking Shi'a targets and non-combatants … al-Qa'ida's ideology does not advocate targeting Shi'a as a central component of jihad" (Fishman, 2006, p. 12). This ideological swing has been recognized in the Arab world, and if the truth be known, is tacitly supported by major Sunni Muslim Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia. One only has to observe the polarization of parties (particularly Saudi Arabia and Iran) over Syria, to witness the now public disunity in the Arab world.

SYRIA

The Context

The Arab Spring started on December 17, 2010 by a Tunisian street vendor named Muhammad Bouazizi, who set himself on fire as a result of the humiliation and corruption that he had endured by local police and government officials. This act inspired an uprising within the Arab world, resulting in the toppling of the Tunisian, Libyan, and Egyptian governments. It was not to spread to the Gulf region, as the monarchies there paid off their population in order to retain their patronage. The UAE went so far as to buy all their military and police officers over the rank of major, an Apple iPhone. Countries from the Levant (ash-Sham in Arabic) were in no financial position to pay off their subjects; so they simply continued their authoritarian rule. On the March 15, 2011, large-scale protests began in the city of Daraa, in the south of Syria, near the border with Jordan. These protests were brutally suppressed, leading to the armed insurgency, which has thus far lasted over four years with more than 220,000 killed. It has attracted thousands of Arab foreign fighters and radical Islamist terrorists. Also particularly striking is the notion of Arab foreign fighters fighting in support of the Syrian regime, including the Hezbollah terrorist group from Lebanon. There are also Persian foreign fighters from Iran, including Republican Guard assistance, which Byman (2005) would define as state-sponsored terrorism.

It is however the religious ideology that probably offers the best context in which to understand the Syrian insurgency. This is illuminated in the many fatwas from Islamic clerics, both moderate and radical. Of particular note is Sheikh Abu al-Mundhir al-Shanqiti, a prominent Mauritanian jihadist scholar, "who is the most influential Jihadist scholar that is not imprisoned or dead" (Zelin, 2012). On the 9 March 2012, he issued an Islamic fatwa:

> acknowledging that Syria's Muslims are exposed to the killing of elderly people, children and women, degradation, and the desecration of everything sacred to them. Jihad in Syria is an obligation for every able-bodied Muslim—it is written in Islamic law (International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2012a, p. 2).

Later in 2012, Sheikh Abu al-Mundhir al-Shanqiti declared the insurgency in Syria "a defensive jihad—an obligation for every Muslim who is capable. A man must join such a jihad, even if he has to walk" (International Institute for Counterterrorism [ICT], 2012b, p. 5). Thus far, the Islamic rhetoric was entirely consistent with other insurgencies, except this time there was no foreign occupation of Muslim lands; it was an insurgency against the government regime in Syria. The only parallel was the previous insurgency in Iraq, where as noted earlier, the insurgency became more sectarian (anti-Shi'a) as the time went on. Since the US withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011, the insurgency is entirely sectarian, with the Sunni terrorist group, the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham, fighting the now Shi'a-led government.

It was not until August 2012 that the sectarian nature of the Syrian conflict really began to be discussed on jihadi websites. The jihadist Web forum Ansar al-Mujahideen published an article by senior al-Qaeda strategist Sheikh Abu Ubaidah Abdullah al-Adam. In it, he declared that, "Alawites are not real Muslims … that they are greater infidels than Jews and Christians … and that jihad against the Alawites in Syria is obligatory." The rhetoric and framing of these Islamist scholars resonated within the Arab world, and attracted (and continues to attract) a cohort of Arab foreign fighters inspired by the notion of a noble defensive jihad.

The Cohort

The composition of the cohort of Arab foreign fighters in Syria is interesting, and the dataset of 1175 of them is presented in Figure 4.4.

Immediately the figures appear to make sense, and in many ways explain the country. For example, Saudi Arabia was the main exporter of Arab foreign fighters in the previous five insurgencies studied, and its involvement is explored in more detail as part of a short case study below. Explaining the remaining Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, the local men are wealthy and perhaps less inclined to give up the comforts bestowed upon them by their rulers. Despite countries in the Levant being geographically closer, Lebanon's involvement is mainly sectarian (against the Shi'a); Palestine has a culture of militancy, and Iraq's small showing demonstrates its focus on its own internal sectarian struggle. The North African countries are well represented because they have tasted "domestic jihad" during their Arab Spring, and feel the need to export the concept of jihad to Syria.

Another feature of the cohort is the number of veterans from previous insurgencies, confirming the earlier observation that many Arab foreign fighters cannot retire from jihad, and remain committed to defending the honor of Muslims. The result is that these individuals bring a great deal of experience to the jihad, they begin to naturally occupy positions of command and authority, and possess credibility in front of less experienced foreign fighters. The other feature related to veterans

FIGURE 4.4 Breakdown of countries of origin of Arab foreign fighters in Syria (*n* = 1175).

FIGURE 4.5   Arab foreign fighter veterans in Syrian ($n = 1175$).

of previous jihads is the recent phenomenon of Libyan foreign fighters, who were veterans of their own domestic jihad during the Arab Spring. Many of these veteran Libyan foreign fighters appear to have flocked to Syria, imbued by their own jihad in Libya. Figure 4.5 shows the breakdown of Arab foreign fighter veterans in Syria.

Related to veteran foreign fighters is the act of recidivism. As noted earlier, prison life in the Arab world is harsh and often underpinned by torture and abuse. Political prisoners appear to attract more abuse than the common criminal, and consequently, as a result of their experience, many inmates return to jihad. Of particular note is the number of Saudis returning to jihad, having been released from prison or from the Saudi Rehabilitation Program. Additionally, former detainees from GTMO prison have also returned to jihad. Figure 4.6 shows the breakdown of recidivists from the Arab foreign fighter cohort in Syria.

To bring the concept of the veteran Arab foreign fighter, the Arab terrorist and the recidivist to life, a brief case study will analyze Saudi-born Ahmad Abdullah ash-Shaya. In November 2004,

FIGURE 4.6   Breakdown of recidivists from Arab foreign fighter cohort in Syria ($n = 1175$).

at the age of only 18 years, he was motivated to go to Iraq as a foreign fighter, to wage jihad on the Americans. He was one of the many Saudis identified in the numerous studies of Saudi foreign fighters (Krueger, 2006; Felter and Fishman, 2007; Hegghammer, 2007). He was motivated by the Islamic clerics and ideologues who framed the message that Iraq had been invaded by the West, and fellow coreligionists were being killed, humiliated, and subjugated. Earlier in the year (2004), the Abu Ghrayb Prison scandal had become public knowledge, giving the Saudi religious establishment a highly emotive frame. As identified by Obaid and Cordesman (2005) "the catalyst most often cited [by] Saudi militants in Iraq [was] Abu Ghrayb" (p. 9). Ash-Shaya like most Arab foreign fighters was to engage in a classical, defensive jihad.

It is noteworthy that ash-Shaya only went to Iraq having first completed the Holy Month of Ramadan (in October 2004), reinforcing the Islamic underpinning of his duty toward jihad. It appears that only after his arrival, was he further radicalized and motivated to broaden his target array, which is entirely consistent with the literature (Kohlmann, 2004, p. 55). From a transcript of his later interrogation (in Saudi Arabia), he was motivated "to kill the Americans, policemen, national guards and the American collaborators" (Komarow and al-Anbaki, 2005). This phenomenon to broaden the target array to include fellow Muslims (whether Sunni or Shi'a) appears to be a contemporary twenty-first century feature of modern jihad.

On the December 24, 2004, within less than two months after ash-Shaya's arrival, he carried out a vehicle-borne terrorist suicide attack on the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad, which killed twelve Iraqi civilians, but he survived losing most of his fingers. He claimed it was not supposed to be a suicide mission: "they asked me to take the truck near a concrete block barrier … and leave it there … but they blew me up in the truck" (Komarow and al-Anbaki, 2005). It is highly unlikely that he was not a volunteer—from the Sinjar Records, 47.6% of Saudi foreign fighters entering Iraq, volunteered for suicide missions.

After he was repatriated back to Saudi Arabia and initially imprisoned, he later attended a Saudi Rehabilitation Center, and in 2006, he was introduced to journalists and visiting delegations as one of the program's earliest graduates. However, despite the rhetoric of a successful rehabilitation, in 2013 Ahmad Abdullah ash-Shaya returned to jihad, this time in Syria. On the November 18, 2013, on an Arabic language Facebook account, he announced that, "he was honored to be a soldier's soldier of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), and that he had pledged allegiance to Sheikh al-Baghdadi." Of note, it is instructive that he had ideologically moved beyond the concept of a defensive jihad (against foreign aggression), and embraced a new ideology that justifies and promotes acts of terrorism, devoid of any religious and moral principles, often against fellow Muslims (Sunni and Shi'a). The key observation is "once a foreign fighter—always a foreign fighter"—you can take a man out of the jihad, but you cannot take the jihad out of the man. The vast majority of Arab foreign fighters (who survive) appear unable to return to normal life—and they either become career foreign fighters or radical Islamist terrorists. The key evidence from the dataset of 973 Arab foreign fighters (not including Syria) suggests that 65% (639) of all Arab foreign fighters later become radical Islamist terrorists.

The last conceptual point and a growing phenomenon in the Syrian insurgency is the level of brutality of Arab foreign fighters, particularly the savage rituals such as beheadings. Conceptually, Hafez (2003) is able to explain this behavior as a form of "moral disengagement to legitimate and motivate violent repertoires of contention" (p. 157). Pictures of beheadings in Syria abound on the Internet, offering the researcher both the reality of contention, but also the evidence of the lack any form of decency, compassion, or moral code. Although acting under the auspices of their Islamic faith, those Arab foreign fighters who do conduct those atrocities appear to frame their actions as "ethically justified" and conducted in "self-defense" ("displacement of responsibility"). It mirrors the many atrocities conducted in the Algerian insurgencies (1962 and the mid-1990s) and also in Bosnia. It is only in Syria, perhaps because of the greater global connectivity, that the number and nature of the atrocities are so apparent.

CONCLUSION

The contemporary Arab world appears to be going through an extended twenty-first century generational phase where it is predisposed to political violence, powered by radical Islam. Many Arabs in this phase appear to display an ideological vulnerability to a perceived threat to their Sunni coreligionists, and feel compelled to participate in jihad in support of Muslim insurgencies. However, as a result of this experience, they are subsequently becoming (further) radicalized and begin to embrace an ideology that justifies and promotes acts of terrorism, often against fellow Muslims, that is completely out of harmony with their Islamic faith. In effect, although the ideological rhetoric implies greater adherence to Islam, the result is the promotion of sacrilegious acts. The evidence suggests that 65% of all Arab foreign fighters later become radical Islamist terrorists. This twenty-first century generational phase is underpinned by a radical (and perverted) interpretation of Islam, a visibly growing Sunni/Shi'a divide, the genuine injustices within the Arab world, and an increased awareness of, and connectivity with, fellow Muslim sufferings. The increasing number of Arab foreign fighters (and other Muslims) now fighting in Syria presents a corresponding existential threat to the Muslim and wider world. However, this threat can only be challenged by a Muslim-led solution.

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5 Al-Qaeda
*Through the Lens of Global Insurgency**

Michael F. Morris

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS) (2002) designates al-Qaeda (AQ) as "America's most immediate and serious threat" (p. vii). Conventional wisdom, reflected in news media, public opinion, and government studies, such as the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT), characterizes the AQ menace as one of transnational terrorism. Recently, however, some analysts have begun to challenge that conclusion. They argue, instead, that AQ represents the emergence of a new type of insurgency (see Fishel, 2002; Gunaratna, 2004; Lesser et al., 1999; Mockaitis, 2003; Rich, 2003; Risen, 2004; Scheuer, 2002; Sullivan and Bunker, 2002; Vlahos, 2002).[†] Assessing the nature of the enemy is a critical first step in the crafting of effective strategy. In the case of AQ, one must answer three important questions in order to clarify the extent of the danger and further hone the United States' (US) strategic response. *Does the movement actually represent an insurgency? If so, are there indeed new elements that make AQ different than previously encountered insurgencies? What implications do these answers have for the current war against Osama bin Laden's movement?* The analysis presented in this chapter suggests that AQ represents an emerging form of global Islamic insurgency, the inchoate strategy of which undermines its potential to achieve revolutionary goals. Nonetheless, not unlike previous failed insurgencies, it possesses both durability and an immense capacity for destruction. These characteristics mandate a counterrevolutionary

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[*] This chapter previously appeared in *Strategic Challenges for Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terrorism* by Dr. Williamson Murray, published by the USA War College Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) in 2006. This chapter also appeared in *Joint Forces Quarterly* as the winner of the National Defense University's Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2005 Strategy Essay Competition.

[†] Only Vlahos (2002) attempts to establish why the threat constitutes insurgency instead of terrorism. The others simply assert that insurgency is the issue and then prescribe various remedies. Vlahos (2002) uses a cultural construct to establish the relationship between violence and the political movement it serves. He terms the existential negotiation between insurgent and regime "civilizational insurgency"—a notion that amounts to a contest for legitimacy. Terrorism, then, is not just a type of political violence, rather it is "an expression of changing relationships within culture and society" (p. 7). With regard to the threat's status as terrorist or insurgent, Vlahos arrives at a similar judgment as this essay via a different analytical methodology.

response at the strategic level that aims to destroy not only AQ's organization but also discredit its ideological underpinnings.

TERRORISM VERSUS INSURGENCY: A DISTINCTION WITH A DIFFERENCE

The distinction between terrorism and insurgency is not merely theoretical, as the appropriate responses to the two phenomena are quite different. Before addressing preferred strategies to counter each, one needs to establish how they are alike and how they differ. Unfortunately, existing definitions do more to cloud than clarify the issues. Neither academic nor government experts can agree on a suitable definition for terrorism. The Department of Defense's (DOD) definition focuses on the type of violence employed (unlawful) toward specified ends (political, religious, or ideological).[*] This characterization fails to address the argument from moral relativity that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." In essence, this objection to a suitable definition submits that while violence may be "unlawful," in accordance with a victim's statutes, the cause served by those committing the acts may represent a positive *good* in the eyes of neutral observers. In an effort to escape this dilemma, the United Nations (UN) definition of terrorism focuses instead on the targets (civilians or noncombatants) of violence rather than on its legal nature or intended objective.[†] Still, UN and DoD definitions both sidestep the notion of state-sponsored terrorism. The definition formulated by DoD cites only unlawful violence (thereby making state terrorism an oxymoron), whereas the UN definition excludes state-sponsored terrorism and deals with state violence against civilians as bona fide war crimes or crimes against humanity under the Geneva Convention. More importantly for a strategist trying to characterize the nature of the threat, neither definition conveys exactly what distinguishes the violence of terrorism from that of an insurgency.

Definitions of insurgency have similar difficulties. DoD (2001) defines the term as "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict" (p. 207). Terrorist organizations with revolutionary aspirations seem to meet that criterion and thus the insurgent definition also fails analysts in differentiating one from another. O'Neill (1990) comes closer to distinguishing the two phenomena by including an overtly political component in his definition of insurgency:

> A struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources (i.e., organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics (p. 13).

Thus, insurgencies combine violence with political means in pursuit of revolutionary purposes in a way that terrorism cannot duplicate. Terrorists may pursue political, even revolutionary, goals, but their violence replaces rather than complements a political program.

If definitions offer only a partial aid in discriminating between terrorism and insurgency, organizational traits have traditionally provided another means to tell the two apart. Insurgencies normally field fighting forces orders of magnitude larger than those of terrorist organizations. Typically, insurgents organize their forces in military fashion as squads, platoons, and companies. Terrorist units are usually smaller and composed of isolated teams or cells not organized into a formal military chain of command. Insurgent forces are often more overt in nature as well, especially in the sanctuaries or

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[*] "Terrorism—the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological" (Department of Defense [DoD], 2001, pp. 428).

[†] The recommended United Nations (UN) definition is "any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or noncombatants, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act" (UN, 2004, pp. 51–2).

zones, which they dominate. Terrorist organizations, which tend toward extreme secrecy and compartmented cells to facilitate security, seldom replicate an insurgency's political structure.

One characteristic that does not serve to distinguish terrorism from insurgency is the use of terror tactics. Terrorists and insurgents may employ exactly the same methods, and utilize force or the threat thereof to coerce their target audiences and further the organizational agenda. Both groups may threaten, injure, or kill civilians or government employees by using an array of similar means. Thus, the use of terror in and of itself does not equate to terrorism; the former is merely a tactical tool of the latter (see Marks, 1996, pp. 151–73). Freedman (1986) suggests that the terror of terrorists equates to "strategic" terrorism, because it is the primary means by which they pursue their agenda. However, the terror that insurgents employ is more tactical in nature, since it is only one of several violent tools such groups wield (p. 58). This parsing underscores the point—a variety of agents, including states, insurgents, or even criminals as well as terrorists may employ the same techniques of terror.

Given the challenges of definition and the shared use of the same tactical repertoire, it is hardly surprising that the terms terrorism and insurgency frequently appear synonymously. The US Department of State (DoS) register of terrorist organizations lists small, covert, cellular groups such as Abu Nidal and Greece's "Revolutionary Organization of November 17" as well as larger organizations with shadow governments in established zones, strong political components, and well-defined military hierarchies, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Philippine's New People's Army (NPA) (Cronin, 2004, pp. 1–3, 22–3, 83–6, 90–2, 96–7). Most analysts would characterize FARC and the NPA as insurgencies, albeit ones that employ strong doses of terror on both opponents and the surrounding population. Not surprisingly, AQ is also on the DoS' list of 37 foreign terrorist organizations. In an effort to determine whether it belongs there, this chapter will employ a third analytical framework to supplement the insights offered by existing definitions and traditional organizational characteristics.

In the 1980s, a notable French sociologist conducted research that determined terrorists find themselves estranged from both the social movements that spawned them and the societies they oppose. Wieviorka (1988) uses the term "social anti-movement" to describe the intermediate stage between legitimate social movements and terrorism. Antimovements may employ violence, but they maintain some association with the parent social movement. It is only when that linkage dissolves, a process Wieviorka (1988) calls "inversion," that a militant becomes a terrorist. The violence of terrorist actors no longer is purposeful—in pursuit of a rational political goal—but replaces the parent social movement's ideology. In essence, this conclusion underscores a frequent contention in the literature on political violence: that terrorism is the domain of organizations, where the strategic repertoire of violence conflates means and ends (Wieviorka, 1988, pp. 3–41, 61–77).[*] Importantly,

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[*] Wieviorka conducted a comparative analysis of four sets of terrorist groups. He investigated the nature of the relationships among the terrorists themselves, the social movements they originated from and the polities they sought to change. Wieviorka determined that the relationship between a terrorist and his parent social movement has been destroyed. The social movement's radicalized terrorist descendent has abandoned his roots and the people whose message he claimed to champion. Over time, the violence of terrorism tends to become more nihilistic and its perpetrators less lucid. Wieviorka's social antimovement construct explains the devolution of legitimate social movements (such as proletarian labor or Palestinian nationalism) to a state of terrorism. Groups in this in-between status become the antithesis of their parent social movement. The antimovements begin to advocate abstract notions that no longer reflect the real issues of the original interest group. For antimovements, political rivals become threats that must be fought or destroyed rather than competed against or negotiated with. Eventually, these groups undergo radical disengagement from existing political systems. Soon utopian goals mandate destruction of existing social compacts in order to erect a new reality. Wieviorka asserts that social antimovements are similar in nature to totalitarian states and certain religious sects—the combination of which can produce the Islamic fascism of the Taliban. The extreme form of such antimovements *may* spin off terrorist groups the way Abu Nidal's cell emerged from the Palestinian Liberation Organization (social movement) and Fatah (social antimovement). The process by which this divorce occurs is termed inversion. Inversion transitions an already separated group from a stance of defensive aloofness to one of radical ideological offensiveness; the associated terrorist violence becomes increasingly apocalyptic and even self-consuming.

With regard to terrorism's conflation of means and ends, The Koranic Concept of War states it plainly, "terror struck into the hearts of the enemies is not only a means, it is the end in itself … Terror is not a means of imposing decision upon the enemy; it is the decision we wish to impose upon him" (quoted in Bodansky, 1999, p. xv).

his construct does not provide a means upon which one can hang a consensus definition of terrorism. Instead it offers another means to distinguish terrorism from insurgency. Specifically, this theory posits that the degree of linkage remaining between a given radical group and its parent social movement determines what Wieviorka (1988) refers to as "pure terrorism" (pp. 63, 290, 297). There is a connection between this notion and the broader political nature of insurgency, though it is not an angle Wieviorka himself actually examines. Organizations that have not yet inverted, and which maintain connections to a significant segment of society, represent not just social antimovements, but potential insurgencies.[*]

Using the three analytical lenses—definitions, organizational traits, and Wieviorka's inversion theory—*Where does AQ fall on the terrorism versus insurgency scale?* Certainly, AQ meets the component tests of the various terrorism definitions: (1) unlawful (a nonstate actor), (2) political/ religious/ideological in intent (fatwas calling for the removal of Islamic regimes guilty of religious heresies), and (3) targeting civilians (i.e., the World Trade Center). It also comprises "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict" in accordance with the DoD's insurgency definition. In terms of exhibiting a political component, some have called AQ an armed political party and the extremist wing of a political religion (Burke, 2003, p. 12; Gunaratna, 2002, p. 240). The group's political works include propaganda efforts such as the issuance of fatwas, protection and projection of Salafist religious infrastructure, and mobilization of grass roots support through cooperation with Islamist parties as well as orchestration of favorable media coverage in the Islamic press.[†] The AQ training manual underscores its commitment to both politics and violence as a mechanism for change.

> Islamic governments have never been and will never be, established through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils. They are established as they [always] have been by pen and gun by word and bullet by tongue and teeth (Gunaratna, 2002, p. 5).

Finally, the terror tactics employed in pursuit of AQ's ideological goals qualifies it for either insurgent or terrorist status.

In terms of traditional characteristics of classic terrorist and insurgent organizations, AQ turns in a mixed score. It is relatively small (<100 hard core adherents), but in Afghanistan it did train approximately 18,000 fighters, who have subsequently dispersed around the world in some 60 countries (Burke, 2003, p. 10; Hoffman, 2004a, p. 552). Of this small army (larger in fact than 61 of the world's 161 armies), perhaps 3000 are true AQ troops, as opposed to mere beneficiaries of AQ tactical training (Gunaratna, 2002, p. 8).[‡] The small, relatively cellular structure of the hardcore suggests a terrorist organization, while the scope and scale of its dedicated, deployed militants indicates a significant, if somewhat dispersed insurgency. When AQ enjoyed political space in which to operate unhindered in Afghanistan, it conducted its business in a relatively overt manner as insurgencies usually do. Under duress since 9/11, it has regressed back to a more covert style of operation in accordance with terrorist protocol.

Wieviorka's (1988) precepts suggest that AQ has not yet inverted and transitioned to pure terrorism. Osama bin Laden's organization stemmed from the political tradition of the Muslim Brotherhood

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[*] Wievorka uses the term "insurgency" interchangeably with the term terrorism in his sociological analysis. The author is indebted to Marks for the insights that the application of Wieviorka's theory provides in differentiating between terrorism and insurgency.

[†] AQ requested Islamic political parties to do propaganda, fund-raising, and recruiting on its behalf in order to "free a warrior to fight" Gunaratna (2002, p. 226). The term "Salafist" refers to those who seek to copy the way the earliest Muslims practiced Islam. "Wahhabi" refers to followers of the eighteenth century puritanical Arab mullah Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. As Burke (2003) notes, "bin Laden and his fellow extremists are Millenarian, fundamentalist, reformist, revivalist, Wahhabi/Salafi and, at least in their rootedness in modernity, if not their program, Islamist" (pp. 38–9). This chapter uses both Wahhabi and Salafist to describe AQ.

[‡] For listings of world army strengths, see the online publication entitled, "Armed Forces of the World."

(MB), which promised an Islamic alternative to capitalist and Marxist models of development.[*] Normally, social movements such as those represented by the MB could compete effectively in an environment of democratic elections. In a Muslim landscape devoid of free elections, however, alternate ideological competitors either die or become subversive to continue the political fight.[†] AQ represents a version of the latter. While the group's methodology of martyrdom (reflecting the radical ideology of bin Laden's Palestinian spiritual mentor Abdallah Azzam) is apocalyptic from a Western perspective, it is in accord with at least a version of the religious tradition of jihad within Islam. Thus, it is not a complete departure from its own societal norms.[‡] Moreover, bin Laden's popularity throughout the Muslim world, the fact that the populace among whom his operatives hide, despite the offer of large rewards, has delivered to Western security forces neither him nor his chief lieutenants, and the relative lack of condemnation of his group's activities by leading Islamic clerics suggests that AQ has not severed its connection with significant segments of its social constituency.[§]

This grass roots support indicates an organization still in the social antimovement phase, rather than a terrorist group divorced from the population it claims to represent. AQ has radically disengaged itself politically (perhaps inevitable given the autocratic nature of the regimes it opposes), is hyperaggressive toward those it perceives responsible for its political weakness (Jews, Americans, and apostate Muslim leaders), and advocates a utopian dream promising a powerful yet thoroughly isolated Islamic world. Such traits are symptomatic of a social antimovement. Pure terrorism, on the other hand, might exhibit the same radical goals and appalling acts, but would result in far broader condemnation of AQ's agenda than has occurred so far throughout the Muslim world. Analysts who conclude that AQ is winning the war of ideas between the radical and moderate Islamic religious traditions further reinforce the counterintuitive determination that AQ is not (yet) a terrorist organization (Bodansky, 2004, pp. xvi–xvii; Burke, 2003, pp. 5–6).[¶] Such evidence indicates a growing linkage between the purveyors of violence and the polity they claim to represent. Purposeful political violence committed on behalf of a sizable segment of society suggests insurgency. Importantly, the judgment that AQ has not descended into terrorism is not to sanction the group's horrific conduct or render support for its political objectives. Instead, it represents an effort to assess AQ's current status, accurately portray its nature, and thereby help determine how best to combat it.

Combating terrorism and insurgency requires different strategic responses. Certainly both pose significant threats to the United States. Terrorists, in an age of transnational cooperation and access

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[*] For background on the MB, see Esposito (1992, pp. 120–133). For the MB's relationship to AQ, see Gunaratna (2002, p. 96).

[†] Of 41 countries with populations at least 2/3 Muslim, the annual Freedom House assessment lists none as free (protecting both political and civic rights). Eight are shown as "partially free" while the rest are categorized as "not free." Seven of the eleven states listed as most repressive are Muslim. Brzezinski (2004, p. 499). Of the 57 members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Lewis (2003, p. 163) credits only Turkey with political, social, and economic freedom. When religious dissidents do become subversive owing to a lack of political "space," they enjoy some advantages over their secular competitors because even ruthless tyrants have difficulty suppressing the religious infrastructure that shields the opposition. See Lewis (2003, pp. 23, 133).

[‡] For the impact Azzam had on bin Laden, see Burke (2003, pp. 68–71). For a discussion of AQ's apocalyptic qualities, see Gunaratna (2002, pp. 93–4).

[§] Shibley Telhami, a University of Maryland professor who conducted a poll of Muslims in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), discovered that Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden tied for fourth place on a list of most admired world leaders behind Jacques Chirac of France (1st), deceased Egyptian President Nasser (2nd), and Hezbollah's leader in Lebanon (3rd). Telhami agrees there is a battle for hearts and minds afoot. "But, unfortunately, things went the way al Qaeda wanted them to go rather than the way the United States wanted them to go in terms of public opinion … What we're seeing now is a disturbing sympathy with al Qaeda coupled with resentment toward the United States." Dafna Linzer, "Polls Showing Growing Arab Rancor at US," July 23, 2004. Some 60% of British Muslims suggest the belief that AQ is "fighting the right fight," while 95% of Saudi middle class and professional men between the ages of 21 and 45 supported bin Laden in a 2002 poll. Vlahos, 19–20. The 9/11 Commission Report cites similarly negative polling data (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004, p. 375).

[¶] The virulent Wahhabi strain of Islam, combining intolerance with a call to jihad, is promulgated in particular by Saudi Arabia. That country alone established some 1500 mosques, 210 Islamic centers, and 2000 madrasahs worldwide between 1982 and 2002. This level of proselytizing accounts, at least in part, for the increasing popularity of radical Islam and its sanction of political violence (Gold, 2003, pp. 12–3, 126).

to weapons of mass destruction, have the means to unleash catastrophic attacks on modern societies that dwarf even the terrible blows of 9/11. But terrorism, however powerful in a destructive sense, remains the province of the politically weak. Terrorists are physically and psychologically removed from broad popular support. Because terrorists remain isolated from the social movements from which they sprang and their political goals become, over time, progressively divorced from reality, it is neither necessary nor possible to negotiate with them. They are a blight, like crime, that one cannot eliminate but which states must control to limit their impact. Of course, states must hunt terrorists possessing the means and will to conduct catastrophic attacks not only with national and international police resources, but also with all the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power. However, states must handle insurgents differently, because they represent both a political and a military challenge. They combine an ideologically motivated leadership with an unsatisfied citizenry (the so-called grievance guerrillas) into a challenge to existing governments. Only a war of ideas can confront and defeat ideologies. An integrated counterinsurgency (COIN) program that enables the targeted government to offer more appealing opportunities than the insurgents' (doubtless utopian) vision must peel away popular support. Finally, a successful approach must identify and systematically neutralize the insurgent strategy's operational elements. AQ represents not terrorism, but an insurgency featuring a Salafist theology that appeals to significant portions of Muslim believers and that sanctifies terror. The next section will explore whether the nascent insurgency has the strategic wherewithal to enact revolutionary change.

AL-QAEDA'S INSURGENCY: A POLICY–STRATEGY MISMATCH

Islamic insurgency is not a new phenomenon. Nevertheless, historically it has not been a successful one (Munson, 1988, pp. 104, 125–37). Moreover, as Freedman (1986) notes, revolutions that rely on terror as the primary means of political violence court strategic failure. *Does AQ's methodology promise a different outcome?* The movement's goals are revolutionary. They envision remaking society such that religious faith is foundational, social stratification is enforced, and the government is autocratic in nature and controlled by clerics. The Islamist governments of Iran, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and Sudan illustrate an approach to the ideal. AQ intends to establish like regimes in lieu of "apostate" Muslim governments such as those of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The new Salafist administrations would strictly enforce Shari'a law and block military and cultural influences from the West. AQ's political objective, then, remains unlimited vis-à-vis targeted Islamic regimes. It seeks to overthrow their form of government. Regarding the United States, the group's political objectives in the short run are more limited: to coerce America to withdraw from the Middle East and abandon its sponsorship of Israel.[*]

   While it is important to classify an insurgency's type and understand its goals, the operative question is how the movement uses the means at its disposal to achieve its desired ends—in other words what strategy does it employ. It is not enough to have a guiding ideology and a susceptible body politic with significant, and potentially exploitable, grievances against the existing government. In the operational realm, something must connect the two. Without this critical linkage, ideologies may produce terrorists and grievances may spawn rebellions. But it is only when ideology and grievances combine that insurgencies result.[†] Understanding how strategy affects that combination provides insight into the best ways to counter a particular insurgency. Current doctrine identifies two basic insurgent strategies: mass mobilization (best illustrated by Mao Zedong's people's war

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[*] There are those who argue that AQ's long-term objective encompasses nothing less than the destruction of the United States and the West (see Tilford, 2004).

[†] Marks' (2004) work stresses the critical linkage between the ideology of the dissident leadership and the practical grievances of the masses. He sees mobilization, orchestrated by covert political infrastructure, as the key operational connector between insurgent leaders and their followers. See Marks (2004, pp. 107–28; Marks, 2000, pp. 33–4).

construct) and armed action (featuring either rural-based foco or urban warfare oriented styles) (US Department of the Army [DA], 2004, pp. 1–7).*

AQ exhibits an interesting blend of both insurgent strategies. Its movement employs the urban warfare version of the armed action strategy. Certainly most of the group's infamous activities have been military rather than political in nature. It has not sought to use rural-based military forces to court recruits and wage a systematic campaign of destruction against target governments. Instead, AQ has employed violence against both government and civilian targets to create instability and undermine the confidence and political will of its enemies. Small, covert teams employing creative suicide techniques planned and executed its attacks against the Khobar Tower barracks in Saudi Arabia (1996), the *USS Cole* (2000), and the World Trade Center (WTC)/Pentagon (2001). AQ has not adopted a mass mobilization strategy, but it does employ some of Zedong's key concepts. The Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) carefully managed mass line finds its analog in the Islamic madrasahs, mosques, and media outlets. These forums publicize bin Laden's philosophy, capture and echo the people's complaints, and conjoin the ideology and grievances in a perfect storm of revolutionary fervor. Islamic madrasahs, mosques, and media also provide a suitable venue for aspects of political warfare. Bin Laden's and his successor's attempts to communicate directly with and

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* Each style exhibits strengths that make it dangerous and weaknesses that leave it vulnerable. Mass mobilization is best exemplified by the people's war waged by Mao Zedong's Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Mao's experience and writings provided, in essence, a blueprint for insurgency that has been the most successful and thus most widely copied strategy. People's war emphasizes politics over military considerations. Accordingly, Mao's strategy is designed to build strength in a gradual manner rather than seize power in a lightning strike. Key operational elements of that strategy include the mass line, the united front, political warfare, covert infrastructure, protracted war, and international support. The mass line is a feedback mechanism that translates the people's complaints into elements of the party's pronounced policy. The united front is a broad assemblage of social movements, political parties, and trade organizations that also oppose the existing government. The insurgency makes common cause with these organizations when convenient and looks to infiltrate and subvert as many as possible in a bid to broaden its own base and power. Political warfare—the concerted use of soft power (such as propaganda, public diplomacy and subversion of the enemy's political or media elements)—is used to enhance the party's own political position while undermining that of the enemy. Infrastructure is the covert "shadow government" that is built and employed to gradually wrest control of the population from the existing government. This infrastructure is also the primary link between revolutionary leaders and their followers—it is the mechanism by which control of the human terrain is forged. Protracted war, perhaps the most well known of Mao's devices, makes a virtue of military weakness by starting with local guerrilla forces and then developing them into larger, more capable mobile formations and ultimately regular units that engage the enemy in conventional combat. This progression is phased, starting with the strategic defensive, then a period of preparation for offensive operations and culminating with the assumption of the strategic offensive. International support is the final pillar in the Maoist strategic construct. It stresses the importance of external diplomatic, military, and economic assistance for the insurgency and/or hindrance of the target government. Mao's thoughts on his strategy may be found in Zedong (1967). General overviews of Maoist strategy are available in Ellis (1995, pp. 177–99) and O'Neill (1990, pp. 34–41). The armed action option subordinates political to military considerations. Mobilization of the population and patient development of covert infrastructure do not play critical roles in this strategy. Instead the operational link between grievance-inspired followers and ideology-driven leaders is the campaign of violence itself in this style of insurgency. Subcategories of this approach include rural-based foco insurgencies and urban warfare insurgencies. The former is best illustrated by the Cuban revolution. A relatively small military force that commences guerrilla operations and recruits additional membership via the success of its military strikes marks Foco insurgencies. These strikes create new and exacerbate existing grievances of the people (O'Neill, 1990, pp. 41–5). There is no separate party that directs military conduct; instead, in the words of Debray (1967) "the guerrilla force is the party in embryo" (p. 106). Foco strategies have not been particularly successful outside Cuba; they lack the staying power that mass mobilization provides and have no reserve manpower available to tap following catastrophic military setbacks. The urban warfare variation of the armed action strategy features raids, bombings, assassinations, and sabotage against political and economic targets in the target country's leading cities. The goal is to create chaos and discredit the government in the eyes of its people. The population's loss of confidence in the government's ability to provide the first mandate of its charter—security for its citizens—may lead the citizenry to side with the insurgents. This strategy is clearly at work in contemporary Iraq. Without an analytical framework such as Wieviorka's, the urban warfare strategy is hard to distinguish from similar patterns of terrorism. Palestine in 1947, Cyprus in 1958, and South Yemen in 1967 provide successful examples of urban warfare. Otherwise this style has proved as barren as its foco counterpart because effective police and security forces have been able to either mitigate or destroy urban insurgents. See O'Neill (1990, pp. 45–7) and Laqueur (1976, pp. 343–52). Laqueur (1976) equates "urban guerrilla warfare" to terrorism (p. xi), but his description of the strategy and its development is useful. Moreover, he concludes that the style is relatively ineffective owing to its lack of an adequate political component (p. 404).

threaten the American people have been neither sophisticated nor effective, but they do illustrate an effort to address his enemy's political vulnerabilities. AQ has also proved quite willing to cooperate, in a virtual united front, with a long list of otherwise dubious allies, including Shi'ite Hezbollah, secular Baathist officials, and Chinese criminal syndicates (Gunaratna, 2002, pp. 146–9; Reeve, 1999, pp. 216–9). International support for AQ is important. Since the displacement of Afghanistan's ruling Taliban party, primary support comes from countries such as Iran, Syria, and a host of like-minded states, regional insurgencies, and terrorist organizations (Bodansky, 2004, pp. 304, 310, 345–6, 405–6, 426, 427, 430, 439).[*]

Zedong's prescription for protracted war is also in keeping with AQ's brand of Islamic revolutionary war. The mujahedeen employed long-term guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan to drive out the Soviets; AQ looks to replicate that success in a similar protracted campaign against America (Chipman, 2003, p. 155–167; Hoffman, 2004a, p. 555). In addition to the small unit attacks characteristic of traditional guerrilla warfare, the larger operations conducted by thousands of AQ-trained soldiers in Afghanistan against the Russians (and later the Northern Alliance) indicate that AQ does not oppose amassing and employing more conventional military power if the time, resources, and political space permit. For example, bin Laden's May 2001 communiqué called for the formation of a 10,000-man army to liberate Saudi Arabia (Burke, 2003, p. 128).[†]

When denied the opportunity to fight conventionally, AQ is willing to fall back on a more limited urban warfare strategy. Such a strategy is in consonance with a protracted war timeline, if not the ponderous methodology of its Maoist antecedent. Urban warfare seeks only to disrupt, not to build a conventional force capable of challenging government forces in pitched battles. It subverts targeted governments in preparation for the day when military action may remove a greatly weakened regime. Regardless of which military strategy AQ employs, it is apparent that the groups and its leadership (past and present) have taken the long view of history necessary to maintain a protracted war. The religious faith of AQ's leadership is unperturbed by short-term setbacks or the lack of immediate progress in unseating target governments. Death in combat is even seen as motivational for those warriors who follow in the footsteps of the martyred mujahedeen.[‡] While AQ does not use the same mobilization techniques Zedong's strategy employed, it nonetheless benefits from similar operational effects achieved in a different way. The purpose of covert infrastructure is to operationalize control of human terrain.[§] The shadow government provides or controls education, tax collection, civil and military recruiting services, public works, economic infrastructure development and operation, police functions, and legal adjudication. While there is no evidence of an AQ equivalent to a communist style covert infrastructure as seen in China, Malaya, or Vietnam, the radical Islamic religious movement has developed a construct that militant ideologues could subvert and employ to attain the same ends. One expert notes that religious institutions may replicate the parallel hierarchies of covert infrastructure and that religious inducement is more compelling to potential insurgent recruits than secular ideology (O'Neill, 1990, pp. 77, 93).

The militant Islamist construct that illustrates such a parallel hierarchy is a virtual counter state known as the da'wa.[¶] Grassroots social programs comprise this alternate society, which aims at prov-

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[*] For evidence of collaboration with Iraq on the development of chemical weapons, see Scheuer (2002, pp. 124, 188–9). Between 1996 and 1998, 10% of bin Laden's phone calls were placed to locations in Iran (Gunaratna, 2002, p. 12).

[†] For AQ's appreciation of the merits of conventional fighting, see Scheuer (2002, pp. 104–5).

[‡] For the use of terror in support of a protracted war methodology, see Lesser et al. (1999, p. 39). On AQ's preference for suicide attacks, see Gunaratna (2002, pp. 91–2).

[§] The notion of covert political infrastructure as a mechanism to "dominate human terrain" is a key insight found throughout much of Marks' work on Maoist insurgency. See Marks (1994, 1996, 1998, 2003a,b, 2004). The salient point with respect to Islamic insurgency is to what degree infrastructure, or something like it, pertains as a viable mechanism for attaining political power.

[¶] Da'wa is not to be confused with the Islamic al-Da'wa political party in Iraq (a descendent of an Iranian-backed Shi'ite revolutionary movement founded in 1958). Rather it is a type of Islamic proselytizing that, in effect, has morphed into a way of seeking what Emmanuel Sivan calls "'re-Islamization from below,' the long-term infiltration into society's every nook and cranny as a way to gain eventual political control" (see Sivan, 2003, p. 4).

ing the efficacy of fundamentalist policies and gradually building a mass base that could eventually translate into political power. The da'wa includes associations of middle-class professionals, Islamic welfare agencies, schools and student groups, nongovernmental humanitarian assistance organizations, clinics, and mosques. These venues advance political ideas and sometimes instigate mass protests. Though this overt nucleus of a parallel government has developed in nations such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, it has not yet attained the revolutionary capacity exhibited by the covert infrastructure of Maoist people's war. Opposition parties such as the MB have not been able to leverage this latent source of organizational strength into a successful challenge to sitting governments (Rubin, 2003, p. 211; Sidahmed and Ehteshami, 1996, pp. 61–6; Sivan, 2003, pp. 1–9).* Gurr (1970) observes that the existence of dissent options such as the da'wa sometimes bleed off revolutionary potential energy and actually make successful insurrection less likely rather than facilitating its advance (pp. 354–5). The da'wa's capacity as a conduit for Maoist style political mobilization is nonetheless striking.

The strategy of AQ is thus a blending of the more familiar mass mobilization and armed action strategies. Some of the factors that made Mao's people war strategy effective are also present in AQ's twist on "making revolution." The religious foundation of AQ's ideology and the devout nature of the societies it seeks to coopt create a novel dynamic with a potentially new way of connecting means to ends. So far this potential is unrealized. In the modern era, radical Muslims have applied the coercive social control consistent with bin Laden's brand of Islam only following the seizure of political power. In Iran, Afghanistan, and Sudan the da'wa did not serve as a virtual counter state as shadow governments do in Maoist people's war. But in the future AQ may not have to replicate Mao's secular infrastructure because alternate mechanisms of control already reside in the target societies. The challenge for Islamic insurgents is to transition the da'wa's capacity for social influence into one of alternate political control. Whether or not such an evolution proves feasible, AQ's armed action approach seeks to achieve its limited political objectives against the US via a military strategy of erosion. That is, additional strikes of sufficient magnitude could induce America to reconsider its policy options in the Middle East.† In addition to the strategic intent of influencing enemy policy, these attacks also serve to: mobilize the Muslim world; generate recruits, money, and prestige; demonstrate the global capacity to disrupt; and provide a forum for a kind of "performance violence" that symbolically underscores the righteousness of its cause (Burke, 2003, p. 163; Juergensmeyer, 2000, p. 124; Lesser et al., 1999, pp. 41, 89–90). Failure to harness a more potent political component with its military erosion option, however, means that AQ is less likely to overthrow targeted Islamic regimes. The unlimited political objective associated with the constrained military means creates a fatal policy–strategy mismatch that dooms its insurgency to failure.‡ So far this chapter has established that AQ's connection to the people in a number of Islamic countries means that its methodology is not terrorism but a kind of insurgency. The strategy of that insurgency, combining a variety of forms and styles in pursuit of both limited and unlimited political goals, demonstrates the ability to disrupt on a massive level, but less likelihood of actually enacting revolutionary change. The final question is how to modify existing policies to better address the peculiar nature of the emerging AQ threat.

IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY POLICY

The insurgent nature of the AQ threat suggests that the United States and its allies must counter the enemy's ideology, his strategy, and the grievances he seeks to manipulate. The Army's October

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* More than 20% of the Islamic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) worldwide have been infiltrated by radical militant organizations. Many Islamic NGOs were originally established and remain controlled by these militant forces, which use these organizations as fronts to radicalize and mobilize unsuspecting populations (Gunaratna, 2002, pp. 6, 227, 239).

† For an assessment of AQ's evolving strategy with regard to non-US targets, see Lia and Hegghamer (2004, pp. 355–75).

‡ McAlister (2004, pp. 297–319) concludes that AQ will fail for another reason—the inherent inefficiencies of its chosen networked organizational construct. Specifically, he posits that the group's size and complexity are disadvantages rather than virtues as usually assumed.

2004 Interim Counterinsurgency Operations Field Manual—FMI 3-07.22—mentions all these aspects of the struggle. Though the new manual recognizes AQ as an insurgency, it does not speak to the unique challenges inherent in battling the first global insurgent movement. Some of the traditional COIN prescriptions are difficult to apply to a netted, transnational movement such as AQ. For example, "clear and hold" tactics do not work when the opponent disperses across 60 nations around the globe. Similarly, sanctuary is no longer a state or even a regional problem; with a global threat, it becomes an international issue. The scope of the challenge increases vastly when potential sponsors include not only nations such as Iran, Sudan, and war-ravaged Syria, but also regions in turmoil such as Chechnya and failed states such as Somalia.

Unlike extant COIN doctrine, the NSCT does not recognize the insurgent nature of the AQ threat. Instead the document characterizes AQ as a multinational terrorist network. Nonetheless, the methodology laid out in the strategy incorporates a variety of COIN techniques. These include winning the war of ideas, eliminating sanctuaries, interdicting external support, and diminishing underlying conditions (NSCT, 2003, pp. 21–4). Interestingly, the National War College student report that inspired much of the Global War on Terrorism strategy paper concluded that AQ represented an evolution of terrorism, which the authors dubbed "pansurgency." The students defined this phenomenon as "an organized movement of nonstate actors aimed at the overthrow of values, cultures, or societies on a global level through the use of subversion and armed conflict, with the ultimate goal of establishing a new world order" (National War College Student Task Force on Combating Terrorism, 2002, p. 10). That conclusion was the most important idea in the study that did not make it into the National Security Council's (NSC) approved Global War on Terrorism (GWoT) strategy paper. Doubtless the NSC preferred the illegitimacy inherent in the terrorist label rather than the ambiguity associated with an insurgent status.

Greater emphasis on COIN methodology, however, would have improved the national counterterrorism (CT) strategy's prescriptions for addressing AQ's ideology, strategy, and exploitation of grievances. Addressing grievances is essentially a tactical response. The current strategy rightly indicates that championing market-based economies, good governance, and the rule of law will serve to mitigate conditions that enemies exploit to recruit insurgents (NSCT, 2003, p. 23.) But experiences in Haiti, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq indicate the overwhelming resource challenges inherent in such nation building. "Draining the swamp" as a means of removing grievances based on poverty, lack of education, poor medical care, and culturally induced violence is a generational investment and fiscally prohibitive even on a state level, much less in a regional sense. Thus, the most effective means to resolve grievances is not through development or repair of shattered infrastructure, but via reform of the targeted state's political process. Broadened opportunity to participate in the *sine qua non* of politics—the decisions about who gets what—undermines radical Islamic movements' protected status in much of the Muslim world as virtually the only available option through which to express dissent. AQ is a religiously inspired revolutionary movement, but fundamentally it is political in nature (Marks, 2004, p. 125.) Thus competitors offering different solutions for extant social, economic, and political grievances most threaten the movement's political potential. In a largely nondemocratic Islamic world, however, a move to greater electoral participation is fully as revolutionary as the theocratic vision peddled by AQ. Consequently, it remains a diplomatic and political hurdle of the highest order.

At the operational level, the NSCT identifies a number of useful diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments for use against AQ. The NSCT endorses a military strategy of annihilation, but it does not identify a defeat mechanism. Against mass mobilization style insurgencies, destruction of the covert infrastructure is the preferred defeat mechanism. AQ exerts far less control over a targeted population because its strategy establishes no shadow government, but the organization remains much more elusive as a result. Thompson (1970) recognized the dilemma posed by insurgencies without infrastructure. He noted that either organization or causes are the vital factors behind insurgencies; which one pertains dictates the appropriate strategic response (pp. 8–9).

If Maoist people's war features organizational strength, then the American Revolution illustrates insurgency motivated by an idea. The colonies possessed a degree of local government, but they lacked the kind of pervasive organizational control that would ensure citizens had to support the revolutionary movement. Instead the glue that held the insurgency together was the popular idea of political independence. Similarly, AQ's strength lies in the appeal of its Salafist/Wahhabian philosophy. This insight suggests that AQ has no structural center of gravity at the operational level. This verdict reflects the amorphous strategy employed by the group thus far and explains its lack of success in either toppling Islamic governments or causing the West to withdraw from the Middle East. But it also underscores the tremendous potential energy possessed by a movement whose ideas appeal powerfully to a sizable minority throughout the Muslim world.

Such an assessment dictates a different kind of response at the strategic level. The conflict is one between competing visions of Islam. Moderate Islam is willing and able to accommodate modernism; radical Islam insists that the religion return to the halcyon days of the seventh and eighth centuries. This is a civil war of sorts, and one, which the West is poorly positioned, to referee and ill-suited to encourage or end. The contest is not the venue of an information operation writ large. Rather it is the age old and fundamental debate on religion's role in governance. Each people must make its own choice; Madison Avenue marketing techniques and western-style politics are neither necessary nor sufficient to sway the result. Instead a sophisticated form of political warfare must support and encourage moderate governments that champion tolerant forms of the Islamic faith, while opposing religious fascism. The National Security and Combating Terrorism strategies mention, but do not stress this war of ideas (The National Security of the United States of America, 2002, p. 6; National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2003, pp. 23–24).[*] It deserves more emphasis and attention because failure in this arena will render moot even the destruction of AQ. Osama bin Laden's movement is merely representative of the threat posed by Salafist theology. Other groups, though less well known, harbor similar political objectives and the conflict will continue until the underlying ideas are rejected by the Muslim umma. The threat posed by radical Islam today resembles that posed in 1917 by communism—a poor idea poised to justify the spread of totalitarianism.[†]

The strategic challenge is to discredit a fascist religious ideology before victim-states experience a century of social, economic, and political oppression, as well as recognize too late that Wahhabism is simply another failed philosophy of government. Key to meeting that challenge is to recognize threats as they are rather than as one wishes them to be. The present National Security Strategy (NSS) fails this charge when it claims the enemy is terrorism rather than the ideology that justifies the terror. This analysis confuses the symptom for the disease. The real problem is a religiously inspired political ideology, the specified end state of which is global hegemony. AQ exemplifies this ideology and represents an emerging danger that demands a clear policy response. Such a policy should promulgate a comprehensive new doctrine encompassing the following elements:

1. The United States opposes those nations whose governments embrace Salafist jihadist ideology.[‡]
2. The United States will seek to contain the spread of Salafist jihadist ideology.
3. The United States will hold accountable those nations that host, sponsor, or support Salafist jihadist groups.
4. The United States will support allies (or nations whose survival is considered vital to its security) if Salafist jihadist nations or movements threaten their sovereignty.

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[*] The importance of political warfare is a common refrain among both COIN and CT strategists. The problem is that no one is quite certain how to operationalize the concept, see Davis and Jenkins (2002, pp. 46–7) and Biddle (2002, pp. 10–2).

[†] The Soviet analogy was posed to a Washington, DC, foreign policy symposium by General John Abizaid, US, Commanding General of US Central Command (CENCOM), in October 2004 (see Ignatius, 2004, p. B1).

[‡] "Salafist jihadists" is the term employed by General Abizaid to describe the generic militant Islamic threat, which AQ exemplifies (see Ignatius, 2004, p. B1).

A doctrine such as this, not unlike Cold War-era anticommunist policies, clarifies the national position, while enabling political leaders to protect US interests by selectively supporting authoritarian allies and/or encouraging political reform. This choice, reflecting the persistent foreign policy tension between idealism and realpolitik, remains the essence of effective diplomacy.

Choosing wisely between idealism and realism is challenging and important because the militant Islamic threat that AQ represents is not monolithic in nature.[*] Branches of AQ and organizations similar to Bin Laden's may be different in important ways. In the early days of the Cold War, the West thought the communist threat was monolithic; time and experience proved that it was not. Neither is the Salafist world. All politics are local—even the politics of religion. COIN strategists must therefore evaluate each case on its own merits. While Islamic militants may cooperate with each other in a global manner, the program they craft to topple a particular government requires independent analysis and a counterrevolutionary strategy that recognizes and leverages local conditions. It is also important to remember that insurgency is only one way to enact social and/or political change. Revolutions also occur peacefully (as the Shah of Iran learned in 1979), via coup (as Lenin demonstrated in 1917), or even by the ballot box (with the prospect of "one man, one vote, one time" should a totalitarian party win).[†]

CONCLUSION

AQ is the most deadly of the more than 100 Islamic militant groups formed over the past 25 years (Gunaratna, 2002, p. 240). The danger it poses flows from its willingness to employ weapons of mass effect, its global reach, its focus on targeting America, and most importantly its revolutionary and expansionist ideology.[‡] The size of AQ, its political goals, and its enduring relationship with a fundamentalist Islamic social movement provide strong evidence that AQ is not a terrorist group but an insurgency. Armed action is its primary strategy, but there are intriguing aspects of mass mobilization techniques that serve to strengthen its organizational impact and resiliency. Elements unique to its methodology include transnational networking and a multiethnic constituency.[§] Together these factors comprise an evolving style of spiritually based insurgency that is somewhat different than the Maoist people's war model, which underwrites most COIN doctrine.[¶] The disparate nature of the threat—in essence a global, but somewhat leisurely paced guerrilla war—makes it difficult to focus an effective strategic response. But AQ's organizational and strategic choices also make it tough for the movement to concentrate its power in ways that achieve its political ends. Thus far no targeted Islamic government has fallen to AQ-inspired violence. Nor have AQ's attacks compelled or coerced the US to alter its policies in the Middle East. The resulting contest of wills is classically asymmetric.

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[*] In the days immediately following 9/11, analysts feared that AQ represented a new type of terrorism: millennial in character, monolithic in nature, global in scope, huge in scale, and equipped with weapons of mass destruction that would render its challenge more existential than any previously encountered (see Burke, 2003, pp. 7–17). More recent scholarship indicates that AQ comprises a relatively small inner circle of bin Laden followers, a panoply of loosely linked but similarly motivated spin-off groups, and a guiding ideology that motivates both the original organization and its clones. For a broader overview of the variance resident in the Islamic militant camp (see Esposito, 1992, pp. 243–53).

[†] Coups are far more prevalent historically than revolutions wrought by insurgency. Laqueur's (1976, p. 408) dated but still valuable study notes that between 1960 and 1975, 120 coups took place while only five guerrilla movements came to power (three in Portuguese Africa, one in Laos and one in Cambodia). The Islamic government in Sudan, for example, came to power via a coup supported by the Sudanese army in June 1989 (see Burke, 2003, p. 132).

[‡] Bin Laden's emphasis on defeating America before overthrowing apostate Islamic states represents a significant switch in philosophy and strategy from that of previous Islamic militant groups (see Scheuer, 2002, pp. 170–7).

[§] Normally AQ's networking receives the lion's share of the analytical attention, but it is perhaps even more important that the group is one of the only two multiethnic militant movements formed since 1968 (the other is Aum Shinrikyo, another religiously based organization that employs terror in pursuit of its policy objectives). This open door policy enables AQ to mobilize disaffected Muslims worldwide (Gunaratna, 2002, p. 87).

[¶] Metz (1993, p. 9) first suggested the concept of a "spiritual insurgency." He posited that an insurgency's ideology, goals, and strategy are less important than its psychological motivation in terms of understanding its character. To that end, he coined both "spiritual" and "criminal" as categories of insurgency worthy of further study.

Long-term success for the United States will require support for true political reform, a revolutionary cause in itself, among autocratic Islamic governments. This path, though potentially destabilizing in the short term, holds more promise in the long run as radical Islamic insurgents are forced to compete with more moderate political rivals in the market place of ideas. A clear policy—one that identifies Salafist ideology as the problem and enunciates America's opposition to the politics of jihad—is essential. Victory also demands delegitimizing the radical Wahhabian strain of Islam that considers the killing of civilians not just a useful tactic, but also a religious imperative. This goal, though beyond the means of a non-Muslim country to effect independently, is the crux of the issue. The rise of Islamic fascism, championed by groups such as AQ, is the central strategic problem of the age. Only victory in the simmering campaign against the emerging global Islamic insurgency will prevent that challenge from evolving into a much longer and more brutal clash of civilizations.

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6 The Threat of Terrorism to Critical Infrastructure
TEN-R and the Global Salafi Jihad

Colin Maclachlan

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

From the earliest city-states, such as Somer and Rome, protecting key assets and infrastructure has always been an issue, but this has gained momentum since the last decade of the twentieth century. This was initiated by the threat of al-Qaeda and has been driven further by the transnational threat of the Global Salafi Jihad (GSJ) movement. For a supranational entity such as the European Union (EU), this threat does not form part of a superficial mind-set, as was concocted with Y2K. The bombings that took place against the rail networks in Madrid and London show the need for a high level of coordination and commitment against home-grown terrorists as they emerge from the previous hunting grounds of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA or the Basque separatist movement) and the Irish Republican Army (IRA), respectively. The challenges faced by all countries with intricate transportations systems and infrastructure are indeed complex. Rail networks, like most modern means of transportation, involve large gatherings of peoples in confined spaces. The crossing of multiple borders incorporates different languages, technologies, and policies related to counter-terrorism (CT) add to the issue. The EU has offered some foresight in enhancing the security of infrastructure with initiatives such as the European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) and the Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN) but, like many policies, intent does not mean capability. The following chapter elucidates the significance of infrastructure not only as an important economic tool within society, but more specifically, as a terrorist target. The reasons for this are varied and encompass social, economic, and political motives. This chapter focuses mainly on the TEN-R European High Speed Rail Network and the threat posed by GSJ; however, data and case studies from similar networks and terrorist organizations will be taken into account. This topic indeed constitutes a large body of data and analysis, but no attempt

is made here to incorporate *all* of the evidence and data that are currently at our disposal. This chapter, therefore, is intended to be a compliment to existing research that has been instrumental in formulating a more comprehensive understanding of this particular aspect of violent terrorism and terrorist acts.

SIGNIFICANCE OF INFRASTRUCTURE AS AN IMPORTANT PART OF TERRORIST THEORIZATION

The United States (US) recently recognized the need to counter the emerging physical and virtual threat to its infrastructure. Former President Bill Clinton's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) stated as early as 1997 in its introduction that

> these critical infrastructures-energy, banking and finance, transportation, vital human services, and telecommunications-must be viewed in a new context in the Information Age. The rapid proliferation and integration of telecommunications and computer systems have connected infrastructures to one another in a complex network of interdependence. This interlinkage has created a new dimension of vulnerability, which, when combined with an emerging constellation of threats, poses unprecedented national risk (PCCIP, 1997, p. ix).

Top of the list of priorities of PCCIP was the sharing of information among agencies. This, one would imagine, would remain the same for the EU's now-28 member states, but how practical such a strategic vision is, and how and when information is released undoubtedly requires further intensive examination.

The attacks occurred on September 11, 2001 (9/11) had quite significant economic repercussions for the United States and world markets. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (ASE), and the NASDAQ Stock Market did not open on September 11 and remained closed until September 17. NYSE facilities and remote data-processing sites were not damaged by the attack, but member firms, customers, and markets were unable to communicate because of major damage to the telephone exchange facility near the World Trade Centre (WTC). When the stock markets reopened on September 17, 2001, after the longest closure since the Great Depression during the 1930s, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) Stock Market index fell 684 points, or 7.1%, to 8920—its biggest-ever one-day point decline, which would not be matched until the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, when on September 29, 2008, the Dow Jones Industrial Average lost 777 points or 7.0%. By the end of the week, the DJIA had fallen 1369.7 points (14.3%)—its largest one-week point drop in history. US stocks lost approximately $1.2 trillion in value for just a single week.

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was created in response to the events of 9/11. With state, local, and regional partners, the TSA oversees the security of highways, railroads, buses, mass transit systems, pipelines, and ports. However, the bulk of the TSA's efforts are in aviation security. There has been substantial investment and improvement over previous years in wide range of infrastructure protection ranging from sensors implemented in water utilities to aviation security. Alarmingly, even the United States, which must be seen as the forerunner with regard to infrastructure protection, seems to be behind the curve. Flynn (2006) states "the flurry of US Government post-9/11 initiatives should not be confused with capability" (p. 4). Following 9/11, the number of so-called "critical" infrastructure sectors and key assets were expanded to 17, and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) included national monuments and icons to matters such as transportation (O'Rourke, 2007, p. 22). National symbols such as the Statue of Liberty or Eiffel Tower must be significant targets for terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda; however, critical transportation networks will be the focus of this examination.

Despite many CT policies and programs put in place across Europe, there has simultaneously been a proliferation of criticism over Europe's lack of recognition and action regarding the threat of terrorism. The case of Abu Qatada, in the United Kingdom (UK), is a stark warning of the potential

pitfalls of different countries all implementing and acting on their own agendas. Information regarding Qatada's links to al-Qaeda was passed to the United Kingdom from the United States as well as from many European countries, including France, Spain, and Germany. However, MI5 (the UK's main intelligence agency) tried unsuccessfully to run him as a double agent posing as a cleric. In the EU, the Madrid Train Bombings on March 11, 2004 (11-M) and the London bombings on July 7, 2005 (7/7) accelerated the rapid pace in which a framework was established for protecting critical infrastructure. In October 2004, the European Commission (EC) adopted a communication on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) in the fight against terrorism. A year later, in November 2005, it launched a Green Paper on an EPCIP. On December 12, 2006, the EC adopted a communication to improve the protection of European Critical Infrastructure (ECI), and on the same day, the EC adopted a proposal for a Council Directive for the identification and designation of ECI in terms of potential terrorist targeting. The actual legal instrument was formally adopted by the EC in December 2008, and came into force in early 2009 (Lindström, 2009, p. 55).

The TEN-R infrastructure qualifies as an ECI under articles 2a and 2b of the 2008 Council Directive owing to it essentially affecting more than one EU member state (Council Directive, 2008). One of the major obstacles it faces will be the speed and volume of information sharing between member states. Europe has again looked to the United States and has mirrored that countries CT initiatives in its CIWIN. This platform has been created for the exchange of warnings linked to the EC's general rapid alert system (RAP) (ARGUS) (European Commission, 2006). RAP is central to the reasoning behind this forum, which is also aimed at providing an exchange of ideas. For now, it seems as though CIWIN will remain primarily as a medium for exchanging contacts and ideas (Lindström, 2009, p. 50). Unfortunately, the EC's report on the member states' response to the EPCIP Green Paper served as a forewarning of potential difficulties that, "the issue of subsidiarity was repeatedly stressed … reference to different legal traditions and organizational systems … importance of the confidentiality principle" (Lindström, 2009, p. 55). Equally unfortunately, it seems as though Europeans have been left waiting for a major incident before the importance of timely sharing of information over national security paranoia is brought to light.

High-speed rail is emerging in Europe as an increasingly popular and efficient means of transport. Many projects are currently being formulated and other still are currently underway. The first high-speed rail lines in Europe, built in the 1980s and 1990s, improved travel times across intranational corridors. Since then, several countries have built extensive high-speed networks, and there are now several cross-border high-speed rail links. Railway operators frequently run international services with tracks continuously being built and upgraded with the aim of meeting international standards. In 2007, a consortium of European railway operators (Railteam) emerged to coordinate and boost cross-border high-speed rail travel. Developing a trans-European high-speed rail network is a stated goal of the EU, and most cross-border railway lines receive a substantial pile of EU funding. Today, only the core countries of Western Europe are "plugged-in" to a cross-border high-speed railway network. This will change rapidly in the coming years as Europe invests heavily in tunnels, bridges, and other infrastructure and development projects across the continent (Figure 6.1).

VULNERABLE AND TARGETED INFRASTRUCTURE

In 2010, it is estimated that over 11,500 terrorist attacks occurred in about 72 countries, resulting in approximately 50,000 victims, including about 13,200 deaths (Worldwide Incidents Tracking System [WITS], 2010). Although the number of attacks rose by almost 5% over the previous year, the number of deaths declined for a third consecutive year, dropping 12% from 2009. This decline reflected a combination of two factors: a decrease in the number of attacks causing more than five deaths along with an increase in attacks causing no deaths at all. The number of deaths in Europe and Eurasia in 2010, resulting from terrorism, is listed at 355, 1187 for people injured, 9 hostages, and 704 attacks in general (WITS, 2010). Iraq can sometimes provide an obscured view of worldwide terrorism and certainly with the exceptionally uncertain and deadly events taking place with

FIGURE 6.1   High-speed lines in Europe, 2014. (From Bernese Media and BIL, 2014, via Wikimedia Commons. Derived from High Speed Railroad Map Europe 2011.)

Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) insurgents; this very much remains the case. Notwithstanding the situation regarding ISIS, attacks in Iraq have dipped in recent years, but when we look at the rest of the world, the evidence is somewhat different. Table 6.1 illustrates the number of deaths and injuries from 2006 to 2010 (Iraq excluded) (Figure 6.2).

Although the slight decline in the number of deaths in 2010 gives some hope for the future, this table shows clearly a general increase in both the number of attacks and resulting deaths over recent years. The following figure is from the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) in Virginia and represents all facility attacks during 2010. Some key statistics stand out. First, the overall number of attacks has risen almost continuously for a decade to nearly 16,000 by 2010. Second, in the area of concern pertaining to the content of this chapter, the number of attacks on transportation increased from 108 to 153. The significance of these increases on Europe is telling. A spectacular attack on a high-speed rail network is, in a commonly used US phrase "a clear and present danger." As recently as the May 28, 2010, in West Midnapore, West Bengal, India, assailants removed a piece of railroad track and derailed a train, which resulted in the deaths of 148 civilians and 200 injuries. The People's Committee against Police Atrocities (PCPA) claimed responsibility (The Economic Times, 2010).

TABLE 6.1
Iraq Casualties, 2006–2010

Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Deaths	7191	9107	10,695	11,656	9822
Attacks	7763	8204	8407	8511	8916

FIGURE 6.2 Number of global Salafist groups by year, 1988–2013. (From Jones, S. G., *A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al Qa'ida and Other Salafi Jihadists*, RAND Corporation—National Defense Research Institute, Santa Monica, 2014.)

The al-Qaeda network exists in ideology alone and provides inspiration for similar or related groups. One such group of which this is an example is the GSJ. This is a violent Muslim revivalist movement that draws inspiration from al-Qaeda. Motivation for this type of group is almost entirely religious and while this is a growing phenomenon, it is also a lethal type of motivation as followers believe they are acting on behalf of God and that all levels of violence are seen as necessary—including indiscriminate attacks on bystanders (Weinberg, 2005, p. 58). There are certainly instances in which individuals have other motives for becoming involved, such as revenge (Alexander et al., 1979, p. 57) or psychological makeup, but experts are divided over whether there is some abnormality or deficiency in a terrorist's psyche. The four strategies of GSJ are fatwa or holy war, sanctioned by legal opinion, justifying fellow Muslims to come, and defend an attacked state. The second strategy is dawa or a call to Islam, essentially the preaching of the words from the prophet. Third, Salafi jihad threatens to overthrow non-Shari'a-law-imposing regimes and controversially sanctions the killing of fellow Muslims in the process. The last strategy is GSJ and focuses on attacking the West, including its friends and allies—this includes the United States but also Israel.

The increasing emergence of radical Islamists in Europe has caused much debate and the production of numerous publications regarding the issue. Some point to a definite gulf between previous generations of Muslims and current generations. Many point to an element of dissatisfaction or a search for a deeper meaning within a self-regarded uneventful life. Some have dismissed this gulf and alluded to a far more complex, and often individual related motivation (Pargeter, 2008, p. 140). For many, the roots of this problem can be traced back to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. It is fairly apparent that any initial roots of ideology can probably be traced back to Afghanistan but oftentimes home-grown cells contain individuals who relate to some external conflict or grievance but also possess their own personal plight that provide the sentimental spark to a bigger and wider charge (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982, p. 9).

THE RISE OF THE GSJ OR DEATH OF AL-QAEDA?

In the years following 9/11, a certain vision about al-Qaeda, global terrorism, and the global terrorism threat became pervasive in North America and throughout Europe. The argument was espoused

not only by many scholars and journalists but also by many government officials and occasionally—perhaps also politically induced—by some experts within the intelligence community. According to the narrative, as a result of the post-9/11 US-led military invasion of Afghanistan as well as the ensuing and pervasive CT initiatives in other countries of South Asia, South East Asia (SEA), the Middle East, and North Africa, the phenomenon of jihadist terrorism underwent a fundamental mutation that can be summarized in the following four basic tenets.

First, as the argument went, al-Qaeda was destroyed as an active terrorist entity with command and control structures or internal hierarchy, becoming powerless and virtually irrelevant. Second, Osama bin Laden himself turned into no more than a symbol, a charismatic figurehead, neither able to lead jihad nor lead in any meaningful sense. Third, global jihad as such devolved into an amorphous, not only decentralized, but also disorganized phenomenon devoid of any strong leadership and prevalent strategy. Finally, as a consequence, the source of the terrorist threat, particularly to open societies in the West, was to be found not in formal jihadist organizations but in independent local cells of home-grown extremists on the periphery of the globalized jihadist movement, acting alone.

However, after US Special Forces killed Osama bin Laden in 2011, notions coming out of Abbottabad appeared to have refute this narrative. Initial disclosures of the computer files and paper documents seized at bin Laden's hideout show that, until his death on May 2, he was acting as the real leader of an identifiable terrorist organization that serves as the matrix for other jihadist entities across the globe. Osama bin Laden was, until recently, exhorting top operations chiefs of al-Qaeda, including Ayman al Zawahiri and Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, with whom he was in touch frequently and directly, to focus on the United States without missing other countries such as Canada, Israel, the UK, Spain, and Germany. He suggested timing for strikes in the United States, including July 4 (commemoration of America's independence) and the 10th anniversary of 9/11. He indicated targets, such as trains at a range of US cities or oil tankers and energy infrastructures at sea. Additionally, he ordered particular modus operandi—for example, coordinated commando attacks at busy tourist sites in at least three Western European nations, including France. Moving beyond the aspirational, he masterminded concrete bomb plots, such as the Easter shopping plan in Manchester in 2009.

The news from Abbottabad makes it clear that al-Qaeda was articulate and active until bin Laden's death, despite being weakened in numbers and degraded in capabilities since 2002. They also suggest that bin Laden continued to exert an important command over its ranks and provide broad strategy to inform cells and other groups to carry out attacks in the style of al-Qaeda. His out-group formal relations further confirm global jihad not as an amorphous but as a polymorphous phenomenon, and the centrality of al-Qaeda in this heterogeneous and expanded movement made of collective and individual actors. More than a decade after 9/11, the global terrorist threat has diversified. No one should deny the menace of radicalized lone wolves and inspired independent cells. The current brutality of ISIS confirms the danger of international terrorism. However, organized and well-articulate terrorist groups including GSJ, as exemplified in 11-M and 7/7, pose the most serious threat in the West, aside from concerns about the radicalization of individuals in Western countries who might orchestrate violent attacks against civilians.

LONDON BOMBINGS: IS "NEW" TERRORISM HOMEGROWN?

On Thursday July 7, 2005, four men—Mohammad Sidique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer, Germaine Lindsay, and Hasib Hussain—drove from Leeds in a hired car down to Luton, where they boarded a train to London King's Cross. They separated in order to travel by different underground trains. Each of the men detonated a bomb in Central London during the morning rush. Three of those bombs were initiated almost simultaneously on board separate underground trains. The fourth was a little later on board a London double-decker bus. Fifty-six people, including the suicide bombers, were killed and approximately 700 more injured. The terrorists were all carrying backpacks containing homemade explosives.

On September 1 2005, Al Jazeera broadcasted a video showing the eldest and presumed leader of the bombings, Mohammad Sidique Khan, explaining the motives behind the attack. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's current leader, was edited into the videotape to imply a perhaps closer link to al-Qaeda than in fact there was. On July 6, 2006 another video was broadcasted on Al-Jazeera, showing a statement by Shehzad Tanweer. Once again, al-Zawahiri was seen in the video commenting but, owing to the delayed release and offset nature of the two separate statements, it is unlikely that the video was produced in tandem. It is rather more plausible that al-Qaeda obtained the videotape and edited, or added a statement by al-Zawahiri, in an attempt to lend credibility and claim responsibility. There also appears to have been confusion as to who claimed responsibility with both the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade and the Secret Organization of al-Qaeda in Europe both making claims. The latter, within hours of the bombings, appeared on the "Qala" website although many experts doubt the claims, particularly of the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade (Brahimi, 2010, p. 112). On August 13, 2005, in a report by *The Independent* newspaper, quoting sources from the Police and Intelligence Services, the bombers acted independently of al-Qaeda. In September 2005, after al-Qaeda officially claimed responsibility through the Al-Jazeera news network, the British government launched an inquiry, which found that the bombers did not have any direct assistance from al-Qaeda.

The structure of the cell that carried out the bombings is an increasing trend of terrorism. After al-Qaeda was dismantled structurally in Afghanistan in 2001, the use of smaller cells working independently became more prominent (Gunaratna, 2003, p. 136). This is designed to evade detection and defend against infiltration, and in this instance, is apparent that the British government had little warning or intelligence that these attacks were about to take place. It is likely that the four individuals and Khan, in particular, drew their ideology from al-Qaeda but received little or no resources or operational direction from al-Qaeda directly. It is, though, worth noting that Khan is believed to have attended terrorist training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Weinberg, 2005, p. 243). Tanweer is also known to have traveled to Pakistan, where he met with Khan, although whether any terrorist training took place there is unclear. Most experts have credited this attack to the Secret Organization of al-Qaeda in Europe. There is also an argument that this type of attack should be place in the consolidated group labeled GSJ, but, if time delays of the videotape release and the type of homemade explosives used are taken into account, it is more probable that this event was not orchestrated by any group or organization other than the four individuals collectively and who were inspired by the violent ideology of al-Qaeda not to mention in direct response to the war in Afghanistan (Riedel, 2008, p. 328). The terrorists certainly undertaken some planning prior to the attacks and would probably have, if even briefly, observed their targets beforehand. By targeting public transport during the morning commute and in the heart of London, the terrorists were aiming at causing as much death and destruction as possible, and to gain the attention of as many as possible (Combs, 2003, p. 118; Drake, 1998, p. 40). Setting the devices off simultaneously is indicative of a plan in which one of the central aims is the cause optimum confusion and panic while stretching the capabilities of emergency and security services. Further aims in terms of psychological terror on British mainland and fear of using public transport, although not the terrorist's main aim, would also be significant. It should also be noted that there is evidence that the bombers were inspired by British clerics who would recruit and entice youngsters into this type of activity, which is another emerging tactic of producing homegrown terrorists.

Many are probably aware that suicide bombers are regularly used by members of religious terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda. No warnings were given for the London attacks, which is also characteristic of al-Qaeda-style terrorism. The bombings were also indiscriminate, which is another typical tactic used by these type of terrorists. The rationale is to cause mass panic and apprehension among the public by not knowing when and from where the next attack may come (Sedgwick, 2004, p. 803). The bombs themselves were homemade organic peroxide-based devices. Experts believe less than only 10 pounds of explosive was used in each of the attacks. The manufacturing of the explosive is thought to be dangerous but not requiring any extensive

technical skill to use. The British government's Intelligence and Security Committee stated this in a report in May 2006 (Riedel, 2008, p. 172). All four terrorists were regarded as "self-starters"—another emerging tactic used by religious terrorist groups such as GSJ. The emerging threat of homegrown terrorists is a serious one and with the reach of the Internet means a terrorist can potentially be influenced and trained from afar. Radical extremists such as the Muslim cleric Abdullah al-Faisal, who preached in the United Kingdom, are known to have had influences on both Germaine Lindsay and Mohammad Siddique Khan. The rationale behind the attacks can be gleaned from the videotaped statements that have emerged after the bombings via Al Jazeera. Two of the bombers point to the treatment of fellow Muslims in Afghanistan and Iraq, condemning all non-Muslims. They believe they have the backing of Allah in killing non-Muslims and any innocent bystanders.

The 7/7 bombings were the deadliest single act of terrorism in the United Kingdom since the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, which killed 270 people. It was also recorded as the deadliest bombing in London since the Second World War. More people were killed by the bombings than in any single Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) attack (in Great Britain or Ireland) during "The Troubles." Moreover, it was the first suicide attack to have taken place on the British Isles. Thus, in many respects, it was a considerable point in the United Kingdom's history. The Impact of the bombings should be measured in a number of ways. First, and most evidently, is the loss of life. This is significant, as is the face that the attacks took place in the public transport system. The terror factor on the public following this event was high, of which the immediate dip in public use of the underground directly after the bombings is greatly indicative. The fact that the attacks represented the first suicide bombings in Britain has also had a significant psychological effect in terms of trust in the security services and government. The economic effect is another factor to be taken into account and it is worth noting that the Pound Sterling fell in value against the US Dollar immediately after the attacks. The dip was relatively short lasting and the market recovered over the next few days. The FTSE100 Index fell by about 200 points in the hours that followed the attacks. This prompted the London Stock Exchange (LSE) to introduce special measures to restrict panic selling in direct response to this. The longer-term economic effect is harder to estimate, but the mass disruption to public transport certainly impacted businesses in a negative way. Finally, the financial costs caused by the damage to property are certainly in the millions.

One of the aims of terrorist organizations is to provoke the government into an overreaction to increase sympathy for their cause. Although this could not have been the main aim of the London suicide bombers, there was a series of raids in the days that followed and one fatal shooting of an innocent man, Jean Charles de Menezes, on the July 22, 2005. This was also related to the follow-up attacks, which had been foiled the day prior. Security in the United Kingdom was raised to the highest alert level. There could also have been a very negative public backlash aimed at the Muslim community. There were several isolated incidents reported against Muslim communities and places of worship but these were relatively brief. If one were to accept that the perpetrators of the 7/7 attacks were linked to al-Qaeda if not directly members, then this attack bears all the marks of a typical al-Qaeda bombing. The videotapes that were broadcast on Al Jazeera provided viewers with first-hand account from the bombers in terms of their aims in the attack. This also ties in with al-Qaeda in terms of defending Muslims and attacking all those who are perceived as being enemies of Islam as well as in criticizing government officials in the United Kingdom for its involvement in the war in Afghanistan.

MADRID BOMBINGS: THE DAMAGE TO INFRASTRUCTURE AND HOUSING

On October 19, 2003, nearly six months after the outset of the invasion of Iraq by US coalition forces, a video was released by al-Qaeda's media arm al-Sahab, showing bin Laden directly threatening Spain. In his words, Spain, then governed by Prime Minister José Maria Aznar from the

Partido Popular (PP), may face a terrorist attack should Spanish military forces continue to be part of the coalition that invaded Iraq and helped topple the regime of Saddam Hussein. Less than six months later, Madrid was shaken by coordinated bomb attacks in several commuter trains at peak hours, killing 191 people and injured 1800. The first well-known al-Qaeda-inspired terrorist conspiracy in Europe had been in preparation for years owing to the long-term presence of radical Islamists in Spain. The first jihadist bombing on the European mainland since 9/11 answered Osama bin Laden's call for violence in the West.

Those who later claimed responsibility for these attacks attested that the war in Iraq was their main source of motivation. Symbolically the bombings were carried out a few days before the first anniversary of Iraq's invasion. On the national scene, because "terrorism is meant to terrify" and affect an audience, terrorists clearly intended to affect the outcome of the national general elections scheduled three days later. The Madrid terrorists were not self-starters, nor were they members of al-Qaeda who had taken an oath of allegiance to bin Laden. Instead, they were mostly first-generation immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) who had been settled in Spain for years, held decent jobs, and some of them had wives and children. The establishment of 11-M was an illustration of the rising context of the contemporary jihadist movement, targeting a country, and blaming it for what was happening thousands of miles away. This example is valuable in describing the evolving nature of the jihadist movement.

11-M, apart from the loss of human lives, caused serious damage in the suburban railway infrastructure of Madrid as well as in some houses near the places of the attack. In the first case, the damage caused both the partial destruction of the trains where the bombs went off, which meant the loss of three locomotives and five coaches in three model 446 trains, and of another two coaches in a model 450 train, as well as the damage caused to the railway installations and the stations. In the latter case, the attacks also caused damage to 114 houses. Regarding damages to the facilities and infrastructure of the Spanish Railways (RENFE), the data provided by the corporate headquarters of this public company have been considered for evaluation and the periodic financial information published by the National Commission.

If we add up all the different items, the total amount obtained exceeds 211.58 million Euros. 63.4% of this figure corresponds to the compensation for the loss of 191 human lives and for the injuries suffered by another 1800 people affected directly by the attacks. The damages have been valued based on the compensation that the victims are eligible to receive. A second important item is that of "opportunity costs" caused by the expression of the solidarity of the society with those affected by the attacks. More than one quarter of the total cost considered in the study is related to the demonstration of March 12, 2004. In third and fourth place, with an equivalent value around 2.5%, appears the damage caused in railway infrastructure and housing as well as the health cost arising from victim support (Figure 6.3).

TEN-R

Although the majority of considerations involved could be leveled at any of the potential corridors within the TEN-R, here I address, in particular, the second corridor, which is situated in Brussels (Belgium) and encompasses London (UK), Paris (France), Amsterdam (Netherlands), and Cologne (Germany). There are several reasons for this. First, this will potentially be the most trafficked corridor in terms of trains and passengers. Second, documentation discovered in bin Laden's compound referred to the targeting of France and Germany, of which Paris must be a prominent target within Europe. The TEN-R and the trans-European conventional rail network form one of a number of networks of the EU's Trans-European Transport Networks or TEN-T, as defined in 1996 by Council Directive 96/48/EC (European Commission, 1996). Other components of the TEN-T involve road, air, and sea transportation links. In 2002, the EU authorities also defined the technical standards for the interoperability of this system, which, in itself, is useful for measuring the risks involved (European Commission, 2002).

Items	Cost in Euro
Rescue and Initial Attention to Victims	2,176,875.00
Health Cost of Attention to Victims	5,156,878.00
Compensation to Victims	134,120,325.00
Wage Loss of Victims	2,375,988.00
Damages in Infrastructure and Housing	5,269,542.00
IFEMA	180,964.00
Psychological Assistance to Victims	4,938,740.00
March 12, 2004 Demonstration	57,365,450.00
Total Cost	211,584,762.00

FIGURE 6.3 Summary of the immediate economic costs of 11-M. (From Buesa, M. et al, *The Economic Cost of March 11: Measuring the Direct Economic Cost of the Terrorist Attack on March 11, 2004 in Madrid*, Working Paper No. 54, Instituto de Analisis Industrial y Fianciero, Madrid, 2006.)

The first stage in this process is to identify the so-called "critical" parts of the TEN-R infrastructure, and to measure the impact caused by any potential damage to any of the key assets that are a subsystem of this critical infrastructure. This is not limited to terrorist activity; but would include natural disasters, criminal intent, human error, or even equipment failure, and so contingencies should be considered for each. The TEN-R would be classed as an economic infrastructure as it falls under the transportation category (Yates, 2003, p. 7). It is also a physical infrastructure and, although there are various definitions for what equates "critical," we can assume that broadly speaking the criticality depends on whether the incapacity of those key assets or systems that make up the critical infrastructure would have a debilitating effect on the security of the state either physically, economically, or psychologically (Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2003, p. 7). Let us use the term "consequence analysis" when considering the possible fallout from the loss of key assets or infrastructure whether temporary or permanent. For the purpose of this chapter, the impact by any score or number will not be measured as has been done in the past (Ferry, 2009), but will instead highlight assets seen as priority. Taking this into account, we should consider the areas of TEN-R that would be an essential target to any potential terrorist or terrorist group. We must also then measure this alongside other factors including, and not limited to, interoperation dependency, time of day, type of cargo, and immediate vicinity (response, hazard area, and proximity to other assets).

In terms of impact, it is always difficult to gauge possible economic losses or probable figures regarding fatalities, but it is possible, and indeed necessary, to look at other similar instances in order to build realistic understanding of consequences. For example, as noted previously, in March 2004, 10 bombs were detonated on board four trains in Madrid during rush hour. Over 190 people were killed and 1800 injured (Santos-Leal et al., 2006, p. 33). Also, the 7/7 bombings in London the following year killed 56 people (including the bombers) and injured approximately 700 others (Phillips, 2006, p. 89). With regard to the economic impact of the London bombings, the value of the Pound fell and the FTSE 100 Index fell by 200 points but these losses were short term and were measured in hours and days rather than in months (Dune, 2005). If we put these into context with the wider European arena, the new high-speed trains are estimated to be able to carry around 750 passengers, much more than the passengers of both the London and Madrid examples. They would also be traveling significantly faster at speeds averaging 125 miles per hour (MPH).

If we look next at the vulnerability of this railroad infrastructure, we find that its geographic dispersion is its greatest vulnerability. The manner in which a railroad is constructed and the comparative ease at which a terrorist could disable is the real Achilles heel in this context. Rail security, for this reason, has always remained an exercise in risk mitigation rather than risk prevention and focuses heavily on the resilience rather than on protective mode (Chittester and Haines, 2004, p. 4).

BOX 6.1   EXAMPLES INFORMING POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES

We can also look further afield for an example of other potential consequences. In 2005, a collision in Graniteville, South Carolina resulted in a release of chlorine gas killing nine people and injured 554 others. It also required the evacuation of a further 5400 people and total damages exceeded $40 million. The disruption to service alone can have significant financial impact. In Texas, service problems on the Union Pacific Railroad during 1998 cost over $1 billion and an additional $643 million in further costs to consumers. After we have estimated the loss of life, economic loss, and so on. We must then move away from the protection side of the theory and into the resilience mode of thought. This focuses on mitigation measures that look to regain control and bounce back from any potential damage and get back to functioning normally again. These include such things as mass warnings and evacuations, facilitating emergency response teams like fire and ambulances and include specific defense mechanisms like Hazardous Materials and Items (HAZMAT) teams.

Source: National Transportation Safety Board, 2005.

Potential and devastating attacks could be aimed at the physical or communicative infrastructure. The RAND Corporation database of worldwide terrorist incidents has recorded over 250 attacks against railway infrastructure in the decade since 1995 (Rollins and Wilson, 2007). It is immediately apparent that areas such as train stations, car storage areas, bridges, tunnels, major junctions, signal control systems, and communications installations would feature highly. The interdependency of some of these subsystems is in itself vulnerability. For example, a loss of signal control systems could have particularly disastrous effects. The network is defined as a system consisting of a set of infrastructures, fixed installations, logistic equipment, and rolling stock (European Commission, 2002). We can split the different subsystems into four main areas. The physical infrastructure consists of the track and rail, signal systems, power and equipment, and the virtual infrastructure would consist of the communication networks (Hartong et al., 2008, p. 22). It is therefore rather clear to see how disruption of the communications network would have a debilitating effect on the signal systems.

There are a number of parties who may wish to exploit these vulnerable areas. These could range from disgruntled employees to disaffected minority groups in any of the countries involved in this particular corridor. If we focus on just the most prominent terrorist groups most likely to attack this infrastructure, then it leaves us with three key groups. The first and least likely are single-issue groups such as Animal Liberation Front (ALF) or perhaps a group with environmental agendas such as Earth Liberation Front (ELF). The second group, which has a greater capacity to mount an attack on an infrastructure like this, would be a nationalist/separatist group. This would include groups such as ETA in Spain. Here, it is worth noting that in the aftermath of 11-M, it was initially thought ETA was the sole perpetrator (MacAskill and Norton-Taylor, 2004). By far, the most likely group to stage an attack on an infrastructure such as TEN-R would be a religious terrorist organization such as al-Qaeda in Europe. This would include individuals or cells inspired by the ideology of al-Qaeda without perhaps having any official links to the group itself such as GSJ.

With these points taken together, if we use a "common sense approach," and look at the critical areas and most vulnerable points within the TEN-R infrastructure in addition to looking at which terrorist organization is most likely to attack, we are able implement mitigation measures against the most obvious threats. In this case the most likely threat would come from an al-Qaeda-inspired religious terrorist cell (Vidino, 2006, p. 27). If we look at the history of previous large-scale bombings in Europe, then this further substantiates this claim. Furthermore, if we focus on the form of attack, then bombing seems to be the most likely means. The four key areas of this infrastructure have been previously noted but if we single-out areas such as stations, bridges, tunnels, junctions, signal command centers, and communication installations, as particularly high-risk areas in need of

additional security measures, then this would maximize the mitigation of threat without attempting to claim wholesale protection.

Given that the TEN-R project has not been completed, it should be underscored that the following points are not intended to highlight perceived "gaps" in the current security measures, but rather potential weaknesses, which are predicted to appear owing to the nature of an infrastructure of this magnitude. It is also not intended to go over the same ground as covered in the vulnerability part of the risk assessment, but rather focus on key areas where it would be assumed that improvement is needed. This is in areas such as liaising between different nation's security services or immigration control. There has been a great deal of work historically in the area of security review with regard to rail networks in places such as the United Kingdom, Spain, and the United States. These can provide a large body of valuable data regarding future recommendations and planning when in terms of future projects—both planning and implementation. Until very recently, the largest threat to rail networks in Europe was from the IRA. The threat was greatest to London rail networks. Analyses of the planning of these bombing campaigns revealed that the IRA attempted to exploit very basic "gaps" in security (Jenkins and Gersten, 2001, p. 9). Such "gaps" included breaks in fences, poor lighting, lack of video surveillance, and access to garbage cans, which were an easy target for any potential terrorist. The Madrid Summit in 2005 brought together the largest gathering of security and terrorism experts that had ever taken place until that point (The International Summit of Democracy, Terrorism, and Security, 2005). This followed 11-M and aimed to showcase democracy and cooperation in the fight against global terrorism at the height of "War on Terror" (WoT).

The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopts a four-dimensional approach: (1) preventing radicalization and recruitment of potential terrorists; (2) protecting potential targets; (3) pursuing terrorists; and (4) responding to the aftermath of an attack (EU, 2005). The EU looks at security measures under eight broad pillars or subcategories. These are Police and Intelligence Cooperation, Judicial Cooperation, Infrastructure and Transport protection, Customs and Border Security, Response Management, Anti-Terrorism Financing, Anti-Radicalization and Terrorist Recruitment, and External Relations. These are useful in breaking down the areas currently in need of improvement. The Madrid Summit highlighted a need for a central point to share information similar to the one in the United States. The Toffler Associates first challenge for the future was for "improved coordination between the government and private sector" (Toffler Associates, 2008). In response to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), the Department of Transportation initiated The Surface Transportation and Public Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center (STPTISAC), which is the focal point for coordinating all aspects of rail security in the industry. Across the EU, there would be a requirement for cross collaboration between law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

There is clearly a need for a centralized European department, which collates, conducts analyses, and shares all the relevant information with regard to infrastructure security. Additionally, a set of shared guidelines needs to be established, and adhered to with regards security standards and best practices (Edwards and Meyer, 2008, p. 5). This would include, and is not limited to, equipment procurement, screening, health and safety, training, testing, and fire. A universal rail safety team consisting of rails safety inspectors, canine teams for explosive detection, planners who would conduct tests, exercises and rehearsals based on worst-case scenarios would be a critical supplement to the aforesaid. The improvement and standardization, if not "Europeanizing," of equipment is, if not the most important issue, probably the most apparent. The current train, rail, and power infrastructure across Europe is in varying dilapidated states, and certainly does not conform to any standardized regulations (Balzacq, 2008, p. 76). Furthermore, the security procedures themselves would have to be improved and extra measures including, and not limited to, video surveillance, blast walls, crumple zones, improved coach impact protection, fire sensors as well as extinguishers. Technology would have to be improved on current European standards. This includes communication systems, which rely heavily on low or nonsecure very high frequency (VHF) radio waves. It also includes video surveillance and data processing of this footage. Other detection systems (chemical and biological)

would be useful though cost heavy but, as the Tokyo Sarin case in 1995 proved, the threat is real. Studies on passenger screening similar to airports have already been done and suggest the type of screening may require (intermittent) modification. Back-up signal control systems will have to be in place and improved considerably in order to defend against a cyber-attack on computer networks.

Arguably more time and resources would be better spent on resilience planning and, while these all-inclusive centers would be part of that, it should also include comprehensive rehearsals, exercises, testing, and emergency contingency planning. There should be provisions for alternative routes, equipment, and communication systems, as well as reserve signal control systems to enable "bouncebackability." Wide, preplanned, and provisioned emergency control sites are vital components within any exercise scenarios and therefore are need to be set-up in order to formulate a more secure system of transportation management. In 2008, Toffler Associates (2008) gathered numerous experts and government officials from around the United States to discuss this issue. They summarized their five main areas that required further in-depth attention: Improved coordination between the government and the private sector; infrastructure is too centralized; The nation's crumbling infrastructure; foreign ownership of infrastructure; and cyber-interdependency.

If we consider these were the concerns raised by the leading thinkers in just one country, then it increases exponentially when we place them in the context of a trans-European network. The size and complexity of the TEN-R project makes it a very vulnerable target. As a further challenge, there are so many different countries that have dissimilar security procedures. Budgets, time, and realistically measuring the likelihood of a potential threat before it happens are always going to be the topic of intense debate. Rail networks will continue to remain soft targets vulnerable to attacks using the simplest of methods with potentially significant consequences to public health and safety. The amplified awareness allows terrorists a broader public forum for making political statements. Solidifying all potential targets against all possible forms of attack is, however, cost exorbitant (Flynn, 2006, p. 13). Effective rail infrastructure protection will therefore need to rely on risk-based assignment of protection assets derived from accurate intelligence on potential threats. The defender can identify critical locations in advance and proactively establish countermeasures to either prevent an attack of temper the effects of an attack. The lack of a comprehensive, focused, and stable passenger rail transportation policy can be considered a significant factor in the current state of passenger rail security (Council of the European Union, 2009). Finally, it should be concluded that planning wholesale protection is not realistic without factoring in resilience mechanisms. In this case, the consideration of resilience should be arguably more important than protection itself. Even if we knew when the next "Hurricane Katrina" was coming, we probably still could not eliminate all the damage but could do much to reduce the aftereffect(s).

OTHER POTENTIAL IMPACTS FROM STRUCTURES INCLUDING LANDMARKS

Religious and ethno nationalism, notes Lia (2005), have accounted for nearly the half (45%) of all the conflicts from 1968 to 2004 (p. 161). We are also providing with the building blocks behind the theory of predicting terrorism trends of the future (Lia, 2005, p. 161). If we agree that global, political, economic, demographic, and technological changes act as causes (and predictors) of terrorism, then this leads us naturally to consider areas of opportunity for terrorism to an even greater extent. However, it may be too early to tell whether this model fits when tested on what has been referred to as "new" terrorism. In Europe, this provides many common areas for concern, such as the Euro crisis, which has a considerably negative effect on European economies and even on the legitimacy of the EU's democratic institutions. The telling rate of immigration and subsequent growth of diaspora communities within Europe will have a great impact on unrest and instability. Some empirical studies suggest a link between immigration and the occurrence of international terrorism in Europe. It is perhaps surprising then that Lia (2005) confidently states that, "there are no clear-cut systemic factors pointing towards large-scale terrorist and sabotage attacks against these targets" (p. 1). Figure 6.4 presents some of the factors contributing to the possibility of terrorism.

Future Trends and Predictions	Overall Effects on Occurrence of Terrorism (+/-/0)	Types of Terrorism	Geographical Locations
A gradual development of regional power centers and a relative decline in the US global hegemony, but no return to intense bipolar military and ideological rivalry.	0/+	No change or possibly more transnational non-state sponsored terrorism.	
More nuclear powers and a continuation of B/C-weapons programs (both most likely in the Middle East and North Korea).	(+)	More mass casualty terrorism.	Middle East and Asia
Growth in the number of states in transition to democracy.	+	More domestic terrorism, primarily ideological.	European eastern and southern periphery
Growth in the number of states and growth in the number of weak states.	+	More domestic terrorism.	European eastern and southern periphery
Collapsed states in the non-Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) world.	+	Domestic terrorism and international terrorism.	Non-OECD world
Greater (Western-led) international military interventionism in internal armed conflicts.	–	Possibly more domestic terrorism in the short-term, but less in the long run.	
Multilateral institutions, international treaties, and regimes will play an increasingly important role in regulating relations between states.	–	Less state-sponsored terrorism.	
Growing relevance of the transnational NGO community in international politics.	–/+	Less international terrorism, more single-issue terrorism or sabotage.	More single issue terrorism in Europe
The influence of private security organizations will grow but they will not replace the state's security apparatus.	(+)	Ideological terrorism against private businesses.	
Growing economic inequality within states.	+	Ideological terrorism (ethnic terrorism, if inequality correlates with ethnicity).	Domestic in industrial world; both domestic and international in developing world

(*Continued*)

FIGURE 6.4 Forecasting terrorist attacks.

Growing inequality between states/regions, but more economic interdependence.	+	Ideological terrorism.
Governments will face reduced legitimacy due to a loss of control over the economy.	0/+	Ideological terrorism. Private businesses as new targets. Private sponsors of terrorism.	Domestic, effect stronger in weaker states (developing world)
The extent of transnational organized crime will increase.	+	Domestic and international terrorism ("criminal" or "economic" terrorism).	
Europe's economic dependence on petroleum imports from the Middle East and North Africa will continue to grow.	(+)/0	International terrorism.	Europe and Middle East
The influx of immigrants and asylum-seekers, both legal and illegal, will continue in the future and significantly increase the size of diaspora communities in Europe.	+	Domestic terrorism. More racial violence, more lucrative human trafficking.	Europe
The future ideological landscape will become less uniform and will shift more rapidly.	+/0	Less ideological terrorism, more single-issue extremism.	
Growth in number and strength of "counter cultures," in particular transnational religious movements and cults.	+	Mass casualty terrorism (low probability and high risk).	
Critical infrastructure in the OECD world will become increasingly reliant on operative computers and information technology.	(+)	Sabotage, single-issue terrorism, a sudden upsurge in cyber terrorism may happen.	OECD countries
Mass media, information production, and even the perception of news will change as a result of the information revolution.	+/-	Mass casualty terrorism?	OECD countries
The proliferation of more powerful weapons and effective equipment for low intensity warfare to nonstate actors will continue.	(+)	Mass casualty terrorism.	
Rapid advancements in information and communication technology will produce far more powerful instruments for surveillance and monitoring of people.	–	Less international and domestic terrorism.	Europe, OECD countries

FIGURE 6.4 (Continued) Forecasting terrorist attacks.

CONCLUSION

There are several prevalent trends over roughly the past decade that should be observed. First, the number of attacks on infrastructure has increased, highlighting their importance as targets from the perspective of (potential) terrorists. Second, the number of terrorist attacks in Europe increased. Third, the number of homegrown terrorists has increased, as has the number of websites supporting terrorism or violent terrorism. These and other factors that indicate a significant threat toward the TEN-R rail network include the increase of immigrant communities, technology advancements, and social unrest through poverty or unemployment. Europe has done much to follow the lead of the United States when it comes to CT programs and strategies, but one of the major weaknesses of European countries and the EU is almost certainly their timely sharing of information. This weakness will play into the hands of GSJ.

The Europeans, individually and collectively, have taken a number of measures to protect their societies, including new legislation, enhanced border security, improved intelligence sharing, and a harmonization of policies in relation to defining, responding, and sentencing terrorists. This *does* represent enhanced security for Europeans, Americans, and others, and reveals two important points. Interdependence in the security sphere is high, largely because 9/11 has blurred even further distinctions between internal and external security. The second point is that despite its power, US security depends on European and vice versa. Europe has always recognized that terrorism is both global and complex; indeed the United States often concedes that this is the case. For Europeans, the causes of terrorism lie in unresolved political problems and/or in weak states. They have taken actions in relation to the latter but not the former. The result casts an entire spectrum of problems.

Europeans have unilaterally, and via various international organizations, provided technical, financial, and legal advice on issues ranging from money laundering to emergency planning in the event of an attack involving weapons of mass-destruction (WMDs) to states around the world. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO, and the EU have provided CT assistance to state within the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Mediterranean. As well, G8 countries, the EU, and NATO have provided assistance further afield. This, combined with other forms of socio-economic assistance, will help build the capacity of weak states to deal with terrorism both locally and internationally. The prevailing tendency in present-day Europe is not anarchy, but hierarchy where relations between states have been domesticated through inter alia a web of multilateral institutions. In Europe, international institutions, such as the EU and NATO, dominate in that they provide persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations. Europe has therefore moved toward a system of institutions and highly regulated treaties on how states, firms, and persons shall relate to each other. The result has been a more "universal type of system," with common policies in several important areas. Increasingly, European security and defense policy will be based upon integration among states, which indicates progressing "Europeanization" of European security. Moreover, the very concept of "national security" is being modified by the concept of "European security."

In many regards, France has even stricter CT laws than the Patriot Act of the United States. In fact, Paris employs the most stringent of Europe's CT measures. Using its strict secularism, French authorities monitor mosques, send undercover agents to mingle with worshippers, and boast a capability of having specialists in certain subsets of North African Arabic and Berber dialects (Vidino, 2006, p. 62). It is worth remembering that 15 out of the 19 members of the group that carried out the 9/11 terrorist attacks were recruited in the EU, particularly in Hamburg. The number of active jihadist-related websites has metastasized since 2001. When Weimann (2005), at the University of Haifa (Israel), began tracking terrorist-related incidents online during the 1990s, he found 12; in August 2005, he tracked more than 4500. Unchecked power in the hands of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has allowed antiterrorism resolutions to be passed, which not only undermine the legitimacy and unity of the United Nations (UN) system in the international legal order,

but which also could be counter-productive to the SC's own aims. Placing questions of interference with individual autonomy on the legal plane reinforces the gravity of the consequences of SC resolutions, which fail to regard human rights. If the UN system fails to acknowledge this, it is likely to conflict with member states, some of which the United States is dependent upon for its continued effectiveness. As a consequence, UN law could fragment across member states to the detriment of international antiterrorism programs.

Infrastructure protection experts stated back in 2008 that, "the results of risk management must not end with dusty reports and unused plans, and the resulting plans must be tested through exercises, which assess and recommend further improvements to CIP and clarify management roles and responsibility" (Johnston and Pickering, 2008, p. 16). Admittedly, these measures take time to perfect, but it is important that they are initiated early and practiced across member states to identify pitfalls. The recent successes in securing the infrastructure of the chemical industry may serve as a potential model worthy of serious study. A roadmap to success for other industries may be to receive expert advice, as the chemical industry and some others have done, on where the "gaps" exist in their current infrastructure security, and to create a concrete action plan to correct those vulnerabilities. When this is combined with a willingness to work with government agencies and all other stakeholders to develop a comprehensive and holistic approach to infrastructure protection, the issues of security and reliability become very correctable problems.

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7 The Power to Hurt Indirectly
Deterrence of Violent Nonstate Organizations by Threats of Domestic–Political Costs

Oren Magen

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

A considerable proportion of the recent academic literature on asymmetric conflict (AC) has high-lighted the effects of "domestic-level" political factors on the military strategies of violent nonstate organizations (VNSOs).[*] Numerous authors have acknowledged that many VNSOs, like national governments, incorporate considerations of political power and popular legitimacy into their policy decisions, and thus are responsive to the demands and needs of the people who constitute their popular base or constituency. Such an approach to the analysis of VNSOs' military behavior is con-sistent with well-established international relations' theoretical approaches underscoring the role of domestic politics in shaping foreign policy decisions. These can be summarized by the words of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1992), who have suggested that, "every foreign policy maker must look over his or her shoulder and contemplate the prospective domestic political risks associated with each foreign policy action"[†] (p. 638).

The bulk of existing works on domestic-level sources of nonstate actors' (NSAs) behavior, how-ever, have focused on one specific aspect of this phenomenon—the ways in which escalation of violence against the external adversary improves VNSOs' political standing domestically and helps them overcome domestic political vulnerabilities (see e.g., Bloom, 2005; Krause, 2013; Lawrence, 2010; Pearlman, 2009; Staniland, 2012). Alternative scenarios, in which the need to gain and retain

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[*] The term VNSO stands for any nonstate organization, which utilizes violence for the purpose of achieving some political objective.
[†] The scholarly work on the effect of domestic-level factors on foreign policy decision-making and international conflict behavior is vast. For a comprehensive review, see De Mesquita and Smith (2012) and Levy (1988).

domestic popular support leads to de-escalation of violence and military self-restraint, have not received much theoretical attention. One can think of two possible reasons for this gap in the literature. First, many VNSOs do not have defined constituencies. This is especially true for transnational terrorist networks, which have attracted a great share of the literature on terrorism and counterterrorism (CT) since al-Qaeda's (AQ) 9/11 attacks against the United States (US). A second possible reason has to do with moral problems associated with policies designated to influence the behavior of VNSOs via coercive manipulation of popular attitudes. These usually involve a considerable amount of suffering inflicted on noncombatants by state responses to VNSO-based violence. A deliberate policy of punishing civilians for actions by groups that claim to represent them, however, is widely viewed as strictly immoral and constitutes a clear violation of international law (a view that many would expect the liberal school of international relations [IR] to give considerable attention to), as indicated by several international conventions such as The Hague Convention (1907) and the Geneva Conventions (1949, 1977).

Nevertheless, civilian suffering might not necessarily be the outcome of deliberate policy aimed at harming civilians. The fact that most VNSOs operate within civilian populations tends to increase the chance that state retaliations result in unintended collateral damage—often resulting in considerable civilian suffering. Even seemingly purely preventive measures, such as curfews, closures, and roadblocks, tend to significantly degrade the welfare of any given population. Defensive denial of access to Israeli targets (i.e., the Israeli Security Barrier [ISB]) has greatly disrupted the lives of many Palestinians. Overall, we can assume that civilians are almost always likely to suffer, at least to some degree, the consequences of a military struggle conducted on (if even allegedly) their behalf. One should consider, moreover, that in many cases government that fight VNSOs have to choose between responding to nonstate violence in ways that involve considerable civilian suffering and between not responding at all. If some degree of civilian suffering is unavoidable, theorization and research of its possible effects on VNSOs' behavior might make an important contribution to our general understanding of the dynamics of AC.

The sources and effects of countercivilian violence have been extensively studied in the general literature on armed conflicts, particularly in the contexts of intrawar coercion, domestic repression of opposition movements, and civil wars (see, e.g., Downs, 2011; Kalyvas, 2006; Pape, 1996; Valentino et al., 2004). Nevertheless, few, if any, works have addressed the question of how and when civilian suffering inflicted by state reactions to VNSO violence affects an organization's decision-making by threatening its popular standing. This chapter assumes that under certain circumstances, state retaliations involving civilian suffering (RICS) might inflict considerable domestic political costs for the organization. Accordingly, RICSs can be said to have a considerable deterrent potential, which stems from a VNSO's desire to avoid domestic political costs. The purpose of this chapter is to suggest a theoretical framework for the analysis of the conditions under which RICSs would produce such deterrent effects.

The theoretical model presented here suggests three primary categories of variables that shape the deterrent potential of RICSs: (1) the nature of a state retaliatory policy and the ways it is perceived by the population; (2) the sources of VNSOs "domestic political vulnerability" (DPV), defined in terms of its dependency on popular support; and (3) general attitudes toward the conflict and toward the use of violence within a VNSO's constituency. The chapter focuses on ethnopolitical VNSOs, which struggle against states on behalf of a certain ethno-national group they claim to represent (i.e., Palestinian Hamas, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam [LTTE], Kuridistan Workers' Party [PKK], and Lebanese Hezbollah). Empirical illustrations are drawn mainly from cases involving the State of Israel and its nonstate adversaries.

DOMESTIC–POLITICAL SOURCES OF VNSOS' MILITARY BEHAVIOR

The common element in all IR theories on the interaction between domestic-level factors and international behavior is the view of the domestic environment of governments as a central source of both incentives and constraints that shape their foreign behavior. Different theories, however, focus

on unique explanatory variables, such as the values and institutional features associated with different regime types (i.e., democratic peace theories [Doyle, 1997; Russett, 1993; Owen, 2000]); procedures of foreign policy decision-making (i.e., the bureaucratic politics approach and the two-level game model [Graham and Philip, 1971; Putnam, 1988]); and electoral pressures leading to diversionary militant foreign policies (Downs and Rocke, 1994; Miller, 1999; Smith, 1996). Such diversity of causal explanations cannot be found in the scholarly literature on VNSOs. Rather, most works, which examine the domestic influences on VNSOs' behavior, suggest different versions of a signal causal explanation, according to which domestic needs and political interests *encourage* violence (or the escalation of it). According to most existing accounts, violence against a state adversary can be used to achieve various domestic political objectives such as mobilizing popular support and resources, increasing popular identification with a VNSOs' agenda, and outbidding domestic competitors. This approach is demonstrated very well in a recent article by Krause (2013) in which he claims that "[VNSOs'] use of violence is driven as much by the pursuit of private benefits in the form of organizational survival and power" and suggests that, "a two-level framework best represents the *political effectiveness of non-state violence*, especially from the perspective of the actors employing it" (p. 261).

The causal logic implied by these prevalent arguments, however, captures only one among several ways in which domestic politics and external policies might interact according to the IR literature on the domestic external nexus. An important aspect that has been largely overlooked is that the consequences of external violence, particularly the harm to civilians caused by the adversary's retaliations, might undermine VNSOs' domestic standing. Accordingly, most authors have not seriously considered the possibility that states can exert coercive influence on VNSOs by threats of domestic political costs. Such form of coercive influence can be viewed as indirect coercion (or deterrence), where the target of influence—VNSO leaders—do not suffer the costs of retaliations (threatened or actual) directly, as opposed to, for example, targeted killings (TK) of VNSO leaders. The costs for a VNSO are rather indirect results generated through the reaction of a third actor (a VNSO's constituency) to the costs inflicted on it by state countermeasures (on indirect deterrence, see Bar [2007, pp. 480–4] and Knopf [2010, p. 10]).

EFFECTS OF RICSs: PREVAILING ARGUMENTS

The theoretical underpinnings of indirect coercion through RICSs can be traced back to early discussions of the strategic value of air bombings against civilian targets during conventional wars. Early airpower thinkers posited that aerial bombings of civilian populations would prompt popular anger against the adversary's government, producing social unrest and possibly other forms of rebellious action that would compel the government to capitulate (Byman and Waxman, 2002, pp. 69–72; Douhet, 1942). The basic logic on which such mechanisms of indirect coercion rely—referred to by Byman and Waxman as "power base erosion"—is that the coercer applies coercive pressure on the adversary's constituency, which in turn causes an unhappy populace to pressure the government to alter its policy (Byman and Waxman, 2002, pp. 59–65). The same logic was later applied in theoretical discussions of economic sanctions (Kirshner, 1997).

However, the proposition that strategic bombings are an effective means of coercion has been greatly contested during the years, as part of "the great airpower debate." (For reviews see, Byman and Waxman, 2000, pp. 5–38; Horowitz and Reiter, 2001; Mueller, 1998). On the basis of accumulated empirical evidence, airpower pessimists have challenged in particular the proposition that air bombings are capable of fostering domestic unrest at a magnitude sufficient to elicit government capitulation. As Pape (1996) argues,

> Air attack on civilian populations, whether it seeks to kill large numbers or destroy the civilian economy, is not likely to coerce states in serious international disputes. Over more than seventy-five years, the record of air power is replete with efforts to alter the behavior of states by attacking or threatening

to attack large numbers of civilians. The incontrovertible conclusion from these campaigns is that air attack does not cause citizens to turn against their government. […] In fact, in the more than thirty major strategic air campaigns that have thus far been waged, air power has never driven the masses into the streets to demand anything (p. 68).

The "unrest" mechanism through which civilian targeting supposedly produces compliance does not operate properly for several reasons. Among them are the fact that nationalism compels peoples to willingly endure high costs during wars and the ability of a modern state to minimize civilian damage by adjustments of civil defenses (Pape, 1996, pp. 21–6). Others, however, have maintained that the effectiveness of RICSs in producing domestic opposition toward the government depends on the degree of legitimacy enjoyed by the government and the stability of the targeted regime. RICSs would be counterproductive if the public is already generally united around the leadership, but they can be effective when used against regimes that have little popular support and are susceptible to internal threats of removal from office (Jentleson and Whytock, 2005–6). This line of argumentation has been particularly prevalent in the scholarly literature on economic sanctions (Allen, 2005; Kirshner, 1997, p. 42).

The coercive potential of civilian targeting in AC has been the subject of a growing volume of theoretical literature and empirical research. The general conclusion of most studies on the subject, to quote one among many, has been that "victimizing civilians is futile, at best, or even counterproductive" (Kocher et al., 2011, p. 201). Civilian suffering caused by state retaliations, as the prevalent argument goes, would foster popular demands for revenge in the form of further violent attacks against a state, and would therefore bolster the support for organizations that perpetuate them. However, empirical studies, which support this argument, have usually tested correlations between the overall level of civilian targeting during wars and the general level of insurgent violence. They thus suffer a measurement problem, which stems from overaggregation of data. Few, if any, studies have treated *shifts* in the military strategy of VNSOs as their dependent variable or have utilized process-analysis methods illuminating decision-making processes that lead to such shifts. The extant literature has also rarely addressed the question of how structural variables related to the nature of the conflict, the composition of the population, and the relationship between the population and the organization shape the impact of RICSs.

Furthermore, empirical works on civilian targeting have mainly studied episodes of intensive violent conflict where the level of violence against civilians by both sides is high. Successful deterrence, however, is usually indicated by low-level violence by both adversaries. Such periods of relatively low levels of violence, when incorporated into quantitative studies based on statistical regressions, would seemingly validate the prevalent argument because low levels of RICSs would be found to correlate with low levels of VNSO violence. In practice, such findings support the opposite argument. To illustrate, a purely quantitative study of the Israel–Hezbollah conflict would probably fail to detect the deterrent effects of the civilian suffering caused by the 2006 Lebanon war, as the empirical data would show that high level of civilian casualties strongly correlates with escalation of Hezbollah attacks, while the avoidance of RICSs by Israel (particularly since the 2006 war) is correlated with low level of attacks by Hezbollah. Such findings run counter to the highly reasonable argument that the civilian suffering inflicted by Israel *during the war* is the reason for the strong deterrence that has prevailed *since the war*.

In summary, existing works can be criticized as failing to capture critical internal dynamics of AC by aggregating at too high a level of analysis. Furthermore, they tend to overlook the dynamic and interactive nature of protracted AC, during which the intensity and quality of violence fluctuate frequently as a result of policy decisions made by both rivals, which in turn are informed by the adversary's violent signals. It can be assumed that a strategic–interactive approach, which looks at states' RICSs as inputs to the decision-making processes of VNSOs, can contribute much to our understanding of the effects of RICSs on the dynamics of AC.

FIGURE 7.1 Simple theoretical model of the deterrent effects of RICSs.

A THEORETICAL MODEL OF THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF RICSs

Figure 7.1 presents an illustrative theoretical model of the causal mechanism underlying the deterrent potential of RICSs: RICSs instigate popular dissatisfaction with a VNSO, which threaten its domestic standing and thus compel it to change its military policies.

This casual chain, however, is hardly predetermined. Under certain circumstances, perhaps in the majority of cases, the outcome will be the opposite, and RICSs would produce an escalation of violence. The remainder of this chapter discusses the conditions under which each of these alternative causal mechanisms would prevail. These are mainly associated with three questions: *When and to what degree would RICSs be perceived by the affected population as a direct outcome of VNSOs attacks? When and to what degree would RICSs produce popular dissent toward a VNSO and demands for military restraint? When and to what degree such popular pressures to restraint violence would affect a VNSO's decision-making?*

CHARACTERISTICS OF A STATE'S RETALIATORY STRATEGY AND PROVOCATION–RETALIATION LINKAGE

RICSs pose an acute dilemma for states that fight VNSOs. As previously discussed, the suffering inflicted on civilians by state retaliations has the potential of producing a boomerang effect by instigating anger and hatred toward the state, which are likely to result in strengthening a VNSO both politically and militarily. Damage to civilians, however, is sometimes unavoidable. The problem, in brief, is how states can avoid the unwanted backlash effect of RICSs and improve the prospects that they would produce the opposite outcome, that is, weakening of a VNSO and a decline in the volume of its military activity.

A good starting point for addressing this question is the assumption that in order to produce popular demands for military restraint by a VNSO, RICSs must be perceived by people as direct, conditional reaction to VNSOs' acts of violence, and thus something that would cease (or decrease) once military attacks against a state stop (or deescalate). Such perceptions are likely to be informed by *the way state retaliations are conducted*. Several basic characteristics of a state's retaliatory policy are of particular importance. First, the degree to which state retaliations are perceived as conditional and reactive (rather than proactive and offensive) is likely to be determined by the degree to which a state consistently avoids acts of unprovoked violence and reciprocate de-escalation of VNSO violence with reduction of its own retaliations. Second, time proximity between provocation and retaliation can greatly enhance the perception that state retaliations are indeed reactive rather than proactive. A third point has to do with the targets of a state's retaliation. If those are somehow logically associated to VNSOs' actions that provoked them, there are better chances that people would perceive them as conditional and reactive. Such logical association can be drawn on geographic basis, by retaliating against targets that reside in areas from which VNSOs' attacks were launched. It can also be based on some sort of resemblance between the targets of VNSO violence to those of state retaliation. During the 1990s, for example, Israeli retaliations for rockets launched by Hezbollah against Israeli border towns frequently resulted in civilian casualties in Lebanon. Although such a "civilians for civilians"

deterrence equation was never openly admitted by Israel, it was clearly implied by Israel's retalia-tory behavior. The proportionality of state retaliations is another factor that may shape the way the affected population interprets state intentions. Disproportionate reactions might lead people to conclude that the attacks that provoked them were little more than pretext for the implementa-tion of a preplanned aggressive policy.

POPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CONFLICT AND THE EFFICACY OF VIOLENCE

The fact that state retaliations are perceived as a direct result of VNSO attacks does not mean that people would actually *blame* an aggressor VNSO for their suffering. Blame attribution usually takes more than the belief that the actions of *X* are the cause for the pain inflicted on or suffered by *Y*. It also requires those actions to be viewed as running counter to our own interests and desires. Put simply, people are not likely to blame a VNSO for their suffering if they view its military actions as consistent with their own interests. Accordingly, RICSs are expected to provoke popular resentment toward a VNSO only when people do not generally support the military behavior that provoked them. This point relates to "pain tolerance"—the degree to which people are willing to suffer the consequences of VNSO violence and the protraction of a conflict. Assuming rationality at the individual level, the more people who believe that VNSO violence contributes to the achieve-ment of the collective goals of their group, the greater their willingness to suffer its consequences at the individual level. By the same token, when people perceive their suffering as the outcome of actions that do not serve their collective interests, their willingness to endure the consequences is likely to diminish, along with their general support for the VNSO.

While the support for VNSOs' military actions has been frequently preassumed, this may not always be the case. People within a VNSO's constituency might oppose violence against a state (or certain forms of it) for several reasons. First, people may not identify with a VNSO's cause or regard its actions—or some of them—as advancing the organization's own parochial interest or those of foreign actors rather than viewing a VNSO as an authentic representative of their collective values and aspirations. Military operations by Hezbollah, for example, have been frequently contested within the Lebanese public, especially since Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, as many Lebanese viewed the organization as an Iranian or Syrian proxy rather than an authentic representa-tive of Lebanese interests.

Second, even when people generally support a VNSO's agenda and some forms of military action, they may disapprove of other forms of violence because they do not view them as necessary or beneficial to their collective goals. As Friedman (2010) notes, "without the sense that violence can succeed, the subordinate rival will not be willing to suffer the costs of repression" (p. 197). If we return to the Hezbollah example, attacks by the organization against Israel's occupation forces in southern Lebanon were consented to by most with the Lebanese public sphere, while launching rockets into Israel proper frequently instigated domestic criticism (Azani, 2008). Furthermore, the notion of instrumental rationality at the individual level suggests that when people believe that their grievances and aspirations are more likely to be addressed by political settlement than by violence, and that a state is genuinely committed to reach such settlement, support for violence would decline. Palestinian public opinion polls, for example, have shown that the degree of trust that the Palestinian population has in the peace process with Israel is a crucial factor in determining the degree of Palestinian support for terrorism and violence against Israeli targets (Shikaki, 2002, 2006). Popular support for (and faith in) peaceful negotiations is likely to grow with the successful progression of the peace process, particularly if its implementation is gradual. The implementation of the Cairo Agreement (May 1994) and the Taba Agreement (September 1995), which included Israel's withdrawal from Palestinian cities and general elections for the Palestinian Authority (PA), instigated growing Palestinian public support for the peace process and a corresponding decline in the support for armed attacks against Israeli targets (Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey

FIGURE 7.2 Popular support for violence as a moderator variable.

Research [PSR] Polls). These two interrelated trends combined to strengthen the deterrent effects of Israeli responses to terrorist attacks by Hamas, which opposed the Oslo Process and initially escalated its attacks against Israeli targets. Israeli countermeasures frequently involved considerable civilian suffering, in the form of border crossing closures and limitation on movement in the occupied territories. In 1996, after a long-lasting closure imposed on the West Bank and Gaza by Israel, in response to a series of suicide attacks by Hamas, the support for the organization in public opinion polls hit rock bottom.[*] Hamas' military activity sharply declined during the remainder of the 1990s. Public statements by Hamas' leaders confirmed that the shift in Hamas' policy was the outcome of its leadership's fears that further retaliations by Israel and the PA would further erode its status within Palestinian society.[†]

It is reasonable to assume that when people do not support certain policies, they are not likely to be willing to endure the costs associated with them. Herein, lies the deterrent potential of RICSs: as illustrated by Figure 7.2, popular attitudes toward the utility and legitimacy of violence constitute a moderator variable that determine the degree to which civilian suffering caused by state retaliations would be blamed on the VNSO and would lead to erosion in its popular status. If the affected population does not support VNSO violence (or certain types of military operations), for whatever reasons, it might attribute blame for its suffering to the VNSO, which provoked state retaliation that hurt them. This, in turn, might erode a VNSO's domestic legitimacy and popular support, which under certain conditions, would translate into considerable damage to the VNSO's interests. These conditions constitute the third category of independent variables in the model.

VNSOs' DOMESTIC POLITICAL VULNERABILITY

Let us assume that the suffering resulting from state retaliations managed to instigate a considerable degree of popular dissatisfaction with a VNSO, expressed through public pressure on a VNSO to change its military policy. The next question is: When and to what degree would VNSOs be responsive to such popular pressures? The question, to put it differently, is one of the potential of popular dissatisfaction to threaten a VNSO's interests, or a VNSO's domestic political vulnerability (DPV). DPV can be taken to be a function of the level and nature of a VNSO's dependence on popular support. When strong popular pressures to cease or reduce violence are coupled with a high level of a

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[*] Opinion polls from March 1996 showed a sharp decrease in support for Hamas (from 12% in January to 6% in March) and unprecedented opposition to the continuation of armed attacks against Israelis (PSR June, August 1996). See Shikaki (1998, p. 35).

[†] A statement from August 1996 by Ghazi Hamad, editor of the Hamas's daily al-Watan and a prominent political figure, is illustrative: "Continuous military operations do not help Hamas: in fact they have a grave and damaging effect on the movement. We do not want the Palestinians to blame Hamas for their suffering" (quoted in Kristianasen, 1999, p. 30).

VNSO's DVP, the result is likely to be a general decrease in VNSO violence, originated from the organization's desire to avoid erosion of its political status in case of noncompliance.

VNSOs' degree and form of dependence on popular support changes from case to case and might shift over time for reasons that will be subsequently discussed. It may be useful to begin, however, with a typology of the central sources of VNSOs' dependence on popular support. They can be roughly divided into three categories: First, most VNSOs rely on local populations for the supply of a wide range of vital resources necessary for effective military functioning as well as for organizational survival and expansion. The provision of these resources can be referred to as *active behavioral support* and includes logistic support in the form of money, manpower, food, shelter, and information.[*] Second, in many cases, a VNSO's freedom of action depends on its ability to retain some sort of operational base or "sanctuary." Many classical theorists and practitioners of insurgency warfare have underscored the importance of "a secure base area within which an insurgent group is able to organize the politico-military infrastructure needed to support its activities" (Brynen, 1990, p. 3). Also known as "safe-havens," such territories have to provide some kind of relative security, thus requiring, in addition to the provision of basic resources by the local population, a considerable degree of *passive behavioral support*, that is, tolerance of activities that would prevent people, at the very least, from cooperating with a state against the organization (Leites and Wolf, 1970; Metz and Millen, 2004; Paul, 2010).

Finally, many VNSOs seek political power within their constituencies as a *goal in itself*, possibly due to a long-term concern for their power position when collective goals are achieved and the spoils of the collective struggle are distributed. Ethno-political organizations, it should be remembered, are usually "embedded in larger, non-unitary social movements" (Krause, 2013, p. 290). Such movements are frequently characterized by internal power struggles between different organizations competing over the leadership of the movement, the power to shape its collective policies, and the right to constitute the government of the future state. Such internal struggles are likely to significantly increase the importance of *attitudinal popular support*—the third type of support on which some VNSOs depend—rendering popular sympathy a top-priority objective in itself, rather than just a means to consolidate military power.[†] This is demonstrated by the fact that many VNSOs—such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Irish Republican Army (IRA)—establish political wings, political parties, and welfare networks, the main purpose of which is to mobilize and retain popular support and legitimacy (Neumann and Smith, 2008, p. 50; Berti, 2011).

The greater a VNSO's DPV, whatever its sources, the more attuned it would likely be to public opinion within its constituency; it would likely incorporate the expected effects of state retaliations on public attitudes into its military decision-making. Failure to heed popular opinion might involve significant costs and risks such as the cutting of supplies, the denial of sanctuary, threats to the organization's security due to local cooperation with state forces, and marginalization by other organizations. These might add up to constitute a severe threat to a VNSO's survival. The prevalent view in the academic literature, however, has been that violence against the external enemy is an effective tool—perhaps *the* tool—used by VNSOs to *overcome* their DPV. As has been suggested by numerous experts, violence, and in particular extreme forms thereof (i.e., terrorism), is instrumental for VNSOs in achieving almost every type of domestic and organizational goal: mobilizing political and material support, increasing popular identification with a VNSO's agenda and outpacing domestic rivals (Bloom, 2005; Krause, 2013; Lake, 2002; Thornton, 1964). High levels of DPV were therefore usually theorized and reported to cause an *escalation* of violence by VNSOs. Cases where DPV has led to the opposite outcomes—military restraint and deterrence—have been rarely discussed or researched.

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[*] For a discussion, see Drennan's chapter in this volume.

[†] For a discussion of the difference between attitudinal support and behavioral support, see Kalyvas (2006, pp. 91–104) and Lilja (2009, p. 308).

There is, however, some agreement—frequently implicit—that a lack of popular support for violence might change the direction of causality. Consider a quote by Bloom (2005), the most prominent proponent of the "outbidding theory," which suggests that terrorist organizations conduct suicide attacks in order to outdo competing organizations:

> The main thrust of my argument is that when violence resonates positively with the civilian population (at particular moments in time), a variety of extremist groups might compete with one another for popularity, engage in outbidding, and use violence to mobilize and radicalize the polity (p. 74).

Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that when support for violence within a VNSO's popular base is widespread, high levels of DPV would raise that VNSO's motivation to employ violence against a state. Sustaining, and even escalating, violence against a state amid coercive pressure would enhance the organization's popular standing and reputation, while succumbing to state pressure would entail considerable reputational costs. The implication, as reasoned by Kuperman (2006), is that the organization "may feel obliged not to back down when the state raises the stakes" (p. 4). What happens, however, when violence does not resonate positively with the population? When this is the case, politically vulnerable organizations would most likely be threatened by a possible popular backlash stemming from the reluctance of people to suffer the consequences of acts they do not support. Seeking to avoid such adverse consequences, a VNSO is expected to suspend attacks that seem to provoke harsh RICSs by a state. High levels of DPV can therefore—under certain circumstances—encourage military restraint and improve the deterrent effects of RICSs. The argument is illustrated in Figure 7.3.

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to conceptual and theoretical development of the concept of DVP, perhaps the most significant conceptual contribution of this chapter to the literature and theory of AC. The guiding question is: What factors do determine the degree and form of VNSOs dependence on popular support? Although the sources and determinant of this dependence as well as the reasons for shifts in its magnitude might be highly case-specific, they merit a general theoretical discussion.

To begin with, a VNSO's form and degree of dependence on popular support are likely to change according to *the phase of its organizational development*. For the sake of simplicity, we may distinguish between two key phases in the development of VNSOs: *the incipient stage* and *the maturity stage*. VNSOs in the incipient stage usually lack well-institutionalized means of popular mobilization. Their initial military attacks might have attracted the attention—and perhaps the support—of some people, but they are still unknown to the population at large, and their political agenda has


FIGURE 7.3   Effect of domestic political vulnerability on the outcomes of RICSs.

not yet gained any widespread popularity. Their central task is therefore popular mobilization, in both its senses: material—the attainment of relatively stable pool of resources needed for their military functioning; and political—raising popular identification with their cause. These two tasks, of course, are interrelated, as popular sympathy for the cause tends to improve the ability to mobilize material resources.

The pressing need to mobilize political and material popular support renders VNSOs at the incipient stage highly dependent on local populations, and thus makes them considerably vulnerable to shifts in public attitudes. Given the lack of any institutionalized mechanisms for recruitment and for provision of resources, failure to secure some level of popular cooperation might lead to organizational paralysis and even outright demise. In the words of Lilja (2009), at initial stages of insurgency "a rebel group's dependency on the population in combination with being a small organization puts rebels' fate in the hands of the population, making them rely on constituent goodwill" (p. 310). This is supported by the fact that the vast majority of VNSOs do not survive beyond the first few years of their birth.[*]

Many scholars, however, suggest that the acute political vulnerability of VNSOs at initial stages of struggle is actually a strong incentive to use and escalate violence rather than a restraining factor (Thornton, 1964). The two most frequently mentioned mechanisms through which violence can help VNSOs overcome their vulnerabilities at the incipient stage are *provocation* and *propaganda*. The use of violence for *provocation* relies on the expectation—already discussed earlier—that the popular anger instigated by a state's retaliations for a VNSO's attacks would rally support for the latter and provide it with the much-needed resources and new recruits. As explained by Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson (2007), "terrorists use violence to provoke governments into harsh and indiscriminate CT responses in order to radicalize and mobilize a population whose interests the terrorists claim to represent," as such responses "leave the population with the impression that the government is unconcerned with their welfare, increasing the appeal of insurgency" (p. 364). Additionally, as broadly agreed among social scientists, conflict with an out-group and the perception of an external threat increases in-group cohesion and feelings of shared collective identity (Coser, 1956, p. 38). The implication is that escalation of mutual violence can also significantly contribute to identity building and ethnic political mobilization.

Unlike the provocation mechanism, the *propaganda* effect of violent operations does not depend on state-level retaliation, but is rather produced by the attention such operations receive in the media. As McCormick (2003) explains, violence

> can be an immediate, inexpensive, and effective means of focusing political attention on the opposition and its cause. Such actions … are designed to define the terms of the struggle, raise popular consciousness, and begin to generate popular support for the terrorists' political agenda (p. 484).

This idea can be summarized by the words of Korpotin (quoted in McCormick, 2003), considered the father of anarchist-communism, according to which a single attack, especially if conducted against a high-profile target, may in a few days "make more propaganda than thousands of pamphlets" (p. 484).

Accordingly, from a state point of view, whose supreme interest in initial stages of insurgency is to avoid pushing people into the hands of insurgent groups, RICSs have considerable counterproductive potential. The fact that many people have not yet mobilized against the state at this point and that a strong national identity has not been established implies that a state has much to lose—and little to gain—from inflicting civilian suffering, even unintentionally. Additionally, there is little a state can do to negate the propaganda effect of a VNSO's operations. Strong retaliations

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[*] As argued by Hoffman (2002, p. 84), approximately 90% of all terrorist groups die within a year and only half of those remaining survive for another decade.

would only draw more media attention and enhance a VNSO's visibility. Therefore, there exists critical important in retaliating proportionally and selectively against people who take active part in military activity against the state, while avoiding, as much as possible, any significant damage to civilians. If such measures are accompanied by "hearts and minds" policies (Leites and Wolf, 1970), which reward communities that avoid participation in the struggle, a state might succeed in isolating a VNSO from the population—"isolation not enforced upon the population but maintained by and with the population" (Galula, 2006, p. 54).

However, despite the relatively low expected utility of RICSs at the initial stage, one can still think of several variables that are likely to increase its deterrent potential (or to reduce its counter-productive potential). These are associated, as has already been implied, with the degree of popular identification with an organization's agenda and the support for its military policies. For one, the initial degree of legitimacy of a state within the affected population is expected to significantly influence people's willingness to suffer the consequences of state retaliations and to support the organization despite them. The more people view the current situation as satisfactory in terms of their basic needs and aspirations (material or political), the greater would be the deterrent potential of RICSs. This might be true even if a considerable degree of collective identity has already been established.

People's readiness to endure the consequences of violent struggle carried on their behalf is also likely to be determined by the degree to which they believe that armed struggle is an effective means of satisfying their grievances and fulfilling their collective aspirations. Otherwise, "there is a good chance they will conclude that—however corrupt and chaotic—the status quo still represents the lesser of two evils" (Neumann and Smith, 2008, p. 52).

Unlike VNSOs at the incipient stage, organizations that have managed to develop into well-institutionalized insurgent groups are likely to be less dependent on popular behavioral support for several reasons. First, it can be assumed that ethno-political VNSOs in their maturation stage have already managed to rally the support and sympathy of a considerable segment of the population. Such increase in popular attitudinal support is likely to translate into higher levels of popular willingness to suffer the consequences of armed struggle, usually accompanied by the consolidation of a stable pool of loyal supporters from which activists can be recruited and resources can be mobilized. The danger of extinction due to of the termination of the resource supply is thus no longer imminent. The same is true for passive support—as the greater is the degree of popular support for a VNSO's cause, the greater would be people's willingness to passively endure the costs of the conflict and to refrain from any cooperation with the government in order to weaken the VNSO. Furthermore, some VNSOs, at the maturation stage, succeed in exercising de facto control over a certain geographical area of one sovereign state or another, and develop government-like institutions that function as "quasi-states," which includes a rudimentary system of social services and a security apparatus (Sayigh, 1998). Such organizational assets provide VNSOs with powerful instruments of social control as they can provide selective incentives to the people in the form of material rewards to collaborators and sanctions against dissenters. This greatly enhances the ability of a VNSO to ensure the passive cooperation of the local population. Processes of organizational institutionalization frequently also include the establishment of relatively stable mechanisms of resource supply from *external sources* such as friendly state sponsors and diasporas. This significantly reduces their dependency on local behavioral support and their vulnerability to fluctuations in popular support within their host society. The level of external material support enjoyed by a VNSO is therefore another variable, which is likely to determine the level of its DPV.[*]

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[*] It is important to remember, however, that external support cannot substitute for certain vital services that can only be provided by local populations (i.e., operational information and sanctuary). Additionally, dependency on state sponsors might severely restrict the organization's autonomy, sometimes to the point that it becomes no more than an obedient proxy. In such cases, RICSs are not expected to have much deterrence potential, as the state sponsor is not likely to ascribe much importance to the support of the local population.

While a VNSO's institutionalization processes are expected to lessen its dependence on popular *behavioral support*, they might, at the same time, increase its dependency on *attitudinal support*. Maturation of ethno-political VNSOs is usually coupled with a parallel institutionalization of the larger social movement of which it is a part. Such process is likely to produce internal competition between different organizations over the hegemony in the movement and the power to control its common institutions, and to establish its agenda (Krause, 2013; Pearlman, 2009). Since attitudinal popular support is vital for organizations, which compete over political power and leadership within a greater social movement, the need to secure such support and overpower rival groups implies a relatively high level of DVP. The level of VNSOs' sensitivity to trends in popular support, however, depends on several factors: (1) the nature and level of a VNSO's domestic political aspirations, (2) the type of institutionalized mechanism of political competition, and (3) a VNSO's position in the overall structure of power within the movement.

Dependency on popular attitudinal support is a function of an organization's domestic political aspirations and its participation (actual or desired) in the formal political institutions of the national movement (Neumann, 2005). VNSOs that do not compete for hegemony in the movement and that instead choose to stay outside the domestic political game (i.e., the Palestinian Islamic Jihad [PIJ]) are likely to be less sensitive (or not at all) to shifts in popular attitudinal support. Others, who aspire to maintain or gain a leadership position, are in much greater need of the sympathy of their constituencies and thus are likely to be more responsive to their wishes. These might include demands to restrict the use of violence in order to avoid the consequences of military escalation by a state. Accordingly, depending on prevalent public attitudes, the deterrent potential of RICSs is expected to improve as the level of a VNSO's political aspiration and its participation in domestic politics increases.

The case of Hamas is highly illustrative. From its inception in the late 1980s to the mid-2000s, Hamas' participation in Palestinian institutionalized politics was considerably limited. Its political leaders focused instead on ensuring and strengthening the organization's ties with the Palestinian public by expanding its network of social services. The situation significantly changed once Hamas' leadership decided to take part in the 2005 Palestinian municipal election and in the parliamentary election of January 2006. This decision reinforced its interest in heeding Palestinian public opinion and thus increased its DPV (Gunning, 2007, pp. 156–7; Malka, 2005, p. 42). This was coupled with ongoing decline in Palestinian public support for armed attacks and overwhelming support in maintaining the 2005 ceasefire between the Palestinian military organizations and Israel.[*] The result was a cautious military policy by Hamas, which abided by the ceasefire until mid-2006 and generally refrained from launching rockets into Israel.[†] Hamas' ascendance to power after the 2006 elections and its subsequent takeover of Gaza in 2007 further underscored the organization's need to consolidate its power in the Gaza Strip, and made it formally accountable for the welfare of the Palestinians residing there. This increased DPV can explain the relatively strong deterrent effect of Israel's retaliations to rocket fire since then, particularly those of operations *Cast Lead* (December 2008) and *Pillar of Defense* (November 2012), which ended with relatively stable ceasefires.

The strong deterrent effects of Israel's latest campaigns against Hamas' semistate in Gaza suggest another type of development that increases VNSOs' DPV—its ascendance to the status of de-facto government. Such development may be the outcome of the establishment of a new self-governing political entity as part of the implementation of political agreements (as with the Palestinian Liberation Organization [PLO] after 1994), or the result of a victory through internal

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[*] In a PSR poll from September 2005, a majority of 62% of Palestinian respondents said that they opposed armed resistance from the Gaza Strip and 60% supported the collection of arms from armed factions in the Strip. 75% said that they support the ceasefire. (PSR Poll, September 2005). Support of maintenance of the ceasefire further increased in December 2005 (PSR Poll, December 2005).

[†] Other Palestinian militant organizations (such as The Islamic Jihad Organization [IJO] and the Popular Resistance Committees [PRC]) kept targeting Israeli towns, causing frequent exchanges of fire between Israeli and Palestinian armed groups during that period.

struggle over the control of the government of an already established semistate (as with Hamas in Gaza in 2007). A related case is one in which a political party affiliated with a VNSO becomes a part of a governing coalition in a sovereign state (i.e., Hezbollah beginning in 2005). In any of these cases, the central political objective of the organization is to secure its governing position amid internal challenges, a somewhat different challenge than overpowering other groups. The difference is not only a matter of semantics, as peoples' expectations from their governments are certainly more demanding than their expectations from rival organizations struggling over political power. The former, unlike the latter, are likely to be held accountable for any deterioration in the life conditions of people within their area of control. At the same time, the rise of VNSOs to governance greatly extends the RICSs arsenal of a state: each and every action that somehow degrades the life conditions of the people under a VNSO's control has the potential to invoke popular dissatisfaction toward the ruling organization.

To make the situation worse, a state's RICSs arsenal now includes attacks against various targets which, while capable of imposing considerable civilian suffering, are perceived as significantly less atrocious and thus are expected to prompt much less criticism in domestic and international public opinion. Such is the case with the bombing of government facilities, infrastructure, and economic targets, which might heavily influence people's life conditions—sometimes for long periods of time—without causing significant human casualties. To illustrate, one can consider the colossal damage to Lebanese society during Israel's campaign against Hezbollah in 2006 in response to the abduction of two Israeli soldiers, which included extensive destruction of Lebanon's infrastructures as well as severe damage to tens of thousands of residential homes and businesses. Economic losses were initially estimated at around $7 billion, or 30% of Lebanon's gross domestic product (GDP) (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 2006). The fact that Hezbollah was then part of the Lebanese government served to justify Israel's harsh response against Lebanon (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs [IMFA], 2006).

Second, the development of institutionalized mechanisms of political competition within the social movement as well as their form and nature are also likely to affect the degree to which VNSOs are sensitive to fluctuations in popular support. When these mechanisms are based on mass participation and electoral systems of representation, the consequences of adverse shifts in attitudinal support are likely to be much more serious in terms of their VNSO's position in the national movement's hierarchy. The reason is that under such circumstances, popular dissatisfaction with VNSOs would more readily translate into loss of political power. For example, Fatah's control of the PLO and the Palestinian national movement over previous years was relatively secure against the effects of Palestinian public opinion, given that the movement's system of representation was hardly based on any meaningful popular participation. However, once the PA has been established in 1994, including an election-based system of representation, Fatah became much more vulnerable to internal challenges to its leadership. Fatah managed to retain its control over the institutions of the Palestinian semistate for over 10 years, perhaps because no elections had been held between 1996 and 2006. However Fatah's defeat by Hamas in the Palestinian parliamentary elections of 2006, commonly attributed to growing popular resentment toward its leadership, clearly demonstrated Fatah's vulnerability to shifts in Palestinian public opinion. The implication, to conclude, is that when power positions are determined by the dynamics of mass political participations, publics have greater leverage over leaders and organizations, which compete for political power.

An additional feature of a VNSO's domestic environment, which is likely to influence its DPV, is *the organization's relative power versus other competing organizations* (Krause, 2011). Most works, which have addressed this issue, however, have focused on cases where domestic competition over popular support brings about escalation of violence due to effort by different organizations to "outbid" their competitors (Bloom, 2005; Krause, 2013). This argument, however, is based on an (frequently implicit) assumption that the use of violence pays high dividends in terms of popular support, which, as has already been noted, is not always the case. The same framework can

therefore be applied to opposite cases, where political vulnerabilities caused by internal rivalries lead to *military restraint*—in line with the argument that some forms of DPV encourage the escalation of violence under some conditions (when violence is highly supported by people); it might have the opposite effect under other conditions (when people are not willing to tolerate the consequences of violence). Take, for example, the case of a close political competition over the leadership of a social movement between two VNSOs (i.e., Hamas and Fatah since the early 2000s). In such cases, relatively small shifts in popular support might have serious implications in terms of attaining or losing the leading position—as demonstrated by the earlier-mentioned case of Fatah's loss to Hamas in the 2006 Palestinian elections. The same fear of being overpowered politically, which can be viewed as the reason for the outbidding dynamic during al-Aqsa Intifada (Bloom, 2005), also provides a possible explanation for the prudent military policy of Hamas since its rise to power in Gaza.

To further illustrate, consider the case of an organization, which enjoys a small share of popular support relative to a bigger organization, which holds a dominant leadership position in the movement. Such organizations, it can be assumed, are under constant risk of political marginalization by the more powerful organization. During the years of the Oslo Accords between Israel and the PLO, to present one example, Hamas was under constant threat of marginalization by Fatah, which controlled the newly established institutions and security apparatus of the PA. This situation relegated Hamas to a position in which it was highly dependent on popular support that was necessary for evading the imminent risks of harsh political repression by Fatah (whose coercive power was growing steadily). The growing threat for Hamas on the part of the PA combined with growing Palestinian popular support for the peace process and the corresponding decline in the support for armed attacks seemed to strengthen the deterrent effects of Israeli responses to Hamas' terrorist attacks. The case illustrates the central line of argument in this chapter: *high political vulnerability when coupled with low popular support for violence leads to stronger deterrent effects of RICSs.*

Finally, we should consider the prevalent case in which a VNSO's operational base resides in a territory of a host state, where only part of the population identifies with a VNSO's agenda and supports it, as was the case, for example, with the PLO in Lebanon during the 1970s. In cases where the host government voluntarily grants a VNSO freedom within its borders, the organization does not have to worry much about local opposition: the support of the government secures its ability to maintain its safe-haven. However, the host government (or other powerful political actors within the host state) might oppose the launch of attacks from its territory, but would lack the power to challenge a VNSO's control of its safe-haven and compel the cessation of its attacks. As demonstrated by the protracted bitter power struggle between the Lebanese government and the PLO during the 1970s, popular local support and ad hoc alliances with other groups might be crucial for securing the upper-hand for a VNSO in constant militarized confrontations with government forces and their supporters. Such dependence on local power is likely to lead to a greater willingness by a VNSO to avoid the alienation of local populations and allies by refraining from military attacks that are expected to provoke harsh state retaliations. To return to the case of PLO in Lebanon, it has been reported that fear of popular backlash within Lebanese society was a significant restraining factor on the PLO military activity from Lebanon, especially during the second half of the 1970s and during the early 1980s (Brynen, 1990; Jabber, 1973, p. 83).

A similar dynamic can be traced in the case of Hezbollah. Israeli retaliations for Hezbollah military attacks from Lebanon frequently exposed (and severed) the conflict of interests between the Lebanese government as well as other non-Shi'ite Lebanese elites, and Hezbollah. The deterrent effect of Operation Grapes of Wrath, conducted by Israel in 1996 in retaliation for the intensification of Hezbollah's rocket fire,[*] can be attributed to Hezbollah's fear of erosion

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[*] During the 16 months following the operations, the organization totally avoided shooting rockets into Israel, despite more than 17 cases of Israeli attacks in Lebanon resulting in civilian casualties, in which 9 citizens died and over 40 were injured. Such incidents frequently sparked threats to respond in kind by Hezbollah's speakers, but no such responses followed.

of its popular support in Lebanon amid growing public criticism of its rocket fire into Israel (Azani, 2008).*

Israel's withdrawal from the occupied security zone in Lebanon in May 2000 had serious implications in terms of public support for Hezbollah's military activity. The end of Israel's occupation stripped the organization of the main source of popular legitimacy for its military operations against Israel and undermined the justification for maintaining its special status as an autonomous armed militia. Events in the Lebanese domestic arena during 2004 and 2005 further increased the internal debate in Lebanon regarding the legitimacy of Hezbollah's operations and its right to maintain its own weapons arsenal. United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1559, adopted in September 2004, called for the withdrawal of foreign forces (i.e., Syrian forces) from Lebanon and in February 2005, former anti-Syrian Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated. These events, and others, prompted a wave of anti-Syrian protests by Lebanon's non-Shi'ite elements, led by the "March 14 Alliance" composed of Sunni, Druze, and Christian political parties. This was coupled with harsh criticism of Hezbollah, which was regarded by many as a Syrian proxy and thus as an agent of foreign interests (International Crisis Group [ICG], 2005, p. 16). The eventual withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon in the spring of 2005 constituted another setback for Hezbollah, particularly in terms of its DPV, as it could no longer rely on Syria to thwart decisions by the Lebanese cabinet that did not favor the organization.

Hezbollah's concerns further increased after the anti-Syrian bloc won a landslide victory in the June 2005 elections. Hezbollah felt it necessary to become more deeply involved in the domestic political processes, and thus decided to join the government (Alagha, 2005, p. 36). This move, however, made Hezbollah even more accountable to the Lebanese public, and further emphasized its need to act cautiously with regard to attacks against Israel. The abduction operation carried out by Hezbollah in July 2006, which ignited the 2006 Lebanon War, was most probably the result of the organization's misperceptions of the response that was expect to be made by Israel rather than flawed assessment of Hezbollah's domestic situation. The organization's political vulnerability was indeed demonstrated by the public's reactions to the war. Anger and hatred toward Israel notwithstanding, Hezbollah was subject to considerable criticism in Lebanon for having irresponsibly provoked the Israeli campaign, and its image as a defender of Lebanon was badly damaged. Lebanese critics of Hezbollah began again to question Hezbollah's commitment to Lebanese interests and implied that foreign interests guided its actions, and thus demanded that it be disarmed (Merom, 2008, p. 14; Zisser, 2009). Contrary to the situation in the past, Hezbollah was also criticized from within its most loyal power base, the Lebanese Shi'ite community (Teheri, 2006). The strong deterrent effect of the 2006 Lebanon war—complete cessation of attacks on Israel's northern border for over seven years—can be attributed to the combination of Hezbollah's increased political vulnerability in Lebanon and the growing critical trend in Lebanon against its military endeavors.

The earlier-presented discussion on VNSOs' DPV suggested several characteristics of a VNSO's domestic environment that are likely to be influential in shaping an organization's dependence on popular support and thus its vulnerability to adverse popular trends. Figure 7.4 presents an

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* The most ardent critic of Hezbollah was Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri, who accused Hezbollah of exploiting the struggle against Israeli occupation to promote its own parochial political interests (Harik, 2005, p. 124). During the election campaign of summer 1996, leading candidates such as Hariri, Amal leader Nabih Berri (also Speaker of Parliament), and Druze leader Walid Jumblat repeatedly blamed Hezbollah for acting against the Lebanese collective interests (Usher, 1997). To a certain extent, the results of the 1996 elections for the Lebanese parliament seemed to point to adverse trends toward Hezbollah in Lebanese public opinion. In the first two rounds of the elections Hezbollah suffered a considerable electoral setback, losing its seats in the Baabda region, a Hezbollah stronghold, and in Beirut. Trying to avoid further electoral damage, Hezbollah submitted to Syrian demands and entered into an electoral alliance with its political rival (Amal) prior to the round of elections in south Lebanon, thus emerging from the 1996 elections with a net loss of only two seats. Nevertheless, the results were considered an unforeseen disappointment by Hezbollah leaders, who hoped to increase their electoral power (Gambill and Abdelnour, 2002). See also, Azani (2008, p. 105).

FIGURE 7.4   Sources and determinants of VNSOs' domestic political vulnerability.

elaborated model of DPV, which includes possible sources and determinants of VNSOs' dependence on popular support.

While the model includes variables that might pose a complex methodological challenge for empirical studies of the subject, it still points to basic questions scholars and policy-makers have to address in order to assess the most probable effects of RICSs on VNSOs' behavior: *How dependent the organizations is on provision of resources from the local population? What is the level of its aspirations in terms of "domestic" political power and leadership? What is the nature of internal political competition within the movement a VNSO belongs to and how political power is distributed within it? Where do VNSOs' main operational bases lie and what type of relationship do VNSOs have with host governments and other powerful groups?* These questions provide a valuable point of vantage for empirical research regarding the deterrent effects of the use of force in AC, and may serve policy-makers who seek to devise effective counterinsurgency (COIN) policies under different conditions.

CONCLUSION

Most contemporary VNSOs are far from the stereotypical image of small clandestine groups committed to using violence regardless of its political consequences. Nor should they be viewed as holding inflexible beliefs according to which violence always increases their popularity. The main argument of this chapter has been that under certain circumstances, escalation of violence in AC instigated by VNSOs' military actions might be counterproductive in terms of an organization's political status and popular legitimacy. The reason lies in the reluctance of people within VNSOs' constituencies to suffer the consequences of state retaliations for an organization's military operations. Accordingly, while being morally problematic (but sometimes hardly avoidable), retaliations that involve civilian suffering have considerable deterrent-potential vis-à-vis VNSOs.

To be sure, transnational terrorist networks such as AQ, whose political aspirations, target audiences, and sources of resource mobilization are much wider than any specific local community, might be immune to popular pressures. But these constitute only one category of VNSOs. Many other VNSOs maintain strong relationships with their constituencies, on whose support and sympathy they rely for the fulfillment of various organizational and political tasks and needs. Such dependence on popular support compels them to heavily consider the consequences of their military policies on their domestic status on the life conditions of the people on whose support they

rely. Failure to incorporate such considerations into their decision-making might lead to significant political and military weakening owing to decline in popular support.

This chapter has also sought to provide an initial theoretical framework for the analysis of the conditions under which suffering inflicted on civilians by state retaliation is expected to erode VNSOs' popular support and thus influence their military decision making. The framework underscores three categories of variables, the values of which can be combined to increase the probability that RICSs would generate an element of deterrence: the way military retaliation by a state are conducted; the level and form of a VNSO's dependence on popular support; and popular attitudes toward violence and its utility within a VNSO's constituency. Additionally, this chapter has introduced the concept of DPV, which has been theorized to have significant explanatory power regarding VNSOs' decision-making and military behavior.

Intentional targeting of civilians is by no means a recommended policy for states, as it constitutes a clear violation of basic international norms of military conduct. One should remember, however, that in many cases, governments have to choose between responding to VNSO violence in ways that involve considerable civilian suffering and not responding at all. Contingent generalization regarding the effects of RICSs under different conditions can thus serve an important diagnostic function for policy-makers who need to assess the effect of their counter-VNSO policies. The application of theory to policy does not necessarily seek to provide policy-makers with precise predictions about the outcomes of certain policies. Rather, it can give policy-makers analytical tools that can assist them in understanding and analyzing various situations they face and provide generalized information regarding the outcomes of certain policies, which were used in similar past situations. Future research based on the framework suggested here may lead to better understandings of the prospective outcomes of different types of states' retaliatory measures under different conditions, and thus may provide the basis for more effective COIN policies.

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8 Latent Insurgency
Is the Threat of Militant Islamist Groups in Indonesia Diminishing?

Paul J. Carnegie

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

During the late 1990s, Indonesia—the world's most populous Muslim nation—began a transition from authoritarian rule. At the time, many commentators expressed concern about the security threat posed by militant Islamists in the wake of Suharto's downfall (Bandoro, 2001, pp. 333–7; Bandoro, 2002, pp. 234–6; Crouch, 2000, pp. 115–33; Gershman, 2002; Hasan, 2002, pp. 4–18). Initially, the archipelago witnessed a proliferation of Islamist paramilitary groups.[*] Yet, during the decade that followed the transition, the worst-case scenarios have failed to eventuate and proved to be largely unfounded. Indonesia today, in coordination with international partners, has reduced its potential threat environment at least strategically. This outcome raises some interesting questions: *Has Indonesia really contained its paramilitary/extremist threat? If so, how and what lessons, if any, can we draw?* Attempting to answer these questions requires a closer look at the nature of the security threat and responses to it.

TAXONOMY AND CONTEXT

Militant groups in Indonesia are numerous and a pretty mixed bag (Hefner, 2007; Santosa, 1996). Of course, this is of no great surprise considering the size, diversity, and history of the archipelago. For our purposes, the main Islamist ones are outlined here on the proviso that I am not providing an exhaustive list and limit myself to the most visible groupings. These groups usually have either direct or indirect ties to larger hard-lined organizations and they are typically factional in character. Included, in no particular order, are the following groups: *Laskar Pembela Islam* (LPI, Defenders of

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[*] It is worth stressing that it is inappropriate to confuse Islamism especially its extreme militant variants with Islam as a religion. The former refers to a contemporary and ideological interaction between politics and religion specifically concerned with the modern politicization of Islamic cultural concepts and symbols in a highly orthodox and, in some instances, violent manner for radical ends.

Islam Army), which operates as the paramilitary wing of the hardline vigilante organization *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI, Islamic Defenders Front). *Laskar Jihad* (LJ, Army of Jihad) operates as a militant offshoot of *Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal-Jama'ah* (FKAWJ, Forum for Followers of the Sunna and the Community of the Prophet). Similarly, the paramilitary group *Laskar Mujahedeen Indonesia* (LMI, Indonesian Mujahedeen Militia) has ties to *Majelis Mujahedeen Indonesia* (MMI, Indonesian Mujahedeen Assembly). Other hardline organizations with links to militant groups include *Negara Islam Indonesia* (NII, Indonesian Islamic State), *Forum Umat Islam* (FUI, the Islamic People's Forum), *Forum Komunikasi Muslim Indonesia* (Forkami, the Indonesian Muslim Communication Forum), *Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia* (HTI, Party of Liberation—Indonesia), and *Gerakan Islam Reformis* (Garis, the Islamic Reformist Movement).

Somewhat differently, the roots of *Ring Banten*, *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI, Islamic Congregation) and *Angkatan Mujahedeen Islam Nusantara* (AMIN, Nusantara Islamic Jihad Forces) trace back to the *Dar-ul-Islam* movement (DI, Abode of Islam). Both DI and *Tentara Islam Indonesia* (TII, Indonesian Islamic Army) formed out of revolutionary Islamic militias that helped fight the long fight against Dutch colonial rule. Colombijn and Lindblad (2002) provide a thought-provoking treatment of the idea of "reservoirs of violence" as a key historical concept for explaining contemporary conflict in Indonesia. Many of the contemporary groups in some ways trace an insurgency connection and their "repertoires of violence" back to the formation and structures of these anticolonial militias.

It is also worth noting that in the aftermath of independence, the secular-oriented nationalism of both Sukarno and Suharto frustrated the political ambitions of militant Islamic organizations by imposing major restrictions on them. Sukarno banned both DI and TII but their cadre continued to fight for the establishment of *Negara Islam Indonesia* (NII, Indonesian Islamic State) under the leadership of S. M. Kartosuwiryo between 1948 and 1963 (Dengel, 1995). Their numbers peaked at about 13,000, primarily in West Java, South Sulawesi, and Aceh. They did eventually suffer defeat after a concerted and bloody campaign by the Indonesian military culminating in the capture and execution of Kartosuwiryo in 1962. DI and TII subsequently unraveled but memories, attachments and frustrations from that period still have resonance with sections of the populace in the aforementioned areas.

CONTEMPORARY VARIANTS

A significant difference between now and then is an influx of *hadrami* (Indonesians of Middle Eastern descent). Some of these arrivals fought with the *mujahedeen* in Afghanistan in the late 1980s bringing with them considerable combat experience. Many of whom have gone on to provide influential tutelage over the years (Abuza, 2002, pp. 427–65; Cox et al., 2009, p. 94). With the rise of a new globally networked terror landscape, groups such as JI started presenting themselves as a regional franchise of al-Qaeda (AQ), with links across South East Asia (SEA) (Abuza, 2005, pp. 31–61; Sholeh, 2006). It claimed to be pursuing, along with its pan-regional partners, the establishment of *darul Islam nusantara* (an archipelagic Islamic state) as a core objective. How much of this is reality and how much of it illusory propaganda was and is difficult to gauge. What is telling is that in a postmodern age of mediatized conflict and our largely self-generated "climates of fear," image and perception function as powerful tools of combat.

Although big on rhetoric and the ratcheting of fear, there is no denying that JI did pose a very real security threat as evidenced by its capacity to conduct jihadist operations. For instance, the 2002 bombings in Bali and Sulawesi, the 2003 Jakarta JW Marriott Hotel bombing, the 2004 suicide bombings at the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, and the 2005 Bali restaurant bombings all bore a substantial JI stamp. Subsequently, the South Jakarta District Court ruled JI an illegal organization in 2008. This ruling brought JI out of the shadows. It could no longer operate as a *tanzim siri* (secret organization) after having its activities so publicly unmasked in the eyes of the wider populace. The most recent Marriot and Ritz Carlton bombings in Jakarta in 2009 are more likely the work of a

JI splinter group, probably *Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad* formerly led by the now deceased Noordin M. Top. The reason for the latter prognosis is that over the past decade, Indonesia's United States (US)/Australian backed counterterrorism squad *Detasemen Khusus 88* (Special Detachment 88—more commonly known as *Densus 88*) has decimated JI's operational capacity.[*] It is responsible for the incarceration or death of many of JI's leading figures and other Islamist militants (Aritonang, 2013).

Other militant groups in the archipelago seem to follow a somewhat different raison d'être. LPI and LJ both publicly deny any links with AQ, and claim to focus firmly on domestic concerns. Something evidenced by their significant involvement in internecine and intracommunal sectarian conflicts in Central Sulawesi and the Maluku Islands. In particular, LJ views itself very much as the protector of Muslims in the Maluku where it retains an active presence (Hasan, 2006, pp. 4–18). But with long histories of localized intracommunal conflict, places such as Central Sulawesi also provide fertile recruiting grounds for organizations such as JI and the Abu Bakar Ba'asyir inspired *Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid* (JAT, Partisans of the Oneness of God) to further peddle their radical message.[†]

Despite denials, suspicions persist that both LPI and LJ enjoy indirect support from orthodox Islamic organizations, namely *Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia* (DDII, Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication) and *Komite Indonesia Untuk Solidaritas dengan Dunia Islam* (KISDI Indonesian Committee for Solidarity of the Islamic World). It is an ill-kept secret that DDII and KISDI receive substantial funding from countries in the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (see Chong, 2008). An estimated 15%–20% of all Saudi charity dollars sent to Indonesia end-up in the hands of suspect groups (Bond, 2005). There are also alleged links between *Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis* (KOMPAK—Crisis Management/Prevention Committee—set up in Central Sulawesi in 1988 to help victims of flood, disaster, and conflict) and the indirect channeling of funds to militant groups. Little-to-no accountability and a lack of discernible paper trails make tracing donations challenging. Moreover, authorities are also challenged with preventing the diversion of donations away from relief operations and into the hands of radicals. The practice of turning of a blind eye or not following up on investigations by sympathetic factions in the National Police Force (POLRI) and Armed Forces (TNI) alongside endemic corruption also plays a role in the ability of radical groups to maintain toeholds in the region (Jakarta Post, 2011; Roosa, 2003, pp. 10–1).

DOMESTIC ATTITUDES AND EFFORTS

Popular sentiment in Indonesia suggests that militant Islamists lack sufficient clout or wide support. The majority of Indonesian Muslims are more interested in supporting organizations that respect

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[*] *Densus 88* formed in 2003 in the aftermath of the 2002 Bali bombings with backing from the US and Australia. It is part of the Indonesian National Police Force and estimated to have arrested about 700 militant suspects and killed 60. Since its formation, the last decade has seen the imprisonment, execution, or killing of all the major suspects in the 2002 Bali bombing. Former terror mastermind Hambali, a key link between JI and al-Qaeda (AQ), is now languishing in Guantanmo Bay. In 2005, police killed Malaysian bomb-maker Azahari Husin, one of the alleged technical masterminds behind the 2002 Bali bombings. In 2008, there was the execution of Amrozi for his role in the Bali Bombings and in 2009 *Densus 88* killed Azahari's close partner and "money man" Noordin M. Top. There was also the shooting of Dulmatin (a leading member of JI) in 2010. In 2011, the radical cleric and JI *amir* (spiritual head) Abu Bakar Ba'asyir received a 15-year sentence for his support of a jihadi training camp in Aceh. However, Ba'asyir is no longer really the major driving force of Indonesia's radical movement, if he ever was, given his poor strategic and coordination skills. In 2012, the capture and extradition from Pakistan of bomb maker Umar "the demolition man" Patek led to a 20-year sentence. Recently, there have been calls for the dissolution of *Densus 88* over wrongful arrests and extra-judicial killings from, coincidentally, Islamist factions in parliament.

[†] These are locations of concern because of an adjacent long-running separatist conflict led by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Mindanao in the Southern Philippines. Although a tentative peace deal has been brokered there recently, Mindanao is still awash with arms, training camps and trafficking routes. This means that arms and personnel can funnel up and down from Mindanao through a chain of islands across the Celebes Sea and into places such as Sulawesi and the Muluku. These areas with their long histories of insurgency and intracommunal tensions provide deep narrative structures of meaning upon which militant Islamist jihad discourses can engraft themselves.

the rule of law, help combat corruption, and attempt to address the archipelago's economic problems within a constitutional framework (The Asia Foundation, 2003). The majority of Islamic involvement in politics in Indonesia remains rather far from being associated with the coercive institution of an Islamist theocracy (Carnegie, 2013a, pp. 62–3). Indeed, given Indonesia's recent authoritarian past, dealing with radicalism and militant threats (especially those of an Islamic nature) is still a sensitive political issue. The notorious *UU Anti-Subversi* 1963 (Anti-Subversion Laws) are still fresh in the memories of many Indonesians and there is an understandable aversion toward the potential return practices under these laws.[*] The specter of overt security intrusion or meddling in religious affairs simply does not play well domestically especially when accusations of brutality continue to plague both TNI and POLRI in outlying regions.[†] Impinging on hard-won civil rights and political freedoms runs the risk of antagonizing or polarizing segments of what is a moderate Islamic majority (Carnegie, 2010, pp. 90–1). Operational disagreement and tension between POLRI and the TNI over the way to deal with the problem further complicates matters.[‡]

Although critics complain of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's overly tentative handling of these issues, his presidential directive in March 2010 authorizes the new National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT, *Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme*).[§] It may fall well short of a "game changing" response but at least it is a step in the right direction for coordinating efforts. To its credit, Indonesia has tried with some success to balance *hard* and *soft* approaches in dealing with its radical militant problem. This largely stems from recognition of the often counterproductive tendencies the exclusive reliance on incarceration and prisons elicits. Prisons can act as incubators for extremism by way of radicalization, training, and recruitment (International Crisis Group [ICG], 2007, pp. 3–5).

Rather than merely adopt a traditional *hard* approach of tactical assaults, punishment, and detention, Indonesia's *smart* program of disengagement and deradicalization is similar in some ways to those run in Malaysia and Singapore (Abuza, 2009, pp. 193–211; Carnegie, 2013b, pp. 17–8; Teo, 2007). Putting issues of underresourcing and ad hoc institutionalization aside for a moment, the *soft* approach involves a three-pronged strategy. If you can get imprisoned militants to recognize the destructive consequences of their actions, it can open a path to a credible alternative or second chance. There is then a possibility for them to rediscover a different Islamic meaning in their lives, a discursive one that does not include the destructive cycle of extreme thinking, mobilization, and violence.[¶] First, breaking this nexus of radicalization involves a focus on persuasion (Kearney, 2006; Oorjitham, 2008). Having militants to turn away from violence and terrorism, and reclaiming them for society is crucial for lasting containment. The thinking is that convincing imprisoned militants to renounce violence and sever previous ties rather than incarcerating them indefinitely is more effective in the long term. Second, encouraging inmates to speak out about their experiences as a warning to others, and third, compelling them to use their influence over other inmates to cooperate

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[*] These former laws gave almost unlimited power to the armed forces to suppress dissent with little or no legal accountability.

[†] Accusations of excessive force have been leveled at units from the national police's Mobile Brigade (Brimob) on their recent "recovery mission" in Poso, Central Sulawesi to deal with a JAT propaganda campaign and its attempts to establish training camps.

[‡] The TNI's Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS) favors monitoring radical groups rather than banning them outright. For BAIS, wholesale bans can force groups underground and make tracking their activities even more difficult. This is in some contrast to POLRI's Home Security Intelligence Agency (BIK) that has sought to have organizations such as *Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia* (HTI) outlawed for its activities.

[§] The BNPT has sought to establish a multiinstitutional de-radicalization program with religious groups, clerics, NGOs, universities, and schools. They include the two Islamic mass organizations *Nahdhlatul Ulama* and *Muhammadiyah* along with the likes of Al-Hikam College, the Islamic State University of Surakarta, and the Indonesian Institute of Sciences.

[¶] This has even included the organization of prayer sessions by members of *Densus 88* in conjunction with militant detainees as a sign of respect and opportunity for the latter to atone for past deeds. Former *Densus 88* chief, Brigadier General Surya Dharma was a prime mover in promoting this approach, as it is an important part of Islamic teaching especially in an Indonesian context to treat someone fairly and give them a second chance if they genuinely seek to repent (*bertobat*).

with authorities are crucial in this approach.[*] The real goal in all of this is to provide these individuals with a "way-back" (O'Brien, 2007; Sheridan, 2008). Harsh treatment and indefinite incarceration alone simply fuels frustration, resentment, and the anger of inmates, and by extension their immediate/extended families against an outside world. Persistent punitive dealings with certain sections of a population, no matter how marginal, runs the associative risk of perpetuating a "ghettoized" subculture of hate and alienation among them toward state and society.

With this in mind, there is a fine line between persuasive prevention and too little state interference. Some worrying currents of religious intolerance are beginning to emerge in Indonesia to the determinant of the human security of minorities.[†] Rather than the much-lauded "unity in diversity," accusations abound that government officials and members of the police are tacitly, and in some cases, openly complicit in allowing hardline Islamist vigilantes to intimidate and incite discrimination against religious minorities (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 2013). The reluctance of authorities to curb their hate speech, incitement to violence, intimidation, and training activities represents a growing trend. Top-ranking officials have appeared at FPI events in Jakarta. This seems to send a mixed message about official attitudes toward FPI methods for maintaining so-called law and order. Paying little notice to certain types of intolerance and acts of intimidation is tantamount to condoning the suppression of religious freedom of expression in the eyes of some outside observers (ICG, 2010a, p. 17). Prosecutions do occur but they are all too infrequent and usually lenient. *Badan Koordinasi Pengawas Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat* (Bakor Pakem—Coordinating Board for Monitoring Mystical Beliefs in Society) further normalizes and reinforces the acceptability of intolerant attitudes and practices through its influential role in recommending the banning of certain religious sects/groups to the Attorney General's Office and its active pursuing of prosecutions for blasphemy (HRW, 2013, pp. 60–6, 71–86).

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND REGIONAL EFFORTS

In the wider context of the "War on Terror" (WoT) and growing international pressure for more definitive action against extremism, we have witnessed Indonesia issuing *Anti-terrorism Decrees No. 1 and No. 2/2002*. This move even received widespread domestic support although it gave *Badan Intelijens Negara* (BIN, the National Intelligence Agency) greater powers in the identification and detention of suspects. Economic aid incentives and logistical assistance from the US Department of State's Anti-Terrorist Assistance program and from the Australian government have also bolstered threat reduction capacity. The TNI and POLRI especially *Densus 88* have been the main beneficiaries of this largesse. They have received large amounts of equipment, technical support, and training. This has even included the construction of multimillion-dollar training facility partly funded by Australia.

The last decade has brought Indonesia and Australia (an important regional partner of the United States) closer together in making inroads against a perceived extremist threat. The Australian government committed 36.8 million Australian dollars over 5 years in cooperation with the Indonesian government to establish the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) in 2004. Based at Indonesian National Police Academy (AKPOL) in Semarang, this bilateral initiative provides a joint police training program for combatting terrorism. Not all joint efforts have been as successful. The Australian Federal Police also had a hand in helping set up the now defunct Multinational

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[*] For instance, ex-JI commander Mohammed Nasir Bin Abbas has played a significant role in helping "de-program" extremist mind-sets especially amongst Indonesian youth. Ex-JI member Ali Imron (brother of Amrozi) also renounced his past mistakes by publishing a book and tapes about his experiences and publicly advocating against terrorism. He and others have worked closely with the authorities and different nonstate actors (i.e., socio-religious organizations) in their de-radicalization efforts with militant detainees. These initiatives have also run in conjunction with ad campaigns on the street and through the media promoting an anti-jihadist message.

[†] Recently, the SETARA Institute (2012) reported 264 such attacks in 2012 up from 244 and 216 in 2011 and 2010, respectively. Local Ahmadiyya, Baha'i, Christian, or Shi'a minorities are the main targets of religiously motivated attacks.

Operation Support Team (MNOST) in Jakarta. It was supposed to provide a locus for countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines to share information and expertise on terrorism issues and deradicalization programs. Having said this, the Indonesian government is certainly now better positioned to coordinate its antiterrorist efforts not only with Australia but also with Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines (Fealy and Thayer, 2009, pp. 211–7).

Despite both the strategic and human security threats posed by militant Islamist groups, a mounting body of evidence suggests that the transnational *jihadist* project is failing in Indonesia (Fealy, 2004, pp. 104–21; Fealy and Borgu, 2005; Hwang, 2012, pp. 1–12). A splintered *jihadist* community simply does not elicit broad-based popular support for its violent tactics. As they descend into factionalism, many radical groups have shifted their emphasis toward a more surreptitious indoctrination of the jihadist message (Ramakrishna, 2009). This involves *dakwah* (proselytization/religious outreach) as an alternative strategy for building support for their project rather than the direct enlistment for indiscriminate terror activities.* Regardless of these efforts to build grassroots support for Islamist jihad insurgency especially amongst the youth, mainstream Indonesian society continues to marginalize them. For instance, hard-lined organizations such as MMI, LMI, FPI, and AMIN led renewed recruitment attempts in Aceh after the 2004 tsunami under the guise of providing humanitarian aid and *dakwah* but met with little community support (ICG, 2010b, pp. 1–27). The fact that the tsunami had simply wiped out many of their previous support networks in the region further thwarted their efforts. As mentioned, an even starker reality is that *Densus 88* has crippled JI. Many of its leading figures and many other Islamist militants are now languishing in prison or dead. All this indicates a diminished macrothreat environment and a more manageable strategic security situation.

CONCLUSION

Please do not think I am being too optimistic here. I am not. Radical organizations such as FPI may be slowly realizing that politics and bombs do not mix but violent intimidation of so-called heretics and deviants by its associated "thugs" or the local mobs they help incite still goes on largely unabated.† The human security threat to religious minorities remains a major problem. Intimidation and attacks against local religious minorities and their places of worship is actually increasing as the strategic threat decreases. Groups such as FPI appear to be able to carry out their vigilante activities with relative impunity. The unwillingness of authorities to tackle this "gray area" between radicalism and outright terrorist activity or intervene for whatever political reasons is essentially allowing them to do as they please. It signals an increasing atmosphere of intolerance and a worrying failure of the state to uphold its human rights obligations to protect religious minorities.‡ The seeming legitimation of intolerance by regency and municipality authorities that pass bylaws banning certain religious sects feeds this growing concern. The worry is that this provides fertile conditions for incubating a transformation of intolerance and radical thinking into more homegrown forms of violence and terror.§

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* The return of Dulmatin (now deceased) from training in Mindanao heavily influenced this shift from indiscriminate terror to a more persistent insurgency. He questioned the effectiveness of suicide bombing as an operational tactic and became a strong advocate of a more coordinated coalition between organizations (*lintas tanzim*) in regard to activities and longer-term strategic goals. Part of his strategic agenda was to enforce Shari'a through jihad and promote the "correct" form of Islam by means of *dakwah*. The thinking being that inculcating community support for their aims would assist in the objective of establishing secure bases across different regions and these bases could then further consolidate the Islamist insurgent message and project.

† Having said this, FPI's chairman and founder, Habib Muhammad Riziek Syihab received a 1.5-year jail term in 2008 for inciting attacks against a gathering held by the National Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Belief in Jakarta that injured seventy demonstrators.

‡ Indonesia is a party (signed and ratified) to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966.

§ In 2012, *Densus 88* arrested 11 suspects accused of planning attacks on several high-profile targets. They were from a relatively new homegrown splinter group, *Hasmi* (the Sunni Movement for Indonesian Society). Even more recently, police arrested several terror suspects supposedly led by the Abu Hanifah cell. The latter also has links to the Abu Omar network that operated in Surakarta and Cirebon, West Java. They were allegedly plotting attacks against the Myanmar Embassy in Jakarta and several US targets in Java in response to the persecution of Rohingya in Burma.

Although the diminishing appeal and promotion of jihadi ideology is limited to the extreme fringes of Indonesian society, it does continue to metastasize in new ways especially among disaffected and impressionable youth who fall into the jihadist orbit via radical *dakwah* groups.[*] A lack of coordinated management of radical organizations, lax money transfer regulation and porous, notoriously difficult to patrol borders facilitate the spread. The movement of funds and personnel to vulnerable conflict prone areas are a less than challenging exercise. Whether the implementation of *Law No. 9/2013 on the Prevention and Eradication of Terrorism Financing* will stem these flows is still an open question. A pressing strategic threat could reemerge without a financially coordinated and genuine effort to deradicalize radical groupings and promote tolerance. As such, the management of security threats, both strategic and human, remains a priority with a continued commitment required to yield meaningful containment. While the Indonesian experience highlights the complex and interlinked character of strategic and human security, there are no simple categorizations or solutions.

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[*] There are multiple recruitment paths into Islamist militancy whether it be spiritual, intellectual, or kinship based. But the *dakwah* activities of jihadist groups and hardline clerics can often gain an initial surreptitious access to young Indonesians through former links with the wide and complex network of *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) that traverse Indonesia. These secretive jihadist groups can then lure students into joining exclusive prayer groups or religious discussions outside campuses, an entry point for potential radicalization. Stating this is not to implicate *pesantren* in the spread of a radical Islamist message as the vast majority of these institutions play vital socio-cultural, religious, and educational roles in Indonesian society. Given their embeddedness in the social fabric of Indonesia, those *pesantren* with long-established credentials are in many ways a bulwark against radicalism.

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9 Mali's Rebels

Making Sense of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad Insurgency

Stewart Tristan Webb

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INTRODUCTION

Mali has a long, protracted history of ethnic rebellion since the formation of the country in 1960. Mali, like many postcolonial states, became rife with ethnic conflict. Since gaining its independence, there have been four ethnic Tuareg rebellions vied for ethnic self-determination in the north of the West African country. Aside from ethnicity, the Tuaregs have a markedly different lifestyle than the rest of the country, which has further isolated group with increased primordial hatred. These primordial hatreds have endured the Post–Cold War and continue to today. The Tuaregs are a nomadic people and historically were renowned raiders, traders, and warriors (Keita, 1998, p. 7). The Tuaregs, being able to live in a desolate and rugged environment, have captured the romantic imagination of the West with their distinctive indigo-colored veils. They have captured the adoration of both the Libyan Colonel Gaddafi regime and Volkswagen, which named a sport utility vehicle (SUV) class after them.

There are approximately 1.3 million Tuaregs located in southern Algeria, southwest Libya, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger, and Mali (Cline, 2013, p. 617). The causes for the Tuareg rebellions include ethnic tensions between people from African and Arab descent, political exclusion, an imbalance in resource wealth, and environmental concerns from mining practices. The Tuaregs have stalwartly attempted to remain as nomadic pastoralists, but Mali and Niger have restricted their mobility to do so (Kisangani, 2012, p. 67). The Malian government after several rebellions decided that a negotiated settlement was in order. The promise of increased development and better conditions was unmet. Inadequate socioeconomic circumstances have forced the Tuaregs to rely on cigarette, fuel, and weapon smuggling to maintain their nomadic lifestyle (Cline, 2013, p. 618).

The insurgencies have also been fuelled by severe droughts and inadequate dispersal of wealth and development.

The most recent rebellion of 2012–13 was the most significant for the region as it was fuelled by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air campaign in neighboring Libya in 2011. Gaddafi's regime welcomed the integration of the Tuareg people into the Islamic Legion (also referred to as the Islamic Pan-African Legion) in the 1980s. Many Tuaregs returned to Mali with weaponry and expertise after the fall of the Gaddafi regime. Unlike the previous rebellions, this one was formed with an alliance between the secular, ethnic Tuareg group—the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA)—and several Islamist groups, which prompted a greater international role in the conflict. The most recent rebellion prompted French and African Union (AU) intervention. At first, France did not want to intervene, but was coerced into doing so once the Islamists had successfully hijacked the rebellion. The likelihood of another rebellion in Mali is almost a certainty at this time. In addition to this, it will also prompt another international response.

THE CREATION OF MALI AND THE ORIGINS OF AZAWAD

Tuareg resistance first rose after French forces claimed Timbuktu in 1893. This resistance sporadically continued until the end of the Kaocen Revolt in 1917 (Soloman, 2013, p. 12). French forces crushed these revolts (Kisangani, 2012, p. 69). During the French colonial period, the French maintained the historical tradition of the Tuareg supremacy over the Black African ethnic groups and even encouraged the hierarchical ethnic system under the "divide and rule" method of colonialism (Kisangani, 2012, p. 69). The Tuaregs believed their nomadic lifestyle was superior to the sedentary lifestyle of those in the south (Soloman, 2013, p. 13). Those in the south reciprocate the north–south divide, as many Malians viewed the Tuaregs as "a bunch of white, feudal, racist, pro-slavery, bellicose, and savage nomadic people" (Kisangani, 2012, p. 13). The Tuareg people believed that they had land-ownership taxed farmers in the region in the form of agricultural subsistence (Keita, 1998, p. 8). The French were unable to assimilate the majority of the Tuaregs and allowed them to continue with their historical lifestyle.

After the end of the Second World War, there were numerous uprisings against French colonial rule in Madagascar, Indochina, and Algeria. During the 1950s, there was a greater call for the French to dissolve its colonies as the British had. The Tuareg desire of an independent state, or *Azawad*, emerged and called for the autonomous state to be located in what are now northern Mali, northern Niger, and southern Algeria (Cline, 2013, p. 618). Unfortunately, there was no cohesive voice among the Tuareg people at this time and the autonomous Tuareg state was merely just a whisper in the desert.

After gaining independence, Mali found itself with very little economic prospects and with a civil service too large than it was able to afford (Keita, 1998, pp. 3–4). It is apparent that the French did not know about the gold wealth in Mali or the uranium deposits in Niger, as there was no mention of this in any French statement of long-term economic goals (Kisangani, 2012, p. 70). When Mali and Niger gained independence, they were two of the poorest countries in West Africa (Kisangani, 2012, p. 70). Mali's first leader, Modibo Keita, attempted to reform the country through socialism and sought to garner favor with the Eastern Bloc (Keita, 1998, p. 4). Tensions rose between the new regional governments and the Tuaregs almost immediately. Tuareg agricultural taxation on farmers in West Africa was seen as extortion as the governments believed that those who worked the lands owned them (Keita, 1998, p. 9). Agricultural land reforms that were announced threatened their privileged status. Accordingly, many Tuaregs believed that the government was trying to destroy their culture in the name of modernization.

The First Tuareg Rebellion in 1962 began with small hit-and-run raids and escalated in both size and destructiveness until 1963 (Keita, 1998, p. 10). The rebellion itself was hindered because the combatants used camels and older small arms. Moreover, the Tuareg population as a whole did not organize under a unified movement. It has been estimated that the insurgents never numbered

more than 1500 (Keita, 1998, p. 10). The economic reforms were not successful. In 1968, Keita was ousted by a military coup led by Lieutenant Moussa Traore. Traore sought assistance with the West and undertook free-market reforms. However, development was not even across the country and was not able to provide employment for a country that was experiencing a high birth rate (Keita, 1998, p. 4). Northern Mali was placed under a repressive military administration and many of the Tuaregs fled to neighboring countries. The government announced development projects but few were actually implemented owing to a lack of funds.

THE SECOND TUAREG REBELLION

Conditions worsened as the region was devastated by a drought between 1968 and 1974 and again in 1980 and 1985. These droughts led to the devastation of the nomadic people's livestock and forced many of them to seek refuge in camps (Keita, 1998, p. 12). This also forced many of the Tuareg people again to seek refuge in neighboring countries. Since the 1960s, many Tuaregs eventually found themselves in Libya. Gaddafi's regime welcomed the Tuareg people and their nomadic lifestyle, and he portrayed them as "Lords of the Desert" (Rohen, 2013, p. 546). The lucrative booming oil industry in Libya proved to be a source of work for many Tuaregs. In 1985, oil prices collapsed globally. Libya was no exception. Collapse of the oil industry in Libya resulted in a large part of its workforce being laid-off (Rohen, 2013, p. 13). Many unemployed workers returned to their homeland. However, the Tuaregs of northern Mali returned to find their homeland devastated by severe drought and little-to-no improvements having been made to the country's overall infrastructure.

Other Tuaregs found themselves in Colonel Gaddafi's regular army and in his Libyan-sponsored "Islamic Legion." In fact, the Tuaregs found themselves to be an integral part of Gaddafi's military and security establishment during his regime (Rohen, 2013, p. 545). During the late-1980s, the Libyan-funded Islamic Legion was dissolved. This led to its fighters returning to their home regions (Rohen, 2013, p. 545). The withdrawal of Soviet forces in Afghanistan also was a factor in the return of fighters. It is not surprising that when the Tuaregs from the Libya's armed forces or from the oil fields returned they received absolutely no government assistance (Kisangani, 2012, p. 71).

When the rebellion broke-out, many communities—both Tuareg and non-Tuareg—did not support it (Keita, 1998, p. 15). The Malian government declared a state of emergency and attempted to bring the rebellion down with force. The rebellion utilized small units composed of less than 15 insurgents that conducted raids on government and civilian installations (Keita, 1998, p. 15). This tactic proved to be so effective that government forces were unable quell the low-level insurgency. The Tuaregs are well known for their raiding abilities. They successfully adopted and subsequently employed hit-and-run tactics with small units rather than engaging in large-scale operations. The rebellion proved to be successful in forcing the government to undertake a political response instead of military action alone.

The successes of the low-level insurgency forced Malian President Traore to recognize that a negotiated settlement would be needed to end hostilities. On January 6, 1991, the Accords of Tamanrasset was signed between Tuareg leaders, and Malian government and military officials. The agreement attempted to build Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBM). It proposed that there would be a disengagement of military from the civilian administration in the north, an integration of Tuareg combatants into the Malian military, a reduction of a Malian military presence in the north, and a guaranteed 47.3% investment in the north from Mali's development fund.

The agreement recognized the need for improved socioeconomic conditions to deter further revolts. Aside from the increase in development funding, the integration of combatants into the Malian army aimed to reduce the problems associated with unemployed. By 1998, it is estimated that as many as 3000 Tuaregs were integrated into the Malian security forces (Keita, 1998, p. 18). The integration of Tuaregs into the government security forces was undertaken to establish trust between the north–south divide. Unfortunately, the mutiny in 1994, where newly integrated Tuaregs turned their guns onto their fellow soldiers, set back the process. The Malian government was able

to rebound after this tragedy. The mutiny reestablished the prejudices the south has toward the Tuaregs. To overcome the belief that Tuareg soldiers were untrustworthy, the Red Cross and other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were invited to help assist with training that concentrated on "professional ethics, respect for human rights, laws of land warfare, and the role of the military in democratic societies" (Keita, 1998, p. 22).

The Malian Army did, however, make reoccurring consultations with Tuareg leaders a priority. These consultations were convened; so both parties could voice their concerns and address their needs through mediation. The Malian Army also became involved in providing humanitarian assistance to northern communities in need by providing foodstuffs and even medical assistance (Keita, 1998, p. 21–2). Following the Accords of Tamanrasset, the Tuareg rebellion splintered in various rebel groups with proponents and opponents of the agreement forming separate groups. This naturally caused intra-Tuareg infighting by 1994.

THE THIRD TUAREG REBELLION

The Third Tuareg Rebellion between 2007 and 2009 took place in both Mali and Niger. Violence erupted in Niger with the Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice (MNJ). The MNJ was primarily a Tuareg movement but was composed of other ethnicities as well. The cause of the rebellion was the desertification of the region, which greatly threatened their livelihoods (Sehmer and Welsh, 2008). The MNJ wanted a share of the uranium wealth, the end of alleged pollution from the mining practices, and more economic development. The conflict transcended the Mali-Niger border and sparked revolt again with Malian Tuaregs. Despite the Accords of Tamanrasset, there was little economic improvement in northern Mali. According to United States Aid (USAID) figures in 2004, the average poverty rate of Timbuktu was 77%; Gao was 78.7%, and Kidal was 92% (Soloman, 2013, p. 13). After the 2009 rebellion was suppressed, many Tuareg fighters sought refuge in Libya and integrated themselves into Gaddafi's military (Shaw, 2013, p. 203). The relationship between the Tuaregs and the Gaddafi regime proved to be instrumental in the Second Tuareg Rebellion and again in the aftermath of NATO's Libya campaign.

THE FOURTH TUAREG REBELLION

On November 16, 2011, the MNLA was established (MNLA, 2011). This coincided with the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime in Libya. It has been widely acknowledged that many Tuareg fighters returned from Libya after the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime. Libya has been a country of sanctuary for the ethnic Tuaregs for many decades. Many Tuaregs found employment in the oil industry and within the Libyan armed forces, including the Islamic Legion. However, when Colonel Gaddafi was overthrown, many of Tuaregs returned back to their home countries.

The security situation in Libya deteriorated, as there was no easy transfer of power from the Gaddafi regime to the Libyan Opposition Movement. The Libyan Opposition Movement, itself, splintered into various groups and militias after the regime change. The NATO campaign was limited to air operations; therefore, there was no international assistance force to oversee the transition and provide an on the ground security presence to limit the chaotic spread of instability. With the steady stream of refugees from Libya, an influx of weaponry and expertise followed. The UN noted that neighboring countries found that, "rocket propelled grenades, machine guns with anti-aircraft visors, automatic rifles, ammunition, grenades, explosives (Semtex), and light anti-aircraft artillery (light caliber bi-tubes) mounted on vehicles" were being smuggled (United Nations Security Council [UNSC], 2012, p. 10). On top of that was the human refugee aspect, again according to UN figures, approximately 420,000 people were displaced in the Libyan conflict and approximately 30,000 returned to Mali during the conflict (UNSC, 2012, p. 6). Malian officials told the UN that they were entering into dialogue with armed refugees for them to hand over their weapons voluntarily (UNSC, 2012, p. 10).

Naturally, the majority of the weapons were not turned over voluntarily. The Touré regime in Mali proved to be corrupt and reneged on its side of the Accords, which further alienated the Tuareg people. In 2010, government officials stole $4 million slated to combat acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), malaria, and tuberculosis (Soloman, 2013, p. 14). The government's development agency disbursed little of the international donor money to the north as well; instead, the Touré government used what little funds it distributed to the north to coopt northern elites (Soloman, 2013, p. 14).

Previous Tuareg rebellions proved not to be unified. The new MNLA allied itself with other organizations in order to gain access to the number of insurgents and weaponry needed for an uprising. Extremist Islamist groups that had Tuareg representation were greatly welcomed. The MNLA found allies in al-Qaeda (AQ) in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM), and splinter groups such as Ansar al-Dine (AAD) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). Iyad Ag Ghali, the current leader and founder of AAD, was a former legionary and fellow Malian Tuareg. Approximately 1000 of his insurgents were also fellow legionaries (Kisangani, 2012, p. 72).

AAD, a Salafi-based group whose name means "Defenders of the Faith" (Shaw, 2013, p. 202), was formed in November 2011 (Berkley Center, 2013). The group has operated regionally and entered into peace negotiations with Burkina Faso and Algeria in November 2012, but the negotiations and ceasefire broke down in January 2013 (Berkley Center, 2013). Because the group was founded by Malian Tuareg, AAD enjoyed the benefits of having been seen as a highly legitimate group in Mali. It was also a group that had a large number of insurgents, weaponry, and expertise, which made it a very tempting group to ally with for the MNLA. It was originally hoped that because AAD was led by a Malian Tuareg that the mutual goal of a free Azawad could be achieved and the role of Islam could be negotiated at a later date.

MUJAO is a splinter group from AQIM (UNSC, 2013). The group has claimed responsibility for abductions in Algeria and for drug trafficking in the region. The reasons for the group breaking from AQIM purportedly originated with the distribution of money gained from the trafficking of narcotics as well as ransoms (UNSC, 2013). Founded in 2007, AQIM was an offshoot of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) that was based in Algeria (Rohen, 2013, p. 551). The group shifted its focus from Algeria to the greater Sahel region in 2006. It was this time that GSPC received a blessing from AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahri and transitioned into AQ in the Islamic Maghreb. AQIM was able to increase its presence across many borders in the region.

These developments did not go unnoticed in the Colonel Gaddafi regime and became concerned about the rise of extremist Islamist groups in the region. In 2006, Libya opened a consulate in the city of Kidal that was to assist with economic development. The Libyan presence was aimed at combating terrorism and complied with the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) that was launched by the United States in 2005 (Rohen, 2013, p. 552). Colonel Gaddafi's involvement in Mali generated a deep sense of distrust among Malian military ranks. In 2009, President Touré allowed Gaddafi to meet with Tuareg rebels without any official Malian government presence (Soloman, 2013, p. 15). It was well known that Gaddafi was supporting the Tuareg rebellions. According to Soloman (2013, p. 15), this caused rumors of a secret deal between Touré and Gaddafi over the future of northern Mali.

In January 2012, Tuareg fighters launched an offensive against Malian government forces (*Al Jazeera*, 2012). When fighting began, Malian government forces conducted house-by-house searches and arrested in several towns for Tuareg tribal sheiks (*Al Jazeera*, 2012). The insurgent coalition, however, failed to take over the country in one quick sweep. After securing the northern part of the country the group halted its movement though many had expected the coalition to immediately push on to the populous southern regions of the country (International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 2013, p. 2). Reasons for this are still unknown, but it is speculated that the coalition delayed pressing on, as they may have wanted to consolidate their control over the territories they had taken or that they were simply regrouping their forces. The occurrence of internal struggles is one possible reason for the pause. The original goal of the MNLA was to form its Azawad—to be composed of Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu (Rohen, 2013, p. 545).

On March 22, 2012, a coup led by Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo successfully removed President Touré from power. The insurgents then consolidated their gains during and declared an independent Azawad only several weeks later on April 6, 2012. The military was already suspicious that Touré and Gaddafi struck a deal concerning northern Mali and the Tuaregs. The Malian government was unable to provide the heavy weaponry and logistical support for the defense against the new insurgent coalition. Unable to mount a counteroffensive, the Malian military protested. In May 2012, the MNLA and AAD signed an agreement that a transitional council would be formed to govern over the Islamic State of Awazad (Soloman, 2013, p. 15–6). AAD's position was strengthened with the introduction of AQIM and MUJAO in the conflict. Soon after Malian troops retreated from their northern positions, infighting between the secular MNLA and the Islamists erupted.

Negotiations between the MNLA and AAD quickly collapsed. The breakdown in talks was principally the result of AAD's rather uncompromising demand that the new state was to be governed under Sharia law, which was introduced when AAD began to dominate the overall insurgency. Sufi shrines were deemed idolatrous. Smoking and music were banned, the Qur'an was introduced into the school system, and other Sharia law measures were introduced. Northern Mali became a safe haven for foreign jihadists (Roggio, 2012). The Western media began describing Mali as the next "Afghanistan" and the Islamists were being compared to the Afghan Taliban in 1993–94. There were sightings of foreign jihadists in northern Mali who had traveled from other countries. Most of the new foreign insurgents were from neighboring West African countries, but some are thought to have come from as far away as Pakistan (Roggio, 2012). It became clearly visible in January 2013 that Malian and regional African forces were unable to turn the insurgent tide. Consequently, French intervention was required.

REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION

The UNSC gave its support for regional intervention with Resolution 2085 on October 12, 2012. The intervention was composed of willing members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). A total of 3300 West African troops were deployed in November that year. As ECOWAS troops were in the midst of organizing and consolidating Malian territory, the Islamists, having overthrown the rebellion, undertook an offensive that captured the town of Konna. This put the strategic airport at Sevare under threat and exposed the vulnerability of the capital of Bamako. In January 2013, France's President François Hollande announced the deployment of French forces to Mali to assist African regional troops and Malian government forces. Interestingly, French intervention was prompted only after the insurgent coalition began to advance significantly toward the Malian capital. At that stage, despite reluctance to deploy military forces and what had appeared to be somewhat of a languid approach to the situation, France deployed some 2400 troops across the country in a matter of days (Soloman, 2013, p. 17). Following France's intervention, regional countries pledged and deployed additional troops to Mali.

France was able to muster international support for its operation, codenamed SERVAL. The European Union (EU) conducted a mission to train and reorganize Malian armed forces. There was also an initiative to resupply Malian government forces with weaponry and ammunition sufficient to sustain its own positions during the course of the conflict. "Live fire" exercises, conducted by Malian troops, succeeded in attracting a healthy dose of media attention. In reality, Malian troops were actually simulating the sounds of their weapons because the government was unable to afford the necessary ammunition. An international fund to provide financial support for military and humanitarian assistance was established at a conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia shortly after the French intervention on January 29 (African Union [AU], 2013).

France did not have strategic airlift capability, and was limited to C-130H Hercules and the C-160 (IISS, 2013). Canada and the United Kingdom (UK) contributed a total of three C-17 Globemasters to fulfill this role and allowed for the deployment of the French Véhicule Blindé de Combat d'Infanterie (VBCI) infantry combat vehicles and the resupply of French and AU forces.

The deployment of the VBCI was a logical choice given that its steel or titanium panels are bolted on top of the all-welded aluminum hull armor providing improved ballistic and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) protection. With AQIM in the Malian theater, it was difficult to ascertain whether the insurgents would rely on IEDs to inflict casualties on French and ECOWAS forces or use operate closer to the realm of regular warfare and its tactics.

The United States aided France with intelligence support. Many media reports indicate that the United States also provided unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) (IISS, 2013). France's allies were hesitant to provide troops for frontline duty in Mali, as public opinion was largely negative of such a measure. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had severely eroded public support for any direct kinetic support. The French response was typical of a CT operation. French forces concentrated on Islamist insurgent positions. Later during the conflict, French and Malian forces conducted sweeps to uproot Islamist fighters from their hideouts and positions. Although the decision to undertake CT operations has opened the door for much criticism, a general COIN operation would have taken far more resources and certainly more time. Understandably, French and ECOWAS troops were not in prime position to undertake COIN operations for several reasons. First, their trust with the local population had yet to be forged. Second, neither the French nor ECOWAS had encouraged political and economic stimulus. In the end, France opted for a light-footprint for Operation SERVAL. France deployed its medium-weight VBCI and light Gazelle attack helicopters. Additionally, the country's Leclerc Main Battle Tanks were put on standby for deployment if heavier direct fire support was deemed necessary. France deployed its heavier armored Cobra helicopters only after one of its Gazelles helicopters was brought down by Islamist insurgent ground fire (Ministère de la Défense, 2013).

MNLA leadership quickly took advantage of French intervention. The Islamist hold over the north was quickly eroding within weeks because of the targeted airstrikes, which routed the Islamist coalition threat from Bamako. The MNLA took full advantage of the situation during the confusion. The MNLA was able to reestablish is positions in Kidal. French forces remained in the country to eliminate the threat of the Islamist insurgency in the countryside and in the mountainous northern region. ECOWAS troops assisted French forces with this task; however, some ECOWAS troops were also tasked with creating a barrier between Malian government troops and MNLA-held positions. French forces were more concerned with CT operations against suspected Islamist strongholds in the mountainous region of Mali. This seemed to be an effortless transition for both the French and ECOWAS contingents. Elements of the MNLA were concerned that human rights abuses and atrocities sparked by revenge would occur if government forces were able to retake their positions. This also allowed the MNLA to hold some of their key positions and offered incentive for a negotiated settlement. The MNLA were able to maintain a certain level of strength at the negotiation table because of their territorial held positions. There was no action against MNLA controlled towns and cities and ECOWAS created a buffer zone between Malian government forces. These became de facto MNLA strongholds.

FUTURE TUAREG REBELLIONS

The potential for another Tuareg Rebellion in Mali is high. At the time of writing this, there has been no negotiated settlement between the MNLA and the government that remotely resembles the Accords of Tamanrasset. The MNLA still hold positions in northern Mali; however, there are indications that the internal cohesion of the MNLA is quickly eroding. According to some reports, there is an internal struggle within the Tuareg movement, led by Ibrahim Ag Assaleh, who wants a renewed Tuareg movement (Journal du Mali, 2014).

Assaleh, a former senior official for the MNLA, has recently established a new politico-military Tuareg movement—le Coalition du Peuple pour l'Azawad (CPA), although it is too early to tell whether the movement will gain any traction or not. However, given that a senior official from the MNLA has started a new splinter movement for a free Azawad indicates that the internal struggle

within the MNLA is greater than previously believed. Assaleh would not have created his own movement without dissident support from within the MNLA. According to Assahel, he has gained support from senior officials from the MNLA and other groups. Assaleh asserts that he will weigh in on the negotiations with the government (Roger, 2014).

During the Second Tuareg Rebellion, the movement for a free Azawad splintered into various groups with the Accords of Tamanrasset. Parallels could be drawn with the creation of le CPA and the aftermath of the Second Tuareg Rebellion. The government and the MNLA may not be able to come to a negotiated settlement that would be accepted by all the Tuaregs. The fracturing of the MNLA organization before a settlement has been agreed upon demonstrates that the MNLA does not represent the opinions of all of its members. The protracted history of the Tuareg rebellion and the government's performance for socioeconomic development in the north already creates the atmosphere of mistrust for both parties. Both the MNLA and the Haut Conseil pour l'unité de l'Azawad (HCUA) have pledged to relinquish its armaments to ease into a peaceful transition process (UNSC, 2014, p. 2).

The poor track record of the Malian government in the south has ostracized the Tuaregs in the north. The Accords set out that the government was to devote a significant amount to the north from its development fund. Unfortunately, those funds were used to coopt support through extortion. Corruption also eroded the funds and jeopardized the health and welfare of the population. It is understandable why many Tuaregs continue to mistrust the government's actions and legitimacy. The lack of development in the north and the vulnerability of the population to severe droughts do not improve the situation at all.

Severe and prolonged droughts have been a catalyst for Tuareg uprisings in the past. Climate change predictions for the country show that the temperature for the north will increase and the rainfall will decrease. The UN Development Program (UNDP) predicts that the mean temperature in Mali will rise 1.2–3.6° Celsius by the 2060s (McSweeney et al., 2014, p. 3). Rainfall in northern Mali will diminish further (McSweeney et al., 2014, p. 3). With increases in temperature and decrease rainfall will mean that further droughts will become more likely. Given that droughts have been a catalyst for Tuareg Rebellions since Mali postcolonial secession, additional rebellions are also more likely.

Militant Islamic extremism has taken root in northern Mali regardless of the best French intentions. Operational SERVAL concentrated on the elimination of Mali turning into a safe haven for militant Islamic extremism. The close geographical proximity of both France and an already destabilized region forced French intervention. French and AU troops conducted sweeps of the country to root out Islamic extremists from the Malian population. Even though the population in the north was unwelcoming of strict Sharia law being imposed on them, the Islamist threat is reemerging. French forces are beginning to withdrawal from the country and some extremist groups are reemerging. AQIM has returned and is conducting retribution killings for those who assisted French forces in Operational SERVAL, including members of the MNLA (Follorou, 2014). AAD fighters have maintained a low profile and evaded French sweeps. In at least one instance informed townsfolk that their activities would increase over time (Follorou, 2014). France pledged to keep 1000 troops in the country without a withdrawal timetable (*British Broadcasting Corporation* [BBC], 2013). French forces will have to work on increasing the capability of Malian and AU forces and provide force multipliers, such as real-time surveillance and air support, to further increase their effectiveness with an increasing Islamic extremist presence in the country as their numbers replenish.

Another hindrance to the immediate peace process is the combination of AAD's revenge killings and MNLA disarmament. If the revenge killings increase, many MNLA insurgents will be discouraged to hand in their arms, which will hinder the peace process and possibly further erode the control of the MNLA leadership and may splinter the group further. It is a possibility that rogue elements of the MNLA will create splinter groups when the MNLA's policies for the peace process are hindered by the efforts of AAD. Malian government forces could attempt to fulfill the security need and target AAD and other Islamic groups to create CSBMs with the MNLA. However, given

the fragility of the peace process and the protracted combative history, any failure will further hinder the peace process. Elements of the MNLA may suggest that the government is purposefully acting ineptly because of revenge motive. This will also put pressure on French and AU forces in the country, as they will have to fulfill the security gap and additional deployments.

CONCLUSION

Unfortunately the overall future for a peaceful Mali is grim. Climate change is predicted to ravage the country with further, and possibly harsher, droughts. Northern Mali remains fundamentally undeveloped and the Tuareg people have relented from diverting from their traditional nomadic roots. Poor socioeconomic conditions and a rampant poverty ratio will drive the Tuareg population to another insurgency. The violence in the last rebellion was amplified by the fact that many Tuaregs returned with armaments from the Libyan revolt and in some cases brought their military training and expertise. Unfortunately, this has not disappeared. The last rebellion provided insurgency experience for many Tuaregs and there has been little effort to disarm them. Militant Islamists are returning to Mali, or at least coming back out of the woodwork, even though French and AU forces attempted to eradicate the threat. Through recruitment and financing, the militant Islamist groups, such as AQIM, AAD, and Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa or l'Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO), will make a reinvigorated resurgence that will be the greatest threat to Mali and the region has ever faced. Without concentrated effort by the Malian government, as well as regional and international actors, a fifth Tuareg rebellion within the next two decades is inevitable.

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10 Crossroads
Tracing the Historical Roots of Modern Insurgency in the Caucasus

Chris Murray

CONTENTS

> Guerrilla war is a kind of war waged by the few but dependent on the support of many.

—B. H. Liddell Hart

INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 2009, Russia officially declared an end to their Chechen counterterrorism (CT) operations (Schaefer, 2011, p. 217). At that time, a century's old conflict rooted deep in a shared past had been raging with only sporadic respites for over 15 years. The relative calm that the Russians

claimed prevailed in the area had critics in the Western media and within the US state department believing the conflict was perhaps finally at an end (Schaefer, 2011, p. 1). At the time of the Russian declaration it is easy to understand why this view would be accepted. Since 2006, there had been a noticeable decline in violence relative to the regional norms. In the months and years since this declaration, however, its emptiness, a standard feature of Russian claims regarding Chechnya, has been laid bare. Once again violence, religious fanaticism, and regional instability are rapidly on the rise.

So what happened? The reality is the claims of calm were never anything more than a mix of propaganda and wishful thinking rooted in a narrow and deeply misguided understanding of the situation. Even as Russia declared victory over the "bandits" and "terrorists" in Chechnya, violence within the rest of the North Caucasus was sharply increasing (Schaefer, 2011, p. 250). The important point missed by most, especially by the Russians, was that violence in the North Caucasus was not simply terrorism or banditry, it was and remains, an insurgency (Schaefer, 2011, p. 1). Through this view, the Russian "victory" over terrorism was in fact nothing more than a lull in activity as this insurgency reorganized (Schaefer, 2011, p. 239).

Despite claims of victory, sanctions against nongovernmental organization (NGOs) that were markedly increased by the Russian government in 2008 have yet to be lifted and a tight seal remains on the information coming out of the Caucasus. Since the spring of 2009 and the official "end" of CT operations, government intimidation, abductions, and repressions have all increased, only further fuelling the cycle of violence and swelling the numbers of insurgent groups. Despite the official calm, Moscow continues to maintain a large federal presence in the north Caucasus in an attempt to maintain control and counter the growing threat of organized insurgency (Schaefer, 2011, pp. 265–68).

This violence and instability has slowly spread outward from Chechnya and has engulfed the entire North Caucasus. However, to think of this violence as being Chechen in origin would be an error. This has been an error in the Russian approach to the situation. An unwillingness or inability to view the violence across the region as being related has been cause for poor policy and costly, often bloody, mistakes. Russia's refusal to recognize this increase in violence as part of a larger reorganization of a North Caucasus insurgency is politically motivated with direct and very real repercussions. Failure to address the insurgency the Russians face, for what it is, has left them to deal with a much more developed and wide spread movement less connected to ethnicity or nationalism than it is with the ideal of creating a pan-Islamic state. Make no mistake, the situation in the North Caucasus is no longer a Chechen one; it is a regional Islamic insurgency. The North Caucasus is on fire and it is Russia that lit the match (Schaefer, 2011, p. 239).

A DIVIDED HOUSE: BACKGROUND

The issue of identity in the North Caucasus reemerged and came to the forefront of political discourse in the era of perestroika of the late 1980s under Gorbachev. Tension in the Caucasus over ethnic, national, and religious identity has been steadily increasing since that period (Shlapentokh, 2008). The collapse of the Soviet Union left not only a power vacuum in the Caucasus but also an ideological and identity vacuum. The reemergence of ethnic and religious identities, and the struggle to define their boundaries is a core element of the current conflict (Hughes, 2012, p. 1).

Over the course of its history, the Caucasus has marked the boundaries of civilizations, states, and empires, but perhaps more significantly, religions. Its peoples are rooted in the traditions, languages, cultures, and religions of this conflicted experience, and the centuries of status as a peripheral borderland have contributed to a fragmented and multifaceted identity. The need to define power structures, create cohesion, and find legitimacy in this diverse region has posed a major challenge. Neither nationalism nor Islam alone was able to provide it. Nationalism is naturally divisive, and in the multiethnic Caucasus, it created concern among fledgling potential leadership (Dadabaev, 2013, p. 1030). Islam, however, is far from a unified force in this region. This mix of conflicting ethnic and religious definitions of identity, and the almost impossible struggle to carve

out a legitimate identity, from which a unified power structure can emerge, has been the blight of the North Caucasus struggle (Gammer, 2005, pp. 835–6).

The Caucasus is arguably one of the most linguistically and culturally diverse places in the world. In a region roughly the size of Greece, there exist no less than 50 nationalities with three different language families (Badenkov, 1998, p. 364). In Dagestan alone, a country of less than three million people and smaller than Croatia, there are more than 30 languages spoken and more than 14 different ethnic groups (Gammer, 2005, p. 834). The diversity of this region permeates its religion as well. To describe this region as predominately Muslim would be deceptively simplistic. There remains a large orthodox Christian population as well. Islam itself is also further divided, including such a diverse array of branches and sects to leave even those intimately familiar with Islam struggling. Islam, however, has become a central point in framing the current issues in the region and is perhaps the least understood.

Putting aside rhetoric and spin, religion is an integral part of identity in the Caucasus. Islam helps to frame everything from outlook to discussion, from motivation to action. The *Vainakh* (Chechen and Ingush) have been fighting religious wars against the Russians on a regular basis since the late eighteenth century. Every time that the Chechens have declared war on Russia, Islam has been an element within the ideology at the core of the conflict. It has been used to unite the region's people while reaching out from beyond the mountains for support from neighboring Muslim states (Schaefer, 2011, p. 148).

The level to which religion plays a role in the continuing conflict is widely debated, the reason is that culture is fluid and religion's prevalence rises and falls with the ebb and flow of time. There is no debate, however, that even if religion does not represent the only or most significant feature of the conflict in the Caucasus, religion is a key element in defining identity (Schaefer, 2011, p. 148). Within the maelstrom of overlapping and conflicting struggles, it appears that the strongest opposition to outside regimes has traditionally come from within Islamic movements (Agadjanian, 2001, p. 479). For those movements whose leadership is not Islamic, there has traditionally been a need to secure at least the appearance of religious legitimization—a feature one can still see in today's conflict. Coopting Islam has been necessary in order to prevent its traditionally resistant nature being turned inward (Agadjanian, 2001, p. 479). Within this milieu, it is easy to grasp just how quickly any resistance movement toward an external power can become bogged down in internal conflict.

DEFINING IDENTITY

The twentieth century, especially the Soviet Union era, has posed an especially difficult challenge to the preservation of traditional culture in the Caucasus. Soviet Union collapse resulted in a search for a national cautiousness that became manifested, in part, through religion, and religion has become deeply entangled with ethnic identity (Agadjanian, 2001, pp. 481–2). Within the Caucasus, contests emerged over the meaning of "orthodox" and "traditional," as well as the legitimacy regarding competing interpretations of "faith." A strong and growing Islamization of the cultural landscape has been a feature that has reemerged in the wake of Soviet Union collapse, and truly come into its own with the end of the Chechen wars of the 1990s. In many ways, Islam has become the last solid recourse for a people with little else of their traditional identity left.

Major deficits have been caused from the internal diversity of the North Caucasus that has left the region susceptible to external incursion. Internal disputes have been a mainstay of Caucasian culture and have been a primary factor in often preventing the emergence of unified leadership. This lack of unified cooperation has left the region militarily weak in comparison with their relatively homogenous regional neighbors. A traditional military response to a conventional force structure such as the ones fielded by Russia in the Caucasus at several points over the last three centuries has often not been a viable option. Along with this, other regional factors such as indigenous disenfranchisement from foreign economic and power structures led to a peripheral existence resulting in the proliferation of banditry and widespread criminality. These factors, along with a geography that has

facilitated and promoted escape, evasion, and raiding, have all contributed to the development of a guerrilla tradition and a culture of insurgency within the Caucasus.

TIP AND RUN: INSURGENCY

As illustrated by the diverse chapters in this volume, insurgency is a type of war, unique in form. Despite being military in appearance, insurgency, more than any other form of war, is in fact a deeply political affair. It is a struggle for political power that is almost entirely dependent on the acquiescence of the local population through agreement or submission. Indeed, T. E. Lawrence (1920) went so far as to suggest that "rebellions can be made by 2% active in striking force and 98% passively sympathetic" populations (p. 22). As a result of this reality, if desired to be effective in the long term, the methods and operations of an insurgency or COIN must be population-centric and of political nature in design. If COIN operations are to be successful over the long term their aim must be to gain the acceptance of the population (Schaefer, 2011, pp. 9–10). There are two potential avenues to achieving this end. The first is through the use of force to compel the population's submission. The other alternative is to work toward winning over the "hearts and minds" of a population. These two tacks have very different approaches and require very different skill sets in order to reach their aim.

The ongoing conflict in the North Caucasus serves to emphasize a number of the fundamental principles of insurgent warfare. The rugged terrain and almost nonexistent infrastructure provides a favorable environment in which to engage in this type of warfare. Mountainous and densely forested regions allow guerrillas to ambush Russian forces that may dare venture into the region in search of the guerrillas. The lack of road networks limits available routes for transportation and logistics leaving Russian military convoys vulnerable to attack. This limited network of roads also allows easy opportunity for insurgents to create chokepoints and control access to the various regions of the North Caucasus. Jagged mountains that leave aircraft vulnerable to attack from small mobile antiaircraft weapons such as shoulder-mounted surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) negate modern technological advantage such as helicopters and close-attack aircraft (Kramer, 2005, pp. 255–6).

IDEAL CONDITIONS: CHECHNYA

Controlling the mountainous southern border of Chechnya has proved extremely difficult for Russia and its forces. For over two centuries, Chechnya had been synonymous in Russian military lexicon to guerrilla warfare. Chechnya's difficult mountainous terrain is perfect for conducting a guerrilla campaign. Beyond geography the social structures of the North Caucasus are also ideal for waging and sustaining a guerrilla campaign. These societies are already a culture of cellular organization centered on clan and family with a high value placed on independent action and loyalty—traits paramount for insurgency (Schaefer, 2011, p. 73). Understanding just how many players are on the ground and how many factors are involved in defining identity in this region is incredibly important in ensuring that one grasps the complexity of the current conflict. The current situation is multilayered and multifaceted.

Owing to the geopolitical position of the North Caucasus, it is hardly surprising that it has been a hot bed of conflict for most of recorded history. Caught at the terminus of three empires, the North Caucasus would be fought over for nearly 400 years by Russian, Ottoman, and Persian empires, all of which have been led by leaders eager to lay claim to its mountain passes (Schaefer, 2011, p. 51). In this long history of conflict, a reemerging feature has been Russian programs aimed at displacing, often by forcible resettlement programs, large portions of the local population. Large migrations of diaspora have been a common theme since the Caucasian War of 1817–1864. These mass migrations were a death sentence to many and created a historical culture of resentment toward Russia. Another factor to this ethnic mobility has been the determination of these people in their desire to return to their ancestral lands. The fallout of the Chechen wars of the 1990s and the continued Russian pressure for security in the region has caused a shift in the nature of conflict and political discourse

in the region. The 1990s were unique in the Caucasus as one of the few moments in recent history when resistance had been framed in terms of nationalism rather than religion (Fahoum, 2008, p. 4).

THE IDEAL BREEDING GROUND: CHAOS

The Chechen wars of the 1990s were relatively short, but incredibly brutal affairs that held devastating consequences for the region. The end of the decade saw any remnant of national identity or nationalist movement in Chechnya on the brink of obliteration (Ratelle, 2013, p. 321). What little infrastructure there had been was all but destroyed. The carpet-bombing of Grozny had left the capital virtually uninhabitable lacking water, electricity, and natural gas for heat (Kramer, 2005, p. 210). It is difficult to determine the exact extent of impact that this held for the region's population. The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) is much more difficult to ascertain than that of refugees who fled the country. That said, in the first month of the second Chechen war alone over 100,000 Chechens had fled to neighboring Ingushetia (Schaefer, 2011, p. 187). The methods utilized by the Russian forces during the wars involved major human rights violations, such as the targeting and "disappearances" (*zachistki*), of civilians and human rights workers. This "counterterrorism" campaign, as the Russian government euphemistically referred to it, only served to further dissolve what social network remained in Chechnya (Schaefer, 2011, p. 4). The lack of coherent leadership compounded the ideological vacuum. With traditional cultural and ethnic ties severely weakened, and clans and families displaced, and the search for identity desperate, the only stable identity that these people had to fall back on was Islam.

THE LAST BASTION OF IDENTITY: ISLAM AS A POLITICAL FORCE

Islam as a motivating force has been steadily rising in prominence since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite Soviet Union efforts to eliminate the influence of religion, the impact of Soviet Union repression and forced migration had the reverse effect in Chechen society. By placing Chechens on the periphery of society in their own lands, the Soviets only strengthened Islam's influence by driving the population toward religion, their only remaining recourse (Schaefer, 2011, p. 107). Islam proved to be an effective tool for social mobilization after the Soviet Union collapsed. The religion became politicized, resulting in its increasing influence in social and ethnic definitions. For these reasons, religion played a crucial role in supporting early Chechen resistance and in maintaining a sense of identity (Smith, 2006, p. 154). Tensions between nationalists and Islamic insurgents increased during the Chechen wars. After the first Chechen war and the establishment of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI), attempts were made at coopting Islam. This only served to strengthen Islamic prominence and did nothing to ease these tensions (Gammer, 2005, pp. 840–1). At the onset of the second Chechen war, jihadists occupied a chief position in the political discourse within Chechnya (Shlapentokh, 2008). While nonreligious movements, such as those headed by Chechen nationalists, struggled to achieve legitimacy, religious groups such as those of the jihadists held the advantage of almost immediate and unquestioned legitimacy. The promotion of Shari'a was simple, direct, designed by Allah, and therefore held immediate legitimacy over all other leadership, which was argued to be blasphemous (Schaefer, 2011, p. 155). In Chechnya the transition from nationalist to Islamic leadership became a straightforward one. Islam was already regarded as a principal component of Chechen identity and the ChRI had become couched in religious terms (Gammer, 2005, p. 835).

The increased international attention aimed at the North Caucasus due to the Chechen wars of the 1990s also brought with it increased support from international jihadists. Foreign fighters, which had not been a significant force in the first Chechen war, had become a visible element in the second Chechen war (Vidino, 2005). Increased opportunities for travel in the region (during the 1990s) also contributed to a shift in the region's particular interpretation of Islam (Ratelle, 2013, p. 43). Increased interaction with North Caucasus diasporas, foreign madrassas, and radical Islam

undermined local Islamic leadership, resulting in the opening of the region to the influence of fundamentalist Islam (Ware et al., 2003, p. 289). With this increase in outside influence, conflict and persisting tension with Russia, the violence and upheaval of Chechen society, and the poor showing of ChRI's ability to govern all helped to radicalize Chechen guerrillas (Kramer, 2005, p. 2).

Another element giving advantage to the rising predominance of Islam among resistance fighters was the substantial external support flowing into Chechnya from Islamic countries in support of jihad. External funds and mercenaries sent to Islamic guerrillas in Chechnya strengthened jihadists visibility, influence, popularity, and dominance within the power struggle that was taking place throughout Chechnya. Lack of external support flowing to the nationalists revolved around Russian international influence. The Russia's were not shy to show that they held the advantage when it came to sophisticated technology and military numbers. These combined provided Moscow with a great deal of confidence. The effectiveness of this combination was proved in the face of the international community. Russia's firepower greatly deterred the international community from approaching the Caucasus as they had the Balkans (Dash, 2000, p. 1517). Beyond this, Russia's growing importance in the energy and resource sectors made most countries unwilling to risk damaging their new relationships with a post–Soviet Russia keen to enter into the arena of international commerce.

Outside Islamic fighters began to coopt the Chechen movement and assist in its transformation into an Islamic one. The lack of strength to counter this intent on the part of unsupported homegrown nationalists made the shift from a Chechen nationalist movement to an international Islamic movement inevitable (Vidino, 2005). The Islamic insurgency was one not aimed at Chechen independence, but an entirely different aim. The goal of creating a North Caucasus Islamic state meant that these radicals had little concern for Chechnya or containing the conflict within Chechen borders. That said, this was a shift to new language manifesting old grudges. Moreover, this Islamic language and foreign influence hardly represented a suddenly unified and cohesive international Islamic movement—it was still a fractured and disjointed conflict. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism would, however, give Russia not only further cause for concern, but would also serve as a pretext for continuing their militaristic drive into the Caucasus.

SETTING A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT: VIOLENT TERRORISM

The first Chechen war had ended in part owing to a single act of terrorism. By 1995, Chechen insurgents were facing an increased Russian pressure inside of Chechnya. It was realized that attacking targets inside Russia was becoming easier and held a higher profile. In June 1995, the Budyonnovsk hospital hostage crisis marked a turning point in the conflict (Ratelle, 2013, p. 81). Russia's attempt to end the hostage standoff by force failed and shook Russian confidence in the government. The Russian government was facing an internal crisis and lacked the domestic strength to continue the war (Schaefer, 2011, pp. 131–5). With President Boris Yeltsin out of the country, attempting to secure Russia's position in the West fell to Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to address the situation. Given the instability of the situation, which was being broadcast live across Russian news networks, Chernomyrdin felt compelled to agree to the terrorist demands and negotiate a ceasefire in Chechnya.

Included in the ceasefire was the Kremlin's agreement to release Chechen hostages, taken illegally in what became an acknowledged policy on the part of the Russian government, which was in direct violation of the Geneva Convention insomuch as "the taking of hostages is prohibited" (Geneva Conventions, 1949). The ceasefire was significant for having revealed to the Russian people and the world the true nature of the Russian campaign straight from the source, their own government. The ceasefire also had the effect of shifting the nature of future conflict toward violent terrorism. The Chechens had reached their aims with the barrel of a gun and a single act of terrorism, setting a dangerous precedent that led to vicious cycle of violence for years to come (Schaefer, 2011, pp. 131–5).

The fallout from Budyonnovsk was tremendous for both sides of the conflict. In Russia, Yeltsin was furious over what he saw as a sign of weakness on the part of the Russian government.

The ceasefire agreement had included a promise of safe passage for Chechen insurgents and hostages. Yeltsin went back on Chernomyrdin's promise, orchestrating an attack on the Chechen convoy in a remote area along the route. Russian forces handled this situation as poorly as they had Budyonnovsk. The insurgents managed to fight their way out of the ambush with their hostages and escape to a small neighboring village of Pervomayskoye. The ambush turned into a siege of Pervomayskoye and the result was Chechen captors "rescuing" their hostages from attacks by Russian forces sent to rescue them. The entire event was an unmitigated media disaster for the Russian government. With the Russian elections fast approaching a peace settlement was reached in May 1996. However, once the elections were won, the Kremlin again reneged and began to push into Chechnya. Yeltsin's decision to renege would be part of a continuing pattern of Russian duplicity in their relationship with the insurgents that would serve only to ensure that Chechens would view negotiated settlements with the Russians as impossible and any offer a trap—nothing more, nothing less. This would only further engrain distrust and resentment toward the Russians and strengthen resolve among the guerrillas to resist by whatever means possible.

A MACABRE RESPITE: RUSSIAN REORGANIZATION AND A FLEDGLING CHECHNYA

A reenergized and determined Chechen resistance would emerge from these events and fight the Russians to a standstill with street-to-street fighting in Grozny. Eventually this led to the signing of the Khasavyurt Accord and the removal of Russian forces from Chechnya (Schaefer, 2011, pp. 135–42). The Chechen Republic of Ichkeria's victory was, however, short-lived. While the Russians had remained, individual sects had refrained from fighting amongst themselves. However, once the Russians departed, these rifts became increasingly apparent (Schaefer, 2011, p. 172). Chechnya now faced a domestic war on two fronts. On one front, the more radical Islamic elements within the insurgency sought to create an Islamic state and institute Shari'a. On the other front, years of chaos and conflict following the Soviet Union collapse had bred a massive criminal element focused on illegal trade through Chechnya's porous borders. Chechnya had emerged from the war devastated with one of the few means of survival left outside of joining the guerrilla movement resting in illegal activity. Smuggling, banditry, abduction, arms trafficking, narcotics trade, sex trafficking, and hijackings were a way of life in the region and threatened long-term stability (Baev, 2006, p. 2). Public order nearly disintegrated as the fledgling republic's quasi-government attempted to gain a foothold. The reality was that during the three years of semi-independent status, the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was marred by rampant criminality, chaotic violence, hostage takings, attacks on foreign aid workers, and general lawlessness (Kramer, 2005, p. 210).

The ineffectiveness of the government only served to increase the power of the warlords. As a direct response to this criminality, the strength of the Islamic fundamentalists grew as individuals turned to them to stem the flow of violence and disorder. In the near lawlessness of Chechnya, numerous training camps were established, which attracted even larger numbers of foreign fighters to become jihadists against the Russian government and its forces. This also increased the extremist nature of Islam in the region (Kramer, 2005, p. 212). Events began to gain their own inertia. The well-developed political economy of war, with shadow businesses and criminal enterprises, kept the new government economically fragile and ensured that instability thrived (Baev, 2004, p. 6). At the same time, this situation allowed for a flood of support by means of monetary funds, small arms, human resources, and training to pour into the region from the rest of the Islamic world. Jihadists began to hold enough influence and control to begin reaching out and establishing their own parallel system of governance (Dash, 2000, p. 1520).

What genuine nationalist movement that had existed had, by this time, devolved into simple criminality (Dash, 2000, p. 1517). For the Russians, there was increasing concern over preventing spillover from Chechnya into surrounding territories. However, Chechnya's ruling regime was waning and social discontent was on the rise (Baev, 2006, p. 4). Russia's regional interests were also

cause for their unwillingness or inability to disengage from Chechnya's internal strife (Dash, 2000, p. 1517). In August 1999, the jihadists' desire to move beyond the Chechen border was realized when Chechen *boeviki* (fighters) crossed into the neighboring Russian Republic of Dagestan in support of a newly declared Islamic state. This newly declared state called upon all Muslims to rise in jihad against Russia (*British Broadcasting Corporation* [BBC], 2011). The stated goal was to create a pan-Caucasian Islamic revolt, institute Shari'a, and eliminate Russian dominance in the Caucasus (Halbach, 2001, p. 108).

A NEW COURSE IS PLOTTED: PUTIN'S RUSSIA AND A CHANGE IN POLICY

By the time of this insurrection, Putin was Prime Minister and Russia's response was in keeping with his character. Russian interest in control of the Caucasus and its resources was becoming invariably tied to Putin's economic policies and his political image of strength. Within weeks, the Islamic rebellion in Dagestan and Chechnya was over. It had never been received with the warm reception the *boeviki* had hoped. Despite this, it had given the Russians the desired pretext to take hold of the region. However, squashing of this revolt was not the end of matters entirely and several violent terrorist attacks inside Russia followed shortly thereafter (Halbach, 2001, p. 108). The blame was quickly levelled at Chechnya and Russia again launched an invasion of Chechnya, which despite Russian claims, continues today (BBC World News, 2011).

The overwhelming commitment of force by the Kremlin emphasized a change in approach with regard to the Caucasus. The unwavering commitment on the part of Putin was only one element in a new demission to the war in Chechnya. Initial actions included an intense opening phase of urban warfare that relied heavily upon extensive air and artillery bombardment (Kramer, 2005, p. 256). The withdrawal of Chechen guerrillas from Grozny in February 2000, and their movement southward into the mountains marked a major shift in the conflict from conventional to insurgent (Kramer, 2005, p. 213).

A NEW FRAMING: THE "WAR ON TERROR"

Terrorism had by this point become the preferred *modus operandi* of the Chechen insurgent. The aim was to maintain pressure on Russian forces in Chechnya while targeting Russians cities for large-scale terrorist attacks (Kramer, 2005, p. 216). Islamic extremist groups began to establish training camps in the Chechen Mountains and began recruiting jihadists, from all over the Caucasus and southern Russian, and indoctrinating them with extremist ideology and training them in terror tactics (Kramer, 2005, p. 212). These Islamic rebels increasingly sought to bring the war to the rest of Russia and its civilian population while seeking to promote the spread of fundamentalist ideology (Kramer, 2005, pp. 245–52).

However, in adopting terrorism as a method of the insurgency, the insurgents provided the Russian government with the very justification required for continued involvement in the region. By promoting Shari'a, engaging in violent international terrorism from their bases in the Caucasus, and promoting an extremist brand of Islamic ideology, the Russians have been able to frame their actions in terms of the grandiose security architecture of the "War on Terror" (WoT), put in place by United States (US) President George W. Bush in 2001. By arguing that Islamic Chechnya has been waging jihad, the Russian government has been able to operate under the guise of a global campaign to combat violent international terrorism. The Russian government was therefore able to successfully promote its actions as an ongoing battle against international terrorism and Islamic fanaticism as opposed to the ruthless crushing of an independence movement. The insurgent drive, beyond the borders of Chechnya and including subversive activities in the Caucasus and terrorist attacks in Russia proper, have helped Russia to reinforce this view (Dash, 2000, p. 1518).

Moscow portrayed its 1999 invasion into Chechnya as motivated by a desire to protect Chechens from a global Islamic terrorist network. Although there was truth in the claim that foreign Islamic

fighters were operating in the region, Moscow was intentionally skewing the reality on the ground. For the most part, the violence in the Caucasus was representative of a patchwork of highly localized struggles for regional power. In these struggles, religion was only one motivating factor (Crews, 2014). The difference between religion and other factors was that it became the common thread by which these groups vocalized their frustrations. This was because Islam was a primary component of their identity. This does not suggest that violence was part of a massive foreign orchestrated unified Islamic movement.

The new framing of Russia's campaign in the Caucasus was superficial but served a purpose on the international stage. In the wake of the September 11, 2001 (9/11), Russia's rebranding of its campaign in the Caucasus as part of WoT, silenced Western criticism. The United States, keen on stabilizing relations with Russia, was unable or unwilling to counter such claims. This only served to validate Russian actions and by turning a blind eye to the countless documented cases of human rights violations committed by Russian federal troops during the occupation (BBC World News, 2011). The second Chechen war, this "anti-terrorist campaign," however, did not prevent foreign Islamist influence from spreading and in fact acted as a rally cry for Islamic solidarity (Halbach, 2001, p. 104).

The Russians learned valuable lessons from the First Chechen War and their "anti-terrorist campaign" went beyond mere rhetoric. As soon as the Russian forces had gained control of Grozny, they moved quickly to coopt both Islamic and nationalist elements of the resistance and establish a cooperative puppet government. Muslim clerics were recruited from the traditional and less radical homegrown Chechen Sufi leadership. They were expected to teach their followers that good Muslims were loyal to the state (Crews, 2014). This program of "Chechenization," as it was dubbed, only contributed to the growth of the insurgency, despite being aimed at the contrary (Baev, 2006, p. 4). "Chechenization" failed to eliminate both nationalist and Islamic insurgents, and the violent resistance to what was viewed as an illegitimate government continued to escalate (Gammer, 2005, p. 842).

The impact of 9/11 made it difficult for the insurgency to obtain external assistance. The use of terrorist attacks viewed through the immediate post-9/11 lens made former-legitimate support through Western charities and humanitarian organizations impossible. Foreign governments who had been previously sympathetic to the Chechen cause were neither willing to risk their relationship with Russia or appear to support terrorists in the radically polarized post-9/11 international community (Schaefer, 2011, pp. 207–8). This situation only strengthened the position of jihadists within the insurgency. Having the ability to control the flow of weapons and funds into the region set jihadists on the fast track to completely dominating the resistance movement (Schaefer, 2011, pp 207–8).

In October 2002, a group of Chechens identifying themselves as members of the Islamic separatist movement attempted a sequel to Budyonnovsk. In the hopes of again, utilizing terrorist tactics to force a Russian withdrawal and end the Second Chechen War, these militants stormed a Moscow theater and took people 850 hostage in what would become known as the Nord-Ost siege (Ratelle, 2013, p. 80). Putin, however, viewed this act in terms of a terrorist attack and not as part of a larger insurgency and his strong stance on this issue had repeatedly ruled out "negotiations with terrorists" (Kramer, 2005, pp. 215–6). Russian forces were quick to respond and after a two-and-a-half day siege launched a raid against the building that eventually led to the deaths of all the attackers and a large number of the hostages.

RUSSIAN STRATEGY: RHETORIC AND IDEOLOGY

After the Nord-Ost siege Putin ordered Russian forces to concentrate on CT, a task the Russian Armed Forces were wholly unsuited for. The Russian military command instead advocated concentrating on military action against terrorist bases outside Russian territories but Putin's framing of the situation began to dictate strategy (Baev, 2006, p. 3). In the wake of a series of heavy-handed attempts at CT, which appeared more as reprisals, Chechen insurgents began placing a greater

emphasis on suicide attacks (Kramer, 2005, p. 253). From 2002 to 2004, Russia became the virtual terrorism capital of the world. During these years it is important to understand Russian motives and approaches while keeping in mind that Russians had been victims of some of the world's worst terrorist attacks (Schaefer, 2011, p. 4).

Throughout this terrorist siege the Kremlin continued to emphasize radical Islam motivated by al-Qaeda (AQ) as the source of these attacks (Schaefer, 2011, p. 163). Moscow's continued framing of events in these terms was aimed at international audiences to insure Russian actions against armed groups in the Caucasus went unchallenged. However, the reality was that Russia was fighting an insurgency that had adopted terrorism tactics with historical grounds for believing the option viable. This insurgency had indeed, increasingly, taken on an Islamic appearance but again, this was an expression of the region's identity and one of the few structures left by which to voice their resistance. In reality, not unlike other insurgencies of this kind, the Russians were facing a large assortment of small armed groups engaging in highly localized struggles with a broad assortment of motivators (Crews, 2014).

ENSURING FAILURE

Often states are reluctant to label an insurgency for what it is for fear of lending credibility to the movement (Schaefer, 2011, p. 41). Regardless of Moscow's reason for doing so, the Kremlin continues to make a major miscalculation in labeling the fighters in the North Caucasus simply as terrorists. In refusing to acknowledge the situation for what it really is, Russia has prevented itself from developing responsive policies (Schaefer, 2011, p. 47). Partly on the basis of these heavy-handed policies, Putin was elected to a second term as president with over 70% support in March 2004 (Schaefer, 2011, pp. 215–6). This has only served to reinforce the Russian terrorism paradigm and ensure the cycle continues unchecked (Schaefer, 2011, pp. 215–6). With no internal opposition, Putin would be able to put Russia on a war footing and model himself as a war leader, rallying Russians to his cause. By 2004, the Kremlin no longer needed to concern itself with public opinion thanks in part to legislation aimed at clamping down media and controlling public opinion. Much like in the Soviet Union era, the Kremlin was now dictating public opinion (Schaefer, 2011, pp. 215–6).

The massive base of public support Putin enjoyed was part of a long term and highly orchestrated government campaign. Beyond the political fodder provided by a series of brutal and highly visible terrorist attacks inside Russia, economic recovery had clearly added to Putin's influence. Moscow had learned this lesson well from the First Chechen War where independent Russian news coverage, highly critical of government policy, had helped to turn public sentiment against the war. Under Putin's government this "error" had been corrected by reimposing stringent control of television news coverage to ensure it conformed to official messaging and aims. This is why when Russian news programs refer to Chechnya they focus entirely on individual acts of terror (Kramer, 2005, p. 257).

THE SURGE: A REORGANIZED INSURGENCY

Despite a carefully orchestrated public relations campaign that included showcasing the "new" Russian-oriented Chechen government, the façade was beginning to crumble. In May of 2004, Chechen insurgents successfully assassinated Russia's man on the ground, Akhmad Kadyrov by detonating a large explosion in Grozny during a World War Two memorial parade (Baev, 2006, p. 4). This served to severely undermine the Russia policy of "Chechenization" (Baev, 2006, p. 4). In the following months, Moscow attempted to project an image of calm and business as usual while searching for a successor. Simultaneously the Kremlin was trying to moderate an increasingly tense standoff between the coopted Chechen political clans competing to fill the power vacuum created by Kadyrov's death (Baev, 2004, p. 4).

The situation continued to escalate as Islamic resistance continued to spread to other Northern Caucasus republics. Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria all witnessed a steady rise in

suicide bombings during this period (Gammer, 2005, p. 844). In June of 2004, the insurgency again began to take on more military operations with a raid on Nazran, in neighboring Ingushetia, which resulted in the deaths of over 100 Russian soldiers and police. The raid also served to provide the guerrillas with an opportunity to expand their arsenal. This raid, and others like it, allowed the forces to acquire supplies of arms, munitions, explosives, and shoulder-held air defense missiles, vastly expanding operational capabilities (Kramer, 2005, p. 231).

Insurgent terrorist operations expanded in concert with these military operations. In September of 2004, insurgents sized a school in Beslan, North Ossetia taking more than a thousand hostages most of whom were children. The insurgents were hoping to call Putin's "bluff" concerning his refusal to negotiate with terrorists and repeat Budyonnovsk. Putin however did not waver and what has widely been criticized as a poorly executed raid was launched after a two-day siege, which resulted in more than 350 casualties (Baev, 2006, p. 4). The fallout from Beslan was beyond manageability even by the Kremlin's public relations teams. Despite firm control of the media, Putin could no longer ignore the deepening crisis in the Caucasus (Baev, 2006, p. 4). The increasing violence had been, until this point, carefully managed but Kadyrov's assassination was a game changer for the Russians (Baev, 2004, p. 4). Beslan acted to clearly reinforce that in the summer of 2004, things had taken an abrupt turn. Beslan marked a major shift in official rhetoric from normalization of the Caucasus toward a war footing. This however, translated into few actual changes in Moscow's Chechen policies (Baev, 2004, pp. 5–6).

DOUBLING DOWN: RUSSIAN COMMITMENT TO SET POLICY COURSE

Far from inducing Moscow to shift toward peace negotiations, the incidents in 2004 only served to reinforce Putin's determination to subdue any threat in the Caucasus. For the insurgency, this also marked a turning point. Chechen rebels began to adopt rhetoric and tactics reflective of AQ, only playing into Putin's framing of the Caucasus as part of the "Global War on Terror" (GWoT) (Kramer, 2005, p. 251; Ratelle, 2013, p. 35). It also became clear that previous methods used to pressure Moscow into negotiations would no longer work. To most observers, the rebels were also displaying a level of commitment to the insurgency that did not shy away from mass bloodshed on both sides of the conflict to obtain their goals. Increasingly, it was becoming apparent that a new generation of fanatics had emerged within the insurgency (Kramer, 2005, p. 254).

Over the course of the last decade, resistance to Russia's presence in the region has grown significantly more violent and extreme despite Moscow's stated intent to stabilize the region. Radical Islam has also come to play a much greater role in the insurgency. The situation has stalled, reaching a sort of macabre equilibrium with neither side being able to fully succeed nor disengage. Territorial separatists have established de facto countries able to exert control over their region, and maintain a localized economy. The conflict is not about patching together a war-torn country or simply defeating a band of terrorists, it is a well-established insurgency and the region faces the challenge of reconciling the fact that two separate functional power structures coexist in parallel (King, 2001, p. 525). As an old Chechen proverb states: Two enemies cannot live under the same roof.

For Putin, Chechnya has become symbolic of his leadership and his reputation is invariably tied to success in the Caucasus. Given the costs, it seems unlikely that Moscow will be able to disengage from the conflict under the Brinkmanship of the current administration (Dash, 2000, p. 1517). Despite an outward display of strength, there exists a deep-rooted uncertainty in the Kremlin over a protracted conflict with no end in sight and that is so closely associated with the current leadership's reputation. Despite what appears to be signs of Putin's combination of CT and "Chechenization" faltering, a policy shift remains unlikely. Within the Kremlin's current dysfunctional power structure, custom tailored by Putin to control events in the Caucasus, any suggestion of a policy shift is viewed as a threat to executive power and credibility (Baev, 2004, p. 6). Despite the risk posed by the continued instability in the Caucasus, the Kremlin has shown little indication of changing their current hard line. In part, the continued instability may serve a purpose. The regional instability

has allowed the Kremlin to advance political goals and has in fact become an integral element in Moscow's political strategy. The instability serves as a pretext for exerting greater direct administrative control over the region (Baev, 2004, p. 6). Beyond the domestic advantages it makes, it easier for the Kremlin to justify keeping large military forces in the region serving the role of power projection and keeping the Caucasus squarely in Moscow's camp (Schaefer, 2011, p. 210). For the local administration in the Caucasus as well as separatists, the benefit from untaxed trade flowing through their warzone also acts as a disincentive for altering the current state of conflict by threatening their already meager livelihood (King, 2001, pp. 525–6). Whatever the advantages, Russia has had to maintain a substantial and costly (both in men and material) presence in the region. Despite massively outnumbering insurgent combatants in Chechnya by upwards of 50:1, Russia has not only been unable to stem the violence but it is again seeing it grow and spread across the region (Kramer, 2005, p. 209). There can be no doubt that given the situation Russian policies are directly contributing to this escalation.

AN ALTERNATE VIEW: RUSSIAN COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE

Current Western counterinsurgency (COIN) theory focuses on what Lt. Col. Robert W. Schafer (US Army) has termed the four "P's"—presence, patience, persistence, and professionalism (Schaefer, 2011, p. 130). It conceives of COIN as being centered on the local population and specifically establishing security and providing for their basic needs. In doing so, as the theory goes, a level of trust and rapport is established, after seeing the benefits of the COIN force, the population begins to shift support away from the insurgents and toward COIN forces. This in turn leads to the local population beginning to provide information on the insurgents to COIN forces, leading to greater security successes and establishing what Lt. Col. Schafer has termed the "Security-Intelligence Cycle" (Schaefer, 2011, p. 211). Western conception of a COIN campaign is inherently poli-centric and aims at building long-term popular support with fighting insurgents as only an ancillary task in reaching this objective. Russian COIN strategy in the Caucasus, however, has been enemy-centric and seems to turn Western COIN theory on its head (Schaefer, 2011, p. 201).

Russian approaches to COIN in the Caucasus have at best provided mixed results. Initially it provided success, in that through the unmitigated use of force it was able to establish a degree of control. Although Moscow enjoyed short-term success, it was at a high cost in terms of violence and destruction, hardening opinion in the region; it would seem that winning "hearts and minds" was not an immediate priority. It has become clear that the wanton human rights abuses, continued use of torture, mass roundups, summary executions, and *zachistki*, have left much of the Caucasus deeply hostile toward Moscow (Kramer, 2005, p. 260). The longer the insurgents are able to provide cause for this to continue, the more this resentment will no doubt grow. This serves to fill an essential twofold need for the insurgents by eroding Russian support and creating an increasingly hostile region as well as serving to boost their own numbers. Che Guevara once said, "The guerrilla fighter needs full help from the people of the area. This is an indispensable condition" (Guevara, 1961, p. 10). Russia has clearly forgotten this basic principle of guerrilla warfare and in doing so has handed the insurgency its most valuable resource.

The level of repression that exists has only served to ensure any Chechen government associated with Moscow lacks credibility. The Russian program of repression has totally undermined the second pillar of Russian COIN strategy, the program of "Chechenization," and has ensured that insurgents will continue to fight (Kramer, 2005, p. 260). Because Moscow never focused on, or indeed was in fact incapable of, creating a perception of legitimacy and trustworthiness, radical Islam has been given a rich breading ground from which to establish itself as the predominant alternate ideology to Russian occupation (Schaefer, 2011, p. 61). The radical Islamization of the insurgency has also served to further poison Russian COIN efforts. Even if, as Moscow claims, many Chechens do not wish to live in an Islamic state under Shari'a, the adoption of radicalized Islamic dogma, in response to Russian occupation, ensures that no compromise can occur (Kramer, 2005, p. 260).

SYSTEMIC SHORTCOMINGS

The high level of corruption that exists within the Russian security apparatus has not helped the situation and has left locals, at the very least, frustrated with security forces (Kramer, 2005, p. 259). Indeed, Russian efforts in the region have suffered from internal corruption, cronyism, and administrative incompetence, all of which are systemic in the Russian army, security forces, and political hierarchy. A great deal of what the Kremlin struggles against in the Caucasus is of its own doing, and resides in Russia's own house (Kramer, 2005, p. 267). The extensive corruption has also allowed the insurgency opportunities to procure arms on the black market from the very forces expected to eliminate the insurgency. This corruption allows insurgents a free hand to travel through the region, provided they can afford the bribes. Even if the corruption problem was eliminated, the Federal Security Service (FSB) and Ministry of the Interior (MVD) have displayed a startlingly high level of incompetence in dealing with ambushes and terrorist attacks (Kramer, 2005, p. 259).

Although violence within Chechnya itself ebbed in the years following Beslan, the insurgency has not declined. In fact, it has been on the move. In Chechnya proper, Ramzan Kadyrov, the son of Akhmad, has brought the full force of his Russian-supported government to bear against the population with little regard for law (Ahmed and Magnay, 2014). With nobody to restrain his actions, Ramzan has firmly consolidated power and caused serious damage to the government's legitimacy in the eyes of other clans cooperating with Moscow. Ramzan has, however, been able to maintain an unprecedented level of control in part owing to a massive injection of money from Moscow aimed at rebuilding Chechnya's infrastructure (Schaefer, 2011, pp. 251–5).

Despite reconstruction programs, the local population continues to support the insurgency. Kadyrov's crackdowns and injection of money has only meant that the insurgency has begun spreading into the surrounding republics of Dagestan and Ingushetia where fighting has increased significantly. This has served to further destabilize the entire region as well as attract foreign Islamic fighters back into the region that were serving in Afghanistan and Iraq (Crews, 2014). Despite the rhetoric and miscalculation the conflict is far from over and the North Caucasus is in fact heating up again (Schaefer, 2011, pp. 274–5). It is also unlikely that Kadyrov will be able to maintain the level of control and stability Moscow's money bought him. In light of the economic downturn, Russia's slumped economy and the immense investment in both the Sochi Olympics and military upgrades, not to mention the marked price decrease in petroleum (the central pillar of the Russian economy), Russia has already begun to slow the flow of funds, and not unexpectedly, the situation inside Chechnya has again begun to deteriorate (Schaefer, 2011, pp. 251–2). Aggressive, heavy-handed, and ineffective tactics have become the benchmark for Russian forces over the last decade as they faced off against a growing insurgency that was rapidly shifting toward terrorism as their preferred form of action. Their clumsy tactics aside, the pattern of Russian invasion and the resulting chaos leading to a breakdown in social structure and displacement of peoples is continually repeated, further hardening local opinions against their efforts. Time and time again, Russian brinkmanship has led to aggressively expansionist policies that lack a coherent end game. This pattern was notably repeated in Georgia with regards to South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE MOUNTAINS: GEORGIA

During the period of nationalist awakening and succession that occurred in the early 1990s, Chechnya was not the only hotspot in the Caucasus. Ossetia was engulfed in a conflict that involved ethnic cleansing. Abkhazia was also threatened with being engulfed in the spreading discontent. Georgian paramilitaries launched attacks throughout the region and Russia responded by becoming involved in an impromptu intervention (Baev, 2006, p. 2). This issue, dating back to the collapse of Imperial Russia, has never really been settled. Despite Abkhazia's continued insistence on maintaining its separateness and its declaration of independence from Georgia in 1999, Georgia continues to regard it as a breakaway region within their own sovereign territory.

Russo-Georgian tensions have remained markedly pitched. Georgia has pursued a Western-centric foreign policy that threatens to bring the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into the Caucasus and upset Russian aims of regional influence. The shared border between Georgia and Chechnya, and the notoriously porous Pankisi Gorge also served as a source of continued tension as Russia battled Chechen insurgents (Vidino, 2005). In 2008, these tensions led to Russia sending troops into South Ossetia on the pretext of providing its Russian-speaking Ossetian peoples with protection (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC], 2011). On a side note, it should be mentioned that at the time of writing this chapter Russia is currently using the same pretext to confront similar concerns regarding NATO in Ukraine. Russian Naval forces also assisted in the occupation of Crimea in an effort to again "protect the ethnic Russian population" in the region, which led to the complete annexation of the entire peninsula by Moscow (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC], 2014). Putin's playbook is a rather limited one.

In 2008, the Russo-Georgian conflict in South Ossetia allowed Russian troops the pretext to move into Abkhazia (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC], 2012). Although Russia claimed it was doing so to protect Russians and Russian speakers, the reality was that Russia's aims were to end Georgian control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia and replace it with its own while weakening Georgia's military capabilities and undermining Georgian moves toward NATO. The Russo-Georgian war also served as a warning to other post–Soviet Union states, especially Ukraine and Azerbaijan, about Western ambitions (Hamilton, 2008). The war itself started after a long game on the part of Moscow to antagonize Georgia and draw that state into conflict. These included both overt and subversive tactics (Hamilton, 2008). The causes of the war are, however, far from one-sided and remain deeply complex. Russian criticisms of Georgian policy regarding these regions, especially Abkhazia, have both merit and historical precedent (Hamilton, 2008).

Whatever the cause, after the 2008 conflict, Moscow formally recognized the independence of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and then withdrew troops from the Georgian border. Nonetheless, Moscow continued to station large forces in these breakaway republics under an agreement with the local governments that also entitles Russia to formal control of their frontiers with Georgia (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC], 2012). The war, in reality, led to the de facto annexation of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Hamilton, 2008). Russia has at no time displayed any intention of lowering its military presence in the region and has taken opportunities such as the 2014 Olympics in Sochi as pretext for increasing the scope of its presence in these republics (Rukhadze, 2014). Moscow's long-term aims regarding its commitments to these territories are no doubt aimed at keeping NATO out and insuring their own continued influence in the region (Hamilton, 2008). There is also little doubt that most Russians would like to see Abkhazia and South Ossetia independent or become part of the Russian federation, although associated costs are something of a different story (Sokov, 2006, p. 2).

In recent years Georgian policy has been to push Russia and force the pace of events. Georgia's aim has been to play on the cost and increasing violence to force Russia into a choice between recognizing Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence or surrendering Russia's presence in the breakaway regions to a multilateral peacekeeping operation friendly to Georgia (Sokov, 2006, p. 3). This may become a moot point or even backfire as violence increases in the region. The presence of alternate leaderships and militaries of substantial numbers (15,000–20,000 men in Karabakh, 5000–10,000 in Transnistria, 2000 in South Ossetia, 5000 in Abkhazia) suggests that the current course of escalation will continue (King, 2001, p. 553).

AN INCONVENIENT BUT SELF-EVIDENT TRUTH: THE GROWTH OF AN ISLAMIC INSURGENCY AND THE NORTH CAUCASUS EMIRATE

Numbers do not lie, and the indicators are clear about the rising violence and instability in the Caucasus. In 2008, Ingushetia witnessed a 36% rise in the number of crimes related to arms trafficking, a 100% rise in racketeering and gang crimes, and a 31% rise in the number of murders

committed over the previous year (Memorial Human Rights Center [MHRC], 2008, p. 2). During the same period, Dagestan suffered at the hands of an extensive assignation campaign that successfully targeted several senior officers (MHRC, 2008, p. 24). Dagestan has become the bomb capital of the Russian Federation with the majority of perpetrators of violence claiming to kill in the name of jihad (Gammer, 2005, p. 838). This confirms that Moscow's long and drawn-out confrontation with Chechen separatists has spread throughout the North Caucasus, and is fused with a wider radical Islamic insurgency. Russia is again witnessing a rise in violence with it beginning to reach beyond the Caucasus and again terrorist attacks are occurring inside of Russia itself (Crews, 2014).

This escalation in violence has taken on a new and historically significant dimension that has increased the already substantial role of Islam in the conflict. Russian claims regarding radical Islam are not without merit. The insurgency of the North Caucasus has indeed taken on an increasingly Islamic character. Individuals fighting to dismantle Russian influence in the region have been unabashed in their intentions to establish an Islamic state under Shari'a. This has increasingly moved from the rhetoric of leadership looking to gain religious support for their legitimacy into very real action. The October 2007 declaration dissolving the unrecognized shadow state of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and the creation of the Caucasus Emirate, demonstrates just how much Islam has come to the forefront of rebel leadership (Schaefer, 2011, p. 236).

First impressions may have been that the founding of an Emirate would just deepen existing rifts in the insurgency. Without one prevailing form of Islam and with the various sects often declaring competing goals, this course would not have been unfathomable (Schaefer, 2011, p. 236). Clearly, the shared goal of driving the Russians out and establishing an Islamic state have combined under the greater Islamic umbrella of the Emirate to bridge these gaps. The Emirate has served to provide a central point around which a relatively professional force has arisen (Schaefer, 2011, p. 241). The Emirate has gained the support of local elders whose authority and opinion carry significant weight. The net result has indeed been divisive for Chechens, but the overall support for the Emirate has been substantial (Shlapentokh, 2008).

PLAYING WITH FIRE: CO-OPTING ISLAM

A key concern for the Kremlin today revolves around the question of Russia's relationship with Islam. A large and varied Muslim population exists both in the Caucasus and inside Russia and even more on Russia's periphery. Conceptualizing how Russia could possibly continue fighting, co-opting, and maintaining alliances inside such a diverse and complex matrix while boasting success is exceptionally difficult. A key element in Putin's "Chechenization" program has been to co-opt Islam for Russia's own political aims (Ratelle, 2013, p. 80). This, however, seems impossible, so long as the situation in the Caucasus remains unresolved. Moscow has attempted to work around this fact by endeavoring to control how Muslims in the region interpret Islam. Moscow has begun mandating which religious authorities are legitimate based on their teaching being politically compatible (Crews, 2014). This is a very risky gambit.

It should be emphasized that "Chechenization" has enjoyed some success under Ramzan Kadyrov. This was done, however, during a period of relative calm. US actions in Afghanistan and Iraq have done a great deal to draw resources and manpower out of Chechnya; however, these forces have returned (Schaefer, 2011, p. 235). The reality is that Moscow's co-opting of Islam through Kadyrov and the "Chechenization" program is a double-edged sword. On the surface, Kadyrov's Chechnya is now much closer to being a true Islamic state under Shari'a than ever before. For Kadyrov, this has been a means to an end and his co-opting program has also served to alienate as many Muslims, especially clerics rendered superfluous, as it has served to bring onside. This is a dangerous strategy and it is playing with fire.

Another aspect to Kadyrov's risky gambit is that in co-opting Islam he has also co-opted former insurgents. These numbers have bolstered Chechen security forces and in the short-term, these

fighters provided an experienced guerrilla/counter-guerrilla force with valuable local knowledge regarding the insurgent's base (Ratelle, 2013, p. 135). The other side of this coin, however, is what will happen if this force becomes disgruntled as the flow of capital from Moscow begins to dry up, which is a very real possibility. This is also why Russian security forces continue to distrust the reliability of Chechen security knowing the general population still maintains a high level of support for the insurgency. This assistance has also amounted to little in practical terms and even in Grozny, the night belongs to the insurgency with security forces rarely venturing out after dark (Schaefer, 2011, pp. 251–5).

An Arab proverb states: Fire only burns he who approaches it. The Islam of the North Caucasus is fixated on creating Shari'a state that would immediately render Kadyrov's regime illegitimate. The efforts by Moscow and Kadyrov to co-opt Islam place religion front and center and emphasize it as the binding ideology for the population. Moving Chechens closer to this regional Islamic identity renders the population more receptive to radical Islamists in the long term (Ratelle, 2013, p. 48). When the eventual downturn in Kadyrov's Administration occurs and the flow of funds from Moscow slows, it will make a short leap for the people to join the Islamic insurgents (Schaefer, 2011, pp. 258–9). Inside Russia, the Chechen co-opting of Islam also serves equal parts remedy and threat. Muslims inside of Russia have embraced a number of competing sects. Moscow, uncomfortable with this level of pluralism, has gambled on picking the right interpretation of Islam. In doing so, it has also risked alienating those Muslims who do not view this state sponsored interpretation as legitimate (Crews, 2014). By placing a clamp on Islamic interpretation, even with the support of Islamic elements within the population, it will create more policy challenges and greater divides between these various communities (Shlapentokh, 2008).

Russian attempts to win local populations in the Caucasus with support of specific religious initiatives (those being of the "right" kind of Islam) and rebuilding programs, like in Grozny, have done little to help their cause (Ratelle, 2013, p. 28). In the matter of reconstruction programs widespread corruption, the treatment of the local population, including mass evictions, have increasingly alienated the locals (MHRC, 2008, p. 20). Despite further financial promises and the announcement of a large job creating initiative, the Russian government lacks the ability to follow through. Strapped for cash by Sochi, military upgrades, and the strain felt as a result of falling oil prices, following through on a "hearts and minds" campaign seems, given Moscow's track record, highly unlikely (Schaefer, 2011, p. 281).

CONCLUSION

The continued problems that Moscow faces in the Caucasus are of its own doing. Moreover, the dysfunctional approach that it seems fanatically committed to continuing is only likely to feed the insurgency (Kramer, 2005, p. 267). Russian forces have grown increasingly distrustful of the reliability of local security forces but seem unwilling to commit to filling the void. In reality, despite a fragile appearance of order Chechnya remains on the brink (Kramer, 2005, p. 215). In a realistic assessment, Russian military forces will likely be able to retain control of the region in the foreseeable future. However, this will no doubt be a Pyrrhic victory requiring massive military investment continuing to fight an insurgency indefinitely (Kramer, 2005, p. 214).

Current prospects for resolving the Abkhazia issue with Georgia remain poor at best. Despite agreements in principal, the issue of Abkhaz autonomy return of displaced Georgians to the region continues to block advancement on resolving the situation. Neither Russia nor Georgia has shown good faith or restraint (Kaufman, 1998, p. 1). The current US involvement has also encouraged both sides to become increasingly reactionary (Kaufman, 1998, p. 4). Public opinion on both sides of the border has become hardened with the situation remaining on the brink, waiting for the push that will send it over the edge and back into war (Kaufman, 1998, p. 1).

In Ingushetia, violence and Islamic radicalism continues to spread. The government's grip appears tight but could lack the strength to maintain even a moderately desirable situation. It is now

dependent on paramilitary forces that are undeniably hated by the local population and have become increasingly targeted by insurgents. Dagestan, likewise, appears close to an armed rebellion and acts as yet another source of regional hostilities (Baev, 2006, p. 8). In 2010, terrorist attacks rose by 20% and again Arab fighters are beginning to appear in the region in large numbers. However, intensive and ongoing fighting in the Middle East between the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and various government and nongovernment forces could draw some of those fights away from Chechnya and the North Caucasus. Still, the Caucasus Emirate has been able to attract foreign jihadists and their support for some time and should be able to continue this practices. Further, the Caucasus Emirate has successfully developed a substantial force of homegrown fighters (Schaefer, 2011, pp. 276–7).

The Russian ability to respond effectively to this growing threat remains poor. The Russian military continues to suffer from a lack of professionalism among the enlisted. Massive levels of corruption through all layers of Government, especially security services, is a continuing problem and only feeds the public perception of illegitimacy (Schaefer, 2011, pp. 278–9). The conflict is also becoming increasingly complex to follow; there are internal clashes that cut across religious lines that have witnessed Cossacks joining with Muslim Abkhazians against Georgians, and Georgians joining Muslim Ingush against Muslims and Christian Ossetians (Halbach, 2001, p. 96). Determining friend from foe is increasingly complex and relies on several identifiers, political, religious, ethnic, territorial, economic and otherwise (Halbach, 2001, p. 96). Without large-scale reform, it seems unlikely that current Russian COIN forces can do anything more than join the fight and a long-term solution seems out of Moscow's reach (Schaefer, 2011, pp. 278–9).

A Russian military reform program has begun and is aimed at attempting to produce a more professionally trained and educated force. This has specifically targeted senior noncommissioned officers (NCO) and is modeled after Western examples. Russian practices have also begun to mirror Western COIN practices (Schaefer, 2011, p. 279). However, these reforms are also coming at a time when Russia has engaged in a massive procurement program aimed at upgrading their entire military. This massive program has launched Russia to the status of the world's third-largest military spender (Rossiya Segodnya [RIA Novosti], 2014). As Moscow attempts to modernize its forces in spite of an economic downturn, there is a need to find ways to keep costs under control. As a result the numbers of personnel on the ground in the Caucasus is expected to fall considerably (Schaefer, 2011, p. 279). The depletion of manpower renders Russian forces even less effective and an even more attractive target. The result of a downscale in Russian forces will serve to guarantee greater chaos in the Caucasus in the future (Schaefer, 2011, p. 279).

Given Putin's continued reliance on international brinkmanship to offset economic stagnation, it seems likely that Russia's unchecked advancement into further regional conflicts will continue. It seems unlikely, under the current administration, that Russia will be able to balance its ambitious military procurement program against the costly challenges of avoiding further instability in the Caucasus. If Moscow fails to address the current imbalance in the massive expenditures associated with security, it seems unlikely they will be able to keep the jihadists at bay or avoided increased instability in the Caucasus. If or when this breakdown or *callkatastroika* occurs, the insurgency in the North Caucasus will almost certainly gain the upper hand (Shlapentokh, 2008). The Kremlin has simply spread itself to thin.

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11 Lashkar-e-Taiba
Regional Insurgent Group or Emerging International Threat?

Stewart Tristan Webb

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

On November 26, 2008, much of the world's media was fixated on the events unfolding during the catastrophic four-day stand-off in Mumbai (capital of the Indian state of Maharashtra and India's most populous city): this attack claimed the lives of over 180 Indian civilians, but also included the deaths of American and Israeli tourists. This signaled the first deliberate attack against foreign nationals in India by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Mumbai brought LeT to the attention of the Western world and has been seen as India's 9/11. This was not the first attack that LeT carried out, but it was by far the most publicized. It is likely that it will not be the last to secure the international media's attention. Prior to this date, in December 2001, LeT carried out an attack on the Indian Parliament buildings with the assistance of another proxy group—Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). This terrorist attack led India and Pakistan to the brink of war, if not nuclear exchange in 2001–2002. LeT has also planned, but failed to carry out, attacks in Denmark, Australia, as well as United States (US). It has only been until recent years that the United States has put a bounty on the capture of Hafiz Mohammed Saeed—one of the founders of LeT. Saeed remains a defiant outspoken public figure in Pakistani society (Al-Jazeera, 2012).

Created after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in mid-1988, LeT has primarily focused on a prolonged insurgency against India. It has only been until recent years that there have been indications that elements of LeT are shifting its attention outside the South Asian subcontinent. This has been backed up with an increase in anti-Western remarks made by its leader and has hinted at broadening its focus globally. This may signal the beginning of a redirection of focus to the global arena. In summation, one can see why some analysts believe that it is only a question of time before LeT carry out a successful attack on Western soil.

Although LeT has a regional focus, it does have connections with other terrorist groups abroad. In fact, LeT has trained some insurgents that have taken part in militant conflicts in Bosnia, the Philippines, and Chechnya. The insurgents who have taken action outside the South Asian theater have been foreign nationals who received training from LeT and have returned to their homelands

to support ongoing insurgencies there. Alarmingly though, LeT is beginning to recruit Westerners to assist with its operations in India and abroad—one example of this involves two of the London bombers (what has since been referred to as the 7/7 attacks) were trained at LeT camps (Riedel, 2011, p. 87). LeT has not been the sole perpetrator of a terrorist attack outside the South Asian subcontinent. In fact, the group has had to rely its connections with other groups, such as al-Qaeda (AQ). LeT does not enjoy a close relationship with AQ as its Pakistani contemporaries (such as JeM) do. The group has, however, provided minimal support for AQ, but this has allowed LeT to maintain good relations with the Pakistani state and its populace. LeT has the capability to broaden its theater of operations, but the question of whether they do so or not remains. If LeT does expand globally, then as an organization it will gain prominence as will its cause. However, it will also erode much of its local support that it has been able to build and place Pakistan within the crosshairs of international attention.

THE ORIGINS OF LᴇT

The history of LeT shares its origins with AQ and many other militant and radical Islamic organizations that began to emerge during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Egypt, for example, opened up its prisons and sent its radical Islamists to wage jihad against the Soviets as a result of their hostilities abroad. Unfortunately, the radicalization did not end there. Just shortly before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, General Zia-al-Haq overthrew Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's government in a coup in 1978. Aside from the military, the coup was supported by anti-Bhutto elements, but also by religious parties (Abbas, 2005, p. 96). With jihad being waged against the Soviet in Afghanistan and with Zia's Islamic devotion, the Islamization of Pakistani society and security forces began. General Zia was instrumental in the proliferation of Deobandism as he, himself, adhered to this school (Abbas, 2005, p. 103). General Zia was not a fundamentalist. Rather, he can aptly be characterized as an opportunist when it came to staying in power and maintaining support.

After the Soviets withdrew fully from Afghanistan by early 1989, many of the mujahedeen turned to robbery, attacked rivals, and targeted Shia communities (Gunaratna and Iqbal, 2011, p. 112). Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) shifted its focus to the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, in which Pakistan took a greater interest during the mid-1980s (Gregory, 2007, p. 1018). Shortly after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan's Kunar Province in 1990, LeT was founded (South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2014). It was during this time that the ISI introduced more Pakistan- and Afghanistan-based groups into Kashmir to counter indigenous Kashmiri militant groups that either began to espouse for Kashmiri independence or wanted to become influential political groups (Fair, 2013, p. 5).

The promotion of Deobandi orthodoxy fueled sectarian conflict against the Shia population and even led to the demand for a constitutional reform to excommunicate the Shias from Islam (Gunaratna and Iqbal, p. 91). Pakistan's ISI quickly started to shift these extremists toward the Kashmiri front to wage a proxy war against India. Many of these Kashmiri proxy groups were formed just before, or just after, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Hindu nationalism played a significant role with this extremist uprising with the destruction of the Babri Masjid in 1992 and the targeting of Muslim communities (Tankel, 2011, p. 138). In fact, Indian security officials were arresting LeT operatives on Indian soil in 1992—eight years before the first LeT attack in India (Hussain, 2008, p. 58). LeT was founded as a militant wing of Markaz Dawat-ul-Irshad (MDI) in 1990 by Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, and Zafar Iqbal. Markaz Dawat-ul-Irshad was founded in 1987 by Abdullah Azzam and both Saeed and Iqbal (Abbas, 2005, p. 210).

During the course of nine years of Soviet hostilities in Afghanistan, Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian Sunni scholar, was a key player for the mujahedeen and for the future of Islamist extremist thinking. Azzam was able to generate finances for the Afghan war and proved useful for both the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the ISI (Abbas, 2005, p. 210). Azzam also traveled around the globe and his travels included visits to some US cities. Azzam's legacy from the Soviet

invasion has had a lasting influence and changed the landscape of the Islamic world. Azzam's true accomplishment during the war was his book entitled, *The Defence of the Muslim Territories*, which was published in 1984. In it, he argued that every Muslim's duty is to support jihad that was being waged in Afghanistan; if the mujahedeen were successful, it would raise their overall prestige and power on an international level (Riedel, 2011, p. 30). After the publication of this book, and the subsequent articles and books that followed, Azzam left the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) owing to his feeling that the group was too timid (Riedel, 2011, p. 30). In the mid-1980s, Azzam also worked with and reportedly inspired Osama bin Laden (Abbas, 2005, pp. 210–1). Azzam was assassinated in Peshawar on November 24, 1989 in a bomb blast, which also claimed the lives of his two sons. He had been planning on joining the Intifada in the West Bank after the conflict being waged in Afghanistan. It has been claimed that the Mossad, Osama bin Laden and the ISI, or the Soviets and the Afghan communists carried out his assassination. The ISI claimed it was Mossad, but this question has never been resolved (Abbas, 2005, p. 211).

Following Azzam's death, Saeed took on the leadership of the MDI and Saeed and Iqbal formed LeT in 1990. Botgh Saeed and Iqbal molded the organization into what it is now: Pakistan's largest and most successful Pakistani proxy group. Saeed's education includes a graduate degree in Arabic and Islamic Studies, which he obtained from Punjab University (Abbas, 2005, p. 211). Following this phase of his formal education, he taught at a university in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (Abbas, 2005, p. 211). Saeed returned to Pakistan and assumed a post as a research officer in General Zia-al-Haq's government-run Islamic Ideology Council (Abbas, 2005, p. 211). After this posting, Saeed served as a professor of Islamic studies at the University of Engineering and Technology in Lahore (Abbas, 2005, p. 211).

Since LeT was founded, the group has conducted many successful attacks on the Indian security forces and administration in the Indian states of Jammu and Kashmir, also known as Indian-controlled Kashmir. In the past 10 years, the organization has increased its presence in India, by reaching out to disillusioned Muslims. LeT's training facilities were located in Afghanistan until 1992 when they were moved to Pakistani-administered Kashmir (PAK) (Hussain, 2008, p. 55). This coincided with both the insurgency moving into India and the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan. By moving them to PAK, they were geographically better suited to infiltrate India. Additionally, LeT's Ahl-e-Hadithi ways could have displeased the burgeoning Taliban movement with its Deobandi tradition.

IMPACT ON ITS AHL-E-HADITH TRADITION AND RECRUITMENT

LeT's Ahl-e-Hadith tradition is unlike most of the extremist groups in Pakistan in that most of them are grounded in Deobandi tradition. The significance of the differentiation in its ideological roots have allowed for the tacit support of the Pakistani populace remaining today. The Pakistani populace is more willing to accept the existence of LeT because of its noninternal violent nature and its Ahl-e-Hadith tradition. In contrast, extremist Deobandism is violently sectarian. The extremist Deobandi movement advocates attacks targeting Pakistan's Shia and Ahmediyyas groups, and has been known to target other non-Islamic peoples, including Christians (Fair, 2011, pp. 18–9). Pakistan's population is estimated to be 75% Sunni and 20% Shia, with the other 5% representing Hindus, Christians, and others (CIA, 2011). The Sunnis are divided into three schools of thought: (1) Barelvis, (2) Deobandi, and (3) Ahl-e-Hadith. Both the Deobandi and the Ahl-e-Hadith traditions are overshadowed by the more moderate Barelvi, which "incorporates local customs into Islamic practice" (Palmer and Palmer, 2004, p. 93). Deobandism seeks to establish an Islamic state in Pakistan or to make Pakistan an Islamic state. The Ahl-e-Hadith tradition is a variant of Salafism in Saudi Arabia and wishes to see Islam proliferate beyond Pakistan's borders (Palmer and Palmer, 2004, p. 93).

In Pakistan, only 10% of the population observes Ahl-e-Hadith tradition. The number of Deobandi madrassas is indicative of the Deobandi majority in Pakistan. According to a survey

conducted by Pakistan's Ministry of Religious Affairs, the number of Deobandi madrassas was 7000 out of a total of 10,000 in 2006. (Allen, 2007, p. 275). In the same survey, the number of Ahl-e-Hadith madrassas was numbered at around 400 (Allen, 2007, p. 275). Ahl-e-Hadith madrassas also differ in their curriculum, which includes English, Pakistani studies, as well as mathematics and sciences, whereas Deobandi madrassas focus primarily on religious studies (Tankel, 2011, p. 28). Many of the unsupervised madrassas in Pakistan do not equip its students with practical skills and because of this, LeT has been successful in avoiding recruitment problems (Clarke, 2010, p. 79).

LeT is also unique as to where it recruits its members, compared with its Deobandi contemporaries. Many of LeT's recruits come from the Deobandi tradition and many of the recruits do not originate from madrassas, but from universities and colleges. This is in keeping with the education that the founding fathers of MDI and LeT had. In fact, the number of LeT recruits coming from madrassas has been estimated to be as low as 10% (Fair, 2009, p. 9). The majority of LeT's recruits originate from Punjab (i.e., such cities as Lahore, Gujranwala, and Multan) (Hussain, 2008, p. 56). This region is also where the Ahl-e-Hadith tradition has its bastions (Hussain, 2008, p. 56). West Point's Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) (2013) found that recruitment by current LeT members (recruit's family or mosque/madrassa) were responsible for recruiting roughly 20% (p. 4). By 2004, 40% of the recruits were recruited by the suggestion of family members (Rassler et al., 2013, p. 5).

Prior to becoming full members of the group, LeT recruits have to prove that they are "good citizens." Missionary activistism or *da'wa* is one such method of proving their value as prospective members. Recruits are assessed according to their ability to influence crowds through acts such as public speaking, preaching about Islam, and social responsibility (Abbas, 2005, p. 212). This general process demonstrated to the Pakistani population that LeT's public behavior did not primarily concern militancy and that when it promoted jihadi activities they were directed against India and not against Pakistan (Tankel, 2011, p. 132). By performing the *da'wa* and offering services that the Pakistani government cannot provide, LeT has reaped the benefits of public support to a relatively impressive extent. In a Pew Research Center (2013) survey, 24% of Pakistanis have a favorable view of LeT while only 36% view the group negatively, and 40% offering no opinion at all (p. 9). The favorability of both AQ and the Haqqani network are 13% and 8%, respectively (Pew Research Center, 2013, p. 9).

LeT's Deobandi contemporaries place little emphasis on social responsibility. This may prove to be one of the reasons why many Pakistani citizens favor LeT. The group may have Ahl-e-Hadith origins, but it also recruits both Deobandis and Barelvis (Fair, 2011, p. 23). One of the speculated reasons is that the Ahl-e-Hadith minority is not viable enough to sustain an insurgency against India on its own. In addition to gaining more potential insurgents, LeT also reduces the chances of a Deobandi attack on the Pakistani state because of the group's indoctrination process. Terrorism toward the state of Pakistan still exists and proves a great concern for security officials, but without LeT`s ability to attract young Deobandi and Barelvi recruits, the situation in Pakistan could actually be much worse. LeT is considered to be a low-level threat to the stability of Pakistani politics, while its Deobandi contemporaries are not (Gunaratna and Iqbal, 2011, p. 117). One reason that can explain this is LeT's history of not targeting the Pakistani state and its air of social responsibility toward the Pakistani state and of its peoples.

Deobandi organizations, such as JeM, enjoy better relations with AQ than LeT does; the reason for this lies within the nature of Deobandism versus the ideological basis on which LeT is formed. Deobandi organizations are considered willing to cooperate with AQ to fulfill their objective of overthrowing the current Pakistani regime and installing an Islamic state. It should come as little surprise to many that Pakistan has suffered greatly at the hands of extremists. The Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) (2011) reported that, "2113 militant, insurgent and sectarian related terrorist attacks were reported from across the country in 2010, killing 2913 people and injuring another 5824" (p. 2). In contrast, LeT's cooperative capacity with the government lies with the aspirations of receiving official support to achieve its primary goal, which is to liberate Kashmir and create a greater Mughal Islamic state. In turn, some elements of Pakistani security forces are willing to

supply LeT with whatever is necessary to continue the insurgency in Indian-controlled Kashmir. Naturally, because of LeT's dealings with the Pakistani government, many of the Deobandi groups have come to view LeT as a group very willing to work with so-called nonbelievers. An important point to consider is that LeT has not attacked members of the Pakistani government, its armed forces, nor its citizens. According to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (2014) from the University of Maryland, there have been two isolated incidents where LeT has been suspected launching attacks within Pakistan between 2001 and 2012—a graveyard and a bus of Sri Lankan cricketers. However, turf wars have occurred in the recent past where LeT has been targeted by other internal extremist groups. In July 2008, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) killed one of LeT's commanders named Shalid Khan and kidnapped more than 60 members of his group. After days of fighting and the occupation of one madrassa, two Afghan Taliban commanders (Ustad Mohamed Yasir and Maulvi Sadre Azam) negotiated a ceasefire (Guanartna and Iqbal, 2011, p. 60). This infighting led to internal splits within the TTP as some deemed it against Shari'a and Mohammed to kill other mujahedeen (Guanartna and Iqbal, 2011, pp. 60–1).

As LeT's insurgency has been primarily focused on Indian-controlled Kashmir, LeT has enjoyed support from Pakistan's armed forces and intelligence services. This does not only mean that they enjoy logistical and training support by members of the ISI and other branches of the government, but also safe haven within the borders of Pakistan. Although asserted by Riedel (2011, p. 83) that LeT's training camps are located in proximity to Pakistani army camps and that retired Pakistani military officers assist LeT, the Pakistani government denies that it offers this form of support to LeT. Some ISI training camps have been moved outside PAK to other camps beyond Pakistan, including Bangladesh (Gregory, 2007, p. 1023). Indian officials have alleged that there are ISI bases in India and in Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka in a bid to surround the Indian state (Gregory, 2007, p. 1023).

LeT does enjoy Pakistan's tolerance for the group existing within its borders. In fact, LeT and Pakistan's civil society coexist, as LeT has been able to deliver services to the public when the Pakistani government has been unable or unwilling to do so. LeT has also taken part in relief efforts outside Pakistan/Kashmir boundaries. LeT assisted in relief efforts after the 2003 earthquake in Iran and sent 20 million Pakistani rupees (PKR) to Sri Lanka after the 2004 Boxing Day earthquake that affected the region (Tankel, 2011, p. 133). By assisting the people of Sri Lanka, LeT more than likely achieved a strategic goal, as it is probable that their actions helped shore up support for the Tamil Tigers and their long-standing insurgency at the time against India.

LeT, and other groups, demonstrated their support for Kashmir during the aftermath of the 2005 earthquake; many of Pakistan's extremist proxy groups offered humanitarian assistance in a continuing bid to gain favor with the indigenous populations. The disaster aid that these groups provided was vital for the survival of the affected population. Owing to their assistance, 17 extremist groups banned by the Musharraf Administration became resurgent (Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, p. 438). In an interview with *Financial Times* on October 26, 2005, former President Musharraf did not hide the fact that extremist organizations were delivering disaster relief assistance, but he did offer this vindication: "why should we not allow our own people who are going there and assisting … whether they are jihadis or anybody?" (Johnson and Farhan, 2005). The jihadis were compensating for the humanitarian services that the Pakistani state (according to the opinion of many) should have offered for its citizens. Instead, Pakistan's army was more concerned with securing the strategic heights along the Line of Control (LoC). The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, under the banner of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), also took part in humanitarian aid operations and reconstruction of the area. NATO delivered close to 3500 tons of supplies, medical and engineering units, and specialist equipment (NATO, 2010). Although this was primarily to assist the Pakistani people and build NATO's image among the populace, it should also be presumed that they were concurrently attempting to combat the growing influence of extremist organizations in the region.

While the Pakistani army was busy resecuring the strategic heights along the LoC, LeT, under its new name, Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), was reported to have begun removing debris and providing

medical service to the earthquake victims within two hours (Behera, 2006, p. 188). LeT also claimed that it had an army of 10,000 volunteers—1000 of which were doctors (Behera, 2006, p. 188). LeT and JeM also opened a series of madrassas for orphaned children in the region (Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, p. 439). LeT opened up a field hospital in the disaster area. Its head was one Dr. Amir Khan, who has links to AQ and to its former leader (Behera, 2006, p. 438). Naturally, this is not the only instance when LeT had connections with AQ. Members of AQ have been known to occupy LeT safe havens (Fair, 2011, p. 27). According to Riedel (2011), LeT has also coordinated operations and training efforts with both AQ and the Taliban. Proxy groups such as LeT gained much support from the local population because of their efforts where the Pakistani government was found to be lacking (pp. 82–3).

FROM CHARITY TO CHAOS

LeT may have a social conscience when it comes to Pakistani civil society, humanitarian assistance, and social development through education of the sciences and humanities. However, it would be completely remiss to say that LeT does not qualify as a violent terrorist organization determined to recreate the Mughal Empire by killing Indian citizens and with the aim of overthrowing the government. LeT had the world fixated on the city of Mumbai in 2008 for several days when it committed one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in the history of India. From November 26–29, LeT planted bombs in taxis, railway cars, and attacked the Leopold Cafe as well as the historic Taj Mahal Hotel—10 terrorists working in five teams accomplished this. This attack specifically targeted sites that are popular with tourists, and included the execution of foreigners held hostage. The infamous event is sometimes referred to as 26/11, invoking the memories of the 9/11 attacks. Prior to the Mumbai attacks, LeT orchestrated a string of successful attacks on the Indian administration in Kashmir and on the Indian government. One attack in particular caused India and Pakistan to mobilize their militaries, and a nuclear standoff that ensued brought India and Pakistan the closest to military conflict since the Kashmir Conflict of 1999. Intense American diplomatic measures in addition to some trade-offs for Pakistan were required to ensure a peaceful resolution. Indian officials made it clear to the George W. Bush Administration (2001–2009) that if Pakistan continued to support terrorism in India, the situation would spiral out of the United States' power to control it (Dholakla, 2005, p. 65).

After the attacks on Indian parliament buildings on December 13, 2001, the Indian government demanded that Pakistan hand over 20 militants, including those who led the successful hijacking of an Indian airliner headed for Afghanistan in 1999 (Schaffer and Schaffer, 2011, p. 152). LeT had also carried out an attack on the Indian-controlled Kashmir legislative assembly two months prior. (Abbas, 2005, p. 225) LeT reignited the 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani crisis by launching an attack on an Indian passenger bus and barracks in Kashmir that housed the families of numerous Indian soldiers (Tankel, 2011, p. 125). This attack claimed the lives of 35 people (predominantly women and children), and brought the region even closer to nuclear exchange (Hussain, 2008, p. 109). LeT does not condone suicide attacks since such acts conflict with the Islamic religion; however LeT does condone *fidayeen* (fighting to the death) attacks. If the ISI were controlling the actions of LeT after the parliamentary attacks, then it would be assumed that further attacks would not be sanctioned given heightened tension between India and Pakistan. Some assert that actions after the Indian Parliament attack were conceived of in order to force the mobilization of Pakistani troops from the Afghan–Pakistan border to subsequently allow Taliban and AQ members free movement into Afghanistan (Clarke, 2010, p. 8). It is difficult to assess whether the relationship between the Taliban, AQ, and LeT would be strong enough to alter LeT's behavior or not. Regardless, LeT has had involvement with AQ, which will be further outlined. Regardless of this, LeT suffered from the attention that the attack received internationally, but other Kashmiri proxy groups bore the brunt of the crackdown that followed.

Shortly after the parliament attack, the international community condemned LeT. On January 12, 2002, Musharraf, in a televised announcement, banned a number of extremist groups. Many

of these extremist groups already felt resentment toward the Musharraf Administration after it allegedly "betrayed" the Taliban following the immediate events of 9/11. In May 2002, Musharraf attempted to halt the activities of the extremist groups. According to Abbas (2005), an ISI officer was informed by some leaders of the jihadi groups that they believed that not only had Musharraf betrayed the Taliban, but also the Kashmiri people (p. 226). What followed was a series of attacks against the Pakistani state and its people. LeT, however, worked within the new parameters set by the government and restricted its activities to the Kashmiri insurgency, and reduced its visibility in Pakistan (Hussain, 2008, p. 53). During the crackdown on extremist groups that took place, over 2000 activists were detained (Hussain, 2008, p. 107). After the Mumbai attacks, China was just one of many countries that in 2009 publicly rebuked LeT for its violent actions. The significance of this being that China, Pakistan's staunch strategic ally, blocked the United Nations (UN) resolution to ban LeT as a UN-defined international terrorist group in 2008 (Fair, 2011, p. 17).

Mumbai is a booming city and financial hub representing India's economic growth and has often been compared to New York. It was not the first time that LeT considered attacking an economically active city. In 2004, LeT planned an attack in Bangalore because of its booming information technology (IT) industry (Tankel, 2011, p. 146). That same year, a planned attack by against the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) was prevented (Fair, 2009, p. 10). The BSE had also been targeted in 1993. During the attack on March 12, 1993, the BSE was targeted in addition to the Air India building headquarters for Shiv Sena (a right-wing Hindu nationalist party in India), the gold market, and the Plaza Cinema (Clarke, 2010, p. 30). It is apparent that these targets were chosen based on their importance to Indian nationality and the belief in the strength of the nation.

Targeting symbols of economic strength in India shocked the country and affected the economic markets in India. It also discouraged foreign investment in what is already considered a turbulent country and therefore weakened it further economically. This approach seems to be considered more so than that of targeting open markets and government officials as terrorist attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan have become known for. Similarities can be traced between the BSE and the World Trade Center in New York—both were symbols of economic power and prosperity of Western capitalism.

LᴇT AND AL-QAEDA

The links between LeT and AQ remain contentious. Some believe that LeT shares no strong links with AQ, unlike many of its Deobandi contemporaries. There is still reason for concern though. As mentioned previously, LeT has collaborated with both the Taliban and AQ in terms of training exercises and other operations. Jones (2011) of the RAND Corporation gave testimony to the US Committee on Homeland Security (CHS), in which he pointed out that LeT is part of AQ's third tier of supporters—those who are allied groups (p. 2). The criteria of an allied group is to have a direct relationship with AQ but not so much as to be viewed as a formal member of the organization (Jones, 2011, p. 2). In the past, LeT has granted AQ members permission to use safe houses in Pakistan. Senior AQ lieutenants have been known to seek refuge at LeT safe houses in Karachi, Faisalabad, and even Rawalpindi, where Pakistan's military headquarters are stationed. One such senior AQ lieutenant was Abu Zubaydah. Zubaydah was captured on March 28, 2002 in Faisalabad. According to Riedel (2011), LeT and AQ are beginning to forge stronger operational ties (p. 83). This is substantiated by means of Riedel's assertion that militant of LeT can freely take part in missions in Afghanistan as well as in Kashmir. This level of fluidity between insurgent hotspots signals the potential expansion of LeT's targeting.

LeT founder Hafiz Mohammed Saeed is stoking the fires of anti-Westernism within Pakistan. On August 9, 2011, he blamed the CIA for the violence that took place that year in Karachi, claiming hundreds of lives (South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2014). It is easy enough to dismiss his accusations against the West as part of the more general aftershock of Western *involvement* in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, Saeed has made anti-Western assertions even before 9/11. In a 2000 interview with

Zahid Hussain for *Newsline*, Saeed referred to Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations*, saying "we believe in the clash of civilizations and our jihad will continue until Islam becomes the dominant religion" (Hussain, 2008, p. 53). One can only imagine what propaganda Saeed was proliferating after NATO helicopters killed 24 Pakistani soldiers on November 26, 2011 and the public outcry in Pakistan that followed (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC], 2011).

The United States continues working with regional actors and strengthening their capacity to contain LeT in the region (Garamone, 2011). The United States is not only working with India, but also with the governments of Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Indonesia in an attempt to restrain and geographically limit LeT to its insurgency in Kashmir and India. LeT-trained insurgents from other countries have operated in their local insurgencies such as those taking place in the Philippines and Bosnia. LeT has proved to have at least some international connections with this process. As with any terrorist organization, it is LeT's international support that proves to be its main threat multiplier. The more international support and links the organization has, the more dangerous and harder to control it becomes, and the likelihood of a successful attack also increases. Previously, LeT's international support was limited to monetary assistance from international donors. After the Mumbai attacks most international monetary assistance to LeT was virtually eliminated by a series of asset freezing abroad. LeT may have lost the ability to easily fundraise money in the Western world, but LeT never lost its support from the Pakistani government, nor its Pakistani civilian support. Similar freezing has been taken against rogue states and various terrorist groups; however, the problem with insurgencies and terrorist groups is that they are inherently adaptive. LeT is adapting by recruiting operatives in the West.

LeT is recruiting Western citizens to assist in carrying out a multitude of duties for the group, such as surveillance and recruitment. Recruiting Westerners also serves four main purposes:

> First, it enabled the group to develop a transnational network, which it used primarily for logistical and support purposes; second, it promoted Lashkar's reputation as an organization with international reach and appeal; third it allowed the group to build its brand among the Kashmiri diaspora who contributed large amounts of money to the groups fighting in Indian-administered Kashmir; and fourth it was a means of promoting the concept of jihad and propagating Lashkar's version of Ahl-e-Hadith Islam (Tankel, 2011, pp. 95–6).

By adopting this policy, LeT is strengthening its international support instead of relying on Salafi donors from the Middle East. The organization is increasing and stabilizing its global reach and connections. This policy has not only included its access to funds, but also to Western recruits.

LeT's policy of recruiting Westerners is indeed successful in terms of recruitment and surveillance. There is the well-known case of an US citizen by the name of David Coleman Headley, whose name before he changed it was Daood Sayed Galini, provided surveillance for the Mumbai attacks. Headley, having a Western name and a US passport, was able to move around freely without being harassed or questioned in detail by Indian security personnel. Headley did not act alone and was assisted by a Canadian named Tahawwur Hussain Rana (Riedel, 2011, p. 91). One might go as far as to suggest that the two conspirators are trend-setters for Western assistance to LeT, but there has been a string of isolated incidents recently indicating that the trend has already developed into policy. Two of the London bombers were trained in LeT training camps (Riedel, 2011, p. 84). Randall Todd Royer—an LeT operative with the Virginia Jihad Network—was asked to undertake reconnaissance duties on potential targets in the United States following 9/11 (Tankel, 2011, p. 97). Westerners have also served as recruiting agents for LeT. Ghulam Mustafa Rama was a citizen of the United Kingdom (UK) and was stationed in France (Tankel, 2011, p. 97). Richard Reid, the well-known "Shoe Bomber," also had ties with LeT (Fair, 2009, p. 11). The most recent LeT associate is Jubair Ahmad, who was accused and arraigned for creating Internet propaganda for dissemination on YouTube (District Court of Eastern Virginia, 2011, p. 4). Jubair Ahmad pleaded guilty in December 2011 (Pelofsky, 2011).

Disseminating propaganda over the Internet is not a new phenomenon for extremist groups. The importance of this globally accessible medium was demonstrated by AQ's operative Anwar al-Awlaki, a Yemeni cleric, but also a US citizen. His importance to AQ is highlighted by the fact that he was able to clearly explain AQ's goals and propaganda in English. Consequently, al-Awlaki was able to build ties with other disillusioned Muslims. Al-Awlaki is reported to have made connections and influenced several people, including Major Malik Hasan, the perpetrator of the Fort Hood attack that claimed the lives of 13 US personnel and injuring 30 more. Al-Awlaki encouraged "US Muslims with radical online lectures encouraging terrorist attacks" (Allen, 2008). Al-Awlaki's direct contact with Hasan assisted in his digression to radicalism (Nelson and Bodurian, 2010, p. 4). It seems very likely that the continuation of al-Alwaki's broadcasts and interaction with others over the Internet would have sparked another attack in the future.

LeT's global propaganda is still in its infancy. Clearly, the propaganda video made by Jubair Ahmad was not a significant threat like al-Awlaki's broadcasts, but that does not mean that the potential does not exist. Aside from propaganda potential, according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Ahmad also received weapons and commando tactics instruction at an LeT training camp before his arrival to the United States (District Court of Eastern Virginia, 2011, p. 3). If LeT were to instruct a US citizen, with links to LeT, to plant a bomb or commit a destabilizing act, rather than just conducting surveillance for AQ or for a possible mission, the situation would be deadly. According to the FBI, Ahmad was in direct contact with Talha Saeed, Hafiz Saeed's son (District Court of Eastern Virginia, 2011, p. 5). Hafiz Mohammed Saeed is already propagating that the United States, Israel, and the West attack Pakistan with impunity. Talha Saeed may succeed his father, or at least have a more proactive approach to the West than his father and the current leadership. Tankel (2011) asserts that, "Lashkar's precise connection to various operations and motivation are not always clear. It is sometimes difficult to determine when elements in the group were acting quasi-independently or factions were pursuing their own agendas" (p. 148). It may be difficult to ascertain LeT's connections to operations and what its global goals are exactly. However, because of the Afghan and Iraq theaters of war, LeT has operated outside its normal geo-parameters of the Indian subcontinent. Moreover, LeT has had operatives in the West conducting surveillance, recruitment, and propaganda missions. It may be difficult to ascertain the exact motivations, but the threat is still apparent.

CONCLUSION: Lᴇᴛ AND THE FUTURE

Currently, LeT is conducting its major activities solely within South Asia. It is known that LeT has operatives within the United States and throughout Western Europe, and that LeT's founder, Hafiz Saeed, is lecturing on how the West conspires against Pakistan. Drone attacks, the incursion of US Special Forces to kill bin Laden, and the recent deaths of 24 Pakistani soldiers in a NATO helicopter attack do not help the case of the West and further fuel anti-Westerner sentiment. There have been isolated incidents linking LeT to activity in Afghanistan, including the capture of one LeT commander in Ghazni province (ISAF, 2013). ISAF argues that the LeT commander was part of attacks that occurred in Kunar, Kandahar, and Ghazni, had links to foreign fighters, and "was actively planning a high-profile attack at the time of his arrest" (ISAF, 2013). A year earlier, another LeT insurgent was killed in an airstrike in Kunar province. The individual killed orchestrated attacks on Afghan and coalition forces (American Forces Press Service [AFPS], 2012). Although still remaining a very regional player, LeT does prove to demonstrate that it is willing to work with other terrorist organizations even if it means fulfilling a small role. It is probable that LeT will provide both direct and indirect support for other organizations operating beyond the geographic limits of South Asia if their interests align and collaboration proves to be beneficial.

Officials of the United States are concerned whether LeT will break out of the South Asian subcontinent and begin operating on a more global scale, and rightly so. Since 9/11 and the Administration of former President George W. Bush, the United States government has shown keen

interest in bolstering its ties with India and increasing Indian military capabilities. American officials, including former Secretary of the Navy, James Webb, are outspoken in their views that both the US and India should be formulating a tighter security relationship to counteract a rising China (Hathaway, 2002, p. 21). This has led to increased US and Israeli arms deals with India, increased diplomatic ties, and the civilian nuclear deal that Pakistan has been repeatedly denied. All of this, combined with poor Indian relations with Pakistan and its people, may assist an LeT attack on, or targeting of, the United States in an effort to injure the actor that is increasing the strength of its enemy. Once one adds in the recent history of captured operatives in the United States and Western Europe, who have had dealings with LeT, and the lectures of Hafiz Saeed, this is a possibility that may soon become reality.

We observed with the Mumbai attacks, the specific and deliberate targeting of tourist hotspots that are popular among Western and Israeli tourists. These targeted killings (attacks perpetrated by terrorists) may have been decided upon, because of the belief of a Judeo-Christian crusade against Muslims. However, with the increase of diplomatic, military, and intelligence ties between India and the West—the continuity of these targeted attacks seem inevitable and the probability of the proliferation of violence in other countries high.

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12 The Haqqani Network
Keeping Insurgency in the Family

Scott Nicholas Romaniuk and Stewart Tristan Webb

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

In 2013, President Barack Obama took it upon himself to create a special operations group in Kabul, Afghanistan, to address the persistent threat posed by the long-standing terrorist and insurgent group: the Haqqani Network. Since United States (US) operations began in Afghanistan in 2001 under President George W. Bush, US and allied forces have contended with the violent persistence of the Haqqani Network while simultaneously orchestrating operations against the Taliban. For more than a decade, while US forces operated in Afghanistan, Haqqani militants challenged the success of US- and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)–led operations against Taliban strong-holds and allied efforts to liberate the country from oppressive Taliban rule. During this period, the Haqqani Network demonstrated its resilience against a coalition of states utilizing sophisticated technologies and weaponry, and that fielded thousands of soldiers under the umbrella of air superi-ority. The Haqqani Network has entrenched itself in the region and successfully defined itself as one that is much more than a mere insurgent group. Pitching beyond this point, the Haqqani Network has indeed forged a position for itself in the political landscape of Afghanistan. Decisions made by the Haqqani Network extend deep into the political process and life of the country, and as Grewal (2013) notes that decision-making of the Network in foreseeable future "has the potential to greatly affect the future of Afghanistan" (p. 1).

Despite the cessation of major US operations in Afghanistan, the Haqqani Network poses a mon-umental challenge to the United States and its partners and their mutual security at home and abroad. Researchers at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point including some of the US' leading research institutes and policy centers have targeted the Network, making it a central component of their research agendas. However, there is still a lot to be understood about this group. Further research is needed to assist on the growing demand that the Haqqani Network will place on US intelligence services, high-ranking military personnel, and politicians. Although the United States

has largely removed its expeditionary forces from Afghanistan, the US Government (USG) will probably maintain a military presence in Afghanistan for the long term. Thus, so long as the United States and its friends and allies postmilitary personnel in Afghanistan and the region surrounding the war-torn country, the Haqqani Network will continue to pose a broad-scale security threat to the United States and partner countries. This chapter approaches the subject matter of the Haqqani Network by examining its leadership, operational capabilities, and ties to other militant groups and states. It looks specifically at how the Haqqani Network has been able to utilize local, human, cultural, political, and international conditions to maintain and strengthen itself over recent years. This, in addition to its exemplary decision-making ability, has been the defining element of the Haqqani family and its survival through the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

ASYMMETRIC THREAT

Leadership: Haqqani at the Helm

The Haqqani Network constitutes a part of the general insurgency operating within Afghanistan. It is based in Pakistan's North Waziristan—part of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) (Institute for the Study of War [ISW], 2015). The group has its roots in the 1970s when drastic changes were taking place in the strategic environment of Central and South Asia. Some very prominent terrorist networks and insurgencies have received considerable support from the Haqqani Network. The September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks against the US homeland was conducted by al-Qaeda (AQ), but to say that the network orchestrated the operations entirely on its own would be grossly misleading. Haqqani Network assistance by means of planning, training, and even execution elevated the operation from conception to fruition (Rassler and Brown, 2011; Grewal, 2013). Grewal (2013) has recently opined that since the Haqqani Network has been able to maintain control of a specific area from which it can plan and implement incidents of violent terrorist acts, it has been able to do exactly that and comfortably support those of other groups such as AQ. Over a decade of relationship building with other groups has led to the establishment of AQ and Taliban presence and influence in numerous provinces. The Haqqani Network played a pivotal role in the establishment of AQ infrastructure (The Fund For Peace [FFP], 2011, p. 5). Although the group has demonstrated remarked resilience in the face of coalition forces, the Haqqani Network has not been active through the entire country of Afghanistan. The network mainly operates in the eastern part of the country—Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Ghazni Wardak, and Kabul provinces—but in these regions alone a large range of factors have conditioned the Haqqani Network to perform in the way it does (ISW, 2015) (Table 12.1).

TABLE 12.1

The Haqqani Network Structure

Tier 1	Senior Haqqani commanders in North Waziristan task: Provide strategic guidance and financing
Tier 2	Senior local commanders with familial ties to the area task: District or multiple village level (i.e., company level commanders)
Tier 3	Locally based group leaders task: Serve as group leaders, conduits for foreign forces and handle local recruiting, handle local logistics (i.e., platoon leaders)
Tier 4	Core fighters task: Dependable, serious fighters, essentially on retainer for the insurgency (i.e., sergeants)
Tier 5	Cash fighters task: Local recruits fighting for money, nonideological, part-time fighters

Source: From Dressler, J. A., *The Haqqani Network: From Pakistan to Afghanistan*. Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Washington, DC, 2010.

Afghanistan is multiethnic with approximately 14 ethnic groups spread across the country—Baluch, Chahar Aimak, Turkmen, Hazara, Pakhtun, Tajik, Uzbek, Nuristani, Arab, Kirghiz, Pashai, and Persian (Grewal, 2013, p. 3). These ethnic groups became situated across the country as a result of centuries of peoples traveling and navigating the country for centuries. Economic and trade interests moved peoples and goods across thousands of kilometers of territory. Since Afghanistan occupied one of the most strategic locales of the ancient world, many set their sights on the area with the aim of building wealth and prosperity. The Haqqani Network is linked to this group of tribes. One in particular—the Zadran Tribe from the highlands Pakhtuns (known as the Nang Pakhtuns)—exists in both Afghanistan and Pakistan "with the establishment of the Durand Line" (Grewal, 2013, p. 4). Nang Pakhtuns comprise a society led by clerics rather than being a tribal-led society with their Islamic principles rooted in Deobandism. Jones (2008) explains the significance of the Deobandi interpretation.

> Deobandism is a conservative Islamic orthodoxy that follows a Salafist egalitarian model and seeks to emulate the life and times of Prophet Mohammed. The Deobandi philosophy was founded in 1867 at the Dar ul-Ulum (Abode of Islamic Learning) madrassa in Deoband, India. Deobandi madrassas flourished across South Asia, and they were officially supported in Pakistan when President Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq assumed control of Pakistani government in 1977. Deobandism became widely practiced in Pakistan, and to a lesser degree in Afghanistan, with the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam as its primary political proponent. It holds that a Muslim's primary obligation and principle loyalty are to his religion. Deobandis believe they have a sacred right and obligation to wage jihad to protect the Muslims of any country (p. 27).

Jalaluddin Haqqani is thought to be in charge of the network although it has been reported that his son (Siraj Haqqani) has assumed command of the network. Siraj is said to have taken over the Haqqani Network owing to his father's age (born circa 1930–1938) and resultant medical issues. Prior to operations against the United States and NATO, Haqqani (senior) was involved in campaigns against the Soviets during the 1980s. His history during the resistance of the Soviet invasion earned him a reputation for being a fervent fighter. Haqqani's reputation for being a devoted defender of Afghanistan against foreign attracted many followers.

When Jalaluddin was born, he was immediately exposed to an environment in which highland Pakhtun's were ready to defend their territory and their Islamic beliefs. Studying at the Dar al-'Ulum Haqqaniyya madrassa (the birthplace of Pakhtun Islamism) located in the North West Frontier Province heavily influenced the up-and-coming leader. Prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan a group of Haqqaniyya graduates known as the "Haqqaniyya network," states Grewal (2013), "used practices of Islamist mobilization in the highland tribal area of both Pakistan and Afghanistan from which many of the Taliban leadership arose" (p. 5). Jalaluddin Haqqani first introduced jihad in Afghanistan in 1973. According to Mawlawli Aziz Khan, one of the Haqqani Network's early members described Jalaluddin's declaration:

> As soon as Daoud declared the establishment of the Republic through the national radio, Mawlawi Sahib Jalaluddin Haqqani declared jihad in the village of Nika, Zadran, and raised the flag of jihad there. He announced the commencement of jihad by loud speakers throughout the region, and some ulama and Taliban [madrassa students] joined him (Rassler and Brown, 2013, p. 45).

1973 marked the moment at which the Haqqani Network would follow a long path of fighting for the autonomy of the Nang Pakhtun (Grewal, 2013). The Soviet invasion leveraged the Haqqani Network's desire to fight for their homeland. This was a critical point in alliance building for the network. The network first turned to a number of influential Afghan Islamists (i.e., Yunis Khalis, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, 'Abd al-Rabb Rasul Sayyf, Burhanudin Rabani, and Ahmad Shah Massoud) all of whom were brought together by an Islamist movement in the country's capital Kabul (Grewal,

2013, pp. 5–6; Rassler and Brown, 2011). The formulation of alliances extended beyond these ties. As Grewal (2013) explains,

> eventually, the Haqqani Network would strategically align itself with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's group Hizb-e-Islami. The alliance provided the greater Pakhtun movement with the necessary strength to control a large portion of the Afghan Mujahidin. This alliance is also significant because it was maintained until the network decided to ally with the Taliban (p. 6).

An interesting political arrangement nearly came to fruition during the early part of Hamid Karzai's tenure. The Afghan president extended the invitation to Jalaluddin Haqqani to serve as the country's prime minister in Kabul, however, the presence of US forces constrained Jalaluddin's ability to accept the offer. Had Jalaluddin accepted Karzai's offer, the political marriage that would have resulted would have likely held a very short shelf life as differing political views on the presence of US forces divided the two figures. Nonetheless, Karzia recognized potential in Jalaluddin as a political leader. The outcome of the invitation to serve the country in a prominent political role and eventual assassination attempts against the Afghan president by the Network under Jalaluddin represents an immense level of instability not only within Afghanistan more generally but also within the political system of that country. A serious question emerges from this early interaction. In what capacity is Afghanistan (under the leadership of Karzai and in a post-US presence era) expected to coexist with a network that fundamentally disagrees with the political visions of the country's existing leadership? Internal strain could easily be aggravated if Afghanistan's external relations with other states, shifts negatively.

During the Soviet occupation, Jalaluddin's base in Zhawar was only a few miles from the Pakistan border, which granted him easy access to the movement of weapons and supplies from Pakistan. It consisted of a series of tunnels, "arms depots and repair shops, a garage, a medical station, a radio center a kitchen, a mosque and a hotel" (Braithwaite, 2011, p. 214). In 1985, the Afghan army (supported by the Soviets) were able to overrun the base, albeit with difficulty, but withdrew shortly thereafter. Within a few days, Jalaluddin reclaimed his former base. Reprisal policies trailed closely behind. Jalaluddin's forces executed 78 Afghan army officers to send a message to others still resisting and potential opposition. Jalaluddin was also politically shrewd and often planned with considerable strategic vision. His use of coercion and a monopoly of violence during the mujahedeen insurgency him the admiration of Pakistanis and even many Americans. The infamous US Senator Charlie Wilson met with Jalaluddin and pronounced him "goodness personified" (Braithwaite, 2011, p. 215). In the late 1980s, he was celebrated by the ISI and idolized in Saudi Arabia; and this in turn developed his links with Wahabbis madrassas and the ISI (Coll, 2004, p. 157). Haqqani also ran funding offices in Saudi Arabia like many of the mujahedeen commanders.

It was not only his proximity to the border, but also the ties that he developed with the Americans and Pakistanis that granted him a substantial share of materiel support. Jalaluddin was the first mujahedeen commander to welcome and incorporate Arab volunteers into his ranks. Foreign additions began in 1987 (Ruttig, 2009, p. 75). After the Soviet withdrawal, Jalaluddin was quick to align himself with the Taliban and rose through their ranks to become a Taliban minister. A number of key factors contribute the threat level posed by Haqqani as leader of the network. First, he has tremendous experience as a field commander and political shrewdness. Second, he has been instrumental in bringing together fighters and forming groups dedicated to the eradication of invading (US and allied) forces in the region. He was one of many mujahedeen leadership that created Hizb-e-Islami and subsequently the Hezb-e-Islami (Khalis) (HIK) (ISW, 2015). Third, not only has he been trained by highly skilled forces in Central Asia, Haqqani also benefitted from close ties with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in previous years and maintained fruitful Pakistani connections. Fourth, he is instrumental in building and operating madrasses and training camps in North Waziristan. Fifth, Haqqani uses religiously based techniques and radical Islamic principles to influence and fuel the resolve of Muslims (ISW, 2015).

CAPABILITIES: WAR STRATEGIES AND TACTICS

The Haqqani network need not claim responsibility for many of the attacks that have taken place in eastern Afghanistan. So violent have their assailments been that the US has properly identified the network as the primary perpetrators of attacks in the area (ISW, 2015). Siraj Haqqani has been responsible for "kidnappings, assassinations, beheading women, indiscriminate killing and suicide bombers—Siraj is the one dictating the new parameters of brutality associated with Taliban senior leadership" (Roggio, 2007). Accordingly, the threshold of violence elevated by Haqqani amongst insurgent and extremist groups is one of the most dangerous aspects of the network. Garamone and Mays (2007) explain, "Siraj Haqqani's extended reach brings foreign fighters from places such as Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Chechnya, Turkey, and Middle Eastern countries into Afghanistan. His reach now certainly exceeds that of his father, and Siraj is working to rival Mullah Omar for the Taliban leadership."

Under the leadership of Siraj (and perhaps being advised by his father) the Haqqani Network's targets extend beyond locals and foreign soldiers thus vastly broadening the peril of Haqqani. The network has also taken on the role of attacking government buildings both within and beyond Afghanistan. In 2009, the network attacked government buildings in Kabul (Oppel et al., 2009). In 2008, the network also planned and attempted the assassination of Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai. Haqqani's assassination attempt presented a slight shift in the network's targeting program. Since that point, figures of authority became part of their violent program (Peter, 2011). Figure 12.1 illustrates the incidents that the Haqqani network has been involved in over time. In total, there have been 66 violent attacks carried out by the group. The Haqqani's ties with Pakistan are also evident in its operations. In 2008, disinterest in being confined by national boundaries, Haqqani orchestrated the attack against the Indian Embassy (Mazzetti and Schmitt, 2008). The Haqqanis are also known to have been involved in the Pakistani-supported Kashmir insurgency in the past (Figures 12.2 through 12.4).

FIGURE 12.1   Haqqani incidents over time (1970–2013). (From Global Terrorism Database (GTD), Haqqani, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START): A Center of Excellence of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, University of Maryland, MD, 2014.)

FIGURE 12.2 Haqqani incidents by attack type (1970–2013). (From Global Terrorism Database (GTD), Haqqani, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START): A Center of Excellence of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, University of Maryland, MD, 2014.)

The rise of the Haqqani Network did not start at the outset of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan through Operation Enduring Freedom. However, the causes for the Haqqani vexation do. Jalaluddin Haqqani was not invited to the Boon Conference in 2001 even though he was a Taliban minister. Instead, his rival, Pacha Khan Zadran, who was from a rival Zadran sub tribe and US supporter, was welcomed to attend (Ruttig, 2009, p. 66). This diplomatic snub did not propel the formation of the organization. Even by mid-2002, many of Haqqani's followers still supported the UN mission in Kabul but unheeded objections and fury from local villagers concerning US aerial bombings slowly shifted the Haqqanis toward insurgency (Ruttig, 2009, p. 67). In 2004, the Haqqani network formed but was limited to "waging small-unit, small-arms, hit-and-run attacks on U.S. bases just a mile or two across the border from Pakistan" (Ruttig, 2009, p. 68). In 2005 Jalaluddin's son, Siraj Haqqani, identified himself as head of the Taliban military committees for the following Afghan

FIGURE 12.3 Haqqani incidents by target type (1970–2013). (From Global Terrorism Database (GTD), Haqqani, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START): A Center of Excellence of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, University of Maryland, MD, 2014.)

FIGURE 12.4 Haqqani incidents by weapon type (1970–2013). (From Global Terrorism Database (GTD), Haqqani, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START): A Center of Excellence of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, University of Maryland, MD, 2014.)

provinces: Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Ghanzi, and Logar. Even by 2006, the Haqqani network's concentration was conducting propaganda activities, which included calls to "all those working in the government, the Afghan army, the occupation forces and the administrative system to terminate their involvement" and some of these calls were conducted by Jalaluddin himself (Ruttig, 2009, p. 68). In 2007, US forces identified the Zamdar area of Khost province to be a main insurgent haven. 2007 marked a change in the dynamic of attacks made by Haqqani with most of them being cross-border attacks.

EXTERNAL SUPPORT: TIES WITH PAKISTAN

The Haqqani network's relationship with Pakistan runs deep. Both the Haqqani network and the ISI forged a relationship when Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan. Both Pakistan and the ISI were strong supporters of the Haqqani-led jihad against Soviet invaders (ISW, 2015). Their relationship continued over a period of many years (Joscelyn, 2011). Those same authorities invited Haqqani to Islamabad with the intention of discussing plans of establishing a post-Taliban government in Kabul. Playing host to a group that many expected was about to be dislodged from Afghanistan indefinitely, Haqqani was granted sanctuary in North Waziristan by Pakistani authorities. There, Haqqani was able to rebuild his network as well as the Taliban.

> The ISI gave refuge to the Taliban leadership after it fled Afghanistan and to its allies, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of the Hizb-e Islami party, who arrived from exile in Iran and operated freely in the NWFP under ISI protection. Hekmatyar opened an office in the Shamshato Camp for Afghan refugees, near Peshawar, which was swiftly turned into a Hizb-e Islami base. Jalaluddin Haqqani, who the ISI had promoted as a possible "moderate" Taliban, was given sanctuary in North Waziristan, where he rebuilt his network on both sides of the border. The remnants of other foreign groups, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), settled in South Waziristan (Rashid, 2009, p. 220).

The Pakistani government has also been supportive of the Haqqani movement by funding and releasing known terrorists and skilled fighters from custody so that they could (re)join Haqqani's rank (Hussain, 2013; ISW, 2015). The Haqqani family is seen as a valuable ally and security stabilizer by some elements of Pakistan's ISI and Frontier Corps. Both have repeatedly called

upon Haqqani to pressure the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan [TTP]) to cease attacks on Pakistan's security forces and to divert their attention to Afghan and Western forces in Afghanistan instead (Ruttig, 2009, p. 76). The Haqqanis have also been able to provide training for Kashmiri proxy groups. Jalaluddin confirmed this in an interview in 1991 (Ruttig, 2009, p. 77). After the Soviet withdrawal of Afghanistan, Pakistan's ISI attempted to transfer many of the mujahedeen fighters to Kashmir with the intention of targeting India. This was not only a strategy to irritate an enemy over a territorial dispute but also to divert Islamists from targeting Pakistan.

This deep and historical connection with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) proves to be a stumbling block to neutralize the organization. "Most analysts believe that even though the Pakistani army and the ISI are now more willing to go after militant groups, they continue some form of alliance with groups they want to use as a strategic hedge against India and Afghanistan" (Bajoria, 2011). Much of Haqqani's strength can be drawn from the power of a nation state. It is difficult to understate the role that Pakistan and powerful ISI officers have played in supporting elements of the network. Grewal (2013) and Perlez et al. (2010) describe the problematic relationship between the Haqqani Network and Pakistan (including some of Pakistan's important military and intelligence leaders) thusly:

> The US Government debated on recognizing the Haqqani Network as a terrorist group because of the impact it will have on the US and Pakistan relationship. The Haqqani Network is deeply rooted in Miram Shah, Pakistan, and Paktia Province, Afghanistan and is reportedly closely affiliated with the Pakistani Army. The sheer fact that the head of the Pakistani Army, General Kayani, and Pakistan's spy chief, Lieutenant General. Ahmad Shuja Pasha, were able to facilitate face-to-face meetings with President Hamid Karzai, demonstrates the relationship between the Pakistan Army and the Haqqani Network (p. 8).

THE HAQQANI WAVE: EXPLOITATION AND MANIPULATION

The Haqqani network has made use of numerous aspects of its environment to continue its violent cause. It takes into account the geographical features Central Asia to support its operations while simultaneously looking to the sociopolitical and religious dimensions of the region and its peoples. This section looks at those features and briefly explores them in order to broadly characterize how the Haqqani network maintains its position as well as how it is able to present itself as a critical threat to both the United States and allied security. The Haqqani Network maintains an ongoing dialog with other insurgent leaders in and around Central Asia. This includes Taliban leaders with whom the network collaborates to enhance the power of their existing forces in Afghanistan (Roggio, 2012). For example, the Haqqani Network predominantly operates in eastern Afghanistan—the result of an arrangement with Taliban leaders throughout the country. The area is mountainous and ideal for maintaining insurgency against forces that face difficulty and continuous challenges in accessing the region. This is also an area in which the Haqqani network is able to boast consistently strong support and a regional history. Haqqani areas of operation are also ideally situated near the border of Pakistan and the FATA, enabling accessibility between Pakistan and Haqqani. The geographic proximity is also suitable for Haqqani to operate its madrasses and training camps in both North and South Waziristan (ISW, 2015).

Religion is an important factor that raises the danger level of the network for US forces, its allies, and regional security. It claims to draw on the radical Islamic principles and teaching of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, "which were prevalent," according to the ISW (2015), "among many of the religiously-motivated Afghan mujahedeen of that time." Religious seminaries are part of the institutionalized process developed by the network over previous years, and these are what facilitate the integration of foreign fighters into Haqqani. Bestializing the Islamic religion has the ability to support the network's cause by drawing in potentially thousands of disillusioned young Muslims and causing rifts within religious (i.e., Muslim) communities. Jalaluddin Haqqani is one Afghanistan's most notable Islamist pioneers, but some having met him believe that the founding of the madrasas

is not based solely on religious zealotry. Madrasas attract many Arab donors and are therefore significant sources of income (Ruttig, 2009, p. 73). Deobandi madrassas, in particular, have

> afforded the clerical leaders a base of manpower capable of sustaining talib militias, periodically fielded by these clerical leaders to either resist the encroachment of state power or to enforce social-moral control, which accorded mullas a military power that they could use in pursuit of personal or ideological objects, becoming a coercive influence within the tribal set-up (Rassler and Brown, 2013, p. 25).

This ties into Saudi Arabian idolization of Jalaluddin during the Soviet occupation and his connections with Wahhabism. Three decades of Haqqani existence has allowed it to build unique interpersonal relationships and connections, and formulate a strategic approach that has far-reaching effects on other near and distant actors. The fact that the Haqqani network is semi-autonomous (although the Taliban have claimed that it operates under their control) lends a great deal of operational flexibility to the organization. This in turn allows it to make a strong impact not only in eastern Afghanistan, but also further afield (Rassler and Brown, 2011).

THE HAQQANI NETWORK AS A STRATEGIC THREAT

The Haqqani Network is the most tactical, operational, and strategic political-military group (insurgent group) in Afghanistan today. It represents a comprehensive threat to Afghanistan, the United States, and Pakistan primarily, and other countries in the region, including the US' friends and allies. Their predominant focus is on Afghanistan but their interests extend beyond the borders of this country. They are tied to other insurgent groups and networks operating in the region. Their connections with like-minded insurgent organizations greatly heighten the level of threat that it poses to both the United States and its friends and allies. Afghanistan is at great risk because of Haqqani connections with militants operating in the north. Haqqani's partnership with the AQ-linked Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) grants Haqqani strategic reach across the entire country. It is likely that the Haqqani Network will maintain its close ties with other insurgent and terrorist groups; however, Haqqani is also likely to broaden its connections with other groups operating elsewhere in the world, particularly if they seek to damage the United States.

Allied forces operating in Afghanistan, since 2002, have done little to weaken the Haqqani Network and to reduce its overall capabilities. Pakistan and the ISI have served a critical role in allowing the Haqqani Network to convalesce in the aftermath of the most recent foreign invasion of Afghanistan. Although Hamid Karzi has been successfully instilled as the president of Afghanistan neither he nor his entourage is immune from the violent capabilities of Haqqani. There should remain a great deal of incredulity regarding any prospects for the Karzai government and the Haqqani Network to work side-by-side much less coexist. The Haqqani Network has expanded its types of attacks, its target types, and the types of weapons that it uses in those attacks over the past several years. The number of incidents has increased steadily since 2002 only to decline in the past year. Since the Haqqani Network has made connections with other militant groups it has the potential to exercise much broader and deeper operations. The group currently maintains a sizeable presence in Afghanistan's eastern region and operates alongside a large Taliban presence or influence, and the significant presence or influence of antigovernment elements. It is now able to attack the south of the country and even launch attacks into Pakistan's northeastern region. Afghanistan's north is not immune to Haqqani influence either.

Haqqani's control of entry points to and from Pakistan is a golden chalice in its strategic posture. Although the border is already porous, the route grants Haqqani even greater access to regions inside Pakistan's FATA (Paktia, Ningrahar, and Konar) and potentially elsewhere in Pakistan's northern regions. Operating in the FATA also brings Haqqani in closer contact with Pakistan's ISI. Pakistan is a continuous supply source for Haqqani operations in Afghanistan. Fighters and vital materials make their way back to Afghanistan to fuel an ongoing campaign within that country.

With increased presence and control over Afghanistan's eastern regions, the group is consolidating a key region from which to launch attacks and exert its influence over Kabul. It is possible that the Afghan government is now fighting a losing battle in which Haqqani control of the capital city is only a matter of time.

Pakistan is able to project its presence or influence into Afghanistan via the Haqqani Network. Haqqani's connections with Pakistani intelligence and military officers means that the Pakistani government is able to follow through on its strategic objectives in Afghanistan by maximizing its political influence around Kabul, "maintain 'strategic depth' by securing terrain in southern and eastern Afghanistan" (Dressler, 2012, p. 38), restrain the influence of the United States as well as other actors in the region such as India, manage the operations of other insurgent groups in the region and limit their capabilities to Afghanistan, and place limitations on the capacity of the United States and its allies to operate in Afghanistan over a longer period. The Haqqani Network has also maintained a very successful and secure leadership and power structure. Having been at the insurgent game for approximately three decades, the Haqqani Network has blatantly demonstrated its devotion to ideological cause and therefore reveals absolutely no sign of relinquishing its historic gains or negotiating with its enemies.

Force withdrawals made by the United States and coalition forces have more than ostensibly left the Haqqani Network as the most powerful player in the country. The Haqqani Network is now building it momentum and regaining ground lost during the coalition campaign years. The removal of considerable coalition forces has left the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) to confront the Haqqani Network (in addition to the Taliban, Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin [HiG], al-Qaeda and Associated Movements [AQAM], other criminals, and antigovernment elements) alone. The ANSF have not received proper support through Afghan governance and rule of law efforts. The ANSF is hindered by the government's inability to tackle corruption, the narcotics trade, healthy criminal network activity, and to see the existence of these issues as serious national security threats. Immense underfunding and poor channeling of existing funds has resulted in consistent shortfalls for the ANSF. Vastly uncompetitive salaries, damaging level of attrition, and high turnover have also taken their toll on the capabilities of Afghanistan's forces. These matters are amplified by poor leadership, lack of strategic vision, obvious analytical and intelligence disabilities, and the poor practice of illogical setting of political and military objectives (Cordesman, 2013, pp. iii–iv).

CONCLUSION

The Haqqani network has existed far longer than either the Taliban or AQ and "has played a key role of terror [of] both" (Goodenough, 2013). The Haqqani Network is much more than a mere confluence of religiously inspired fighters operating in parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Above and beyond the Haqqani network having been able to draw foreign fighters from numerous countries across the Middle East, it is also capable of training them in a network of madrassas and training camps supported by foreign funds, and spreading its radical Islamic ideology to other major insurgent groups that have posed a tremendous threat to the United States for years. The Haqqanis have survived the turbulent years through the Soviet occupation, rise of the Taliban, and what was thought to be their collapse in Afghanistan. According to some Pakistani analysts, the Haqqanis are seen to be a stabilizing factor for the country and as a strategic asset that will maintain some control over regional militancy. The Haqqanis have been pivotal in diverting TTP attacks on Pakistan targets and providing training for Kashmiri fighters when the ISI was shifting its priorities from Afghanistan to Kashmir. This was also a similar circumstance when the ISI was trying to divert the threat of Islamist extremism from targeting Pakistan.

Even as a nonstate actor, the Haqqani network is the recipient of immense aid from Pakistan (Bajoria, 2011). Pakistani military and intelligence agencies are able to strengthen its power base on local, regional, and global levels as a result (Rassler and Brown, 2011). The Haqqani Network is

unique insomuch as it is a particular actor that has the benefits of state actors and operates in multiple dimensions. As Rassler and Brown (2011) note, "while the Haqqani Network is a sophisticated and dangerous organization in its own right, the group is best understood as a nexus player, tying together a diverse mix of actors central to various conflict networks." The Haqqani Network has come to embody a conviction that can be utilized by others sharing similar sentiments about the defense of their mutual and respective lands in the face of a demonized US and allied force structure. The group transcends national borders, largely through its radical Islamic ideology that brings peoples together. It binds them in a mutual moral cause primarily against the United States. The Haqqanis were shrewd not to begin their insurgency in Afghanistan until there was a local disenfranchisement with the Afghan government and NATO forces, because of the US aerial bombings of local villages. This allowed the Haqqani Network to form under a moral banner and strengthen their followers' resolve.

In recent years, it has achieved a level of recognition that has only been gained by the Taliban itself. The group's objective, as made clear by its current leadership, is the expulsion of foreign forces occupying Afghanistan. Following withdrawal of United States and allied forces, the Network's aspirations should come as little surprise. Given that the United States and its coalition partners will be withdrawing all of their forces from Afghanistan by 2016, and that a renewed rebellion against the Afghan government is likely to take place, the Haqqani network will remain a significant, if not the most important, player in the country.

FURTHER RESEARCH

There are a number of ways to analyze the Haqqani Network. As the strategic environment in Afghanistan and in the surrounding region changes new questions about what Haqqani is, how it is structured, and what it intends to do in the future will need to be addressed. The withdrawal of coalition forces is probably one of the most significant changes to have begun over the past several years that will bring about changes in the region. Force reductions in any theater of operations usually precipitate a change opportunity-assessment by military groups operating in the same areas. The Afghan army, even before the withdrawal of ISAF forces, has shown signs of weakness. Levels of training, equipment procurement and dispersal, and overall government support has left the Karzai government's forces underprepared to deal with a host of enemies that have acted as natural protectors' easily defendable territory. The primary aim of this chapter was to assess and demonstrate the abilities of the Haqqani Network over a long period of time. It has also sought to demonstrate the degree to which one can expect the Haqqani Network to be involved in the future of Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent, Pakistan. Overall, one should expect the group to play a considerable role. Haqqani's future operations are likely to be influenced quite heavily by US policy not solely with regard to the Middle East and Arab states, but also in terms of how the US and its friends and allies will respond to the rise of other extremist or military groups displaying either affable or disputatious ideologies and strategic objectives.

APPENDIX: HISTORY OF HAQQANI NETWORK ATTACKS, 2003–2013

Date	Country	City	Perpetrator	Killed	Injured	Target Type
11-10-2013	PK	Wana	Mujahedeen Ansar	3	2	Military, private citizens, and property
01-10-2013	PK	Swabi	N/A	0	2	Private citizens and property
04-09-2013	AFG	Sharan	Haqqani Network	1	0	Private citizens and property

(Continued)

Date	Country	City	Perpetrator	Killed	Injured	Target Type
03-08-2013	AFG	Jalalabad	Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)	12	22	Government (diplomatic)
04-07-2013	PK	Boyya	N/A	6	8	Military
13-04-2013	PK	Swabi	N/A	0	0	Private citizens and property
27-02-2013	PK	Karachi	Haqqani Network	0	0	Police
08-09-2012	AFG	Kabul	Taliban	7	4	Government (general), military
01-06-2012	AFG	Khost	Haqqani Network	21	N/A	Military
16-04-2012	AFG	Wazir Akbar Khan	Haqqani Network	3	3	Government (diplomatic)
15-04-2012	AFG	Gardez	Haqqani Network	2	3	Business
15-04-2012	AFG	Kabul	Haqqani Network	2	3	Business
15-04-2012	AFG	N/A	Haqqani Network	2	3	Government (general)
15-04-2012	AFG	Qabel Bay	Haqqani Network	2	3	Military
15-04-2012	AFG	Qabel Bay	Haqqani Network	2	3	Military
15-04-2012	AFG	Wazir Akbar Khan	Haqqani Network	2	3	Government (diplomatic)
15-04-2012	AFG	Jalalabad	Haqqani Network	2	3	Government (diplomatic)
15-04-2012	AFG	Kabul	Haqqani Network	2	3	Military
15-04-2012	AFG	Kabul	Haqqani Network	2	3	Government (general)
15-04-2012	AFG	Kabul	Haqqani Network	2	3	Government (diplomatic)
15-04-2012	AFG	Pol-e Alam	Haqqani Network	2	3	Military
15-04-2012	AFG	Pol-e Alam	Haqqani Network	2	3	Police
15-04-2012	AFG	Pol-e Alam	Haqqani Network	2	3	Government (general)
15-04-2012	AFG	Gardez	Haqqani Network	2	3	Police
15-04-2012	AFG	Wazir Akbar Khan	Haqqani Network	2	3	Government (diplomatic)
15-04-2012	AFG	Jalalabad	Haqqani Network	2	3	Military, airports, and aircraft
15-04-2012	AFG	Kabul	Haqqani Network	2	3	Business
15-04-2012	AFG	Wazir Akbar Khan	Haqqani Network	2	3	Government (diplomatic)
15-04-2012	AFG	Wazir Akbar Khan	Haqqani Network	2	3	Government (diplomatic)
15-04-2012	AFG	Wazir Akbar Khan	Haqqani Network	2	3	Government (diplomatic)
15-04-2012	AFG	Kabul	Haqqani Network	2	3	Government (general)
02-12-2011	AFG	Muhammad Agha	Haqqani Network	2	70	Military
19-11-2011	PK	Shaidu	Gunmen	1	1	Private citizens and property
03-11-2011	AFG	Herat	Haqqani Network	7	5	Business, military
29-10-2011	AFG	Kabul	Haqqani Network (suspected)	18		Military, private citizens, and property
13-09-2011	AFG	Kabul	Haqqani Network	1	0	Airports and aircraft
13-09-2011	AFG	Kabul	Haqqani Network	N/A	N/A	Government (general)
13-09-2011	AFG	Kabul	Haqqani Network	10	20	Government (general), military, government (diplomatic)

<div align="right">(Continued)</div>

Date	Country	City	Perpetrator	Killed	Injured	Target Type
11-09-2011	AFG	Unknown	Haqqani Network	5	94	Police, military, private citizens, and property
28-06-2011	AFG	Kabul	Haqqani Network (suspected)	19	8	Business, police
18-05-2011	AFG	Jadran district	Haqqani Network (suspected)	45	20	Private citizens and property
19-02-2011	AFG	Jalalabad	Haqqani Network (suspected)	46	73	Business, police, military
19-12-2010	AFG	Kunduz	Haqqani Network	9	14	Military, private citizens, and property
19-12-2010	AFG	Kabul	Haqqani Network	6	9	Military, private citizens, and property
27-08-2010	AFG	N/A	Haqqani Network (suspected)	13	N/A	Military
27-08-2010	AFG	N/A	Haqqani Network (suspected)	13	N/A	Military
18-07-2010	AFG	Kabul	Haqqani Network	5	20	Private citizens and property
18-05-2010	AFG	Kabul	Haqqani Network	19	47	Military, private citizens, and property
26-02-2010	AFG	Kabul	Haqqani Network (suspected)	17	32	Private citizens and property
18-01-2010	AFG	Kabul	Haqqani Network (suspected)	0	0	Private citizens and property
18-01-2010	AFG	Kabul	Haqqani Network (suspected)	N/A	N/A	Government (general)
18-01-2010	AFG	Kabul	Haqqani Network (suspected)	N/A	N/A	Private citizens and property
18-01-2010	AFG	Kabul	Haqqani Network (suspected)	N/A	N/A	Business
18-01-2010	AFG	Kabul	Haqqani Network (suspected)	N/A	N/A	Business
18-01-2010	AFG	Kabul	Haqqani Network (suspected)	5	0	Private citizens and property
18-01-2010	AFG	Kabul	Haqqani Network (suspected)	N/A	N/A	Government (general)
30-12-2009	AFG	Khost	Haqqani Network (suspected),	10	6	Government (general)
	AFG	Khost	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (suspected)			
30-06-2009	AFG	N/A	Haqqani Network (suspected)	0	0	Military
11-02-2009	AFG	Kabul	Haqqani Network	14	28	Government (general)
28-12-2008	AFG		Haqqani Network (suspected)	17	58	Private citizens and property
04-12-2008	AFG	Khost	Haqqani Network (suspected)	4	0	Government (general)
12-11-2008	AFG	Kandahar	Haqqani Network	0	16	Private citizens and property
10-11-2008	AFG	Charkh	Haqqani Network	0	0	Journalists and media
25-10-2008	PK	Miran Shah	TTP (suspected)	0	0	Terrorists/nonstate militia

(*Continued*)

Date	Country	City	Perpetrator	Killed	Injured	Target Type
07-07-2008	AFG	Kabul	Haqqani Network	58	141	Government (diplomatic), private citizens, and property
27-04-2008	AFG	Kabul	Haqqani Network	4	14	Government (general)
28-03-2008	PK	N/A	Haqqani Network (suspected)	0	0	Journalists and media, private citizens, and property
03-03-2008	AFG	Bagram Air Field	Haqqani Network	3	4	Government (general), military, private citizens, and property
14-01-2008	AFG	Kabul	Haqqani Network (suspected)	7	N/A	Government (diplomatic)
17-06-2007	AFG	Kabul	Haqqani Network	36	52	Police
22-12-2006	AFG	Kabul	Haqqani Network	1	7	Government (general)
11-09-2006	AFG	Tani	Haqqani Network	8	40	Private citizens and property
10-09-2006	AFG	N/A	Haqqani Network	3	N/A	Government (general)
14-01-2003	PK	N/A	N/A	0	1	Private citizens and property

Source: From Global Terrorism Database (GTD), Haqqani, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START): A Center of Excellence of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, University of Maryland, MD, 2014.

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13 Manchuria—The Cockpit of Insurgent Empire
A Historical Perspective from the Khitan Liao to the People's Republic of China

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Some regions of the world are considered to be particular hotbeds of reoccurring rebellion, instability, and insurgency throughout the eras. Currently, places such as Palestine, the Northern and Southern Caucasus, border regions of Sudan (including South Sudan) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), as well as the Afghan-Pakistani border hold much of the discussion on contemporary border instability and nonstate actors seeking to or having succeeded in setting up de facto regional autonomy if not outright independence. History is also rife with such examples of regions that, in specific periods, either overthrew occupational governments after being conquered by an external power or established a new system from separating from a previously dominant state with which it had been integrated for some time. From Scotland under Robert the Bruce and the Pueblo and Mapuche Indians of the New World against the Spanish Empire, to the short-lived yet popular Ikko-Ikki religious movement in sixteenth century Japan, the American Revolution, or the Abkhaz struggle to evict Georgia following the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), varying degrees of regional autonomy were fought for (often asymmetrically) leading to a variety of outcomes in the long and short term.

What is most unique, however, is when such regions not only enable their own independence *but are successful enough to push back into the core territories of their erstwhile sovereigns and take either partial or total mastery over them.* This less frequent occurrence is still hardly a rarity in the grand scheme of world events, as case studies as diverse as the Marathas against the Mughals going from regional rebellion to de facto rival empire in eighteenth century India to the early nineteenth century South American revolution led by Simon Bolivar, which started only in a specific region but

soon came to cover a near majority of the South American continent and ally with other movements further south. But there is one region that stands alone for hosting such infrequent occurrences on multiple occasions through a long swathe of historical eras, and that is present day Northeast China, or as it is commonly known historically: Manchuria.

The rest of the steppe belt stretching through Central Asia was also fertile ground for tribal and nomadic people with imperial ambitions, but considering the lack of established bureaucratic control over these regions for most of history, the Turko-Mongolian imperialists of Central Asia can be seen as already existing independent actors in their own right, unlike Manchuria, which was often (directly or indirectly) under the sway of the ruling Chinese dynasty. Despite, or perhaps because of, this constant exposure and subjugation to the core area of China, this remarkable region of mixed mountains, steppe, coastal peninsula, temperate forest, and vast spaces turned out numerous successive waves or non-Chinese people who took over parts or even all of China proper. They founded a succession of dynasties that fused the insider knowledge of being under the dominion of the great power, with the unique military skills of living on the frontier (Perdue, 2005, p. 32). This phenomenon of a peripheral rebel movement and insurgency growing to multinational and dynastic proportions is remarkable enough to warrant examination of their strategies and politics in greater depth. Although often overlooked in studies of insurgency and (irregular) warfare, the case shares a distinct relationship with the factors and characteristics of insurgency in modern war.

In this chapter, I present four examples of Manchuria being used as a power base to achieve such objectives, starting with the Khitan Liao in the tenth century and their Jin successors, moving on to the Manchurian state formation and eventual conquest of all of China to found the Qing Dynasty in the seventeenth century, and ending with the strange series of events in the early to mid-twentieth century when Manchuria became the cockpit for Mao's victory in the Chinese Civil War. The events noted above might, at first glance, appear rather deeply embedded within the annals of history; however, it is precisely those unique events that converge to form a transition in the region that has led to what I previously noted as the rare establishment of either a de facto government or completely independent state. The result in this case, we find, is one of the two most prominent states in the modern international system.

CASE STUDY I: KHITANS—THE FORMLESS ADAPTORS

The Khitans were hardly the first unified nomadic or seminomadic people to realize how many concessions could be wrung from the materially superior Chinese through armed raids and expeditions. Often, the dynasty in power would close the trade routes for political purposes, leaving raiding as the most viable method to either restore the previously open trade through threat or extracting tribute through force. Before the Khitans, others had come down the road of using the natural talents of societies who lived on horseback with the power projection of the recurve bow and lack of an easily located base for the Chinese to retaliate against before. Such behavior both immediately outside and inside Chinese territory could make the frontiers untenable and force recalcitrant governments to reopen trade or even to pay tribute, which was a necessary function of their societies as while they could in fact sustain themselves, the ruling class was dependent on securing the trade routes for merchants (Beckwith, 2009, pp. 328–9).

But it was the Khitans who would be the first to not simply rebel on the frontiers, but form their own Chinese-style dynasty and take and integrate into their new peripheral state core Chinese territories. They began as another one of the many nomadic tribes, which hovered around the Chinese periphery—in this case, more east than most such people. In fact, they were one of the weaker tribes, a group of people subjected to hostility and sidelining by other tribes in the region (Franke and Twitchett, 1994, p. 47). As the Tang Dynasty began to collapse upon itself in the late tenth century, the government invited them to play a larger role protecting the north–east frontier of the state by overrunning the aggressive Po-Hai kingdom setting up their own polity in its place which would theoretically by allied to Chinese interests. The destruction of the Po-Hai Kingdom went ahead as

planned, but it was the provision to then claim allegiance to the dying Tang Dynasty where Khitan and Chinese interests diverged (Legg, 1970, p. 213).

A combination of Chinese settlement and trade integration with local non-Chinese had made the Liao river valley region in south-central Manchuria a unique multicultural valley, and the Khitans went about making it their de facto core region. From such a location they could utilize the talents of various kinds of people each with their own skill sets, including Chinese settlers and their agrarian and technological skills, nomadic people who were skilled riders and forest tribes used to harvesting the resources and traveling upon the rivers (Barfield, 1991, p. 24).

As an increasingly unified people with greater amounts of state formation, the Khitan frontier became to be a regional rival in northern China for the dynasty, which it was ostensibly allied. As the Tang disintegrated, Khitan forces swept into now lawless regions, setting up regional governments integrated with their own nascent state. The rapid and largely peaceful annexation of these regions moved increasingly deeper into core Chinese areas until the Khitans became a minority in their own state, and moved to claim legitimacy and loyalty by the now majority Han Chinese subject population by declaring themselves to be a legitimate successor dynasty with the same name as their original core area, the Liao. Their leader Abaoji realized that his diverse collection of ethnic groups could not be ruled with Khitan law alone, and so devised a decentralized form of government where each community was governed by its own standards and organization. Abaoji was both Khan and Emperor, depending on which subject of the new kingdom you asked (Franke and Twitchett, 1994, pp. 56–62).

To uphold this new regime, the Liao Dynasty sought accommodation by maintaining a nomadic government that still conducted business in major cities, which were designated as "regional capitals" that the ruling entourage would travel continuously between. Each city had a locally recruited permanent staff of bureaucrats. The northern and western sections of the empire were ruled in the manner of steppe people with personal relationships with the ruler and interwoven relationships between families, lords, and vassals whereas in the south the Chinese were governed according to the methods to which they were used to with Confucian examinations for civil service under a large centralized administration. Although Khitan governors were installed in these regions, the Chinese were largely left alone, and their loyalty was easily transferred to the new state because on the whole they largely detected little difference from the previous Tang government except for greater levels of regional autonomy (Meskill and Gentzler, 1973, pp. 144–6).

There would be no Liao dominion over the entirety of China, however. The majority of the core Chinese areas soon coalesced into the new Sung Dynasty, a state that in total was of far greater population and potential tax base than that of the more peripheral (if almost equally huge in territorial land control) Liao. The careful multicultural approach of the Khitans had paid benefits but also prevented further southern expansion. Recognizing the changing fortunes and adapting to them, the Khitans ceased attempts at direct territorial acquisition and instead used their fast mounted army to raid the remaining peripheral kingdoms such as Korea and the Tanguts, using pressure to set up tributary networks and open trade with these people before the Sung could do the same. As long as the tribute poured in and access to trade was uninterrupted, the Liao would keep their forces out of these client regions, though the threat to redeploy them in case of any interference always remained. Despite the apparent massive imbalance of demographic factors, the Liao had succeeded in establishing a bipolar system where even the Sung had to recognize the existence and legitimacy of a rival or "northern" court (Franke and Twitchett, 1994, pp. 67–86).

The Sung, being a native dynasty who held most of the historic Chinese areas, were unhappy with this situation, and struck back with their massive armies in an attempt to at least capture (or from their perspective, recapture) the core parts of northern China held by Liao forces. The smaller yet more mobile Liao forces got the better of the fighting and drove the Sung armies back to where they had come from. Having fought to a standstill, both dynasties drew up an official peace treaty in 1004, acknowledging after decade of conflict the new bipolar system, which had grown up in the circumstances around them. Of course, owing to the Liao's ability to launch deep raids for plunder across the border, the Sung had to purchase the peace with annual tribute. Conceding that this was probably

cheaper than having to fend off perpetual attacks by nomadic people, the Chinese in the south effectively purchased a peace for 200,000 lengths of silk and 100,000 ounces of silver. They also had to acknowledge the permanent loss of the disputed northern territories and establish equal relations with the foreign regime of the Liao (Franke and Twitchett, 1994, pp. 99, 105–10; Tao, 1988, p. 15).

The more hands off approach of Liao government often attracted migrant workers and caused a sort of "brain drain" on the Sung, but the downside was more factionalism in the government from the various semi-autonomous communities, leading to fairly frequent succession crisis. Still, for over a century the peace held, and the two courts maintained stable relations with one another. But the Sung court was in effect biding its time to strike back. They saw their opportunity in the sudden outbreak of Jurchen tribe rebellion against the Liao. Moving quickly to use their navy to supply the isolated tribal people, the Sung-Jurchen alliance soon succeeded in overrunning the Liao state in 1125, with the Jurchens doing most of the fighting and proclaiming the "Jin" Dynasty in place of the Liao. The Sung soon rued their new allies however, who not only refused to give the Sung any territorial concessions the former Liao territory, but in fact drove even further south, taking far more territory from the south than the Liao ever had (Legg, 1970, pp. 217–8; Tao, 1988, pp. 88–91).

The Jurchens would go on to wage near continuous warfare on the Sung, but also to more closely adapt and integrate with the Chinese way of life they came into contact with. They did retain the service of many Khitans in the early days, however, as their experience walking between the nomadic frontier and agrarian Confucian worlds made them excellent liaisons. But the Khitan nobility had retained their lifestyle and horseback, and not all stayed to accommodate to the new regime. Under the leadership of Prince Yelu Daishi, about 100,000 Khitans packed up and fled west. Allowed free passage through areas they had once ruled directly, this government in exile made itself a new home in the northern reaches of Central Asia, establishing the Kara-Khitai Khanate using the same methods they had worked out when they were the Liao. Their new Turkic and Muslim subjects were governed separately and locally, and their neighbors were integrated into tribute networks while retaining domestic autonomy—while the Khitans were governed in their own traditional methods. This new arrangement would last another hundred years until reforms tried to centralize the state, alienating its people and enabling the newly rising Mongols to use local rebellions to annex the kingdom. Not long after, the Mongols would also destroy and incorporate the Jurchen Jin state into their fold as well (Biran, 2005, pp. 22–32, 39–44, 135).

The Khitan experience of drawing on the roots of what is now commonly called Manchuria to turn a group of tribal vassals into a rebel kingdom and then an empire was the first instance in the region's history showing the unique situation of how being both in the Chinese and steppe worlds could impact on even a peripheral people. Even after almost two centuries of this arrangement ending in collapse, many Khitans were still well adapted enough to migrate as an army on the move and set up a new kingdom in an even more alien environment speaks to the adaptable nature of such peripheral people should the opportunities align with their interests.

CASE STUDY II: MANCHU—FROM BIRTH TO COLLAPSE

Owing to the Manchurian focus in these select case studies, the incredibly important era in Eurasian history known as the Mongol Empire must be overlooked. But needless to say, the securing on transcontinental trade routes from Europe to East Asia and Siberia to Iran altered the nature of the Eurasian power dynamic long after the Mongol domination had divided and collapsed. Technologies were exchanged and gunpowder became more prominent all over Eurasia, including among the very peripheral people who played such a role in spreading its use out of China proper (Lorge, 2008, pp. 43–4). One of these people were the Jurchens, who, having survived the Mongol period as vassals and conquered subjects, began to reassert themselves as an independent power in their now core area of Manchuria.

With the collapse of the Mongol "Yuan" Dynasty, the Jurchen people began to reemerge as a unified pseudo-state, though still ostensibly under Chinese dominion from the new native-led Ming

Dynasty in China proper. Chinese military forces and auxiliaries took a proactive role early in the Ming era to secure the subordination of the these new Jurchens, and southern Manchuria once again became a kind of frontier zone half in the Chinese cultural sway and half in the dominion of tribal outsiders. The cost of this proactive policy was, however, somewhat large, and so the scope of Ming incursion was reduced over time, eventually restricted to refurbishing the long neglected Great Wall and merely retaining direct rule on the Liaotung Peninsula at the southernmost extremity of Manchuria (Li, 2002, pp. 8–14).

With the gradual weakening of Ming influence, a process of a few hundred years in the region, the Jurchens began outright seizing territory inhabited by Chinese townspeople and farmers, imitating the Khitan advance of the tenth century in the very same region. The clan that wielded most power by the start of the seventeenth century was the Aisin-Gioro family, which, under the leadership of Nurhaci, came to dominate the early formation of a second Jurchen entity. To break with the past, however, Nurhaci declared that their tribal confederacy would be renamed "Manchu," and soon he set about setting up Manchuria as a proper state. The first task to enable this vision was to integrate the variety of subjects was found once again in the concept of decentralized governance, centralized army. In the particular context of the new Manchu state, this was the banner system. The banner system was a military organization of peoples along socially autonomous guidelines based on their ethnicity and lifestyle. The nomadic Mongol auxiliaries were one banner, the seminomadic Manchu were another (and of course, the dominant one), and the Chinese collaborators and defectors had their own banner system as well. All were subordinate to the royal family, but outside of military issues and taxation, the people of the banners were largely left alone as autonomous units of the empire. Loyalty and bravery were rewarded with promotions into the Manchu establishment, thus ensuring that with material gain also came integration with the ruling dynasty (Li, 2002, pp. 27–31, 34–8).

By this point in time the Chinese Ming dynasty was beginning to crumble. It was dealing with internal rebellion, rampant piracy, and had recently expended much blood and treasure aiding Korea in a particularly large conflict begun by the newly unified Japan's attempt to invade and conquer that peninsula. Corruption was rife at court, and famine began to rear its shriveled head in some of the provinces. The Manchus could not have asked for a better time to expand their domain at Chinese expense. Nurhaci struck the now vulnerable Chinese frontier in southern Manchuria and took the Liaotung peninsula and integrated it into his domain. He died soon after, but his state survived, and his successors built upon his foundations in the generations to come (Perdue, 2005, p. 111).

For the era in which they dwelled, the Manchu war machine was fast becoming a truly deadly combination of utilizing the various talents of diverse people coupled with a widespread adoption of gunpowder weapons. Nurhaci was once been repulsed by the guns mounted on the refurbished Ming Great Wall, and had learned their value. The armies of his successors were quick to realize that considering their numerical inferiority they had to add firearms to the repertoire of nomadic cavalry and rapid movement, which they were accustomed to. This army simply needed an opportunity to strike further southward, and soon events in China would give them their chance (Perdue, 2005, p. 127).

Rebellions rocked the Ming, and when a rebel army took the capital installing a new emperor in Beijing in 1644. The lead Ming general guarding the Great Wall was unsure whom to support, but the brutal treatment of the court staff at the hands of the rebels led him to negotiate a pact with the Manchus to open the gates. The frontier Chinese and Manchu armies combined and struck southward, overrunning the new dynastic armies and retaking Beijing with a combination of gunpowder and cavalry speed that soon rolled all of northern China into the newly proclaimed Qing Dynasty under the leadership of the Manchurian royal family descended from Nurhaci (Perdue, 2005, pp. 127–8).

Because the Qing had overrun so much territory so fast and had gone from frontier insurgents to ruling dynasts over at least part of the country in only a few decades, it was inevitable that they would have their own insurgents to deal with. Wisely, they had first subdued Mongolia before moving into China, but much of southern China remained declared in its loyalty to the remnants of the Ming Dynasty. In southwest a claimant to the thrown held on, and along the southeast coast the

pirate warlord Koxinga had established an anti-Manchurian movement based on sea power, which established a base of Taiwan after evicting the Dutch in a victorious invasion. The native Chinese of the south had now become the insurgents. The Qing had to deal with this problem in a speedy manner as surely knowledge of the perpetual and eventually unsuccessful wars of their Jin ancestors played on their thinking. It was, however, relatively easy for them to build from strength to strength with each realm they conquered. Taking on Jesuits for science, Muslim traders for connections to the remaining Central Asian trade routes, Mongol imperial legitimacy and allies, and Chinese defectors, their forces grew more powerful as they spread, rather than less. In a brutal campaign to clear the southern coasts of collaborators to Koxinga, the Qing eventually took over the whole of China, and by 1678 the part Mongol and part Manchu Kangxi Emperor could claim to truly be the lord of all of China (Crossley, 1997, p. 107).

And now that, for the first time, the perpetual rebels and frontiersmen from Manchuria had finally come to rule the entirety of the Chinese core, something unique started to happen. Forged in the fires of resistance, peripheral state formation, and insurgency, the Manchus were uniquely placed for geopolitical action. Once they had captured the whole of China proper they turned out to be the first dynasty capable of successful long term gains in frontier pacification. The combined arms nature of the multicultural Banner Armies coupled with gunpowder technology was an unprecedented opportunity for the new regime to win legitimacy with its new subjects through border security. The western Mongols and various Central Asian potentates still needed quelling, and so the Manchu Qing went to work, launching a massive invasion of the western territories (Darwin, 2007, pp. 125–7).

Galdan Khan had rose to power with the disaffection of those Mongol tribes not integrated into the new Qing ruling structure further east. He was effectively the last truly independent and powerful nomadic warlord, but in an era were agrarian societies were greatly increasing their rate of technological advance; he was fighting a losing battle. Despite early victories and a not-unimpressive range of raiding and indirect rule, Galdan got the worst of Manchu expeditions in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, and eventually his attempt to found his own insurgent periphery crumbled under Qing flexibility and power when the Kangxi Emperor lured Galdan east on pretext of a negotiated settlement and ambushed him with an army sporting canons mounted on camels and horsemen in ambush. Not even the nimble western Mongolians could escape the speedy onslaught, though forces would have be retained for nearly constant campaigns against the western Mongols until finally, generations later, the Qing would seize on the internal discord of the state and absorb the rest of the western frontier as well as Tibet as vassals. This later big push after decades of subtly undermining their enemies by recruiting disaffected Mongols into the banner system and using the lucrative trading opportunities connections with China proper could offer was the final seal on the deal. Finally, for the first time in history aside from the height of Mongol power when China was effectively a province in a world empire, a dynasty in China had secured the northern and western borders with a sense of permanency and long-term gain (Perdue, 2005, pp. 272–7).

These Qing gains were new, and changed the game. The nomad's relevance as decisive actor in Chinese frontier affairs was broken for good. Former insurgents from the frontier had achieved what native Chinese had tried to do for centuries and never quite succeeded in since the days after the Han Dynasty. But there was little time to enjoy this victory. In barely more than half a century from the closure of the last western campaigns at the end of Qianlong's reign new threats would appear from across the seas and upend the new Manchurian balance of power.

CASE STUDY III: MANCHURIA AS CONFLICT ZONE OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

With the coming of the Opium War, and the humiliation of Chinese armies in the mid-nineteenth century, the Qing order began to fray. The nomads were pacified, but the new foreigners now wanted to break into the system, and had the means to do so with their rifled guns and steam-powered

warships. From the perspective of the ruling dynasty, any hopes that this problem could be contained on the coasts by conceding port cities was soon to be dashed, for the weakness the government had shown in the face of a pittance of British and French naval expeditions was much more telling to the power which shared a land border with China–Russia.

With the Manchu hegemony weakened by a rude awakening of their changed position in the international order and subsequently rocked by a massive civil war known as the Taiping Rebellion, the Qing could do little as a Russian expedition floated down the Amur River in a prime example of gunboat diplomacy and forced the government to effectively surrender coastal Outer Manchuria without firing a shot. The nature of Anglo-Russian rivalry at the time meant that the Qing had to effectively play off two powers intent on devouring more of their hard won empire amongst themselves while dealing with internal discord. Recognizing that keeping Manchuria as a preserve for the Manchu people was keeping this large and resource-rich region underpopulated and thus vulnerable to foreign incursion, the dynasty reluctantly decided upon the policy of lesser evils and lifted the previously existing restriction on Han Chinese settling their homeland. Considering the instability and unpromising economic opportunities throughout China, many gladly took the opportunity, and throughout the latter half of the century Manchuria's population would balloon, going from a frontier launching pad of Manchus to the new settled frontier of the Han Chinese whom they had conquered (Rossabi, 1975, p. 196).

Populating the territory such a policy did accomplish, but the mass migration northeast from China's core also meant its economic potential was now increased. The Russian Empire began a campaign to win further concessions in the region, especially in the form of railway ownership and operation. But despite the slow build of Russian power throughout the region, they would end up not being the primary actor in the region's ever-changing fate. The role would go to a nation, which had responded to the challenge of European naval power and industrialization much more effectively than China had, Japan.

In 1868, pro-Emperor factions who ended up taking a crash course in modernization had toppled Japan's Shogunate. From industry and economics to the army and navy, in a few decades Japan stood above China for the first time in its usually peripheral history. From the very start of its expansion and establishment of an empire the key target of its goals was the resource-rich Manchuria. Policies to acquire this choice piece of real estate entered full swing upon the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, where the modern forces of Japan crushed the larger Qing army and navy in a series of battles. Officially, Japan's only concessions were Taiwan, the southern tip of Manchuria's Liaotung Peninsula, and influence over Korea (and even the Liaotung concession would have to be abandoned-temporarily it turned out-in face of French, Russian, and German diplomatic pressure), but geographic access to the realm was now contiguous with places of Japanese dominion, and therefore adjacent to the gains the Russians had made in the region. After the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5, the southern half of Manchuria fell into the Japanese orbit, with the much-disputed peninsula and southern railway concessions going to the Japanese. Infiltrations by army units and agents followed soon after (Paine, 2003, pp. 321–2).

The various empires picking away at the Qing state as well as massive internal difficulties finally precipitated the collapse of the Manchu empire in 1911. Though officially now a republic, China in fact experienced so much chaos that independent warlords who pursued their own objectives and fought each other de facto ruled many of the regions. One of the first and most powerful of these warlords was Marshal Zhang Zuolin, who carved out his fiefdom in Manchuria and pursued by far the most independent line of the already quite rogue warlord movement. Because of the relative remoteness, historically and geographically, of the region he inherited, he could afford to do so. He also had another advantage, the active help of the Japanese intelligence community as well as the aid of military advisers and weapons suppliers connected to them (Jowett and Walsh, 2010, p. 18). Manchuria had returned to its traditional role as an insurgent producing frontier.

Zhang Zuolin largely did what was necessary to hold on to his fiefdom, and considering the massive economic concessions he gave the Japanese, they were more than happy that he do so.

But as a decade passed, it became clear that Zuolin's increasing power and dreams of restoring the former dynasty were leading him to take a much more independent line than the Japanese were willing to stomach. Battlefield defeat at the hands of the Kuomintang hardly helped his perceived usefulness. Figuring that Zuolin's opium-addled son would be a more pliant proxy to have, and not wanting to lose any influence over the Manchuria that was effectively the center of Japanese ambitions for decades now, the intelligence services of Japan assassinated the warlord and quickly installed his son in his place. They gravely underestimated the young successor; however, as he soon began to open talks with the Kuomintang government and seemed to publicly renounce any aspirations of independence or personal rule. Realizing that more drastic measures would be required to hold on to their gains in Manchuria (and in fact, that drastic measures could increase such gains), the Japanese Kwantung Army set about first manufacturing a bogus reason for intervention in the attempted bombing of a railway concession, and then launching a full-scale invasion of the region in "response" in 1931 (Yamamuro, 2005, pp. 98–9).

It was a lopsided affair. The divided warlord, republic, and partisan forces were no match for the relatively mechanized Japanese army with tanks, air support, and armored cars. For the first time since the Mongols, a single nonnative army had overrun the majority of the Manchurian frontier. Thinking wisely of avoiding direct engagement with the Imperial Army at this point, the conventional forces of the Kuomintang government in China backed off, but stated that they had not abandoned claims to the region. The conventional operations were soon complete, but the Kwantung army found itself engaged in a variety of counterinsurgency operations for the years subsequent to the initial attack (Yamamuro, 2005, pp. 99–100).

Cooperation with locals, especially elites, became a key factor in the making of what was passed off as a new state, a supposed homeland for the Manchus named "Manchukuo." Officially proclaimed in 1932, the local merchants and affluent settlers were brought into the state, as well as the Russian White exiles having settled there after their loss in the Russian Civil War. The exiled former emperor, Pu Yi, was invited to become monarch of the new state and was installed as Emperor of Manchukuo. Heavy industry and massive amounts of invested money poured in from Japan and the resource rich periphery became in a very short amount of time a vital part of the economic structure of the Japanese Empire. The somewhat ambiguous nature of this territorial acquisition prompted much of the reinvestment from the profitable industries into subsidized soybean farming specifically set up near the border in a conscious attempt to lure Japanese farmers to settle there and fill out the gaps in the vast peripheral spaces bordering the hostile USSR (Young, 1998, p. 40).

It was by the late 1930–1940s that a strange parallel with the Liao Dynasty came to be noticeable in the modern example of Manchukuo. Though much more brutally governed, and with Chinese far less integrated into the ruling class, Manchukuo, as a detached northeastern realm under foreign sway, began to bear some similarities to its old Khitan-governed forebear. It was protected by a smaller but seemingly more proficient army that could strike with greater speed than its Chinese opponents, it attracted immigration through job opportunities offered to defectors, and while it did not have a decentralized government or a rotating capital system, it did attempt to bill itself as a multicultural state of many races and a type of paragon for cultural cooperation and integration for all of East Asia. Manchurian folklore and religion were tied to Japanese Shintoism in a bizarre attempt to claim that Pu Yi himself had been "reborn" through Amaterasu, the sun goddess from whom the Japanese royal family claimed descent (Duara, 2003, pp. 186–8).

This new state, however, had insurgency problems of its own. Aggressive border demarcation with Mongolia led to a clash with the USSR in which the Kwantung Army was badly mauled in 1938. More constantly, residual partisans, sometimes communists or nationalists but often rogue bandits attempted to cause trouble in the western peripheries of the new state. Not all these disturbances could be dealt with the overwhelming force of the Kwantung Army, and so special squadrons of anti-partisan cavalry militia were formed to police the roads in the more frontier-like areas. Often led by the dashing figure of Kawashima Yoshiko, (or her birth name Aisin Gioro Xianyu), a member of the Manchurian royal family who grew up in Japan and worked for Japanese intelligence, these

lower-order armed forces of Manchukuo even began to resemble the banner system of the early Qing—or at least they would if there were any leadership opportunities given to anyone outside the Kwantung Army. Once the "pacification" of the countryside was complete, Kawashima Yoshiko would go on to become a major public figure in Manchukuo society, becoming a radio personality and singer. But as the years wore on even someone as in the Japanese pocket as herself could no longer stomach the constant undermining of the supposed multicultural state to Japanese war interests in China and the Pacific, and so she, like the proclaimed ideals of the state she served, was shunted aside into irrelevance (Yamamuro, 2005, p. 99; Duara, 2003, pp. 63–4).

Much like the Liao, the experiment of Manchukuo ended in spectacular and almost immediate collapse from attacks launched by a northern, rather than southern foe. Soviet armies struck into the territory in 1945, and the gutted Kwantung Army, most of whose equipment had been sent to active fronts by this time, was crushed in a lightening campaign. The heavy industry and infrastructure of the place was turned over to serve Soviet needs, and under the temporary administration of the USSR, many of Mao's communists began to infiltrate the region. The Soviets soon withdrew, handing sovereignty back to the Chinese—but the Chinese Civil War broke out soon after the end of the Second World War, and once again Manchuria would play a decisive role (Young, 1998, pp. 406–9).

After it became clear that Manchuria had become a proxy-communist government in exile, the Kuomintang government struck north and attempted to invade the perpetually troublesome province. Mao's amorphous tactics and local support however outmaneuvered his armies, drove him from the land, and gained so much momentum that the communists could in fact switch to the offensive—which they did, cascading down from Manchuria and sweeping over much of China with a speed that surpassed the early Manchu Qing. Once again, Manchuria had created insurgents capable of expansion into state core areas. Like the Ming loyalist Koxinga, the Kuomintang government retreated to Taiwan, effectively abandoning the mainland. Like the Kangxi Emperor, Mao would soon turn his attention to the western frontier and in a much more direct way; achieve the submission of Xingjiang and Tibet (Rossabi, 1975, p. 267).

CONCLUSION

Manchuria is unlikely to produce any such wildly successful frontier movements in the foreseeable future. Its rapid industrialization and urbanization make it now as core a part of China as any other, and its heritage-erasing name of "North-East Province" belie a new demographic reality. That being said, the numerous historical case studies this one region provides for the relatively unique event of insurgency on the periphery becoming expansionist government over part or all of the core state is remarkable. The question remains, why was this so, and could this feat be replicated elsewhere?

Manchuria represented a vast space of varied topography and peoples living in some sort of relative integration with both each other and the massive Chinese presence to the south. Walking in the nomadic, seminomadic, and agrarian worlds gave a great combination of military flexibility and administrative prowess, which came to be used by the Khitans, the Jurchens, and the Manchus alike. The key question is where today lie restive frontier regions and insurgent areas where some sense of cosmopolitan multiculturalism exists within the movement itself (as opposed to say nationalistic and religiously fundamentalist ones) who also have the military flexibility for rapid and surprise movements? And if this combination is met, could it be as effective in today's world as it once was? Rwandan-backed rebels in the DRC and Russian-backed rebels in Georgia look promising, but still have the advantage of massive outside great power backing.

No matter what the future holds it certainly remains possible that the right combination of territory, relatively open culture, and mobility could one day upend some core state's territory-and the insurgents could once again become an expansionist government. Were such a geopolitical upset to occur, the triumphs and foibles of the various Manchurian experiments would be worth examining for comparison. Most tellingly, a key element of Manchurian success at expanding out of the periphery and into the core was its relative multiculturalism and strong desire to win collaborators from

other communities, especially the communities of the majority. This means that even if a rebellion is ethnically based, it has far more potential to threaten the core region if its grievances are political, rather than ethnic, and works to cultivate relations outside its own community.

Another observation, which may be pertinent for looking at other peripheral insurgencies, and which might hypothetically expand into core regions, can be found by specifically looking at the Qing example. The Qing, merging periphery and core into military strategy, became in effect the most effective anti-partisan military machine up to that point in Chinese history. In a similar parallel, the largely asymmetric seasoned guerillas of Chairman Mao turned out to be extremely proficient at securing borders and reining the periphery in tighter to the core regions. So while any number of partisan movements may threaten government's core regions if successful enough, they also carry with them the potential to be successful at counterinsurgency if they manage to wrest control of core regions into their sphere of power.

In this way, it could be said that if an insurgent movement is pragmatic, open, tolerant, and largely political instead of ethnic or religious, it stands the chance of being able to sell itself to potential collaborators and subjects in a way that increases their chance at displacing the elites in the enemy core partially or wholly. What will be interesting to see is if any insurgent movements of the future repeat something similar to the success once enjoyed by the various peoples who lived in Manchurian history.

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14 From David to Goliath
Chinese Pacification and Counterinsurgency Operations in Modern Wars

Francis Grice

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

During the Chinese Revolutionary Civil War (1922–1949), the Communists played the role of "David" to the Nationalists' "Goliath." This enabled the future regime to acquire crucial firsthand experience concerning the kind of strategies and tactics that insurgents use when fighting against larger incumbent forces, as well as the kinds of methods that governments use to oppose them. While the insurgency was being waged, the Communists adopted a generally sympathetic and supportive discourse toward the plight of minority races in China, as they were keen to rally these groups against their Nationalist adversaries (Larson, 2009). This included the peoples who lived in the regions now known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and the Tibetan Autonomous Region (hereafter shortened to "Xinjiang" and "Tibet"). However, after the Communists achieved power in 1949, the story changed radically. Red Army forces were dispatched into both Xinjiang and Tibet, with the goal of forcibly incorporating them into the Chinese state: David had become Goliath. From that time forward, the Chinese government has faced varying levels of resistance in these regions and reacted using a broad array of pacification and counterinsurgency (COIN) techniques.

This chapter provides an overview of the dissidence movements within Xinjiang and Tibet, before appraising each of the main techniques used by the Chinese to identify, mitigate, and suppress

resistance in these areas since they were occupied in 1949 and 1950, respectively. These methods include armed suppression, colonization, economic development, education and propaganda, information gathering, international diplomacy, political enfranchisement, and religious control. This chapter then explains how the location of China's two dissident regions and its attitudes toward these territories has increased the level of priority that China attributes to COIN, compared with the levels usually adopted by Western nations in their COIN operations. The chapter concludes with the assessment that Chinese pacification and COIN operations have enjoyed mixed success: Xinjiang and Tibet remain firmly under Chinese control, but both regions continue to experience simmering discontent and periodically erupt with outbursts of overt resistance activities.

BACKGROUND

Xinjiang is located in the northwest corner of China, and has shifted between periods of Chinese rule, independence, and Islamic domination for most of its existence. It has traditionally been inhabited by a multitude of races, with the Uyghur the most numerous, although in recent years Uyghur numerical superiority has been overturned by huge numbers of Han immigrants. Resistance to the Communist rule, imposed in 1949, was initially limited. Some separatist groups appeared and several riots broke out, but these failed to capture popular support and achieved little. During the 1980s, resistance intensified, with the outbreak of multiple riots and student demonstrations, including one that was loosely connected with the Tiananmen Square riots in Beijing. Throughout the early 1990s, protests and outbursts of disruption continued, including three large-scale riots and protests at Baren in 1990, Lop Nur in 1993, and Gulja in 1997. The 1990s also saw the beginnings of organized irregular warfare by an increasingly militarized resistance movement, including bombings, attacks on army bases and police stations, and prison raids. After Gulja, the use of terrorism and guerrilla warfare increased exponentially, gradually replacing riots and protest as the predominant form of resistance in the region. This remains the reality today, although riots do occasionally occur, including the Urumqi riots in 2009.

Situated to the south of Xinjiang and southwest of China, Tibet has experienced a long and complex relationship with China that has spanned back over the millennia. At the end of the Chinese Revolutionary Civil War in 1949, Tibet existed as an essentially independent kingdom, under the religious leadership of the Dalai Lama. In October 1950, Mao Zedong ordered a full-scale invasion by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Little help from the international community was forthcoming and conventional resistance by the Tibetan armed forces was short lived; so the Chinese were able to quickly seize control. Discontent with the occupation simmered, breaking out into an armed uprising in 1956. For the next three years, Tibetan guerrillas harassed the occupying Chinese forces before the Chinese intensified their suppression and the Dalai Lama was forced to flee to India in 1959. Guerrilla operations continued for the next decade, supported by lackluster special operations work by the United States (US) but by the end of 1960s, the uprising had been mostly pacified. Discontent remained and in late 1980s open revolt again flared, this time as a series of protests and riots that lasted from 1987 until 1989. Resentment bubbled, with the next major eruption of resistance breaking out in 2008, which coincided with the Beijing Olympic Games. These outbursts were again pacified. Opposition to Chinese domination continues today, most notably through an ongoing series of "self immolations" by Tibetan monks in protest against Chinese occupation.

METHODS OF COIN

ARMED SUPPRESSION

Possibly the most recognized of methods for COIN is armed suppression. This includes the use of military and paramilitary forces to fight against armed insurgents, the imprisonment of suspected rebel fighters and sympathizers, and the implementation of measures such as martial law and

curfews. The goal is to repress existing and potential outbursts of rebellion by killing or deterring dissidents who take up arms against the state.

During the Maoist era, the people of Xinjiang faced varying degrees of violence, including a purge after the Hundred Flowers Campaign and wide-scale persecution and imprisonment by Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution (Tyler, 2004, pp. 144, 149). The use of armed suppression lessened initially after Mao's death, but soon returned in a series of anticrime campaigns, which, in Xinjiang, were predominantly directed against separatism. In 1989, a new era of violence was ushered in when the Chinese authorities violently suppressed a student protest march (Dillon, 1995, p. 19). During the decade of riots and protests that followed, the Chinese government often employed violent counter-measures, such as beating protestors, shooting into crowds, arresting and detaining demonstrators, imposing curfews, and closing the region's airport and railway station (Tyler, 2004, pp. 164–72).

This deployment of violent suppression by the Chinese government was formalized through a series of military crackdowns, implemented regularly (often annually) from 1996 until the present day, known as "Strike Hard" campaigns (Adams and Spiegel, 2005, p. 66; Boehm, 2013, pp. 60–124; Mudie, 2014). These have included temporary quarantining of selected villages and neighborhoods while door-to-door searches are carried out, hundreds of arrests during each operation, summary trials and sentencing, and frequent use of the death penalty (Adams, 2005, pp. 66–71). The aftermath of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks against the United States led to an even greater increase in the use of repressive violence in the region (Dreyer, 2008, p. 295). According to one scholar on the topic, the use of force by the Chinese has been refined in recent years, with the result that their forces "are still brutal, but kill less often" (Wayne, 2008, p. 89). This may have some truth to it, although it is clear that the use of force was central to Chinese efforts to reinstate order during the 2009 Urumqi riots (Odgaard and Nielsen, 2014, p. 2). Police and military shootings of armed resistors remain a noteworthy feature in the region today (BBC News, 2014; Ponnudurai, 2013).

Tibet has also been subject to considerable amounts of armed suppression by the Chinese government. When the first tangible vestiges of guerrilla resistance developed in 1956, the Chinese responded with military force, including artillery and bomber aircraft, both against the guerrillas and against any villages and monasteries they suspected of aiding them (Smith, 1996, p. 421). This culminated in the bombardment of Lhasa in 1959 (Barton, 2003, p. 47). Martial law was then imposed, many monasteries were demolished or closed, military retaliation was employed against anyone who resisted, many thousands were arrested, tortured, or killed, and prisons and forced labor camps were established (Powers, 2007, p. 205). During the Cultural Revolution, Chinese Red Guard terrorized the Tibetans with widespread executions, torture and rape on an unprecedented scale, and the defiling and destruction of innumerable monasteries (Powers, 2007, p. 208).

Initially, the years following Mao's death saw a reprieve in the use of armed suppression (Barton, 2003, pp. 86–8). This changed in 1989 when China's new security chief, Qiao Shi, decided that the existing policies toward Tibet had been too lenient, and embarked upon a campaign of "merci-less repression," which meant that "any attempts to demonstrate against Chinese rule—or even expression of pro-independence sentiments—would be met with extreme force and brutal punishment" (Powers, 2007, p. 209). Following 9/11, the Chinese government further ratcheted up their use of violence as a pacification tool in Tibet, including during the 2008 Tibetan riots, where force remained central to Chinese efforts to restore stability (Odgaard and Nielsen, 2014, p. 2). Ongoing shootings against protestors and monks continue today (Finney, 2013a; Lococo, 2012).

Supporting its repression, the Chinese have maintained an elaborate system of prison camps, labor camps, and work farms in Xinjiang. The origins of these began during or prior to the Maoist period, but they were subsequently developed and remains today as an important (albeit probably smaller) component of China's ongoing COIN and pacification operations (Tayler, 2009, pp. 243–5; Tyler, 2004, pp. 181–98). Similarly, in Tibet, a prison camp system was established under Mao, during which an estimated 173,000 people died from overwork, torture, or malnutrition (Laird, 2007, p. 348). An evolved (and again, probably smaller) version of this prison camp system is believed to remain today (Barton, 2003, p. 132; Laird, 2007, p. 348).

Armed suppression has yielded mixed results. Over the past 65 years, police and military forces have always been able to either repress or contain outbursts of overt violence, including the revolt that gripped Tibet in the late 1950s, and the riots and the protests that engulfed Xinjiang in the 1990s. At the same time, however, armed rebel groups continue to exist in Xinjiang, and these undertake periodic terrorist and guerrilla attacks against police stations and other bastions of statutory authority. In Tibet, dissidence has evolved into the self-immolation of Buddhist monks, a form of protest that armed suppression is struggling to contain.

COLONIZATION

One of the most pervasive methods of pacification adopted by the Chinese government is colonization, the policy of importing Han natives into minority areas. Broadly, the logic of this approach is that by altering the racial balance from a primarily hostile indigenous group toward a predominantly positive population who owe their ancestry and loyalty to the home country, the Chinese government can dilute the legitimacy of the claims to independence of the native inhabitants in the area. They can also create a less receptive environment for any insurgents in the region, and so reduce their ability to hide within the population, secure supplies and recruits from sympathizers, and obtain other crucial elements of support. They can further increase the probability that the population will report on the whereabouts of any rebels to the statutory authorities. Finally, by tilting the racial balance toward the Han, they can alter the overall mood of each region away from a discourse of separatism toward one of loyalty toward the homeland. This policy has been employed in both Xinjiang and Tibet.

In Xinjiang, colonization has been practiced very acutely. In 1949, there lived 222,401 Han in the region, a mere 6.7% of the population, but by 2010 this number had soared to 8.75 million, representing 40% of the population, a ratio that made the Han the largest single racial group within the region (Chaudhuri, 2010, p. 14; Godbole, 2012, p. 9). This migration was initially brought about by direct state-sponsorship, particularly during the Maoist era. In recent years it has been supported by less direct, but nevertheless impactful incentive schemes, including the relaxation of migration controls, use of regional development plans, and the deliberate prioritization of Han migrants for urban employment in the region (Howell and Fan, 2011, p. 119).

Disagreement exists about the extent to which colonization has occurred in Tibet. One writer describes one side of the argument

> as a means of transforming Tibet into an integral part of China, settlement strategies have been practiced throughout the country. Chinese are offered good jobs in Tibet, with higher salaries, extra holidays, and are permitted to have two children instead of one. Population transfer is the one Chinese policy that has caused most anger among the exile government and Tibet supporters in the West, since Tibetans have become a minority and their claims are marginalized (Fjeld, 2005, p. 18).

However, other authorities maintain that Han immigration has been relatively small, so that the Tibetans remain the dominant racial group within the region. According to official statistics, the number of Tibetans in the Tibetan Autonomous Region in 1952 was 1.27 million, representing 100% of the population. By 2005, this had risen to 2.55 million out of a 2.68 million, representing 95.3% of the population (Rong, 2007, p. 2–3). It seems likely that the truth lies somewhere in the middle. The number Han living in urban areas of Tibet do probably rival or outnumber the Tibetans in those areas, but the numbers of Tibetans living in the countryside almost certainly dwarf the Han population in those areas (Fischer, 2008, p. 633). The picture created suggests that Han migration into Tibet has undoubtedly occurred, but not at the same scale as in Xinjiang.

The impact of this approach for repressing rebellion in Xinjiang and Tibet is debatable. Some analysts suggest that the method has proved very successful. One author's description of its effectiveness in Xinjiang is worth quoting here:

the efficacy of this strategy is evident in the urbanized epicenters of unrest. The overwhelmingly Han population in the cities limits the effectiveness of Uyghur uprisings, containing the insurgency within urban centers and preventing it from the spreading to rural regions. When Uyghurs effectively become "strangers in their own land" the Xinjiang territory no longer belongs to the Uyghur nation, but the broader Han consciousness. The strategy mirrors Mao's dictum of the guerrilla needing to be a fish in friendly waters. Here the government shapes the "waters" (population) of Xinjiang to their cause by crowding out the pro-insurgency Uyghur populace (Ong, 2012).

These sentiments probably hold true for Tibet as well. At the same time, however, the influx of large numbers of Han settlers has inevitably caused resentment among the existing inhabitants of both regions. Many feel that their culture is threatened and resent the incentives offered to Han citizens to migrate into the region. In both Xinjiang and Tibet, government policies have often favored the Han settlers, which has created a visible wealth disparity between them and comparatively poorer Ugyhurs (Chaudhuri, 2010, p. 17). This has fueled support among the indigenous population for militant resistance movements and increased the tension needed to spark outbursts of ethnic violence.

Economic Development

Another method of stabilization employed by the Chinese government in preempting and undermining resistance to its rule has been to stimulate economic development. The government's objective has been to remove many of the material grievances that often steer populations toward militarized resistance, such as unemployment and economic hardship, while also encouraging the native inhabitants to believe that their quality of life is higher under Chinese rule than it would be if they were independent (Ong, 2012).

The use of economic development to reduce unrest began during Mao's tenure as Chairman. During this period, it was argued that rapid industrial development and socialist values would override social discontent among the peasants and minority nationalism among such groups as the Tibetans and the Uyghurs. During the 1980s and 1990s, the Chinese government invested massively in its western provinces, with the hope that this would reduce potential instability and even fragmentation in the country by narrowing the wealth divide between its rich eastern and poor western regions (Ong, 2012; Tyler, 2004, pp. 204–9). This policy was rejuvenated in 2000, with the launch of "China's Great Western Development" plan, which aims to develop infrastructure, protect the environment, promote education, create new jobs, and provide better lifestyles for the inhabitants of China's six western provinces and five autonomous regions (Saeed, 2012, p. 89). While COIN is only one goal among many for this plan, the Chinese government has nevertheless lauded the program as being instrumental for easing unrest and increasing stability (Mu, 2010; Wong, 2010).

This approach has borne mixed results. On the one hand, economic prosperity has grown in many of the poorer parts of China, including Xinjiang and Tibet, which has helped to increase the wealth and lifestyles of at least some of their inhabitants. On the other hand, the prosperity that economic development was intended to bring has often failed to reach its intended recipients. In both Xinjiang and Tibet, the majority of business and employment opportunities have tended to go first to the Han settlers in the regions (Chaudhuri, 2010, p. 17). This has led to a widening of the wealth divide, which in turn has fostered further tension and resentment, fueling the appetite of the populations to support militarized resistance against the state.

Education and Propaganda

The purpose of education and propaganda in China's COIN efforts has revolved around the use of educational and cultural institutions to change the perceptions of the inhabitants of Xinjiang and Tibet about Chinese rule. This includes convincing them to perceive the benefits (real or imagined) of living under Communist rule, to shift their sense of identity away from a particular racial group

toward a broader identity of being "Chinese," and to reject resistance against the state as illegal and immoral.

The use of education and propaganda as pacification tools has a long history within Xinjiang. While Xinjiang was initially allowed autonomy over its education system, during the late 1950s and 1960s the region was subjected to intense political education. This included the forced participation of local Imams in ideology courses, intensive propaganda across newspapers and the radio after the Hundred Flowers campaign, and a mass education campaign during The Great Leap Forward (Millward and Tursun, 2004, pp. 93–4; Tyler, 2004, pp. 133, 144). During the Cultural Revolution, groups of Red Guard from Beijing spread out across the region's schools to spread their radical Communist messages, mosque schools were closed, and traditional Islamic syllabi abolished (Tyler, 2004, pp. 149, 156). Even when the pressure eased during the early 1970s, the curricula at schools remained heavily politicized (Tyler, 2004, p. 151).

Initially, during the years that followed Mao's death, significantly more freedom was allowed regarding education in Xinjiang. Schools were allowed to teach the history of the Uyghur people, Islamic literature was allowed to circulate, the Roman script was abolished, and Arabic was restored (Tyler, 2004, p. 152). However, by the late 1980s, education had again become politicized, with traditional Marxist values espoused heavily through the school system, while concepts such as Islamic culture and religion were minimized or covered through a purely Marxist lens (Tyler, 2004, pp. 157–8). Books about Uyghur history and Islam, in particular, have been singled out for censorship, on the basis that these promote separatism and resistance to Chinese rule (Tyler, 2004, pp. 158–9). In recent years, this process has continued. As Wayne (2008) describes,

> the Chinese state's agenda is drilled into young Uyghur consciousness through socialization in quasi-indigenous institutions. In their neighborhood schools, Xinjiang's children are taught that Xinjiang has long been a part of China… Beijing's education agenda is presented in Uyghur language text and lessons, yet the ideas are those disseminated by the core throughout China's internal periphery. Local educators risk deviation from this regime at their own peril; teachers who deviate might lose their jobs or could face arrest (p. 116).

Propaganda continues to play a fundamental role in attempts to reduce discontent with Chinese rule through education, as Graham (2012) reports,

> here, the state engages in a heavy propaganda campaign to win the support of the local population, chiefly Uyghurs and other Central Asian ethnic groups. The most critical and reoccurring themes focus upon fostering ethnic unity; social harmony and stability; patriotism; economic development; territorial integrity; and close relations between the military and the people. Propaganda is an inextricable part of CCP [Chinese Communist Party] patriotic education campaigns. Propaganda is omnipresent in public spaces, found everywhere from municipal buildings to schools, roadways, buses, and town squares.

Political education has been in implemented in Tibet as well. Soon after the first major resistance movements in the late 1950s, the Chinese introduced "study groups" and mass propaganda, the purpose of which was to sever traditional bonds of trust between social groups and to reorientate Tibetans to thinking about issues within Maoist frameworks (Barton, 2003, p. 54; Smith, 1996, p. 476). This escalated during the Cultural Revolution, when Red Guards from central China made Tibetans engage in "struggle sessions" (Barton, 2003, p. 84; Smith, 1996, p. 402). Religious education was banned, and Tibetan translations of Mao's Little Red Book were distributed instead (Hopkirk, 1982, p. 85).

In the years immediately following Mao's death, efforts were made to liberalize education within Tibet, with the politician Hu Yaobang asserting that, provided "the socialist orientation is upheld, vigorous efforts should be made to revive Tibetan culture, education and science" (Bass, 1998, p. 52). However, further unrest in the country in the late 1980s led Chinese leaders to rethink their more liberal approach. In the 1990s, education in the region again became heavily politicized,

including multiple "Patriotic Education Campaigns," directed at people of all ages, with particular emphasis upon young people (Bass, 1998, p. 55). In 2000, a "materialism and atheism" campaign was launched, with the goal of removing the influence of religion upon children, followed by a two month campaign in 2004 to "eliminate internal secret splittist groups, separatists based outside and the influence of religion" (Bass, 2005, p. 436). These educational efforts were underscored by a hard edge. Between 1989 and 1994, for example, 64 children under the age of 18 were arrested for activities such as displaying pro-independence posters and making copies of the banned Tibetan national flag (Bass, 2005, p. 436).

Education and propaganda remain a central component of China's efforts to suppress separatist tendencies in Tibet today. This was well shown in a recent Radio Free Asia (RFA) report about an elderly Tibetan man who was beaten and detained by the Chinese government for protesting against a political propaganda team and dance troupe who had arrived at his village to conduct political education (Finney, 2013b). The efficacy of politicizing education and employing widespread propaganda has been mixed. On the one hand, there does appear to be a growing trend within both Xinjiang and Tibet for young people to see learning Mandarin and engaging with the Chinese education system, rather than their respective native languages and institutions, as the path to an economically prosperous future. On the other hand, the inhabitants of these two regions often view the minimization of Uyghur and Tibetan language, history, and identity within the classroom, coupled with seemingly neverending bombardment of Chinese propaganda, as offensive and repressive.

INFORMATION GATHERING

Often considered to be one of the most important components of effective COIN, information gathering has been used frequently by the Chinese as antiresistance tools in both Xinjiang and Tibet. The purpose of this sphere of COIN is to track and identify rebellious dissidents and their supporters through activities such as the surveillance and infiltration of these groups. The information gathered can then be used to inform pacification activities against these threats.

In Xinjiang, this process began soon after Chinese troops occupied the region in 1949, when Han cadres were sent to the region to stir up unrest among the peasants against the upper classes, who were described as reactionary or counterrevolutionary (Tyler, 2004, p. 132). Administrative structures were also put in place to manage and monitor mosques and other institutions (Tyler, 2004, p. 133). After many Uyghurs complained about Communist party malpractices during the Hundred Flowers campaign, the party launched investigations across the region, while scrutiny of all people by Communist zealots in the region was exponentially increased during the Cultural Revolution (Tyler, 2004, pp. 144, 149–150). After Mao's death, surveillance was temporarily reduced, but in response to increasing unrest during the 1990s, the state began practices such as positioning video recorders in mosques, using torture to extract information from suspects, and conducting door-to-door searches after protests and riots (Tyler, 2004, p. 157, 167, 169). By the turn of the millennium, Chinese surveillance of Xinjiang society was firmly embedded

> in order to ferret out such offenses, surveillance is necessary. Informers are essential. For this the police rely on local "security committees" which operate in every parish (xiang) and city block. They are the so-called "mass line" of police work. Not even Stalin thought of this. The Public Security Bureau, which is organized on military lines into brigades, regiments, and battalions, has agents disguised as employees attached to every factory, school, business and government agency (Tyler, 2004, p. 174).

In Tibet, this process began in the late 1950s and 1960s, when local elites were coerced into supporting the Chinese authorities and ordinary Tibetans were forced to participate in state-run "study groups," in which they were pressured into reporting on one another (Smith, 1996, p. 476, 561). During the initial liberalizing period that followed Mao's death, efforts to monitor insurrectionary potential among the Tibetan population decreased, but in the aftermath of the 1987 riots and 1989

protests, the Chinese authorities reasserted themselves in this area. The authorities conducted door-to-door house searches and arrested thousands of people, a policy that continued throughout the 1990s (Smith, 1996, pp. 617–18, 652).

In the twenty-first century, Chinese efforts to identify and monitor potential dissidents have integrated traditional policing with new advances in technology. In the city of Lhasa, a "grid system" has been implemented, in which police and volunteers patrol particular portions of the city, while security managers watch and react to events using surveillance cameras, smart phones, and 600 "convenience police posts" (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 2013; The Economist, 2013). In the countryside, work teams regularly conduct house-to-house searches and interview residents (Vandenbrink, 2013).

Intensive intelligence and surveillance efforts have, undoubtedly, been of great benefit to the Chinese authorities in their efforts to prevent and respond to dissident violence. As with any intelligence efforts, it is difficult to estimate exactly how many acts of protest or terrorism have been deterred by surveillance and investigatory work, because such data are seldom made available. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the Chinese state's efforts have enabled it to discover and suppress potential plots prior to their implementation, as well as to identify and arrest suspects of resistance activities after they have been carried out. It also seems likely that the knowledge that an extremely widespread and pervasive system exists has deterred at least some dissidents from undertaking sedition against the state. At the same time, however, both overt and covert activities do manifestly occur, and often seem to surprise the state, forcing it to react to events as they appear, rather than intercept them before they happen. Xinjiang rebels, catching the Chinese authorities off guard, for example, periodically storm police stations and other government bastions. Similarly, the Tibetan self-immolation movement began without any awareness of its likelihood by the Chinese authorities, and even now they struggle to identify who is going to martyr themselves in this fashion next.

INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY

The Communist government in China has always been proactive in trying to isolate active and potential resistors from external sources of support, particularly in Xinjiang and Tibet. The former experienced several major convulsions of emigration, first during the 1930s and 1940s, and then again in 1962, with a mass exodus of roughly half a million of its indigenous inhabitants (Tyler, 2004, pp. 143, 226–9). By 2004, an estimated one million Ugyhurs lived as exiles in other parts of the world, with the majority settled in the neighboring republics of the former Soviet Union (Tyler, 2004, p. 299). Efforts to create an exile political organization were made as early as 1963, but the first tangible resistance organizations were developed during the 1990s, including the East Turkestan National Center in Turkey (ETNC) (Bovingdon, 2010, pp. 135–68). Some of these exile organizations have agitated their new hosts and the global community to criticize the Chinese governance of Xinjiang, others have provided financial support for resistance efforts in their homeland, and others still have undertaken training in irregular warfare and terrorism. It is fairly well established, for example, that a number of Xinjiang exiles received training by al-Qaeda (AQ) in Afghanistan prior to the US-led intervention in 2002, although the number of trainees is disputed (Tyler, 2004, p. 243).

China has responded aggressively, especially in recent years, to this challenge. At the individual level, it has spied on exiles living abroad, infiltrated exile political groups, and placed unpleasant pressure on émigrés who return to Xinjiang for short visits to cease their discourse against the Chinese government. At the interstate level, it has used its economic and political clout to pressure its neighbors into signing extradition treaties and to returning potential Uyghur political agitators. In 1996, the Chinese signed the Shanghai Treaty with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia, which included provisions for the extradition of "criminal" elements and created an 80-mile-deep cordon along mutual borders deployed by joint military units (Tyler, 2004, p. 239). Adding to this, the Central Asian states undertook the closure of Ugyhur publications and offices,

arrested Uyghurs who criticized China, and watched for the exportation of propaganda, money, and guns (Rashid, 2002, p. 202). This was expanded by the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001, which added Uzbekistan and deepened cooperation against "terrorism, extremism and separatism" (Bhattacharji, 2012; Melson, 2006; Vandenbrink, 2014). China has also pursued cooperation with other countries over the issue, including Pakistan, with whom it signed extradition treaties in 2003 and 2007 (Daily Times, 2007; Ghulam, 2010, pp. 166–7; Patil and Ahmed, 2011).

After 9/11, the Chinese government attempted to convince the United States and its allies that the Xinjiang separatist movement was a terrorist organization; to some extent they were successful: in 2002, a major resistance group associated with Xinjiang separatism, "The Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement" (ETIM) was labeled a terrorist organization by the United States and the United Nations (UN), and in 2005 the United States declared that links existed between the group and AQ (Pike, 2011; Sloan and Anderson, 2009, p. 160). However, the United States has also shown some truculence, refusing, for example, to handover 15 Uyghur detainees to China in 2003 on the basis that they posed little or no terrorist threat, deporting them instead to Albania (MacCormack, 2009, p. 477).

In Tibet, the situation has been similar, with a few differences. The largest source of cross-border dissension stems from the Dharamshala region of India, to which the Dalai Lama and roughly 85,000 Tibetan refugees fled in 1959 (Bernstoff and von Welck, 2003, p. 133). Since that time, the number of Tibetans who have departed has risen to 130,000, with the majority residing in India (Bernstoff and von Welck, 2003, p. 125). In Dharamshala, the Dalai Lama has established an extensive government in exile, including departments of Education, Finance, Home, Security, Health, Information and International relations, and Religion and Culture (Bernstoff and von Welck, 2003, pp. 130–3). The Chinese have worked to counter the influence of the Dalai Lama and his followers through diplomatic methods, with increasing success in recent years. This has included pressuring states to not recognize the government in exile, abstain on meeting with the Dalai Lama, and close branches of the Tibetan government within their territories (MacKerras, 2007, pp. 469–71). The recent 2014 meeting between President Obama and the Dalai Lama is emblematic of China's approach. The Chinese refuted the Dalai Lama's claim, first made in 1988, that he desires a peaceful transition to greater autonomy for Tibet by claiming that he is "a wolf in sheep's clothing" who aspires to use violent methods to bring about an independent Tibet (Osborne, 2014; Smith, 1996, pp. 608–9). They also asserted that the meeting represented a "gross interference in Chinese affairs" and a "serious violation of the norms of international relations," which would "seriously damage Sino-US relations" (Rampton, 2014).

To some degree, Chinese efforts in this area have been effective. Uyghurs, and to a lesser extent Tibetans, are regularly deported to China from the countries on its border, enabling them to reduce the potential for the creation of terrorist warrens within diasporas outside of their territory. At the same time, however, some states are willing to defy Chinese demands by providing a haven for refugees from both Xinjiang and Tibet. Most prominently, India continues to allow the Dalai Lama and his followers to maintain a fully fledged government in exile, while neighboring countries are not always willing to hand over the migrants that the Chinese authorities request. Similarly, governments have often defied Chinese wishes by recognizing and hosting prominent exiles, such as the Ugyhur campaigner, Rebiya Kadeer, and the Tibetan Dalai Lama.

Political Enfranchisement

Political enfranchisement is, theoretically at least, one of the tools that the Chinese government has used to reduce resentment in Tibet and Xinjiang. The logic behind the method is that by empowering local people with positions in government, they become stakeholders within the system. This is intended to increase their devotion to the Communist system and decrease their propensity to attack it.

Adherence to this policy has been sketchy at best. In Xinjiang, some limited efforts to incorporate the local inhabitants into the region's governmental structures were made during the early-mid 1950s, but local participation was curtailed after the Hundred Flowers campaign, during which many minority officials in Xinjiang had joined the chorus of dissent against Communist rule (Dreyer, 2008, pp. 286–90). Following Mao's death, minority groups were again encouraged to join local government. By 1995, in Xinjiang, 55.8% of cadre positions were filled by non-Han inhabitants and this remains the norm in the region today (Ong, 2012). On the surface, this would suggest a high level of political enfranchisement for the Uyghurs and other minorities in the region. However, the Chinese government has simultaneously maintained a tight grip on power by only recruiting and promoting those Uyghurs who show fealty toward Communist rule, and has ensured that all posts that hold any real power are filled by trusted Han immigrants from the mainland (Bovingdon, 2004, p. 14). The deliberate character of this policy is highlighted by how "Uyghurs in regional and local government are frequently called upon to announce the party's unpopular policies, all but guaranteeing those officials will not develop a local power base" (Bovingdon, 2004, p. 18). A strong indicator was shown on the third anniversary of the Urumqi riots, when local Han officials were handed batons by the state to protect themselves in case of violence, whereas Uyghur officials were provided with none (Adams, 2012).

The situation in Tibet has been broadly similar. Initially, some elements of governmental inclusion were adopted, but as Mao's reign continued, this policy was scaled back significantly (Dreyer, 2008, pp. 286–90). After Mao's death, a short period of local political enfranchisement occurred, but the Chinese government responded to increasing Tibetan unrest in the late 1980s by importing Han administrators to reassert political control, and by purging Tibetans from positions of authority (Barton, 2003, p. 89). The involvement of native Tibetans in the lower tiers of government has continued, and remains the standard today, but their role is often marginal. President Jintao summarized the two-tiered approach in 2008 when he asserted that the Communist Party of China (CPC) should "fully trust" and "tremendously support" the work of Han cadres in Tibet, but also noted the importance of "grassroots cadres from all ethnic groups in Tibet" and asserted that the Party should "care about them more, support them more and help them more" (Kang, 2008).

The extent to which this method has been effective for suppressing antipathy and resistance to Chinese rule is mixed. On the one hand, the inclusion of local people in the regional governments in Xinjiang and Tibet has helped some local people to gain a sense of belonging within the system. On the other hand, many people continue to feel disenfranchised and distrusted, because Han administrators are often appointed to the power-holding positions, while native participation is limited to symbolic roles. Furthermore, many of the indigenous inhabitants continue to desire independence rather than autonomy, and even the most thorough of efforts to involve them within the Chinese regional apparatus can only temper, not remove, this aspiration.

Religious Control

As a Marxist state, the Chinese government formally pursues a creed of atheism and views religion as a threat to its authority. This includes in Xinjiang and Tibet, where it views Islam and Buddhism respectively as security risks. These religions are viewed as concerning because they provide leadership for their followers that fall beyond the purview of the Chinese government. The potential for transnational Islamic extremism to inflame, influence, and support insurgency in Xinjiang is viewed as particularly concerning.

Consequently, the Chinese authorities have worked hard to minimize, redirect, and control religion within Xinjiang and Tibet. During the Cultural Revolution, religion was clamped down upon heavily, with all of China's inhabitants, both in the mainland and within its minority regions, forcibly encouraged to reject religion and to criticize those who practiced it (Barton, 2003, p. 85; Millward and Tursun, 2004, pp. 97–8; Tyler, 2004, p. 156). During the 1980s, some degree of religious toleration was extended across these areas but following the upheavals of the 1989, state persecution of

religion again rose (Barton, 2003, pp. 87–94; Tyler, 2004, p. 157). In Tibet, for example, the government imposed reeducation programs for monasteries, replaced the heads of monastery and nunneries with Communist party officials, forced the retirement of anti-Chinese senior monks, and prohibited religious education for children (Barton, 2003, pp. 100–2; Lloyd-Roberts, 1998). These policies have remained (Wong, 2009). Similarly, in Xinjiang, pressure was placed upon people working for the government or in state industries to abstain from worshipping publically or attending mosque, while religious education was limited to Marxist diatribes against religion (Tyler, 2004, pp. 157–8).

Efforts to repress religion have been accompanied by attempts to subvert its leadership to the state. Throughout most of the occupation of Tibet, for example, the Chinese have used the pro-Chinese Panchen Lama as a tool to undermine support for the Dalai Lama, and influence religious loyalties (Barton, 2003, pp. 29–30, 47–9, 80, 91). This policy was rejuvenated in the mid-1990s, when the Chinese formally declared "religion would have to adapt itself to socialism rather than vice-versa. It underscored this point by rejecting the Dalai Lama's candidate for the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama. The child simply disappeared and was replaced by a candidate approved by Beijing" (Dreyer, 2008, pp. 296–7). Some concessions have been made, such as the modification of the birth control rule for Xinjiang to allow couples to have two children, rather than the maximum of one that exists across most of the rest of country, but such concessions tend to be rare and of limited impact (Tyler, 2004, pp. 159–60).

Attempts to suppress or divert religion within these countries have yielded mixed results. It is true that overt displays of religion have decreased, and the supervision and monitoring of mosques and monasteries have decreased the ability of religious leaders to foment discontent or allow anti-government activities to be planned. At the same time, however, these activities have not dampened the devotion of many believers to their religion. Furthermore, by placing the state in opposition to religion, the Chinese have created a self-fulfilling philosophy: the desire to practice religion means, in effect, the desire to oppose the Chinese state. This encourages, rather than discourages, devout religious followers to rebel against the Chinese government.

LINKS TO BROADER FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY

Chinese preoccupation with the internal threats it faces in Xinjiang and Tibet has influenced its conceptions of security and its foreign policy. One prominent example occurred in March 2014, when the Chinese chose to abstain on the United Nations Security resolution to criticize the secession referendum in the Crimea, despite the traditional partnership between Russia and China over UN issues. A core motivation behind China's decision was their concern that supporting the principle of self-determination, cited by Russia, might inflame calls, both internally and externally, for Xinjiang and Tibet to be granted independence on that same basis (Hatton, 2014). A second notable example occurred earlier, in the aftermath 9/11. In this case, China supported America's military intervention into Afghanistan in the hope that "in return for Chinese Support for Operation Enduring Freedom, the Americans would sign off on equating the separatist Uighurs with the mass murderers of al-Qaeda" (Nichols, 2008, p. 97).

More broadly, as we have seen, the Chinese priority of managing unrest in Xinjiang and Tibet has influenced its foreign policy, galvanizing it into forming a range of partnerships and building the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. It has also colored China's relationship with India, with the issue of India's harboring the Dalai Lama and supporting the notion of a free Tibet contributing to the outbreak of the 1962 Chinese–India War and subsequently acting as a constant irritant between the two Asian powers (Lidarev, 2012). COIN and pacification operations form a considerable component of China's military planning. As Liff and Erickson (2013) recently highlighted, the internal security threats that China faces in Xinjiang and Tibet is one of the major drivers of China's increasing military spending (pp. 824–5). Similarly, both the police and the armed services carry out regular training exercises in the two regions, with the goal of ensuring that these organizations have the capabilities and experience to handle any unrest, which might occur in relation to Chinese

rule (Agence France-Presse [AFP], 2010, 2013; Krishnan, 2012). This demonstrates an internal COIN orientation for both the Chinese military and police.

Moreover, the Chinese government contributes to the running of the "Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure" (RATS) in Tashkent, which shares information about terrorism between SCO members. The Chinese military also encourages and participates in joint counterterrorist (CT) training exercises, known as "Peace Missions" with its partners in the SCO (Godehardt and Pengxin, 2009, pp. 1–2; Kuo, 2013; McDermott, 2007, pp. 1–23). This further confirms the centrality that managing security in Xinjiang and Tibet play within the minds of China's diplomats and military planners.

VERSUS WESTERN COIN

For many Westerners, the terms "pacification" and "counterinsurgency" evoke images of foreign wars fought by expeditionary forces in faraway places, including colonial policing, Cold War proxy wars, CT operations, and humanitarian interventions. Modern Chinese pacification and COIN operations have to be understood in a different light. Communist China considers the two main territories in which it has conducted these activities—Xinjiang and Tibet—to form an inalienable part of historic China. This is reinforced by the immediate proximity of these two areas next to China, which provides a stronger physical attachment for the Chinese government than that experienced by even the most devoted colonial powers. It is true, for example, that France colonized Algeria, Vietnam, and other countries with the so-called colons and many of its people and political establishment considered these areas to form part of "Greater France." However, these territories were separated from France by considerable distances, and French attachment to these areas harked back only to the nineteenth century. This represented a significantly higher degree of separation than the Chinese feel toward Xinjiang and Tibet, where the territories border on the edge of China proper, and where historical associations go back millennia. Consequently, a major difference between Western and Chinese COIN emerges: for the West, COIN has traditionally been fought abroad; for modern China it has been carried out at home.

This has two important ramifications. First, it has helped China to exhibit "infinite political will" and resolutely follow a path of "no turning back" in its COIN and pacification work within Xinjiang and Tibet (Blanchard, 2013; Wayne, 2007, pp. 46–7). It has often been possible, albeit unpalatable, for Western political leaders to disengage and retreat from COIN operations when they have been waged overseas. The distance between the theater of conflict and the home country has reduced, at least partially, the perception that the home country itself is under attack. The fact that the Chinese government and views Xinjiang and Tibet as forming an integral part of China, means that they do not feel that they can withdraw from either of these territories, as to do so would be to jeopardize internal stability, something that neither the Communist Party, nor the majority of people in China, would countenance (Mu, 2011; Wayne, 2007, pp. 46–7).

Second, while distinctions have often existed between how the West approaches its internal policing at home and its COIN abroad, with the former usually carried out by domestic police and the latter conducted primarily by the armed forces, in Xinjiang and Tibet the lines are blurred. Responsibility for the security aspects of COIN in these regions are shared by both the military and the police, in the form of the PLA, the People's Armed Police (PAP), the Public Security Bureau (PSB), local police forces, and (only in Xinjiang) the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) (Mu, 2011; Wayne, 2007, p. 45; Wayne, 2008, pp. 73–80).

HAS CHINESE COIN PROVED EFFECTIVE?

The chapter has discussed a plethora of tools used by the Chinese government to pacify rebellion (and potential rebellion) within Xinjiang and Tibet over the past 65 years, as well as the relative effectiveness of each method adopted. It has also considered the centrality of COIN and pacification

operations in these two regions within broader Chinese military planning, as well as the fundamental differences between Western and Chinese COIN.

One glaring question arises from this discussion: *Has Chinese COIN proved effective?* The answer seems to be both "yes" *and* "no." On the one hand, the Chinese government continues to rule over Xinjiang and Tibet, with no obvious symptoms that it is losing its grip on these provinces. International support for its efforts in these regions remains mixed, with some countries actively supporting Chinese efforts, others paying them little heed, and a few vocalizing criticisms of its efforts. None seem likely to intervene in the near future. This suggests that the Chinese government is not failing in its pacification and COIN efforts within these regions. On the other hand, resistance efforts continue to occur regularly within both areas. This includes highly visible protests, such as the self-immolations of monks in Tibet, and premediated military actions by organized political groups, such as seizures of police stations and raids upon prisons by Xinjiang insurgent forces. Diaspora movements continue to lobby for greater global attention toward China's occupation of these regions, with the result that they remain in the consciousness of the international community. This suggests that the Chinese government is not succeeding fully in its pacification and COIN efforts in these regions either.

Without the addition of any major new factors, it seems likely that the impasse is likely to continue. Resistance to Chinese rule will not be eradicated by the Chinese government's actions, but it will be prevented from achieving a level beyond low-level violence and containable disruption. China's pacification and COIN strategies will ensure that the Communist government will retain its hold over both Xinjiang and Tibet, but true peace will remain elusive, with ongoing temporary bouts of localized instability and disorder likely to continue, at least into the near future.

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15 The "Father-to-Son" War
Burma's Karen Nationalist Insurgency

Scott Nicholas Romaniuk

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The strategic implications of insurgency have fluctuated throughout history. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) insurgency (1975–1983), for example, was a low-level insurgency that caused little more than minor disturbances in Iraq and less so beyond her borders (Cordesman and Davies, 2008). The Taliban insurgency, which formed following the collapse of Taliban authority in Afghanistan in 2001, spread beyond Afghan borders and into neighboring Pakistan (Farrell and Giustozzi, 2013, p. 847). The movement fed regional instability and challenged the capabilities of the world's leading military powers, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Many insurgency campaigns, like those during the Cold War era, have been overshadowed by larger wars waged between principal state actors. In many cases, their effects were of little concern to state actors preoccupied with great power politics.

In the Post-Cold War era, and indeed following the September 11, 2001 attacks, attention has been captured by the threat posed by insurgency for a number of reasons. Unease about the outbreak of war between states has, at least for now, faded. Globalization has ushered in wave after wave of change and insecurity, which has cultivated discontent in many regions of the world. The fraying or complete collapse of political, social, and economic orders, in combination with issues of migration and asylum, failing states and authoritarian regimes, the abuse of liberal democratic principles and powers, the spread of arms, abuses of religious rights, and illicit economies in addition to organized crime have fueled the perceived a need to turn to insurgency as an alternative means of being heard and achieving political and social goals (Metz and Millen, 2004). The United States Army (USA), in its 2006 counterinsurgency (COIN) manual, spoke directly of the need to adapt to the strategic significance of insurgency given the prominent position that it's taken on many national agendas:

> To succeed against superior resources and technology, weaker actors have had to adapt. The recent success of US [United States] military forces in major combat operations undoubtedly will lead many future opponents to pursue asymmetric approaches … Today the world has entered another period when insurgency is common and strategically significant. This is likely to continue for at least a decade, perhaps longer (pp. 1–2).

While insurgency has been written into histories of violence over the course of thousands of years, COIN and state-level strategies to address growing and fading concern about insurgency has existed for mere decades. Insurgency campaigns are constantly changing and adapting to the changes inherent in the world. Some have been tamed by COIN ideas, strategies, doctrine, and operational arts, while others have managed to overcome governments and the tools they possess in combating the problem. The "fish in the sea" model, associated with Mao Zedong (1954), is the most widely known form of insurgency. This is a "phased attrition model" than can be used to describe insurgent activity during the Cold War (i.e., the Vietnam War). However, as much of the world has changed since the end of bipolarity with the dissolution of the Soviet Union (SU) so has the dynamics of unconventional warfare. In the twenty-first century, "attrition is not the deciding factor on either side" in insurgency settings (Schaffer, 2007). "Today's insurgencies," he argues, "are psychological wars of political endurance, not attrition" (para. 1). Understanding why some insurgency campaigns are successful while others abandon their violent efforts in achieving political objectives through unconventional means and ultimately fail is no simple issue to address. The existence of certain conditions dictated whether or not insurgents will be successful in their cause. Most insurgencies throughout history have failed. Some succeed. Why? In some cases, all of the preconditions for success need to be met. In other cases, only some or a combination of those preconditions are required.

RESEARCH QUESTION

What constitutes an effective insurgency campaign? I analyze the specific conditions that have supported insurgency operations in Burma since 1949 using the Karen nationalist movement (Karen National Union [KNU] and Karen National Liberation Army [KNLA]) as a case study. I examine how the requisite conditions of an effective insurgency campaign can potentially inform attempts at combating and possibly preventing the formation of insurgency. Within my methodological framework, I explore the preexisting conditions provided by the United States government (USG) (2012) including historical, societal, political, or economic factors that either directly or indirectly fuel insurgency. The following set of nested questions also informs the research: Are all conditions necessary for an effective insurgency campaign? Does a combination of conditions lead to a greater level of efficiently or success of insurgency? Which conditions are shown to be the most important and least important?

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The primary purpose of this research is to discern the means by which an effective insurgency campaign can be qualitatively measured. An effective insurgency campaign is composed of a host of factors that can potentially facilitate the rise and subsequent operations of an insurgent group (i.e., insurgents, militants, separatists, rebels, and guerrillas). One of the persistent challenges in making sense of insurgency is the existence of variegated means by which effective insurgent campaigns are waged. The problem stems from many different insurgencies' ability to thrive given a confluence of different historical, societal, political, or economic factors. This research proceeds with an assumed equivalence of the terms "successful" and "effective" as they relate directly to the issue of insurgency. The framework employed is, as described in the subsequent section, based on a number of preexisting conditions put forward by the USG and a range of scholarship.

METHODOLOGY

RESEARCH PARADIGM, STRATEGY, AND APPROACH

I operate within an interpretivist research paradigm with Burma's* Karen insurgency† (1949–ongoing) as the unit of analysis. Through a subjective lens of analysis, I consider qualitative (and to a lesser extent quantitative) features of insurgent activity and insurgency campaigns to build an understanding of this ubiquitous form of violence. I incorporate primary and secondary materials and apply a historical analysis and process tracing of the events that define the cases selected. A critical analysis is made of government documents, and public materials including newspapers and media releases, in addition to scholarly work on the subject. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and reports of other international bodies are also incorporated. For the purpose of this research, I have chosen to limit the scope to a single case study that began during the Cold War period and extends to the present day (referred to as "ongoing"). The case connects with conditions explicit in select typologies to present implications for both theory and practice (Table 15.1; Figure 15.1).

My examination is built around Burma's Karen rebels because it is one of the world's longest-running insurgencies and continues to threaten the political order of a democracy-in-the-making in South East Asia (SEA) (see Thornton, 2006). Both Burma and the Karen have repeatedly made headlines after signing peace deals and reaching ceasefire agreements, the latest of which has raised hope that decades of bitter fighting might soon end (McElroy, 2012). This case study, rather than being representative, is chosen because of the length of the insurgent movement and because of the relatively little scholarly attention it is afforded. A basis is provided for understanding why insurgency succeeds and what factors constitute a successful insurgency. The characteristics of what appears to be a successful insurgency by virtue of their long history can be useful when applying to other contexts regardless of how long they have been waging armed opposition against national governments.

TYPOLOGICAL INQUIRY

Different ways exist for analysts to categorize insurgencies. Of these, the two most common ways to distinguish between them involves closely looking at the main objectives they seek to fulfill and

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* In 1989, a year after thousands were killed while the government suppressed a popular uprising the ruling military junta officially changed the name of the country from "Burma" to "Myanmar Naing-ngan." Rangoon was also changed to Yangon. Both names are internationally recognized but the United Kingdom (UK) and France do not recognize the name change. In this study, I use the traditional "Burma" as well as "Rangoon" instead of "Yangon." I also follow the use of "Karen" (i.e., Karen State) rather than the military junta redesignation "Kayin." I use the term "Burmese" to refer to all citizens, the language, and the country (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC], 2007).

† "Karen insurgency" denotes the general rebellion by the Karen National Union (KNU) including its armed wing the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA). Use of "KNU" also includes the "KNLA" (World Press, n.d.).

TABLE 15.1

Ongoing Insurgencies and Locations, 1945–Present

Movement	Location	Date
Chechnya (Chechen Rebels)	Russian Federation	1994–ongoing
Basque Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)	Spain	1968–ongoing
Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN)	Mexico	1994–ongoing
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN)	Colombia	1964–ongoing
Revolutionary Front for the Independence of East Timor (FReTiLIn)	Indonesia	1975–ongoing
India's Naxalite–Maoist Insurgency	India	1967–ongoing
Irish Republican Army (IRA)	Northern Ireland, United Kingdom (UK)	1969–ongoing
Iraqi Jihadists	Iraq	2003–ongoing
Karen Insurgency	Burma (Myanmar)	1949–ongoing
Kashmiri Separatists	Pakistan, India (Jammu, Kashmir)	1988–ongoing
Kurd Guerrillas	Iraq	1945–ongoing
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	Uganda	1987–ongoing
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelem (LTTE)	Sri Lanka	1983–ongoing
Movimiento Estudiantil Chicano de Aztlán (MEChA)	United States (US), Mexico	1969–ongoing
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)	Philippines	1970–ongoing
National Liberation Front (FLN), Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), Armed Islamic Group (GIA)	Algeria	1992–ongoing
New People's Army (NPA)	Philippines	1968–ongoing
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)	Palestinian Territories	1973–ongoing
Southern People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and Southern People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)	Sudan	1983–ongoing
Taliban	Afghanistan	2001–ongoing
Thailand Insurgency Groups (Barisan Revolusi Nasional, Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO), and Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Pattani (BNPP)	Thailand	1960–, 1965–, 1968–, 1971–ongoing, respectively
Tibetan Militants	Tibet (China)	1952–ongoing
Unified Communist Party of Nepal (UCPN)	Nepal	1996–ongoing

Source: Adapted from Ayoob, M., *Regional Security in the Third World: Case Studies for Southeast Asia and the Middle East*, Croom Helm, London, 1986; Tan, A. T. H., *A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia*, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2007; Zimmerman, F. H., *Why Insurgents Fail: Examining Post-World War II Failed Insurgencies Utilizing the Prerequisites of Successful Insurgencies as a Framework*, MS Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Monterey, 2007, March.

they primary methods by which they pursue their goals. Potential problems in examining insurgencies along these lines are entrenched in the view that insurgencies are capable of and have certainly altered their goals as well as their campaign methods. Another challenge rests in the idea that insurgencies do not always operate alone. Numerous instances illustrate that they either compete against one another or enter into varied degrees of partnerships and even alliances. Others compete against one another while committing their efforts against government forces in parallel, as is the case in Burma. Even in spite of resolving their differences in the face of postconflict governance, insurgencies have still been shown to work together. Combining insurgent efforts accordingly increases the complexity in discerning which specific conditions contribute to which group in addition to the precise goals and methods used by each group respectively. A further challenge is cultivated by

FIGURE 15.1   Ongoing insurgencies timeline, 1945–present.

potential infighting or disagreement that may take place between group leadership and the basic operatives of which they are comprised. Fighters of a particular group may exhibit methods of conflict not officially advocated or espoused by the command of that group.

Insurgency goals, according to the USG (2012), can usually be placed within one or more of the following categories:

1. Revolutionary insurgencies seek to replace the existing political order with an entirely different system, often entailing transformation of the economic and social structures.
2. Reformist insurgencies do not aim to change the existing political order but, instead, seek to compel the government to alter its policies or undertake political, economic, or social reforms.
3. Separatist insurgencies seek independence for a specific region. In some cases, the region in question spans existing national boundaries.
4. Resistance insurgencies seek to compel an occupying power to withdraw from a given territory.
5. Commercialist insurgencies are motivated by the acquisition of wealth or material resources; political power is simply a tool for seizing and controlling access to the wealth.

These conditions form part of just one specific typology. Another way of classifying insurgencies is by looking at the organizational structure. Whereas a specific insurgency may identify with political causes, others may focus on military aspects of a struggle. Again, it is necessary to remain cognizant of their capacity to alter their structures. The USG (2012) also typologizes insurgencies along several lines.

1. *Politically Organized.* Insurgencies develop a complex political structure before or at the same time they begin undertaking military operations against the government. These groups stress consolidating control of territory through the use of shadow governments

rather than through military power. The military component of politically organized insur-
gencies is subordinate to the political structure.

2. *Militarily Organized*. Insurgencies emphasize military action against the government over
political mobilization of the population. The insurgents calculate that military success
and the resulting weakening of the government will cause the population to rally to the
insurgents' cause. Militarily organized insurgencies begin with small, weak, ill-defined
political structures, often dominated by military leaders.

3. *Traditionally Organized*. Insurgencies draw on preexisting tribal, clan, ethnic, or reli-
gious affiliations. Established social hierarchies—a system of chiefs and subchiefs, for
example—often substitute for political and military structures in traditionally organized
insurgencies.

4. *Urban-Cellular*. Insurgencies develop and are centered in urban areas. These insurgencies
lack hierarchical political and military leadership structures, instead organizing around
small, semiautonomous cells. Urban-cellular insurgencies generally rely more heavily on
terrorism than do other types of insurgency. Their cellular structure and reliance on terror-
ism can limit their ability to mobilize popular support (USG, 2012).

The earlier-stated typologies provide opportunities for unique case selection while also enabling
an avoidance of selection bias. The USG circulated information about insurgency activity with the
intention of it being applied universally. The opportunity is presented to select cases along a number
of lines of reasoning.

BARD O'NEILL'S ANALYTICAL MODEL

Having looked at the seminal features of select typologies, I blend these with a straightforward model
for analyzing and insurgencies developed by O'Neill (1990, 2005). The simplicity and practicality
of this model finds its roots in two very notable and praiseworthy books by O'Neill. They include,
Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare and Insurgency and Terrorism:
From Revolution to Apocalypse. In his work, O'Neill presents a handful of insurgency typologies
useful for framing various studies. He highlights uses of employing theoretical and descriptive writ-
ings in the context of insurgency with the aim of producing a fuller-bodied study inclusive of critical
factors that support insurgent strategies and campaigns. Extending this further, O'Neill's coverage
relates soundly to state-level policy and action utilized against insurgencies. Thus, already the main
actors in insurgency conflict are encompassed by this methodology.

O'Neill drifts from the more theoretical-based approaches to insurgency and political violence
with the aim of tackling practical aspects of this phenomenon. Since the ultimate goals of an insur-
gent group can change over time or even rather abruptly, O'Neill's work navigates these possibilities
by considering concealed, abstruse, divergent, and shifting characteristics of insurgencies, their
strategies, the environments in which the live and work, their support structures, organizational
matrices, and oppositional conditions (O'Neill, 1990, 2005). I borrow the method and adapt it to
account for historical milieu from which insurgencies have developed and depict insurgent activity
as it stands in opposition to another actor, namely government authority or forces.

In his analytical model for studying insurgency and insurgency warfare, O'Neill presents seven
steps. Step one entails compiling a description of the insurgency—its nature, classification, short-
and long-term goals, the political resources and military means used to attain those goals, form
of warfare adopted (terrorism, guerrilla warfare, or conventional warfare (Taylor, 2004, p. 32).
There is a need to collect the general facts regarding the insurgent group. Seven different kinds of
insurgencies exist: anarchists, egalitarians, traditionalists, pluralists, secessionists, reformists, and
preservationists (these correlate with insurgency classification put forward by the USG). Each clas-
sification offers insight into different goals. Classifying leads to a better understanding of how the
group develops, organizes, and goes about trying to achieve its objectives.

Step two involves outlining the strategic approach of the insurgent group. There are four major strategies that a group can use to realize their goals: (1) Marxist–Leninist conspiratorial strategy, (2) Mao Zedong's strategy of protracted popular war, (3) the military-focus strategy as employed by leaders such as Fidel Castro, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, and Regis Debray, and (4) a strategy of urban-warfare as in the context of Carlos Marighella (O'Neill, 1990; Taylor, 2004, p. 33). "One must remember," according to Taylor (2004), "that while most insurgents often adopt one of these strategies or a combination thereof, they do not always adhere to all of their core tenets" (p. 34).

Step three considers the environmental conditions in which the insurgency operates. The environment component can be a complex relationship involving multiple aspects. Generally speaking, however, this factor can be divided into either a physical or human components. When discussing the physical component, reference is made to topographical features of a given region, the various climatic conditions found in an observed environment, and the transportation and communications systems that exist (Davidson, 2005, p. 19; O'Neill, 1990). "The human component is comprised of demography, social structure, economics, and the political culture" (O'Neill, 1990, p. 59).

Step four is an investigation the popular support that insurgencies (may) strive to obtain with the view of achieving their stipulated goals. Their support from the local population is seen as a means of bolstering their image as a legitimate group with a legitimate cause at the expense of the image held by the government and governing authorities. Popular support can be the single most important strategic factor that dictates the outcome of an insurgent movement. When an insurgent group is forced to contend with oft-times overwhelming force in the form of government infrastructure, military and police forces, technological weaponry possessed by those forces, economic provisions, and communication, popular support can offset many or even all of these factors. This factor can exist be in the form of active (direct) and passive (indirect) support. Achieving the support of a population usually leads to the potential for the group to recruit further members for its cause from that population. It is not always easy for a group to understand and appeal to diverse principles and emotions (other elements such as economic classes, political convictions, ethnicity, religion, and education) that individuals and families share in any given community (O'Neill, 1990).

Step five refers to the organization and cohesion of an insurgency. It is important because it allows an insurgency to function in a way that might compensate for particular deficiencies of the group itself, reinforce other positive qualities possessed by the group, and can "compensate for the material superiority of their opponents," namely the government or other insurgency groups (O'Neill, 1990, p. 90). Insurgencies, according to O'Neill (1990), possess "three structural dimensions—scope, complexity, and cohesion—and two functions—instrumental services and channels for expressive protest" (p. 90). "Scope refers to the numbers and kinds of people across the political spectrum who either play key roles in the movement (political cadres, terrorists, guerrillas, and regular soldiers) or provide active support" (O'Neill, 1990, p. 90). The complexity of an insurgency refers to its overall organization. It is, as Davidson (2005) notes, "the ability of the insurgent leaders to identify, integrate, coordinate, and diversify their organization into military operations, communications, transportation, logistics, and training" (pp. 20–1). Cohesion is also of critical importance because it refers to a centralized command of the insurgency that dictates the level of damage that the insurgency is able to inflict. When a group possesses this characteristic its overall impact can be considerably heightened. However, the absence of cohesion in an insurgency does not necessarily mean that the insurgency will fail or lacks the ability to be a serious threat.

Step six examines external support to determine the extent to which the group received moral, political, material, and sanctuary support. In some instances, the public declares that the overall cause of the insurgency is just and that the strategy and tactics employed by the group are either admired or simply tolerated so long as the group's final objectives can be actualized (O'Neill et al., 1980). An insurgency can find that other states or nonstate actors politically support their cause and therefore might be able to legitimize it. A notable case of this is how Hezbollah and Hamas are supported politically by Iran and Lebanon and find further support among the populations of Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Territories. Material support can also come in the form of monetary

aid, weaponry, medical supplies, technology, and training (Davidson, 2005, p. 22). The aspect of external support is essential in the analysis of any insurgency group and its chances for success. O'Neill (1990) argues that, "insurgent groups normally must obtain outside assistance if they are to succeed" otherwise they become can easily become crippled or remain substantially weak (p. 111).

Step seven looks at the response of the government. There are always a number of options available for a government or governing authorities when it comes to reacting to threats posed by insurgent groups. This step seeks to evaluate those options, why the government would undertake such responsive measures, and the performance level of its actions (O'Neill, 1990). It is difficult to understate the importance of how the government responds to insurgencies. As O'Neill (1990) states, "of all the variables that have a bearing on the progress and outcome of insurgencies, none is more important than governmental response" (p. 125). In many ways, the response factor of the government can largely dictate the outcome of the insurgency. If the government (as an instrument of national power) is incapable of organizing the propose response strategy or if the government fails in communicating with the public or showing the intentions of the insurgency properly, then it stand to lose a great deal of legitimacy in its opposition to the group. Taylor (2004) states that, "history is replete with examples of governments that underestimated the potency of an insurgency until it was too late" (p. 46).

STATE OF THE ART

In research on insurgency activity, a major focus has been made on campaigns and operations waged after the Second World War. Insurgency is generally accepted as a strategy employed by groups, organizations, or networks unable to achieve predetermined political or social objectives by conventional means (Metz and Millen, 2004, p. 2). The term is used synonymously with those of "guerilla warfare," "asymmetric conflict," "unconventional warfare," and "revolutionary warfare." Insurgency is usually a long or drawn-out conflict facilitated by specific geographical features or what Metz and Millen (2004) refer to as "complex terrain (jungles, mountains, urban areas)" as well as aspects of psychological warfare and political mobilization (p. 2). These characteristics highlight the processual dynamics undergirding insurgency campaigns. Scholars have been especially concerned with the prevalent factors that not only give rise to insurgents and their operations but also to what actually enable an insurgency to gain strength and remain in motion.

Given that both insurgencies and states are principally made up of people, the main focus of insurgency studies has remained on populations. In the prospect theory approach, the view is that the population of a given community or state has the option to support either the government in power or one or more of the insurgencies that operate within a country (Harris, 2012; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). A population can be swayed and manipulated to support either one or the other depending on the ability of the insurgency to demonstrate that people are negatively affected by policies put in place by government. Aiming to harmonize the discontent of a population with the moral or ideological cause of the group, a useful framework is established in which popular supports strengthens the abilities and cause of the insurgency while weakening the cause or legitimacy of the government (Masters, 2004). In other words, "the way in which people define reference points has an effect on how they perceive violent options" (p. 703). The approach considers individuals as independent agents "making deliberate choices that will lead to a desired outcome" (McDermott, 1998) with the selection of the course of action often being "influenced by how options are framed" (Masters, 2004, p. 704). Tversky et al. (1990) suggest that a "framing effect" connected to "choice and risk orientation" is predicated on such relationships as "losses vs. gains; e.g., mortality vs. survival" (p. 215; Masters, 2004, p. 706). An effort by the insurgency is made to show that a population has incurred a level of loss with the intention of spurring a response that will strengthen the insurgency's cause. "A person who has not made peace with his losses," reasons Kahneman and Tversky (1979), "is likely to accept gambles that would be unacceptable to him otherwise" (p. 287; Masters, 2004, p. 706).

Studies also identify the manipulation of government response as the one of the primary expedients of a successful insurgency and its campaign. These tactics have been demonstrated following al-Qaeda's assault on the US in 2001, prompting the United States to respond with overwhelming military force to compel Muslims to view the United States and its allies and friends as Western imperialists operating in occupied Muslim lands. This tactic has also been used in combination with terrorists and insurgents attacking civilian targets with the aim of inciting fear in local populations. Al-Qaeda used violence against other Muslims and states that support the United States and its allies and friends during former-president Bush and Obama's self-styled (Global) War on Terror ([G]WoT). The approach has been successful in discouraging states and communities to support the United States and its foreign policy objectives. As Counihan (2011) has noted, "this both discourages support for the government and undermines government legitimacy by highlighting its inability to protect its citizens" (p. 2).

Research has taken into consideration quantitative elements in addition to qualitative trajectories of analysis. Collier and Hoeffler (1998), taking the quantitative direction of inquiry, examined the emergence of civil war in line with four variables: Per-capita income; Amount of natural resources; Ethno-linguistic fractionalization; Population size (p. 563). Their investigation was concerned with the connection points between civil war and economic factors. Drawing on Grossman (1995) and Azam (1995), and using the Singer and Small (1982, 1994) data set on civil wars, 1816–1992, Collier and Hoeffler (1998) argue that, "rebels will conduct a civil war if the perceived benefits outweigh the costs of rebellion" (p. 563). Their results correlate with the approach to population as a useful resource in waging a successful insurgency campaign in noting that, "countries with larger populations have higher risks of war and these wars last longer" (p. 569).

Research on insurgency has also looked to financial, organizational, and political weakness as determinants of potential insurgency activity "due to weak local policing or inept and corrupt counterinsurgency practices" (Fearon and Laitin, 2003, p. 80). Their data show, according to the authors that, "measures of cultural diversity and grievances fail to postdict civil war onset, while measures of conditions that favor insurgency do fairly well" (p. 76). Studies engaging with insurgency specifically take into account the growth and escalation of groups involved in unconventional warfare against states and state-like actors while others consider how insurgency ends. Studies comprising the literature employ a range of theoretical approaches while assuming both qualitative and quantitative methodological engagement. Multiple subfields have been partially integrated in the research on insurgency. An appreciable breadth of progress has been made in understanding the many conditions under which insurgency thrives, however, aspects of research on this issue remain separated. In spite of the positive aspects mentioned here, few comparative works of insurgency are made and those that are seldom postulate factors prevalent in other research traditions.

DEFINING INSURGENCY

Unconventional warfare is far more complex and illusory than conventional warfare. Since irregular warfare has been identified as one of the greatest security challenges to the international community in the twenty-first century, there is a persistent need to formulate intellectual frameworks that equip governments and NGOs with the tools necessary to engage with. Whether or not governments should decide to combat insurgencies remains a normative question. If they choose to do so, the clearer understanding of what they are dealing with, the better.

Insurgency, as defined by the US Government Counterinsurgency Guide (2009), is the "organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region" (US Department of State [DoS], p. 6). When insurgents attempt to displace the powers of government and either completely or partially control the resources and population of territory, "they do so through the use of force (including guerilla warfare, terrorism, coercion/intimidation), propaganda, subversion, and political mobilization" (p. 6). The document states further:

insurgents fight government forces only to the extent needed to achieve their political aims: their main effort is not to kill counterinsurgents, but rather to establish a competitive system of control over the population, making it impossible for the government to administer its territory and people. Insurgent activity is therefore designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and influence (US DoS, 2009, p. 6).

Insurgency, as defined by Stoker (2009) is

a struggle between a government and a group or groups not possessing controlling political power that use violent and non-violent methods in pursuit of a particular political objective such as overthrowing the government or breaking away and establishing an independent state. On rare occasions, they fight to keep things from changing. Certain past violent Protestant groups in Northern Ireland are sometimes held up as examples of this (p. 1).

Schaefer (n.d.) describes insurgency simply as "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion or conflict" (p. 3). Insurgency and terrorism share much of the same conceptual ground given that the majority of insurgents look to terrorism as their main tactic because of the success that it has been associated with for several decades (p. 19; Chalaind, 1982, p. 30). Insurgency and terrorism share a many characteristics. Both are types of violence and force used by nonstate actors to fulfill political objectives (Tucker and Lamb, 2006).

Although a significant amount of blurring takes place between the two terms there are stark differences to note. On one hand, terrorism comes under normative and political scrutiny. Gaerty (1992) highlight how "governments will often attempt to condemn their opponents as terrorists, since the public relations victory achieved by this linguistic sleight of hand can be crucial in any ensuing struggle for popular support" (p. 15). Kilcullen (2005), on the other hand, reasons that the term "insurgent" has a degree of legitimacy attached to it, which according to Rosenau (2007), "explains why incumbents typically refuse to describe their adversaries as such" (p. 3). Borrowing from O'Neill (2005), insurgency is defined as

a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously used political resources (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics (p. 13).

In O'Neill's definition, a fair bit of emphasis is placed on the aspect of politics. While insurgencies possess aspects of politics and violence, it is precisely the aspect of violence that sets an insurgency apart from a more basic political movement (2005). Indeed, the violent aspect of the insurgency is intentional and aimed at either combatants or noncombatants, or both to achieve their goals that are perceived as unachievable by other means (Davidson, 2005, p. 14).

To truly grasp the diversity of insurgency and insurgency warfare one must take these and other definitions into account. There are obvious differences among them. However, these differences are central to a thorough comprehension of insurgency. Each of the definitions allows researchers to examine insurgency while honing in on specific aspects or features of a particular group. Taken together, or modified so that each can potentially work with one another (and pairing it a workable analytical model), we build a positive vantage point from which to examine any number of insurgencies so as to learn about their goals, the means by which they attempt to fulfill those goals, strategy and tactics, and the likelihood that the group will be successful. Part of determining the condition of success is looking at it as either a direct or indirect outcome and what that state of success would more or less look like (Figures 15.2 and 15.3).

FIGURE 15.2 Burma (Myanmar) and neighboring countries, 2014. (From Frontline World, *Burma: State of War*, University of California, Berkeley, CA, 2011.)

THE KAREN NATIONAL UNION (KNU)

Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)

Background and Description

Burma has contended with armed rebellion from the moment it gained independence from Britain in 1948. Major armed separatist movements have plagued the government and state-level development for decades. These rebellions stem from the colonial age of then-Burma and the way that Britain formed the country. Burma, as described by Tan (2007), was an "artificial construct" with ethnic groups such as the Karen, Shan, Mon, Arakanese, Chin, and Nga refusing to be ruled by Burmans (p. 45). In order to achieve their desired statehood they rebelled with armed violence.

The Karen Rebels have been fighting against the government of Burma and the Tatmadaw (officially the Myanmar Armed Forces*) since 1949. Using the USG (2012) classification of insurgen-

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* Army (Tatmadaw Kyi), Navy (Tatmadaw Yay), and Air Force (Tatmadaw Lay) (CIA World Factbook, 2014a).

FIGURE 15.3 Burma (Myanmar): Divisions and states. (From Global Security, Myanmar: Divisions and States, 2013.)

cies, the KNU can be appropriately regarded as a separatist group because of its primary goal of gaining independence from the ruling military junta of Burma. Since Tatmadaw soldiers operate within Karen State, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) has been fighting on its own soil for years with the hope of expelling these forces from that territory. In view of this, The KNU may also be regarded as a resistance group. According to the USG's (2012) additional classification criteria, the KNU is militarily organized and originally relied on its military capabilities to project power and resist authorities in Rangoon. The KNU is also traditionally organized because of its connections with established tribes, clans, and ethnoreligious groups. Because the KNU retains obvious political and military structures, it represents a combination of these two arrangements.

The composition of the KNLA is roughly 3–4000 men and women, with many having previously served with the British army during the Second World War to fight against Japanese occupation forces (Rand, 2003). Their rank and file includes both men and women. Although their numbers are relatively low, especially considering the sizable force that the Burmese government is able to field against them, they seek to defend a remarkably large piece of Burmese territory. With seven provinces along the borders of Burma and Thailand, their main goal is the formation of a Karen

republic (Gerringer, 2002, p. 289). The Karen cannot be seen as a unified front against the government because of the composition of the group. Some Karen are Christian, other are "hill" Karen that have waged the most aggressive violence against Burma since the group's formation. In 1994, the Democratic Karen Buddhist group split from the KNU/KNLA. According, reference to the Karen as a "single" group is rather misleading and therefore problematic in itself.

Over the course of its history, Karen rebels practiced violent tactics in remote and relatively safe territory near the Thai border. Government forces of Burma have shied away from entering into Karen territory for fear of aggression they may encounter. Armed resistance against the Burmese government has become the world's longest civil war. It has been noted that foreigners travel to the region to offer their support for the group in different ways, including taking up arms and fighting against Burmese government forces. Despite the pressures level against them over the previous years and long decades of intense and tiresome fighting, the KNU/KNLA is particularly significant for its ability to have created an entirely self-sufficient system (Gerringer, 2002, p. 289).

Strategic Approach (A Cause to Fight For)

The Karen people have been dominated by Burmese rule for hundreds of years. Independence from the ruling elite has been the primary objective of the KNU and it is this goal, first and foremost, that has help to sustain their continued opposition to Burmese rule past and present (Smith, 1999). The KNU movement is much older than usually understood. When the Karen National Association (KNA) formed in 1881, this moment marked the beginning of the nationalist movement (Smith, 1999; South, 2011). The emergence of a pan-Karen national identity during the early 1900s helped bring Karen "together" in their desire for recognition and eventually (what many hoped would become) independence. Friction with Burmese nationalists and Karen élite laid the groundwork for conflict that sparked during the Second World War and gained extensive momentum in the immediate postwar period (Smith, 1999).

The primary political struggle of the Karen has been blended with guerilla warfare and conventional military operations to form its violence portfolio. Weapons and materials were and still are second-hand with much of its modern weaponry acquired from the opposing Tatmawdaw. Taken from Burmese government forces, they are able to use the same level of weapons technology but only to a limited extent. To fund operations the KNU receives money from anyone traveling through Karen-controlled territory. Within its territory, where it is claimed that crime has been eliminated, the Karen are responsible for governing the majority of the narcotics movement (Gerringer, 2002, p. 289). Its strategic approach has remained moderately intact over the past several decades, however, maintaining such an approach has become increasingly tenuous for the KNU as a result of a changing political climate, social, and economic opportunities for the Karen, and structural transformations within the KNU itself (South, 2011).

The KNU originally demonstrated that an uprising against the newly independent government was possible but much of its opportunity for meeting its original strategic objectives was lost as the 1940s came to a close. During the 1950s, the initiative swung unquestionably in favor of the Burmese government. Although the KNU's initial aim was complete independence, in 1976 the armed group called for the creation of a federal system instead of a fully independent Karen State (South, 2011). Significant differences between groups within the KNU/KNLA have been noted with some calling for an "all-or-nothing" victory, while others have looked to the political process as a means of exiting from a long and tiring campaign of violence and war against the ruling government (South, 2011, p. 42).

Environment

Burma is a large and poor country strategically located in SEA (22 00 N, 98 00 E). It is roughly the size of France and the United Kingdom (UK) combined and shares borders with five other countries: China, India, Thailand, Laos, and Bangladesh. Its 1940 km of coastline comprises its maritime borders with Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]

World Factbook, 2014a). Some of its borders are poorly secured. Four new crossing-points have been announced between Burma and Thailand: Myawaddy-May Sot, Tachileik-Mae, Kawthaung-Ranong, and Htee Khee-Sunaron (Karen News, 2013). Karen State accounts for approximately 4% of the total land area of the country (almost the size of Belgium). It is situated in the southeast of Burma and on the border the country shares with Thailand. The region is moderately secluded and attracts fewer travelers than other parts of the country despite efforts to open crossing and allow visa-holding foreigners to enter the country (South, 2011).

The region is known to be an area that even government forces have been unable to penetrate at certain points. Through the center of state runs the Dawna mountain range. At some points, the mountain ranges reach heights of up to 2000 m (6562 ft) and form a natural barrier for anyone trying to access the region. With access limited by steep and rugged highlands, the region is covered with thick jungle (CIA World Factbook, 2014a). Interior valleys, plains, and deltas have provided little defensive support for KNU forces in previous years; yet, the higher elevations provide defensive strongholds and the KNU have been far more successful at defending their positions in the mountainous terrain. Movement across these geographic features, explains Cusano (2001), produced a healthy union between various Karen peoples over the years.

> As the eastern retreat into the Dawna mountains and towards the Thai border hastened during the 1960s and 1970s, lowland and urban Karens from the Irrawaddy Delta, Yangon and Insein began moving to the new "liberated areas." Servings in the KNU's mountainous strongholds, the lowland Karens married local highlanders, producing a generation of culturally, linguistically, and religiously diverse Karens who personify the socio-demographic impact of the KNU's eastward migration. As a war in the mountains intensified, the KNU recruited more of the traditionally insular highlanders, and the fate of the migrant KNU insurgents and local Karen civilians became inextricably linked (p. 143).

Prior to 1988, the KNU had little contact with other groups that were operating in central Burma. After 1988, other non-Karen people (i.e., urban Burman) who were sheltered in Karen territory fused their cause to fight with the Karen (Cho, 2011). Generally speaking, poor lines of communication and supply issues have hampered maintaining insurgent operations in the region. In some instances, leaders are not completely aware of the actions of frontline soldiers.

Using the term "isolated" can also be somewhat specious. Even though the state is remotely situated, no region can escape connections with the external world entirely. Neither Burma nor Karen State is an exception. International influence has penetrated even the deepest parts of the country. The communist ideology was exceptionally pervasive during the time when Burma became independent. It too found its way to communities throughout Burma. As Smith (2007) posits,

> after independence, especially, political activists were greatly affected by communism and the strategies for peasants-based rebellion that swept across the region following Mao Zedong's victory in China. Revolutionary booklets, such as Mao Zedong's On Protracted War and On Guerrilla Warfare, became essential reading for many insurgent commanders, convincing many anti-government groups of the effectiveness and legitimacy of pursuing armed struggle in order to achieve power (p. 300).

Critical to the defense of Karen forces and likely the survival of insurgent forces within the state is the "depth" of this region given its uncultivated jungle and forests. The remaining side (the border that Karen State shares with Thailand) leaves a small section that has proven challenging for government forces to reach and therefore Rangoon is unable to entirely close all four sides of Karen State.

Local Popular Support

One of the greatest obstacles facing insurgencies is their general lack of military equipment and material capabilities. A second major restriction placed on the Karen insurgency is legitimization of their cause and their efforts in recruiting new soldiers. They are usually made up of a very small percentage of the population of the country in which they operate. Since these factors can signify

incredibly drawbacks for an insurgency and its cause, and because confronting government forces directly in through conventional warfare would certainly result in defeat, an insurgent group will typically fight its way to controlling the population or attempt to win locals' support for their primary cause. The insurgency is not the only actor that attempts to win local support. "Success of both counterinsurgent and insurgent forces," according to Zimmerman (2007), "depends on their ability to influence the populace in way beneficial to their causes" (p. 25). Lawrence (1963) argues that the most crucial goal of an insurgency gain the support of the civil or local populations through active goals with "real concerns and grievances of the local people being met" (p. 84).

When hostilities flare between an insurgent group and government forces, a population is often divided in its support of the fighting parties. Divisions among the population initially stand as a drawback for both sides but there are opportunities both to garner further support (Zimmerman, 2007). The majority of a population tends to be neutral in the conflict while of two smaller segments of the population one usually supports the government's position and the other sides with the insurgents. The large neutral body can be the tiebreaker in the hostilities. Unconventional warfare dramatically differs from conventional warfare in given that less attention is given to capturing territory and controlling land and more attention is invested in controlling or winning the support of a population.

Little has changed for the KNU in terms of its geographic control since it began fighting government forces decades ago. The group controls small segments of territory with the capacity to project its force in various pockets, but one factor that has remained problematic for the government is the support that it receives from the population. In eastern Burma, the KNU receives a high level of popular support (Voice of America [VoA], 2009). Much of its support comes from other Karen in the region. Christian communities in particular have extended their support to their broader cause. South (2011) explains that support is most likely to come from people "who are more likely to have contacts with international patrons" (p. 2). This support has wavered during its six decades of operations. Over time, Karen people been unable to consolidate their "liberated zones" and with the loss of its extensive areas of control many of its support ties with non-Karen communities have been cut (South, 2011, p. 2). Even though the KNU controls tiny pockets of territory in the eastern part of the country and is able to call on a relatively small amount of material resources, weaponry, and technology, the support that it receives from the population has seemingly offset this reality. KNU leaders have enjoyed being received by crowds of supporters that enter the jungles of eastern Burma to listen and see Karen soldiers (South, 2011). The events might well be more symbolic than having the ability of serving the KNU in any practical measure. Symbolism alone cannot maintain a nationalist movement in terms other than carrying forward a particular vision or irresolute hope (Table 15.2).

Members of the three Karen political parties potentially signify a source of renewed support for the Karen cause. Rather than viewing the Karen through their anti-government aspirations, the establishment of political representation (see Table 15.3 under Government Capabilities and Response) in the form of parties enables a voice for change to be established and heard from within the government itself (South, 2011). Having these parties active in government means that a vital link between the Karen cause and civilian populations can be strengthened. This might allow for a renewed strengthening of support for the Karen in eastern Burma, who continue fighting government military forces.

Authority Weakness

Initially, the KNU had a moderate advantage over government forces when it began its operations decades ago. The country's independence emerged from violence and bloodshed. Both the country and its fresh independence were situated in a landscape that had been completely devastated as a result of the Second World War years (fighting between the British and Japanese). Since independence was gained in 1948, successive governments in the country were occupied with numerous ethnic and political conflicts and rebellions. Communists began uprising against the government

TABLE 15.2

Karen Armed Groups

Strength	Leader	Status	Formation	Name
		Insurgent Groups		
7 brigades/3000-plus active Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) soldiers (Karen State and Mon State, Bago and Tenasserim Regions)	Tamla Baw	Active armed conflict	February 1947	Karen National Union
500–800 (southern Karen State)	La Pwe (N'Kam Mweh [Mr. Moustache]	Ex-ceasefire group; resumed armed conflict November 2010	December 1994/ November 2010	"Kloh Htoo Baw" group (formerly the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army [DKBA Brigade Five] and other non-BGF DKBA units)
		Ceasefire Groups		
12 battalions/3–4000 soldiers (central and northern Karen State, Mon State)	Tha Htoo Kyaw	Ex-ceasefire group; incorporated into Tatmadaw command structure August 2010 (aligned with Karen State Democracy and Development Party)	December 1994/ August 2010	Karen Border Guard Force (former-DKBA)
100 soldiers (Toungoo area, eastern Bago Region/northern Karen State)	Farrey Moe (Pee Reh)	Ceasefire group; semi-defunct	April 1998	Thandaung Peace Group (Leikto Group)
Maximum 20 (Pa'an area central Karen State)	P'doh Aung San (former KNU forestry minister; successful USDP candidate 2010 elections	Ceasefire group; semi-defunct	April 1998	P'doh Aung San Group
1 battalion, plus some militia (prior to BGF transformation, 3 columns)/150–200 soldiers (southern Karen State)	Daw Daw/Lae Win (formerly-Thu Mu Hae)	Ex-ceasefire group; incorporated into Tatmadaw command structure August 2010 (aligned with Karen State Democracy and Development Party)	February 1997/ August 2010	Karen Border Guard Force (former-Karen Peace Force/ Hongtharong Peace Group)
500–800 (southern Karen State)	Htein Maung	Non-BGF ceasefire group; relationship with government (highly unstable)	February 2007	KNU/KNLA Peace Council

Source: Adapted from South, A., *Burma's Longest War: Anatomy of the Karen Conflict*, Transnational Institute, Burma Center Netherlands (BCN), Amsterdam, Netherlands, 2011.

TABLE 15.3
Karen Political Parties

Seats (Successful Candidates, November 7, 2010 Election)	Orientation	Leader	Formation	Name
Upper House [National Assembly]: 3 Lower House [People's Assembly]: 2 Karen State: 4 Total: 9	Karen State–based; strong networks in Buddhist and Christian communities; independent government	Khin Maung Myint	2010	Pluong–Sgaw Democracy Party
Upper House: 1 Lower House: 1 State-Region: 4 Total: 6	Yangon and Bago Regions and Irrawaddy Delta-based networks among mostly Christian elites; independent of governments	Tun Aung Myint	2010	Karen People's Party (KPP)
Upper House: 1 Lower House: 0 Karen State: 1 Total: 2	Formed after incorporation of most DKBA and KPF units into Tatmadaw-controlled BGF; aligned with government	Tha Htoo Kyaw	2010	Karen State Democracy and Development Party

Source: Adapted from South, A., Burma's Longest War: Anatomy of the Karen Conflict, Transnational Institute, Burma Center Netherlands (BCN), Amsterdam, Netherlands, 2011.

shortly after independence. Following this, various ethnic-based uprisings spurred in multiple provinces. After Buddhism was instated as the country's official religion the situation worsened. Further degeneration of the overall socio-political climate followed with changes made to the constitution (with only certain groups having been granted rights).

Divisions within the ruling party followed suit and after a military coup d'état new leadership became infamous for its human rights violations. Military forces cracked down on external influence that came from government and NGOs, as well as journalists (South, 2011). Continued violence drew international condemnation and the country suffered economically. Although the country has a great deal of mineral wealth, government control and poor economic policy has spoiled the ruling administration's opportunity to capitalize on promising industries. The governments of Burma were strained on nearly every front conceivable for decades as many political struggles followed well into the 1960s and beyond (i.e., Communist Party of Burma [CPB], Red Flags, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, Shan State Army, United Wa State Army [UWSA], Kachin Independence Organization [KIO], Pa-O National Organization, Mong Tai Army, and the All Burma Students' Democratic Front). Even today, the Karen people are not the only group to be engaged in continued conflict with the government (South, 2011).

Initial weakness in authority and lack of control over a myriad of issues and elements within the country provided the KNU with a miniscule advantage. Other minorities rose-up against the government after the Karen rose in revolt. Initially, the Karen fielded thousands of soldiers. Having marched against government forces, Karen and Kachin units

seized Toungoo, Meiktila, Maymyo, and Mandalay. They also advanced on and almost captured the capital Rangoon (now Yangon). The major battle occurred at Insein, nine miles from the capital, where they held out in a 112-day siege lasting into late May [1949] (Tucker, 2013, p. 291).

Lack of KNU unity, organization, and equipment in the form of weaponry and firepower turned the situation around for government forces. Rangoon also retained control of the air and the rivers.

These factors worked in unison and aided government forces in recapturing lost territory and by 1950 both the KNU and the Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO)* (the original military wing of the KNU) were unable to mount a major threat against the government (Tucker, 2013). By 1955, government forces undertook major operations against the Karen and drove into Karen-held territory. The following decades represented a patchwork of talks (reception, refusal, and delayed acceptance). During the processes, fighting continued. The KNLA (once 20,000 men strong) slowly shrunk to between 3 and 4000 men by 2006 while government forces grew to around 400,000 (South, 2011; Tucker, 2013).

Military service age and obligation provides the government with considerable human resources with which to continue practicing war against armed movements throughout the country. Neither men nor women are required to enter into service even though a 2010 law was drafted reintroducing conscription (CIA World Factbook, 2014a). The law has not yet entered into force. Conscription would obligate men and women (including professionals) to serve up to three years in any of the military branches. Service may also be pushed to five years in the case of an officially declared emergency (CIA World Factbook, 2014a). It is estimated that the level of human resources reaching military significant age annually is well over 500,000 for men, and just over the same mark for women (CIA World Factbook, 2014a). Burma, therefore, has the ability to call upon a vast extent of military personnel that it can invest in its continued conflict with such groups as the KNLA.

Organization and Cohesion

The KNU appears, at least prima facie, to maintain cohesion and is often referred to as a single front as mentioned earlier. A long period of war nurtured a series of fundamental changes in the movement and the organization now, "is only one of seven Karen armed groups that are still active" as of early 2011 (South, 2011, p. 14). For decades, the KNU was a considerable organization and one of the most significant of the many ethnic groups in Burma (making up roughly 7% of the total population of the country) (CIA World Factbook, 2014b). From the 1940s until the 1990s, the KNU demonstrated considerable challenge to the Burmese government and was able to field a large guerrilla army. Figure 15.4 shows the location of main Karen armed groups as of 2011. Their positions show that control is limited to a thin strip of territory within Karen State proper with the exception of a larger zone in the north. Only parts of Karen State are controlled by the KNU/KNLA. The Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) Border Guard Force (BGF) effectively isolates pockets of KNLA forces along the entire length of the state.

Organization and cohesion of the movement meant that approximately 50 years of fighting has been possible. Much of the movement's fighters are now based in temporary jungle camps situated at various points along the Thai-Burma border (Frontline World, 2011). Given its lack of permanent camps and with its established headquarters at Manerplaw overrun in 1994 by veteran soldiers of the DKBA (allied with the Burmese government) who defected from the KNU/KNLA, the cohesion of the Karen movement has seriously eroded. Since the mid-1990s, organization of the KNU has ebbed but the KNU manages to maintain what South (2011) refers to as its "loose alliance along the Thailand border" (p. 8). The Burmese central government no longer stands as the KNU's only adversary. 1994 was a watershed with the DKBA surpassing the KNU/KNLA "as the military and economically most powerful Karen non-state actor" (South, 2011, p. 10). Table 15.3 depicts the existence of other insurgent groups and their strength. It also represents several groups that have become semidefunct or been incorporated into the Tatmadaw.

An account can be made of the current state of organization and cohesion of the Karen insurgency. Cohesion can be taken as a condition in which, according to Staniland (2009, 2012), "fighters and factions obey orders and rarely launch splits or violent internal challenges." "Splits, feuds, coups, and [forms of] defiance" compromise the cohesive condition, whereas "respect for orders"

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* The KNDO is the oldest guerrilla organization in the world (operating since 1947).

FIGURE 15.4 Main Karen Armed Groups, 2011. (From South, A., Burma's Longest War: Anatomy of the Karen Conflict, Transnational Institute, Burma Center Netherlands (BCN), Amsterdam, Netherlands, 2011.)

and "peaceful leadership successions" are positive signs that cohesion exists. While preexisting structures of collective action remain intact in the case of the KNU, external support (as noted in the following section) is in decline and the idea of aid actually leading directly to KNLA strength is dubious. The organizational capacity of the KNU is relatively low as compared to previous decades. This is compounded by a lack of resource centralization. Despite these shortcomings, the KNU still holds onto both an "idea" and a "base" and can also reach out to and connect with "ordinary" Karen people. In other words, there is still very much a living cause for the KNU but how this is

overshadowed by the reality of the movement's fragmentation and instances of soldier defects sheds much more light on the future of the group. Necessary conditions that lead to cohesion are generally missing in the case of the KNU and even if the KNU/KNLA were able to renew both their organizational and cohesive statuses, neither, according to Staniland (2009, 2012) would be sufficient in bringing about victory without taking other factors into account.

External Support

The Karen have enjoyed support within the country but their external support has come largely from Christian communities, "who are more likely to have contact with international patron" (South, 2011, p. 2). The Karen and their conflict have receive a wide range of attention and indeed, many observers have made analyses of the "political situation, armed conflict and its humanitarian impacts" but little support is tendered toward the Karen people and their struggle (South, 2011, p. 2). External support for the Karen nationalist movement has predominantly included the interests and activities of missionaries has been the result of Cold War security interests (South, 2011, p. 4). The changing security architecture of the Cold War period and government consolidation over regions of the country impacted the external support the Karen received.

Healthy doses of external support for the Karen are nested in the intersection of US interests in containing communism in SEA (from 1950 to 1970) and the anticommunist sentiments of Karen leaders such as General Bo Mya (South, 2011, p. 20). Fear of communist spreading to Thailand compelled Thailand and the US (indirectly) to support Karen soldiers with the aim of preventing armed and well-organized communist parties in Thailand and Burma (supported by China) from coming together. Moderate levels of support that the Karen enjoyed during previous decades have drastically changed over time. The KNU, more recently, has "received material assistance and legitimization through support for refugees living in camps along the Thailand–Burma border" (South, 2011, p. 4). Refugee camps may now play the most important role in supplying KNU forces. As South (2011) explains,

> an important factor in understanding this international support is the correlation between the rights-based promotion of liberal-democracy adopted by Western aid agencies, and the values espoused by the KNU, which seeks legitimacy through appeals to international norms. In the humanitarian spirit of the "Do No Harm" doctrine, aid agencies and donors should analyze the relationship between their assistance and advocacy activities and the dynamics of conflict in Burma. They should understand that by supporting the refugee camps in Thailand, they are helping to underwrite the KNU's ability to continue to wage war in Burma. The camps provide refuge to KNU members and their families and are a source of limited material support to the insurgents; and implicitly legitimize the KNU's struggle (pp. 4–5).

KNU external support deteriorated because it failed to maintain its connections with Christian communities and because it began to marginalize other groups despite the fact that it was fighting against its own marginalization. They also failed to build relationship with other communities that lie beyond the Karen state as well as the borderlands. Strategic visions regarding Karen armed group fighting did not receive adequate consideration or assessment over previous years. As a result, the purpose of the KNU had become clouded and therefore affected the level of support that it received by others that may have had little understanding of long-term Karen goals. Governance capacities have also been overlooked by Karen armed groups, which have impacted the support level that outside actors were and are willing to provide to a group that pursues violent means to realize their main purpose.

Government Capabilities and Response

The initial disarray of the newly independent state of Burma in 1948 and the first decade of its postindependence era proved to be one of the most decisive factors that enabled the KNU to push government back to within a few kilometers from Rangoon. Efforts made by the KNU cannot be

dismissed when taking account of the movement's initial success strategically, operationally, and tactically; still, initial success is a product of a relationship that involves poor policy choices and responses by the Burmese government. After a cessation of military hostilities was reached on September 4, 1948, "government policemen massacred some 80 members of the Karen tribe near Palaw in Tavoy district on December 23–25, 1948" KNU (University of Central Arkansas, 2014). Infuriated by these actions, the KNDO pressed further violent attacks against the Burmese government and were able to capture a number of cities between January 1, 1949 and April 20, 1949 (Twante, Bassein, Toungoo, Insein, Einme, Loikaw, Meiktila, Kyaukse, Maymyo, Mandalay, and Nyaunglebin). As government forces pushed back, then-Yugoslavia offered military assistance and armed with advanced military weaponry (including aircraft), government troops made significant gains against the KNU (University of Central Arkansas, 2014).

During the course of the government's military offensives, Saw Ba U Gyi (leader of the KNU) and later General Min Maung (commander of the Karen "rebels") were killed spurring structural changes to the nationalist movement. The first conflict phase (August 26, 1948–April 12, 1964) was costly and resulted in approximately 15,000 deaths. Military hostilities ended with a ceasefire agreement that led to a comparably long postconflict phase (April 13, 1964–June 19, 1975) (University of Central Arkansas, 2014). The second conflict phase (June 20, 1975–January 12, 2012) saw renewed military offensives and attacks by both the government and the KNU. Roughly 35,000 individuals were killed during the conflict and thousands of Karen fled as refugees to Thailand (some 250,000 individuals were displaced) (other estimates put the death toll as high as 60,000 with around one million displaced) (Smith, 2007, p. 300). As Karen bases were captured, and refugee camps attacks, Karen forces continued to attack civilians and killed indiscriminately but government forces outnumbered the KNLA and possessed superior weaponry (University of Central Arkansas, 2014).

Beyond military force, the Burma government has responded to the Karen insurgency by other means. Other forms of engagement pose immense challenges to the movement. While government forces fight Karen soldiers, efforts at hindering the movement's mobilization processes have been successful. The Burma government along with some international organizations (IOs) openly refers to the Karen as "secessionists" and "violent terrorists" devoted to perpetuating the conflict that has last for decades because they are uncompromising and seek their own gains (Verkuyten, 2010, p. 23). Verkuyten (2010) and Kuroiwa and Verkuyten (quoted in Giles et al., 2010) explain,

> these kinds of negative labeling question the legitimacy of the goals and acts of an ethno-political movement and can easily hamper mobilization processes, because people can be reluctant for the leaders to identify with a stigmatized social movement or group. Hence, it is crucial for the leaders to produce and communicate in narratives and symbols (i.e., Karen flag, anthem, Martyr Day) alternative understandings of the Karen insurgency (p. 23).

The Karen have reacted to depictions in three ways. First, they refer to themselves as "freedom fighters" as opposed to terrorists and portray their cause as just and one that defies the oppression of a ruling military élite. Messages about the Karen movement centers on the idea of historical reclamation. Second, the Karen juxtapose the image of a brutal Burmese regime, characterized by brutality and aggression, by portraying their people as "inherently simple, honest, tranquil and a peace-loving people" (Verkuyten, 2010, p. 23). Third, Karen leaders propagate a story of endurance in order to formulate an image of commitment and people fighting for a legitimate cause (Verkuyten, 2010, p. 23).

Other responses include harsh reprisals such as imprisonment of soldiers captured and found guilty of crimes and driving Karen people across the border with Thailand. For decades the Burmese government has pursued a policy of "scorched earth" in eastern Burma (Smith, 2007; South, 2011). Part of this policy includes ethnically cleansing the Karen people from their land and replacing them other ethnic peoples. During the course of its "scorched earth" policy, Rangoon

has burned villages, planted land mines, incorporated Karen people into slave labor programs, and perpetrated war crimes against Karen civilians. Instances and indiscriminate rape and killing have also been recorded (Apple and Martin, 2003; DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary, 2005; Zoya and Lewis, 2010).

By 2003, up to 43 cases of rape of ethnic women by Tatmadaw soldiers were documented with another 125 cases having taken place the following year. Nine cases led to the death of the rape victims. Of these cases, 12 were gang rapes, and 15 of the perpetrators were Tatmadaw officers. The documented cases took place long the Thai-Burma border (Apple and Martin, 2003; DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary, 2005; Zoya and Lewis, 2010). Terrorization of the local population has become commonplace throughout the border regions. Sexual violence has become a systematic political strategy (rather than a simple offshoot of military operations) implemented by the Burmese government with the intention of marginalizing and terrorizing anyone who stands in the way of the government (Apple and Martin, 2003; DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary, 2005; Doyle and Simpson, 2008, p. 60).

Despite these egregious issues, the Burmese government has granted a political voice to Karen nationals, who maintain seats in Upper House and Lower House of the Burmese government. Although their representation is embryonic, their presence represents a step forward for both the Karen movement and for the government, both of which might come to reach a peaceful relationship through these positions. Table 15.3 shows the state of Karen political parties as of 2010.

CONCLUSION

Table 15.4 presents the Karen insurgency against seven prerequisites for success: (1) a cause to fight for, (2) local popular support, (3) authority weakness, (4) environment, (5) organization and cohesion, (6) external support, and (7) government capability and response. I show the initial and ongoing conditions measured as: "2" (favorable), "1" (moderately favorable), "0" (neutral), "–1" (moderately adverse), and "–2" (adverse). In Table 15.4, it can be observed that many of the prerequisites necessary for the success of the KNU/KNLA insurgency in Burma were largely absent.

The KNU had a sound cause to fight for in the late-1940s when Burma just became independent of the Britain, and indeed their claims for independence were and still are historically legitimate. Although the Burmese government was new at the time and has to contend with wholesale destruction as a result of the fighting that took place during military exchange between the Japanese and British forces the Second World War, the government did not suffer from major weakness. Perhaps the greatest obstacle rests in the ruling junta having had to face the emergence of multiple ethno-political insurgencies and armed group concurrently. However, the government quickly acclimatized to the strain of nationalist movements operations within its own borders and responded reasonably and with strong force.

TABLE 15.4
Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army Insurgency

Prerequisites for a Successful Insurgency (for KNU/KNLA)	Initial	Ongoing
A cause to fight for	1	–2
Local popular support	1	–1
Authority weakness	0	–2
Environment	1	0
Organization and cohesion	0	–2
External support	1	–2
Government capability and response	–1	–2

Environmental conditions in Burma can be harsh in terms of the geography and climate. To an extent, the rugged terrain, mountains, and thick jungle provided the ideal backdrop of a guerrilla-style insurgency. Although environmental conditions can have a positive impact on the longevity of an insurgency campaign, alone they have not been decisive over the past six decades. To be sure, the geographic conditions have also negatively impacted the life of the movement for impeding on communication between armed groups across movements and within the KNU movement itself. When hostilities broke out between the KNU and the government, the KNU/KNLA represented relatively unified front (at least for the Karen) against the ruling military junta. This slowly eroded over time, and with experienced sharp decline when the KNU split into five different factions—at times these factions fought one another even while they were still fighting the Burmese government (Hpa'an, 2013).

External support has been regarded as the single most important condition of a successful insurgency. Without assistance from outside actors—either direct or indirect support by means of political support, military supplies, and monetary funds—an insurgency or armed movement essentially operates without a lifeline. It might rightly be regarded as an army surrounded by an enemy and cut-off from a greater body of forces including its vital supply lines. Support from the outside world therefore signifies a strategic, operational, and tactical necessity without which armed groups might be fighting a futile rearguard operation in perpetuity. Cold War security concerns meant that the KNU could enjoy a limited range of external support but its support suddenly changed when the political climate between the rivaling Cold War era superpowers warmed. Elevating narcotics trafficking to a lucrative international level ushered in a healthy dose of monetary aid for the movement but the KNU suffered from a lack of essential backing in other forms.

For several years, the KNLA was successful in pushing government forces back and came to within a few kilometers of Rangoon. Several key cities and numerous small cities fell to the KNLA and switched hands several times during the course of the fighting. The Tatmadaw had always been numerically superior to the KNLA and possessed far more weaponry and supplies necessary to wage a war within its own borders. The KNLA currently measures less than 1% the total operational size (in terms of absolute numbers) of the Tatmadaw and simply incapable of calling on able-bodied men and women to the extent that the Burmese government can. Rangoon also received external support to defeat the insurgents. Outmanned and outgunned, the history of the KNLA's field operations since the 1950s can be accurately characterized as a slow push back to the east. Moreover, the military junta required little-to-no time in responding to the movement's aggressive actions and is now able to field government soldiers along the Thai–Burma border and even launched attacks within Thai territory against refugee camps.

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16 An Assessment of the United Nations Counterterrorism Initiatives
2001–2015

Emeka Thaddues Njoku

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The war against terrorism still rages on well over a decade after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks on the United States (US) homeland. The United Nations (UN) has since been at the forefront in the war against terrorism, by adopting 18 legal instruments against specific terrorist activities globally; the UN has equally shown deep commitment in the fight against international terrorism. The Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS) adopted by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in 2006 was a watershed in the fight against terrorism because it boosted collective efforts aimed at combating terrorism. The Institute for Environmental Diplomacy and Security (2015, p. 1) states,

> when the [UN]GA first adopted the Strategy by consensus in 2006, it was groundbreaking in bringing together the "harder" and "softer" elements of counterterrorism. In four distinct "pillars," the Strategy urges states to address the conditions conducive to the threat of terrorism (pillar one); to take measures to prevent and combat terrorism and to develop the necessary capacity to do so (pillars two and three); and to ensure that human rights are upheld in all counterterrorism efforts (pillar four)." The strategy was significant because it was the first time that there was a consensus among UN members on the need for common strategic and operational framework to stop the spread of terrorism globally. The Strategy forms a basis for a concrete plan of action in the war against terrorism.

The Security Council (SC) played a salient role in countering terrorism after the 9/11 terrorist attack on the United States through the adoption of several resolutions that saw the establishment of specialized agencies having specific mandates in the overall process of countering the upsurge of terrorist movements globally. However, approximately 14 years after, terrorism has yet to be eradicated. The UN and its specialized agencies may have succeeded in building concrete security measures in preventing another 9/11 in the United States and other industrialized societies; the story is however, different in developing societies of North Africa, South Asia, the Arab Peninsula, as well as Eastern and Western Africa, where known terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda (AQ), al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Taliban, the Islamic State of Syria and the Levant (ISIL), and Boko Haram have been attacking local and Western interests. This therefore raises a fundamental question, "what is the rationale behind the success of terrorist activities irrespective of the strong measures put in place by the UN and its specialized agencies in counter terrorism strategies?" The argument in this chapter assumes two paths. First, it argues that, to successfully counter the upsurge of terrorism, there is a need to intellectualize and assimilate the concept and place it in the proper perspective. A succinct understanding of the term informs policy frameworks aimed at curbing the hydra headed problem to the peace and stability of the world. Second, it argues for a reevaluation of the global counter terrorism strategy by examining the inherent challenges to its success.

CONCEPTUALIZING TERRORISM

It is becoming increasingly difficult to conceptualize terrorism. Scholars argue that this is partly due to the misapplication of the term by states to achieve political objectives (Cronin, 2003; Franks, 2005; Held, 2008; Hoffman, 2006; Kalic, 2005; Lacquer, 1999; Lee and Perl, 2002; Makinda, 2005; Nathanson, 2010; Obi, 2005; Schmid, 2011; Wilkins, 1992). Scholars view the concept from two distinct perspectives. While some scholars posit that terrorism is an act that essentially describes the activities of nonstate actors (NSAs), others argue that NSAs as well as states can commit acts of terrorism. At this point, it is important to assimilate the political and intellectual trajectory of the concept by historicizing it. According to Wilkinson (1976), the concepts "terror" and "terrorism" could be traced to the Latin word "terrere," which denotes trepidation (p. 9). Etymologists claim that the word was not used until between 1793 and 1798 during the French revolution, when the French words "terrorisme," "terroriste," "terroriser" came into use (Wilkinson, 1976, p. 9). However, for Schmid (1997), use of the term in Western European languages' lexicon dates back to the fourteenth century and was first used in English in 1528 but gained political nuance during the French revolution. The French revolutionaries launched what is known as "régime de la Terreur," which saw the elimination of those perceived as enemies of the state, in order to consolidate their hold on power (Hübschule, 2005, p. 3; Hoffman, 2006, p. 3).

The elusiveness, which pervades the conceptualization of the term over the years, can be attributed to its dynamism in respect of the actors and actions involved. From the eighteenth century up to the nineteenth century, the term was viewed as the abuse of power by repressive governments. Its central point was the government of Benito Mussolini's Italy, Adolf Hitler's Nazi Germany, and Stalin's Soviet Russia that were protuberant at the time (Viotti and Kauppi, 2009). From the 1960s to the 1980s, the activities of nationalist/ethnic separatist, radical ideology organization, which emanated during the colonial and neo-colonial political systems, were termed "terrorism." This followed a major paradigm shift in the 1990s. During this period, states and their agents defined the term as essentially violent acts by clandestine groups against the state to influence its actions (Chomsky, 1986; Falk, 2004; Franks, 2005; Held, 2008; Hoffman, 2006; Kalic, 2005). Thus, the historiography of state involvement in acts of terrorism tactically eroded.

According to Hoffman (2006, p. 19), former President George W. Bush, while addressing a joint session of Congress on several occasions, invoked the word "terror"—that is, the "state of being terrified or greatly frightened," according to OED'S definition—rather than the specifically political

phenomenon "terrorism." Hoffman states that "the consequences of his semantic choice, whether deliberate or not, nonetheless proved as portentous as they were significant: heralding a virtually open-ended struggle against anyone and anything that arguably scared or threatened Americans." Presenting it in short terms illuminates the subjective nature of the term—political actors reintellectualize the term in reaction to historical events (Hoffman, 2006). Moreover, scholars have opined that political rather than theoretical attributes have compounded the search for a definition of the term (Held, 2008; Nathanson, 2010). The political features of the concept can be seen in two forms: (1) the politics in the conceptualization of the term and (2) the politics in the act itself. Owing to the derogatory form, the term has assumed over recent years, states and nonstates actors often term as terroristic or terrorism the actions of their enemies and reject any definition of the term that indicts their own activities or that of their allies and friends. Thus, how one understands the concept of terrorism ultimately depends on who does it (Held, 2008; Nathanson, 2010). In the same vein, the cliché "one man terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" has further augmented the challenge of formulating any fruitful definition of the term. In fact, it has raised more questions about the term, such as: *Who are terrorists? What constitute acts of terrorism?* Hence, a field of moral and political issues is cultivated. According to Jenkins (2009), the cliché further explains the political nature or subjective reinterpretation of the term, which is seen as remonstration against the categorization of those who rebuff the policies or actions of the state, as terrorists. Nathanson (2010), however, states that accepting this cliché deflects groups from moral criticism whereby "actions can be morally wrong even if their intended goals are genuinely valuable" (p. 13). In other words, people can be *freedom fighters* and *terrorists* at the same time—freedom fighters because of their aims and objectives and terrorists by the means of which they hope to achieve freedom.

Scholars argue that one of the factors that distinguish terrorism from other types of violence is that it is subliminally and definitely political (Hoffman, 2006; Wilkinson, 1976). Terrorist deployment of violence to manipulate the decision of both state and NSAs is explicitly political. Held (2008) succinctly captures this when she stated that

> terrorism is certainly violence, and it is political violence. One can doubt that Al Qaeda has a political objective in the sense which many people understand politics, but since it aims at the religious domination of the polity; its violence is indeed political, though perhaps it is not open to usual responses to political aims, through dialogue and compromise. Al Qaeda's aim to expel US and European forces from the Middle East is clearly political (p. 16).

Similarly, Mamdani (2004a, p. 6) argues that terrorists or those involved in the acts of terrorism are largely motivated by their political conviction. In his words:

> Osama bin Laden is a political strategist and not a theologian and those who follow him do so for political reasons. The crops of Islamic terrorists are not from the conservative Muslim societies but from the secular intelligentsia, whose agenda is the acquisition of power in this world. Moreover for the secular intelligentsia to legitimize their ideology, they sought for an Islamic political thought, which they find in the idea of jihad, giving it a subjective re-interpretation as opposed to the true Islamic teachings about jihad.

This was further corroborated by Kane (2004) who opines that suicide bombings by terrorist groups, which aim to destabilize an identified enemy is mainly a political act. Therefore, in order to fully grasp the meaning of terrorism, we need to appreciate its political nature in terms of the historiography of its intellectualization and of the acts itself.

Scholars have argued that, in order to appreciate the concept of terrorism, the attributes associated with the term over the years need to be fully analyzed (Wilkinson, 1976). Terrorism is known for its unselective nature. The casualties of an attack by terrorist groups are not the proposed target but an entire population (Cronin, 2003; Obi, 2005; Wilkinson, 1976). Wilkinson (1976) asserts that terrorists' indiscriminate nature does not preclude the fact that terrorists sometimes have specific

targets, whether individual or collective, but this unavoidably creates the fear that anybody can be a potential victim of a terrorist attack. First, Aron (1966, p. 170) has stated that the "action of violence is labelled 'terrorist' when its psychological effects are out of proportion to its purely physical result" (pp 13). Second, acts of terrorism are spontaneous and unpredictable, irrespective of the fact that terrorists on occasion send out death threats or indications that attacks are imminent; but this is still within the discretion of the terrorists (Malraux, 1946; Wilkinson, 1976). This is particularly unique to state terrorism, where dictatorial states deploy the instruments of terrorism with impunity and turn a blind eye to societal values and norms in the state to force its citizens to conform to its interests (Blakeley, 2010; Jackson et al., 2010; Wilkinson, 1976). Third, terrorism is unscrupulous and antinomian in character. Terrorists believe in the superiority of their laws over societal laws or norms and thus not under obligation to obey societal laws." Terrorism, when waged consciously and deliberately, is implicitly prepared to sacrifice all moral and humanitarian consideration for the sake of some political end (Wilkinson, 1976, p. 17).

Correspondingly, scholars stress the view that differentiating terrorism from other forms of violence such as intentional or natural disasters and politically motivated violence illuminates the concept of terrorism. Reiterating his argument that terrorism is covertly and overtly political, Wilkinson (1976) stated that various forms of criminal violence such as arson, serial killings, ritual killings, and arm robbery have been misconstrued as acts of terrorism. These postulations blur the concept of terrorism, as these acts are carried out to attain certain psychological or personal satisfaction. Furthermore, Whittaker (2004) and Hoffman (2006) also underscore the view that terrorism should be divorced from other forms of political violence, which equally breeds an ambiance of terror such as insurgency and guerrilla warfare. While groups engaged in terrorism, insurgency, and guerrilla warfare are increasingly deploying similar strategies such as bombings of public places, suicide bombings, hostage taking, hit-and-run, and abduction, to achieve their aims, Laqueur and Beckett (quoted in Hoffman, 2006) assert that the term "guerrilla," for example,

> in its most widely accepted usage, is taken to refer to a numerically larger group of armed individuals, who operate as a military unit, attack enemy military forces, and seize and hold territory (even if only ephemerally during daylight hours), while also exercising some form of sovereignty or control over a defined geographical area and its population. "Insurgents" share these same characteristics; however, their strategy and operations transcend hit-and-run attacks to embrace what in the past has variously been called "revolutionary guerrilla warfare," "modern revolutionary warfare," or "people's war" but is today commonly termed "insurgency." Thus, in addition to the irregular military tactics that characterize guerrilla operations, insurgencies typically involve coordinated informational (i.e., propaganda) and psychological warfare efforts designed to mobilize popular support in a struggle against an established national government, imperialist power, or foreign occupying force (p. 35).

Unlike guerrilla fighter and insurgents, most terrorist groups do not operate as military units and avoid engaging combat-ready regular military forces. Terrorist groups are incapable of maintaining control of a geographical area, rally for public support, or maintaining public governance at central, regional, and local levels. However, there are exceptions to these claims, as terrorist groups such as Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and Hezbollah are known to exude control in some geographical spaces (Hoffman, 2006; Schmid, 2011), and recently Boko Haram in Nigeria assumed control of territory in the northern region of Nigeria—even mounting their own flags (Murdock, 2013). Part of the features of terrorist groups in the contemporary world is the acquisition and control of territory. Furthermore, Hoffman (2006) argues that, violent acts by individuals should not be misinterpreted as terrorism, as these individuals are driven by personal motives. Terrorist groups have often voiced that their aims are purely humanitarian. Nevertheless, these arguments have become problematic owing to the rise of what has been termed *lone wolf terrorists*. The emergence of lone wolf terrorists who are radicalized with little or no contact with known terrorist groups are a major source of concern to law enforcements agencies in various states (Barnes, 2013). In fact, the phenomenon of lone wolf terrorism has

proved very difficult to understand and are often overshadowed by much more marked cases such as the 9/11 attacks. Cases of lone wolf terrorism include Jose Pimentel, who allegedly conspired to explode homemade bombs for terrorist purposes in the New York area on November 21, 2011 (Goldstein and Rashbaum, 2011); Anders Behring Breivik, a Norwegian terrorist who detonated a 2100-pound bomb in the Norwegian government quarters in Oslo on July 22, 2011 (killing eight people and later killing 69 people in Utoya—a small island 25 miles from the capital) (Ravndal, 2012); and the Boston marathon bombers, Tamerlan Tsarnaev and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, both of whom carried out an attack that killed three and injured more than 200 people on April 15, 2013 (McClam, 2013). Moreover, 2014 to 2015 have seen the rise of ISIL-inspired lone wolves that have carried out attacks in different parts of the developed states. These include the May 2014 attack on a Jewish museum of Belgium by Mehdi Nemmouche, which killed 4 people. He was believed to have been radicalized in Syria. Moreover, in September 2014, Alton Nolen, who recently converted to Islam, beheads a female coworker after he was fired. In October 2014, a Canadian soldier was killed by Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, who also recently converted to Islam. In 2015, two brothers, Said and Cherif Kouachi, carried out an attack that left 12 people dead outside the headquarters of the French satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo* in Paris (Bajekal, 2014; Barrabi, 2015).

Two major conceptions have emerged in the classification of terrorism. These I termed the *realist* and *idealist* perspectives (Njoku, 2011). First, proponents of the realist perspective regarding the conceptualization of terrorism argue that acts of terrorism are essentially NSAs' affairs. Thus, states cannot be deemed terrorist in the same way as nonstates actor even though they create a climate of fear, terror, and destructions by means of the application of the instrument of coercion (Cronin, 2003). According to Cronin (2003), "this use of force is different from terrorism. Hence, the fact that a precision guided missiles sometimes go astray and kill innocent civilians is a tragic use of force, it is not terrorism" (p. 33). For realists, power is not only the perquisite of states but critical to its survival. Therefore, the realists view contends that any attempt at theorizing the activities of the state in the enforcement of the law as terrorism is misleading (Njoku, 2012).

In contrast, the idealist school of thought argues that any act, whether legally or extra-legal, that triggers the climate of fear, terror, and destructions with ultimate objective to scoring a political point is terrorism (Blakeley, 2010; Chomsky, 1986; Jackson et al., 2010; Stohl, 2006). For Blakeley (2010), in intellectualizing terrorism, attention should be placed more on the actions rather than on the actors, "even if the motives, functions and effects of terrorism by states and non-states actors are different, the act of terrorism itself is not, because the core characteristics of terrorism are the same" (p. 13). The idealists school further refutes the realist argument that states are at liberty to apply the instrument of coercion in enforcing the law by advancing that the monopoly of force is not excuse for the arbitrary use of force (Stohl, 2006). Blakeley (2010) further expounds this argument through her assertion that, although international law prescribed the conditions under which states have the right to go to war (*Jus ad bellum*), the same law also stated how war is to be fought (*Jus in bello*). Thus, any state that goes beyond these stipulated rules of engagement is guilty of terrorism. Chomsky (1986) assumed a more radical position by stating that any analysis of the concept that sets aside states' involvement in acts of terrorism is reductionist, because such studies undermine the historiography of the concept, which is traced back to the activities of the French revolutionaries who took over the state from the monarchy and launched a regime of terror on the people in the eighteenth century. Consequently, Jackson et al. (2010) calls for the inclusion of state actors in the conceptualization of terrorism, claiming that

> by all accounts, state terrorism has been one of the greatest sources of human suffering and destruction for the past five centuries, employing extreme forms of exemplary violence against ordinary people and specific groups in order to engender political submission to newly formed nation states, transfer populations, and generate labour in conquered colonial territories, imperial powers and early modern states, killed literally tens of millions of people and destroyed entire civilizations and people across the Americas, the Asia pacific, the subcontinent, the Middle East and Africa (p. 1).

There seems to be no end in sight on the debate on the concept of terrorism. The UN, an institution that provides a meeting point of international actors on issues that affect the entire world, has been incapable of ensuring a consensus in the definition of terrorism. At best, the UN agrees that terrorism violates the principle upon which the organization was established. Even the 2006 strategy plan of action in the global war on terrorism failed to unambiguously define terrorism. This challenge has been traced to countries in the Middle East, the governments of which are skeptical about any definition that disproves genuine fighting in the name of freedom from foreign occupation. As a result of these opposing stand points on the conceptualization of terrorism, I offer a definition of terrorism, holding that it may be understood as "as a violent attack by individuals, groups or states on civilians or unarmed combatants in order to push forward their political, primordial and personal, humanitarian objectives" (Njoku, 2011). This definition incorporates both the realist and idealist conception of terrorism. It takes into consideration both state and NSA such as: individuals, groups and states, and factors that engender terrorism such as political reasons that may come in form of liberation from foreign occupation or influence, unpopular government ruthlessly enforcing its wills on her citizens, primordial reasons such as age long acrimony between two identities especially religious groups; personal reasons such as loss of job, marginalization, frustration and depression, instability in the family, and poverty. Moreover, the primordial, personal, or humanitarian factors that spur terrorism are inherently political because the act of one group trying to influence the decision of another is clearly political. Accordingly, this definition merely attempts to harmonize the friction found among scholars on the definition of the term but does not purport to be an entirely novel definition.

THE UNITED NATIONS' EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORISM: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

In order to critically analyze the UN CT programs from 2001 to the present day, it is important to historicize its CT initiatives prior to 9/11. The war on terrorism was one of the major challenges, which the UN inherited from the defunct League of Nations. Thus, international efforts at combating terrorism began years before the UN was established (Ruperez, 2005). In 1934, the League of Nations (LN) took the first major step at outlawing terrorism. This was contained in its draft convention for the prevention and punishment of terrorist acts. In the draft convention, terrorism was viewed as "all criminal acts directed against a state and intended or calculated to increase a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public" (LN, 1938). However, the draft convention never came into effect even after it was adopted in 1937. A major loophole in the convention was its complete neglect of the concept of state terrorism. Nevertheless, it influenced later dialog on the challenges posed by terrorism, when the UN and other regional and subregional international organizations (IOs) examined the issue from the legal and the political angles (Saul, 2006).

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Prior to 9/11, the UNGA deliberated on the subject of defining terrorism, but all efforts proved abortive owing to the hard stance by some member states, particularly within the Middle East. Ruperez (2005), to this end, states that the elusiveness that pervades the UN in defining terrorism should be interpreted as redundancy on the part of GA as it deliberated and formulated ad hoc conventions dealing specifically with terrorism (p. 14). The challenge posed by terrorism caught the full attention of the GA following the 1968 hijackings of El Al Israel Airlines aircraft and the 1972 Munich Olympic terrorist attack. By September 8, 1972, then-Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim, proposed to the Assembly to include in its agenda of its 27th session, "measures to prevent terrorism and other forms of violence which endanger or take innocent human lives or jeopardize fundamental freedoms" (A/8791, 1972). Subsequently, the Sixth Committee of the GA, under agenda-entitled

measures to prevent terrorism, was assigned the duty of examining issues pertaining to terrorism globally. From 1993 to 2001, the question of human rights while countering the threat of terrorism took center stage in the global war against terrorism. Within this period, the GA also agreed that the existence of the root causes did not justify terrorist acts and had since been issuing or adopting several resolutions such as: Resolution 2625 of October 1970, which states that every state has a duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting, or participating in terrorist acts in another state, A/RES/51/210 of December 1994, which established an ad hoc committee to elaborate international agreements to suppress nuclear terrorism, and A/RES/49/60 of February 1995, which states measures to eliminate international terrorism (Document A/RES/49/60, 1995; A/RES/51/210, 1994; Ruperez, 2005). Despite these efforts by the GA in countering terrorism prior to 9/11, Boulden and Weiss (2004) observe that, the General Assembly handled the issue of terrorism as a general international problem. Consequently, the upsurge of terrorist attacks during the course of the 1990s may have prompted the SC to take over matters dealing with CT from the GA.

The Security Council

Arguably, the SC took a fairly forceful stance in addressing the challenge of terrorism after it took over the responsibility from the GA. Although the SC adopted Resolution 635 in 1989, its first direct resolution on terrorism in reaction to the Lockerbie tragedy, as stated by Boulden and Weiss (2004), was its response to the terrorist attacks involving both the Pan-Am flight 103 bombing in Lockerbie in 1988 and the Union des Transports Aériens (UTA) Flight 772 in which the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was alleged involved, through its Resolution 731 in 1992 warning the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya of the repercussion of failing to hand over suspects involved in the attack. Within the same year, the SC adopted Resolution 748, which characterized the Libyan action as a threat to international peace and security, and invoked Chapter VII of the Charter, which imposed a broad range of sanctions on Libya. Resolution 883 and 1192 of 1992 and 1998 later reinforced it respectively (Ruperez, 2005, p. 17). Consequently, in 1996, the Libyan government handed over six of its citizens who were involved in the Pan-Am Flight 103 terrorist attack. They were tried in a Scottish court. Basset al-Megrahi was convicted for murder and sentenced to life imprisonment in 2001 in a Scottish prison. He was, however, released in 2009 and it was arranged that he would serve his prison sentence in Libya, as a result of his failing health.

In another development, the refusal of the Sudanese government to extradite persons suspected of an assassination attempt on former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's prompted the SC to impose sanctions and a ban on commercial flights to Sudan. Following the downturn of Sudan's economy as a result of sanctions, the Sudanese government obliged to SC demands. The ban was subsequently lifted in September 2001. Moreover, the Sudanese government expelled several individuals suspected of terrorism, including Osama Bin Laden (Ruperez, 2005, p. 18i). The SC also responded to the terrorist attack on the United States (US) embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 by adopting Resolution 1189, which condemned the attack and called for collective efforts in investigating those involved. The SC also imposed economic sanctions on the government of Afghanistan and demanded that the Taliban cease its support for international terrorism and extradite bin Laden (Ruperez, 2005, p. 18ii). Additionally, the SC adopted Resolution 1267 in 1999, which imposed sanctions on AQ, the Taliban, and related persons or entities. Successively, a committee was established to supervise observance of its sanction. This committee was originally called the AQ and Taliban Sanctions Committee or the 1267 Committee (later changed to the AQ Sanctions Committee) (Ruperez, 2005, p. 18iii). Therefore, during the 1990s, the policy of the SC, in reaction to incidents of terrorism, was the imposition of economic and diplomatic sanctions on states involved in or supportive of groups involved in acts of terrorism (Norman, 2004, p. 7).

The UN efforts to counter terrorism prior to 9/11 essentially focused on the imposition of sanctions, which did little or nothing to suppress the upsurge of terrorism. Even though the sanctions had positive effects on the states involved, how sanctions can have similar positive effects on remains

a puzzle. Unlike states, NSAs are not afraid of national economic loss or shortfall of political and diplomatic benefits. This brings to the fore the activities of the 1267 Committee. The activity of this Committee has no practical significance and its efforts were ineffective against terrorist networks. This is because terrorists do not possess territories such as states and are typically mobile; hence they are scattered in various parts of the world. Therefore, imposing sanctions on them is simply a waste of valuable time. Furthermore, lethality of terrorism today can be blamed on the UN's handling of the issue of terrorism prior to 9/11. If the SC and the GA had been more assertive on the matter, specifically having a working definition of the concept of terrorism, it may have prevented its proliferation. There are fears that terrorist might one day have access to weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) as several attempts by terrorists to purchase nuclear wastes or technologies through illicit markets have been reported. However, the 9/11 attacks were a wake-up call for the UN to adopt more realistic measures to contain terrorism.

THE UNITED NATIONS' CT MEASURES FROM 2001 TO 2013

Debatably, the UN has not been wanting in her approach to curbing global terrorism using the collective adoption of resolutions. The UN has emphasized the need for collective effort in terms of checking the encumbrances of terrorism. The SC adopted Resolution 1368 on September 12, 2001—just one day after the 9/11 attacks. Rupérez (2005), opines that the resolution was aimed at invoking the right to individual and collective self-defense under the terms of Article 51 of the Charter, which also called upon all member states to cooperate in order "to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of terrorist acts and to redouble their efforts to prevent and suppress them" (p. 18). The legitimization of the use of coercion to fight terrorism made this resolution exceptionally unique. Yet, a major resolve was the adoption of Resolution 1373 on the September 28, 2001; it was adopted to impose on all members of the UN a wide range of measures to curb terrorism. This includes financial, legal, security, and cooperative measures. It also enlightened member states about the need to ratify these resolutions. Furthermore, Resolution 1373 brought about the establishment of the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC), which is responsible for monitoring compliance by member states.

The CTC was introduced with the chief aim of monitoring compliance with this resolution, strengthening the capacity of states in addressing terrorism, and helping to facilitate the provision of technical assistance to countries in dire need of help to implement the CT policies of the UN. In the words of Kofi Annan, former-Secretary General of the UN, "the CTC is the centre of global efforts to fight terrorism." The CTC comprises 15 members, drawn from the SC. Non-members can be invited to attend meetings. A chairman who is appointed by the SC heads the 15-member team. However, members of the CTC reach decisions collectively or by consensus, and it is the duty of the chairperson to see that members through a process of consultation reach a consensus. In the event that the members do not achieve consensus on any matter, the SC attends to the matter (Murphy, 2007, p. 4). Subsequently, the SC, in March 2004, adopted Resolution 1535, which saw the emergence of the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED). This was aimed at solving the inadequacies of CTC, which include lack of finance and personnel. The CTED is made up of 40 members, half of which are legal experts. Their duties include the analysis of reports submitted by states that cover areas such as legislative drafting, terrorist financing, refugee and immigration law, police and law enforcement; others include customs, border control, arms trafficking, as well as maritime and transport security. In order to further achieve their aims and objectives, the CTED was divided into an Assessment and Technical Assistance Office (ATAO), which is further subdivided into three geographical areas. This would enable experts to concentrate and specialize in specific regions (CTED, 2009).

During the same year, the UN adopted Resolution 1540, which entails the prohibition of states from supporting NSAs to acquire, use, and transfer nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and means of their delivery (CTED, 2009). Rupérez (2005) also reports that following the Beslan

terrorist attack in the Russian Republic of South Ossetia in September 2004 (claiming hundreds of lives), the Russian Federation sponsored Resolution 1566 (p. 20). Although this was similar to Resolution 1373, among other things, it brought to bear the introduction of an international fund with the view to compensate victims (and their families) of terrorist acts. Resolution 1566, therefore, introduced new areas of CT strategies that were previously anonymous. He further stated that the terrorist attack on London, United Kingdom (UK) brought about the sponsorship of Resolution 1624 in September 2005 by the UK government. This resolution calls on member states to implement policies to, "prohibit by law incitement to commit terrorist act(s), to prevent such conduct and deny safe haven to any person, with respect to whom there is credible and relevant information, giving serious reasons for considering that they have been guilty of such an act." Member states of the UN assumed a firm position on the issue of terrorism in September 8, 2006 when it adopted resolution A/RES/60/288.

The GA established the GCTS. In the words of al-Khalifa, President of the 61st Session of the GA, in 2006:

> The passing of the resolution on the global counter terrorism strategy, with its annex plan of action by 193 member states, represents a common testament that we, the UN, will face terrorism head on and that terrorism in all forms and manifestations committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes, must be condemned and shall not be tolerated (UN, 2008).

The introduction and subsequent adoption of the GCTS makes it the first of its kind whereby member states agree to come together and share common ground, strategy, and approach when it comes to addressing the war on terrorism (CTED, 2009). The GCTS entails a "holistic and inclusive approach to counterterrorism." Therefore, this novel method, unlike others, carried along other members of the UN in the fight against terrorism. This new strategy also addressed factors that necessitate the proliferation of terrorism in the global arena. At a review of the resolution on the GCTS (A RES/60/288) during September 2008, identified the crucial role that regional and subregional bodies as well as stakeholders can play in this long fight.

The attack on United States significantly changed the perception of the world as regards terrorism and simultaneously broadened the UN's approach to CT policy and efforts. Boulden and Weiss (2004) posit that there is no gainsaying that the response of the SC on the 9/11 terrorist attack has been an historic one; this is backed by reliable data, which also show that the activities of UN organs after the attack on the United States reflect issues pertaining to terrorism. Further to this, Resolution 1368 was passed after 9/11; this gives member states the right to self-defense, "reaffirming the inherent right of self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter," which legitimizes the use of force in the war against terrorism. Hence, the 9/11 attacks influenced the approach of the UN to CT in the post-9/11 era. Prior to 9/11, attack sanctions were adopted as a deterrence but Boulden and Weiss (2004) note that sanctions are still in use after 9/11, except for the continuing sanctions against the Taliban and AQ. They both argued that the effectiveness of sanctions can only be determined and visible when directed toward state actors and not NSAs. Boulden and Weiss (2004) conclude that the main thrust of UN methods in curbing terrorism in post-9/11 has been the use of military force, general and financial obligations, in addition to those sanctions monitored by the CTC and other agencies involved in CT efforts. Murphy (2007) states that the establishment of CTC, following Resolution 1373, epitomizes the institutionalization of the understanding of terrorism by the world body (UN) and the importance of collective efforts to curb the spread of terrorist attack (p. 2). Part of these collective efforts involves freezing of financial assets of terrorists and their supporters, denying those traveling opportunities or safe haven, preventing terrorist recruitment, as well as weapons supply and cooperating with other countries in information sharing and prosecution (Cortright, 2005, p. 4).

Although there have been constraints in the discharge of their duties, the efforts and activities of the CTC and CTED in curbing terrorism can best be described as positive. Cortright (2005)

praises the CTC for its creation of a political and legal authority for the global efforts in countering terrorism (p. 5). Murphy (2007) elucidates further when he submitted that there is a link between the CTC/CTED and the realization among nation states of the significance of collectively coming up with a multilateral legal framework needed to mitigate terrorist activity (p. 4). The convention against terrorist bombing and financing held in 1998 and 1999, respectively, has received the support of 135 countries. Furthermore, $200 million US dollars of potential terrorist funds has been frozen. All these significant success in the fight against terrorism can be attributed to the efforts made by the CTC.

Another exceptional success of the CTC is in its knowledge in the administrative and judicial fields as well as executive differences that exist in many countries of the world. This has guided against impetuous decisions and subtleness in handling member states' conformity to Resolution 1373 and has played a pivotal role in directing their attention to the responsibility of helping to monitor the ability of the legislative and administrative institutions. Moreover, it has helped in assessing the level of preparedness of members based on reports submitted by their respective governments. This has helped the CTC to come up with a Technical Assistance Matrix (TAM), which measures the various type of assistance needed by each member state, and to create a Directory of Assistance (DoA). In 2006, 75 countries that requested assistance were referred to the Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) of the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) while 64 other states' request were taken to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Report of the CTC, S/2006/989).

The CTC has yet to been given a passing mark for its method of cooperating with other relevant organizations as regards the sharing of information between parties through conferences and meetings. Nonetheless, total compliance is not given as regards sharing of information even though meetings are well attended by all governmental, international, regional, and subregional organizations. Perhaps, the most exceptional achievement of the CTC is the establishment of its CTED. The CTED came about through SC Resolution 1535. This saw the adoption of policy, which addresses the issue of human rights violations. The CTED was mandated to liaise with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and other human rights organizations involved in matters related to CT processes. The committee directed the CTED to consider relevant human rights obligation during the course of their activities. The CTC/CTED now routinely concerns themselves with relevant human rights issues in all their activities. However, they do not consider it their absolute priority. Disputably, the CTC has been successful in its approach to balancing assessment, monitoring countries compliance with Resolution 1373, rendering assistance to countries that lack the institutional and financial capacity to implement the resolution, that have made good use of the process of information gathering and utilization.

The UN activities of CT have not been limited to the aforementioned bodies; UN specialized agencies have been involved in the fight against the proliferation of terrorism. Though these agencies hold specialized responsibilities, the scope of deterring terrorist has been widened to also include these agencies, particularly in addressing the root cause of terrorism and factors such as finance and narcotics, which aids terrorists in effectively carrying out their programs. These agencies includes the UNODC, TPB, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nation Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), World Health Organization (WHO), and the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF). The UNODC and TPB, which are based in the Austrian capital of Vienna, have been playing significant roles in CT strategies of the UN. A relationship that can be described as cordial has existed between the UNODC and the TPB, as well as some regional and sub-regional bodies such as the African Union (AU), South African Development Community (SADC), Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Pacific Island Forum (PIF), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), and the Organization of American States (OAS). The relationship has brought about a broad-based sustainable and symbiotic nexus in addition to general and highly praised cooperation among these bodies in areas such as provision of technical assistance and the

holding of ministerial conferences, missions, seminars, and workshops, among other events and programs (Reports of the Secretary General, 2007). This relationship could also be traced to the professional and consultative functions or outlook of the UNODC.

The role of the UNDP in the fight against terrorism cannot be over emphasized. Though, it is not mentioned in the UN strategy program, its activities addresses the root causes of terrorism and conditions that necessitate the spread of terrorism, which include promoting good governance, rule of law, and social inclusion. It conducts various programs, ensuring respect for the rule of law, democracy, quick conflict prevention and recovery, justice, security, empowerment of marginalized peoples in society, facilitating assessments for development, assistance and various types of aid, and establishing good relationships with civil societies and private sectors. The UNDP has the potential of ensuring the maximization of states' commitments to CT and capacity building, which can be seen in the broader global development agenda (CTED, 2009).

In a report entitled "United Against Terrorism," former-General Secretary of the UN (UNSG) Kofi Annan emphasized the importance of the role of UNESCO in the war against terrorism, which includes, "the fight against ethnic and religious exclusion and discrimination, the promotion of quality education, religious and cultural tolerance, inter-faith and intra-faith dialogue, the role of the mass media and codes of conduct for journalists covering terrorism" (pp. 4–5). Moreover, UNESCO has ensured a link between efforts made to support interactions among civilizations, cultures, and peoples, and the efforts adopted in order to discourage and stop extremism and fanaticism. A significant role in addressing radicalization and recruitment of terrorists and the exploitation of the Internet for carrying out terror is played by UNESCO. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has also been vocal against the proliferation of nuclear energy and various types of weapons in the global arena, including the sensitization of states that possess WMDs, and the need to protect these weapons from being stolen or sold to terrorist networks. Moreover, the IAEA has helped prevent terrorists from assessing nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological materials, ensuring that there is adequate security and overall preparedness in place so as to respond swiftly and effectively in an event of an attack using these materials. In the same vein, we find that the World Health Organization (WHO) is exceptionally helpful in terms of improving public health systems with the aim of preventing the utilization of biological weapons; this and many other organizations have been found helpful through the reform and modernization of border management system facilities and institutions, at national, regional, and international levels.

As part of CT efforts and having a renewed commitment by way of strengthening international cooperation through collective prevention and combating terrorism, the Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) was established by the UNSG in 2005. The statutory responsibility of the CTITF, which is composed of 23 UN system entities, including agencies with or without an explicit CT mandate, is to ensure overall coordination and coherence in the CT efforts of the UN system. It also facilitates the sharing of valuable information among CTITF entities about their areas of activities, so as to increase positive collaboration. The CTITF has also been rendering assistance to member states in various ways necessary for the implementation of the primary UN strategy. In accordance with the global strategy, the CTITF has concentrated more on areas such as, conflict prevention and resolution, addressing extremism and radicalism that engenders terrorism, supporting the victims of terrorism, preventing and responding to WMD attacks, tackling the finance of terrorism, countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes, facilitating UN integrated implementation of the GCTS, protecting human rights while countering terrorism, and fully strengthening the protection of vulnerable targets (Calvani, 2008, p. 1). Furthermore, the CTITF, through its I-ACT initiative, which is an information system that works as a key communication mechanism among the task force entities, has helped interested member states enforce the UN GCTS in an integrated manner. I-ACT aids in facilitating improved information sharing and coordination of technical assistance delivery among the various actors. In 2008, Madagascar and Nigeria became the first partnering member states that have formally requested that they be

considered for assistance with the integrated implementation of the Strategy as part of the I-ACT Initiative. Burkina Faso joined in 2009 (CTITF, 2013).

Similarly, 2011 saw the establishment of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Center (UNCCT), which was adopted by the UNGA through Resolution A/RES/66/10. The aim of the UNCCT is to contribute to the implementation of the GCTS and to achieve this, the UNCCT works with 30 CTITF units through regular consultations to be able to ascertain which CT initiatives fall within their purview, promote cooperation between national and regional bodies involved in CT efforts and programs, and building the capabilities spectrum of states in the fight against terrorism (CTTITF, 2013). In 2012, during the second meeting of the Advisory Board of the UNCCT, the UNSG remarked that the strategic priorities of the UNCCT include

> development of national and regional CT strategies, support for integrated capacity building assistance (I-ACT), countering the financing of terrorism, promoting dialogue, understanding and countering the appeal of terrorism, protecting human rights while countering terrorism, promote and protect rights of victims of terrorism and protection of vulnerable targets (CTITF, 2013, p. 1).

CHALLENGES CONFRONTING THE UN IN COMBATING TERRORISM

Arguably, the UN has made significant efforts in combating terrorism globally. However, these efforts are one of mixed success because terrorist acts have continued unabated particularly throughout Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Certain challenges have been identified as factors behind this fractional success of the UN in its global strategies of countering the spread of terrorism. It is categorized into three. These challenges include: (1) political, (2) financial, and (3) procedural.

POLITICAL CHALLENGES

The political challenges that have impinged the success of the UN in its war against terrorism can be further segmented into two fields: (1) disagreement on the definition of terrorism and (2) the challenge of upholding human rights while countering terrorism. For years, extensive dispute has been identified among UN members as to what constitutes terrorism or who can rightly be called a terrorist. This discrepancy among members hampers any sense of collective purpose and strategic framework at countering terrorism globally. At the 42nd conference of the UN held in 2007, participants agreed that

> a binding definition of terrorism would help shape law enforcement efforts, intelligence roles, and the establishment of "universal rules of engagement." A clear definition would also standardize the measurement of results for UN and donor programs. Therefore, a successful global framework would require codifying what constitutes a terrorist act and developing instruments for enforcement.

Cortright (2005) traces this definitional enigma to the standpoints of actors in the international community on the concept of the term. While some argue that terrorism is any action that threatens and destroys human life; for others, terrorism should be divested from legitimate acts of resistance from oppression.

Actors often use the concept of morality in the international system to obscure the definition of terrorism. Scholars argue that the effect of an action attracts more attention than its intent. According to International Terrorism and Security Research (ITSR) (2008), "collateral or unintended attack on civilians by uniform military personnel on a legitimate assignment is viewed to be the same as a terrorist bomb, which is intentionally directed to a civilian target with the aim of creating that damage." Moreover, the inherent dispute over differentiating terrorists from freedom fighters is one of the major challenges of reaching consensus in the definition of terrorism (Anan, 2005). This is more noticeable in the Middle East where members' support for the Palestinian resistance to the activities of Israel has influenced their behavior toward UN CT initiatives. Hence, they are careful

to accept any definition that undermines the existence of Palestine as a state (Cortright, 2005, p. 19). Lack of agreed definition has continued to affect agencies of the UN such as the CTC and CTED in achieving their statutory responsibilities of countering terrorism (Murphy, 2007, p. 10). In 2006, the UN unanimously adopted the GCTS, which was regarded as a major milestone for the UN and a belief that member states are moving closer to having a sense of common purpose—a collective framework in defeating the global threat of terrorism. However, this cannot be compared to an unambiguous definition of the concept, which will spawn member states to establish policies geared to full implementations of UN resolutions in dealing with terrorism in their respective countries.

Second, the issue of protecting human rights while combating terrorism is another major political challenge, which has hampered many UN efforts. The UN has (over the last 10 years) set in place various resolutions aimed at addressing the problem of human rights in its CT programs by stressing the importance of adhering to the principles of the rule of law and human rights. According to Cockayne et al. (2012), "these achievements were not merely rhetorical but also legal, through the creation of a secure and shared legal framework for international responses to terrorism" (p. 7). 2005 was a significant year in addressing human rights while countering terrorism. During that year, UN member states established a special Rapporteur for the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms that operate under the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). The statutory responsibility of the special Rapporteur is the promotion of best practices and investigating allegations of human rights violations in the process of CT efforts. Furthermore, the UNGA's 2006 adoption of the GCTS provided, in part, measures aimed at protecting human rights more comprehensively. These were all enshrined in the fourth pillar, which requested member states not to impede on their obligations to the protection of international human rights law, refugee law, and international humanitarian law, while enforcing CT measures within their respective states. Moreover, it also called upon member states to establish criminal justice systems that would ensure that the rule of law is strictly adhered to—enabling the protection of the fundamental rights of persons being extradited or prosecuted for terrorist acts. In order to ensure that fundamental rights and freedom of persons are protected, the SC has gone further in improving on the listing and delisting procedures by establishing an Ombudsperson charged with the responsibility of facilitating the handling of delisting requests (Cockayne et al., 2012).

However, irrespective of these seemingly laudable efforts of the UN in ensuring that the rights of persons are recognized and protected, the problem of violations of human rights during the course of CT efforts persists. Some observers are of the opinion that although at the international front the UN may have focused on the need for states to respect human rights in their CT strategies, this has however, not been truly replicated among all the member states of the UN nor among international agencies as violations of human rights continue to be reported. Anan (2005) explains that numerous measures, which "states are currently adopting to counter terrorism are infringing on human rights and fundamental freedom" (p. 16). Individuals suspected of being terrorists or believed to have information on the activities of terrorists have been detained and faced all manners of financial restriction without having rights of appeal granted to them. Moreover, government officials have exploited the framework of the former Bush–Cheney Administration's (and even that of the Obama–Biden Administration) "War on Terror" (WoT) in order to unleash violence on credible opposition and minority group, thereby undermining democratic freedoms (Murphy, 2007). One notable case in point is Putin's response to the Beslan school siege (North Ossetia-Alania), where he proposed a restriction of Russian democracy by ending popular regional elections and removing local electoral districts in the lower house of the Duma. Another case in point involves the US Patriotic Act that was adopted after 9/11, which grossly undermined civil liberties by empowering the US government (USG) to conduct searches and wire taps without warrants, as well as limiting judicial oversight of invasive information gathering undertakings (Gershman, 2004, p. 10). On January 26, 2010, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment, the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (WGEID)

and the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) released a joint study on global practices in relation to secret detention in the context of CT operations. In so doing, 63 states were alleged to have been involved in secret detention, torture, and the melting all sorts of inhumane and degrading treatments of persons accused of terrorism (A/HRC/13/422010).

The CTC has been criticized as a result of its purported indifferent posture on issues pertaining to human rights and its position that bringing human rights dimensions to the CTC's discussions with states may make it more complex for states to make and act on quick decisions on actions that required urgent attention (Foot, 2007). In 2003, a briefing between the Chair of the CTC and SC was held with Canadian, Latin American, European, Asian, and African representatives airing similar views regarding the fact that CTC activities fail to take into account fundamental human rights issues. This might well be a factor behind the existence of a frail commitment to Resolution 1373. Lack of concern for human rights protection by the CTC may be traced to the US' hard stance on complete compliance to Resolution 1373 established in 2001. They argued that, for the CTC to contribute meaningfully to the WoT, it has to assist states in implementing Resolution 1373 and concomitantly holding states accountable when they refuse to do so. The SC has been criticized for failing to pay more attention to the effects of national level implementation of Resolutions 1373 (Okuma and Botha, 2012). The 1267 Committee, established in 1999 with the aim of identifying and subsequently imposing restraints on named terrorists, has also come under serious criticism for its CT approach; specifically, on the arbitrary and discriminatory listing and delisting of people suspected to be terrorists without recourse to human rights concerns (Cameron, 2005; International Court of Justice [ICJ], 2009). According to Foot (2007),

> three Somali Swedes, for example, were accused of association with an international financing network supposedly linked with terrorism and had their assets frozen. One of these individuals who were running for public office in Sweden protested that he had no knowledge of this assumed terrorist link. A public outcry ensued in Sweden because of the absence of legal recourse for the listed individuals. Further controversies—associated with the Chinese listing of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, and Russian efforts to put several Chechen groups on the list—also had the effect of damaging the credibility of 1267 procedures (p. 498).

Lack of an agreed definition gives states the liberty to define terrorism in ways that are consistent with the activities of their opposition. Pillay (2009) best captures this by stating that

> without a universal definition of terrorism, States may create broad, overreaching definitions and inadvertently criminalize activity outside the realm of terrorism. States may also intentionally create a broad definition and use this broad power to suppress oppositional movements or unpopular groups under the guise of combating terrorism. People may be prosecuted for legitimate exercise of protected human rights due to vague and unclear domestic definitions of terrorism (p. 7).

Moreover, ignoring human rights concerns as regards CT can only succeed in indirectly supporting terrorism. According to Murphy (2007, p. 23), "to compromise on the protection of human rights will hand to the terrorist a victory they cannot achieve on their own." Similarly, Cortright (2005) states that many of those who become political militants are motivated not by hatred of freedom but by an extreme yearning for it.

Financial Challenges

In recent years, the UN system has faced the challenge of funding the activities of its extensive agencies owing to the UN's growing responsibilities. The increasing range of global security threats has forced the UN to establish agencies tasked with addressing these challenges. However, funding a large and growing body of agencies has been a major challenge in and of itself. The organs of the UN such as the UNGA, SC, Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), ICJ, and the Secretariat and

Special Missions are financed by the regular budget of the UN. Recently, the UN regular budget dues payment scheme has reached its maximum (22%) and minimum (0.001%) rates for all nations based on their ability to pay. The United States pays the highest rate. Gross National Product (GNP) essentially influences the assessment rate. In view of the fact that the United States has one of the highest GNPs in the world, the USG's dues assessments are higher than those of other member states (Browne, 2013). However, the UN has been faced with the problem of arrears. Most developed countries (such as the US) have for years been withholding their payments, and poorer states are incapable of paying their full assessment. In April 2008, members arrears to the regulation's budget top US$919 million of which the United States alone owed US$846 million—representing 92% of the regular budget arrears (Global Policy Forum [GPF], 2014). Lehman and McClellan (2006) observe that the UN has been restrained from fulfilling its statutory responsibility as a result of late payment by member states, and the UN's highest contributors, namely the United States, have attributed the majority of UN financial problems to late payment. This can however be traced to the influence of US Congress (p. 2). Browne (2013) states,

> Congress has, over the years, sought to influence the direction of the United Nations and the US policy at the United Nations and its agencies. A variety of tools has been used from "sense of Congress" resolutions to restrictions placed in authorization and appropriations legislation. Congressional committees have held hearings to educate and to carry out their oversight functions. US nominees to be ambassadors at the United Nations or its agencies have been queried on various aspects of the US policy and UN activity. Congress has reduced or increased executive branch funding request; has withheld funding of the US proportionate share that would finance particular programs or tied release of US contributions to executive branch certifications once certain policy goals had been met (p. 49).

Furthermore, numerous other states also have a history of defaulting on their UN dues. In 2006, only 40 member states paid their entire dues on time. Also, in 2005, member state arrears amounted to 62% of assessed budget (Lehman and McClellan, 2006). Therefore, the various institutions that were established by the USC to counter terrorism such as the CTC, CTED, CTITF, and other specialized agencies relied more on voluntary contributions from member states; hence, long-term planning of projects aimed at assisting countries in countering terrorism has become extremely difficult.

Procedural Challenges

Administrative challenges stand as another major factor affecting CT agencies of the UN in achieving their salient objectives. Indifferent attitudes of some member states regarding the directives of CT agencies often obstruct creditable efforts by CT agencies. Millar and Rosand (2006) reason that member states choose to pursue their own agendas in combating terrorism within their respective states or regions, rendering them apathetic to the policies or procedure of UN CT agencies (pp. 31–4). Similarly, states are recalcitrant in establishing critical judicial mechanisms to speedily prosecute those who have been accused of being involving in or inciting terrorism. Therefore, international conventions that are adopted and ratified but do not retain the requisite internal mechanisms to perform their tasks are of little use. Moreover, the CTC and CTED have yet to create a pattern of linking the assistance-seeking countries in the enforcement of UN resolutions to combat terrorism and the assistance providing states, in order to ensure that the needs of assistance-seeking countries are met. The interest of less-developed countries in global CT efforts is very low because some of these countries, particularly those that have yet to experience a surge of terrorism within their own borders, continue to view terrorism as a Western problem (Dagne, 2002).

In the same vein, cooperation among appropriate institutions established to counter terrorism globally is another major procedural challenge. The potential to coordinate between UN CT agencies and other regional and subregional international organizations has yet to manifest from good intentions to intermittent meetings, where important issues in the current global fight against

terrorism (not the same as the WoT) would be brought to the fore and appropriately dealt with. The major gap that currently exists in the desired level of cooperation and coordination between regional and subregional international organizations and UN CT agencies, is a result of the fact that most regional and subregional international organizations regard the information they have as being highly classified, or because of the perception that sharing information with agencies of the UN would undermine their own CT measures. As such, they are reluctant to share information with UN agencies involved in CT efforts (Murphy, 2007, p. 8). Even though the CTITF I-ACT initiative aims to address the challenge of information sharing among member states, the fact that only a few countries have requested to be members show the reluctance of member states to share valuable intelligence in countering terrorism in certain regions.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have argued that over the years, debates focusing on the concept of terrorism have assumed two parts. There are scholars and observers who view terrorism from the realist perspective, while others intellectualize the term from the idealist perspective. For the realists, terrorism is essentially a violent activity carried out by clandestine groups against a state and its citizens with the aim of influencing it politically. The realists argue that states cannot be termed terrorists for simply implementing their statutory responsibility of law enforcement, even though such actions breed terror, death, and even destruction. This is due to the fact that the monopoly of the use of force by the state is fundamental to its very survival. However, the idealist refute such claims by advancing the debate that any attempt at defining terrorism in a manner that shields certain state actions is not only reductionist and perverse but also ignores historical dynamism regarding the term. For idealists, history has shown that states are not only the originators of terrorism but that they have continued to employ instruments that are consistent with features of what scholars have described as terrorism. They argue that when states go beyond the dictates of the constitution or international conventions in the process of law enforcement, the result is an act of terrorism. For idealists, any definition on terrorism must include both states and NSAs.

It has also been argued in this chapter that the definitional enigma surrounding the concept of terrorism, which confronts the contemporary international community, has a manifold effect on various CT policies of the UN. First, lack of collective definition of the concept of terrorism creates a dangerous platform for states to frame any definition that justifies their own actions, whether these impinge on human rights or not. States have also been known to provide definitions of the concept that mirrors the activities of credible opposition as terroristic; thus, justifying further withdrawal of the fundamental rights of their citizens. Absence of a consensual definition continues to impede any sense of shared purpose and tactical framework at countering terrorism globally. Therefore, the UN should consider a broad-based dispassionate definition of the concept of terrorism that will cover both states and NSAs as perpetrators of terrorist acts. Emphasis should be placed on action.

Although the UN and its plentiful agencies have made considerable efforts in combating terrorism globally, the challenge of human rights violation in the fight against terrorism remains perennial. It has been observed that neglecting the human rights question in CT policymaking and implementation is tantamount to procreating additional terrorist groups and ultimately a decline in popular support in the global fight against terrorism. Hence, the international community should do more on the issue of adherence to UN conventions with respect to fundamental freedoms and rights of persons. Specifically, the UNHCHR should continuously engage UN agencies involved in combating terrorism by means of unremitting dialog. Such dialog should hone in complete compliance regarding human rights in the implementation of policy, legislation, and CT practice.

On the other hand, funding has been a major challenge to the UN over the years. Its increased responsibilities around the world have created the need for more funds to effectively achieve its stated goals. However, member states have continued to act indifferently when it comes to paying their UN dues. Arrears owed by developed states and worst still, by developing states are simply

enormous. This has stifled plans to combat terrorism. Regrettably, the UN has been forced to reduce most of its CT programs simply because the requisite funds do not exist. Therefore, the UN should find better ways of sourcing for special funds solely for CT programs. Lastly, administrative challenges, particularly in the areas of coordination and cooperation among all agencies participating in the fight against terrorism and other regional and subregional international organizations and in information sharing, have further affected the successful enforcement of CT policies. Although, the CTITF coordinates all other agencies, the problem is still recurrent. Thus, it is suggested that the UN should consider a resolution that would establish a United Nations Commission for Terrorism (UNCT) to coordinate all initiatives of the UN specialized agencies and other regional and subregional international organizations combating terrorism, thereby resolving the problem of coordination, intelligence gathering, and cooperation.

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17 Insurgencies, Civil Wars, and International Support
Reassessing Evidence of Moral Hazard from the Balkans

Marinko Bobić

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Readers should be familiar with the concept of "dirty hands," or the willingness to use deception and fraud for supposedly good ends (Shugarman and Rynard, 2000, p. 87). Sometimes, killing or intentionally exposing (a government's own) civilians to potentially lethal danger falls into this category—depending what we understand as *good ends*. In that sense, international intervention can be deemed as a good end if it helps bring a party in conflict closer to its goals. Although there was no known victimization of its own civilians, it is generally considered a good thing for British citizens to have had the United States (US) enter the Second World War in order to support the United Kingdom's (UK) fight against Nazi Germany. Sometimes, however, to receive such international support, parties seek to support the conditions in which civilians become the victims of vicious crime(s). This is especially the case when conditions make it difficult for an actor to find support or even allies in the international system. When a party intentionally seeks to be victimized, particularly when it allows its own civilians to become victims of violent events, in order to receive external benefits, we refer to this as "moral hazard." Although readers may be familiar with some episodes of victimization of civilians throughout history, whether episodes occur in order to draw international support is not entirely clear.

The murkiness of this understanding presents a critical problem for both academics and policymakers. More specifically, the problem stems from a claim that without providing direct evidence showing how governments (and certainly rebels) rationalize the victimization of civilians in order to trigger international intervention, we have a misleading account of actors' motivations and intentions (Bellamy and Williams, 2011, p. 557). This supposedly misleading account reduces complex and multilevel phenomena to a single variable, following simplified explanations, and ignoring

or misinterpreting significant pieces of international events that do not correspond to theoretical grounding. As a consequence, we should recognize that the concept of "moral hazard" provides us with very little if even no insight at all into the dynamics of insurgencies and civil wars. In fact, if this murkiness misleads our understanding, then it is better not to apply the concept at all. However, in this case, we are left in an equally problematic position. This is essentially a difficulty that has been raised regarding the theory or "moral hazard's" empirical evidence; but such a problem is also of an epistemological and ontological nature. To establish a direct link between the rationale of governments and/or of rebels, and the outcome of international intervention, we would face even further problems. *Can we ever truly know the motivation of a warring party? How can we know of actors' motivations given the highly compromising nature of having such information public? Would actors ever admit to it?* These types of questions haunt any discussion pertaining to the idea of "moral hazard," including the one presented in this chapter. Nonetheless, it is *empirical evidence* that is deemed the most problematic aspect this more general challenge, or rather, the lack of it. Accordingly, this chapter is a heuristic attempt to find a satisfactory solution to the "moral hazard" debate by focusing on and ultimately reassessing evidence that is currently available to us.

In this chapter make use of evidence from the Bosnian and Kosovo wars to show a high likelihood that "moral hazard" played an important part in the calculations of the warring parties. As such, they did so in order to win the conflict with the support of the international community. The central argument is therefor that the concept of moral hazard advances, rather than undermines, our understanding of parties' behavior in an armed conflict—especially among insurgencies—by providing us with an important rationale as to *why* victimization of civilians is a strategic asset. Foreign military intervention does encourage a party in conflict to apply a strategy of provoking or staging the victimization of civilians. The case studies of Bosnia and Kosovo show that the strategy can provide at least some significant results.

There are two important caveats in this study, or any study involving victimization of civilians. First, some of the evidence presented here is controversial. Even those who agree theoretically may not (entirely) agree empirically (or even methodologically) (Crawford and Kuperman, 2005, p. 144). Victimizing civilians is an immoral and illegal act, despite the strategic benefits it may bring. As such, actors who may have engaged in acts that promote violent acts against civilians (thus creating civilian victimization) have a legitimate reason not to openly admit to their crimes. Some of the evidence here rests on high probabilities, rather than on certainties. However, the fact that the ethnic groups covered within this study have engaged in victimization of civilians, and that some of the evidence presented here has been recognized by the Serbian government, shows that there is a high probability that the evidence is worthy of serious consideration. This can be firmly seen as the case even though "it may not always be easy to determine the identity of the initiator of violence" (Grigorian, 2005, p. 197). Therefore, findings that critique "moral hazard" can be "verified or refuted as in any other history book" (Foucault, 1991, p. 33). For any disputed evidence, it is up to historians to debate and resolve them. Furthermore, this study can only pertain to weak and middle powers that fight insurgencies or civil wars, since they constitute a group of actors that are most susceptible to international intervention. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: First, I highlight some of the key premises and conclusions that were advanced by "moral hazard" theorists. This subsequently shows us how the concept of "moral hazard" has been recently critiqued. Next, I reassess evidence from the Bosnian war and Kosovo insurgency to show that there are strong indications that the victimization of actors' own civilians may have occurred in order to trigger an international intervention. Finally, before concluding, I highlight some ways in which the theory of "moral hazard" ought to be restructured and focused, such that its explanatory power is not misinterpreted.

THEORY OF MORAL HAZARD AS IT STANDS

The concept of "moral hazard" emerged from the field of economics. It refers to the risk of a contracting party changing its own behavior to the detriment of another party within a contract. An

example of this is people with insurance who take more risks because they know they are protected in the event that the risks bring about negative consequences (Kuperman, 2008a, p. 219; Wessels, 2006, p. 390). Similarly, when it comes to humanitarian intervention, "moral hazard" refers to the idea that the prospect of external support tempts groups, which would otherwise be cautious and remain peaceful, to take risks and use violence in challenging authorities (Crawford, 2005, p. 175). That is, otherwise cautious and peaceful groups enjoy a type of "insurance" provided by humanitarian intervention (Crawford and Kuperman, 2005, p. 143). In a way, it is a perverse incentive because it stimulates undesirable behavior by promising to reward it. This concept then essentially relies on the intervener to create a perverse incentive structure that will encourage others to act according to that incentive. Of course, the outcome is undesirable for the intervener, and therefore we apply the term "perverse," or in more illustrative terms, we can say that, "the road to hell is paved with good intentions" (Kydd and Straus, 2013, p. 673).

However, though an economic situation can be similar in many ways to a humanitarian situation, not all would agree that transplanting the concept of "moral hazard" from economics to politics is justifiable. Wagner (2005) argues that there are many situations than appear similar but ought not to fall under the same concept (p. 238). For example, automobile safety regulations have increased the number of automobile accidents (because they reduced the risk of personal injury that accidents entailed) but this ought not to be seen as the same "moral hazard" to which we refer in economics. That is, it is not clear whether there is the same reasoning behind government decisions to deter rebellions and the economic literature regarding optimal insurance contracts (Wagner, 2005, p. 240). Although he is correct that many differences need to be accounted for, the concept of "moral hazard" at the moment is the most widely used term for describing victimization of an actor's own civilians in the hopes of receiving international support. Of course, economists argue that "moral hazard" has a slightly different meaning in economics and that a much more analogous term would be "adverse selection" (Rauchhaus, 2009, p. 872). In fact, no concept from economics can be easily incorporated into the field of international relations (IR) due to the different nature of actors, institutions, and their environments. However, the origin of the concept matters less than the actual "meaning" of it within IR.

There are also different types of "moral hazard." But before delving into that we should note that Crawford (2005) emphasizes a difference between *proximate* and *remote* causes of war. *Proximate* causes of war are those that actually trigger a war, while *remote* causes are long-term instances of tension and conflict. For example, an accidental death of an ethnic group member would be a proximate cause. A remote cause would be socioeconomic hardships of an ethnic group. Bearing this in mind, Crawford (2005) lists different types of consequences (*direct* and *indirect*) and different types of "moral hazard" (*thin* and *thick*). As for consequences, direct consequences appear in the behavior of actors induced by incentives. Indirect consequences appear in others' reactions (or anticipated reactions) to such behavior. Finally, thin "moral hazard" occurs when interveners create incentives that either indirectly cause perverse consequences they do not intend nor anticipate or directly cause perverse consequences they do not intend but do anticipate. Thick "moral hazard," on the other hand, occurs when the interveners create incentives that directly cause perverse consequences they neither intend nor anticipate. Crawford (2005) has thus developed a more sophisticated conceptual framework that captures some nuances in this causal relationship. However, others have established their own nuances. Kuperman (2008a) defines two types of behavior that emerge from "moral hazard." These are *irresponsibility* and *fraud*. In the former, the insured stops taking normal precautions against loss because insurance reduces or eliminates the potential cost. In the latter, the insured intentionally seeks nominal loss because the insurance payout is greater. Both behaviors can apply to international intervention.

Apart from theory, two policy-related concepts deserve particular attention. First concept is that of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). In 2005, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted the R2P principle, the main proposition of which is state sovereignty is not a right and that governments have a responsibility to intervene within the territory of other states with the aim of

protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity (United Nations [UN], 2005, p. 30). On the other hand, UN member states have a duty to behave responsibly toward their own populations, and when a state fails in fulfilling its responsibility, external actors should act in a "timely and decisive" manner to protect civilians from these crimes in a way that is consistent with the UN Charter (Moon, 2009). Yet, even though R2P is an important concept that has been used to define humanitarian intervention (Kuperman, 2008b), the two concepts are not synonymous. Many scholars do not mention R2P. This is important because R2P has not existed during the Rwandan genocide or the Srebrenica massacre. Yet, as argued here, the international community was very much implicated as an intervening actor.

The second concept is that of "genocidal violence," which is a label for actions of genocide and ethnic cleansing (including forced migration) (Kuperman, 2005, p. 149; Kuperman, 2008a, p. 220). The importance of this concept is that it is a *dependent variable* while R2P can be seen as an *independent variable*. Namely, it is genocidal violence that is often provoked by a particular ethnic group in order to draw international intervention, but also their own initial demise until the intervention takes place. The work "provoke" is used to illustrate that a violent rebellion takes place with the aim of rattling the security establishment of the government. Cases such as Burundi would not be included because genocidal violence occurred during the 1990s in response to a peaceful and not to a violent challenge, but Kosovo and Bosnia, on the hand, are typical cases that serve as a solid example in this case. More problematic however, are cases of low-scale civilian victimization, such as psychological or physical torture, temporary incarceration, denial of basic necessities, abduction, or even infrequent cases of bloodshed. In response to the awareness that civilian victimization does not necessarily have a large scope, some scholars have refrained from using the concept of "genocidal violence" in favor of such terms as "risky behavior" since it reflects the behavior of belligerents anticipating international intervention (Crawford, 2005, p. 179). Upon closer scrutiny, however, risky behavior can be seen as an *intervening variable*, rather than a *dependent variable*. Thus, scholars choosing to focus on "risky behavior" rather than "genocidal violence," do not necessarily exclude the latter, but only point out that it is the behavior of the *provocateurs* in which we are interested, not the retaliators, or even the result.

DOING AWAY WITH THE THEORY OF MORAL HAZARD

The main problem that this chapter seeks to highlight is that the theory of "moral hazard" has recently come under heavy fire by Bellamy and Williams (2011) whose argument not only seeks to diminish the importance of "moral hazard" as a theory, but to completely discredit it. Their central argument is that "the claim—that R2P causes genocidal violence that would not otherwise occur—has not yet been subject to careful scrutiny in order to assess its empirical validity" (p. 540). Specifically, these authors state that empirical evidence shows in no way supports the conclusion of moral hazard theory, and that moral hazard theory's largest weakness is its overt reductionism and inappropriateness for the task. Instead, as evidence they show that the number of international humanitarian deployments after 1994 remained relatively consistent, suggesting that the emergence of R2P had no effect on increasing incentives for rebels to start an armed struggle. They show that there was an overall decline in all forms of armed rebellion against established governments, as depicted in Figure 17.1. This of course is based on the assumption that the moral hazard theory would expect the number of rebellions to increase with a growth in international deployments.

Since there was no increase in rebellions, we are led to believe that R2P must have created favorable conditions for governments to accommodate potential rebels, rather than provoked genocidal violence. In other words, we are told to observe that it cannot be that R2P causes genocidal violence when in fact such violence has been reduced. In addition to this point, Bellamy and Williams (2011) assert that rebellions should also be longer in duration and greater in intensity as rebels choose to endure, waiting for international intervention. Again, they demonstrate that no increase in the duration or intensity of the rebellions after 1999 has taken place, and that Cold War rebels actually

FIGURE 17.1 Rebellions against established governments, 1990–2008. (Adapted from Bellamy, A. J. and Williams, P. D., *European Journal of International Relations*, 18(3), 2011, p. 547.)

endured longer on average than have Post-Cold War rebels. 90% of armed conflicts during the Cold War lasted more than 8 years, while only 42% did so after the Cold War (Bellamy and Williams, 2011, p. 550). Given this data, the authors want to show that since the emergence of R2P, rebellions have become rare, shorter, and less deadly. The case studies they utilize include Bosnia and Kosovo, but also Rwanda and Darfur. Given that this chapter reassesses evidence from Bosnia and Kosovo only, it is worth noting key arguments regarding only these two cases. This chapter therefore proceeds to present evidence from the two cases and illustrates how it contrasts with evidence presented by Bellamy and Williams (2011).

REEVALUATING ORIGINAL CASES

Civil War in Bosnia

It is difficult to analyze conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina on its own, for the dynamics that shaped it are very much related to the conflict throughout the whole of Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, conflict in Yugoslavia began in June 1991 owing to Croatian and Slovenian proclamations of independence from the federal state. Bosnia followed the same path in March 1992, with its own proclamation, but the ethnic Serbian population living in those countries did not support the secession of Croatia and Bosnia. They wanted to stay part of Yugoslavia or secede from these seceding countries. Thus, when the United States and the European Union (EU) recognized the independence of Croatia and Bosnia, the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) initially tried to prevent secession by force. Eventually, the Serbs formed their own territorial militaries (such as the Army of Republic of Srpska [VRS] and the Serb Army of the Krajina [SVK]), which refused to recognize independent Croatia and Bosnia. Fighting commenced in 1991 in Croatia and in 1992 and in Bosnia. During 1993, armed conflict also broke-out between Croats (HVO) and Bosnian Muslims (ABiH); however, owing to US pressure, the two sides formed a united front in 1995 against the Serbs. The united front helped to break the Serbian stronghold, resulting in a peace agreement that was reached in the US city of Dayton (Ohio) (Kuypers, 1997, p. 76). There are many important characteristics of the war in Bosnia, such as the historical divide in the region between the West (Western Europe and the US), the East (Russia), and the Islamic world. For the purposes of this chapter, it is important to highlight how the

conflict was shaped by key events of civilian victimization; behind which laid a calculus to shape international opinion that would increase the likelihood of international intervention.

One event of particular importance is the first explosion at the Markale marketplace in Sarajevo on February 6, 1994. The blast killed 68 and, following this massacre, US and Western media play immediately blamed the Army of Republic of Srpska (VRS), calling for further military involvement by the West. Indeed, this event served as one of the key factors in the political processes of the UN and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to further increase pressure on the VRS. Both pressure and political processes eventually led to the (rather infamous) NATO air operation against Serb positions. On February 8, 1994, NATO began to enforce a no-fly zone over Bosnia (Waters and Waters, 2013, p. 498). However, on February 18, 1994, Reuters reported that UN analyses showed that then President Alija Izetbegovic's regime was responsible for the explosion that took place at Markale on February 6. *The New York Times* subsequently confirmed that television camera crews were on the scene before the explosion to film the massacre (Smith, 2012). Such statements also came from many other sources, such as the UN under-secretary for humanitarian affairs Yasushi Akashi, UN General Lewis MacKenzie, and the issue even recently surfaced during Karadžić's trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former-Yugoslavia (ICTY) (Djukic and Dubinsky, 2001, p. 47). According to a witness at the trial (a former member of the Bosnian police forces), former President of Bosnia and Herzegovina Alija Izetbegović, his son Bakir Izetbegović, and head of the Islamic society of Bosnia, Ulema Mustafa Cerić, and a few others planned to cause high civilian casualties in Sarajevo in order to provoke NATO intervention from which Bosnian Muslim forces would ultimately benefit.

The same logic applies to the genocide that took place in Srebrenica, where the same witness described Srebrenica as a necessary sacrifice of civilians for the greater cause. Specifically, the plan was for the Bosnian Muslim forces to use Srebrenica, a designed safe area under the safety of the UN protection force UNPROFOR, to attack surrounding Serbian villages and thereby cause massive retaliation against civilian population under UN watch (Balkan Transitional Justice, 2013). Prosecution later rejected this testimony as a conspiracy theory. Undisputed is that the VRS and Serbian paramilitary forces nonetheless committed war crimes that can be described as genocidal. The plan of VRS was to create an "unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica" (Toal and Dahlman, 2011, p. 131). Such a plan targeted Bosnian Muslims. However, it is debatable whether such a massacre would have taken place without attacks of the ABiH under Naser Orić who raided nearby Serbian villages (Toal and Dahlman, 2011, p. 131). These attacks only gave the VRS and Serbian paramilitary units the necessary pretext for enacting violent revenge. If the allegations against the Bosnian Muslim leadership proved to be true, actions of Orić could be categorized as a "moral hazard." Orić might have successfully conducted his mission, but he escaped unharmed and NATO subsequently launched Operation Deliberate Force (August–September 1995) with heavy air strikes against Serbian command, control, and heavy weapons emplacements, while the Croatian army defeated the bewildered Serbian forces both in Croatia and in Western Bosnia (Rimanelli, 2008, p. 347).

International intervention that stemmed from the "moral hazard" may have been an obvious choice for the leadership of Bosnian-Croatians and Muslims. In other words, the choice may have been presented to them from the beginning of the war. Kuperman (2008b) cites several Bosnian Muslim leaders who stated the importance of involving the international community on the Bosnian-Muslim side (p. 61). Rumors circulated that US Ambassador to Belgrade Warren Zimmerman promised US recognition of Bosnia and that he encouraged Izetbegović to object to a previously signed peace plan (Burt and Añorve, 2013, p. 164). United States promises may have shaped military actions of the Bosnian-Muslim until the end of the war. The Washington Post reported on April 30, 1994 that US actions "had given the Muslim-led Bosnian government the false impression that Washington's military support was on the way" (Lucas, 2005). While the United States as a mediator did maintain close relationships with all warring parties, how closely did Izetbegović follow the interests of Washington is difficult to prove. The United States' particular interest to be involved in

the Bosnian conflict, especially after the disaster in Somalia, may have given the Bosnian Muslim leadership a signal that intervention on its behalf was very likely.

Consider this evidence against claims put forward by Bellamy and Williams (2011) that Bosnian-Muslim leadership did not pursue independence motivated by a belief that the West would intervene against the Bosnian Serbs. Rather, there was intent to separate from Yugoslavia, which predated the emergence of perverse incentives (Bellamy and Williams, 2011, p. 551). With this, the authors eliminate agency, assuming that desire to seek independence at one point has to persist at another. But Izetbegović may have changed his mind during the course of the war. This is consistent with aforementioned indications that Izetbegović pursued a different course of interest owing to the influence of Zimmerman, who encouraged Izetbegović to withdraw his signature from the Cutilheiro peace plan (Gow, 1997, p. 88). Although Izetbegović may indeed have pursued the goal of independence from the beginning, as Bellamy and Williams (2011) state, Zimmerman himself denied allegations that this was the result of personal meeting. However, there remains significant evidence to suggest otherwise.

A more problematic issue is that Bellamy and Williams (2011) do not consider in their study any of the massacres presented so far, such as Markale, and the controversial evidence surrounding them. By the time the Markale incident occurred, there existed substantial evidence that the West was sympathetic to the Bosnian cause. Both Croatia and Bosnia received widespread international recognition, Serbia faced economic sanctions, and the UN Security Council (SC) established a no-fly zone over Bosnia in order to deny the use of airspace to Bosnian-Serb aircraft (Greenberg and McGuinness, 2000, p. 37). The Serbs were under a great deal of pressure with any sort of humanitarian calamity portraying the Serbs as perpetrators of violence. This type of negative imagery seriously risked brining about further international sanctions or action against them. As such, by strategic logic, any targeting of Croatian- or Bosnian-Muslim civilians would have serious consequences for the Serbs. This is where an opportunity presented itself for the Bosnian-Muslim leadership to further involve the international community. Although direct causalities cannot be established due to the ethical problems related to this type of evidence, indicators presented here show a strong tendency that "moral hazard" was present in Bosnia.

Insurgency in Kosovo

Although Kosovo shares some similarities with Bosnia, primarily in the distribution of power between belligerents, where the Serbs had the upper hand, in Kosovo the warring parties were the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The main strategy by the JNA was one of counterinsurgency (COIN). Serbia's goal was to hold onto its southern province indefinitely. For this task, it possessed both the political support and the military capabilities (Mockaitis, 2011). However, the intense fighting resulted in an estimated 600 deaths and the displacement of approximately 300,000 persons, while hundreds of villages were destroyed. One of the prominent features of this conflict was the widespread abuse against civilians, both by the Serbian special police, the JNA, and the KLA. Documented abuses include, but are not limited to, extrajudicial executions, the use of disproportionate force, indiscriminate attacks against civilians, systematic destruction of civilian property, and the taking of hostages (Abrahams and Andersen, 1998, p. 88).

By 1998, the Serbians were aware of the rising international pressure. US Secretary of State Madeline Albright called for strong action against Belgrade as early as March of that year (Little and Wickham-Jones, 2000, p. 133). Albright, from the start of the Kosovo conflict, believed that it was important to be tough with the Serbians since the Kosovo crisis was a continuation of Serbian ethnic cleansing practices, which dominated the region for much of the decade (Bahador, 2007, p. 132). Aware of this pressure, Belgrade knew that it needed to build much greater legitimacy if it were to successfully wage a COIN campaign in Kosovo. Belgrade knew that avoiding "crossing the red line," which would again trigger international intervention against them, would be a difficult

task (Kuperman, 2008b, p. 66). For this reason, Belgrade initially avoided a harsh crackdown on Kosovo's ethnic-Albanians, targeting individuals rather than entire groups. Despite its efforts and keen awareness of mounting international condemnation of its actions, Belgrade found it exceptionally difficult to avoid an escalation of negative media attention attributed to them. The effect was often referred to as "the CNN effect."

The KLA had rather limited military capabilities to face the Serbian military in direct confrontation. Likewise, it was in no position to conduct large-scale military operations against civilians. What seemed to work in the JNA's favor was to depict the KLA as a terrorist organization. In the words of former President Slobodan Milosević, even the Islamic fanatics, including Bin Laden, were operating in Kosovo and seeking to destabilize the area (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC], 2002). However, in a campaign to build legitimacy and prevent an international intervention, some crimes against Serbian civilians in Kosovo might have been committed by the Serbian military itself. Only recently has it come to light that the murder of six Serbian teenagers in café "Panda" in Peć in 1998 was an act of a Serbian Unit for Special Operations (JSO), an elite Special Forces police unit of the Yugoslav State Security Service (RDB). According to an investigation by Kurir, "the goal of this crime was, according to our sources, that in the eyes of the international public, the KLA is depicted as a terrorist organization and thus actions of the Serbian forces in Kosovo are justified" (Kurir Team, 2014). First Deputy Prime Minister Alksandar Vučić publicly stated that there is no evidence that this massacre was the act of Albanians (Mihajlović, 2014). Although details of this investigation are still underway, it is clear that the deaths of these civilians played a role in shaping the perception of the (international) public on the need for Serbians to wage war in Kosovo.

The connection between international support and violence against civilians bears much stronger evidence in the case of KLA's strategy, which was to gain international support by triggering a vicious cycle of violence by the Serbians against Albanians. According to Halberstam (2002), the goal was "to escalate tensions and thereby provoke Milosevic and the Serbs to retaliate in a way that would bring the West in as a de facto ally, much as it had finally entered the earlier struggle over Bosnia" (p. 367). Serbian retaliation was mostly carried out against Albanian civilians. Adem Jashari and over fifty of his family members were outgunned and killed by Yugoslav forces. The bloody event was an important trigger for the Albanian civilian support of the KLA during the war (Bahador, 2007, p. 67). At the highest point of the conflict, Serbian forces succeeded in initially driving about 800,000 ethnic Albanians into neighboring countries (and internally displacing nearly 500,000 more within Kosovo) (Licklider and Bloom, 2013, p. 126). This scale of violence proved to be of immense importance to KLA, which received strong support from the Albanian population in Kosovo.

The link between the KLA's strategy and NATO intervention should also receive elaboration. The violence that characterized the Kosovo conflict was not merely a beneficial coincidence for the Albanian cause. That is, the KLA leadership was fully aware of the requirements that it needed to fulfill in order to trigger an intervention. As Bahador (2007) contends, some comments by Albanian and KLA leadership have even validated this argument. According to Dugi Gorani, a Kosovo-Albanian negotiator at Rambouillet, "the more civilians were killed, the chances of international intervention became bigger, and the KLA of course realized that. There was this foreign diplomat who once told me, 'Look, unless you pass the quote of five thousand deaths you'll never have anybody permanently present in Kosovo'" (Little, 2000). In the same presentation, one can find similar statements by others such as Hashim Thaci, the KLA's political leader. Although many would denounce such claims fearing political backlash, such evidence would hardly, if ever, be indisputable. The implication, however, is that the link between international intervention and the necessity to victimize civilians grows stronger with each successive piece of evidence.

Almost any rulebook on COIN will state that for an insurgency to be eradicated, one needs to remove insurgents from the population. That is, one needs to be able to identify and exterminate the insurgents without harming the population. However, this strategy requires time, resources, and civilian support. Without civilian support, the insurgents are not able to recruit, gather intelligence,

or find shelter. Nonetheless, given these stringent requirements, governments are seldom able to engage in such a protracted strategy. One alternative is to conduct an extensive campaign against an entire population that supports the insurgency (Perritt, 2008, p. 48). The problem is that brutality against civilians feeds popular support for insurgents and their cause. In this case, it also feeds international support, which is exactly what the KLA wanted. A cofounder of the KLA confirmed that it was essential for the KLA to gain international support in order to win the war (Kuperman, 2008b, p. 69). As such, it (for the most part) succeeded.

Success, however, is easily applicable in hindsight. Whether the KLA could reliably have predicted a military intervention substantial enough to save its forces from destruction and prevent the imposition of an even harsher Serbian regime in Kosovo is questionable. Although such an outcome cannot be completely cast aside, the KLA had little to lose by implementing a strategy of civilian victimization, while the benefits were at least twofold. First, the KLA's struggle became more legitimate in the eyes of Albanians the more oppressive Serbian methods had become. Second, the KLA had an opportunity to bring NATO into the conflict. Even if neither of these outcomes occurred, there could be nothing to assure the KLA leadership that the Serbians would not have escalated the conflict anyway. That is, the KLA faced a difficult battle regardless of the outcome of potential intervention by NATO; but only through an intervention it was possible to defeat the Serbs, at least militarily.

Bellamy and Williams (2011) disagree that the case of Kosovo supports the theory of "moral hazard." Instead, they present evidence from the Kosovo case as follows. First, they admit that the KLA leadership had a strategy to provoke Serbian overreaction, although such a strategy may not have resulted from expectations that international intervention would have taken place; rather, it was a result of local politics (Bellamy and Williams, 2011, p. 552). Second, they claim that the KLA had a violent strategy in place since the early 1990s—"from the start, the Defenders at Home preferred persistent acts of violent opposition to the Serbs and were not much concerned with strategy" (Bellamy and Williams, 2011, p. 553). The violent strategy did not receive widespread support from the ethnic-Albanian population. Only when the Albanian government collapsed in 1997 and when the Serbians attempted to arrest Adem Jeshari, did Kosovar-Albanians begin to rally in favor of the radicals' cause.

Although "the road to war in Kosovo had little to do with beliefs about the likelihood of third-party intervention" (Bellamy and Williams, 2011, p. 554), the authors actually conflate, as in the case of Bosnia, long-term strategy and specific tactical events. The KLA's push for an independent Kosovo through armed struggle indeed has a longer history than is often stated, but as analyzed here; specific events contained the strategic rationale of "moral hazard," and not the rebellion. Certainly, civilian victimization might have been committed even if there was no likelihood for international intervention, but it was the actions of the international community that ultimately motivated the KLA to act with more assertiveness. After all, in December 1998, the violence in Kosovo escalated, exactly at the time when key policy-makers in the US administration (including in particular Madeleine Albright) were already persistently pressing for a forceful solution to the conflict (Daalder and O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 69). Thus, the United States was seriously considering intervention in the Balkans. The KLA had many reasons to expect foreign support. As early as March 1998, Serbia was facing sanctions, several months before the controversial massacres that played a key role in drawing NATO into the war.

RECONSTRUCTING "MORAL HAZARD THEORY"

In order to revamp the theory of moral hazard, it is first important to note the weaknesses of the current framework. First, Bellamy and Williams (2011) are right to point-out that a focus on R2P can render the theory of moral hazard problematic. Although R2P is one of the many principles underlying international interventionism, it certainly should not be the only principle of focus. In fact, international military interventions have existed for centuries without the concept of R2P. Even

though R2P seeks to create a new international norm that sovereign states ought to be responsible for the wellbeing of all populations, such a norm is only one, among many others, that have been used throughout history for interventionist purposes. The most commonly known historical norm is that of "mission civilisatrice," which occurred during the golden age of Western imperialism, and the meaning of which implied that the West was required to civilize the "backward" peoples living in distance parts of the world (Rieff, 2002, pp. 57–70). As such, the focus should be on any action under the guise of protecting civilian victims of armed conflict, which Bellamy and Williams (2011) categorize in robust peace operations, traditional peacekeeping, sanctions, and judicial interventions, among others (p. 542). These are various types of interventions that might be welcome by a warring party. Any international action targeting a "rouge" regime may be welcome by the opposition, although such action may not be quite enough.

There seems to be heavy reliance on the idea of genocidal violence, rather than on a strategy that victimizes one's civilians. Kuperman (2005) uses "genocidal violence" as a label for actions of genocide and ethnic cleansing (p. 149). It would, however, be correct to critique "moral hazard" as a concept if it implies that with expectations of international intervention we ought to see more genocidal violence—that is, either a greater occurrence of genocide, larger-scale genocides, and increased brutality within genocidal campaigns. In this aspect, "moral hazard" should not be about genocide, but about the victimization of an actor's own civilians. There can be no true "suicidal rebellions." Small, but significant occasions of civilian victimization such as massacres serve a much bigger purpose in civil wars and insurgencies. Such occasions cost very little in terms of the overall population and yet they produce powerful imagery of which the international community cannot help but take notice. Grigorian (2005) supports this idea. Moreover, the victimization of one's civilians can also be staged, such that the victims may not be real victims. Indeed, this might have been the case in the Račak massacre, where there are still inconclusive signs whether the bodies were those of real civilians or of fighters merely staged to appear as civilians (Judah, 2002, p. 194).

Third, regarding the period after the concept of R2P emerged, the presentation of numbers, intensity or duration of rebellions worldwide addressed by Bellamy and Williams (2011) suffers from lack of control for other confounding effects that may have influenced the presented trend (see Figure 17.1). Although they do mention the influence of factors such as the end of superpower rivalry, avoidance of persecution and sanctions by leadership engaged in genocidal violence, and the growing number of nonauthoritarian regimes, it is unclear whether we would still be seeing the same trend if these factors were controlled for. Western (2005) states that a robust intervention regime could deter state violence and improve overall conditions (p. 226). The method of statistically measuring the quantity, intensity, and duration of rebellions, as to indicate whether the promise of humanitarian intervention has the effect of changing the strategy (by creating incentive to victimize civilians), overlooks the subjective perception of leadership. Leadership engaged in civilian victimization for the purposes of international intervention may in fact end a conflict sooner by successfully employing the strategy. This is likely what happened in Bosnia as Croatians and Bosnian-Muslims coerced the Serbians into agreeing to a peace deal after NATO intervened and the US-backed offensive. As a result, if confounding effects are taken into account, then it becomes much more difficult to have a *reductionist* account of "moral hazard," which brings us to the next point.

Regarding *reductionism*, "moral hazard" should not be seen as the only factor that needs to be taken into account when an international intervention is being considered. I have shown here how domestic actors managed to manipulate civilian victimization in order to gain international support. However, such a strategy does not always work. For example, civilian victimization in Palestine did not attract sufficient international support to trigger an intervention (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 2002). Similarly, one should not see the relationship between "moral hazard" and international intervention as unidirectional. Often, the geopolitical strategies of great powers can drive incentives of actors on the ground. That is, international actors cause *domestic* actors to act. In fact, it should come as little surprise that nearly 200 different variables in quantitative analysis have been

identified for understanding the causes of genocidal violence (Dixon, 2009). In this respect, "moral hazard" is not necessarily *perverse* in its effects. It may simply seem *perverse* in the rhetorical claim of the interveners, but in reality and in their geopolitical considerations, interveners may welcome new developments as it gives them an opportunity to secure their interests. This addresses the point that if interveners persist after realizing they are inciting rebellion, then "moral hazard" cannot so easily be held accountable (if at all) (Grigorian, 2005, p. 195; Rauchhaus, 2005, pp. 217–221). In this vein, I depart from drawing parallels with economics, as *perverse effects* are not always perverse. Theory of moral hazard should thus avoid the discussion on intentions, interests and anticipation of the interveners. It is adequate to focus only on the *perverse effect* of respecting civilian immunity in wars. This is an important and necessary departure from what theorists of "moral hazard" have been advocating thus far.

The claim here is not that the "moral hazard" makes wars either less or more bloody, but rather that it can affect the strategy of belligerents, including that of governments—something that recent studies have increasingly showing to be the weakness of previous theories on humanitarian intervention (Kydd and Straus, 2013, p. 674). Belligerents may be motivated by greed and grievance, but motivation is not enough to win a war. Therefore international intervention offers a strategic opportunity, or in the case of various actors, a strategic necessity to commit violent acts against their own civilians. Whether such a strategy leads to less blood or more bloody outcomes is difficult to account for without proper counterfactual analysis. The important take from the analysis presented in this chapter is that the concept of "moral hazard" explains an important part of a puzzle, without which we might still be *puzzled* by certain events. It may be a small, but important component, of how and why violence is used in insurgencies and civil wars. There are many variables to account for, and no study thus far has successfully grappled with the complexity of the situation.

CONCLUSION

"Moral hazard" is not just about R2P, genocidal violence, or perverse incentives, nor can it be measured simply as the quantity of (new) rebellions, length of a given conflict, or a number of (new) interventions. Further, it cannot be a sole variable used to explain the relationship between violence and international intervention. Because of this, it is correct to point out that victimization of civilians is a very complex phenomenon involving many variables. After all, Kuperman (2008b) stated that "by no means is all genocidal violence caused by the prospect of humanitarian intervention" (p. 54). For this reason, we face a serious need to revise the theory of moral hazard but not to eliminate it. The purpose of this chapter has therefore been to show that the concept of "moral hazard," with some modification, plays a key role in being one of the factors that can potentially influence the strategy of one of the warring parties in a given conflict or war. This does not mean that warring parties will necessarily use this strategy, or that they will succeed, but rather that promises of international intervention may provide them with incentive to do so.

The evidence established here demonstrates the very real possibility that warring parties in a conflict have utilized logic of "moral hazard" to their advantage, whether they are aware of the existence of such a concept or not. Two cases were analyzed since the evidence from them has been a subject of recent critique of "moral hazard." In the first case, Bosnian-Muslims probably massacred Bosian-Muslims in Markale and exposed civilians in Srebrenica to Serbian slaughter by deliberate provocation with the hope of draw NATO (with its abundance of sophisticated weaponry) into the conflict, especially since the international community had already begun and continued punishing Serbians. In the second case, Kosovar-Albanians followed a similar approach with key massacres such as Račak. Interestingly, recent evidence from the massacre of the six Serbian teenagers in Peć indicates that civilians can be victimized also to change international perception, and possibly reduce the likelihood of intervention—something that has not been discussed before. The most important conclusion to draw from this is that international intervention, or the promise of it, can make the victimization of civilians strategically useful,

especially since the welfare of nonparticipants of conflict and ware have increasingly become the focus of international humanitarian law (IHL), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations, (IOs), and states.

The effectiveness of civilian victimization, and the role it plays in the outcome of conflicts, is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, future studies should focus on measuring the effectiveness of civilian victimization, introducing control variables, introducing the possibility of conjectural and combinational variables, and abandoning concepts such as R2P and genocidal violence, in order to introduce other (even conceptual) forms of international intervention, as well as other forms of violence that do not reach levels approximating genocide. This chapter has highlighted, in particular, that "moral hazard" is much more effective in explaining certain instances of events within and pertaining to civil wars and insurgencies, rather than explaining overall causes of conflict and war, and their outcomes.

This chapter has had to tread carefully when presenting evidence that "moral hazard" is indeed a serious phenomenon with which to contend. Significant public relations and propaganda campaigns to such a degree have tainted the wars of former Yugoslavia that even scholarship has been influenced by strong biases. Nonetheless, this analysis leaves no side *clean*. Nor does this analysis exculpate the perpetrators of *retaliation* from ultimate responsibility for their criminal acts. It is simply that we will not be able to escape in the future the perverse effect that the more civilians are safeguarded by the international community, the greater the reasons to showcase the immoral actions of the opponent. When *morality* becomes a part of security interests of an organization such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), there becomes an even bigger reason to label one's opponent as immoral (Cornish, 2001, p. 110). However immoral it may be, the victimization of civilians is no longer an unfortunate effect of wars, but can also form part of a central and indeed deliberate strategy. Understanding the weaknesses of the many policies created that are being created and implemented becomes absolutely critical. In doing so, it is possible to ensuring critical feedback that would be in the interest of policy makers, academics, and the international community as a whole. Simply put, we need to generate prescriptions so that third parties do not make matters worse for those who are *not* responsible (Rauchhaus, 2005, p. 215).

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INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN MODERN WAR

A collection of original works covering all aspects of insurgency and counterinsurgency through a multinational lens, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Modern War* addresses the need to look beyond the United States and other prominent counterinsurgency actors in the contemporary world. It also reassesses some of the latent and burgeoning insurgent organizations and networks around the globe and suggests alternative approaches to understanding insurgency, counterinsurgency, and conventional and asymmetric warfare as they relate to insurgency and counterinsurgency.

This book makes significant contributions to international and interdisciplinary discussions regarding the seminal features of insurgency and counterinsurgency in modern warfare. It also relates topics with terrorism in the post-9/11 era, including the historical roots of insurgency, radicalism in Europe, and regional radical groups like al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba. It emphasizes how issues around insurgency, counterinsurgency, and terrorism permeate or evolve into particular forms of warfare, military operations, and related governmental activities.

Using a diversified lens of analysis, the chapters illustrate key elements that spawn insurgency such as insurgents' beliefs, motivations, aims, leadership characteristics, recruitment methods, operations planning, and responses to state and non-state efforts to contain insurgency. The book also examines how certain terrorist and insurgent operations can remain in the shadows and become secret wars beneath the growing surface threats they pose to the societies in which they breed activity.

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Modern War takes a unique look at a subject that has become widely studied and written about in reaction to modern terrorism and insurgency. It analyzes conditions under which insurgency and counterinsurgency occur from nuanced perspectives that have not previously received full consideration.